Professional Documents
Culture Documents
EXAMINATION QUESTIONS
IN
REMEDIAL LAW
ARRANGED BY TOPIC
(1987 2004)
Silliman University
College of Law Batch 2005
From the ANSWERS TO BAR EXAMINATION
QUESTIONS by the UP LAW COMPLEX
July 26, 2005
Page 1 of 172
The Authors
July 26, 2005
Page 2 of 172
TABLE OF CONTENTS
General principles...............................................................................................................
Jurisdiction..........................................................................................................................
Civil Procedure..................................................................................................................
Summary Procedure.........................................................................................................
Criminal Procedure...........................................................................................................
Special Proceedings........................................................................................................135
Evidence............................................................................................................................146
Page 3 of 172
General principles...............................................................................................................
Family Courts Act..............................................................................................................
General principles..............................................................................................................
hierarchy of courts.......................................................................................................
Jurisdiction..........................................................................................................................
accion publiciana.............................................................................................................
incapable of pecuniary estimation...................................................................................
libel..................................................................................................................................
payment of docket fees....................................................................................................
probate.............................................................................................................................
replevin............................................................................................................................
unlawful detainer.............................................................................................................
Katarungang pambarangay....................................................................................................
RA 3019; mandatory suspension...........................................................................................
Civil Procedure..................................................................................................................
Civil action; claims that survive; money claims..............................................................
actionable documents.......................................................................................................
actions that survive..........................................................................................................
money claims.............................................................................................................
amendment of complaint.................................................................................................
amendment of complaint to conform to evidence.....................................................
amendment of compromise agreement............................................................................
amendment of pleadings..................................................................................................
annulment of judgment; rule 45 vs rule 65......................................................................
appeals.............................................................................................................................
bill of particulars..............................................................................................................
cause of action.................................................................................................................
joinder........................................................................................................................
parties.........................................................................................................................
splitting a cause of action..........................................................................................
certification against forum shopping...............................................................................
class suit...........................................................................................................................
common cause of action; party in default........................................................................
compulsory counterclaim.................................................................................................
concurrent jurisdiction.....................................................................................................
counterclaim....................................................................................................................
cross-claims/ 3rd party claims...........................................................................................
cross-claims/third party claims........................................................................................
death
death of a party; effect...............................................................................................
death of defendant; effect..........................................................................................
default..............................................................................................................................
default; remedies..............................................................................................................
demurrer to evidence.......................................................................................................
dismissal by the plaintiff..................................................................................................
dismissal of action; effect on counterclaim.....................................................................
dismissal without prejudice.............................................................................................
effect of failure to answer................................................................................................
error of judgment vs error of jurisdiction........................................................................
execution of judgments
Page 4 of 172
settlement of estate........................................................................................................141
administrator..........................................................................................................143
issues on ownership...............................................................................................144
issues on ownership...............................................................................................144
modes.....................................................................................................................145
venue..............................................................................................................................145
Evidence............................................................................................................................146
admissibility...................................................................................................................146
admissibility of DNA.............................................................................................147
admissibility of evidence.......................................................................................147
admissibility; anti-wire tapping act.......................................................................148
admissibility; objections........................................................................................149
admission of evidence not alleged in the complaint..............................................149
admissions/confessions..................................................................................................149
authentic documents......................................................................................................149
best evidence rule..........................................................................................................150
best evidence rule; parol evidence rule..................................................................151
character evidence.........................................................................................................151
confession; affidavit of recantation................................................................................151
cross-examination..........................................................................................................152
dead man statute............................................................................................................152
dying declaration...........................................................................................................153
effect of an offer of compromise...................................................................................155
electronic evidence........................................................................................................156
equipoise doctrine..........................................................................................................156
examination of witnesses...............................................................................................156
formal offer of evidence................................................................................................157
res inter alios acta....................................................................................................158
formal offer vs offer of proof...................................................................................159
hearsay evidence............................................................................................................159
hearsay exceptions...................................................................................................159
impeachment of witnesses.............................................................................................161
judicial notice; foreign law............................................................................................162
kinds; admissibility........................................................................................................162
lost documents; secondary evidence..............................................................................163
marital disqualification rule...........................................................................................163
marital privilege; parental privilege; privileged communication............................165
memorandum.................................................................................................................165
offer to marry; circumstantial evidence.........................................................................166
offer to pay expenses; effect..........................................................................................166
offfer of testimonial and documentary...........................................................................166
opinion rule....................................................................................................................166
parol evidence rule.........................................................................................................167
preponderance vs substantial evidence..........................................................................167
qualifications of witnesses.............................................................................................168
qualifications of witnesses; weight of evidence......................................................168
res gestae; dying declaration..........................................................................................168
res inter alios rule...........................................................................................................170
right to cross examine....................................................................................................170
rules of admissibility......................................................................................................171
suppression of evidence; presentation of informant......................................................172
tender of excluded evidence..........................................................................................172
Page 8 of 172
Answer;
3)
Civil cases may be adjudicated without trial, such as In the
following rules:
a)
b)
c)
d)
Summary Judgment.
Judgment on the Pleadings.
Summary procedure.
Sec. 3 of Rule 17.
Plea of guilty.
b)
Motion to quash on the ground
extinction of criminal action or liability.
of
double
jeopardy
or
c)
Motion to dismiss on the ground of violation of the right
to a speedy trial.
General principles
1997 No. 17;
Distinguish:
(a)
(b)
Page 9 of 172
General principles
1998 No I.
1.
2.
ANSWER:
1.
A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong. (See. 3[a], Rule 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), while a
special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a
status, a right or a particular feet. (Sec. 3[C]. Rule 1,1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure.)
2.
The Rules of Court should be liberally construed in order
to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding. (Sec. 6, Rule 1 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure.)
ADDITIONAL ANSWER:
However, strict observance of the rules is an imperative
necessity when they are considered indispensable to the prevention of
needless delays and to the orderly and speedy dispatch of Judicial
business. (Alvero vs. Judge de la Rosa, 76 Phil. 428 and other cases.)
General principles
2003 No. I.
In rendering a decision, should a court take into consideration
the possible effect of its verdict upon the political stability and
economic welfare of the nation? 4%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, because a court is required to take into consideration only
the legal issues and the evidence admitted in the case. The political
stability and economic welfare of the nation are extraneous to the case.
