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Strategic Arms Limitation after SALT I

Author(s): Paul Doty
Source: Daedalus, Vol. 104, No. 3, Arms, Defense Policy, and Arms Control (Summer, 1975),
pp. 63-74
Published by: The MIT Press on behalf of American Academy of Arts & Sciences
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20024346
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In a sense. survey corporate By a strategic nuclear exchange ecutives found only two or three who considered anxiety over the possibility likely in the next decade. reason for dealing with the very difficult problem of curbing nuclear-arms competi 63 . The 1963 treaty. strategic breakthrough. In 1963 the concerns expressed in many public opinion polls in this country centered on the the echoed of nuclear war1 and these concerns were likelihood throughout ex a six recent of hundred rest of the world.PAUL DOTY Strategic Arms Limitation After SALT I of November. unless the present these reached after only ceilings is the modified. some essential steps have been weapons systems will have been accomplished.2 This evidence of diminished of nuclear war is almost surely linked to the improvement in understanding between the two leading nuclear powers?and of more demonstrations rational behavior within has been exemplified them?which by the succession of nuclear treaties. visible for progress timely Clearly those who thought or hoped that the time had come for such an achievement. fitted with multiple re-entry vehicles). of strategic compensation and for the alleged geographical of the nuclear-armed submarines. independently targeted The large numbers proposed for these ceilings allow the continuing development and deployment of most of the weapons systems now being planned by the two sides. But it to significant limita does provide for the elimination of several persistent obstacles tions and for a framework within which these limitations can be negotiated..e. we will have reached a turning point in the long. On seem also to have produced an air of self the other hand. is transformed into a treaty. that there is no urgent satisfaction and complacency. more has been accomplished than this assessment implies. does not in itself constitute agreement agreement Consequently. frustrating effort to bring under control. contrast. This turning point will not necessarily be a strategic nuclear weapons no substantial controls on existing or planned however. disadvantages on equal Soviet Union have been resolved in the process of arriving at agreements that ceilings for the number of strategic delivery systems and the number of missiles can be MIR Ved (i. in the throw-weights of taken: The issues of forward-based systems. about a dozen other treaties negotiated in various ways. tortuous. arms in and it was a disappointment limitation. for example. over the last twelve years In addition. are will the limits begin to be felt. If the Vladivostok Agreement Still. and the 1972 ABM treaty were particularly underground two leading nuclear powers to the practice for the of important introducing verified restraint and the benefits to be derived from it. banning all but limit the nuclear-arms competition nuclear-weapons testing. of asymmetries for the British and French missile forces on either side. these developments It is now argued. 1974.

Nevertheless. we certainly ways to reduce the invulnerability toward a strategic environment that ismore stable in times do not seem to be moving reduction of the arms competition and military of crisis. The complexity agree of the . It will be absent in government leaders who subor benefit through mutual arms to control of nuclear for the dinate the slow. military expenditures. the defenses compensate has not been grasped: the multiplication of warheads this opportunity of has become the instead both major occupation strategic es through MIRVing tablishments. Thus the commitment has so far been one that has functioned a can be accom at of and uncertainties where levels. Moreover. However. environment which would be altered by the arms-control The military ments that are now possible is itself undergoing rapid change.PAUL 64 DOTY tion to the extent of actually reducing the number of nuclear armaments on each side. another. variety asymmetries only high have have modated. Progress toward the second objective has been even more limited. and planned strategic programs budgets had set for SALT remain Thus the objectives that the United States government it is now at least possible to move into the area of significant unrealized. With the number of warheads growing toward a figure that ismore than tenfold greater than that originally thought adequate for deterrence. for those who have the will. The principal to negligible achievement has been the limitation of anti-ballistic missiles numbers. the second was to find limitations that would improve the stability of these forces in another times of crisis and. continue. military establishments. in time. reduce the risk of nuclear war. based on the Vladivostok Agreement. and with a growing effort on both sides to find improvements of the sea-based deterrent of the other. with continued in yield and accuracy. At first glance. these three objectives will Treaty. But States policy is revealed by scrutinizing side to United the three set for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). on strategic offensive arms for the first time since the arms competition it will be absent in decades ago. When is concluded. three began those military planners on both sides who seek military superiority rather than mutual restraint.3 The first objec stated objectives tive was to achieve essential equivalence in the strategic forces permitted to each side. quired. But these in fact represent only very vague limitations in the simplest categories of judging strategic force. The will to do so is the first requirement. This was supposed to allow both sides to forego multiplying their strategic forces to fail to penetrate for those that might of the other side. remained largely unfulfilled. reorienting largest a new effort is clearly re But. the next decade should instead be spent in adjusting our strategic inventory to the Vladivostok under the assumption that the present relative calm will ceilings. essential equivalence may seem to been established by the equal ceilings. That the third objective?the come is in the in than area?has receded rather closer evident the strategic budgets on both sides. the third was to reduce arms competition the SALT II and. they appear to have been made possible by settling on numbers sufficiently high to allow deferment of many problems that would have had to be solved had the numbers been to equivalence lower. in this and other ways. demanding attempts to gain quest an in terms nuclear of one index or from superiority alleged advantage diplomatic limitations in those who underestimate the difficulty of And it will be ineffective in institutions American two the the and the Soviet the world.

