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Chapter 13

Can the Intelligence Community Keep
Pace with the Threat?
Jeffrey T. Richelson

On November 25, 1991, President George Bush signed National
Security Review Directive 29, "Intelligence Capabilities 19922005." The directive required over twenty government agencies
to specify their intelligence requirements and priorities for the
next thirteen years. Among the highest priorities specified were
intelligence on the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.!
Few, if any, would disagree with the proposition that monitoring nuclear proliferation activities should be a major task for the
U.s. intelligence community in the years ahead. 2 In addition to
monitoring those countries that have not acknowledged their nuclear weapons capability (e.g., Israel, Pakistan, India), there is
the need to monitor those who, at various times, seek to develop
or acquire such a capability (e.g., North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Libya).
At the same time, many would also point to the post-Gulf
War discoveries concerning the Iraqi nuclear program, as well as
internal intelligence community disputes over Iranian nuclear
intentions, as troubling signs that the U.S. intelligence community may not be able to adequately monitor such nuclear weapons
programs. 3 Among the gaps in U.s.-UN knowledge about the
Iraqi program was the identity of the program's director. In July
1991, five months after the end of the Persian Gulf War, the UN
officials responsible for destroying Iraq's nuclear weapons were

resulted from the perception that none of the Iraqi scientists who had been interro4 gated had a full grasp of the complex program. "The revelations about Iraq's clandestine nuclear activities also raise questions about the adequacy of nuclear intelligence gathering by the United States and other concerned states. considered to be an outmoded technology.292 JEFFREY 1'. The significance of the Al Atheer scientific research installation. possibly a foreigner. The belief in an unknown mastermind. It wasn't until September that the UN inspectors discovered secret Iraqi documents that indicated that the program's director was JaHar Dhia JaHar. Likewise. and the aid of the U. The Iraqi development of the huge. intelligence. a complex of buildings about forty miles south of Baghdad. the UN inspectors often found themselves involved in a game of hide-and-seek with the Iraqis. However. 5 Nor was the identity of the program's director the only aspect of the Iraqi program that escaped U. which was not linked to the Iraqi program until a week before the end of the war. intelligence community.s. the purpose of another installation (at Furat) that was secretly building centrifuges for enriching uranium to a weapons-grade level was apparently not discovered until after the war. inefficient devices went undetected by U. the experience of the UN inspection team in Iraq could be taken as another indicator of the great diHiculty of monitoring a foreign nuclear weapons program. The complex."8 Further.S.s. to precisely assess how well the U. Although it is impossible.? In the face of such post-Gulf War discoveries. was misunderstood. it is possible to examine the challenges faced . one nuclear proliferation expert observed. they had dismissed the possibility that he was in overall charge of the nuclear weapons program. and other Western intelligence agencies for years. Despite their mandate to conduct intrusive inspections.s. 6 But possibly the biggest surprise concerning the Iraqi nuclear program was its reliance on calutrons. at least on an unclassified basis. Although the inspectors had been aware of JaHar's existence and position in the IAEC since July. RICHELSON searching for an unidentified "mastermind" who they believed had overall charge of the Iraqi program. the deputy head of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC). turned out to be the nerve center of the Iraqi nuclear program. intelligence community might be able to monitor foreign nuclear weapons programs. there are reasons to believe that the situation is not as bleak as it might appear.

You can remove fissile material. as noted above. reprocessing facilities that extract pluto- . the United States did not discover the role of the Furat centrifuge production facility until after the war. and scientists were involved. uranium mining sites and mills. the facilities-which may include research and power reactors. communications and emissions. weapons assembly and storage sites. 9 Such individuals are the one element that are likely to survive a concerted attack on a nuclear weapons program and provide the basis for regenerating a damaged program. Successful monitoring may help answer some of the questions as to what is inside a facility. of course. It would be helpful to begin by examining the different collection targets associated with foreign nuclear weapons programs. but you cannot take out the know-how. from their appearance or emissions. David Kay. Collection Targets Any nation's nuclear weapons program consists of several distinct elements. and nuclear test sites. laboratories." l0 Monitoring the activities of such individuals can provide valuable clues to the course of a nuclear program. noted: "You can remove the equipment. 12 A crucial question concerning these facilities is exactly what is inside them-how sophisticated is the equipment. Thus. you'd want to go out and find out what they were doing. enrichment facilities. Reactors discharge heat."l! A second key element is. and what are their capabilities? Just as it is important to investigate what is inside the facilities. You can destroy instruments. intelligence community in effectively monitoring such programs and to explore ways in which the probability of successful monitoring can be (or possibly is being) increased. the head of the inspection operation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). who led the UN inspection teams in Iraq.Lan tfle intelligence Lommumty Keep Face with the Threat? 293 by the U. One key element is the thousands of skilled scientists and technical workers employed in any program. technicians. it is also vital to monitor what leaves the facilities-specifically.S. Maurizio Zifferero. "If you identify 10 people and they end up all working at some place labeled a dairy research institute. centrifuge production facilities. Secret Iraqi documents seized by the UN inspection team in the summer of 1991 indicated that more than ten thousand nuclear workers. Thus. The function of only some of the facilities is apparent. observed.