They can have persuasive influence but they are not the main factors
that should be considered in deciding a case. A decision should be based
on the law, rules of procedure, justice and equity. However, in
exceptional cases the court may consider the political stability and
economic welfare of the nation when these are capable of being taken
into judicial notice of and are relevant to the case.
General principles; hierarchy of courts
1996 No. 1:
2)
Answer;
2} By "hierarchy of courts" is meant that while the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have
concurrent original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus, such concurrence
does not accord litigants unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to
which application therefor may be directed. The application should be
filed with the court of lower level unless the importance of the issue
involved deserves the action of the court of higher level. (Uy vs.
Contreras, 237 SCRA 167)
(NOTE:
purposes)
Jurisdiction
1987 No (1)
A leased his commercial land and building in Malate, Manila to
B, a resident of Malolos, Bulacan. The contract of lease provided that
in the event A violates the contract, B may file suit in Manila, As
Page 10 of 172
which
court
can
you
Answer:
I can lawfully file the action for ejectment either in the MetroTC
of Manila or in the MTC of Malolos. Metropolitan and Municipal Trial
Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over the cases of forcible
entry and unlawful detainer or ejectment cases. The stipulation in the
lease contract that if B violates the contract A may sue B in Malolos is
valid, because the location of the real property in such cases
determines the venue of the action and not jurisdiction over the subject
matter. However, since the agreement as to the venue is merely
permissive, as shown by the use of the word may, the action may also
be filed in Manila where the real property is located. (Villanueva vs.
Masqueda, 155 SCRA 904)
Jurisdiction
1988 (2)
Norma is the owner of Love and Peace Enterprises, a sole
proprietorship engaged in the manufacture of bullets, with a work force
of 100 employees whom top employee, Evelyn, supervises. Norma, however,
soon to lost confidence in Evelyn, and to force her to resign, refused
to pay her salaries and other economic benefits required by law. Instead
of resigning, however, Evelyn decided to fight back.
On the strength of Art. 1701 of the Civil Code, as follows:
ART 1701. Neither capital nor labor shall act oppressively against
the other, or impair the interest or convenience of the public in
relation to Art. 212 thereof as follows:
ART 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another
in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for damages.
Evelyn went to the RTC on a complaint for actual, exemplary and
moral damages. Norma moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction alleging that it is the labor arbiters who are vested with
the jurisdiction. Evelyn opposed the motion on the ground that her
complaint is based on tort and hence, purely civil in character.
2.a) decide the incident with reason.
2.b) what is jurisdiction and how does it differ from cause of
action? How are they acquired? Explain.
Answer:
2.a) Motion to dismiss granted. Under the Labor Code, the labor
arbiters have jurisdiction over all claims for damages sought to be
recovered by an employee arising from an illegal dismissal or forced
resignation. (Atlas Fertilizer Corp. vs. Navarro, 149 SCRA 432; Primero
vs. IAC, Dec. 14, 1987)
2.b) Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine cause,
the right to act in a case. It is given by law and in the manner
prescribed by law; whereas cause of action is an act or omission of one
party in violation of the legal rights of the other.
Jurisdiction
1992 No. I:
In a suit to recover a sum of money, plaintiff filed his
complaint with the Regional Trial Court instead of with the Municipal
Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the case because of the amount
involved. The defendant did not file a motion to dismiss. Neither did
the Regional Trial Court dismiss the case on its own initiative. At the
pre-trial hearing, defendant tried to have the case settled. With the
Page 11 of 172
effective help of the presiding judge, he was able to forge with the
plaintiff a compromise agreement which stipulated that he would pay in
twelve (12) equal monthly installments starting the first day of the
following month, each to become due without need of any demand. Failure
to pay any installment when due will render the entire amount
enforceable by writ of execution. Judgment was rendered on the basis of
the compromise agreement and was then served on the parties.
Defendant failed to pay the first installment as it fell due.
Plaintiff thereupon sought execution which was granted, and the
corresponding writ of execution was issued. Defendant filed in due form
a motion to set aside the writ of execution upon the contention that the
court had no power to order the issuance of the writ of execution
because it has no jurisdiction over the nature of the action, an issue
that can be raised at any stage of the case. The court granted the
defendant's motion and accordingly set aside the writ of execution.
Did the court act correctly? Why?
Suggested Answer:
Yes. the court acted correctly, because jurisdiction over the
subject matter or nature of an action cannot be conferred by agreement
of the parties. Whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter, it shall dismiss the action. (Sec, 2 of Rule 9)
Another Acceptable Answer:
Inasmuch as the defendant did not file a motion to dismiss and
the parties submitted a compromise agreement on the basis of which
Judgment was rendered, the defendant is estopped to raise the question
of jurisdiction. (Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29 and other cases)
Jurisdiction
1993 No (17)
Menez Duque filed an action against Fuji, Inc. before the Regional
Trial Court for recovery of actual. Moral and exemplary damages
resulting from his alleged unfounded and unjust dismissal from his job.
Fuji, Inc. filed an answer asserting that Menez dismissal was for
just and valid cause.
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision sustaining Menez claim
and ordering Fuji, Inc. to pay him actual, moral and exemplary damages.
Fuji, Inc. appealed to the Court of Appeals where it insisted that
Menez dismissal was for valid and just cause.
Without resolving the assigned error, the Court of Appeals set
aside the appealed decision and dismissed the case on the ground that it
is the Labor Arbiter, not he ordinary courts, which has jurisdiction to
entertain the claim for damages.
Pursuant to RA No. 6715, claims for actual, moral, exemplary and
other forms of damages arising from employer-employee relations falls
within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters.
Considering, however, that the lack of jurisdiction of the trial court
was assigned as error in the appellants brief, did the Court of Appeals
act properly in its decision? Why?
Answer:
Yes, because the fact that the lack of jurisdiction of the trial
court was not assigned as error in the appellants brief should not
prevent the Court of Appeals from taking up that issue, as the lack of
jurisdiction of the lower court is apparent from the face of the record.
It is fundamental that a court of justice could only validly act upon a
cause of action or subject matter of a case over which it has
jurisdiction. Said jurisdiction is one conferred by law and cannot be
acquired through, or waived by, any act or omission of the parties.
Alternative Answer:
Page 12 of 172
(c)
P150,000.00.