to limit the quality (as well as the number) of MIRVed missiles.STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AFTER SALT I 65 for further change in the present strategic arsenals were problems and the potential not foreseen in the fifties and sixties. in the quality of the weapons must also improvements be limited by collateral restraints if the limitation of numbers is to retain its on number could simply shift usefulness. the banning of weapons from certain locations. The recognition that an arms race can easily shift from a quantitative to a one under the influence of restriction is numerical absent from earlier qualitative arms-control literature. agreements qualitative the objective of an arms race from numerical to qualitative superiority. categories: can In other words.and mutual restraint in order to consolidate to It is in context needs. that is. they replaced at . and on Numerical limits were placed on anti-ballistic missiles the number of launchers in submarines (SLBMs). and the numbers and types of missiles they may carry. Before the mid-sixties. amine the alternatives that exist. The revolutionary the expansive period of new conceptions over: is the of nuclear weaponry present task is the less heady one of finding phase forces at lower levels self.e. limitations be applied by controlling either quantity or quality. Qualitative numerical controls are considered for then it becomes evident enforceable. Thus. and placing a ceiling on the total MIRVed throw weight (i. ways more to accept routes to the limitation of strategic arms should be considered? many a Although large number can be identified. Outright bans on certain types of weapons (such as space-based ABM a numerical limitation systems) can also be considered (by limiting the number to the set. in which it was assumed that a commonly were if weapons. To complete Seabed Arms Control Treaty of 1971 and in nuclear-free zones. Agreements to slow carrying submarines. However. as well as the number of SLBM How in the Interim Agreement of that year. were placed on ABM radars and limits. as in the zero). when many of the ideas for arms control took shape. down schedules for the deployment of new systems represent another form of nu merical limit. that the role of balanced related this justified obviously it is necessary first to ex reductions of strategic forces will be discussed. to limit numerical limitation their weight. numerical limit would provide a freeze. can also be classed as a (by limiting the number to zero in specific locations). Qualitative the greatest effort has been directed toward attempts ICBM silos in SALT I. Restricting MIRVing to missiles below a certain size. limits on improvement. almost all of them fall into two main and 2) control over the improve 1) control over the numbers of weapons. if numbers are to be controlled. that. range.. Such an effort will not recapture that animated the fifties. on the total throw are to of illustrations missiles allowed be of proposals that have MIRVed) weight failed to attract support from either side Qualitative restraints on bombers. The problems limits lie in deciding precisely what categories are to be subject to numerical control and how maintaining of weapons the numbers restraints usually enter the picture only after agreed upon is to be verified. limiting the number of re-entry vehicles per missile. The foregoing illustrations show the basic distinction the two types of between in numerical limitation. Without restraints. are likely to be examined in the negotiations of a SALT II Treaty. However. a new effort is now needed to join these rather na?ve and often elemen tary ideas to the complexity of the present situation. ment of weapons. in the 1972 treaty.

