PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

1. TENCHAVEZ VS. ESCANO DOCTRINE

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 124862, December 22, 1998 ]
FE D. QUITA, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF
APPEALS AND BLANDINA DANDAN,*
RESPONDENTS.

hearing on 23 October 1987, private respondent as

well as the six (6) Padlan children and Ruperto
failed to appear despite due notice. On the same
day, the trial court required the submission of the
records of birth of the Padlan children within ten
(10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or
without the documents, the issue on the declaration
of heirs would be considered submitted for
resolution. The prescribed period lapsed without the
required documents being submitted.

DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J .:

FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos,

were married in the Philippines on 18 May 1941.
They were not however blessed with children.
Somewhere along the way their relationship soured.
Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San
Francisco, California, U.S.A. She submitted in the
divorce proceedings a private writing dated 19 July
1950 evidencing their agreement to live separately
from each other and a settlement of their conjugal
properties. On 23 July 1954 she obtained a final
judgment of divorce. Three (3) weeks thereafter she
married a certain Felix Tupaz in the same locality
but their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in
the U.S.A., she married for the third time, to a
certain Wernimont.
On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31
August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance
of letters of administration concerning the estate of
Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company.
Respondent Blandina Dandan (also referred to as
Blandina Padlan), claiming to be the surviving
spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo,
Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, all surnamed
Padlan, named in the petition as surviving children
of Arturo Padlan, opposed the petition and prayed
for the appointment instead of Atty. Leonardo
Cabasal, which was resolved in favor of the latter.
Upon motion of the oppositors themselves, Atty.
Cabasal was later replaced by Higino Castillon. On
30 April 1973 the oppositors (Blandina and the
Padlan children) submitted certified photocopies of
the 19 July 1950 private writing and the final
judgment of divorce between petitioner and Arturo.
Later Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to be the sole
surviving brother of the deceased Arturo,
intervened.
On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the
immediate declaration of heirs of the decedent and
the distribution of his estate. At the scheduled

The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escao[1]

which held that "a foreign divorce between Filipino
citizens sought and decreed after the effectivity of
the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386) was not
entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction,"[2]
disregarded the divorce between petitioner and
Arturo. Consequently, it expressed the view that
their marriage subsisted until the death of Arturo in
1972. Neither did it consider valid their extrajudicial
settlement of conjugal properties due to lack of
judicial approval.[3] On the other hand, it opined
that there was no showing that marriage existed
between private respondent and Arturo, much less
was it shown that the alleged Padlan children had
been acknowledged by the deceased as his
children with her. As regards Ruperto, it found that
he was a brother of Arturo. On 27 November
1987[4] only petitioner and Ruperto were declared
the intestate heirs of Arturo. Accordingly, equal
adjudication of the net hereditary estate was
ordered in favor of the two intestate heirs.[5]
On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the
Padlan children were allowed to present proofs that
the recognition of the children by the deceased as
his legitimate children, except Alexis who was
recognized as his illegitimate child, had been made
in their respective records of birth. Thus on 15
February 1988[6] partial reconsideration was
granted declaring the Padlan children, with the
exception of Alexis, entitled to one-half of the estate
to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and petitioner to
the other half.[7] Private respondent was not
declared an heir. Although it was stated in the
aforementioned records of birth that she and Arturo
were married on 22 April 1947, their marriage was
clearly void since it was celebrated during the
existence of his previous marriage to petitioner.
In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, Blandina
and her children assigned as one of the errors
allegedly committed by the trial court the
circumstance that the case was decided without a
hearing, in violation of Sec. 1, Rule 90, of the Rules
of Court, which provides that if there is a
controversy before the court as to who are the

lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the

distributive shares to which each person is entitled
under the law, the controversy shall be heard and
decided as in ordinary cases.
Respondent appellate court found this ground alone
sufficient to sustain the appeal; hence, on 11
September 1995 it declared null and void the 27
November 1987 decision and 15 February 1988
order of the trial court, and directed the remand of
the case to the trial court for further proceedings.[8]
On 18 April 1996 it denied reconsideration.[9]
Should this case be remanded to the lower court for
further proceedings? Petitioner insists that there is
no need because, first, no legal or factual issue
obtains for resolution either as to the heirship of the
Padlan children or as to their respective shares in
the intestate estate of the decedent; and, second,
the issue as to who between petitioner and private
respondent is the proper heir of the decedent is one
of law which can be resolved in the present petition
based on established facts and admissions of the
parties.
We cannot sustain petitioner. The provision relied
upon by respondent court is clear: If there is a
controversy before the court as to who are the
lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
distributive shares to which each person is entitled
under the law, the controversy shall be heard and
decided as in ordinary cases.
We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists
either as to the right of the six (6) Padlan children to
inherit from the decedent because there are proofs
that they have been duly acknowledged by him and
petitioner herself even recognizes them as heirs of
Arturo Padlan;[10] nor as to their respective
hereditary shares. But controversy remains as to
who is the legitimate surviving spouse of Arturo.
The trial court, after the parties other than petitioner
failed to appear during the scheduled hearing on 23
October 1987 of the motion for immediate
declaration of heirs and distribution of estate, simply
issued an order requiring the submission of the
records of birth of the Padlan children within ten
(10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or
without the documents, the issue on declaration of
heirs would be deemed submitted for resolution.
We note that in her comment to petitioner's motion
private respondent raised, among others, the issue
as to whether petitioner was still entitled to inherit
from the decedent considering that she had secured
a divorce in the U.S.A. and in fact had twice
remarried. She also invoked the above quoted

procedural rule.[11] To this, petitioner replied that

Arturo was a Filipino and as such remained legally
married to her in spite of the divorce they
obtained.[12] Reading between the lines, the
implication is that petitioner was no longer a Filipino
citizen at the time of her divorce from Arturo. This
should have prompted the trial court to conduct a
hearing to establish her citizenship. The purpose of
a hearing is to ascertain the truth of the matters in
issue with the aid of documentary and testimonial
evidence as well as the arguments of the parties
either supporting or opposing the evidence. Instead,
the lower court perfunctorily settled her claim in her
favor by merely applying the ruling in Tenchavez v.
Escao.
Then in private respondent's motion to set aside
and/or reconsider the lower court's decision she
stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was
relevant in the light of the ruling in Van Dorn v.
Romillo Jr.[13] that aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national
law. She prayed therefore that the case be set for
hearing.[14] Petitioner opposed the motion but
failed to squarely address the issue on her
citizenship.[15] The trial court did not grant private
respondent's prayer for a hearing but proceeded to
resolve her motion with the finding that both
petitioner and Arturo were "Filipino citizens and
were married in the Philippines."[16] It maintained
that their divorce obtained in 1954 in San Francisco,
California, U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine
jurisdiction. We deduce that the finding on their
citizenship pertained solely to the time of their
marriage as the trial court was not supplied with a
basis to determine petitioner's citizenship at the time
of their divorce. The doubt persisted as to whether
she was still a Filipino citizen when their divorce
was decreed. The trial court must have overlooked
the materiality of this aspect. Once proved that she
was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their
divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and
petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit
from Arturo.
Respondent again raised in her appeal the issue on
petitioner's citizenship;[17] it did not merit
enlightenment however from petitioner.[18] In the
present proceeding, petitioner's citizenship is
brought anew to the fore by private respondent. She
even furnishes the Court with the transcript of
stenographic notes taken on 5 May 1995 during the
hearing for the reconstitution of the original of a
certain transfer certificate title as well as the
issuance of new owner's duplicate copy thereof
before another trial court. When asked whether she

was an American citizen petitioner answered that

she was since 1954.[19] Significantly, the decree of
divorce of petitioner and Arturo was obtained in the
same year. Petitioner however did not bother to file
a reply memorandum to erase the uncertainty about
her citizenship at the time of their divorce, a factual
issue requiring hearings to be conducted by the trial
court. Consequently, respondent appellate court did
not err in ordering the case returned to the trial court
for further proceedings.
We emphasize however that the question to be
determined by the trial court should be limited only
to the right of petitioner to inherit from Arturo as his
surviving spouse. Private respondent's claim to
heirship was already resolved by the trial court. She
and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while the
prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo was
subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage
considered void from the beginning under Arts. 80
and 83 of the Civil Code. Consequently, she is not a
surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this
status presupposes a legitimate relationship.[20]
As regards the motion of private respondent for
petitioner and her counsel to be declared in
contempt of court and that the present petition be
dismissed for forum shopping,[21] the same lacks
merit. For forum shopping to exist the actions must
involve the same transactions and same essential
facts and circumstances. There must also be
identical causes of action, subject matter and
issue.[22] The present petition deals with
declaration of heirship while the subsequent
petitions filed before the three (3) trial courts
concern the issuance of new owner's duplicate
copies of titles of certain properties belonging to the
estate of Arturo. Obviously, there is no reason to
declare the existence of forum shopping.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
decision of respondent Court of Appeals ordering
the remand of the case to the court of origin for
further proceedings and declaring null and void its
decision holding petitioner Fe D. Quita and Ruperto
T. Padlan as intestate heirs is AFFIRMED. The
order of the appellate court modifying its previous
decision by granting one-half (1/2) of the net
hereditary estate to the Padlan children, namely,
Claro, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda,
with the exception of Alexis, all surnamed Padlan,
instead of Arturo's brother Ruperto Padlan, is
likewise
AFFIRMED.
The
Court
however
emphasizes that the reception of evidence by the
trial court should be limited to the hereditary rights
of petitioner as the surviving spouse of Arturo
Padlan.

The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in

contempt of court and to dismiss the present
petition for forum shopping is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Mendoza, and Martinez, JJ., concur.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------* The name of private respondent Blandina Dandan

appears as Blandina Padlan in the proceedings
before the lower courts.
[1] No. L-19671, 29 November 1965, 15 SCRA 355.
[2] Id., p. 367.
[3] Then Art. 190 of the Civil Code provided that in
the absence of an express declaration in the
marriage settlement, the separation of property
between spouses during the marriage shall not take
place save in virtue of a judicial order. Quite in
relation thereto, then Art. 191, par. 4 of the same
Code provided that the husband and the wife may
agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership during the marriage, subject to judicial
approval.
[4] Decision penned by Judge Tomas V. Tadeo Jr.
of RTC-Br. 105, Quezon City; Appendix "A" of Brief
for the Oppositors-Appellants; CA Rollo, p. 15.
[5] Article 1001 of the Civil Code provides that
should brothers and sisters or their children survive
with the widow or widower, the latter shall be
entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the
brothers and sisters or their children to the other
half.

[6] Appendix "B" of Brief for the OppositorsAppellants; See Note 4.

[7] Article 998 of the Civil Code provides that if a
widow or widower survives with illegitimate children,
such widow or widower shall be entitled to one-half
of the inheritance, and the illegitimate children or
their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate,
to the other half.
[8] Decision penned by Justice Pacita CaizaresNye with the concurrence of Justices Romeo J.
Callejo Jr. and Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis; Rollo, p.
39.

N. Llorente (hereinafter referred to as "Lorenzo")

may have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years
that they lived together as husband and wife.

[9] Id., p. 42.

[10] Id., p. 180.
[11] Rollo, p. 196.

The Facts

[12] CA Rollo, p. 29.

[13] G. R. No. 68470, 8 October 1985, 139 SCRA
139.
[14] CA Rollo, p. 30.
[15] Record on Appeal, pp. 24-26.

The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted

serviceman of the United States Navy from March
10, 1927 to September 30, 1957.[3]
On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula
Llorente (hereinafter referred to as "Paula") were
married before a parish priest, Roman Catholic
Church, in Nabua, Camarines Sur.[4]

[16] Rollo, p. 206.

[17] Brief of Oppositors-Appellants, p. 13; CA Rollo,
p. 15.

Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo

departed for the United States and Paula stayed in
the conjugal home in barrio Antipolo, Nabua,
Camarines Sur.[5]

[18] Brief of Appellee; Id., p. 17.

[19] Rollo, pp. 225-226.
[20] Arturo M. Tolentino, Commentaries and
Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines,
1979 Ed., Vol. III, p. 264.
[21] Rollo, pp. 129-132.
[22] Professional Regulation Commission v. Court
of Appeals, G. R. No. 117817, 9 July 1998.

FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 124371, November 23, 2000 ]
PAULA T. LLORENTE, PETITIONER, VS. COURT
OF APPEALS AND ALICIA F. LLORENTE,
RESPONDENTS.

On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to

United States citizenship and Certificate of
Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued in his favor
by the United States District Court, Southern District
of New York.[6]
Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the
American Forces in 1945, Lorenzo was granted an
accrued leave by the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife
and he visited the Philippines.[7] He discovered that
his wife Paula was pregnant and was "living in" and
having an adulterous relationship with his brother,
Ceferino Llorente.[8]
On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy
registered in the Office of the Registrar of Nabua as
"Crisologo Llorente," with the certificate stating that
the child was not legitimate and the line for the
father's name was left blank.[9]

DECISION
PARDO, J.:

The Case

The case raises a conflict of laws issue.

What is before us is an appeal from the decision of
the Court of Appeals[1] modifying that of the
Regional Trial Court, Camarines Sur, Branch 35,
Iriga City[2] declaring respondent Alicia F. Llorente
(herinafter referred to as "Alicia"), as co-owners of
whatever property she and the deceased Lorenzo

Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her.

In fact, on February 2, 1946, the couple drew a
written agreement to the effect that (1) all the family
allowances allotted by the United States Navy as
part of Lorenzo's salary and all other obligations for
Paula's daily maintenance and support would be
suspended; (2) they would dissolve their marital
union in accordance with judicial proceedings; (3)
they would make a separate agreement regarding
their conjugal property acquired during their marital
life; and (4) Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for
her adulterous act since she voluntarily admitted her
fault and agreed to separate from Lorenzo
peacefully. The agreement was signed by both
Lorenzo and Paula and was witnessed by Paula's

father and stepmother.

The agreement was
notarized by Notary Public Pedro Osabel.[10]
Lorenzo returned to the United States and on
November 16, 1951 filed for divorce with the
Superior Court of the State of California in and for
the County of San Diego. Paula was represented
by counsel, John Riley, and actively participated in
the proceedings. On November 27, 1951, the
Superior Court of the State of California, for the
County of San Diego found all factual allegations to
be true and issued an interlocutory judgment of
divorce.[11]
On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became
final.[12]
In the meantime,
Philippines.

Lorenzo

returned

to

the

On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F.

Llorente in Manila.[13] Apparently, Alicia had no
knowledge of the first marriage even if they resided
in the same town as Paula, who did not oppose the
marriage or cohabitation.[14]
From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived
together as husband and wife.[15] Their twenty-five
(25) year union produced three children, Raul, Luz
and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente.[16]
On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will
and Testament. The will was notarized by Notary
Public Salvador M. Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo
with attesting witnesses Francisco Hugo, Francisco
Neibres and Tito Trajano. In the will, Lorenzo
bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three
children, to wit:

"(1) I give and bequeath to my wife ALICIA R.

FORTUNO exclusively my residential house and lot,
located at San Francisco, Nabua, Camarines Sur,
Philippines, including ALL the personal properties
and other movables or belongings that may be
found or existing therein;
"(2) I give and bequeath exclusively to my wife
Alicia R. Fortuno and to my children, Raul F.
Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in
equal shares, all my real properties whatsoever and
wheresoever located, specifically my real properties
located at Barangay Aro-Aldao, Nabua, Camarines
Sur; Barangay Paloyon, Nabua, Camarines Sur;
Barangay Baras, Sitio Puga, Nabua, Camarines
Sur; and Barangay Paloyon, Sitio Nalilidong,
Nabua, Camarines Sur;

"(3) I likewise give and bequeath exclusively unto

my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and unto my children,
Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F.
Llorente, in equal shares, my real properties located
in Quezon City Philippines, and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 188652; and my lands in
Antipolo, Rizal, Philippines, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title Nos. 124196 and 165188, both of
the Registry of Deeds of the province of Rizal,
Philippines;
"(4) That their respective shares in the abovementioned properties, whether real or personal
properties, shall not be disposed of, ceded, sold and
conveyed to any other persons, but could only be
sold, ceded, conveyed and disposed of by and
among themselves;
"(5) I designate my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO to be
the sole executor of this my Last Will and
Testament, and in her default or incapacity of the
latter to act, any of my children in the order of age, if
of age;
"(6) I hereby direct that the executor named herein
or her lawful substitute should served (sic) without
bond;
"(7) I hereby revoke any and all my other wills,
codicils, or testamentary dispositions heretofore
executed, signed, or published, by me;
"(8) It is my final wish and desire that if I die, no
relatives of mine in any degree in the Llorente's
Side should ever bother and disturb in any manner
whatsoever my wife Alicia R. Fortunato and my
children with respect to any real or personal
properties I gave and bequeathed respectively to
each one of them by virtue of this Last Will and
Testament."[17]
On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Iriga, Camarines Sur, a
petition for the probate and allowance of his last will
and testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia
be appointed Special Administratrix of his
estate.[18]
On January 18, 1984, the trial court denied the
motion for the reason that the testator Lorenzo was
still alive.[19]
On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly
executed, the trial court admitted the will to
probate.[20]

On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could be

terminated, Lorenzo died.[21]
On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same
court a petition[22] for letters of administration over
Lorenzo's estate in her favor. Paula contended (1)
that she was Lorenzo's surviving spouse, (2) that
the various property were acquired during their
marriage, (3) that Lorenzo's will disposed of all his
property in favor of Alicia and her children,
encroaching on her legitime and 1/2 share in the
conjugal property.[23]
On December 13, 1985, Alicia filed in the testate
proceeding (Sp. Proc. No. IR-755), a petition for the
issuance of letters testamentary.[24]
On October 14, 1985, without terminating the
testate proceedings, the trial court gave due course
to Paula's petition in Sp. Proc. No. IR-888.[25]
On November 6, 13 and 20, 1985, the order was
published in the newspaper "Bicol Star".[26]
On May 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court issued a
joint decision, thus:

"Wherefore, considering that this court has so found

that the divorce decree granted to the late Lorenzo
Llorente is void and inapplicable in the Philippines,
therefore the marriage he contracted with Alicia
Fortunato on January 16, 1958 at Manila is likewise
void. This being so the petition of Alicia F. Llorente
for the issuance of letters testamentary is denied.
Likewise, she is not entitled to receive any share
from the estate even if the will especially said so her
relationship with Lorenzo having gained the status
of paramour which is under Art. 739 (1).
"On the other hand, the court finds the petition of
Paula Titular Llorente, meritorious, and so declares
the intrinsic disposition of the will of Lorenzo
Llorente dated March 13, 1981 as void and declares
her entitled as conjugal partner and entitled to onehalf of their conjugal properties, and as primary
compulsory heir, Paula T. Llorente is also entitled to
one-third of the estate and then one-third should go
to the illegitimate children, Raul, Luz and Beverly,
all surname (sic) Llorente, for them to partition in
equal shares and also entitled to the remaining free
portion in equal shares.
"Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal
administrator of the estate of the deceased, Lorenzo
Llorente. As such let the corresponding letters of
administration issue in her favor upon her filing a

bond in the amount (sic) of P100,000.00

conditioned for her to make a return to the court
within three (3) months a true and complete
inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, and credits,
and estate which shall at any time come to her
possession or to the possession of any other person
for her, and from the proceeds to pay and discharge
all debts, legacies and charges on the same, or
such dividends thereon as shall be decreed or
required by this court; to render a true and just
account of her administration to the court within one
(1) year, and at any other time when required by the
court and to perform all orders of this court by her to
be performed.
"On the other matters prayed for in respective
petitions for want of evidence could not be granted.
"SO ORDERED."[27]
In time, Alicia filed with the trial court a motion for
reconsideration of the aforequoted decision.[28]
On September 14, 1987, the trial court denied
Alicia's motion for reconsideration but modified its
earlier decision, stating that Raul and Luz Llorente
are not children "legitimate or otherwise" of Lorenzo
since they were not legally adopted by him.[29]
Amending its decision of May 18, 1987, the trial
court declared Beverly Llorente as the only
illegitimate child of Lorenzo, entitling her to one-third
(1/3) of the estate and one-third (1/3) of the free
portion of the estate.[30]
On September 28, 1987, respondent appealed to
the Court of Appeals.[31]
On July 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated
its decision, affirming with modification the decision
of the trial court in this wise:

"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is

hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
Alicia is declared as co-owner of whatever
properties she and the deceased may have
acquired during the twenty-five (25) years of
cohabitation.
"SO ORDERED."[32]
On August 25, 1995, petitioner filed with the Court
of Appeals a motion for reconsideration of the
decision.[33]
On March 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals,[34]
denied the motion for lack of merit.

Hence, this petition.[35]

The Issue

Stripping the petition of its legalese and sorting

through the various arguments raised,[36] the issue
is simple. Who are entitled to inherit from the late
Lorenzo N. Llorente?
We do not agree with the decision of the Court of
Appeals. We remand the case to the trial court for
ruling on the intrinsic validity of the will of the
deceased.

The Applicable Law

The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became

an American citizen long before and at the time of:
(1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3)
execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly
established, admitted and undisputed.
Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents
are necessarily governed by foreign law.
The Civil Code clearly provides:

"Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or

to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines,
even though living abroad.
"Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property
is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.
"However, intestate and testamentary succession,
both with respect to the order of succession and to
the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may
be the nature of the property and regardless of the
country wherein said property may be found."
(emphasis ours)
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our
jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they
must be alleged and proved.[37]

While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded,

the Court of Appeals did not admit the foreign law.
The Court of Appeals and the trial court called to the
fore the renvoi doctrine, where the case was
"referred back" to the law of the decedent's
domicile, in this case, Philippine law.
We note that while the trial court stated that the law
of New York was not sufficiently proven, in the
same breath it made the categorical, albeit equally
unproven statement that "American law follows the
`domiciliary theory' hence, Philippine law applies
when determining the validity of Lorenzo's will.[38]
First, there is no such thing as one American law.
The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil
Code cannot possibly apply to general American
law. There is no such law governing the validity of
testamentary provisions in the United States. Each
State of the union has its own law applicable to its
citizens and in force only within the State. It can
therefore refer to no other than the law of the State
of which the decedent was a resident.[39] Second,
there is no showing that the application of the renvoi
doctrine is called for or required by New York State
law.
The trial court held that the will was intrinsically
invalid since it contained dispositions in favor of
Alice, who in the trial court's opinion was a mere
paramour. The trial court threw the will out, leaving
Alice, and her two children, Raul and Luz, with
nothing.
The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It
declared Alice entitled to one half (1/2) of whatever
property she and Lorenzo acquired during their
cohabitation, applying Article 144 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines.
The hasty application of Philippine law and the
complete disregard of the will, already probated as
duly executed in accordance with the formalities of
Philippine law, is fatal, especially in light of the
factual and legal circumstances here obtaining.