An
action
for
replevin
of
motorcycle
valued
at
(d)
An action for interpleader to determine who between the
defendants is entitled to receive the amount of P190,000.00 from the
plaintiff.
(e)
A petition for the probate of a will involving an estate
valued at P200,000.00.
Answer;
(a)
An action for specific performance or, in the alternative,
for damages in the amount of 180,000.00 falls within the jurisdiction of
Metropolitan Trial Courts in Metro Manila. Although an action for
specific performance is not capable of pecuniary estimation, since the
alternative demand for damages is capable of pecuniary estimation, it is
within the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts in Metro
Manila. (Sec. 33 of BP 129 as amended by RA No. 7691: Cruz us. Tan, 87
Phil. 627],
(b)
An action for injunction is not capable of pecuniary
estimation and hence falls within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Courts.
Page 13 of 172
Page 14 of 172
Was
the
denial
of
the
Motion
to
Dismiss
the
Complaint
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) The denial of the Motion to Dismiss the Complaint was not
correct. Although the assessed value of the parcel of land involved was
P19,000.00, within the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Manila, the action filed by A for Specific Performance against B to
compel the latter to execute a Deed of Conveyance of said parcel of land
was not capable of pecuniary estimation and, therefore, the action was
within the jurisdiction of Regional Trial Court. (Russel v. Vestil, 304
SCRA 738 [1999]; Copioso v. Copioso, G.R. No. 149243, October 28,2002;
Cabutihan v. Landcenter Construction, 383 SCRA 353 [2002]).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
If the action affects title to or possession of real property
then it is a real action and jurisdiction is determined by the assessed
value of the property. It is within the jurisdiction therefore of the
Metropolitan Trial Court.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(b) The Court could declare B in default because B did not
obtain a writ of preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order
from the Regional Trial Court prohibiting the judge from proceeding in
the case during the pendency of the petition for certiorari. (Sec. 7 of
Rule 65; Diaz v. Diaz, 331 SCRA 302 [2002].
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The Court should not declare B in default inasmuch as the
jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Court was put in issue in the
Petition For Certiorari filed with the Regional Trial Court. The
Metropolitan Trial Court should defer further proceedings pending the
result of such petition. (Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corporation v.
Court of Appeals, 164 SCRA 421 [1988]).
Jurisdiction
2004 NO. IV
B. Plaintiff filed a complaint for a sum of money against
defendant with the MeTC-Makati, the total amount of the demand,
exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees,
litigation expenses, and costs, being P1,000,000.
In due time,
defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of the
MeTCs lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. After due hearing,
the MeTC (1) ruled that the court indeed lacked jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the complaint; and (2) ordered that the case therefore
should be forwarded to the proper Regional Trial Court immediately.
Was the courts ruling concerning jurisdiction correct?
Was the
courts order to forward the case proper? Explain briefly. (5%)
Jurisdiction; accion publiciana
1992 No. XIV:
While Alfredo was abroad, a parcel of land belonging to him was
intruded into and occupied by Rodrigo on January 1, 1991. When Alfredo
returned on February 1. 1991, he immediately demanded that Rodrigo
vacate the property. When the demand went unheeded, Alfredo prepared a
complaint alleging: that he is the owner of the property which Rodrigo
has intruded into and is occupying; that the intrusion, done with
strategy and stealth, has caused him actual damages of P30,000.00; and
he. therefore, is praying the court to restore him to the possession of
Page 15 of 172
the property, to award him damages, and to further grant him such other
reliefs as may be proper in the premises. The complaint was filed on
March 1, 1991 with the Regional Trial Court which eventually rendered a
decision declaring Alfredo to be the owner of the land, awarding him
damages of P5,000.00, and ordering that possession of the property be
restored to him. Rodrigo appealed to the Court of Appeals where he
questioned the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, pertinently
contending that it was the Municipal Trial Court which had original and
exclusive jurisdiction over the case because (1) it was a forcible entry
case, having been filed within one year from the alleged intrusion; (2)
the intrusion was allegedly done through strategy and stealth which are
hallmarks of a forcible entry case; and (3) the declaration of ownership
was uncalled for since Alfredo did not ask for it.
As counsel for Alfredo, what points will you raise and advance to
rebut the arguments of Rodrigo and to justify the jurisdiction, as well
as the decision of the Regional Trial Court?
Suggested Answer;
As counsel for Alfredo, I would raise the point that the action
was not one of forcible entry, but an accion publiciana or a plenary
action for recovery of possession dejure which is within the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. Moreover, the claim of actual
damages in the amount of P30,000.00, is not within the jurisdiction of
the Municipal Trial Court. If it were an action of forcible entry, the
damages that could be claimed would be the reasonable compensation for
the use and occupation of the land and the amount thereof could exceed
Twenty
Thousand Pesos.
But damages
other than
the reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the premises are not
recoverable in an action of forcible entry, (Reyes us. Court of Appeals.
38 SCRA 138)
With respect to the declaration of ownership, I would argue that
it was correct inasmuch as Rodrigo did not question the ownership of
Alfredo.
Jurisdiction; incapable of pecuniary estimation
2000 No. XVIII-a
(a) A brings an action in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila
against B for the annulment of an extrajudicial foreclosure sale of real
property with an assessed value of P50,000.00 located in Laguna. The
complaint alleged prematurity of the sale for the reason that the
mortgage was not yet due. B timely moved to dismiss the case on the
ground that the action should have been brought in the Regional Trial
Court of Laguna. Decide with reason. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) The motion should be granted. The Metropolitan Trial Court
of Manila has no jurisdiction because the action for the annulment of
the extrajudicial foreclosure is not capable of pecuniary estimation and
is therefore under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts.
(Russell v. Vestil, 304 SCRA 738,[1999]).
However, the action for annulment is a personal action and the
venue depends on the residence of either A or B. Hence, it should be
brought in the Regional Trial Court of the place where either of the
parties resides.