before American deployment apparent to government began. three new were recognized: of modification different and allowed. (MIRV or not). But this assumption became untenable as the speed with regarding replacements which was demonstrated could be introduced and as improvements technological satellite systems for verifying compliance were developed. improvements into a fixed introduced some can number of weapons using 1) and 3). 2) 1) detectably not different and different or the same. Not unexpectedly. In its place. Despite limitations on flight tests are very unpopular with the military. and that inspection all. At that time. systems designed replace existing to the extent that also reduce the number of confidence firings of deployed missiles these desir a "first strike" would be even less conceivable than at present. categories central issues in SALT I. uncertain. the number of neces by negotiating qualitative sary prohibitions that the imagination too to negotiate. negotiations. counterpart. time to have negotiated MIRV limit in SALT bears testimony to this. in both the internal and external verifiability?became to be central features of arms-control and will continue treaties.PAUL 66 DOTY of the ones that had been eliminated. Observations of flight tests can provide additional information if they can be reliably tied to missiles known to be in particular silos. when considering range. The appropriate a MIRV ban or limit would have been in 1969 or 1970. at best. number of warheads. The complexity of the issues arising from qualitative restraints is the result of the many features of a weapons system that significantly affect its military utility. measures estimates generally provide only for the counting of silos and approximate of their size. 3) undetectably detectably can be gradually lowed. also observable substantial by Consequently. able consequences. it is obvious that in the possibilities of verification restrict limitations extent to which the severely can limits be upon. would be duplicates would reveal the violation. and eventually the agree ments restraints?and their operational qualitative regarding. cumbersome might suggest becomes too great and therefore A further difficulty with qualitative restraints is that. In almost every case. However. although specific major improvements be prevented by enforcing 2) to control the rate of possible improvement for a fixed number of weapons. But the prudence of that course is only now becoming leaders. accuracy. hence al allowed. qualitative can be controlled by severely limiting the annual number of flight improvements of new or improved tests. they must be The current attempt to negotiate a partial introduced prior to large-scale deployment. qualitative agreed A potential solution to this problem arises from the fact that most substantial of missiles and testing stage that is improvements require a development qualitative most the other side. Yet verification reliability. such to missile Moreover. guidance of the warheads megatonnage readiness. For ex an ICBM we are concerned with its size. This kind of control could greatly retard the development a restriction could ones. the discussion of. and the possibility in a fixed num restraints in limiting improvements The usefulness of qualitative to of human is the also ber of weapons foresight?it subject shortcomings systems in advance and forestalled to be discerned is impossible for all future developments restraints. Were one to try to do so. and silo hardness. of their being proposed at SALT is. the pressures on them to exploit the American advantage were too strong and their perceptions of the complications itwould introduce were too dim . of the warheads. to be effective. payload for a given ample.

the usefulness of qualitative one negotiating itself restricted whenever party considers inferior to the other. therefore. the schedule of reduction. it engages the military of systems without both sides in an institutionalized and continuous process of scheduled reductions and verification. it is important to recognize that it is closely related to qualitative restraints. or freeze the numbers of strategic weapons an arms not will itself systems stop by race competition. Negotiated restraints is based what verifiable upon pro qualitative in a fixed number of vide the principal means of restricting the growth of capability as are possible and negotiable will only such measures strategic weapons. and the definition of the components: in many programs can be undertaken subject to reduction. at the end of a research and development cycle. A program of numerical in strategic systems involves three essential reductions the rate of reduction. is thus destined Within to expand. it will tend to avoid agreeing to a qualitative inferior position. performance. set at moderate their being replaced by new ones. partially restrain or retard improvements in strategic-weapons limits or ceilings strategic capability fixed numerical by recourse to reductions can it be diminished. Yet the limits on acceptable verification procedures technologically the restraint be so simple and inclusive as to preclude require that the qualitative to prevent pose limits limits can A quite kinds of distinctions further development restraints will be that would allow one side to catch up. the process Finally. technologically to limit it is reasonable to conclude that an agreement From these considerations. it is useful to summarize the argument for reduction. reduction schedules may be . strategic capability provides of