5 into the air. in 1989. and Israel-have shown an inclination and ability to acquire crucial material and technologies by illicit means. 13 Cerman corporations have provided key nuclear technology not only to Iraq but also to Pakistan. an investigation by the Italian Service for Information and Military Security (SISMI) identified twenty-two companies that "might have benefited from the financial operations that were 'steered' by the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL) in Atlanta .acilities also must communicate with some related facilities and the nuclear program's nerve center. Switzerland (metal casings).S. there are the foreign governments. Finland (copper coils). 16 A recent concern is the smuggling of nuclear material stolen from former Soviet and East European nuclear facilities.294 h'''''''H'V T RICHELSO\I niurn emit krypton~R. Iraq. Japan (carbon fiber). for nuclear programs.-made military-grade capacitors. Although the material so far seized by authorities would be of little . Iraq received key nuclear-related equipment and material from Britain (plutonium). Thus. 14 Various international banking institutions also playa significant role in the proliferation effort by funding and directing the financial activities of companies involved in proliferation activities. In addition to people and facilities located within the prolif~ erating nation. Iraqi agents attempted to illicitly acquire U. or groups that supply key technologies and material. Pakistan acquired the special steel electronics and processing vessels needed to produce nuclear weapons material from German firms such as NTG. Thus. Thus. PTB. unacknowledged and emerging nuclear statesincluding Pakistan. sometimes covertly or unknowingly. and the United States (power supply units). It also acquired a multimillion-dollar plant to convert natural uranium to gaseous form-······an essential step in enriching it to weapons grade. And. India. corporations. and Leybold-Heraeus. France (research reactors). r. Israel and Pakistan have sought to illegally acquire krytrons from sources in the United States. Africa (uranium ore concentrate). ltaly (plutonium separation utility)."]5 Additionally. and enrichment plants leak radiation into the surface. In 1990. South America (uranium ore concentrate). West German investigators uncovered a Pakistani smuggling network that apparently assisted Pakistan's uranium-enrichment efforts by providing specialized containers for the transport and storage of uranium hexafluoride.

but with how many warheads they were producing and the characteristics of those warheads. its efforts to ac- . 1'7 Just as there are a variety of targets. NUCINT sensors are of much lesser value when the questions involve a nation/s nuclear intentions. In the early 1950s. The constellation of nuclear intelligence aircraft. the activity does create a new concern. Naturally. there are also a number of different collection methods and strategies. ground stations. estimates of the Soviet Union/s plutonium production and nuclear weapons production rate. Such sensors.2 kilometers and are so broad that they are also detectable from satellite altitudes. ships.18 The most direct technical means of collecting intelligence on other nations' nuclear weapons programs is through the variety of sensors that fall in the NUCINT category.Can the intellzgence Communzty Keep Pace wzth the Threat? 295 immediate value in developing atomic weapons. and human intelligence (HUMINT). Collection Methods and Strategies Various means exist to gather intelligence on nuclear weapons programs-including nuclear intelligence (NUCINT). communications intelligence (COMINT). they can even be placed in an attache case. can be deployed on spacecraft. and helicopters. the outflows of hot water from the Savannah River production reactors are easily visible in thermal infrared photographs taken from an altitude of 1. imagery intelligence (IMINTL signals intelligence (SIGINT). Fuel reprocessing plants can be monitored by the releases of krypton-85 gases. small boats. 19 Plutonium production reactors can be detected by satellite infrared sensors. and Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) arrays provided a valuable means of providing answers to such questions. aircraft. which are sufficiently large to be detectable at long distances. Thus.S. the krypton-85 level was the key to U. 20 But NUCINT certainly does not playas great a role in evaluating the nuclear weapons programs of emerging nuclear states as it did in monitoring the Soviet nuclear weapons program. which detect radiation and other effects resulting from radioactive sources. The United States was concerned for over forty years not with how the Soviets would attempt to acquire an A-bomb or whether they had succeeded.