Jurisdiction; incapable of pecuniary estimation
2000 No. XVIII-b
(b) A files an action in the Municipal Trial Court against B,
the natural son of As father, for the partition of a parcel of land
located in Taytay, Rizal with an assessed value of P20,000.00. B moves
to dismiss the action on the ground that the case should have been
brought in the Regional Trial Court because the action is one that is
not capable of pecuntary estimation as it involves primarily a
Page 16 of 172
determination of hereditary rights and not merely the bare right to real
property. Resolve the motion. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(b). The motion should be granted. The action for partition
depends on a determination of the hereditary rights of A and B, which is
not capable of pecuniary estimation. Hence, even though the assessed
value of the land is P20,000.00, the Municipal Trial Court has no
jurisdiction. (Russell v. Vestil, supra)
Jurisdiction; libel
1995 No. 6
Mario, a resident of Quezon City, sued for libel the editor,
publisher and columnist of Ang Bagong Filipino, a newspaper of general
circulation, with principal office at
Binondo, Manila. He claimed that because his reputation had been
badly besmirched by the offensive article he suffered damages estimated
at 1 Million. The case was filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City.
The accused moved to quash the Information on the ground that the
RTC had no jurisdiction to try the case considering that under Sec. 2 of
RA
7691
Metropolitan
Trial
Courts
exercise
exclusive
original
jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not
exceeding six (6) years (of which libel is one) irrespective of the
amount of fine, accessory or other penalties or civil liability arising
from the offense. The accused also claimed that the offensive article
was printed and first published in Manila so that the case should have
been filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila.
Decide.
Page 17 of 172
jurisdiction
over
the
issue
of
Answer:
Page 18 of 172
5.b) The RTC has jurisdiction over the issue of possession of the
vessel. The replevin case is not involved in the labor dispute. The
question of who has the better right of possession is outside the
competence of labor tribunals and within the jurisdiction of civil
courts. (Basaya, Jr. Vs. Militante, Dec.11, 1987)
Jurisdiction; unlawful detainer
1988 (1)
Luis is the owner of a 5-door apartment unit 3 doors of which he
has leased to Fe, Garry and Marilou for a monthly rental of P250 per
door. Fe, Garry and Marilou have been his tenants for close to 30 years
at that rate. He occupies the fourth door as his own residence. The
fifth door is vacant. Alleging that he needs to repossess all 3 doors
for the use of his son, Fern, who had recently gotten married, and who
does not allegedly have a residence of his own, he sued, after the
requisite letters to vacate, Fe, Garry and Marilou before the MetroTC
for unlawful detainer. Fe, Garry and Marilou answered the complaint and
set up the defense that ejectment was not proper because the fifth door
was available for Ferns residence. At the trial, they likewise
endeavored to prove that Fern in fact has a residence of his own and
that the suit was Luis mere strategy to force them to agree to a rental
hike of P1,500 a door, in violation of the rental laws. The trial judge,
however, decreed ejectment. On appeal to the RTC, Fe, Garry and Marilou
alleged that the decision was null and void, for lack of jurisdiction,
there having been no prior confrontation among the parties before the
lupong tagapayapa pursuant to PD1508. Luis countered that the
jurisdictional question not having been raised below, it cannot be raise
for the first time on appeal.
1.a) Can Fe, Garry and Marilou validly challenge the jurisdiction
of the MTC? Explain.
1.b) What is the effect of Luis failure to resort
conciliation process before the lupong tagapayapa provided
PD1508? Explain.
to the
for in
Answer:
1.a) No, because lack of prior confrontation among the parties
before the lupong tagapaya pursuant to PD1508 does not affect the
jurisdiction of the MTC over the action for unlawful detainer. (It is
presumed that the complaint was filed within one year from the demand to
vacate.) (Rayales vs. IAC, 127 SCRA 470)
Moreover, by answering the complaint and setting up the defense
without objecting to the jurisdiction of the court, they are estopped
from raising the question of jurisdiction. (Tijam vs, Sibonghanoy, 23
SCRA 29)
1.b) Luis failure to resort to the conciliation process affects
the sufficiency of his cause of action and makes his complaint subject
to dismissal on the ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity.
(Rayales vs. IAC, supra)
Katarungang pambarangay
2001 No. V.
An amicable settlement was signed before a Lupon Tagapamayapa on
January 3, 2001. On July 6, 2001, the prevailing party asked the Lupon
to execute the amicable settlement because of the non-compliance by the
other party of the terms of the agreement. The Lupon concerned refused
to execute the settlement/agreement.
a)
Is
the
Lupon
settlement/agreement? (3%)
correct
in
refusing
to
execute
the
b)
What should be the course of action of the prevailing party
in such a case? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Page 19 of 172
a)
Yes, the Lupon is correct in refusing to execute the
settlement/agreement because the execution sought is already beyond the
period of six months from the date of the settlement within which the
Lupon is authorized to execute. (Sec. 417, Local Government Code of
1991)
b)
After the six-month period, the prevailing party should move
to execute the settlement/agreement in the appropriate city or municipal
trial court. (Id.)
Katarungang Pambarangay Law
1995 No. 14:
Alice, a resident of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, filed with the
Metropolitan Trial Court thereat a complaint for damages against her
next-door neighbor Rosa for P100,000.00 with prayer for preliminary
attachment. She alleged that Rosa intrigued against her honor by
spreading unsavory rumors about her among their co-workers at the
Phoenix Knitwear factory located at Valenzuela.
After pre-trial the court motu proprio referred the case for
amicable settlement between the parties to the Lupon Tagapayapa of
Barangay 2, Zone 3. of Valenzuela where the factory is located. Rosa
questioned the order contending that the court had no authority to do so
as both parties had already gone through pre-trial where amicable
settlement was foreclosed and the parties were already going to trial.
1.
2.
Rosa also opposed the referral to the Lupon Tagapayapa of
Barangay 2, Zone 3, claiming that the venue was wrong as the proper
Lupon was that of Barangay 1, Zone 5, where she and Alice reside.
Is Rosa's opposition valid? Explain.
3.
Suppose that the Lupon of Barangay 2, Zone 3, is successful
in forging an amicable settlement between Alice and Rosa, is the
compromise immediately executory? Explain.
4.
How, when and by whom shall the compromise agreement be
enforced? Explain.
Answer;
1.
Rosa is not correct. The Local Government Code provides that
in non-criminal cases not falling within the authority of the Lupon, the
court may at any time before trial refer the case to the Lupon concerned
for amicable settlement. (Sec. 408)
2.
No, because the law also provides that the venue of disputes
arising at the workplace of the contending parties shall be brought in
the barangay where such workplace is located. {Sec. 409[d])
3.
No, because any compromise settlement shall be submitted to
the court which referred the case for approval. (Sec. 416).