old weapons for the orderly elimination rates. Third. However. systems. In practice. will un a continuous continuous rate of The of reduction imposition improvement. if the continued growth in strategic forces is to be reversed how reduction agreements might rather than simply retarded. be expected in restraints lies in their acceptability different kind of limit on qualitative itself as being at an earlier Insofar as the Soviet Union perceives negotiation. but only its breaching taxpayer. improvements Military strategic. can be made readily verifiable. At one extreme. it is asking more than the system will bear to im deployment. Sec to counter diminish hold constant. of course. of most major weapons stage than the United States in the development technological restraint that will freeze it in a systems. forces are being reduced by the most obvious index?numbers. Fourth. dergo or even a to it. crucial to any proposed program. it provides in and allowed conventional forces. The rate of reduction is. This psychological will make clear to all that arms control has begun in earnest. some new scheme for numerical must be brought into play. Before examining operate. while restraining any on the other.STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AFTER SALT I 67 In general. There are at least five a means of compensating for the inevitable points in its favor: First. one has to admit that the premeditated of serviceable weapons will risk outraging both the dedicated officer and the thrifty barrier is admittedly very great. Reduction categories ways. destruction Against these positive features. Yet it is only then that to work. it provides a highly visible sign to all that arms control is at work. Although its choice obviously depends on many factors. it provides ond. only restraints and numerical Because of the inability of qualitative limits to stabilize reduction the strategic capability of the two sides.

the question arise in deciding what clearly. they can produce strategic capability one. A single-step reduction over a few years. rate of the the Again. would. used together for what qualitative case. stocks. random versus national selection of weapons versus inactivation of eliminated destruction to be eliminated. seems at first to be more manageable than a scheme of progressive annual reductions. and over eight years to forty-three per cent. perhaps with a specification of minimum rates for reductions within each year. As seriously contemplates beginning we have argued. or as a process that 3) could be renegotiated rather than and repeated. by contrast. it can only be deferred. negotiated. on At the other maximum reduction extreme. could be changed along the way. however. Clearly these two extremes enclose a broad spectrum of rates of reduction. the first years of balanced reductions would mean cutting into the ex cessively high forces that both sides were doing without only a few years ago. weapons The rate of reduction can be most simply defined as the constant percentage by in certain categories must be reduced annually. The goal of a single-step program is finite. no amount of qualitative can compensate. Obviously. A progressive annual reduction over an unstipulated period. Four important distinctions the more obvious reduction schemes: encompass versus annual reductions. Some possible classes for this purpose are illustrated by the following categories: . and this should be borne in mind as we consider the other variations to which we now turn. progressive 1) single step or individual to aggregates reductions of weapons 2) applicable categories improvement systems. Of course. if reductions are sufficiently rapid. As such. In this regarded simply as a supplement restraints cannot do. reduction will be crucial. it will have quite another.PAUL DOTY 68 use of qualitative to the maximum restraints. it at the end. the proper treatment of this problem is far beyond the scope of our present considerations. The more timely questions are are to to to be and how control be weapons subject they specified. Thus. the burden to be carried by qualitative restraints is more measures and the obvious need be only thereby greatly reduced. of tensions over whether it is to be regarded as one step not to be repeated. commit the military planning and procurement on both sides to a continuous bureaucracies and this could process of retrenchment. risk the development would have fairly firm projections. and it corresponds to a period in which both sides implies consolidation It does. simple answers. which the remaining weapons ten per cent per year over five years would reduce the level to fifty-nine per cent of the the rate original inventory. But the course and extent of subsequent reductions engages one's whole conception of future of the roles that all the that world-order is. it forces a consideration arrangements. But. it represents a single engagement a process. a commitment to In other words. if it bites deeply into advanced of obsolete weapons. even if less ambitious in the short run. to stop reductions crucial if one becomes of where no are For there the this process. nuclear powers and potential nuclear powers will want to play. gradually diminishing dependence schedules assumes that. or "hold periods" could be inserted to permit inten sive verification. weapons 4) systems. reductions compensate in prudent or a either a constant fashion. have far-reaching psychological and political consequences. If it is sufficiently low to provide only for the orderly disposal it will have one kind of impact.