human sources can report on what is inside facilities and can acquire and pass on documents and hardware of great value in helping to understand a foreign nuclear weapons program--for example. an overview that could be extraordinarily difficult to piece together by relying on technical collection. 24 It is easy to provide examples in which HUMINT was or would have been of tremendous value in evaluating the status of a foreign nuclear weapons program.S. In addition. At least one penetration of the Chinese government has involved someone with access to information concerning Chinese nuclear relations with Pakistan. research and development. 21 It has been suggested that such deficiencies were due to an inadequate devotion to human intelligence collection and an overreliance on technical collection. none of which give off signals detectable by such sensors. certain smuggling networks may not rely on any form of interceptable communications in conducting their operations. particularly imagery and signals intelligence. That source reported on the following: 1. In spite of the massive intelligence-gathering means at the disposition of several nations. including overhead reconnaissance and electronic intercepts. intelligence professionals who have been stymied in their attempts to monitor and curb proliferation through satellite intelligence gathering and export controls are turning anew to developing networks of agents and informants.L':Jb JEFFREY L KICHELSON quire nuclear material and technology. suppliers. there seem to have been serious deficiencies in the general assessment of Iraq's nuclear program. China's nuclear exports to Argentina and South Africa . facilities." In particular the report claimed that the CIA was working "at a frenzied pace" to establish human intelligence networks in hard-to-penetrate countries such as Iraq and North Korea. and progress). a master list of foreign suppliers. Further. 23 Potentially. Human sources not only can provide information on intentions but also can provide an integrated overview of a program (its people. HUMINT can be applied to foreign nuclear weapons programs to provide a level of understanding that would probably be unavailable from technical collection. 22 And it has recently been reported that "U. Human sources can also scoop up soil samples around a· suspected nuclear installation to be examined for traces of uranium hexafluoride. or production work.

26 Aside from the significant new information provided by Iraqi defectors after the Persian Gulf War. 4. 297 Chinese technicians who helped at a suspected Pakistani bomb-development site Chinese scientific delegations who were spending a substantial amount of time at a centrifuge plant in Kahuta where Pakistani scientists were attempting to produce enriched uranium Pakistani scientists from a secret facility at Wah who showed a nuclear weapons design to some Chinese physicists in late 1982 or early 1983 and who sought Chinese evaluation of whether the design would yield a nuclear blast The triggering mechanism for the Pakistani bomb design that appeared to be very similar to one used by China in its fourth nuclear tesf S Information about the Taiwanese nuclear program was also provided by an informant. Colonel Chang Hsien-Yi. Further. 3. This is an enormous operation:'27 It is important to acknowledge the potential value of HUMINT and the value of improving HUMINT collection on proliferation activities. as stunning: "The scope of this is much more extensive than we thought. According to The Samson Option: Vanunu's Times interview and his photographs of many of the production units in the Tunnel.. the Mordechai Vanunu case certainly illustrates the potential value of HUMINT. This information indicated that the Taiwanese were in the process of building a secret installation that could have been used to obtain plutonium. who worked in a Taiwanese research institute.S. which includes a breakdown of the specific function of each unit inside the Tunnel. or thermonuclear. or Machon 2.. weapons.Can the Intelligence Community Keep Pace with the Threat? 2. 5. In addition to attempts to penetrate the actual or po- . One American official who has been analyzing Israel's nuclear capability since the late 1960s depicted Vanunu's information. U. Army human intelligence reports on the Pakistani presence at Chinese nuclear test sites and on Iraqi-Chinese discussions about construction of a nuclear reactor also indicate the value that can be played by human sources.. provided the American intelligence community with the first extensive evidence of Israeli capability to manufacture fusion.

according to one U.s. we had nothing. 30 Satellite imagery can show the presence of completed reactors.. it has been reported that the CIA networks in East Germany and Cuba were heavily penetrated by those nations' security services. and Iran. and power lines. there is also an obvious value to penetrating portions of the suppliers' network and smuggling operations. HUMINT successes. Whereas the United States has apparently learned "zip" about the North Korean program from human sources. it may be impossible to attain sufficiently reliable human intelligence.298 JEFFREY T RrCHELSON tential nuclear programs. As desirable as it may be. roads. including technical collection and analysis. In the 1970s. intelligence official. as recruiting a source in the North Korean program. the United States did have some human intelligence sources reporting on Iraq. Local conditions-including the isolation of the country as well as the thoroughness and brutality of the security service-and the nature of a country's relations with the United States may preclude sufficient successful recruitments. Thus. cooling towers. an excessive preoccupation with HUMINT may divert attention from enhancing other activities. Gaseous diffusion plants are reasonably conspicuous because of their large size (and heavy power demand)due to the fact that each passage of uranium hexafluoride through a diffusion barrier increases its enrichment by only a very small percentage. there is a real danger in viewing HUMINT as the answer to monitoring proliferation activities. it has learned a great deal from satellite imagery. Zip. Certainly. Recruiting a source in the Pakistani nuclear program will not be as difficult. as well as facilities under construction and their external characteristics. particularly from nations such as Iraq. Imagery intelligence can and has provided information valuable in monitoring nuclear weapons programs. 28 However. there have been some significant failures. But he added: "With North Korea. imagery and COMINT can provide significant hard information (and a valuable check on HUMINT) on many aspects of foreign nuclear weapons programs..S. satellite imagery alerted the United States to the existence of a research installation. It should not be forgotten that along with notable U. which may yield significant benefits.29 In addition. probably by several orders of magnitude. North Korea. Thus. railroad .