4.
Upon approval thereof, it shall have the force and effect of
a Judgment of the court and shall be enforced in accordance with Section
6, Rule 39.
Katarungang Pambarangay Law
1999 No. I
a.
What
Pambarangay Law? (2%)
is
the
object
of
the
Katarungang
b.
What is the difference, if any, between the conciliation
proceedings under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law and the negotiations
for an amicable settlement during the pre-trial conference under the
Rules of Court? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Page 20 of 172
a.
The object of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law is to effect
an amicable settlement of disputes among family and barangay members at
the barangay level without judicial recourse and consequently help
relieve the courts of docket congestion. (Preamble of P.D. No. 1508, the
former and the first Katarungang Pambarangay Law.)
b.
The difference between the conciliation proceedings under
the Katarungang Pambarangay Law and the negotiations for an amicable
settlement during the pre-trial conference under the Rules of Court is
that in the former, lawyers are prohibited from appearing for the
parties.
Parties must appear in person only except minors or
incompetents who may be assisted by their next of kin who are not
lawyers.
(Formerly Sec. 9, P.D. No. 1508; Sec. 415, Local Government
Code of 1991, R.A. 7160.) Ho such prohibition exists in the pre-trial
negotiations under the Rules of Court.
RA 3019; mandatory suspension
2001 No. XIX
Governor Pedro Mario of Tarlac was charged with indirect bribery
before the Sandiganbayan for accepting a car in exchange of the award of
a series of contracts for medial supplies. The Sandiganbayan, after
going over the information, found the same to be valid and ordered the
suspension of Mario. The latter contested the suspension claiming that
under the law (Sec. 13 of R.A. 3019) his suspension is not automatic
upon the filing of the information and his suspension under Sec. 13,
R.A. 3019 is in conflict with Sec. 5 of the Decentralization Act of 1967
(R.A. 5185). The Sandilganbayan overruled Marios contention stating
that Marios suspension under the circumstances is mandatory.
Is the courts ruling correct? Why?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. Marios suspension is mandatory, although not automatic,
(Sec. 13 of R.A. No. 3019 in relation to Sec. 5 of the Decentralization
Act of 1967 (R.A. No. 5185). It is mandatory after the determination of
the validity of the information in a pre-suspension hearing. [Segovia v.
Sandiganbayan, 288 SCRA 328 (1988) and other cases]. The purpose of
suspension is to prevent the accused public officer from frustrating or
hampering his prosecution by intimidating or influencing witnesses or
tampering with evidence or from committing further acts of malfeasance
while in office. (Id.)
Civil Procedure
Civil action; claims that survive; money claims
1991 No. X:
A filed a complaint against Y with the RTC of Argao, Cebu, for
payment of a promissory note in the sum of P50,000.00, for liquidated
damages of P5,000.00 and attorney's fees of P5,000.00. After he filed
his answer, Y died, but his lawyer did not file a motion to dismiss. In
the meantime, Y's widow filed with the above court a special proceeding
for the settlement of the intestate estate of Y. The widow, Z. was
appointed the administratrix of the estate. A filed in the civil case a
motion to have Y substituted by the administratrix; the latter did not
object. The court granted the motion. Trial on the merits was had. In
due course, the court rendered a decision in favor of A, At the time it
was rendered, the period to file claims in the intestate estate of Y had
already lapsed. The administratrix. X, did not appeal from the decision;
and after it became final, A moved for the execution of judgment. Z
opposed the motion contending that the decision is void because the
claim does not survive. The case should have been dismissed upon the
death of Y since upon his death, the court lost jurisdiction over the
case.
(a) Rule on the issue.
Answer;
Page 21 of 172
(a)
Since Y died before final judgment in the RTC, the action
for money should have been dismissed and prosecuted as a money claim
against his estate.
However, since the widow, Z, who was appointed
administratrix of the estate, did not object to the trial on the merits
and did not appeal from the decision, she is deemed to have waived the
right to have the claim litigated in the estate proceedings. Moreover,
she is estopped from questioning the court's jurisdiction.
Hence, the
decision is valid. (Sec. 21 of Rule 3; Ignacio v. Pambusco, 20 SCRA 126;
Echaus v. Blanco. 179 SCRA 704)
(b)
If the opposition
execution be validly issued?
is
without
merit,
can
the
writ
of
Answer:
(b) No, because a judgment for money cannot be enforced by a writ
of execution against the estate of the deceased which is in custodio
legis. (Sec. 7 of Rule 39; Paredes v. Moya, 61 SCRA 527)
(c) If it cannot be issued, what is the remedy of A?
Answer;
(c) His remedy is to file a money claim against the estate of Y
based on the judgment. Although the period for filing money claims has
already lapsed, the same may be allowed before an order of distribution
is entered. (Secs. 2 and 5 of Rule 86; Echaus v. Blanco, supra)
Civil procedure; actionable documents
1987 No (9)
A filed a suit against B and C for the recovery of the personal
property which, according to the complaint, had been sold to him by the
defendants father during latters lifetime under a document entitled
Bill of Sale. The substance of the bill was pleaded in the complaint and
a copy thereof was attached to the complaint as exhibit. B and C filed
an answer which disclaimed knowledge or information bout the Bill of
Sale and averred that the signature thereon allegedly belonging to their
father appears to be a forgery. At the trial of the case, B and C
commenced, through counsel and by means of an expert witness, to adduce
evidence to prove that the sellers signature was a forgery. A objected,
saying that the genuineness and due execution of the Bill of Sale was
deemed admitted because the answer was unverified, as a matter of law,
inasmuch as the verification was made only on the express basis of best
information and belief.
Resolve the objections with reasons.
Answer:
Objection overruled. B and C do not have to deny specifically
under oath the genuineness and due execution of the Bill of Sale since
they do not appear to be a party thereto, the same having been allegedly
executed by their deceased father. (Sec. 8 of Rule 8). Their answer
disclaiming knowledge or information bout the Bill of Sale and averring
that the signature thereon appears to be a forgery is sufficient to put
in issue the genuineness and due execution of said document.
Civil procedure; actionable documents
1990 (7)
In his answer to the complaint, Mario alleged that he does not owe
Norma any sum of money, and that he executed the promissory note only to
enable Norma to show the same to her husband to explain the
disappearance of the amount from the conjugal funds as Norma lost the
same in the casino. The answer is not verified. At the trial, the lawyer
of Norma objected to the testimony of Mario as to his accommodation
story because, as the answer is not verified, he is deemed to have
admitted the genuineness and due execution of the promissory note.