Since the freedom to mix would not be allowed outside of broad categories. a very distant approximation to the truth. as in the Interim Agreement of 1972. 5) Within any category or class the number allowed might be determined by a separate criterion rather than by specific number. if the preservation of the freedom to mix. in which reductions might subsequently of the manner be car prior to consideration ried out. that is. systems. that imposed the various ceilings preserves the aims inherent in the prior agreement and restraints. which represents the most con trolled mode of reduction. a few more general observations may be useful. Nevertheless. However. approximation Reduction schedules would obviously lead to different consequences when applied to different levels of aggregation. aggregate that all of all and major delivery systems (ICBMs sizes. may be used to define other categories with 3) Size. Consequently. If the classification an to inventory for each side according represent categories (for example. categories of weapons imposed that is. etc). there may be ICBMs. Minuteman III. (for example. agreement. SLBMs. differ for each side. 2) Sublimits may be separate limits for broad on the aggregate number. each side could predict with some confidence in which the other side's force structure would the manner change over time. parties. case. Under 2) or 3) the bias weapons would be against the oldest or smallest weapons in each category. inventory schedule. If applied to the first level. usually designated one or a in view both the involve of of the This may. part only aggregate. The results may not be equally to both parties. Thus the number of MIRVed mis throw weight of the class. Poseidon. ing different combinations is intimately for an arms-control agreement The choice of the level of aggregation and it will probably be agreed upon related to what the two sides wish to accomplish. and heavy bombers). so that asymmetries would not develop or increase as reductions proceed. agreeable the negotiation might again return to definitions of equivalency or relative value. specific or ICBMs may be divided into two classes according to size.STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AFTER SALT I 69 as an 1 ) All those to be controlled can be put into a single class. for ex . however. types. thereby allow siles might be determined by the combined of different numbers. less versatile number. and preserve the most modern and effective ones. Reduction programs would then have to be fitted into an already existing and care would have to be taken to insure that a given reduction program agreement. level denoted the simplest way of dealing with major by 1) represents a total re number because would be selected. or other characteristics. in this 4) Classes may be defined in terms of existing weapons is it would done comprehensively. B-52 bombers. as in the Thus. to change the composition of the an in forces the an future within is strategic agreed aggregate number. before pursuing this. MIRVed may be treated as a separate category. It does. Here all asymmetries are taken care of in the original as of on and each is same side's reduced the sumption parity. strategic force. important con dition for an arms-control this will still be tolerable. that of a total aggregate it is likely that each side would tend to eliminate its older. quire heavy bombers) The are assumed to be equivalent. SLBMs. Vladivostok Agreement. missiles limits. Minuteman II. This situation is avoided in schedules of the type indicated under 4). they will.

systems Totally likely that its reductions in categories to each side would prefer to concentrate that it wished out. patently unacceptable. any Nevertheless. Soviet position. are dealt with. higher rates are destroyed or in of reductions might be negotiable. an alternative way to avoid the development of asym destruction. Insofar as the weapons involved would be those nearing obsolescence. Therefore. Their availability elimination Another alter itself be the subject of negotiation. metries as reduction proceeds. and. ample. by adopting them. for elimination lies in how weapons designated The final distinction of inspectors would be unambiguous and under the supervision Their destruction to curb the the intention of the superpowers it would convey dramatically decisive: arms race. seems one of that the consideration alternative academic. on the total aggregate of strategic delivery . for a fraction of the newly improved weapons would also be picked for It is. conditions event of a nuclear exchange. selected eliminations were partially MIRVed. although for of putting at least some weapons the alternative useful to consider designated in the event of abrogation of the into an inactive state. weapons However. Such a situation could be avoided to be inactivated were if the missiles mix was chosen at random: this would then insure that the MIRVed-single-warhead preserved through the reduction stage. Whether designated weapons it would be useful if their identification were subject to inspection by the activated. then itmight be to the advantage of both not to risk passing through a potentially unstable period in and those of the other which the missiles of one side were almost completely MIRVed were not. which would make them easy targets in the can be found that would In any event. but both sides were uncertain of the extent. inventories lies in removed from national option for weapons some Most versions this force. The anticipation of tial numbers are designated. this more