Similarly. imagery satellites detected North Korean workers digging trenches in frozen ground between Yongbyon's principal facility for reprocessing nuclear fuel and one of two facilities suspected of storing nuclear wastes. 34 But clearly.s. noted that the North Koreans may have built a "pilot plant" to process plutonium. reconnaissance activities. before taking the risky leap and building at Yongbyon. housing. power grids. North Korea. Although there are virtually no specific examples in the open literature of the contribution of COMINT to nuclear proliferation intelligence-the only exception being a report of National Security Agency intercepts of South African-Israeli communications after the September 22. The conclusion drawn by the CIA was that the North Koreans were planning on burying the pipes between the two facilities and thus concealing their connection from IAEA inspectors. 33 Communications between the different elements of a nuclear program and between the different elements and higher authority are subject to interception by space and other COMINT systems. During 1988-89. 31 In the winter of 1991. possibly to haul away equipment. graphite-moderated. U. Further photos showed a thirty-megawatt.s. imaging satellites monitoring Iraq have detected uranium-enrichment machinery being moved around on trucks or buried to evade detection by UN inspectors. 1979. the director general of the IAEA. in a report circulated to several governments. imagery satellites also detected trucks pulling up to the reprocessing plant before the arrival of lAEA inspectors in 1992.Can the Intelligence Community Keep Pace with the Threat? 299 trae](s. And it is clear that several nations. It has been noted that Pakistani officials regularly use the telephone to relay information about their nation's nuclear weapons program. have made or examined the feasibility of denial and deception efforts to hide aspects of their nuclear weapons programs from U. . In 1980. 35 Thus.S. and storage areas.S.S. U?la incident-it is safe to assume that there are a number of classified examples of the contribution of COMINT. additional satellite imagery revealed a second large building that seemed perfectly suited for reprocessing plutonium. 32 U. Hans Blix. a satellite returned imagery that indicated that a new reactor was going up at Yongbyon. gas-cooled machine that burned natural uranium. technical collection effort directed against Iraq left significant gaps. the U. out of satellite view. including Iraq. and South Africa. U.

In addition. In addition. Due to launch failures. space SIGINT constellation has increased since 1987-88. As a result. The tunnels are believed to be part of a program to harden the facility against a possible attack. in addition to its visible-light imagery capability. the United States has launched approximately three Advanced KH-lls and two LACROSSE spacecraft. with the launch of two VORTEX and two MAGNUM geosynchronous SIGINT spacecraft. But the new spacecraft have additional capabilities.S. possible plans to build a nuclear reactor that would be camouflaged to defeat satellite surveillance. it was discovered that Iraq had constructed underground facilities for nuclear weapons development and had buried related power lines. and the LACROSSE is a radar imagery spacecraft. nighttime construction. Since that time. It has also been reported that North Korea was working on aspects of its nuclear weapons program in Bakchon County at a secret underground site designed to avoid satellite detection (and international inspection). and activities taking place under cloud cover-have increased dramatically. 37 At the same time. it should not be assumed that gaps are inevitable or that denial and deception measures cannot be defeated. The United States reportedly first became aware of the facilities after a North Korean diplomat defected in May 1991. Iraq pursued. imagery satellite constellation in the 1987-88 period was quite limited compared with today's constellation---consisting of one KH-ll visible-light electro-optical spacecraft through October 1987 and two KH-lls through November 1988. with China.Likewise. a strict communications security program prohibits Iraqi officials from discussing the nuclear program over the telephone. imagery satellites detected the digging of deep tunnels around the nuclear site at Yongbyon in early February 1992. U. the Advanced KH-ll is capable of producing infrared imagery.S. in itself. 36 In the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War. the circumstances under which the United States can monitor certain activities or their effects-such as heat discharges. significant. the U. .S. a new heavier SICINT spacecraft is scheduled for launch in late 1994. Further. They may also be part of a program to hide nuclear weapons components from international inspectors. the size of the U. The increased number of imagery spacecraft in orbit is.