Validity of the Foreign Divorce

In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[40] we held that owing to

the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the
Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by
the policy against absolute divorces, the same
being considered contrary to our concept of public
policy and morality. In the same case, the Court
ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad,

provided they are valid according to their national

law.
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v.
Court of Appeals,[41] that once proven that
respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he
obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in
Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner
could "very well lose her right to inherit" from him.
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,[42] we recognized the
divorce obtained by the respondent in his country,
the Federal Republic of Germany. There, we stated
that divorce and its legal effects may be recognized
in the Philippines insofar as respondent is
concerned in view of the nationality principle in our
civil law on the status of persons.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of
the Court of Appeals must be reversed.[43] We hold
that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente
from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in
this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now, the
effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the
estate of the decedent) are matters best left to the
determination of the trial court.

Validity of the Will

The Civil Code provides:

"Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts,

wills, and other public instruments shall be
governed by the laws of the country in which they
are executed.

As a guide however, the trial court should note that

whatever public policy or good customs may be
involved in our system of legitimes, Congress did
not intend to extend the same to the succession of
foreign nationals. Congress specifically left the
amount of successional rights to the decedent's
national law.[45]
Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass
upon the other issues raised.

The Fallo

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The

decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No.
17446 promulgated on July 31, 1995 is SET ASIDE.
In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decision
of the Regional Trial Court and RECOGNIZES as
VALID the decree of divorce granted in favor of the
deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente by the Superior
Court of the State of California in and for the County
of San Diego, made final on December 4, 1952.
Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court
of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of
Lorenzo N. Llorente's will and determination of the
parties' successional rights allowing proof of foreign
law with instructions that the trial court shall proceed
with all deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of the
deceased within the framework of the Rules of
Court.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

"When the acts referred to are executed before the

diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the
Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities
established by Philippine laws shall be observed in
their execution." (underscoring ours)
The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property
to his second wife and children by her is glaringly
shown in the will he executed. We do not wish to
frustrate his wishes, since he was a foreigner, not
covered by our laws on "family rights and duties,
status, condition and legal capacity."[44]
Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall
inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved by
foreign law which must be pleaded and proved.
Whether the will was executed in accordance with
the formalities required is answered by referring to
Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and

Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------[1] In CA-G. R. SP. No. 17446, promulgated on July

31, 1995, Lipana-Reyes+, J., ponente, Torres, Jr.
and Hofilena, JJ., concurring.
[2] In Spec. Proc. No. IR-755 (In the Matter of the
Probate and Allowance of the Last Will and
Testament of Lorenzo N. Llorente, Lorenzo N.
Llorente, Petitioner) and Spec. Proc. No. IR-888
(Petition for the Grant of Letters of Administration
for the Estate of Lorenzo N. Llorente, Paula T.

Llorente, Petitioner), dated May 18, 1987, Judge

Esteban B. Abonal, presiding.
[3] Decision, Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 51.
[4] Exh. "B", Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, p. 61.

[27] RTC Decision, Rollo, p. 37.

[28] Order, Regional Trial Court in Spec. Proc. Nos.
IR-755 and 888, Rollo, p. 46.
[29] Citing Article 335 of the Civil Code, which
states, "The following cannot adopt: xxx

[5] Ibid.
[6] This was issued pursuant to Lorenzo's petition,
Petition No. 4708849, filed with the U.S. Court.
Exhs. "H" and "H-3" Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, p.
157, 159.

(3) a married person, without the consent of the

other spouse; xxx", the trial court reasoned that
since the divorce obtained by Lorenzo did not
dissolve his first marriage with Paula, then the
adoption of Raul and Luz was void, as Paula did not
give her consent to it.

[7] Decision, Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 51; Exh.

"B", Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, p. 61.

[30] Order, Regional Trial Court, Rollo, p. 47.

[8] Ibid.

[31] Docketed as CA-G. R. SP No. 17446.

[9] Exh. "A", Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, p. 60.

[32] Decision, Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 56.

[10] Exh. "B-1" Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, p. 62.

[33] On August 31, 1995, petitioner also filed with

this Court a verified complaint against the members
of the Special Thirteenth Division, Court of Appeals,
Associate Justices Justo P. Torres, Jr., Celia
Lipana-Reyes + and Hector Hofilena for "gross
ignorance of the law, manifest incompetence and
extreme bias (Rollo, p. 15)."

[11] Exh. "D", Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, pp. 6364.

[12] Exh. "E", Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, p. 69.
[13] Exh. "F", Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, p. 148.

[15] Comment, Rollo, p. 147.

[34] Again with Associate Justice Celia LipanaReyes+, ponente, concurred in by Associate
Justices Justo P. Torres, Jr. and Hector Hofilena
(Former Special Thirteenth Division).

[16] Decision, Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 52.

[35] Filed on May 10, 1996, Rollo, pp. 9-36.

[17] Exh. "A", Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, pp. 3-4;

Decision, Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 52.

[36] Petitioner alleges (1) That the Court of Appeals

lost its jurisdiction over the case when it issued the
resolution denying the motion for reconsideration;
(2) That Art. 144 of the Civil Case has been
repealed by Arts. 253 and 147 of the Family Code
and (3) That Alicia and her children not are entitled
to any share in the estate of the deceased (Rollo, p.
19).

[14] Decision, Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 52.

[18] Docketed as Spec. Proc. No. IR-755.

[19] Decision, RTC, Rollo, p. 37.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid.

[37] Collector of Internal Revenue v. Fisher, 110

Phil. 686 (1961).

[22] Docketed as Spec. Proc. No. IR-888.

[38] Joint Record on Appeal, p. 255; Rollo, p. 40.
[23] Decision, RTC, Rollo, p. 38.
[24] Decision, Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 52.

[39] In Re: Estate of Edward Christensen, Aznar v.

Helen Garcia, 117 Phil. 96 (1963).

[25] Ibid., pp. 52-53.

[40] 139 SCRA 139 (1985).

[26] Ibid., p. 53.

[41] 300 SCRA 406 (1998).

[42] 174 SCRA 653 (1989).

[43] The ruling in the case of Tenchavez v. Escano
(122 Phil. 752 [1965]) that provides that "a foreign
divorce between Filipino citizens sought and
decreed after the effectivity of the present civil code
is not entitled to recognition as valid in this
jurisdiction" is NOT applicable in the case at bar as
Lorenzo was no longer a Filipino citizen when he
obtained the divorce.
[44] Article 15, Civil Code provides "Laws relating to
family rights and duties, or to the status, condition
and legal capacity of persons are binding upon
citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad." (Underscoring ours)
[45] Bellis v. Bellis, 126 Phil. 726 (1967).

FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. NO. 162580, January 27, 2006 ]
ELMAR O. PEREZ, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF
APPEALS, FIFTH DIVISION, TRISTAN A.
CATINDIG AND LILY GOMEZ-CATINDIG,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule

65 of the Rules of Court assails the July 25, 2003
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 74456 which set aside and declared as null and
void the September 30, 2002 Order[2] of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 84,
granting petitioner's motion for leave to file
intervention and admitting the Complaint-inIntervention[3] in Civil Case No. Q-01-44847; and its
January 23, 2004 Resolution[4] denying the motion
for reconsideration.
Private respondent Tristan A. Catindig married Lily
Gomez Catindig[5] twice on May 16, 1968. The first
marriage ceremony was celebrated at the Central
Methodist Church at T.M. Kalaw Street, Ermita,
Manila while the second took place at the Lourdes
Catholic Church in La Loma, Quezon City. The
marriage produced four children.
Several years later, the couple encountered marital
problems that they decided to separate from each
other. Upon advice of a mutual friend, they decided
to obtain a divorce from the Dominican Republic.
Thus, on April 27, 1984, Tristan and Lily executed a

Special Power of Attorney addressed to the Judge

of the First Civil Court of San Cristobal, Dominican
Republic, appointing an attorney-in-fact to institute a
divorce action under its laws.[6]
Thereafter, on April 30, 1984, the private
respondents filed a joint petition for dissolution of
conjugal partnership with the Regional Trial Court of
Makati. On June 12, 1984, the civil court in the
Dominican Republic ratified the divorce by mutual
consent of Tristan and Lily. Subsequently, on June
23, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 133, ordered the complete separation of
properties between Tristan and Lily.
On July 14, 1984, Tristan married petitioner Elmar
O. Perez in the State of Virginia in the United
States[7] and both lived as husband and wife until
October 2001. Their union produced one
offspring.[8]
During their cohabitation, petitioner learned that the
divorce decree issued by the court in the Dominican
Republic which "dissolved" the marriage between
Tristan and Lily was not recognized in the
Philippines and that her marriage to Tristan was
deemed void under Philippine law. When she
confronted Tristan about this, the latter assured her
that he would legalize their union after he obtains an
annulment of his marriage with Lily. Tristan further
promised the petitioner that he would adopt their
son so that he would be entitled to an equal share in
his estate as that of each of his children with Lily.[9]
On August 13, 2001, Tristan filed a petition for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lily with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, docketed as
Case No. Q-01-44847.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to
File Intervention[10] claiming that she has a legal
interest in the matter in litigation because she
knows certain information which might aid the trial
court at a truthful, fair and just adjudication of the
annulment case, which the trial court granted on
September 30, 2002. Petitioner's complaint-inintervention was also ordered admitted.
Tristan filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with the Court of Appeals seeking to annul the order
dated September 30, 2002 of the trial court. The
Court of Appeals granted the petition and declared
as null and void the September 30, 2002 Order of
the trial court granting the motion for leave to file
intervention and admitting the complaint-inintervention.

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied,

hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition filed
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner
contends that the Court of Appeals gravely abused
its discretion in disregarding her legal interest in the
annulment case between Tristan and Lily.
The petition lacks merit.
Ordinarily, the proper recourse of an aggrieved
party from a decision of the Court of Appeals is a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. However, if the error subject of the
recourse is one of jurisdiction, or the act complained
of was granted by a court with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, as alleged in this case, the proper
remedy is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the said Rules.[11] This is based on the premise
that in issuing the assailed decision and resolution,
the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to excess of lack of
jurisdiction and there is no plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A
remedy is considered plain, speedy, and adequate if
it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the
injurious effect of the judgment and the acts of the
lower court.[12]
It is therefore incumbent upon the petitioner to
establish that the Court of Appeals acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction when it promulgated the assailed
decision and resolution.
We have previously ruled that grave abuse of
discretion may arise when a lower court or tribunal
violates or contravenes the Constitution, the law or
existing jurisprudence. By grave abuse of discretion
is meant, such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The
abuse of discretion must be grave as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility
and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in
contemplation of law.[13] The word "capricious,"
usually used in tandem with the term "arbitrary,"
conveys the notion of willful and unreasoning action.
Thus, when seeking the corrective hand of
certiorari, a clear showing of caprice and
arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion is
imperative.[14]
The Rules of Court laid down the parameters before
a person, not a party to a case can intervene, thus:

Who may intervene. A person who has a legal

interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success
of either of the parties, or an interest against both,
or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a
distribution or other disposition of property in the
custody of the court or of an officer thereof may,
with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the
action. The court shall consider whether or not the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and
whether or not the intervenor's rights may be fully
protected in a separate proceeding.[15]
The requirements for intervention are: [a] legal
interest in the matter in litigation; and [b]
consideration must be given as to whether the
adjudication of the original parties may be delayed
or prejudiced, or whether the intervenor's rights may
be protected in a separate proceeding or not.[16]
Legal interest, which entitles a person to intervene,
must be in the matter in litigation and of such direct
and immediate character that the intervenor will
either gain or lose by direct legal operation and
effect of the judgment.[17] Such interest must be
actual, direct and material, and not simply
contingent and expectant.[18]
Petitioner claims that her status as the wife and
companion of Tristan for 17 years vests her with the
requisite legal interest required of a would-be
intervenor under the Rules of Court.
Petitioner's claim lacks merit. Under the law,
petitioner was never the legal wife of Tristan, hence
her claim of legal interest has no basis.
When petitioner and Tristan married on July 14,
1984, Tristan was still lawfully married to Lily. The
divorce decree that Tristan and Lily obtained from
the Dominican Republic never dissolved the
marriage bond between them. It is basic that laws
relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding
upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad.[19] Regardless of where a citizen of the
Philippines might be, he or she will be governed by
Philippine laws with respect to his or her family
rights and duties, or to his or her status, condition
and legal capacity. Hence, if a Filipino regardless of
whether he or she was married here or abroad,
initiates a petition abroad to obtain an absolute
divorce from spouse and eventually becomes
successful in getting an absolute divorce decree,
the Philippines will not recognize such absolute
divorce.[20]

When Tristan and Lily married on May 18, 1968,

their marriage was governed by the provisions of
the Civil Code[21] which took effect on August 30,
1950. In the case of Tenchavez v. Escano[22] we
held:
(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens,
sought and decreed after the effectivity of the
present Civil Code (Rep. Act No. 386), is not
entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction;
and neither is the marriage contracted with another
party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the
foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity in the
country. (Emphasis added)
Thus, petitioner's claim that she is the wife of
Tristan even if their marriage was celebrated abroad
lacks merit. Thus, petitioner never acquired the
legal interest as a wife upon which her motion for
intervention is based.
Since petitioner's motion for leave to file intervention
was bereft of the indispensable requirement of legal
interest, the issuance by the trial court of the order
granting the same and admitting the complaint-inintervention was attended with grave abuse of
discretion. Consequently, the Court of Appeals
correctly set aside and declared as null and void the
said order.

[5] Referred as Lily Corazon Catindig in some parts

of the records.
[6] Rollo, p. 27.
[7] Id. at 34.
[8] Id. at 35.
[9] Id. at 28.
[10] Id. at 45-48.
[11] Delgado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137881,
December 21, 2004, 447 SCRA 402, 411.
[12] Tomas Claudio Memorial College, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 152568, February 16, 2004,
423 SCRA 122, 132.
[13] Banal III v. Panganiban, G.R. No. 167474,
November 15, 2005.
[14] Olanolan v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
165491, March 31, 2005, 454 SCRA 807, 814.
[15] RULES OF COURT, Rule 19, Sec. 1.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The

assailed Decision dated July 25, 2003 and
Resolution dated January 23, 2004 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74456 are AFFIRMED.

[16] Nordic Asia Limited v. Court of Appeals, G.R.

No. 111159, July 13, 2004, 434 SCRA 195, 198.

No pronouncement as to costs.

[18] Pagtalunan v. Tamayo, G.R. No. 54281, March

19, 1990, 183 SCRA 252, 257.

[17] Id. at 199.

SO ORDERED.
[19] CIVIL CODE, Art. 15.
Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario,
JJ., concur.
Panganiban, C.J., (Chairman), in the result.

[20] Sta. Maria, Persons and Family Relations,

Fourth Edition, p. 23.
[21] Republic Act No. 386 (1950).

------------------------------------------------------------------------------[1] Rollo, pp. 26-31. Penned by Associate Justice

Eugenio S. Labitoria and concurred in by Associate
Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Regalado E.
Maambong.

[22] 122 Phil. 752, 765 (1965).

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 168785, February 05, 2010 ]
HERALD BLACK DACASIN, PETITIONER, VS.
SHARON DEL MUNDO DACASIN, RESPONDENT.

[2] Id. at 74. Penned by Judge Mariflor P. Punzalan

Castillo.
[3] Id. at 49-58.
[4] Id. at 33.

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case

For review [1] is a dismissal [2] of a suit to enforce a

post-foreign divorce child custody agreement for
lack of jurisdiction.

The Facts

Petitioner Herald Dacasin (petitioner), American,

and respondent Sharon Del Mundo Dacasin
(respondent), Filipino, were married in Manila in
April 1994. They have one daughter, Stephanie,
born on 21 September 1995. In June 1999,
respondent sought and obtained from the Circuit
Court, 19th Judicial Circuit, Lake County, Illinois
(Illinois court) a divorce decree against petitioner.
[3] In its ruling, the Illinois court dissolved the
marriage of petitioner and respondent, awarded to
respondent sole custody of Stephanie and retained
jurisdiction over the case for enforcement purposes.
On 28 January 2002, petitioner and respondent
executed in Manila a contract (Agreement [4] ) for
the joint custody of Stephanie. The parties chose
Philippine courts as exclusive forum to adjudicate
disputes arising from the Agreement. Respondent
undertook to obtain from the Illinois court an order
"relinquishing" jurisdiction to Philippine courts.
In 2004, petitioner sued respondent in the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 60 (trial court) to
enforce the Agreement. Petitioner alleged that in
violation of the Agreement, respondent exercised
sole custody over Stephanie.
Respondent sought the dismissal of the complaint
for, among others, lack of jurisdiction because of the
Illinois court's retention of jurisdiction to enforce the
divorce decree.

contravening Article 2035, paragraph 5 of the Civil

Code [6] prohibiting compromise agreements on
jurisdiction. [7]
Petitioner sought reconsideration, raising the new
argument that the divorce decree obtained by
respondent is void. Thus, the divorce decree is no
bar to the trial court's exercise of jurisdiction over
the case.
In its Order dated 23 June 2005, the trial court
denied reconsideration, holding that unlike in the
case of respondent, the divorce decree is binding
on petitioner under the laws of his nationality.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner submits the following alternative theories
for the validity of the Agreement to justify its
enforcement by the trial court: (1) the Agreement
novated the valid divorce decree, modifying the
terms of child custody from sole (maternal) to joint;
[8] or (2) the Agreement is independent of the
divorce decree obtained by respondent.

The Issue

The question is whether the trial court has

jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioner's suit
and enforce the Agreement on the joint custody of
the parties' child.

The Ruling of the Court

The trial court has jurisdiction to entertain

petitioner's suit but not to enforce the Agreement
which is void. However, factual and equity
considerations militate against the dismissal of
petitioner's suit and call for the remand of the case
to settle the question of Stephanie's custody.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

In its Order dated 1 March 2005, the trial court

sustained respondent's motion and dismissed the
case for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court held that:
(1) it is precluded from taking cognizance over the
suit considering the Illinois court's retention of
jurisdiction to enforce its divorce decree, including
its order awarding sole custody of Stephanie to
respondent; (2) the divorce decree is binding on
petitioner following the "nationality rule" prevailing in
this jurisdiction; [5] and (3) the Agreement is void for

Regional Trial Courts Vested With Jurisdiction

to Enforce Contracts

Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law. At

the time petitioner filed his suit in the trial court,
statutory law vests on Regional Trial Courts
exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions
incapable of pecuniary estimation. [9] An action for
specific performance, such as petitioner's suit to
enforce the Agreement on joint child custody,

belongs to this species of actions. [10] Thus,

jurisdiction-wise, petitioner went to the right court.
Indeed, the trial court's refusal to entertain
petitioner's suit was grounded not on its lack of
power to do so but on its thinking that the Illinois
court's divorce decree stripped it of jurisdiction. This
conclusion is unfounded. What the Illinois court
retained was "jurisdiction x x x for the purpose of
enforcing all and sundry the various provisions of
[its] Judgment for Dissolution." [11] Petitioner's suit
seeks the enforcement not of the "various
provisions" of the divorce decree but of the postdivorce Agreement on joint child custody. Thus, the
action lies beyond the zone of the Illinois court's socalled "retained jurisdiction."

Petitioner's Suit Lacks Cause of Action

The foregoing notwithstanding, the trial court cannot

enforce the Agreement which is contrary to law.
In this jurisdiction, parties to a contract are free to
stipulate the terms of agreement subject to the
minimum ban on stipulations contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.
[12] Otherwise, the contract is denied legal
existence, deemed "inexistent and void from the
beginning." [13] For lack of relevant stipulation in
the Agreement, these and other ancillary Philippine
substantive law serve as default parameters to test
the validity of the Agreement's joint child custody
stipulations. [14]
At the time the parties executed the Agreement on
28 January 2002, two facts are undisputed: (1)
Stephanie was under seven years old (having been
born on 21 September 1995); and (2) petitioner and
respondent were no longer married under the laws
of the United States because of the divorce decree.
The relevant Philippine law on child custody for
spouses separated in fact or in law [15] (under the
second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family
Code) is also undisputed: "no child under seven
years of age shall be separated from the mother x x
x." [16] (This statutory awarding of sole parental
custody [17] to the mother is mandatory, [18]
grounded on sound policy consideration, [19]
subject only to a narrow exception not alleged to
obtain here. [20] ) Clearly then, the Agreement's
object to establish a post-divorce joint custody
regime between respondent and petitioner over
their child under seven years old contravenes
Philippine law.