Decide on the objection with reason.
Page 22 of 172
Answer:
Objection overruled. A verified answer is necessary in denying the
genuineness and due execution of the promissory note on which the action
is based. However, the defense of Mario does not dispute the genuineness
or due execution of the promissory note. His defense of want of
consideration, that he executed the promissory not only to enable Norma
to explain the loss of the conjugal funds does not require a verified
answer. (Sec. 8 of Rule 8).
Civil procedure; actionable documents
1991 No. VII:
In an action for collection of P2,000,000.00. plaintiff bank
alleged that defendant Oriental Textile Mills. Inc., for valuable
consideration, executed in favor of the bank a promissory note for said
amount. Defendant filed an answer to the complaint denying liability and
alleging that Jesus Lim had no authority to negotiate and obtain a loan
in its behalf, nor to sign the promissory note. The answer was not
verified. During the trial, defendant sought to introduce evidence to
show that Jesus Lim was not authorized to enter into the transaction and
to sign the promissory note for and in behalf of the defendant
corporation. Plaintiff objected to such evidence, claiming that Lim's
authority had been admitted by defendant's failure to verify the answer.
(a) The judge sustained the objection. Was the ruling correct?
Answer:
(a) Yes. If a copy of the promissory note had been attached to
the complaint or set forth therein, the failure of defendant to deny
specifically under oath the due execution of the promissory note, or to
verify the allegation in its answer that Jesus Lim had no authority to
obtain a loan or to sign the promissory note, constitutes an admission
of the due execution thereof. Hence, defendant's evidence was properly
objected to by plaintiff. [Secs. 7 and 8 of Rule 8; Imperial Textile
Mills, Inc. v. CA, 182 SCRA 584)
(b)
Supposing that no objection was made, trial proceeded, and
judgment was thereafter rendered in favor of the plaintiff.
The latter
filed a motion for execution pending appeal and forthwith filed a bond
in a sum double the amount adjudged. May the court grant the motion
solely on the ground that a bond was filed?
Answer;
(b) No, the mere filing of the bond is not a sufficient good
reason for execution pending appeal. (Roxas v. CA, 157 SCRA 370) Since
no objection was made by plaintiff to defendant's evidence of lack of
authority of Jesus Lim, the same was admissible and constituted a good
defense to plaintiffs action.
Civil procedure; actions that survive
2000 No. I-c
c)
PJ engaged the services of Atty. ST to represent him in a
civil case filed by OP against him which was docketed as Civil Case No.
123. A retainership agreement was executed between PJ and Atty. ST
whereby PJ promised to pay Atty. ST a retainer sum of P24,000.00 a year
and to transfer the ownership of a parcel of land to Atty. ST after
presentation of PJs evidence. PJ did not comply with his undertaking.
Atty. ST filed a case against PJ which was docketed as Civil Case No.
456. During the trial of Civil Case No. 456, PJ died.
i)
Is the death of PJ a valid ground to dismiss the money claim
of Atty. ST in Civil Case No. 456? Explain. (2%)
ii) Will your answer be the same with respect to the real
property being claimed by Atty. ST in Civil Case No. 456? Explain (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Page 23 of 172
(c)
(i) No. Under Sec. 20, Rule 3, 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, when the action is for recovery of money arising from
contract, express or implied, and the defendant dies before entry of
final judgment in the court in which the action is pending at the time
of such death, it shall not be dismissed but shall instead be allowed to
continue until entry of final judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by
the plaintiff shall be enforced in the manner especially provided in the
Rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased person.
(ii) Yes, my answer is the same. An action to recover real
property in any event survives the death of the defendant. (Sec. 1, Rule
87, Rules of Court). However, a favorable judgment may be enforced in
accordance with Sec. 7(b) Rule 39 (1997 Rules of Civil Procedure)
against the executor or administrator or successor in interest of the
deceased.
Civil procedure; actions that survive; money claims
1992 No. IV:
After termination of trial on the merits, and as the trial Judge
was about to finish his decision dismissing plaintiffs suit for payment
of a purported P369.000.00 loan, the defendant died. His counsel
accordingly filed with the court a notice of defendant's death.
Simultaneously, he moved that plaintiffs suit be dismissed, to be
thereafter pursued as a money claim in the proceeding for the settlement
of defendant's estate. The judge denied the motion to dismiss on the
ground that there is no need for any further proceeding since he is
going to dismiss the case anyway in a forthcoming decision. Three (3)
days later, the decision dismissing the case was promulgated.
Did the judge act correctly? Explain your answer.
Suggested Answer:
No, because in an action for the recovery of money, if the
defendant dies before a final judgment is rendered by the Regional Trial
Court, the action shall be dismissed and prosecuted as a money claim.
(Sec. 21 of Rule 3) The fact that the judge was ready to render a
decision dismissing the case does not prevent the application of the
rule.
Another Acceptable Answer:
Yes, the Judge acted correctly in deciding the case, because the
defendant died after termination of the trial on the merits. To dismiss
the case and require the parties to present their evidence all over
again before the probate court would cause unnecessary expense and
delay. The plaintiff may appeal from the decision and if the judgment is
reversed, the judgment entered would then be filed as a proven money
claim with the probate court.
Civil procedure; amendment of complaint
2003 No. III.
After an answer has been filed, can the plaintiff amend his
complaint, with leave of court, by changing entirely the nature of the
action? 4%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the present rules allow amendments substantially altering
the nature of the cause of action. (Sec. 3, Rule 10, 1977 Rules of Civil
Procedure; Heirs of Marcelino Pagobo v. Court of Appeals, 280 SCRA 870
[1997]).
This should only be true, however, when the substantial change or
alteration in the cause of action or defense shall serve the higher
interests of substantial justice and prevent delay and equally promote
the laudable objective of the rules which is to secure a just, speedy
and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. (Valenzuela
v. Court of Appeals, 363 SCRA 779 [2001]).
Page 24 of 172
Page 25 of 172
reflect the true agreement between him and B, and substantially affected
the compromise agreement, I would set aside. I would not approve the
amendment without the consent of B.