increased coverage of supplier communications links may reveal valuable new information.S. North Korea and other potential proliferators were not ignored in imagery and COMINT collection plans. as well as more frequent searches for new frequencies that might be associated with such programs. Increasing imagery and COMINT coverage means increasing the probability of detecting new facilities and new developments. 39 Imagery coverage can be increased in several ways-by scheduling images of targets already on the target list to be produced more frequently. 40 Likewise. technical collection systems is a function not only of their number and technical characteristics and capabilities but also of how they are employed-of human decisions concerning the areas and facilities to be covered and the frequency of coverage. Increased nighttime coverage (employing Advanced KH:-ll and LACROSSE spacecraft) and increased coverage in the presence of cloud cover (relying on LACROSSE spacecraft). they certainly did not receive as much attention as they might have and as they are receiving now. Although Iraq. Thus. along . In addition to increased attention to the communications links of a particular proliferator.Also.S. and by devoting more attention to anomalous or suspicious facilities. by increasing the frequency and area of missions devoted to searching for new facilities. the United States has recently stepped up satellite reconnaissance of Iran's nuclear-related facilities in response to evidence of a "suspicious procurement pattern" of nuclear-related technologies. the attempts by Iraq and North Korea to construct underground facilities suggest that it may be necessary to detect some nuclear facilities in the construction stage. some believed that it might be imperative to obtain photography of Soviet missile silos while thev were under construction because once construction was completed they would be camouflaged. reconnaissance satellites. the "take" obtained from constructing and deploying U. technical collection efforts was the former Soviet Union.S. Defeating denial and deception measures may depend on a variety of strategies. Although that was not actually a problem. COMINT coverage can be increased by more frequent monitoring (andfor processing) of communications links known to be associated with nuclear weapons programs. 38 Until recently. In the days before the launch of the first U. including more frequent imagery coverage at night and when cloud cover is present. the primary focus of U.

the choice between plutonium and highly enriched uranium). The analytical component of the proliferation monitoring effort can improve the chances of successful monitoring.with coverage of more territory. As a result. which makes the intelligence problem of monitoring Soviet nuclear weapons developments simple by comparison. it is necessary to evaluate information against a variety of models of nuclear proliferation. before even the proper analytic strategy.. A fundamental condition for analytical success. 41 Clearly. given the constraints facing potential proliferators. more attention to the issue would have been justified. the most direct. This is particularly true when dealing with an intelligence problem such as proliferation. there are a number of suppliers for the resources required. increase the chances of detecting construction of underground facilities before they have been completed. Aside from the multitude of potential proliferators. there are distinct alternative paths to the production of nuclear weapons. often including the desire to achieve the capability covertly. they would do X. paths that are the product of numerous choices (e. And for any particular path or paths chosen. is to focus analytic resources on the problem. Improved analysis is another. least costly. Instead. Furthermore.g. they are not pursuing such a capability" may have little validity. The staff of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence found only one finished intelligence community assessment of the Iraqi procurement network in the 1983-89 period. analysts had concluded that Iraq was seeking . and most "rational" method may not be the one chosen. the logic that "if they were pursuing a nuclear capability. But improvements in collection are only one means of enhancing the ability to monitor the activities of emerging nuclear powers. It appears that the surprise that resulted from the discovery that Iraq was employing calutron technology to produce nuclear material stemmed from the dismissal of the method as being obsolete. Analysis Improving the ability to monitor attempts at nuclear proliferation requires more than enhanced collection operations--whether human or technical. and since they are not doing X. Hence.