recent in But when substan would little weapons present difficulty. This is contrary to a long-standing improve verification. as one in which the contributing nuclear powers could exercise some joint control in crisis periods. in effect. Consequently. but it would greatly other side. problems of equivalency new seems not it would be allowed. may appear somewhat they the course that might be followed if reduc expected from the Vladivostok Agreement. procedure can be expected. even have power of gradual withdrawal of weapons Still another the foregoing considerations Although on do permit some practical observations tions were to be pursued in the framework That Agreement proposed a ceiling (2. diminish the anxieties of the negotiating parties. granted can imagine situations in which both sides would prefer random rather than self if the land-based ICBMs of both sides of weapons. many objections of the rate at which reductions will surely affect the negotiation this opposition it is it is difficult to estimate the extent of its influence. treaty or other emergency would native would be to store them in groups. This unusual procedure would approximately have the further effect of discouraging any attempt to improve the weapons systems being reduced. by five per cent per year. that each side would insist on deciding The expectation for itself which weapons are to be retired. proceed.400) their seem such and theoretical. of to international future option being assigned but one can envision some possibly acceptable versions. the of This could then be between subject separate negotiations phase military staffs. For example. subject to the agreed reduction is so readily taken for schedule.PAUL DOTY 70 do not arise.

pointing throw-weight a at is it also be noted that there should bomber but gap in present present agreement. it follows that it would be unrealistic to assume that the reopening and solving the problem of these ceilings could be greatly reduced without is to be Substantial reductions that allow each side to select what asymmetries. If this is true. and quick-reacting a less balanced and less stable strategic slow-reacting weapons will probably produce a reduction program will be to avoid this situation. The number of MIRVed missiles allowed is now unneces into fantasy that are required to visualize either the excursions sarily high. To do so. Despite a first strike on the other. provide numerical compensation that the Soviets have now abandoned. it would be appropriate in working out the Vladivostok Agreement. Reduction schedules that would reductions preserve they formula would allow the Soviets the high degree of freedom to mix in the Vladivostok to carry their heavy-missile and the Americans their bomber advantage advantage into the smaller force structures prescribed by a reduction agreement. At present. more obviously equivalent strategic forces that are also more stable in crisis situations. the opposite direction. Presumably this apparent comparably large missiles denying as was not to considerations the such decision unspecified asymmetry by equalized in the aggregate for British and French submarines. removed from its strategic inventory will almost certainly increase the asymmetries in both force structures. By this test. or essential equivalency. it seems likely that the very high ceilings of the Vladivostok Agree ment were deemed desirable at the time because they permitted the agreement on an number and the ignoring of asymmetries overall aggregate within the respective strategic forces. it will be necessary to program must diminish asymmetries are introduce new sublimits along the way in order to insure that the asymmetries at in to In least the reductions. Moreover. a preference to retain MIRVed missiles over un MIRVed missiles. Asymmetries to one or both parties that were acceptable at high ceilings may become unacceptable these ceilings are lowered. the stability of the strategic situation would be vastly improved if the ceiling for MIRVed missiles were cut in half. a reduction as it progresses. The reason for emphasizing that these two asymmetries lies in the importance were assume if undertaken. the degree to which this scenario has become side mounting a test of arms-control options is very great. Union about three hundred quite large ICBMs (of the SS-9 and SS-18 class) while to the United States.STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AFTER SALT I 71 vehicles subject to two sublimits: one set a ceiling of 1. proportion particular diminishing for heavy missiles and heavy bombers. Whatever the and other similar requirements are out correct in in critics the missile the the gap rationale. and their numbers may have to be decreased In retrospect. In order to keep the foregoing discussion general. specific sublimits may have to be established on a separate schedule. . This should not obscure the virtues of the simpler procedure of a single-step reduction where it is appropriate. The principal task in negotiating and to promote more symmetric.320 on the numbers of MIRVed sizes to approximately the for each side and the other limited overall missile missiles The latter limit has the effect of allowing the Soviet sizes of those now deployed. this instance. weapons over large missiles over small missiles. we have employed the concept over a period of years that would be widely ap of a schedule of reductions proceeding plicable. when that is becoming This example illustrates a more general observation increasingly apparent: to preserve In order a rough balance.