The Agreement is not only void ab initio for being

contrary to law, it has also been repudiated by the
mother when she refused to allow joint custody by
the father. The Agreement would be valid if the
spouses have not divorced or separated because
the law provides for joint parental authority when
spouses live together. [21] However, upon
separation of the spouses, the mother takes sole
custody under the law if the child is below seven
years old and any agreement to the contrary is void.
Thus, the law suspends the joint custody regime for
(1) children under seven of (2) separated or
divorced spouses. Simply put, for a child within this
age bracket (and for commonsensical reasons), the
law decides for the separated or divorced parents
how best to take care of the child and that is to give
custody to the separated mother. Indeed, the
separated parents cannot contract away the
provision in the Family Code on the maternal
custody of children below seven years anymore
than they can privately agree that a mother who is
unemployed, immoral, habitually drunk, drug addict,
insane or afflicted with a communicable disease will
have sole custody of a child under seven as these
are reasons deemed compelling to preclude the
application of the exclusive maternal custody
regime under the second paragraph of Article 213.
[22]
It will not do to argue that the second paragraph of
Article 213 of the Family Code applies only to
judicial custodial agreements based on its text that
"No child under seven years of age shall be
separated from the mother, unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise." To limit this
provision's enforceability to court sanctioned
agreements while placing private agreements
beyond its reach is to sanction a double standard in
custody regulation of children under seven years old
of separated parents. This effectively empowers
separated parents, by the simple expedient of
avoiding the courts, to subvert a legislative policy
vesting to the separated mother sole custody of her
children under seven years of age "to avoid a
tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn
away from her." [23] This ignores the legislative
basis that "[n]o man can sound the deep sorrows of
a mother who is deprived of her child of tender age."
[24]
It could very well be that Article 213's bias favoring
one separated parent (mother) over the other
(father) encourages paternal neglect, presumes
incapacity for joint parental custody, robs the
parents of custodial options, or hijacks decisionmaking between the separated parents. [25]
However, these are objections which question the

law's wisdom not its validity or uniform

enforceability. The forum to air and remedy these
grievances is the legislature, not this Court. At any
rate, the rule's seeming harshness or undesirability
is tempered by ancillary agreements the separated
parents may wish to enter such as granting the
father visitation and other privileges. These
arrangements are not inconsistent with the regime
of sole maternal custody under the second
paragraph of Article 213 which merely grants to the
mother final authority on the care and custody of the
minor under seven years of age, in case of
disagreements.
Further, the imposed custodial regime under the
second paragraph of Article 213 is limited in
duration, lasting only until the child's seventh year.
From the eighth year until the child's emancipation,
the law gives the separated parents freedom,
subject to the usual contractual limitations, to agree
on custody regimes they see fit to adopt. Lastly,
even supposing that petitioner and respondent are
not barred from entering into the Agreement for the
joint custody of Stephanie, respondent repudiated
the Agreement by asserting sole custody over
Stephanie. Respondent's act effectively brought the
parties back to ambit of the default custodial regime
in the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family
Code vesting on respondent sole custody of
Stephanie.
Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree's
alleged invalidity - not because the Illinois court
lacked jurisdiction or that the divorce decree
violated Illinois law, but because the divorce was
obtained by his Filipino spouse [26] - to support the
Agreement's enforceability. The argument that
foreigners in this jurisdiction are not bound by
foreign divorce decrees is hardly novel. Van Dorn v.
Romillo [27] settled the matter by holding that an
alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce
decree obtained abroad. [28] There, we dismissed
the alien divorcee's Philippine suit for accounting of
alleged post-divorce conjugal property and rejected
his submission that the foreign divorce (obtained by
the Filipino spouse) is not valid in this jurisdiction in
this wise:

in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local

law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy
and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national
law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released
private respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which divorce
dissolves the marriage.
xxxx
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private
respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner.
He would have no standing to sue in the case below
as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control
over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the
Decision of his own country's Court, which validly
exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision
he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his
right over the alleged conjugal property. (Emphasis
supplied)

We reiterated Van Dorn in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera

[29] to dismiss criminal complaints for adultery filed
by the alien divorcee (who obtained the foreign
divorce decree) against his former Filipino spouse
because he no longer qualified as "offended
spouse" entitled to file the complaints under
Philippine procedural rules. Thus, it should be clear
by now that a foreign divorce decree carries as
much validity against the alien divorcee in this
jurisdiction as it does in the jurisdiction of the alien's
nationality, irrespective of who obtained the divorce.

The Facts of the Case and Nature of Proceeding

Justify Remand
There can be no question as to the validity of that
Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United
States. The decree is binding on private respondent
as an American citizen. For instance, private
respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband,
in any State of the Union. What he is contending in
this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding

Instead of ordering the dismissal of petitioner's suit,

the logical end to its lack of cause of action, we
remand the case for the trial court to settle the
question of Stephanie's custody. Stephanie is now
nearly 15 years old, thus removing the case outside
of the ambit of the mandatory maternal custody
regime under Article 213 and bringing it within
coverage of the default standard on child custody

proceedings - the best interest of the child. [30] As

the question of custody is already before the trial
court and the child's parents, by executing the
Agreement, initially showed inclination to share
custody, it is in the interest of swift and efficient
rendition of justice to allow the parties to take
advantage of the court's jurisdiction, submit
evidence on the custodial arrangement best serving
Stephanie's interest, and let the trial court render
judgment. This disposition is consistent with the
settled doctrine that in child custody proceedings,
equity may be invoked to serve the child's best
interest. [31]
WHEREFORE, we REVERSE the Orders dated 1
March 2005 and 23 June 2005 of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 60. The case is
REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with
this ruling.
SO ORDERED.
Brion, Del Castillo, and Perez, JJ., concur.
Abad, J., see separate opinion.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------[1] Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure.
[2] In the Orders dated 1 March 2005 and 23 June
2005 issued by the Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 60.

enforce the provisions of the said judgment which

necessarily included guidelines for the child's
custody.
[Petitioner] being admittedly an American, following
the nationality rule which Philippine civil laws
adhere to, the Judgment of the Illinois Court would
be binding upon him since the judicial disposition
refers to matters of status or legal capacity of a
person.
xxxx
Moreover, this Court cannot act upon [petitioner's]
prayer to enforce the terms of the said Compromise
Agreement the said agreement being invalid and
therefore, void, precisely because it seeks to
transfer jurisdiction over the issue of child custody
from the Illinois Court to this Court by agreement of
the parties, when the previous Court had already
effectively asserted its authority to act upon all
matters relating to the said issue.
In this regard, Art. 2035 of the Civil Code expressly
states that no compromise upon the questions of
civil status of persons, validity of marriage, or legal
separation, future support, jurisdiction of courts and
future legitimate shall be valid.
[8] As a corollary claim, petitioner submits that the
stipulation in the Agreement "vesting" exclusive
jurisdiction to Philippine courts over conflicts arising
from the Agreement, even if void for being contrary
to Article 2035, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code, is
severable from and does not affect the validity of
the other terms of the Agreement on joint custody.

[3] Petitioner did not contest the proceedings.

[4] Denominated "Compromise Agreement on Child
Custody and Support."
[5] Under Article 15 of the Civil Code which
provides: "Laws relating to family rights and duties,
or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines,
even though living abroad."
[6] This provides: "No compromise upon the
following questions shall be valid: x x x (5) The
jurisdiction of courts[.]"
[7] The trial court held (Records, pp. 157-158):
[H]aving expressly recognized the
Illinois Court's judgment [petitioner]
provisions including the provision
would maintain sole jurisdiction to

validity of the
is bound by its
that the Court
implement and

[9] Section 19, paragraph 1, Batas Pambansa Blg.

129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691,
provides: "Jurisdiction in civil cases.- Regional Trial
Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the
litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation; x x x
x"
[10] See Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership v.
Herrera, 205 Phil. 61 (1983).
[11] Records, p. 17 (emphasis supplied).
[12] Article 1306 of the Civil Code provides: "The
contracting parties may establish such stipulations,
clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem
convenient, provided they are not contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order, or public
policy."

[13] Article 1409, paragraph 1 of the Civil Code

provides: "The following contracts are inexistent and
void from the beginning: (1) Those whose cause,
object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy; x x x x"
[14] It can be inferred from the terms of the
Agreement that the parties intended to be bound by
Philippine law on its intrinsic validity (this is evident,
for instance, from the stipulation selecting Philippine
courts as exclusive forum to settle "any legal issue
or dispute that may arise from the provisions of [the]
Agreement and its interpretation x x x" (Records, p.
19; emphasis supplied). At any rate, Philippine law
has the most substantial connection to the contract,
considering its object (custody of a FilipinoAmerican child), subject (Filipino-American child
under seven years of age, born of a Filipino mother,
both of whom reside in the country) and parties
(Filipina mother and alien father).
[15] Including those marriages whose vinculum has
been severed (see Sempio-Dy, Handbook on the
Family Code of the Philippines 67-68 [1988]).
[16] The provision states: "In case of separation of
the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by
the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall
take into account all relevant considerations,
especially the choice of the child over seven years
of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.
No child under seven years of age shall be
separated from the mother, unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise." (Emphasis
supplied)
[17] Gamboa-Hirsch v. Court of Appeals (Res.),
G.R. No. 174485, 11 July 2007, 527 SCRA 320
(reversing the Court of Appeals' ruling mandating
joint custody and awarding sole custody to the
mother).
[18] Perez v. Court of Appeals, 325 Phil. 1014
(1996). For children over seven, custody decisions
are guided by the standard of "best interest of the
child."

Art. 363. In all questions on the care, custody,

education and property of children, the latter's
welfare shall be paramount. No mother shall be
separated from her child under seven years of age,
unless the court finds compelling reasons for such
measure.

The general rule that children under seven years of

age shall not be separated from their mother finds
its raison d'etre in the basic need of minor children
for their mother's loving care. In explaining the
rationale for Article 363 of the Civil Code, the Code
Commission stressed thus:

The general rule is recommended in order to avoid

a tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn
away from her. No man can sound the deep
sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of
tender age. The exception allowed by the rule has
to be for compelling reasons for the good of the
child: those cases must indeed be rare, if the
mother's heart is not to be unduly hurt. If she has
erred, as in cases of adultery, the penalty of
imprisonment and the (relative) divorce decree will
ordinarily be sufficient punishment for her.
Moreover, her moral dereliction will not have any
effect upon the baby who is as yet unable to
understand the situation. (Report of the Code
Commission, p. 12)
[20] Sole maternal custody is denied only for
"compelling
reasons"
such
as
"neglect,
abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual
drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the
child, insanity or affliction with a communicable
disease" (Id. at 476; internal citation omitted).
[21] Civil Code, Article 211, as amended.
[22] See note 20.
[23] See note 19.
[24] Id.

[19] Our discussion in Pablo-Gualberto v. Gualberto

V, G.R. No. 154994, 28 June 2005, 461 SCRA 450,
471-472, on the statutory genealogy and policy
grounding of the second paragraph of Article 213 is
enlightening:

[A]rticle 213 takes its bearing from Article 363 of the

Civil Code, which reads:

[25] This line of argument can be subsumed under

the rubric of "unfair state intervention" but this
complaint can very well be leveled against the entire
field of family law where the state injects itself on a
host of areas impinging on the decision-making
capacity and autonomy of individuals ranging from
the intensely personal (e.g. who can marry [Article
5, Family Code], where to marry [Article 5, Family

Code], who can celebrate the marriage [Article 5,

Family Code], and how to relate to one's spouse
[Articles 68-72]) to proprietary (e.g. Articles 74-125,
Family Code, on property relations of spouses and
Articles 194-208, Family Code, on support) to
familial (e.g. Articles 209-233, Family Code, on
parental authority).
[26] Petitioner hooks his argument on Gonzales v.
Gonzales (58 Phil. 67 [1933]), Arca v. Javier (95
Phil. 579 [1954]) and Tenchavez v. Escao (122
Phil. 752 [1965]). These cases, involving Filipino
spouses, merely applied the "nationality rule" (now
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code) to reject
validating foreign divorce decrees obtained by
Filipino spouses to circumvent the no-divorce rule in
this jurisdiction. They are no authority to support
petitioner's submission that as to aliens, foreign
divorce decrees are void here.
[27] 223 Phil. 357 (1985).
[28] Id. at 361-363.Van Dornspawned the second
paragraph of Article 26 granting to Filipino spouses
of aliens who obtain foreign divorce decrees the
right to remarry. (Republic v. Orbecido III, G.R. No.
154380, 5 October 2005, 472 SCRA 114).
[29] G.R. No. 80116, 30 June 1989, 174 SCRA 653.
[30] Bagtas v. Santos, G.R. No. 166682, 27
November 2009.
[31] Thus, in habeas corpus proceedings involving
child custody, judicial resolutions extend beyond the
custodial right of persons exercising parental
authority over the child and reach issues on
custodial arrangements serving the child's best
interest (see Bagtas v. Santos, id., remanding a
habeas corpus petition to determine the fitness of
the legal custodians notwithstanding that the
question of illegal withholding of custody has been
mooted by the transfer of the child's physical
custody to the habeas corpus petitioners).
2. REPUBLIC VS. IYOY DOCTRINE
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. NO. 152577, September 21, 2005 ]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER,
VS. CRASUS L. IYOY, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule

45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Republic of the
Philippines, represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General, prays for the reversal of the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
62539, dated 30 July 2001,[1] affirming the
Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu
City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077,
dated 30 October 1998,[2] declaring the marriage
between respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada
Rosal-Iyoy null and void on the basis of Article 36 of
the Family Code of the Philippines.
The proceedings before the RTC commenced with
the filing of a Complaint[3] for declaration of nullity
of marriage by respondent Crasus on 25 March
1997. According to the said Complaint, respondent
Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at
Bradford Memorial Church, Jones Avenue, Cebu
City. As a result of their union, they had five
children Crasus, Jr., Daphne, Debbie, Calvert,
and Carlos who are now all of legal ages. After
the celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus
discovered that Fely was "hot-tempered, a nagger
and extravagant." In 1984, Fely left the Philippines
for the United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all
of their five children, the youngest then being only
six years old, to the care of respondent Crasus.
Barely a year after Fely left for the U.S.A.,
respondent Crasus received a letter from her
requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce
papers; he disregarded the said request. Sometime
in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the
letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got
married to an American, with whom she eventually
had a child. In 1987, Fely came back to the
Philippines with her American family, staying at
Cebu Plaza Hotel in Cebu City.
Respondent
Crasus did not bother to talk to Fely because he
was afraid he might not be able to bear the sorrow
and the pain she had caused him. Fely returned to
the Philippines several times more: in 1990, for the
wedding of their eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in 1992,
for the brain operation of their fourth child, Calvert;
and in 1995, for unknown reasons. Fely continued
to live with her American family in New Jersey,
U.S.A. She had been openly using the surname of
her American husband in the Philippines and in the
U.S.A. For the wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself
had invitations made in which she was named as
"Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus." At the time the Complaint
was filed, it had been 13 years since Fely left and
abandoned respondent Crasus, and there was no
more possibility of reconciliation between them.
Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint
that Felys acts brought danger and dishonor to
the family, and clearly demonstrated her

psychological incapacity to perform the essential

obligations of marriage. Such incapacity, being
incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for
declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36, in
relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family
Code of the Philippines.
Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim[4] with the
RTC on 05 June 1997. She asserted therein that
she was already an American citizen since 1988
and was now married to Stephen Micklus. While
she admitted being previously married to
respondent Crasus and having five children with
him, Fely refuted the other allegations made by
respondent Crasus in his Complaint. She explained
that she was no more hot-tempered than any
normal person, and she may had been indignant at
respondent Crasus on certain occasions but it was
because of the latter's drunkenness, womanizing,
and lack of sincere effort to find employment and to
contribute to the maintenance of their household.
She could not have been extravagant since the
family hardly had enough money for basic needs.
Indeed, Fely left for abroad for financial reasons as
respondent Crasus had no job and what she was
then earning as the sole breadwinner in the
Philippines was insufficient to support their family.
Although she left all of her children with respondent
Crasus, she continued to provide financial support
to them, as well as, to respondent Crasus.
Subsequently, Fely was able to bring her children to
the U.S.A., except for one, Calvert, who had to stay
behind for medical reasons. While she did file for
divorce from respondent Crasus, she denied having
herself sent a letter to respondent Crasus
requesting him to sign the enclosed divorce papers.
After securing a divorce from respondent Crasus,
Fely married her American husband and acquired
American citizenship. She argued that her marriage
to her American husband was legal because now
being an American citizen, her status shall be
governed by the law of her present nationality. Fely
also pointed out that respondent Crasus himself
was presently living with another woman who bore
him a child. She also accused respondent Crasus
of misusing the amount of P90,000.00 which she
advanced to him to finance the brain operation of
their son, Calvert. On the basis of the foregoing,
Fely also prayed that the RTC declare her marriage
to respondent Crasus null and void; and that
respondent Crasus be ordered to pay to Fely the
P90,000.00 she advanced to him, with interest,
plus, moral and exemplary damages, attorney's
fees, and litigation expenses.
After respondent Crasus and Fely had filed their
respective Pre-Trial Briefs,[5] the RTC afforded both

parties the opportunity to present their evidence.

Petitioner Republic participated in the trial through
the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu.[6]
Respondent Crasus submitted the following pieces
of evidence in support of his Complaint: (1) his own
testimony on 08 September 1997, in which he
essentially reiterated the allegations in his
Complaint;[7] (2) the Certification, dated 13 April
1989, by the Health Department of Cebu City, on
the recording of the Marriage Contract between
respondent Crasus and Fely in the Register of
Deeds, such marriage celebration taking place on
16 December 1961;[8] and (3) the invitation to the
wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, wherein
Fely openly used her American husband's surname,
Micklus.[9]
Fely's counsel filed a Notice,[10] and, later on, a
Motion,[11] to take the deposition of witnesses,
namely, Fely and her children, Crasus, Jr. and
Daphne, upon written interrogatories, before the
consular officers of the Philippines in New York and
California, U.S.A, where the said witnesses reside.
Despite the Orders[12] and Commissions[13] issued
by the RTC to the Philippine Consuls of New York
and California, U.S.A., to take the depositions of the
witnesses upon written interrogatories, not a single
deposition was ever submitted to the RTC. Taking
into account that it had been over a year since
respondent Crasus had presented his evidence and
that Fely failed to exert effort to have the case
progress, the RTC issued an Order, dated 05
October 1998,[14] considering Fely to have waived
her right to present her evidence. The case was
thus deemed submitted for decision.
Not long after, on 30 October 1998, the RTC
promulgated its Judgment declaring the marriage of
respondent Crasus and Fely null and void ab initio,
on the basis of the following findings
The ground bearing defendant's psychological
incapacity deserves a reasonable consideration. As
observed, plaintiff's testimony is decidedly credible.
The Court finds that defendant had indeed exhibited
unmistakable signs of psychological incapacity to
comply with her marital duties such as striving for
family unity, observing fidelity, mutual love, respect,
help and support. From the evidence presented,
plaintiff adequately established that the defendant
practically abandoned him. She obtained a divorce
decree in the United States of America and married
another man and has establish [sic] another family
of her own. Plaintiff is in an anomalous situation,
wherein he is married to a wife who is already
married to another man in another country.

Defendant's intolerable traits may not have been

apparent or manifest before the marriage, the
FAMILY CODE nonetheless allows the annulment
of the marriage provided that these were eventually
manifested after the wedding. It appears to be the
case in this instance.
Certainly defendant's posture being an irresponsible
wife erringly reveals her very low regard for that
sacred and inviolable institution of marriage which is
the foundation of human society throughout the
civilized world. It is quite evident that the defendant
is bereft of the mind, will and heart to comply with
her marital obligations, such incapacity was already
there at the time of the marriage in question is
shown by defendant's own attitude towards her
marriage to plaintiff.
In sum, the ground invoked by plaintiff which is
defendant's psychological incapacity to comply with
the essential marital obligations which already
existed at the time of the marriage in question has
been satisfactorily proven. The evidence in herein
case establishes the irresponsibility of defendant
Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy, firmly.
Going over plaintiff's testimony which is decidedly
credible, the Court finds that the defendant had
indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of such
psychological incapacity to comply with her marital
obligations. These are her excessive disposition to
material things over and above the marital stability.
That such incapacity was already there at the time
of the marriage in question is shown by defendant's
own attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff. And
for these reasons there is a legal ground to declare
the marriage of plaintiff Crasus L. Iyoy and
defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy null and void ab
initio.[15]
Petitioner Republic, believing that the afore-quoted
Judgment of the RTC was contrary to law and
evidence, filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals.
The appellate court, though, in its Decision, dated
30 July 2001, affirmed the appealed Judgment of
the RTC, finding no reversible error therein. It even
offered additional ratiocination for declaring the
marriage between respondent Crasus and Fely null
and void, to wit
Defendant secured a divorce from plaintiff-appellee
abroad, has remarried, and is now permanently
residing in the United States. Plaintiff-appellee
categorically stated this as one of his reasons for
seeking the declaration of nullity of their marriage...
...

Article 26 of the Family Code provides:

"Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the
Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5)
and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
"WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO
CITIZEN AND A FOREIGNER IS VALIDLY
CELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE IS THEREAFTER
VALIDLY OBTAINED ABROAD BY THE ALIEN
SPOUSE CAPACITATING HIM OR HER TO
REMARRY, THE FILIPINO SPOUSE SHALL
LIKEWISE HAVE CAPACITY TO REMARRY
UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW."
The rationale behind the second paragraph of the
above-quoted provision is to avoid the absurd and
unjust situation of a Filipino citizen still being
married to his or her alien spouse, although the
latter is no longer married to the Filipino spouse
because he or she has obtained a divorce abroad.
In the case at bench, the defendant has
undoubtedly acquired her American husband's
citizenship and thus has become an alien as well.
This Court cannot see why the benefits of Art. 26
aforequoted can not be extended to a Filipino
citizen whose spouse eventually embraces another
citizenship and thus becomes herself an alien.
It would be the height of unfairness if, under these
circumstances, plaintiff would still be considered as
married to defendant, given her total incapacity to
honor her marital covenants to the former. To
condemn plaintiff to remain shackled in a marriage
that in truth and in fact does not exist and to remain
married to a spouse who is incapacitated to
discharge essential marital covenants, is verily to
condemn him to a perpetual disadvantage which
this Court finds abhorrent and will not countenance.
Justice dictates that plaintiff be given relief by
affirming the trial court's declaration of the nullity of
the marriage of the parties.[16]
After the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution, dated 08
March
2002,[17]
denied
its
Motion
for
Reconsideration, petitioner Republic filed the instant
Petition before this Court, based on the following
arguments/grounds
Abandonment by and sexual infidelity of
respondent's wife do not per se constitute
psychological incapacity.

The Court of Appeals has decided questions of

substance not in accord with law and jurisprudence
considering that the Court of Appeals committed
serious errors of law in ruling that Article 26,
paragraph 2 of the Family Code is inapplicable to
the case at bar.[18]
In his Comment[19] to the Petition, respondent
Crasus maintained that Fely's psychological
incapacity was clearly established after a full-blown
trial, and that paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code of the Philippines was indeed applicable to
the marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely,
because the latter had already become an
American citizen.
He further questioned the
personality of petitioner Republic, represented by
the Office of the Solicitor General, to institute the
instant Petition, because Article 48 of the Family
Code of the Philippines authorizes the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal assigned to the trial court, not the
Solicitor General, to intervene on behalf of the
State, in proceedings for annulment and declaration
of nullity of marriages.

assumed and discharged by the parties to the

marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of
the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to
live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. There is hardly any doubt
that the intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
psychological condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated...
The psychological incapacity must be characterized
by
(a) Gravity It must be grave or serious such that
the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in a marriage;
(b) Juridical Antecedence It must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only
after the marriage; and

After having reviewed the records of this case and

the applicable laws and jurisprudence, this Court
finds the instant Petition to be meritorious.