(b) I will appeal from said order granting the amendment despite
my opposition to the CA on both questions of fact and law or to the SC
on question of law only. While a judgment on compromise is not
appealable, an order denying the motion to set aside the compromise on
the ground of fraud, mistake or duress is appealable. (Reyes vs. Ugarte,
75 Phil. 505). In this case, the judge approved an amendment to the
compromise agreement despite my opposition, and hence the amendment to
the judgment on compromise is appealable.
Another Alternative Answer:
(a) No, because the judgment is already final and executory and
beyond amendment.
Civil procedure; amendment of pleadings
1993 No (4)
In an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land filed in the
RTC, the defendant, through his lawyer, filed and answer therein
admitting the averment in the complaint that the land was acquired by
the plaintiff through inheritance from his parents, the former owners
thereof.
Subsequently, the defendant changed his lawyer and with leave of
court, amended the answer. In the amended answer, the abovementioned
admission no longer appears, instead, the alleged ownership of the land
by the plaintiff was denied coupled with the allegation that the
defendant is the owner of the land for the reason that he bought the
same form the plaintiffs parents during their lifetime.
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision upholding the defendants
ownership of the land.
On appeal, the plaintiff contended that the defendant is bound by
the admission contained in his original answer.
Is the contention of plaintiff correct? Why?
Answer:
No, because pleadings that have been amended disappear from the
record, lose their status as pleadings and cease to be judicial
admissions. While they may nonetheless be utilized as against the
pleader as extrajudicial admissions, they must, in order to have such
effect, be formally offered in evidence.
Alternative Answer:
Yes, because an admission in the original pleadings does cease to
be a judicial admission simply because it was deleted in an amended
pleading. The original answer, although replaced by an amended answer
does not cease to be part of a judicial record, not having been expunged
therefrom.
Civil procedure; amendment of pleadings
1994 No (15)
Michele sued Juliet for reinvindication for the recovery of land.
After the hearing but previous to the rendition of judgment, Michelle
amended her complaint making the principal action one for rescission of
contract. Juliet objected.
If you were the judge, would you allow the amendment?
Answer:
No. I would not allow the amendment because the amendment of the
complaint from recovery of land to one for rescission of contract is a
substantial change in the cause of action which may not be done after
the trial and previous to the rendition of judgment.
Page 26 of 172
as
an
original
action
from
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1.
The grounds for annulment of judgment of the Regional Trial
Court are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
(Sec, 2, Rule
47,
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.)
2.
Certiorari as an original action and certiorari as a mode
of appeal may be distinguished as follows:
(a)
The first is a special civil action under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, while the second is an appeal to the Supreme Court from
Page 27 of 172
the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial Court under
Rule 45.
(b) The first can be filed only on the grounds of lack or excess
of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, while the second is based on the errors of law
of the lower court.
c) The first should be filed within sixty (60) days from notice
of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed (Sec. 4. Rule
65), while the second should be filed within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the judgment or final order or resolution appealed from, or of
the denial of the petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration
filed in due time after notice of the judgment. (Sec. 2, Rule 45, 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.)
(d) The first cannot generally be availed of as a substitute for
a lost appeal under Rules 40, 41, 42, 43 and 45.
(e)
Under the first, the lower court is impleaded as a party
respondent (Sec. 5 of Rule 65), while under the second, the lower court
is not imp leaded. (Sec. 4 of Rule of 45)
Civil procedure; appeals
2003 No. IV.
Defendant X received an adverse Decision of the Regional Trial
Court in an ordinary civil case on 02 January 2003. He filed a Notice of
Appeal on 10 January 2003. On the other hand, plaintiff A received the
same Decision on 06 January 2003 and, on 19 January 2003, filed a Motion
for Reconsideration of the Decision. On 13 January 2003, defendant X
filed a Motion withdrawing his notice of appeal in order to file a
Motion for New Trial which he attached. On 20 January 2003, the court
denied As Motion for Reconsideration and Xs Motion to Withdraw Notice
of Appeal. Plaintiff A received the Order denying his Motion for
Reconsideration on 03 February 2003 and filed his Notice of Appeal on 05
February 2003. The court denied due course to As Notice of Appeal on
the ground that he period to appeal had already lapsed. 6%
(a) Is the courts denial of Xs Motion to Withdraw Notice of
Appeal proper?
(b)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) No, the courts denial of Xs Motion to Withdraw Notice of
Appeal is not proper, because the period of appeal of X has not yet
expired. From January 2, 2003 when X
received a copy of the adverse
decision up to January 13, 2003 when he filed his withdrawal of appeal
and Motion for New
Trial, only ten (10) days had elapsed and he had
fifteen (15) days to do so.
(b) No, the courts denial of due course to As appeal is not
correct because the appeal was taken on time. From January 6, 2003 when
A received a copy of the decision up to January 19, 2003 when he filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, only twelve (12) days had elapsed.
Consequently, he had three (3) days from receipt on February 3, 2003 of
the Order denying his Motion for Reconsideration within which to appeal.
He filed is notice of appeal on February 5, 2003, or only two (2) days
later.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Since As Motion for Reconsideration was filed on January 19,
2003 and it was denied on January 20,2003, it was clearly not se for
hearing with at least three days notice. Therefore, the motion was pro
forma and did not interrupt the period of appeal which expired on
January 21, 2003 or fifteen (15) days after notice of the decision on
January 6, 2003.
Civil procedure; bill of particulars
Page 28 of 172
(b)
What is the effect of non-compliance with the order of a
bill of particulars? 4%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) Before responding to a pleading, a party may move for a bill
or particulars of any matter which is not averred with sufficient
definiteness or particularity to enable him properly to prepare his
responsive pleading. If the pleading is a reply, the motion must be
filed within ten (10) days from service thereof. (Sec. 1 of Rule 12)
(b) If the order is not complied with, the court may order the
striking our of the pleading or the portions thereof to which the order
was directed or make such other order as it deems just. (Sec. 4 of Rule
12)
Civil procedure; cause of action
1999 No. II
a.
(2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a.
An action is one by which a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong.
(Sec. 3(A), second par., Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.) A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party
violates a right of another.
(Sec. 2, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules) An
action must be based on a cause of action. (Sec. 1, Rule 2 of the 1997
Rules)
Civil procedure; cause of action; joinder
1999 No. IV
a.