and measures to block such procurement attempts or actions. ~ ~' •.>-- / . '>-110-. a U.~ .~ •. the extensive nature of the program resulted in security fences being placed so far from those facilities that the fences went unnoticed. as well as to simply evaluate the meaning of data already collected. Models of alternative proliferation paths can be (and presumably are) employed to direct collection activities. Hence. imagery satellite photographed a suspected nuclear test site in the Kalahari Desert. . they are not cause for despair-for even though it may be desirable for the United States to know everything immediately. . there is considerable room (and need) for improvement.S. following a tip from the Soviet Union.s. "..".. may suffice. 44 But as the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War showed.v"". -. However.•. .v •.-. in 1992 the United States was able to persuade China and Argentina to cancel planned transfers of key technologies to Iran. That pressure. Knowledge of select procurement attempts or other actions. The overall performance of u. Recognizing the variety of paths a nation may pursue to achieve a nuclear weapons capability can also improve the value and efficiency of the collection effort. Conclusion Although the postwar discoveries concerning the Iraqi nuclear weapons program raise legitimate concerns about the ability of the U.7 ·•.S. intelligence in the proliferation area can be improved by a number of means. 42 Similarly. It was subsequently discovered that Iraq was pursuing both approaches..--. at the very least. Great Britain. the United States began working with France.~v"""".. U. this is not generally necessary to put a brake on proliferation. may have discouraged a South African test in the Kalahari.~ v (~. On the basis of that imagery. to enrich its uranium through the use of delicate fast-spinning centrifuges that separate the heavier and lighter isotopes of ura~ nium gas.S.. then or in the future. 43 In 1977.. analysts apparently considered it unlikely that some Iraqi facilities detected by satellite reconnaissance were involved in the nuclear weapons program because of a lack of visible security around the facilities.. 'L'-''''"'t" ".. intelligence community to monitor nuclear proliferation activities. and West Germany to develop a concerted response to a possibly impending test. ¥.

suppliers. analysts also need to consider the numerous alternative paths that can be used to produce nuclear weapons. In setting intelligence collection requirements and in analyzing data. For in addition to improving HUMINT collection. Better integration of the analytical effort presently being conducted by several distinct intelligence organizations may produce better analysis. U. November 14.S. intelligence should be able to improve the effectiveness of technical collection. As with collection activities. A near exclusive focus on improving HUMINT may divert attention from other areas of possible improvement. But beyond improvements in sensor capabilities and the number of spacecraft in orbit. 2. But it will also be necessary to make better use of the analytical resources already available. Gates to the Association of Former Intelligence Officers. imagery satellites and the increased number of those satellites in operation. Remarks by Director of Central Intelligence Robert M. it should not be seen as the answer. it is also necessary to improve imagery collection strategies-by devoting more time to (1) searching for new facilities. as well as analysis. among the most important and necessary improvements are those that lie in the area of analysis. . 1992. However. Boston. p. (2) examining suspicious or anomalous facilities. Massachusetts. Finally.JV<t JnHKEY L l'(ICHELSON Improving HUMINT collection is one of those means. The development of an improved broad-area search capability would further enhance imagery capabilities. Technical collection has already improved due to the increased sensor capabilities of U. More frequent monitoring and processing of nuclear weapons programs. COMINT collection can also be improved in similar ways. some improvement would come just from an increase in effort-in other words. Notes 1. and financial communications links known to be associated with nuclear weapons programs would increase the probability of discovering relevant information. Increased searches for relevant communications could also produce valuable information. and (3) reexamining known nuclear facilities. for such coIIection may provide information that would be of tremendous value and that is unobtainable from other sources. the hiring of more analysts or the devotion of more analytical time to proliferation problems.S.

p. 29." New York Times. It should be noted that HUMINT comes in two varieties-overt and clandestine. ." New York Times. the Department of Energy Office of Intelligence. 4. 1989-1990 (Boulder: Westview." 12. A6." New York Times. July/August 1992. 10. Smith and Frankel. pp. 17. October 8. October 11. May Destroy the Hardware.1992. David Albright and Mark Hibbs. 1992.N. 1991. AI. The most prominent organizations in the U." Washington Times. "U. C2.N.Can the Intelligence Community Keep Pace with the Threat? 305 2. "U. "Saddam's Nuclear-Weapons Dream". November 30. "CIA Says Iran Makes Progress on Atom Arms. pp. SISMI. Elaine Sciolino. p. Spector with Jacqueline R." n. pp. 10. "Iraq's Quest for the Nuclear Grail: What Can We Learn?" Arms Control Today. Rowan Scarborough and Bill Gertz.N. and the Z (Special Projects) Division of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. "Saddam's NUclear-Weapons Dream. Overt collection includes interviewing selected individuals. 14. 1991.s." 13. pp.S. Smith. A3. pp. 7. "Iraq's Nuclear Quest: Tentacles in Four Continents. Michael Wines. pp. October 20. Strengthening IAEA Safeguards: Lessons from Iraq (Stanford: Center for International Security and Arms Control. September 22. "U. Anthony Fainberg. 15. Lewis. 1990). p. 16. 1991. Scarborough and Gertz. AI.N." New York Times. the Central Intelligence Agency. "U. AI. August 8. 1991. the Air Force Technical Applications Center. All. "Iraq's Nuclear Program Shows the Holes in U. Says It Missed 2 A-Plants in Iraq. 1990. Cl. p. pp. 1991. 1991. Stanford University." Washington Post. 18. Eric Schmitt. "U.s. "U. 1. ES. 1991. Schmitt. Gary Milhollin. A6. R. Jeffrey Smith. May Destroy the Hardware. Intelligence. "U. Is Building Up a Picture of Vast Iraqi Atom Program. 9. but Iraqi Nuclear Workers Remain. Smith and Frankel. 3334. R. Michael Wines. A44-A4S. pp. Paul Lewis.S." 11. 6. October 13. 8. "For Sale: Nuclear Contraband.d." Washington Post. A36. October 1. 11-14. the Defense Intelligence Agency. A9. June 10. pp. Spring 1992." New York Times. p. Steve Call. Says It Missed 2 A-Plants. 3. "U. p. "Nuclear-Related Plant Discovered in Iraq. Elaine Sciolino. A30. Paul Lewis. Leonard Spector.N. intelligence community involved in monitoring foreign nuclear programs are the DCI Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee." Washington Post. AI. p. "Subject: BNL Affair-Atlanta Branch. "Saddam's Nuclear-Weapons Dream. 5.181-98. 1990. 1991. November 29." Washington Post.s. December 23. "Threats in the Middle East. A8. 1993)." Orbis. Aides Discover Atom Arms Center Concealed by Iraq. such as businessmen and travelers. who may have relevant information. Officials Seek Mastermind in Charge of Iraq's Nuclear Effort." New York Times. Leonard S. 3." New York Times. Aides Discover Atom Arms Center". "Asia's Nuclear Nightmare: The German Connection. Jeffrey Smith and Glenn Frankel. November 16. Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons.