(c) Incurability It must be incurable or, even if it

were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved.[21]

More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and

application of Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines were handed down by this Court in
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,[22] which,
although quite lengthy, by its significance, deserves
to be reproduced below
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that
both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus,
our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the
Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the
nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable,"
thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of
the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
"protected" by the state.

The totality of evidence presented during trial is

insufficient to support the finding of psychological
incapacity of Fely.
Article 36, concededly one of the more controversial
provisions of the Family Code of the Philippines,
reads
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who,
at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even
if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
Issues most commonly arise as to what constitutes
psychological incapacity. In a series of cases, this
Court laid down guidelines for determining its
existence.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[20] the term
psychological incapacity was defined, thus
". . . [P]sychological incapacity" should refer to no
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly cognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on

marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity
must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.

Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the

incapacity must be psychological - not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may
be physical. The evidence must convince the court
that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person
could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given
valid assumption thereof. Although no example of
such incapacity need be given here so as not to
limit the application of the provision under the
principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root
cause must be identified as a psychological illness
and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists
and clinical psychologists.[23]
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at
"the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing
when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable
at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in
regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to
the assumption of marriage obligations, not
necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job...
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring
about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words,
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in
the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates
the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such noncomplied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in
the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate

Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should
be given great respect by our courts...
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear
as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The
Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under
Canon 1095.[24]
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,[25] further clarified
that
there
is
no
requirement
that
the
defendant/respondent spouse should be personally
examined by a physician or psychologist as a
condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity
of marriage based on psychological incapacity.
Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to allege
expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the
Family Code of the Philippines.[26] Such
psychological incapacity, however, must be
established by the totality of the evidence presented
during the trial.
Using the guidelines established by the aforementioned jurisprudence, this Court finds that the
totality of evidence presented by respondent Crasus
failed miserably to establish the alleged
psychological incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore,
there is no basis for declaring their marriage null
and void under Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines.
The only substantial evidence presented by
respondent Crasus before the RTC was his
testimony, which can be easily put into question for
being self-serving, in the absence of any other
corroborating evidence. He submitted only two
other pieces of evidence: (1) the Certification on the
recording with the Register of Deeds of the
Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and
Fely, such marriage being celebrated on 16
December 1961; and (2) the invitation to the
wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, in which
Fely used her American husband's surname. Even
considering the admissions made by Fely herself in
her Answer to respondent Crasus's Complaint filed

with the RTC, the evidence is not enough to

convince this Court that Fely had such a grave
mental illness that prevented her from assuming the
essential obligations of marriage.

II

It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the

Family Code of the Philippines contemplates
downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance
of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a
mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will,
on the part of the errant spouse.[27] Irreconcilable
differences, conflicting personalities, emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse,
habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion,
and abandonment, by themselves, also do not
warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under
the said Article.[28]

According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family

Code of the Philippines
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.

As has already been stressed by this Court in

previous cases, Article 36 "is not to be confused
with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the
time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It
refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a
party even before the celebration of marriage. It is
a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive
one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities
of the matrimonial bond one is about to
assume."[29]
Fely's hot-temper, nagging, and extravagance; her
abandonment of respondent Crasus; her marriage
to an American; and even her flaunting of her
American family and her American surname, may
have hurt and embarrassed respondent Crasus and
the rest of the family. Nonetheless, the aforedescribed characteristics, behavior, and acts of Fely
do not satisfactorily establish a psychological or
mental defect that is serious or grave, and which
has been existence at the time of celebration of the
marriage, and is incurable. Even when the rules
have been relaxed and the personal examination of
Fely by a psychiatrist or psychologist is no longer
mandatory for the declaration of nullity of their
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines,[30] the totality of evidence presented
during trial by respondent Crasus, as the spouse
seeking the declaration of nullity of marriage, must
still prove the gravity, judicial antecedence, and
incurability
of
the
alleged
psychological
incapacity;[31] which, it failed to do so herein.
Moreover, this Court resolves any doubt in favor of
the validity of the marriage.[32] No less than the
Constitution of 1987 sets the policy to protect and
strengthen the family as the basic social institution
and marriage as the foundation of the family.[33]

Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the

Philippines is not applicable to the case at bar.

As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a

special situation wherein one of the married couple
is a foreigner who divorces his or her Filipino
spouse. By its plain and literal interpretation, the
said provision cannot be applied to the case of
respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the
time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a
Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not
established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer
filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce
from respondent Crasus sometime after she left for
the United States in 1984, after which she married
her American husband in 1985. In the same
Answer, she alleged that she had been an
American citizen since 1988. At the time she filed
for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and
pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in
Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she
was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights
and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity,
even when she was already living abroad.
Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not
allow and recognize divorce between Filipino
spouses.
Thus, Fely could not have validly
obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.
III
The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on
behalf of the Republic, in proceedings for annulment
and declaration of nullity of marriages.
Invoking Article 48 of the Family Code of the
Philippines, respondent Crasus argued that only the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the RTC
may intervene on behalf of the State in proceedings
for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages;
hence, the Office of the Solicitor General had no
personality to file the instant Petition on behalf of
the State. Article 48 provides
ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order
the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to

appear on behalf of the State to take steps to

prevent collusion between the parties and to take
care that the evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed.
That Article 48 does not expressly mention the
Solicitor General does not bar him or his Office from
intervening in proceedings for annulment or
declaration of nullity of marriages. Executive Order
No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative
Code of 1987, appoints the Solicitor General as the
principal law officer and legal defender of the
Government.[34] His Office is tasked to represent
the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any
litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter
requiring the services of lawyers. The Office of the
Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of
the Government and, as such, shall discharge
duties requiring the services of lawyers.[35]
The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the
Philippines is to ensure that the interest of the State
is represented and protected in proceedings for
annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages by
preventing collusion between the parties, or the
fabrication or suppression of evidence; and, bearing
in mind that the Solicitor General is the principal law
officer and legal defender of the land, then his
intervention in such proceedings could only serve
and contribute to the realization of such intent,
rather than thwart it.
Furthermore, the general rule is that only the
Solicitor General is authorized to bring or defend
actions on behalf of the People or the Republic of
the Philippines once the case is brought before this
Court or the Court of Appeals.[36] While it is the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal who actively
participates, on behalf of the State, in a proceeding
for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage
before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General
takes over when the case is elevated to the Court of
Appeals or this Court. Since it shall be eventually
responsible for taking the case to the appellate
courts when circumstances demand, then it is only
reasonable and practical that even while the
proceeding is still being held before the RTC, the
Office of the Solicitor General can already exercise
supervision and control over the conduct of the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal therein to better
guarantee the protection of the interests of the
State.
In fact, this Court had already recognized and
affirmed the role of the Solicitor General in several
cases for annulment and declaration of nullity of

marriages that were appealed before it, summarized

as follows in the case of Ancheta v. Ancheta[37]
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals [268
SCRA 198 (1997)], this Court laid down the
guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Art. 48 of the Family Code, one of which concerns
the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State:
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear
as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The
Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under
Canon 1095. [Id., at 213]
This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin [355
SCRA 285 (2001)] reiterated its pronouncement in
Republic v. Court of Appeals [Supra.] regarding the
role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
State...
Finally, the issuance of this Court of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,[38] which
became effective on 15 March 2003, should dispel
any other doubts of respondent Crasus as to the
authority of the Solicitor General to file the instant
Petition on behalf of the State. The Rule recognizes
the authority of the Solicitor General to intervene
and take part in the proceedings for annulment and
declaration of nullity of marriages before the RTC
and on appeal to higher courts. The pertinent
provisions of the said Rule are reproduced below
Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition.
...
(4)
It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner
shall serve a copy of the petition on the Office of the
Solicitor General and the Office of the City or
Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from the date
of its filing and submit to the court proof of such
service within the same period.
...

Sec. 18. Memoranda. The court may require the

parties and the public prosecutor, in consultation
with the Office of the Solicitor General, to file their
respective memoranda in support of their claims
within fifteen days from the date the trial is
terminated. It may require the Office of the Solicitor
General to file its own memorandum if the case is of
significant interest to the State. No other pleadings
or papers may be submitted without leave of court.
After the lapse of the period herein provided, the
case will be considered submitted for decision, with
or without the memoranda.

and loveless marriage, this is one of those

situations where neither law nor society can provide
the specific answer to every individual problem.[39]

Sec. 19. Decision.

SO ORDERED.

...

Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr.,

and Tinga, JJ., concur.

(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General and

the public prosecutor, shall be served with copies of
the decision personally or by registered mail. If the
respondent summoned by publication failed to
appear in the action, the dispositive part of the
decision shall be published once in a newspaper of
general circulation.
(3) The decision becomes final upon the expiration
of fifteen days from notice to the parties. Entry of
judgment shall be made if no motion for
reconsideration or new trial, or appeal is filed by any
of the parties, the public prosecutor, or the Solicitor
General.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the

assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001, affirming
the Judgment of the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 22,
in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October
1998, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The
marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely
Ada Rosal-Iyoy remains valid and subsisting.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------[1] Penned by Associate Justice Portia AlioHormachuelos with Acting Presiding Justice Cancio
C. Garcia and Associate Justice Mercedes GozoDadole, concurring; Rollo, pp. 23-31.
[2] Penned by Judge Pampio A. Abarintos, Id., pp.
63-66.
[3] Records, pp. 1-3.

...

[4] Id., pp. 8-13.

Sec. 20. Appeal.

[5] Id., pp. 25-29, 30-32.

...

[6] Id., pp. 23-24.

(2) Notice of Appeal. An aggrieved party or the

Solicitor General may appeal from the decision by
filing a Notice of Appeal within fifteen days from
notice of denial of the motion for reconsideration or
new trial. The appellant shall serve a copy of the
notice of appeal on the adverse parties.

[7] TSN, 08 September 1997.

[8] Records, p. 36.
[9] Id., p. 37.
[10] Id., pp. 40-45.

Given the foregoing, this Court arrives at a

conclusion contrary to those of the RTC and the
Court of Appeals, and sustains the validity and
existence of the marriage between respondent
Crasus and Fely. At most, Fely's abandonment,
sexual infidelity, and bigamy, give respondent
Crasus grounds to file for legal separation under
Article 55 of the Family Code of the Philippines, but
not for declaration of nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the same Code. While this Court
commiserates with respondent Crasus for being
continuously shackled to what is now a hopeless

[11] Id., pp. 48-49.

[12] Penned by Judge Pampio A. Abarintos, dated
07 November 1997 (Id., p. 51) and 01 August 1998
(Id., p. 58).
[13] Id., p. 52.
[14] Id., p. 61.
[15] Supra, note 2, pp. 65-66.

[16] Supra, note 1, pp. 28-30.

[17] Penned by Associate Justice Portia AlinoHormachuelos with Associate Justices Cancio C.
Garcia and Mercedes Gozo-Dadole, concurring;
Rollo, p. 32.

incapacity becomes
celebration.

manifest

only

after

its

The complete facts should allege the physical

manifestations, if any, as are indicative of
psychological incapacity at the time of the
celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need
not be alleged.

[18] Id., p. 13.

[19] Id., pp. 36-41.
[20] G.R. No. 112019, 04 January 1995, 240 SCRA
20, 24.
[21] Id., pp. 33-34.
[22] G.R. No. 108763, 13 February 1997, 268
SCRA 198, 209-213.
[23] As will be subsequently discussed in this
Decision, later jurisprudence and rules of procedure
on petitions for the declaration of nullity of marriage
under Rule 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines
do not require the examination of the parties by an
expert, i.e., a psychiatrist or psychologist, to
establish the psychological incapacity of either or
both parties.
[24] The roles of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General are now governed by the
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(A.M. No. 01-11-10-SC), which became effective 15
March 2003. The requirement of a certification by
the Solicitor General on his agreement or opposition
to the petition has been dispensed with to avoid
delay.
[25] G.R. No. 136490, 19 October 2000, 343 SCRA
755.
[26] Section 2(d) of the Rule on Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 01-11-10-SC) reads
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriages.

[27] Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, supra,

note 22, p. 211.
[28] Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco, G.R. No.
158896, 27 October 2004, 441 SCRA 422; Dedel v.
Court of Appeals and Corpuz-Dedel, G.R. No.
151867, 29 January 2004, 421 SCRA 461; GuillenPesca v. Pesca, G.R. No. 136921, 17 April 2001,
356 SCRA 588; Marcos v. Marcos, supra, note 25;
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126010,
08 December 1999, 320 SCRA 76.
[29] Marcos v. Marcos, supra, note 25, p. 765.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra, note 21.
[32] Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco, supra, note 28;
Republic v. Dagdag, G.R. No. 109975, 09 February
20001, 351 SCRA 425; Marcos v. Marcos, supra,
note 25; Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, supra, note
28; Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, supra,
note 22.
[33] Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Philippine
Constitution of 1987.
[34] Book IV, Title III, Chapter 12, Section 34.
[35] Id., Section 35.
[36] Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v.
Tonda, G.R. No. 134436, 16 August 2000, 338
SCRA 254, 265.
[37] G.R. No. 145370, 04 March 2004, 424 SCRA
725, 738-739.
[38] A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

...
(d) What to allege. A petition under Article 36 of
the Family Code shall specifically allege the
complete facts showing that either or both parties
were psychologically incapacitated from complying
with the essential marital obligations of marriage at
the time of the celebration of marriage even if such

[39] Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco, supra, note 28,

p. 439; Dedel v. Court of Appeals and CorpuzDedel, supra, note 28, p. 467; Santos v. Court of
Appeals, supra, note 20, p. 36.

3. VAN DORN VS. ROMILLO DOCTRINE

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 138322, October 02, 2001 ]
GRACE J. GARCIA, A.K.A. GRACE J. GARCIARECIO, PETITIONER,VS. REDERICK A. RECIO,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be

recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree
is valid according to the national law of the
foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the
governing personal law of the alien spouse who
obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts do
not take judicial notice of foreign laws and
judgments; hence, like any other facts, both the
divorce decree and the national law of the alien
must be alleged and proven according to our law on
evidence.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of

the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the January 7,
1999 Decision[1] and the March 24, 1999 Order[2]
of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City,
Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026-AF. The assailed
Decision disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage
between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A. Recio
solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan
City as dissolved and both parties can now remarry
under existing and applicable laws to any and/or
both parties."[3]
The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the
above-quoted Decision.

The Facts

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha

Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on
March 1, 1987.[4] They lived together as husband
and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, [5] a
decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the
marriage, was issued by an Australian family court.

On June 26, 1992, respondent became an

Australian citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of
Australian Citizenship" issued by the Australian
government.[6] Petitioner -- a Filipina -- and
respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in
Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan
City.[7] In their application for a marriage license,
respondent was declared as "single" and
"Filipino."[8]
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and
respondent lived separately without prior judicial
dissolution of their marriage. While the two were
still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided
on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory
Declarations secured in Australia.[9]
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage[10] in the court a
quo, on the ground of bigamy -- respondent
allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time
he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed
that she learned of respondent's marriage to Editha
Samson only in November, 1997.
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back
as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior
marriage and its subsequent dissolution.[11] He
contended that his first marriage to an Australian
citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce
decree obtained in Australia in 1989;[12] thus, he
was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.
On July 7, 1998 -- or about five years after the
couple's wedding and while the suit for the
declaration of nullity was pending -- respondent was
able to secure a divorce decree from a family court
in Sydney, Australia because the "marriage ha[d]
irretrievably broken down."[13]
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the
Complaint be dismissed on the ground that it stated
no cause of action.[14] The Office of the Solicitor
General agreed with respondent.[15] The court
marked and admitted the documentary evidence of
both parties.[16] After they submitted their
respective memoranda, the case was submitted for
resolution.[17]
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed
Decision and Order.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on
the ground that the divorce issued in Australia was
valid and recognized in the Philippines. It deemed

the marriage ended, but not on the basis of any

defect in an essential element of the marriage; that
is, respondent's alleged lack of legal capacity to
remarry. Rather, it based its Decision on the
divorce decree obtained by respondent.
The
Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus,
there was no more marital union to nullify or annul.

The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the

divorce decree obtained by the respondent in
Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties to
remarry, without first securing a recognition of the
judgment granting the divorce decree before our
courts."[19]

Hence, this Petition.[18]

The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of

this Decision, we shall concentrate on two pivotal
ones: (1) whether the divorce between respondent
and Editha Samson was proven, and (2) whether
respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to
marry petitioner. Because of our ruling on these
two, there is no more necessity to take up the rest.

Issues

Petitioner submits the following issues for our

consideration:

The Court's Ruling

"1
The Petition is partly meritorious.
The trial court gravely erred in finding that the
divorce decree obtained in Australia by the
respondent ipso facto terminated his first marriage
to Editha Samson thereby capacitating him to
contract a second marriage with the petitioner.

First Issue:
Proving the Divorce Between
Respondent and Editha Samson

"2

The failure of the respondent, who is now a

naturalized Australian, to present a certificate of
legal capacity to marry constitutes absence of a
substantial requisite voiding the petitioner's
marriage to the respondent

"3

The trial court seriously erred in the application of

Art. 26 of the Family Code in this case.

"4

The trial court patently and grievously erred in

disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53 of
the Family Code as the applicable provisions in this
case.

"5

Petitioner assails the trial court's recognition of the

divorce between respondent and Editha Samson.
Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,[20] petitioner
argues that the divorce decree, like any other
foreign judgment, may be given recognition in this
jurisdiction only upon proof of the existence of (1)
the foreign law allowing absolute divorce and (2) the
alleged divorce decree itself.
She adds that
respondent miserably failed to establish these
elements.
Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, marriages
solemnized abroad are governed by the law of the
place where they were celebrated (the lex loci
celebrationis). In effect, the Code requires the
presentation of the foreign law to show the
conformity of the marriage in question to the legal
requirements of the place where the marriage was
performed.
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal
principles as the take-off points for our discussion.
Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce;
hence, our courts cannot grant it.[21] A marriage
between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by
a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles
15[22] and 17[23] of the Civil Code.[24] In mixed

marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner,

Article 26[25] of the Family Code allows the former
to contract a subsequent marriage in case the
divorce is "validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry."[26] A
divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both
aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided it is consistent with their respective
national laws.[27]
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far
as pleading and proof are concerned, can be made.
Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that "aliens may
obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided they are valid according to
their national law."[28] Therefore, before a foreign
divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the
party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact
and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it.[29] Presentation solely of the divorce
decree is insufficient.
Divorce as a Question of Fact
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can
be admitted in evidence, it must first comply with the
registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and
52 of the Family Code. These articles read as
follows:

"ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required,

each of the contracting parties shall file separately a
sworn application for such license with the proper
local civil registrar which shall specify the following:
xxx
xxx

xxx

"(5)
If previously married, how, when and
where the previous marriage was dissolved or
annulled;
xxx
x x x"

xxx

"ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties

has been previously married, the applicant shall be
required to
"ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties
has been previously married, the applicant shall be
required to furnish, instead of the birth or baptismal
certificate required in the last preceding article, the
death certificate of the deceased spouse or the
judicial decree of the absolute divorce, or the

judicial decree of annulment or declaration of nullity

of his or her previous marriage. x x x.
"ART. 52.
The judgment of annulment or of
absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the
delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes shall
be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and
registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not
affect their persons."
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the
Australian divorce decree is a public document -- a
written official act of an Australian family court.
Therefore, it requires no further proof of its
authenticity and due execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a
foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary
value, the document must first be presented and
admitted in evidence.[30] A divorce obtained abroad
is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the
best evidence of a judgment is the judgment
itself.[31] The decree purports to be a written act or
record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a
foreign country.[32]
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other
hand, a writing or document may be proven as a
public or official record of a foreign country by either
(1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof
attested[33] by the officer having legal custody of
the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by
a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record
is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office. [34]
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha
Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by
an
Australian
family
court.[35]
However,
appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the
aforementioned rules on evidence must be
demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the
divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in
evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its
admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been
registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan
City.[36] The trial court ruled that it was admissible,
subject to petitioner's qualification.[37] Hence, it was
admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the
judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to object properly

rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written

act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.[38]
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52)
of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent
was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws
after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992.[39]
Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien
and clothing him with the political and civil rights
belonging to a citizen.[40] Naturalized citizens, freed
from the protective cloak of their former states, don
the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming
an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to
the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied
him to Philippine personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove
Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner, because
she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign
judgment. He contends that petitioner was satisfied
with the original of the divorce decree and was
cognizant of the marital laws of Australia, because
she had lived and worked in that country for quite a
long time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is
allegedly known by Philippine courts; thus, judges
may take judicial notice of foreign laws in the
exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies
with "the party who alleges the existence of a fact or
thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an
action."[41] In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden
of proving the material allegations of the complaint
when those are denied by the answer; and
defendants have the burden of proving the material
allegations in their answer when they introduce new
matters.[42] Since the divorce was a defense raised
by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent
Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts
cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.[43] Like
any other facts, they must be alleged and proved.
Australian marital laws are not among those matters
that judges are supposed to know by reason of their
judicial function.[44] The power of judicial notice
must be exercised with caution, and every
reasonable doubt upon the subject should be
resolved in the negative.

Second Issue:
Respondent's Legal Capacity
to Remarry

Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient

proof of the divorce, respondent was legally
incapacitated to marry her in 1994. Hence, she
concludes that their marriage was void ab initio.
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce
decree, which was validly admitted in evidence,
adequately established his legal capacity to marry
under Australian law.
Respondent's contention is untenable. In its strict
legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a
lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But
divorces are of different types. The two basic ones
are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and
(2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first
kind terminates the marriage, while the second
suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.[45]
There is no showing in the case at bar which type of
divorce was procured by respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an
interlocutory decree -- a conditional or provisional
judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a
separation from bed and board, although an
absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the
prescribed period during which no reconciliation is
effected.[46]
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court
may under some foreign statutes and practices, still
restrict remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions,
remarriage may be limited by statute; thus, the
guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the
ground of adultery may be prohibited from marrying
again. The court may allow a remarriage only after
proof of good behavior.[47]
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree
contains a restriction that reads:

"1.
A party to a marriage who marries again
before this decree becomes absolute (unless the
other party has died) commits the offence of
bigamy."[48]

This quotation bolsters our contention that the

divorce obtained by respondent may have been
restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal
capacity to remarry according to his national law.
Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial
court, which erroneously assumed that the
Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondent's

capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence

on this matter.