on the orderly restraining and reduction of already more could then concentrate strategic forces. In this respect. powers to a treaty calling for substantial reductions will engage them in procedures for destruc exceedingly more complex than that process of simply certifying weapons tion that is sometimes taken to represent arms control. of reduc all that might be said for the usefulness. 660. The military position. and accompanying necessary increase. More important." or not. or control and limit the technology the military armed forces. in one step confer many of the oblivion. report. will have to be which may have been acceptable a commitment by the two leading nuclear tightened as numbers are lowered. charged with maintaining strength of the nation.PAUL 72 DOTY in 1975-76. In either event. The destruction the futile and the tragic. naturally interest in genuine arms find neither of these options congenial. energies of the negotiating are more useful purposes that could be saved for Subsequent negotiations prodigious. and had a "half life of one plenary session. it has become apparent that numerical it will become new dynamic situation. will be based on what is perceived as constituting acute an advantage over the adversary. But as the political control grows. of course. the removal of for seven years. to institute new sublimits. diplomats. The that permits improvement. This view is strengthened by the very short life of the a to the Newhouse SALT I option (Option D) which. As reductions progress. verification procedures.320 and then reduced back to the much safer number of. the Soviets face a particularly es of planes and tanks?and of American production problem. Fundamentally. say. such an agreement would or were more a to would achieve the MIRVed that take decade forces to be built gains up to 1. Despite that this mode of arms control is certain to encounter tions. this view was much more prevalent a few years ago than it is at Apocryphal there are only two options in arms control: either control and present. limit numbers. Their recollection World War II tells them to pecially the astronomical production of motor vehicles?in restraints. that would otherwise with asymmetries in the context of high ceilings. On the other hand. In short. With either in the SALT II Treaty or by a subsequent treaty negotiated a first-strike scenario would be assigned to this lower number of MIRVed missiles. Alterna a comparable number of its older missiles tively. it must be admitted has about it a touch of of expensive weapons strong resistance. and conclude that it would be pref . upgrading not to mention the the capital and resources. and indeed necessity. seek controls on numbers and to reject technological reflect that American sense of can the continued military superiority technology.4 contained according one hundred strategic missiles per year substantial reduction schedule. The choice will not be an easy one for either side. both sides could agree to identify or from refrain for future retirement and improving them. some accommodation by the military will have to be made. Likewise. into the arms-control to deal reduction schedules. they States has been the side to introduce almost every new weapons the United system into the strategic inventory since World War II. More introduce a reduction programs would over. manageable This survey of what might be called the tactics of reducing numbers of strategic to present the versatility and the complexity of this mode of has attempted weapons arms control and to demonstrate if the that reductions would become unavoidable containment and the decrease of strategic capability are desired by both sides.