In addition. Thus. Hersh. "Pakistani Use of Chinese Nuclear Weapons Test Facilities." Washington Post. 1992.: Pergamon-Brassey's. pp. David A. p.C. Stephen Engleberg and Michael R. 22. "Nuclear Exports to China?" Washington Post. Arms Control Verification: The 1echnologies That Make It Possi/lle (McLean." Washington Post. actions. 1991). "Controlling Nuclear Weapons at the Source. and should. 26. February 9. "Help Wanted: Bring Cloak. AI. at p. Gordon. p. So Do CIA Recruits' Resumes. January 12." Washington Times. 377. 24. 1985. B2. which technical collection systems cannot provide. A3. Entry 214. 28. "Taipei Halts Work on Secret Plant to Make Nuclear Bomb Ingredient. seek to determine Iran's present nuclear intentions. p. 1986. This is a fairly poor argument for the value of HUMINT. November 22. A15. Seymour M." November 26. "Controlling Nuclear Weapons at the Source: Verification of a Cut-Off in Production of Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium for Nuclear Weapons. U. 21. 1992." June 19. 1986). 20-22. Files 4-4459 through 4-4592. "Nuclear Pact with China Wins Senate Approval. pp. Military Reference Branch. or soil samples seems to be a far better example of its potentially great value. 1954. March 23. Va. 27. The unique ability of human sources to acquire documents. Fulghum. 25. 1986 (SanitizedlDeclassified). knowledge of intentions may have only a limited impact on U. 20." Washington Post. RG 341. and Peter W. National Archives and Record Administration." in Kosta Tsipis. "Advanced Arms Spread Defies Remote Detection. The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy (New York: Random House.S.306 JEFFREY T RICHEI. Frank Von Hippel and Barbara Levi. D. Janeway. 1992." Aviation Week and Space Technology. pp. Griffin. "China-Iran Nuclear Link Is Reported. Army Operational Group. pp. 198. p. Subject: (Unci. 23. Tyler and Joanne Omang. 1985." p." New York Times. pp. eds. AI. October 23. "Memorandum for Director of Intelligence. it is not clear that their conclusions should influence U. with communications intelligence being a very significant means. Hafemeister. p. although intelligence analysts may. Jack Anderson and Dale Van Atta. At. November 9. Patrick E. "Nuclear Power Plant Development Plans. SOOth MI Brigade. November 3. Patrick E..S. "As Intelligence Needs Change.s. Washington. David W. Joanne Omang. Fainberg. A20-21. 1985. A19. Rodman D. Von Hippel and Levi. 1991 (SanitizedlDeclassified). James Adams. Overt HUMINT collection may prove fruitful for some segments of the international suppliers network. 18. C7. The standard argument for the benefits of HUMINT is that it can provide information on intentions. and particularly regarding proliferation. 377. Dagger. Strengthening IAEA Safeguards. Under what circumstances the United .) Determination of Proper Security Classification. December 28." May 12. Tyler. p. "A Few Spoken Words Sealed Atom Pact." Washington Post. 338-88. 1985. actions in attempting to limit Iran's acquisition of nuclear technologies--given the nature of that regime and the fact that intentions can change overnight.SON 19. hardware. Intentions are detectable by a variety of collection methods. AS. DCS/O.