Separation Between Rederick A. Recio and Grace

J. Garcia Recio since October 22, 1995.[60]

We also reject the claim of respondent that the

divorce decree raises a disputable presumption or
presumptive evidence as to his civil status based on
Section 48, Rule 39[49] of the Rules of Court, for
the simple reason that no proof has been presented
on the legal effects of the divorce decree obtained
under Australian laws.

Based on the above records, we cannot conclude

that respondent, who was then a naturalized
Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry
petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree with
petitioner's contention that the court a quo erred in
finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed
respondent with the legal capacity to remarry
without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence
to show the Australian personal law governing his
status; or at the very least, to prove his legal
capacity to contract the second marriage.

Significance of the Certificate

of Legal Capacity
Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal
capacity required by Article 21 of the Family Code
was not submitted together with the application for a
marriage license. According to her, its absence is
proof that respondent did not have legal capacity to
remarry.
We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract
marriage is determined by the national law of the
party concerned.
The certificate mentioned in
Article 21 of the Family Code would have been
sufficient to establish the legal capacity of
respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly
authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie
evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of
the alien applicant for a marriage license.[50]
As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence
that proves respondent's legal capacity to marry
petitioner. A review of the records before this Court
shows that only the following exhibits were
presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner:
(a) Exhibit "A" - Complaint;[51] (b) Exhibit "B" Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio
(Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino)
on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva
Ecija;[52] (c) Exhibit "C" - Certificate of Marriage
Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D.
Samson (Australian) on March 1, 1987 in Malabon,
Metro Manila;[53] (d) Exhibit "D" - Office of the City
Registrar of Cabanatuan City Certification that no
information of annulment between Rederick A.
Recio and Editha D. Samson was in its records;[54]
and (e) Exhibit "E" - Certificate of Australian
Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio;[55] (2) for
respondent: (a) Exhibit "1" -- Amended Answer;[56]
(b) Exhibit "2" - Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of
Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of
Australia;[57] (c) Exhibit "3" - Certificate of
Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio;[58] (d)
Exhibit "4" - Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage
in the Family Court of Australia Certificate;[59] and
Exhibit "5" -- Statutory Declaration of the Legal

Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare

her marriage to respondent null and void on the
ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that
under Australian law, he was really capacitated to
marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce
decree. Hence, we believe that the most judicious
course is to remand this case to the trial court to
receive evidence, if any, which show petitioner's
legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that,
then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the
parties' marriage on the ground of bigamy, there
being already in evidence two existing marriage
certificates, which were both obtained in the
Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated
March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City
dated January 12, 1994.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure
and substantial justice, we REMAND the case to the
court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence
which conclusively show respondent's legal capacity
to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring
the parties' marriage void on the ground of bigamy,
as above discussed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, and Sandoval-Gutierrez,
JJ., concur.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------[1] Penned by Judge Feliciano V. Buenaventura;

rollo, pp. 7-9.
[2] Rollo, p. 10.
[3] Ibid., p. 9.
[4] Rollo, p. 37.

[6] Id., p. 44.

[23] "ART. 17. The forms and solemnities of

contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall
be governed by the laws of the country in which
they are executed.

[7] Id., p. 36.

xxx

[8] Annex "1"; temporary rollo, p. 9.

"Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or

property, and those which have for their object
public order, public policy and good customs shall
not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country."

[5] Ibid., p. 47.

[9] The couple secured an Australian "Statutory

Declaration" of their legal separation and division of
conjugal assets.
See Annexes "3" and
Comment; rollo, p. 48.

"4"

of

xxx

xxx

Respondent's

[10] Id., pp. 33-35.

[11] Id., p. 39.
[12] Amended Answer, p. 2; rollo, p. 39.
[13] Id., pp. 77-78.

[24] Tenchaves v. Escano 15 SCRA 355, 362,

November 29, 1965; Barretto Gonzalez v.
Gonzalez, 58 Phil. 67, 71-72, March 7, 1933.
[25] "Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the
Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4),
(5), and (6), 36, 37, and 38. (71a)

[14] Id., p. 43.

[15] Rollo, pp. 48-51.
[16] TSN, December 16, 1998, pp. 1-8; records, pp.
172-179.
[17] RTC Order of December 16, 1998; ibid., p. 203.

"Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a

foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law." (As amended by EO 227, prom. July
27, 1987)

[18] The case was deemed submitted for decision

on January 11, 2000, upon this Court's receipt of
the Memorandum for petitioner, signed by Atty.
Olivia Velasco-Jacoba.
The Memorandum for
respondent, signed by Atty. Gloria V. Gomez of
Gomez and Associates, had been filed on
December 10, 1999.

[26] Cf. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr., 139 SCRA 139,

143-144, October 8, 1985; and Pilapil v. IbaySomera, 174 SCRA 653, 663, June 30, 1989.

[19] Petitioner's Memorandum, pp. 8-9; rollo, pp.

242-243.

[29] For a detailed discussion of Van Dorn, see

Salonga, Private International Law, 1995 ed. pp.
295-300. See also Jose C. Vitug, Compendium of
Civil Law and Jurisprudence, 1993 ed., p. 16;

[20] 43 Phil. 43, 49, March 3, 1922.

[27] Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr., supra.

[28] Ibid., p. 143.

[21] Ruben F. Balane, "Family Courts and

Significant Jurisprudence in Family Law," Journal of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, 1st & 2nd
Quarters, 2001, Vol. XXVII, No. 1, p. 25.

[30] "SEC. 19. Classes of documents.--For the

purpose of their presentation in evidence,
documents are either public or private.

[22] "ART. 15. Laws relating to family rights and

duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity
of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad."

"Public documents are:

"(a)
The written official acts, or records of the
official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies
and tribunals, and public officers, whether in the
Philippines, or of a foreign country.

xxx

xxx

x x x."

[31] Burr W. Jones, Commentaries on the Law of

Evidence in Civil Cases, Vol. IV, 1926 ed., p. 3511;
3, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence provides that
"when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other
than the original document itself."
[32] "SEC. 19. Classes of documents.-- For the
purpose of their presentation in evidence,
documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a)
The written official acts, or records of the
official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies
and tribunals, and public officers, whether in the
Philippines, or of a foreign country.
xxx

xxx

x x x."

[33] "Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. Whenever a copy of a document or record is
attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation
must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct
copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the
case may be. The attestation must be under the
official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or
if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the
seal of such court."
[34] "Sec. 24. Proof of official record.--The record of
public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of
Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may
be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by
a copy attested by the officer having the legal
custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has
the custody. If the office in which the record is kept
is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made
by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by
any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines
stationed in the foreign country in which the record
is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office."

presented in court (TSN, December 16, 1998, p. 5;

records, p. 176), but only photocopies of the same
documents were attached to the records (Records,
Index of Exhibits, p. 1.).
[36] TSN, December 15, 1998, p. 7; records, p. 178.
[37] TSN, December 16, 1998, p. 7; records, p. 178.
[38] People v. Yatco, 97 Phil. 941, 945, November
28, 1955; Marella v. Reyes, 12 Phil. 1, 3, November
10, 1908; People v. Diaz, 271 SCRA 504, 516, April
18, 1997; De la Torre v. Court of Appeals, 294
SCRA 196, 203-204, August 14, 1998; Maunlad
Savings & Loan Asso., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, GR
No. 114942, November 27, 2000, pp. 8-9.
[39] Art. 15, Civil Code.
[40] Joaquin Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996
ed., p. 566.
[41] Ricardo J. Francisco, Evidence: Rules of Court
in the Philippines, second edition, p. 382.
[42] Ibid., p. 384.
[43] Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd. v. Court of
Appeals, GR No. 119602, October 6, 2000, p. 7.
[44] Francisco, p. 29, citing De los Angeles v.
Cabahug, 106 Phil. 839, December 29, 1959.
[45] 27A CJS, 15-17, 1.
[46] Ibid., p. 611-613, 161.
[47] 27A CJS, 625, 162.
[48] Rollo, p. 36.
[49] "SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final
orders.--The effect of a judgment or final order of a
tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to
render the judgment or final order is as follows:
xxx

xxx

xxx

See also Asiavest Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, 296

SCRA 539, 550-551, September 25, 1998; Pacific
Asia Overseas Shipping Corp. v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 161 SCRA 122, 133-134,
May 6, 1988.

"(b)
In case of a judgment or final order
against a person, the judgment or final order is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the
parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title.

[35] The transcript of stenographic notes states that

the original copies of the divorce decrees were

"In either case, the judgment or final order may be

repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want

of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear

mistake of law or fact."
[50] In passing, we note that the absence of the said
certificate is merely an irregularity in complying with
the formal requirement for procuring a marriage
license. Under Article 4 of the Family Code, an
irregularity will not affect the validity of a marriage
celebrated on the basis of a marriage license issued
without that certificate. (Vitug, Compendium, pp.
120-126; Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family
Code of the Philippines, 1997 reprint, p. 17; Rufus
Rodriguez, The Family Code of the Philippines
Annotated, 1990 ed., p. 42; Melencio Sta. Maria Jr.,
Persons and Family Relations Law, 1999 ed., p.
146.)
[51] Records, pp. 1-3.
[52] Ibid., p. 4.
[53] Id., p. 5.
[54] Id., p. 180.
[55] Id., pp. 170-171.
[56] Id., pp. 84-89.
[57] Id., pp. 181-182.
[58] Id., pp. 40-41.

and January 31, 1996[3] Resolutions of the

Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in
SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its May 15, 1998
Resolution[4] denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.
The instant case involves the settlement of the
estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who
was the former governor of the Province of Laguna.
During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three
marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit
on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six
children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda,
Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia
predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married
Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias.
However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an
American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce[5]
before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of
Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which
issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and
Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973.[6]
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent
Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos,
before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the
United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los
Angeles, California, U.S.A.[7] He had no children
with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from
the time of their marriage up to his death on
December 18, 1992.

[59] Id., p. 183.

[60] Id., pp. 184-187.
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. NO. 133743, February 06, 2007 ]
EDGAR SAN LUIS, PETITIONER, VS. FELICIDAD
SAN LUIS, RESPONDENT.
[G.R. NO. 134029]
RODOLFO SAN LUIS, PETITIONER, VS.
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS ALIAS FELICIDAD
SAN LUIS, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Before us are consolidated petitions for review

assailing the February 4, 1998 Decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which
reversed and set aside the September 12, 1995[2]

Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of

their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement
of Felicisimo's estate. On December 17, 1993, she
filed a petition for letters of administration[8] before
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as
SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled to Branch
146 thereof.
Respondent alleged that she is the widow of
Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the
decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street,
New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that
the decedent's surviving heirs are respondent as
legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage,
and son by his second marriage; that the decedent
left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive,
valued at P30,304,178.00 more or less; that the
decedent does not have any unpaid debts.
Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership
assets be liquidated and that letters of
administration be issued to her.

On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis,

one of the children of Felicisimo by his first
marriage, filed a motion to dismiss[9] on the
grounds of improper venue and failure to state a
cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for
letters of administration should have been filed in
the Province of Laguna because this was
Felicisimo's place of residence prior to his death. He
further claimed that respondent has no legal
personality to file the petition because she was only
a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time
of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same
grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking
the dismissal[10] of the petition. On February 28,
1994, the trial court issued an Order[11] denying the
two motions to dismiss.
Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss,
respondent filed on March 5, 1994 her
opposition[12] thereto. She submitted documentary
evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised
the powers of his public office in Laguna, he
regularly went home to their house in New Alabang
Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought
sometime in 1982. Further, she presented the
decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family
Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove
that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had
already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that
Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by
virtue of paragraph 2,[13] Article 26 of the Family
Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr.[14]
Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner
Edgar San Luis, separately filed motions for
reconsideration from the Order denying their
motions to dismiss.[15] They asserted that
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot
be given retroactive effect to validate respondent's
bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this
would impair vested rights in derogation of Article
256[16] of the Family Code.
On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of
Felicisimo from his first marriage, filed a motion to
disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E.
Santos from hearing the case.
On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an
Order[17] denying the motions for reconsideration. It
ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent,
possessed the legal standing to file the petition and
that venue was properly laid. Meanwhile, the motion
for disqualification was deemed moot and

academic[18] because then Acting Presiding Judge

Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador S.
Tensuan pending the resolution of said motion.
Mila filed a motion for inhibition[19] against Judge
Tensuan on November 16, 1994. On even date,
Edgar also filed a motion for reconsideration[20]
from the Order denying their motion for
reconsideration arguing that it does not state the
facts and law on which it was based.
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an
Order[21] granting the motion for inhibition. The
case was re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by
Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
On April 24, 1995,[22] the trial court required the
parties to submit their respective position papers on
the twin issues of venue and legal capacity of
respondent to file the petition. On May 5, 1995,
Edgar manifested[23] that he is adopting the
arguments and evidence set forth in his previous
motion for reconsideration as his position paper.
Respondent and Rodolfo filed their position papers
on June 14,[24] and June 20,[25] 1995,
respectively.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed
the petition for letters of administration. It held that,
at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly
elected governor and a resident of the Province of
Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed
in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also
ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to
file the petition for letters of administration because
her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus,
void ab initio. It found that the decree of absolute
divorce dissolving Felicisimo's marriage to Merry
Lee was not valid in the Philippines and did not bind
Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled
that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code
cannot be retroactively applied because it would
impair the vested rights of Felicisimo's legitimate
children.
Respondent moved for reconsideration[26] and for
the disqualification[27] of Judge Arcangel but said
motions were denied.[28]
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which
reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court in
its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998, the
dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12,
1995 and January 31, 1996 are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and

October 24, 1994 are REINSTATED; and the

records of the case is REMANDED to the trial court
for further proceedings.[29]
The appellante court ruled that under Section 1,
Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term "place of
residence" of the decedent, for purposes of fixing
the venue of the settlement of his estate, refers to
the personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual
residence or place of abode of a person as
distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It
noted that although Felicisimo discharged his
functions as governor in Laguna, he actually resided
in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters
of administration was properly filed in Makati City.
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had
legal capacity to marry respondent by virtue of
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the
rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[30] and Pilapil v.
Ibay-Somera.[31] It found that the marriage
between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly
dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute divorce
issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State
of Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph 2, Article
26, Felicisimo was capacitated to contract a
subsequent marriage with respondent. Thus With the well-known rule - express mandate of
paragraph 2, Article 26, of the Family Code of the
Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and
the reason and philosophy behind the enactment of
E.O. No. 227, - there is no justiciable reason to
sustain the individual view - sweeping statement - of
Judge Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26, par. 2 of the
Family Code, contravenes the basic policy of our
state against divorce in any form whatsoever."
Indeed, courts cannot deny what the law grants. All
that the courts should do is to give force and effect
to the express mandate of the law. The foreign
divorce having been obtained by the Foreigner on
December 14, 1992,[32] the Filipino divorcee, "shall
x x x have capacity to remarry under Philippine
laws". For this reason, the marriage between the
deceased and petitioner should not be denominated
as "a bigamous marriage.
Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the
petitioner as the surviving spouse can institute the
judicial proceeding for the settlement of the estate
of the deceased. x x x[33]
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for
reconsideration[34] which were denied by the Court
of Appeals.
On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via
the instant petition for review on certiorari.[35]

Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and motion to

adopt the said petition which was granted.[36]
In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and
Rodolfo insist that the venue of the subject petition
for letters of administration was improperly laid
because at the time of his death, Felicisimo was a
resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They contend that
pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray[37] and
Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City,[38]
"residence" is synonymous with "domicile" which
denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when
absent, one intends to return. They claim that a
person can only have one domicile at any given
time. Since Felicisimo never changed his domicile,
the petition for letters of administration should have
been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
Petitioners also contend that respondent's marriage
to Felicisimo was void and bigamous because it
was performed during the subsistence of the latter's
marriage to Merry Lee. They argue that paragraph
2, Article 26 cannot be retroactively applied
because it would impair vested rights and ratify the
void bigamous marriage. As such, respondent
cannot be considered the surviving wife of
Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity to file
the petition for letters of administration.
The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was
properly laid, and (2) whether respondent has legal
capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration.
The petition lacks merit.
Under Section 1,[39] Rule 73 of the Rules of Court,
the petition for letters of administration of the estate
of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial
Court of the province "in which he resides at the
time of his death." In the case of Garcia Fule v.
Court of Appeals,[40] we laid down the doctrinal rule
for
determining
the
residence
as
contradistinguished from domicile - of the decedent
for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of
his estate:
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual
residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or
domicile." This term "resides," like the terms
"residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of
the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the
application of venue statutes and rules - Section 1,
Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such
nature - residence rather than domicile is the
significant factor. Even where the statute uses the

word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning

residence and not domicile in the technical sense.
Some cases make a distinction between the terms
"residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in
statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous,
and convey the same meaning as the term
"inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be
viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning,
the personal, actual or physical habitation of a
person, actual residence or place of abode. It
signifies physical presence in a place and actual
stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means
merely residence, that is, personal residence, not
legal residence or domicile. Residence simply
requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given
place, while domicile requires bodily presence in
that place and also an intention to make it one's
domicile. No particular length of time of residence is
required though; however, the residence must be
more than temporary.[41](Emphasis supplied)
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that
"residence," for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is
synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in Nuval
and Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case
because they involve election cases. Needless to
say, there is a distinction between "residence" for
purposes of election laws and "residence" for
purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election
cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as
synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent
residence to which when absent, one has the
intention of returning.[42] However, for purposes of
fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the
"residence" of a person is his personal, actual or
physical habitation, or actual residence or place of
abode, which may not necessarily be his legal
residence or domicile provided he resides therein
with continuity and consistency.[43] Hence, it is
possible that a person may have his residence in
one place and domicile in another.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that
Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna,
respondent proved that he also maintained a
residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to
the time of his death. Respondent submitted in
evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale[44] dated
January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased
purchased the aforesaid property. She also
presented billing statements[45] from the Philippine
Heart Center and Chinese General Hospital for the
period August to December 1992 indicating the
address of Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala
Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented
proof of membership of the deceased in the Ayala
Alabang Village Association[46] and Ayala Country

Club, Inc.,[47] letter-envelopes[48] from 1988 to

1990 sent by the deceased's children to him at his
Alabang address, and the deceased's calling
cards[49] stating that his home/city address is at
"100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village,
Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial address is in
"Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna."
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a
resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of
fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate.
Consequently, the subject petition for letters of
administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial
Court[50] which has territorial jurisdiction over
Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed
on December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa
was still a municipality and the branches of the
Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial
Region which had territorial jurisdiction over
Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as per
Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3.[51]
Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad's legal
personality to file the petition for letters of
administration, we must first resolve the issue of
whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien
spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil
Code, considering that Felicidad's marriage to
Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or
before the Family Code took effect on August 3,
1988. In resolving this issue, we need not
retroactively apply the provisions of the Family
Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that
there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to
rule in the affirmative.
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[52] involved a
marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino wife,
which marriage was subsequently dissolved through
a divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming
that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law,
the alien spouse alleged that his interest in the
properties from their conjugal partnership should be
protected. The Court, however, recognized the
validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse
had no interest in the properties acquired by the
Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private
respondent from the marriage from the standards of
American law, under which divorce dissolves the
marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court
of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L.
Ed. 794, 799:

"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from

the bond of matrimony by a competent jurisdiction
are to change the existing status or domestic
relation of husband and wife, and to free them both
from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed
as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband
without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is
unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the
nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not
marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still
absolutely freed from the bond of the former
marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private
respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner.
He would have no standing to sue in the case below
as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control
over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the
Decision of his own country's Court, which validly
exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision
he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his
right over the alleged conjugal property.[53]
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife,
the Court ruled that she should no longer be
considered married to the alien spouse. Further,
she should not be required to perform her marital
duties and obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that,
under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still
married to private respondent and still subject to a
wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the
Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be
obliged to live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to private respondent.
The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs
with possible rights to conjugal property. She should
not be discriminated against in her own country if
the ends of justice are to be served.[54] (Emphasis
added)
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v.
Ibay-Somera[55] where the Court recognized the
validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said
case, it was held that the alien spouse is not a
proper party in filing the adultery suit against his
Filipino wife. The Court stated that "the severance
of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the
former spouses from each other, hence the
actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy
on the other."[56]
Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals,[57] the Court
stated that where a Filipino is divorced by his
naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn
applies.[58] Although decided on December 22,
1998, the divorce in the said case was obtained in

1954 when the Civil Code provisions were still in

effect.
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the
development of limited recognition of divorce in the
Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has long
been interpreted as severing marital ties between
parties in a mixed marriage and capacitating the
Filipino spouse to remarry as a necessary
consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce
obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his treatise,
Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that
"if the foreigner obtains a valid foreign divorce, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law."[59] In Garcia v. Recio,[60] the Court
likewise cited the aforementioned case in relation to
Article 26.[61]
In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III,[62]
the historical background and legislative intent
behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code
were discussed, to wit:
Brief Historical Background

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino

signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise
known as the "Family Code," which took effect on
August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country
where they were solemnized, and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the
original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was
likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36,
and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph
was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now
provides:

ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the

Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5)
and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the

Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under

Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx

Legislative Intent

Records of the proceedings of the Family Code

deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2
of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy,
a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is
to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who,
after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its
origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.
The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held
therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the
alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and
consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to
remarry under Philippine law.[63] (Emphasis added)
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in
resolving a situation where a divorce is validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the
enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2,
Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law
already established through judicial precedent.

purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the

meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge
should be to discover in its provisions the intent of
the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never
be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as
this is never within the legislative intent. An
indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we
presume the good motives of the legislature, is to
render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not
independently of but in consonance with justice.
Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep
them so. To be sure, there are some laws that,
while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when
applied in a particular case because of its peculiar
circumstances. In such a situation, we are not
bound, because only of our nature and functions, to
apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to
their language. What we do instead is find a
balance between the word and the will, that justice
may be done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and
must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded,
yielding like robots to the literal command without
regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are
apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a
law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again,
"where these words import a policy that goes
beyond them."
xxxx

Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated

by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of
the parties and productive of no possible good to
the community, relief in some way should be
obtainable.[64] Marriage, being a mutual and
shared commitment between two parties, cannot
possibly be productive of any good to the society
where one is considered released from the marital
bond while the other remains bound to it. Such is
the state of affairs where the alien spouse obtains a
valid divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse, as
in this case.
Petitioners cite Articles 15[65] and 17[66] of the Civil
Code in stating that the divorce is void under
Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned.
However, in light of this Court's rulings in the cases
discussed above, the Filipino spouse should not be
discriminated against in his own country if the ends
of justice are to be served.[67] In Alonzo v.
Intermediate Appellate Court,[68] the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law
by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its

More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined

justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to
render every one his due." That wish continues to
motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and
the law in every case brought to it for decision.
Justice is always an essential ingredient of its
decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we
interpret the law in a way that will render justice,
presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker,
to begin with, that the law be dispensed with
justice.[69]
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the
divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee
which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry,
would have vested Felicidad with the legal
personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo's
surviving spouse. However, the records show that
there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of
the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the
marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the
laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio,[70] the Court
laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and
proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held

that presentation solely of the divorce decree is

insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due
execution must be presented. Under Sections 24
and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be
proven as a public or official record of a foreign
country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a
copy thereof attested by the officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is not kept in
the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied
by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record
is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office.[71]
With regard to respondent's marriage to Felicisimo
allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she
submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate
and the annotated text[72] of the Family Law Act of
California which purportedly show that their
marriage was done in accordance with the said law.
As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be
alleged and proved.[73]
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial
court for further reception of evidence on the
divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the
marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated
to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find
that the latter has the legal personality to file the
subject petition for letters of administration, as she
may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as
regards the properties that were acquired through
their joint efforts during their cohabitation.
Section 6,[74] Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states
that letters of administration may be granted to the
surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section
2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of
administration. - A petition for letters of
administration must be filed by an interested person
and must show, as far as known to the petitioner: x
x x.
An "interested person" has been defined as one
who would be benefited by the estate, such as an
heir, or one who has a claim against the estate,
such as a creditor. The interest must be material
and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent.[75]
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an
interested person who has a direct interest in the
estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation,

the existence of which was not denied by

petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce
and Felicisimo's capacity to remarry, but fails to
prove that her marriage with him was validly
performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she
may be considered as a co-owner under Article
144[76] of the Civil Code. This provision governs
the property relations between parties who live
together as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage, or their marriage is void from the
beginning. It provides that the property acquired by
either or both of them through their work or industry
or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not
necessary that the property be acquired through
their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property
acquired during the union is prima facie presumed
to have been obtained through their joint efforts.
Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners
shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is
proven.[77]
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity
of both the divorce and the marriage, the applicable
provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code
which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil
Code by expressly regulating the property relations
of couples living together as husband and wife but
are incapacitated to marry.[78] In Saguid v. Court of
Appeals,[79] we held that even if the cohabitation or
the acquisition of property occurred before the
Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs.[80]
The Court described the property regime under this
provision as follows:
The regime of limited co-ownership of property
governing the union of parties who are not legally
capacitated to marry each other, but who
nonetheless live together as husband and wife,
applies to properties acquired during said
cohabitation in proportion to their respective
contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the
extent of the proven actual contribution of money,
property or industry. Absent proof of the extent
thereof, their contributions and corresponding
shares shall be presumed to be equal.

xxxx
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v.
Fernandez, which involved the issue of coownership of properties acquired by the parties to a
bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship,
respectively, we ruled that proof of actual
contribution in the acquisition of the property is
essential. x x x

[9] Id. at 10-24.

As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests
upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings
or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative
issue. Contentions must be proved by competent
evidence and reliance must be had on the strength
of the party's own evidence and not upon the
weakness of the opponent's defense. x x x[81]
In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent's
legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration may arise from her status as the
surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under
Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the
Family Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating and
affirming the February 28, 1994 Order of the
Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners'
motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order
which
dismissed
petitioners'
motion
for
reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case be
REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings.

[10] Id. at 30-35.

[11] Id. at 38.
[12] Id. at 39-138.
[13] When a marriage between a Filipino citizen and
a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.
[14] G.R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985, 139 SCRA
139.
[15] See Records, pp. 155-158, 160-170 and 181192.
[16] This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar
as it does not prejudice or impair vested rights or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or
other laws.

SO ORDERED.
[17] Records, p. 259.
Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario,
JJ., concur.

[18] Id. at 260.

[19] Id. at 262-267.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------[1] Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, pp. 45-66. Penned by

Associate Justice Artemon D. Luna and concurred
in by Associate Justices Godardo A. Jacinto and
Roberto A. Barrios.

[20] Id. at 270-272.

[21] Id. at 288.
[22] Id. at 301.
[23] Id. at 302-303.

[2] Records, pp. 335-338. Penned by Judge Paul T.

Arcangel.

[24] Id. at 306-311.

[3] Id. at 391-393.

[25] Id. at 318-320.

[4] Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, p. 68. Penned by

Associate Justice Artemon D. Luna and concurred
in by Associate Justices Demetrio G. Demetria and
Roberto A. Barrios.

[26] Id. at 339-349.

[27] Id. at 350-354.
[28] Id. at 391-393.

[5] Records, p. 125.

[29] Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, p. 66.
[6] Id. at 137.
[30] Supra note 14.
[7] Id. at 116.
[8] Id. at 1-5.

[31] G.R. No. 80116, June 30, 1989, 174 SCRA

653.

[32] Parenthetically, it appears that the Court of

Appeals proceeded from a mistaken finding of fact
because the records clearly show that the divorce
was obtained on December 14, 1973 (not
December 14, 1992) and that the marriage of Gov.
San Luis with respondent was celebrated on June
20, 1974. These events both occurred before the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988.

[50] The Regional Trial Court and not the Municipal

Trial Court had jurisdiction over this case because
the value of Gov. San Luis' estate exceeded
P200,000.00 as provided for under B.P. Blg 129,
Section 19(4).

[33] Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, p. 65.

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 18 of B.P. Blg.

129, and Section 4 of the Executive Order issued by
the President of the Philippines on January 17,
1983, declaring the reorganization of the Judiciary,
the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts
in the National Capital Judicial Region are hereby
defined as follows:

[34] See CA rollo, pp. 309-322, 335-340, and 362369.

[35] Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, pp. 8-42.

[51] SC Administrative Order No. 3 dated January

19, 1983 states in part:

[36] Id. at 75.

[37] 52 Phil. 645 (1928).

xxxx

[38] G.R. No. 104960, September 14, 1993, 226

SCRA 408.

5. Branches CXXXII to CL, inclusive, with seats at

Makati - over the municipalities of Las Pinas,
Makati, Muntinlupa and Paraaque. x x x
[52] Supra note 14.

[39] SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased

persons be settled. - If the decedent is an inhabitant
of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a
citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters
of administration granted, and his estate settled, in
the Court of First Instance in the province in which
he resides at the time of his death, x x x.
(Underscoring supplied)

[53] Id. at 139, 143-144.

[54] Id. at 144.
[55] Supra note 31.
[56] Id. at 664.

[40] G.R. Nos. L-40502 & L-42670, November 29,

1976, 74 SCRA 189.

[57] G.R. No. 124862, December 22, 1998, 300

SCRA 406.

[41] Id. at 199-200.

[42] Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, supra
note 38 at 415.
[43] See Boleyley v. Villanueva, 373 Phil. 141, 146
(1999); Dangwa Transportation Co. Inc. v.
Sarmiento, G.R. No. L-22795, January 31, 1977, 75
SCRA 124, 128-129.

[58] Id. at 414; See also Republic v. Orbecido III,

G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005, 472 SCRA 114,
121.
[59] Tolentino, Arturo M., Commentaries and
Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines,
Vol. I, 1990 ed., p. 263.

[44] Records, pp. 76-78.

[60] G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA

437.

[45] Id. at 60-75.

[61] Id. at 447.

[46] Id. at 79.

[62] Supra note 58.

[47] Id. at 80.

[63] Id. at 119-121.

[48] Id. at 81-83.

[64] Goitia v. Campos Rueda, 35 Phil. 252, 254-255

(1916).

[49] Id. at 84.

[65] ART. 15. Laws relating to family rights and

duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity
of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad.
[66] Art. 17. x x x Prohibitive laws concerning
persons, their acts or property, and those which
have for their object public order, public policy and
good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by
laws
or
judgments
promulgated,
or
by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a
foreign country.

[78] Francisco v. Master Iron Works & Construction

Corporation, G.R. No. 151967, February 16, 2005,
451 SCRA 494, 506.
[79] G.R. No. 150611, June 10, 2003, 403 SCRA
678.
[80] Id. at 686.
[81] Id. at 679, 686-687.

[68] G.R. No. L-72873, May 28, 1987, 150 SCRA

259.

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 155635, November 07, 2008 ]
MARIA
REBECCA
MAKAPUGAY
BAYOT,
PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS AND VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT,
RESPONDENTS.

[69] Id. at 264-265, 268.

[G.R. NO. 163979]

[70] Supra note 60.

[71] Id. at 448-449.

MARIA
REBECCA
MAKAPUGAY
BAYOT,
PETITIONER, VS. VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT,
RESPONDENT.

[72] Records, pp. 118-124.

DECISION

[73] Supra note 60 at 451.

VELASCO JR., J.:

[74] SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of

administration granted. - If x x x a person dies
intestate, administration shall be granted:

The Case

[67] Supra note 14 at 144.

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case

may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of
the court, or to such person as such surviving
husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have
appointed, if competent and willing to serve; x x x.

[75] Saguinsin v. Lindayag,116 Phil. 1193, 1195

(1962).
[76] Article 144 of the Civil Code reads in full:

When a man and a woman live together as husband

and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage
is void from the beginning, the property acquired by
either or both of them through their work or industry
or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership.

[77] Valdes v. RTC, Br. 102, Quezon City, 328 Phil.

1289, 1297 (1996).

Before us are these two petitions interposed by

petitioner Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot
impugning certain issuances handed out by the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 68187.
In the first, a petition for certiorari[1] under Rule 65
and docketed as G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca assails
and seeks to nullify the April 30, 2002 Resolution[2]
of the CA, as reiterated in another Resolution of
September 2, 2002,[3] granting a writ of preliminary
injunction in favor of private respondent Vicente
Madrigal Bayot staving off the trial court's grant of
support pendente lite to Rebecca.
The second, a petition for review under Rule 45,[4]
docketed G.R. No. 163979, assails the March 25,
2004 Decision[5] of the CA, (1) dismissing Civil
Case No. 01-094, a suit for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage with application for support
commenced by Rebecca against Vicente before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Muntinlupa City; and
(2) setting aside certain orders and a resolution
issued by the RTC in the said case.

Per its Resolution of August 11, 2004, the Court

ordered the consolidation of both cases.

The Facts

Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20,

1979 in Sanctuario de San Jose, Greenhills,
Mandaluyong City. On its face, the Marriage
Certificate[6] identified Rebecca, then 26 years old,
to be an American citizen[7] born in Agaa, Guam,
USA to Cesar Tanchiong Makapugay, American,
and Helen Corn Makapugay, American.
On November 27, 1982 in San Francisco,
California, Rebecca gave birth to Marie Josephine
Alexandra or Alix. From then on, Vicente and
Rebecca's marital relationship seemed to have
soured as the latter, sometime in 1996, initiated
divorce proceedings in the Dominican Republic.
Before the Court of the First Instance of the Judicial
District of Santo Domingo, Rebecca personally
appeared, while Vicente was duly represented by
counsel. On February 22, 1996, the Dominican
court issued Civil Decree No. 362/96,[8] ordering
the dissolution of the couple's marriage and "leaving
them to remarry after completing the legal
requirements," but giving them joint custody and
guardianship over Alix. Over a year later, the same
court would issue Civil Decree No. 406/97,[9]
settling the couple's property relations pursuant to
an Agreement[10] they executed on December 14,
1996. Said agreement specifically stated that the
"conjugal property which they acquired during their
marriage consist[s] only of the real property and all
the improvements and personal properties therein
contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Alabang,
Muntinlupa."[11]
Meanwhile, on March 14, 1996, or less than a
month from the issuance of Civil Decree No.
362/96, Rebecca filed with the Makati City RTC a
petition[12] dated January 26, 1996, with
attachments, for declaration of nullity of marriage,
docketed as Civil Case No. 96-378. Rebecca,
however, later moved[13] and secured approval[14]
of the motion to withdraw the petition.
On May 29, 1996, Rebecca executed an Affidavit of
Acknowledgment[15] stating under oath that she is
an American citizen; that, since 1993, she and
Vicente have been living separately; and that she is
carrying a child not of Vicente.
On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition,
this time before the Muntinlupa City RTC, for

declaration of absolute nullity of marriage[16] on the

ground of
Vicente's
alleged psychological
incapacity. Docketed as Civil Case No. 01-094 and
entitled as Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot v.
Vicente Madrigal Bayot, the petition was eventually
raffled to Branch 256 of the court. In it, Rebecca
also sought the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains with application for support
pendente lite for her and Alix. Rebecca also prayed
that Vicente be ordered to pay a permanent monthly
support for their daughter Alix in the amount of PhP
220,000.
On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to
Dismiss[17] on, inter alia, the grounds of lack of
cause of action and that the petition is barred by the
prior judgment of divorce. Earlier, on June 5, 2001,
Rebecca filed and moved for the allowance of her
application for support pendente lite.
To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca interposed an
opposition, insisting on her Filipino citizenship, as
affirmed by the Department of Justice (DOJ), and
that, therefore, there is no valid divorce to speak of.
Meanwhile, Vicente, who had in the interim
contracted another marriage, and Rebecca
commenced several criminal complaints against
each other. Specifically, Vicente filed adultery and
perjury complaints against Rebecca. Rebecca, on
the other hand, charged Vicente with bigamy and
concubinage.

Ruling of the RTC on the Motion to Dismiss

and Motion for Support Pendente Lite

On August 8, 2001, the RTC issued an Order[18]

denying Vicente's motion to dismiss Civil Case No.
01-094 and granting Rebecca's application for
support pendente lite, disposing as follows:
Wherefore, premises considered, the Motion to
Dismiss filed by the respondent is DENIED.
Petitioner's Application in Support of the Motion for
Support Pendente Lite is hereby GRANTED.
Respondent is hereby ordered to remit the amount
of TWO HUNDRED AND TWENTY THOUSAND
PESOS (Php 220,000.00) a month to Petitioner as
support for the duration of the proceedings relative
to the instant Petition.
SO ORDERED.[19]
The RTC declared, among other things, that the
divorce judgment invoked by Vicente as bar to the

petition for declaration of absolute nullity of

marriage is a matter of defense best taken up
during actual trial. As to the grant of support
pendente lite, the trial court held that a mere
allegation of adultery against Rebecca does not
operate to preclude her from receiving legal
support.
Following the denial[20] of his motion for
reconsideration of the above August 8, 2001 RTC
order, Vicente went to the CA on a petition for
certiorari, with a prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of
preliminary injunction.[21] His petition was docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 68187.

Grant of Writ of Preliminary Injunction by the CA

On January 9, 2002, the CA issued the desired

TRO.[22] On April 30, 2002, the appellate court
granted, via a Resolution, the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction, the decretal portion of which
reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, pending final
resolution of the petition at bar, let the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction be ISSUED in this case,
enjoining the respondent court from implementing
the assailed Omnibus Order dated August 8, 2001
and the Order dated November 20, 2001, and from
conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. 01094, upon the posting of an injunction bond in the
amount of P250,000.00.

dismissed Civil Case No. 01-094, and set aside

incidental orders the RTC issued in relation to the
case. The fallo of the presently assailed CA
Decision reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is
GRANTED. The Omnibus Order dated August 8,
2001 and the Order dated November 20, 2001 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one
entered DISMISSING Civil Case No. 01-094, for
failure to state a cause of action.
No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[26]
To the CA, the RTC ought to have granted Vicente's
motion to dismiss on the basis of the following
premises:
(1) As held in China Road and Bridge Corporation v.
Court of Appeals, the hypothetical-admission rule
applies in determining whether a complaint or
petition states a cause of action.[27] Applying said
rule in the light of the essential elements of a cause
of action,[28] Rebecca had no cause of action
against Vicente for declaration of nullity of marriage.
(2) Rebecca no longer had a legal right in this
jurisdiction to have her marriage with Vicente
declared void, the union having previously been
dissolved on February 22, 1996 by the foreign
divorce decree she personally secured as an
American citizen. Pursuant to the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code, such divorce
restored Vicente's capacity to contract another
marriage.

SO ORDERED.[23]
Rebecca moved[24] but was denied reconsideration
of the aforementioned April 30, 2002 resolution. In
the meantime, on May 20, 2002, the preliminary
injunctive writ[25] was issued. Rebecca also moved
for reconsideration of this issuance, but the CA, by
Resolution dated September 2, 2002, denied her
motion.
The adverted CA resolutions of April 30, 2002 and
September 2, 2002 are presently being assailed in
Rebecca's petition for certiorari, docketed under
G.R. No. 155635.

Ruling of the CA

Pending resolution of G.R. No. 155635, the CA, by

a Decision dated March 25, 2004, effectively

(3) Rebecca's contention about the nullity of a

divorce, she being a Filipino citizen at the time the
foreign divorce decree was rendered, was dubious.
Her allegation as to her alleged Filipino citizenship
was also doubtful as it was not shown that her
father, at the time of her birth, was still a Filipino
citizen. The Certification of Birth of Rebecca issued
by the Government of Guam also did not indicate
the nationality of her father.
(4) Rebecca was estopped from denying her
American citizenship, having professed to have that
nationality status and having made representations
to that effect during momentous events of her life,
such as: (a) during her marriage; (b) when she
applied for divorce; and (c) when she applied for
and eventually secured an American passport on
January 18, 1995, or a little over a year before she
initiated the first but later withdrawn petition for

nullity of her marriage (Civil Case No. 96-378) on

March 14, 1996.
(5) Assuming that she had dual citizenship, being
born of a purportedly Filipino father in Guam, USA
which follows the jus soli principle, Rebecca's
representation and assertion about being an
American citizen when she secured her foreign
divorce precluded her from denying her citizenship
and impugning the validity of the divorce.
Rebecca
seasonably
filed
a
motion
for
reconsideration of the above Decision, but this
recourse was denied in the equally assailed June 4,
2004 Resolution.[29] Hence, Rebecca's Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, docketed under
G.R. No. 163979.

The Issues

In G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca raises four (4)

assignments of errors as grounds for the allowance
of her petition, all of which converged on the
proposition that the CA erred in enjoining the
implementation of the RTC's orders which would
have entitled her to support pending final resolution
of Civil Case No. 01-094.
In G.R. No. 163979, Rebecca urges the reversal of
the assailed CA decision submitting as follows:
I

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN

NOT MENTIONING AND NOT TAKING INTO
CONSIDERATION IN ITS APPRECIATION OF THE
FACTS THE FACT OF PETITIONER'S FILIPINO
CITIZENSHIP AS CATEGORICALLY STATED AND
ALLEGED IN HER PETITION BEFORE THE
COURT A QUO.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN

FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT RESPONDENT IS
ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING THAT HIS
MARRIAGE TO PETITIONER HAD ALREADY
BEEN DISSOLVED BY VIRTUE OF HIS
SUBSEQUENT AND CONCURRENT ACTS.

IV

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN

RULING THAT THERE WAS ABUSE OF
DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL
COURT, MUCH LESS A GRAVE ABUSE.[30]
We shall first address the petition in G.R. No.
163979, its outcome being determinative of the
success or failure of the petition in G.R. No.
155635.
Three legal premises need to be underscored at the
outset. First, a divorce obtained abroad by an alien
married to a Philippine national may be recognized
in the Philippines, provided the decree of divorce is
valid according to the national law of the
foreigner.[31] Second, the reckoning point is not the
citizenship of the divorcing parties at birth or at the
time of marriage, but their citizenship at the time a
valid divorce is obtained abroad. And third, an
absolute divorce secured by a Filipino married to
another Filipino is contrary to our concept of public
policy and morality and shall not be recognized in
this jurisdiction.[32]
Given the foregoing perspective, the determinative
issue tendered in G.R. No. 155635, i.e., the
propriety of the granting of the motion to dismiss by
the appellate court, resolves itself into the questions
of: first, whether petitioner Rebecca was a Filipino
citizen at the time the divorce judgment was
rendered in the Dominican Republic on February
22, 1996; and second, whether the judgment of
divorce is valid and, if so, what are its consequent
legal effects?

II
The Court's Ruling
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
RELYING ONLY ON ANNEXES TO THE PETITION
IN RESOLVING THE MATTERS BROUGHT
BEFORE IT.

III

The petition is bereft of merit.