with a consequently sophisticated weapons high unit cost that makes the to us nor lines neither acceptable large numbers turned out by endless production our budgets.S. matched for by enthusiasm so that the Soviet cannot missile throw be jointly limiting technology larger weights to interests American tend sizes Instead. and might ex position? This must represent a continuing the SALT talks. several branches of the American government have devoted a great deal of attention to the Soviet lead in the throw weight of ICBMs and the number of warheads that in them. that the current state of affairs is not so sharply drawn. these observations suggest that the military leadership on both sides would probably much prefer numerical reductions to equally drastic restraints on either technological of existing systems or the development of new improvements ones. that the United States has a three-fold lead in warheads. Although permanent technological they do not remove it. For two decades States has been shifting to progressively more the United systems. between reduction of strategic and arms can the U. Some further evidence can be found in official pronounce for this preference on both sides. In short. it will . At a rhetorical level. completion the further of the new limitation phase and of possible talks the USSR. however. we do have great pressed More important. this concern is not. The technological is also now open to argument "superiority" as the Soviet defense and remains the industry increases in sophistication the Soviets could hardly ex recipient of unrestrained budgetary largess. In these proposals ingly MIRVing efforts both technological and numerical restraints are requested. play on a con role. Taken together. under these restraints. a continuing logical lead can be assured. and also to the establishment of some kind of limits on their The qualitative successful questions siderable of improvement. American views on this question display a characteristic diversity. for the most part.STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AFTER SALT I 73 ?rable to seek controls on technology rather than on numbers. that we would have a pect the United States to make concessions on the expectation within question lead. fully exploited. The Soviet reac tion to the apparent American lead has been to field much larger mis technological a greater part of the Soviet strategic force in this visible. plain much of the stalling that characterized It should be evident. these considerations moderate the dilemma. Evidently itwould be a good thing to give some thought to how we could move from the limita tion of arms to their gradual reduction. evidently assuming techno that. and siles and to concentrate The American response has not surpris component. to size limit involved the and of Soviet missiles. potentially more threatening. Moreover. that weapons beyond one or two thousand are of increas ingly more marginal utility. do they not risk placing themselves permanently in an inferior technological dilemma for the Soviets. specific endorsement past three of them from Chairman in statements Brezhnev dating from the years.A. Despite ments that Soviet representatives have not ex allegations in interest in reduction formulas the SALT any discussions. if the government of the United States adheres to the principles of equal security and renunciation of attempts to gain unilateral advantages as set down in our agreements. and that we prefer our more diversified force in any case. ignoring the fact that the deliverable megatonnage could be deployed of the whole strategic force on each side is approximately equal. prefer limiting numbers and of launchers. But if they acquiesce in this.

" in the World. Role 1973. p. Proxmire. we 1985. p. 1974-75). in an Corporate Between Balance interview 1963. in Newsweek. Cold Dawn: I. published Executives See America's Skepticism. Foreign For 17 (Winter." Policy. C. on the FY 1976 and Transi to the Congress of Secretary of Defense James R. both I think sides. Kissinger "How The of Salt Story December 22. A number to reductions So is an agreement. October 27. 5 6 Strategic J. 4 in New H. References 1 Gallup 2 poll B.8 equitable the aide m?moire to take place well before take effect as soon as there of Defense Secretary in these reductions to reciprocate willing that That to preclude can that negotiations it is clear 1985.. 1. 1974. Tribune. 136. 5. Senator W. 3 P. p.. May. July 5. Hope and (New York. p. E. as the talks enter a new phase. 27. Schlesinger Defense and FY 1976-1980 1977 Authorization (mimeographed). forces [strategic] fashion. February A. on an next item for the the at least become acceptable agenda strategic weapons has steps to be taken in arms control. FY . 1973. sional York Herald Nitze. his opinion. The following statement was made in defense interview: in a Newsweek of the Vladivostok Agreement in fact is the significance of the nuclear what of this agreement? The nightmare Now. welcome would has in an be easier. Record. although insisted in the early days of Secretary Kissinger he has more recently modified SALT that reductions could not be negotiated. 1975. Programs" Request. 1. "The L. Hanson. Congres 1974. February Pravda. The first objective now is into Once of that has been built the achieved. December 15. 1974. "Statement tion Budgets. Congressional 5. Russett tune. 1972. Jackson..PAUL DOTY 74 find Soviet the as ing the a conscientious to be Union limitation reduction and of and active an in such partner undertak important arms.6 strategic On the American side. 1973). were reductions the negotiations now been to start only after 1985. Newhouse. age is the on the expectation arms based One of what the other side is doing. December 4. . The no later than 1980 for start would from eliminated on reductions an agreement start as soon as possible and statement. 7 Henry 8 and B. 1. M. g. It would seem. June 30. we find that reduction proposals have also been made by several Senators. 1974.6 And. has to get fear of strategic must in be to get that cycle of self-fulfilling one's priorities prophecies right. therefore.7 in his 1975 budget Finally. H. Senator Record. Brezhnev. That substantially planning terrupted. that impression in fact said after place never intended will reductions the take it was because on negotiations of people gained announcement Vladivostok were the states that: Schlesinger that provided the Soviet Union in numbers of balanced reduction that a negotiated.