p. "South Africa's Sixteen-Year Secret: The Nuclear Bomb." Washington Times. p. "Journey to Isolation". Bill Gertz. "Cuban Defector Impeaches CIA Spies. pp. R. Shows Photos to Argue Iraq Hides Nuclear Material. Army Operational Group. 28-35.Can the Intelligence Community Keep Pace with the Threat? 307 States would attempt (or has attempted) to recruit clandestine sources in German. B15. Bill Gertz. Stephen Green.S. U. 1991. "Controlling Nuclear Weapons at the Source. Italian." New York Times. 30. May 12. AI. "Journey to Isolation." Washington Times. North Korea is located well within 30 to 50 degrees north latitude." New York Times Magazine. Bill Gertz." Washington Times. 38. "North Koreans Pursue Nuclear Weapons. Intelligence". A12. 1992.: Amana Books. Sanger." 35. July 10. 31. 1989. Michael Breen." Wall Street Journal. p." Blix meant in a location not likely to be the subject of coverage. Sanger. Fialka. AI. To be literally "out of satellite view/' the plant would have to be in the Arctic 37. November 15. A26. 1991. "Saddam's Nuclear Secrets. 128-29." Washington Post.S. A16.s. February 21. pp. Korea Goes Underground with Nuclear Plants." Washington Post. Don Oberdorfer. AI." Washington Post. or other West European corporations makes for interesting speculation. AI. Korea and the Bomb: High-Tech Hide-andSeek. Jack Anderson and Dale Van Atta. by "out of satellite view. p. pp. All. All. 1991. A9. 1994). David E. VI. "U." Newsweek. "Iraq's Nuclear Program Shows the Holes in U." Washington Times. pp. 28ff. 1991. 33. AID. One measure of the value of more intense coverage might be how much additional information the United States acquired about Iraqi nuclear programs due to increased technical collection in the period between the Iraqi invasion and the beginning of the air campaign. "Nu_ clear Power Plant Development Plans. 1992. "Satellite Spots Iraq Burying Atomic Gear.375. p. June 27. 1988. Paul Lewis. "Iraq's Nuclear Program Shows the Holes in U. John J. "N. pp. October 25. p. pp. 1989. 39. A9. 1991. Sciolino. 1993. (source of quotation)." Presumably. After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. July 29. April 27. All. Sanger. "North Korea May Be Developing Ability to Build Nuclear Weapons. "N. July 19.s. September 12. R." Washington Post. Burrows and Robert Windrem. 1988). William E. 29. October 7. Von Hippel and Levi. the United States sharply stepped up its technical collection operations directed at Iraq. Jeffrey Smith. Sanger. 34. Sciolino.S. 36. pp. imagery satellites." p. "North Korea Digs Tunnels for Nuclear Arms. 1993. "Journey to Isolation". "Journey to Isolation". Living by the Sword (Brattleboro. making it easily accessible to all U. Jeffrey Smith. . Critical Mass (New York: Simon and Schuster. 32. March 21. Decisions concerning the targeting of space imagery and space signals intelligence systems are made by the Dcr Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation (COMIREX) and the SIGINT Overhead Reconnaissance Subcommittee (SORS) of the DCI SIGINT Committee. "Stasi Files Reveal CIA Two-Timers. Intelligence.

p. given reports of close Israeli-South African links. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. p." 44. Halted Nuclear Bid by Iran. Halted Nuclear Bid by Iran. 43. 1991. A30. U.S. D." New York Times. A8. Steve Coil. p. Congress." . Nuclear Proliferation Today: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons.30H JEFFREY L KICHELSON 40. pp.S. 1993).S. September 27.S.: Ballinger. Spector. Is Building Up a Picture of Vast Iraqi Atom Program. November 17. Mass. The Intelligence Community's Involvement in the Banca Nazionale Del Lavoro (BNL) Affair (Washington. "U. 41. it is possible that such a test was planned in 1977 with Israeli help. government and private analysts are skeptical that South Africa had enough fissionable material for a bomb in 1977. 292. Some U. Of course. "U. that two shafts had been dug at the site for a potential nuclear blast.: Government Printing Office. Coil. "U. AI. "South Africa's Sixteen-Year Secret. 1984 (Cambridge. 1992. Leonard S. 42.S. 1984). And the South Africans confirmed." Washington Post. See Smith. 9. in 1993. Michael Wines.C.