Rebecca an American Citizen in the Purview of This

Case

There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at

the time she applied for and obtained her divorce
from Vicente, was an American citizen and remains
to be one, absent proof of an effective repudiation of
such citizenship. The following are compelling
circumstances
indicative
of
her
American
citizenship: (1) she was born in Agaa, Guam, USA;
(2) the principle of jus soli is followed in this
American territory granting American citizenship to
those who are born there; and (3) she was, and
may still be, a holder of an American passport.[33]
And as aptly found by the CA, Rebecca had
consistently professed, asserted, and represented
herself as an American citizen, particularly: (1)
during her marriage as shown in the marriage
certificate; (2) in the birth certificate of Alix; and (3)
when she secured the divorce from the Dominican
Republic. Mention may be made of the Affidavit of
Acknowledgment[34] in which she stated being an
American citizen.
It is true that Rebecca had been issued by the
Bureau of Immigration (Bureau) of Identification (ID)
Certificate No. RC 9778 and a Philippine Passport.
On its face, ID Certificate No. RC 9778 would tend
to show that she has indeed been recognized as a
Filipino citizen. It cannot be over-emphasized,
however, that such recognition was given only on
June 8, 2000 upon the affirmation by the Secretary
of Justice of Rebecca's recognition pursuant to the
Order of Recognition issued by Bureau Associate
Commissioner Edgar L. Mendoza.
For clarity, we reproduce in full the contents of ID
Certificate No. RC 9778:
To Whom It May Concern:
This is to certify that *MARIA REBECCA
MAKAPUGAY BAYOT* whose photograph and
thumbprints are affixed hereto and partially covered
by the seal of this Office, and whose other
particulars are as follows:

Place of Birth: Guam, USA Date of Birth: March

5, 1953
Sex: female Civil Status: married Color of Hair:
brown
Color of Eyes: brown
Distinguishing marks on
face: none

was - r e c o g n i z e d - as a citizen of the

Philippines as per pursuant to Article IV, Section 1,
Paragraph 3 of the 1935 Constitution per order of

Recognition JBL 95-213 signed by Associate

Commissioner Jose B. Lopez dated October 6,
1995, and duly affirmed by Secretary of Justice
Artemio G. Tuquero in his 1st Indorsement dated
June 8, 2000.
Issued for identification purposes only. NOT VALID
for travel purposes.
Given under my hand and seal this 11th day of
October, 1995

(SGD) EDGAR L. MENDOZA

ASSO. COMMISSIONER

Official Receipt No. 5939988

issued at Manila
dated Oct. 10, 1995 for P 2,000
From the text of ID Certificate No. RC 9778, the
following material facts and dates may be deduced:
(1) Bureau Associate Commissioner Jose B. Lopez
issued the Order of Recognition on October 6,
1995; (2) the 1st Indorsement of Secretary of
Justice Artemio G. Tuquero affirming Rebecca's
recognition as a Filipino citizen was issued on June
8, 2000 or almost five years from the date of the
order of recognition; and (3) ID Certificate No. RC
9778 was purportedly issued on October 11, 1995
after the payment of the PhP 2,000 fee on October
10, 1995 per OR No. 5939988.
What begs the question is, however, how the above
certificate could have been issued by the Bureau on
October 11, 1995 when the Secretary of Justice
issued the required affirmation only on June 8,
2000. No explanation was given for this patent
aberration. There seems to be no error with the
date of the issuance of the 1st Indorsement by
Secretary of Justice Tuquero as this Court takes
judicial notice that he was the Secretary of Justice
from February 16, 2000 to January 22, 2001. There
is, thus, a strong valid reason to conclude that the
certificate in question must be spurious.
Under extant immigration rules, applications for
recognition of Filipino citizenship require the
affirmation by the DOJ of the Order of Recognition
issued by the Bureau. Under Executive Order No.
292, also known as the 1987 Administrative Code,
specifically in its Title III, Chapter 1, Sec. 3(6), it is
the DOJ which is tasked to "provide immigration and
naturalization regulatory services and implement the

laws governing citizenship and the admission and

stay of aliens." Thus, the confirmation by the DOJ of
any Order of Recognition for Filipino citizenship
issued by the Bureau is required.
Pertinently, Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99002[35] on Recognition as a Filipino Citizen clearly
provides:
The Bureau [of Immigration] through its Records
Section shall automatically furnish the Department
of Justice an official copy of its Order of Recognition
within 72 days from its date of approval by the way
of indorsement for confirmation of the Order by the
Secretary of Justice pursuant to Executive Order
No. 292. No Identification Certificate shall be
issued before the date of confirmation by the
Secretary of Justice and any Identification
Certificate issued by the Bureau pursuant to an
Order of Recognition shall prominently indicate
thereon the date of confirmation by the Secretary of
Justice. (Emphasis ours.)
Not lost on the Court is the acquisition by Rebecca
of her Philippine passport only on June 13, 2000, or
five days after then Secretary of Justice Tuquero
issued the 1st Indorsement confirming the order of
recognition. It may be too much to attribute to
coincidence this unusual sequence of close events
which, to us, clearly suggests that prior to said
affirmation or confirmation, Rebecca was not yet
recognized as a Filipino citizen. The same
sequence would also imply that ID Certificate No.
RC 9778 could not have been issued in 1995, as
Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-002 mandates
that no identification certificate shall be issued
before the date of confirmation by the Secretary of
Justice. Logically, therefore, the affirmation or
confirmation of Rebecca's recognition as a Filipino
citizen through the 1st Indorsement issued only on
June 8, 2000 by Secretary of Justice Tuquero
corresponds to the eventual issuance of Rebecca's
passport a few days later, or on June 13, 2000 to be
exact.

the February 22, 1996 judgment of divorce from the

Dominican Republic.
The Court notes and at this juncture wishes to point
out that Rebecca voluntarily withdrew her original
petition for declaration of nullity (Civil Case No. 96378 of the Makati City RTC) obviously because she
could not show proof of her alleged Filipino
citizenship then. In fact, a perusal of that petition
shows that, while bearing the date January 26,
1996, it was only filed with the RTC on March 14,
1996 or less than a month after Rebecca secured,
on February 22, 1996, the foreign divorce decree in
question.
Consequently, there was no mention
about said divorce in the petition. Significantly, the
only documents appended as annexes to said
original petition were:
the Vicente-Rebecca
Marriage Contract (Annex "A") and Birth Certificate
of Alix (Annex "B"). If indeed ID Certificate No. RC
9778 from the Bureau was truly issued on October
11, 1995, is it not but logical to expect that this
piece of document be appended to form part of the
petition, the question of her citizenship being crucial
to her case?
As may be noted, the petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage under Civil Case No. 01094, like the withdrawn first petition, also did not
have the ID Certificate from the Bureau as
attachment. What were attached consisted of the
following material documents: Marriage Contract
(Annex "A") and Divorce Decree. It was only
through her Opposition (To Respondent's Motion to
Dismiss dated 31 May 2001)[36] did Rebecca
attach as Annex "C" ID Certificate No. RC 9778.
At any rate, the CA was correct in holding that the
RTC had sufficient basis to dismiss the petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage as said
petition, taken together with Vicente's motion to
dismiss and Rebecca's opposition to motion, with
their respective attachments, clearly made out a
case of lack of cause of action, which we will
expound later.

When Divorce Was Granted Rebecca, She Was not

a
Filipino Citizen and Was not Yet Recognized as
One

Validity of Divorce Decree

The Court can assume hypothetically that Rebecca

is now a Filipino citizen. But from the foregoing
disquisition, it is indubitable that Rebecca did not
have that status of, or at least was not yet
recognized as, a Filipino citizen when she secured

First, at the time of the divorce, as above

elucidated, Rebecca was still to be recognized,
assuming for argument that she was in fact later
recognized, as a Filipino citizen, but represented
herself in public documents as an American citizen.

Going to the second core issue, we find Civil

Decree Nos. 362/96 and 406/97 valid.

At the very least, she chose, before, during, and

shortly after her divorce, her American citizenship to
govern her marital relationship. Second, she
secured personally said divorce as an American
citizen, as is evident in the text of the Civil Decrees,
which pertinently declared:
IN THIS ACTION FOR DIVORCE in which the
parties expressly submit to the jurisdiction of this
court, by reason of the existing incompatibility of
temperaments x x x. The parties MARIA REBECCA
M. BAYOT, of United States nationality, 42 years of
age, married, domiciled and residing at 502 Acacia
Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Philippines, x x
x, who personally appeared before this court,
accompanied by DR. JUAN ESTEBAN OLIVERO,
attorney, x x x and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT,
of Philippine nationality, of 43 years of age, married
and domiciled and residing at 502 Acacia Ave.,
Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Filipino, appeared
before this court represented by DR. ALEJANDRO
TORRENS, attorney, x x x, revalidated by special
power of attorney given the 19th of February of
1996, signed before the Notary Public Enrico L.
Espanol of the City of Manila, duly legalized and
authorizing him to subscribe all the acts concerning
this case.[37] (Emphasis ours.)
Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was
bound by the national laws of the United States of
America, a country which allows divorce. Fourth,
the property relations of Vicente and Rebecca were
properly adjudicated through their Agreement[38]
executed on December 14, 1996 after Civil Decree
No. 362/96 was rendered on February 22, 1996,
and duly affirmed by Civil Decree No. 406/97 issued
on March 4, 1997. Veritably, the foreign divorce
secured by Rebecca was valid.
To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the holding
in Garcia v. Recio that a foreign divorce can be
recognized here, provided the divorce decree is
proven as a fact and as valid under the national law
of the alien spouse.[39] Be this as it may, the fact
that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when
she secured the divorce and that divorce is
recognized and allowed in any of the States of the
Union,[40] the presentation of a copy of foreign
divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign
court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.
It bears to stress that the existence of the divorce
decree has not been denied, but in fact admitted by
both parties. And neither did they impeach the
jurisdiction of the divorce court nor challenge the
validity of its proceedings on the ground of
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law,

albeit both appeared to have the opportunity to do

so. The same holds true with respect to the decree
of partition of their conjugal property. As this Court
explained in Roehr v. Rodriguez:
Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata
to a foreign judgment [of divorce] x x x, it must be
shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had
been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds
allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of
Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure), to wit:
SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments.The effect of
a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having
jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the
judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the
judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest
by a subsequent title; but the judgment may be
repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want
of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact.
It is essential that there should be an opportunity to
challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the
court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its
efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of Court
clearly provide that with respect to actions in
personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a
foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie
evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and,
as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.[41]
As the records show, Rebecca, assisted by counsel,
personally secured the foreign divorce while Vicente
was duly represented by his counsel, a certain Dr.
Alejandro Torrens, in said proceedings. As things
stand, the foreign divorce decrees rendered and
issued by the Dominican Republic court are valid
and, consequently, bind both Rebecca and Vicente.
Finally, the fact that Rebecca may have been duly
recognized as a Filipino citizen by force of the June
8, 2000 affirmation by Secretary of Justice Tuquero
of the October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of Recognition
will not, standing alone, work to nullify or invalidate
the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an
American citizen on February 22, 1996. For as we
stressed at the outset, in determining whether or not
a divorce secured abroad would come within the
pale of the country's policy against absolute divorce,

the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties

at the time a valid divorce is obtained.[42]

marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid

divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry.[45]

Legal Effects of the Valid Divorce

Both elements obtain in the instant case. We need

not belabor further the fact of marriage of Vicente
and Rebecca, their citizenship when they wed, and
their professed citizenship during the valid divorce
proceedings.

Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by

Rebecca, the same shall be given a res judicata
effect in this jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the
divorce decree obtained, the marital vinculum
between Rebecca and Vicente is considered
severed; they are both freed from the bond of
matrimony. In plain language, Vicente and Rebecca
are no longer husband and wife to each other. As
the divorce court formally pronounced: "[T]hat the
marriage between MARIA REBECCA M. BAYOT
and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT is hereby
dissolved x x x leaving them free to remarry after
completing the legal requirements."[43]
Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage,
Vicente could no longer be subject to a husband's
obligation under the Civil Code. He cannot, for
instance, be obliged to live with, observe respect
and fidelity, and render support to Rebecca.[44]
The divorce decree in question also brings into play
the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code,
providing as follows:
Art. 26. x x x x
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by E.O.
227)
In Republic v. Orbecido III, we spelled out the twin
elements for the applicability of the second
paragraph of Art. 26, thus:
x x x [W]e state the twin elements for the application
of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:

Not to be overlooked of course is the fact that Civil

Decree No. 406/97 and the Agreement executed on
December 14, 1996 bind both Rebecca and Vicente
as regards their property relations. The Agreement
provided that the ex-couple's conjugal property
consisted only their family home, thus:
That the parties stipulate that the conjugal property
which they acquired during their marriage consists
only of the real property and all the improvements
and personal properties therein contained at 502
Acacia Avenue, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa,
covered by TCT No. 168301 dated Feb. 7, 1990
issued by the Register of Deeds of Makati, Metro
Manila registered in the name of Vicente M. Bayot,
married to Rebecca M. Bayot, x x x.[46] (Emphasis
ours.)
This property settlement embodied in the
Agreement was affirmed by the divorce court which,
per its second divorce decree, Civil Decree No.
406/97 dated March 4, 1997, ordered that, "THIRD:
That the agreement entered into between the
parties dated 14th day of December 1996 in Makati
City, Philippines shall survive in this Judgment of
divorce by reference but not merged and that the
parties are hereby ordered and directed to comply
with each and every provision of said
agreement."[47]
Rebecca has not repudiated the property settlement
contained in the Agreement. She is thus estopped
by her representation before the divorce court from
asserting that her and Vicente's conjugal property
was not limited to their family home in Ayala
Alabang.[48]

There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated

between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and

No Cause of Action in the Petition for Nullity of

Marriage

A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien

spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

Upon the foregoing disquisitions, it is abundantly

clear to the Court that Rebecca lacks, under the
premises, cause of action. Philippine Bank of
Communications v. Trazo explains the concept and
elements of a cause of action, thus:

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the

parties at the time of the celebration of the

A cause of action is an act or omission of one party

in violation of the legal right of the other. A motion
to dismiss based on lack of cause of action
hypothetically admits the truth of the allegations in
the complaint. The allegations in a complaint are
sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the
defendants if, hypothetically admitting the facts
alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon
the same in accordance with the prayer therein. A
cause of action exists if the following elements are
present, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by
whatever means and under whatever law it arises or
is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the
named defendant to respect or not to violate such
right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such
defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of the
defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may
maintain an action for recovery of damages.[49]
One thing is clear from a perusal of Rebecca's
underlying petition before the RTC, Vicente's motion
to dismiss and Rebecca's opposition thereof, with
the documentary evidence attached therein: The
petitioner lacks a cause of action for declaration of
nullity of marriage, a suit which presupposes the
existence of a marriage.
To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of
action, the movant must show that the claim for
relief does not exist rather than that a claim has
been defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite,
or uncertain.[50] With the valid foreign divorce
secured by Rebecca, there is no more marital tie
binding her to Vicente. There is in fine no more
marriage to be dissolved or nullified.
The Court to be sure does not lose sight of the legal
obligation of Vicente and Rebecca to support the
needs of their daughter, Alix. The records do not
clearly show how he had discharged his duty, albeit
Rebecca alleged that the support given had been
insufficient. At any rate, we do note that Alix,
having been born on November 27, 1982, reached
the majority age on November 27, 2000, or four
months before her mother initiated her petition for
declaration of nullity. She would now be 26 years
old. Hence, the issue of back support, which
allegedly had been partly shouldered by Rebecca,
is best litigated in a separate civil action for
reimbursement. In this way, the actual figure for the
support of Alix can be proved as well as the earning
capacity of both Vicente and Rebecca. The trial
court can thus determine what Vicente owes, if any,
considering that support includes provisions until

the child concerned shall have finished her

education.
Upon the foregoing considerations, the Court no
longer need to delve into the issue tendered in G.R.
No. 155635, that is, Rebecca's right to support
pendente lite. As it were, her entitlement to that kind
of support hinges on the tenability of her petition
under Civil Case No. 01-094 for declaration of nullity
of marriage. The dismissal of Civil Case No. 01-094
by the CA veritably removed any legal anchorage
for, and effectively mooted, the claim for support
pendente lite.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in G.R. No.
155635 is hereby DISMISSED on the ground of
mootness, while the petition for review in G.R. No.
163979 is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
Accordingly, the March 25, 2004 Decision and June
4, 2004 Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No.
68187 are hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, (Chairperson), Carpio-Morales, Tinga,
and Brion, JJ., concur.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------[1] Rollo (G.R. No. 155635), pp. 3-34.

[2] Id. at 36-38. Penned by Associate, now
Presiding, Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and
concurred in by Associate Justices Andres B.
Reyes, Jr. and Mario L. Guaria III.
[3] Id. at 40-41.
[4] Rollo (G.R. No. 163979), pp. 10-43.
[5] Id. at 575-583.
[6] Id. at 145.
[7] See Certification of Birth from the Government of
Guam issued on June 1, 2000; rollo (G.R. No.
155635), p. 213.
[8] Rollo (G.R. No. 163979), pp. 146-150.
[9] Id. at 214-217.
[10] Rollo (G.R. No. 155635), pp. 151-158.

[11] Id. at 154.

[12] Rollo (G.R. No. 163979), pp. 206-212.
[13] Id. at 305-306. Per a motion to withdraw dated
November 8, 1996.

[33] Rollo (G.R. No. 155635), pp. 388-389, issued

on January 18, 1995 with expiration date on
January 17, 2005.
[34] Supra note 15.
[35] Adopted on April 15, 1999.

[14] Id. at 213. Per Order of Judge Josefina

Guevara Salonga dated November 14, 1996.

[36] Rollo (G.R. No. 163979), pp. 268-292.

[15] Id. at 236-237.

[37] Id. at 147, 214-215.

[16] Id. at 126-144.

[38] Supra note 10.

[17] Id. at 156-204.

[39] Supra note 31.

[18] Id. at 123-124. Penned by Presiding Judge

Alberto L. Lerma.

[40] Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., No. L-68470, October

8, 1985, 139 SCRA 139, 143.

[19] Id. at 338.

[41] G.R. No. 142820, June 20, 2003, 404 SCRA

495, 502-503.

[20] Id. at 125. Per Order dated November 20,

2001.

[42] Id. at 501-502.

[21] Rollo (G.R. No. 155635), pp. 512-590.

[43] Rollo (G.R. No. 163979), pp. 148, 216.

[22] Id. at 592-593.

[44] Van Dorn, supra note 40, at 144.

[23] Id. at 38.

[45] G.R. No. 154380,October 5, 2005, 472 SCRA

114, 122.

[24] Id. at 852-869.

[46] Rollo (G.R. No. 155635), p. 154.
[25] Id. at 850-851.
[47] Rollo (G.R. No. 163979), p. 215.
[26] Supra note 5, at 583.
[48] Van Dorn, supra note 44.
[27] G.R. No. 137898, December 15, 2000, 348
SCRA 401, 409.
[28] Enumerated in San Lorenzo Village
Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
116825 March 26, 1998, 288 SCRA 115, 125: (1)
the legal right of the plaintiff, (2) the correlative
obligation of the defendant, and (3) the act or
omission of the defendant in violation of said legal
right.

[49] G.R. No. 165500, August 30, 2006, 500 SCRA

242, 251-252; citations omitted.
[50] Azur v. Provincial Board, No. L-22333,
February 27, 1969, 27 SCRA 50, 57-58.

[29] Rollo (G.R. No. 163979), p. 597.

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010 ]
GERBERT R. CORPUZ, PETITIONER, VS.
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS AND THE
SOLICITOR GENERAL, RESPONDENTS.

[30] Id. at 22-23.

DECISION

[31] Garcia v. Recio, G.R. No. 138322, October 2,

2001, 366 SCRA 437, 447.

BRION, J.:

[32] Llorente v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124371,

November 23, 2000, 345 SCRA 592, 600.

Before the Court is a direct appeal from the

decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated via a petition for

review on certiorari[2] under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court (present petition).
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino
citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through
naturalization on November 29, 2000.[3]
On
January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent
Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.[4]
Due to work and other professional commitments,
Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He
returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005
to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover
that his wife was having an affair with another man.
Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada
and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court
of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted
Gerbert's petition for divorce on December 8, 2005.
The divorce decree took effect a month later, on
January 8, 2006.[5]
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on
and has found another Filipina to love. Desirous of
marrying his new Filipina fiance in the Philippines,
Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office
and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his
and Daisylyn's marriage certificate. Despite the
registration of the divorce decree, an official of the
National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert
that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still
subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the
foreign divorce decree must first be judicially
recognized by a competent Philippine court,
pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.[6]
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial
recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of
marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC.
Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any
responsive pleading but submitted instead a
notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She
offered no opposition to Gerbert's petition and, in
fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself
but was prevented by financial and personal
circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be
considered as a party-in-interest with a similar
prayer to Gerbert's.
In its October 30, 2008 decision,[7] the RTC denied
Gerbert's petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert
was not the proper party to institute the action for
judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as
he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that
only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy,
under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code,[8] in order for him or her to be able to
remarry under Philippine law.[9] Article 26 of the
Family Code reads:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the

Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5)
and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.

This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with

the legislative intent behind the enactment of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
as determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido
III;[10] the provision was enacted to "avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a
divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse."[11]

THE PETITION

From the RTC's ruling,[12] Gerbert filed the present

petition.[13]
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is
essentially for declaratory relief, similar to that filed
in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a
determination of his rights under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking
into account the rationale behind the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he
contends that the provision applies as well to the
benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC
ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by
limiting the standing to file the petition only to the
Filipino spouse - an interpretation he claims to be
contrary to the essence of the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code. He considers himself
as a proper party, vested with sufficient legal
interest, to institute the case, as there is a possibility
that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries
his Filipina fiance in the Philippines since two
marriage certificates, involving him, would be on file
with the Civil Registry Office. The Office of the
Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their respective
Comments,[14] both support Gerbert's position.

Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether

the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of
this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign
divorce decree.

cases, the Court refused to acknowledge the alien

spouse's assertion of marital rights after a foreign
court's divorce decree between the alien and the
Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the
foreign divorce had already severed the marital
bond between the spouses. The Court reasoned in
Van Dorn v. Romillo that:

THE COURT'S RULING

The alien spouse can claim no right under the

second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of
the Filipino spouse
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the
legislative history and intent behind the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of
defective marriages - void[15] and voidable[16]
marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial
declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the
marriage exists before or at the time of the
marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates
the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising
after the marriage.[17] Our family laws do not
recognize absolute divorce between Filipino
citizens.[18]
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in
marriages between a Filipino and an alien,
President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her
legislative
powers
under
the
Freedom
Constitution,[19] enacted Executive Order No. (EO)
227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its
present wording, as follows:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the

Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5)
and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated into
the law this Court's holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo,
Jr.[20] and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.[21] In both

To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino

spouse] has to be considered still married to [the
alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's obligations
x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should
not be obliged to live together with, observe respect
and fidelity, and render support to [the alien
spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one of
her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property.
She should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served.[22]
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was
included in the law "to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the
alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse."[23] The
legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino
spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status,
settling the doubts created by the divorce decree.
Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a
substantive right to have his or her marriage to the
alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating
him or her to remarry.[24] Without the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the
judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce,
whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that
purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding,
would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse
since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode
of severing the marital bond;[25] Article 17 of the
Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute
divorces cannot be subverted by judgments
promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of
the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family
Code provides the direct exception to this rule and
serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of
the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or
her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not
limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce
decree.
If the court finds that the decree
capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts
can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise
capacitated to contract another marriage. No court
in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar

declaration for the alien spouse (other than that

already established by the decree), whose status
and legal capacity are generally governed by his
national law.[26]
Given the rationale and intent behind the
enactment, and the purpose of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC
was correct in limiting the applicability of the
provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In
other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code;
the alien spouse can claim no right under this
provision.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence
of a right that clothes the party with legal interest to
petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion - i.e., that the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
bestows no rights in favor of aliens - with the
complementary statement that this conclusion is not
sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert's petition before
the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal
interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his
foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree
itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the
alien's national law have been duly proven
according to our rules of evidence, serves as a
presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert,
pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court which provides for the effect of foreign
judgments. This Section states:

SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final

orders.--The effect of a judgment or final order of a
tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to
render the judgment or final order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a
specific thing, the judgment or final order is
conclusive upon the title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a
person, the judgment or final order is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be
repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want
of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact.

To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject

of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party
with the requisite interest to institute an action
before our courts for the recognition of the foreign
judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared,
no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien
abroad may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided the divorce is valid according to his or her
national law.[27]
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign
divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our
courts do not take judicial notice of foreign
judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained
that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect
within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a
tribunal of another country."[28] This means that
the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be
proven as facts under our rules on evidence,
together with the alien's applicable national law to
show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself
or herself.[29] The recognition may be made in an
action instituted specifically for the purpose or in
another action where a party invokes the foreign
decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
In Gerbert's case, since both the foreign divorce
decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing
his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be
official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play.
This Section requires proof, either by (1) official
publications or (2) copies attested by the officer
having legal custody of the documents. If the
copies of official records are not kept in the
Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a
certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record
is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his
petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the
required certificates proving its authenticity,[30] but
failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on
divorce.[31] Under this situation, we can, at this
point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of
supporting evidence, unless we deem it more
appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to
determine whether the divorce decree is consistent
with the Canadian divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter
course of action, given the Article 26 interests that
will be served and the Filipina wife's (Daisylyn's)
obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at

the same time, will allow other interested parties to

oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a
petitioner's presumptive evidence of a right by
proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be
taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a
recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once
recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata[32]
between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule
39 of the Rules of Court.[33]
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is
served by the practice of reciprocal recognition of
foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata
effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as
the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition
and for considering the alien spouse bound by its
terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will
not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the
substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code provides.
Considerations beyond the recognition of the
foreign divorce decree
As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note
that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already
recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and
Daisylyn's marriage certificate based on the mere
presentation of the decree.[34] We consider the
recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to
draw attention of the bench and the bar to what had
been done.
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts,
events and judicial decrees concerning the civil
status of persons shall be recorded in the civil
register." The law requires the entry in the civil
registry of judicial decrees that produce legal
consequences touching upon a person's legal
capacity and status, i.e., those affecting "all his
personal qualities and relations, more or less
permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his
own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate,
or his being married or not."[35]
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although
a foreign one, affecting a person's legal capacity
and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No.
3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil Status
specifically requires the registration of divorce
decrees in the civil registry:

Sec. 1. Civil Register. - A civil register is established

for recording the civil status of persons, in which
shall be entered:

(a) births;
(b) deaths;
(c) marriages;
(d) annulments of marriages;
(e) divorces;
(f) legitimations;
(g) adoptions;
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;
(i) naturalization; and
(j) changes of name.
xxxx

Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. -- The local registrars

shall keep and preserve in their offices the following
books, in which they shall, respectively make the
proper entries concerning the civil status of persons:
(1) Birth and death register;
(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not
only the marriages solemnized but also divorces
and dissolved marriages.
(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption,
change of name and naturalization register.

But while the law requires the entry of the divorce

decree in the civil registry, the law and the
submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso
facto authorize the decree's registration. The law
should be read in relation with the requirement of a
judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it
can be given res judicata effect. In the context of
the present case, no judicial order as yet exists
recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the
Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of
turn and without authority of law when it annotated
the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and
Daisylyn's marriage certificate, on the strength
alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was
aware of the requirement of a court recognition, as it
cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982,[36] and
Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of
1982[37] - both of which required a final order from
a competent Philippine court before a foreign
judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered
in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the

registration of the decree. For being contrary to

law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree
without the requisite judicial recognition is patently
void and cannot produce any legal effect.
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that
the recognition that the RTC may extend to the
Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself,
authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil
registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign
judgment is not the proper proceeding,
contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the
cancellation of entries in the civil registry.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry
in a civil register shall be changed or corrected,
without judicial order."
The Rules of Court
supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by
specifically providing for a special remedial
proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may
be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and
procedural requirements that must be complied with
before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or
correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It
also requires, among others, that the verified
petition must be filed with the RTC of the province
where the corresponding civil registry is located;[38]
that the civil registrar and all persons who have or
claim any interest must be made parties to the
proceedings;[39] and that the time and place for
hearing must be published in a newspaper of
general circulation.[40] As these basic jurisdictional
requirements have not been met in the present
case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed
with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling
should not be construed as requiring two separate
proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce
decree in the civil registry - one for recognition of
the foreign decree and another specifically for
cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign
divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special
proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right
of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108
of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate
adversarial proceeding[41] by which the applicability
of the foreign judgment can be measured and
tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake
of law or fact.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review

on certiorari, and REVERSE the October 30, 2008
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City,
Branch 11, as well as its February 17, 2009 order.
We order the REMAND of the case to the trial court
for further proceedings in accordance with our ruling
above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the
Civil Registrar General. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio Morales, (Chairperson), Bersamin, *Abad,
and Villarama, Jr., JJ., concur.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------*
Designated additional Member of the Third
Division, in view of the retirement of Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno, per Special Order No. 843 dated
May 17, 2010.
[1] Dated October 30, 2008, penned by Judge Perla
B. Querubin; rollo, pp. 24-31.
[2] Id. at 3-20.
[3] Id. at 27.
[4] Marriage Certificate, id. at 37.
[5] Certificate of Divorce, id. at 38.
[6] Id. at 47-50; the pertinent portion of NSO
Circular No. 4, series of 1982, states:
It would therefore be premature to register the
decree of annulment in the Register of Annulment of
Marriages in Manila, unless and until final order of
execution of such foreign judgment is issued by
competent Philippine court.
[7] Supra note 1.
[8] Executive Order No. 209, enacted on July 6,
1987.
[9] Rollo, p. 31.
[10] G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005, 472 SCRA
114.
[11] Id. at 121.

[12] Gerbert's motion for reconsideration of the

RTC's October 30, 2008 decision was denied in an
order dated February 17, 2009; rollo, p. 32.

judgments promulgated, or by determinations or

conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

[15] The void marriages are those enumerated

under Articles 35, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41, 44, and 53 in
relation to Article 52 of the Family Code.

[26] Parenthetically, we add that an alien's legal

capacity to contract is evidenced by a certificate
issued by his or her respective diplomatic and
consular officials, which he or she must present to
secure a marriage license (Article 21, Family Code).
The Filipino spouse who seeks to remarry, however,
must still resort to a judicial action for a declaration
of authority to remarry.

[16] The voidable marriages are those enumerated

under Article 45 of the Family Code.

[27] Garcia v. Recio, supra note 17 at 447; citing

Van Dorn v. Romillo, supra note 20.

[17] Garcia v. Recio, G.R. No. 138322, October 2,

2001, 366 SCRA 437, 452.

[28] Remedial Law, Volume II, Rules 23-56 (2007

ed.), p. 529.

[18] Ibid. See A. Tolentino, Commentaries and

Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines,
Volume One, with the Family Code of the
Philippines (2004 ed.), p. 262.

[29] Republic v. Orbecido III, supra note 10 at 123

and Garcia v. Recio, supra note 17 at 448; see also
Bayot v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 155635,
November 7, 2008, 570 SCRA 472.

[19] Proclamation No. 3, issued on March 25, 1996.

[30] Rollo, pp. 38-41.

[20] G.R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985, 139 SCRA

139.

[31] The foreign divorce decree only stated that the

marriage between Gerbert and Daisylyn was
dissolved by the Canadian court. The full text of the
court's judgment was not included.

[13] Supra note 2.

[14] Rollo, pp. 79-87 and 125-142, respectively.

[21] G.R. No. 80116, June 30, 1989, 174 SCRA

653.
[22] Van Dorn v. Romillo, supra note 20 at 144.
[23] Republic v. Orbecido, supra note 10 at 121.
[24] The capacity of the Filipino spouse to remarry,
however, depends on whether the foreign divorce
decree capacitated the alien spouse to do so.
[25] See Article 17 in relation to Article 15 of the
Civil Code:

Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or

to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines,
even though living abroad.

xxxx

Art. 17. x x x Prohibitive laws concerning persons,

their acts or property, and those which have for their
object public order, public policy and good customs
shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or

[32] Literally means "a thing adjudged," Black's Law

Dictionary (5th ed.), p. 1178; it establishes a rule
that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a
court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the
rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits,
on points and matters determined in the former.
Supra note 28 at 462.
[33] See Philsec Investment Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 103493, June 19, 1997, 274
SCRA 102, 110, where the Court said:

While this Court has given the effect of res judicata

to foreign judgments in several cases, it was after
the parties opposed to the judgment had been given
ample opportunity to repel them on grounds allowed
under the law. It is not necessary for this purpose to
initiate a separate action or proceeding for
enforcement of the foreign judgment. What is
essential is that there is opportunity to challenge the
foreign judgment, in order for the court to properly
determine its efficacy. This is because in this
jurisdiction, with respect to actions in personam, as
distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign
judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of

the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is

subject to proof to the contrary.

[34] On the face of the marriage certificate, the word

"DIVORCED" was written in big, bold letters; rollo,
p. 37.
[35] Silverio v. Republic, G.R. No. 174689, October
22, 2007, 537 SCRA 373, 390, citing Beduya v.
Republic, 120 Phil. 114 (1964).

administration for her appointment as administratrix

of the intestate estate of Orlando. The case was
docketed as Special Proceedings (Spec. Proc.) No.
228.
On 3 March 2005, while Spec. Proc. No. 228 was
pending, respondent Louella A. Catalan-Lee, one of
the children of Orlando from his first marriage, filed
a similar petition with the RTC docketed as Spec.
Proc. No. 232.
The two cases were subsequently consolidated.

[36] Rollo, pp. 47-50.

[37] Id. at 51.
[38] Section 1, Rule 108, Rules of Court.
[39] Section 3, Rule 108, Rules of Court.
[40] Section 4, Rule 108, Rules of Court.
[41] When the entry sought to be corrected is
substantial (i.e., the civil status of a person), a Rule
108 proceeding is deemed adversarial in nature.
See Co v. Civil Register of Manila, G.R. No.
138496, February 23, 2004, 423 SCRA 420, 430.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G. R. No. 183622, February 08, 2012 ]
MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CATALAN,
PETITIONER, VS. LOUELLA A. CATALAN-LEE,
RESPONDENT.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review assailing the

Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[1] and Resolution[2]
regarding the issuance of letters of administration of
the intestate estate of Orlando B. Catalan.
The facts are as follows:
Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American
citizen. After allegedly obtaining a divorce in the
United States from his first wife, Felicitas Amor, he
contracted a second marriage with petitioner herein.
On 18 November 2004, Orlando died intestate in
the Philippines.
Thereafter, on 28 February 2005, petitioner filed
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City
a Petition for the issuance of letters of

Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of Spec. Proc.

No. 232 on the ground of litis pendentia, considering
that Spec. Proc. No. 228 covering the same estate
was already pending.
On the other hand, respondent alleged that
petitioner was not considered an interested person
qualified to file a petition for the issuance of letters
of administration of the estate of Orlando. In support
of her contention, respondent alleged that a criminal
case for bigamy was filed against petitioner before
Branch 54 of the RTC of Alaminos, Pangasinan,
and docketed as Crim. Case No. 2699-A.
Apparently, Felicitas Amor filed a Complaint for
bigamy, alleging that petitioner contracted a second
marriage to Orlando despite having been married to
one Eusebio Bristol on 12 December 1959.
On 6 August 1998, the RTC had acquitted petitioner
of bigamy.[3] The trial court ruled that since the
deceased was a divorced American citizen, and
since that divorce was not recognized under
Philippine jurisdiction, the marriage between him
and petitioner was not valid.
Furthermore, it took note of the action for
declaration of nullity then pending action with the
trial court in Dagupan City filed by Felicitas Amor
against the deceased and petitioner. It considered
the pending action to be a prejudicial question in
determining the guilt of petitioner for the crime of
bigamy.
Finally, the trial court found that, in the first place,
petitioner had never been married to Eusebio
Bristol.
On 26 June 2006, Branch 70 of the RTC of Burgos,
Pangasinan dismissed the Petition for the issuance
of letters of administration filed by petitioner and
granted that of private respondent. Contrary to its
findings in Crim. Case No. 2699-A, the RTC held
that the marriage between petitioner and Eusebio

Bristol was valid and subsisting when she married

Orlando. Without expounding, it reasoned further
that her acquittal in the previous bigamy case was
fatal to her cause. Thus, the trial court held that
petitioner was not an interested party who may file a
petition
for
the
issuance
of
letters
of
administration.[4]
After the subsequent denial of her Motion for
Reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to
the Court of Appeals (CA) via her Petition for
Certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the RTC in dismissing her Petition for the
issuance of letters of administration.
Petitioner reiterated before the CA that the Petition
filed by respondent should have been dismissed on
the ground of litis pendentia. She also insisted that,
while a petition for letters of administration may
have been filed by an "uninterested person," the
defect was cured by the appearance of a real partyin-interest. Thus, she insisted that, to determine
who has a better right to administer the decedent's
properties, the RTC should have first required the
parties to present their evidence before it ruled on
the matter.
On 18 October 2007, the CA promulgated the
assailed Decision. First, it held that petitioner
undertook the wrong remedy. She should have
instead filed a petition for review rather than a
petition for certiorari. Nevertheless, since the
Petition for Certiorari was filed within the fifteen-day
reglementary period for filing a petition for review
under Sec. 4 of Rule 43, the CA allowed the Petition
and continued to decide on the merits of the case.
Thus, it ruled in this wise:

As to the issue of litis pendentia, we find it not

applicable in the case. For litis pendentia to be a
ground for the dismissal of an action, there must be:
(a) identity of the parties or at least such as to
represent the same interest in both actions; (b)
identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the
relief being founded on the same acts, and (c) the
identity in the two cases should be such that the
judgment which may be rendered in one would,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to
res judicata in the other. A petition for letters of
administration is a special proceeding. A special
proceeding is an application or proceeding to
establish the status or right of a party, or a particular
fact. And, in contrast to an ordinary civil action, a
special proceeding involves no defendant or
respondent. The only party in this kind of
proceeding is the petitioner of the applicant.

Considering its nature, a subsequent petition for

letters of administration can hardly be barred by a
similar pending petition involving the estate of the
same decedent unless both petitions are filed by the
same person. In the case at bar, the petitioner was
not a party to the petition filed by the private
respondent, in the same manner that the latter was
not made a party to the petition filed by the former.
The first element of litis pendentia is wanting. The
contention of the petitioner must perforce fail.
Moreover, to yield to the contention of the petitioner
would render nugatory the provision of the Rules
requiring a petitioner for letters of administration to
be an "interested party," inasmuch as any person,
for that matter, regardless of whether he has valid
interest in the estate sought to be administered,
could be appointed as administrator for as long as
he files his petition ahead of any other person, in
derogation of the rights of those specifically
mentioned in the order of preference in the
appointment of administrator under Rule 78, Section
6 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:

xxx xxx xxx

The petitioner, armed with a marriage certificate,

filed her petition for letters of administration. As a
spouse, the petitioner would have been preferred to
administer the estate of Orlando B. Catalan.
However, a marriage certificate, like any other
public document, is only prima facie evidence of the
facts stated therein. The fact that the petitioner had
been charged with bigamy and was acquitted has
not been disputed by the petitioner. Bigamy is an
illegal marriage committed by contracting a second
or subsequent marriage before the first marriage
has been dissolved or before the absent spouse
has been declared presumptively dead by a
judgment rendered in a proper proceedings. The
deduction of the trial court that the acquittal of the
petitioner in the said case negates the validity of her
subsequent marriage with Orlando B. Catalan has
not been disproved by her. There was not even an
attempt from the petitioner to deny the findings of
the trial court. There is therefore no basis for us to
make a contrary finding. Thus, not being an
interested party and a stranger to the estate of
Orlando B. Catalan, the dismissal of her petition for
letters of administration by the trial court is in place.

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is

DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.[5] (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of this
Decision.[6] She alleged that the reasoning of the
CA was illogical in stating, on the one hand, that
she was acquitted of bigamy, while, on the other
hand, still holding that her marriage with Orlando
was invalid. She insists that with her acquittal of the
crime of bigamy, the marriage enjoys the
presumption of validity.
On 20 June 2008, the CA denied her motion.

In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. we held that owing to the

nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the
Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by
the policy against absolute divorces, the same
being considered contrary to our concept of public
policy and morality. In the same case, the Court
ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
provided they are valid according to their national
law.
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v.
Court of Appeals, that once proven that respondent
was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained
the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn
would become applicable and petitioner could "very
well lose her right to inherit" from him.

Hence, this Petition.

At the outset, it seems that the RTC in the special
proceedings failed to appreciate the finding of the
RTC in Crim. Case No. 2699-A that petitioner was
never married to Eusebio Bristol. Thus, the trial
court concluded that, because petitioner was
acquitted of bigamy, it follows that the first marriage
with Bristol still existed and was valid. By failing to
take note of the findings of fact on the nonexistence
of the marriage between petitioner and Bristol, both
the RTC and CA held that petitioner was not an
interested party in the estate of Orlando.
Second, it is imperative to note that at the time the
bigamy case in Crim. Case No. 2699-A was
dismissed, we had already ruled that under the
principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a
valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign
nationality. This doctrine was established as early
as 1985 in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[7] wherein we
said:

It is true that owing to the nationality principle

embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorces[,] the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy
and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national
law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released
private respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which divorce
dissolves the marriage. xxx
We reiterated this principle in Llorente v. Court of
Appeals,[8] to wit:

In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, we recognized the divorce

obtained by the respondent in his country, the
Federal Republic of Germany. There, we stated that
divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in
the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned
in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on
the status of persons.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of
the Court of Appeals must be reversed. We hold
that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente
from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in
this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. xxx
Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still first be
proven as we have enunciated in Garcia v. Recio,[9]
to wit:

Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a

foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary
value, the document must first be presented and
admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is
proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best
evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The
decree purports to be a written act or record of an
act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign
country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other
hand, a writing or document may be proven as a
public or official record of a foreign country by either
(1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof
attested by the officer having legal custody of the
document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by
a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record

is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his

office.

respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent

Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.

The divorce decree between respondent and Editha

Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by
an Australian family court. However, appearance is
not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned
rules on evidence must be demonstrated.

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts

cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any
other facts, they must be alleged and proved.
Australian marital laws are not among those matters
that judges are supposed to know by reason of their
judicial function. The power of judicial notice must
be exercised with caution, and every reasonable
doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the
negative. (Emphasis supplied)

Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the

divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in
evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its
admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been
registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan
City. The trial court ruled that it was admissible,
subject to petitioner's qualification. Hence, it was
admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the
judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to object properly
rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written
act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.

It appears that the trial court no longer required

petitioner to prove the validity of Orlando's divorce
under the laws of the United States and the
marriage between petitioner and the deceased.
Thus, there is a need to remand the proceedings to
the trial court for further reception of evidence to
establish the fact of divorce.

Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52)

of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent
was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws
after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992.
Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien
and clothing him with the political and civil rights
belonging to a citizen. Naturalized citizens, freed
from the protective cloak of their former states, don
the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming
an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to
the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied
him to Philippine personal laws.

Should petitioner prove the validity of the divorce

and the subsequent marriage, she has the
preferential right to be issued the letters of
administration over the estate. Otherwise, letters of
administration may be issued to respondent, who is
undisputedly the daughter or next of kin of the
deceased, in accordance with Sec. 6 of Rule 78 of
the Revised Rules of Court.

Burden of Proving Australian Law

Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the

divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee
which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry,
would have vested Felicidad with the legal
personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo's
surviving spouse. However, the records show that
there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of
the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the
marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the
laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, the Court laid
down the specific guidelines for pleading and
proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held
that presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due
execution must be presented. Under Sections 24
and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be
proven as a public or official record of a foreign
country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a
copy thereof attested by the officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is not kept in
the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied
by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service

Respondent contends that the burden to prove

Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner, because
she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign
judgment. He contends that petitioner was satisfied
with the original of the divorce decree and was
cognizant of the marital laws of Australia, because
she had lived and worked in that country for quite a
long time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is
allegedly known by Philippine courts; thus, judges
may take judicial notice of foreign laws in the
exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with
the "party who alleges the existence of a fact or
thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an
action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of
proving the material allegations of the complaint
when those are denied by the answer; and
defendants have the burden of proving the material
allegations in their answer when they introduce new
matters. Since the divorce was a defense raised by

This is consistent with our ruling in San Luis v. San

Luis,[10] in which we said:

stationed in the foreign country in which the record

is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office.

[6] Id. at 31-36.

With regard to respondent's marriage to Felicisimo

allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she
submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate
and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of
California which purportedly show that their
marriage was done in accordance with the said law.
As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be
alleged and proved.

[8] 399 Phil. 342, 355-356 (2000).

Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial

court for further reception of evidence on the
divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the
marriage of respondent and Felicisimo. (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, it is imperative for the trial court to first
determine the validity of the divorce to ascertain the
rightful party to be issued the letters of
administration over the estate of Orlando B.
Catalan.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is
hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated
18 October 2007 and the Resolution dated 20 June
2008 of the Court of Appeals are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let this case be
REMANDED to Branch 70 of the Regional Trial
Court of Burgos, Pangasinan for further
proceedings in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Perez, and Reyes, JJ.,
concur.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------[1] Penned by Associate Justice Amelita G.

Tolentino, with Associate Justices Lucenito N. Tagle
and Ramon R. Garcia concurring; rollo, pp. 20-30.
[2] Id. at 49.
[3] Id. at 38-45; penned by Judge Jules A. Mejia.
[4] As narrated by the Court of Appeals on p. 3 of its
Decision.
[5] Rollo, pp. 26-29.

[7] 223 Phil. 357, 362 (1985).

[9] 418 Phil. 723, 723-735 (2001).

[10] G.R. Nos. 133743 & 134029, 6 February 2007,
514 SCRA 294, 313-314.