(2%)
b.
A secured two loans from B? one for P500,000.00 and the
other for P1,000,000.00, payable on different dates. Both have fallen
due. Is B obliged to file only one complaint against A for the recovery
of both loans? Explain.
(2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a.
The rule on joinder of causes of action is that a party
may in one pleading assert, in the alternative or otherwise join as many
causes of action as he may have against an opposing party, provided that
the rule on joinder of parties is complied with;the joinder shall not
include special civil actions or actions governed by special rules, but
may include causes of action pertaining to different venues or
jurisdictions provided one cause of action falls within the jurisdiction
of a Regional Trial Court and venue lies therein; and the aggregate
amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction where the claims in all
the causes of action are principally for the recovery of money. (Sec.
5, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules)
b.
No.
Joinder is only permissive since the loans are
separate loans which may be governed by the different terms and
conditions. The two loans give rise to two separate causes of action and
may be the basis of two separate complaints.
Civil procedure; cause of action; parties
1998 No III
Give the effects of the following:
1.
2.
Page 29 of 172
1.
The effect of splitting a single cause of action is found
in the rule as follows:
If two or more suits are Instituted on the
basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment on
the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the
others. (Sec. 4 of Rule 2, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.)
2.
The effect of the non-joinder of a necessary party may be
stated as follows: The court may order the inclusion of an omitted
necessary party if jurisdiction over his person may be obtained. The
failure to comply with the order for his inclusion without justifiable
cause to a waiver of the claim against such party. The court may proceed
with the action but the judgment rendered shall be without prejudice to
the rights of each necessary party. (Sec. 9 of Rule 3, 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure.)
Civil procedure; cause of action; splitting a cause of action
1996 No. 3;
1)
The complaint alleged that the defendant acted in bad faith,
arbitrarily, illegally, wrongfully, and in violation of law.
However,
it did not contain any averment of facts showing that defendant's acts
were done in the manner alleged.
Does the complaint state a cause of action? Explain.
2)
X brought an action against Y for the annulment of the sale
of certain shares of stock. After the case was decided in favor of X, he
filed another action for the recovery of the dividends that had already
accrued when the first action was filed.
Is the second action for the recovery of the dividends proper?
Answer:
1) No, because it does not state the ultimate facts constituting
the plaintiffs cause of action. The allegations that the defendant acted
in bad faith, arbitrarily, illegally, wrongfully and in violation of the
law are mere conclusions of fact or conclusions of law, [Remitere vs.
Vda. De Yulo, 16 SCRA 251)
Alternative Answer:
Yes, if the complaint alleges ultimate facts and states that the
acts were done in bad faith, arbitrarily, illegally, wrongfully and in
violation of the law. The rule allows malice, intent, knowledge or other
condition of the mind to be averred generally, (Sec. 5 of Rule 8)
2) No, because the recovery of the dividends is part of the cause
of action for the annulment of the sale of certain shares of stock and
should have been claimed in the first action. The second action
constituted splitting a single cause of action.
Civil procedure; cause of action; splitting a cause of action
1999 No. III
a.
What is the rule against splitting a cause of action and
its effect on the respective rights of the parties for failure to comply
with the same? (2%)
b.
A purchased a lot from B for Pl,500,000.00. He gave a
down payment of P500,000, signed a promissory note payable thirty days
after date, and as a security for the settlement of the obligation,
mortgaged the same lot to B. When the note fell due and A failed to pay,
B commenced suit to recover from A the balance of P1,000,000.00. After
securing a favorable judgment on his claim, B brought another action
against A before the same court to foreclose the mortgage. A now files a
motion to dismiss the second action on the ground of bar by prior
judgment.
Rule on the motion.
(2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a.
The rule against splitting a cause of action and its
effect are that if two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the
Page 30 of 172
same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in
any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others. (Sec.
4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules)
b.
The motion to dismiss should be granted. When B commenced
suit to collect on the promissory note, he waived his right to foreclose
the mortgage.
B split his cause of action.
Civil procedure; certification against forum shopping
2000 No. II.
As counsel for A, B, C and D, Atty. XY prepared a complaint for
recovery of possession of a parcel of land against Z. Before filling the
complaint, XY discovered that his clients were not available to sign the
certification of non-forum shopping. To avoid further delays in the
filing of the complaint, XY signed the certification and immediately
filed the complaint in court. Is XY justified in signing the
certification? Why? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. counsel cannot sign the anti-forum shopping certification
because it must be executed by the plaintiff or principal party
himself (Sec. 5, Rule 7. 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; Excorpizo v.
University of Baguio, 306 SCRA 497, [1999]), since the rule requires
personal knowledge by the party executing the certification, unless
counsel gives a good reason why he is not able to secure his clients
signatures and shows that his clients will be deprived of substantial
justice (Ortiz v. Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 708, [1998]) or unless he
is authorized to sign it by his clients through a special power of
attorney.
Civil procedure; class suit
1991 No IV:
An airplane carrying 200 passengers crashed somewhere in the
jungles of Agusan. All the passengers and crew perished. Twenty (20)
relatives of the fatalities filed for themselves and in behalf of the
relatives of all those who perished in the mishap a class suit for
damages totalling P5 Million against the airline. The propriety of the
class suit is questioned by the defendant. Resolve the issue.
Answer:
A class suit is not proper in this case because there is no
common or general interest in the subject matter of the controversy.
Each of the plaintiffs has a separate claim for damages. (Newsweek v.
IAC, 142 SCRA 171; Administrative Matter No. 88-1-646-0 on Request of
Plaintiffs, heirs of passengers of the Dona Paz, March 3, 1988.)
Civil procedure; class suit
1994 No (14)
Four hundred residents of Barrio Ramos initiated a class action
suit through Albert, a former mayor of the town, to recover damages
sustained due to their exposure to toxic waste and fumes emitted by the
cooking gas plant of Top Fuel Gas Corporation located in the town.
Is the class suit proper?
Answer:
No. The class suit is not proper. Each plaintiff suffered separate
and distinct damages from their exposure to the toxic waste and fumes
emitted by the cooking gas plant. Each of them has to prove his or her
damages.
Civil procedure; common cause of action; party in default
1995 No. 8:
Jose, Lito and Luis executed a promissory note in favor of
Teresita Comparza which reads: "For value received we promise jointly
Page 31 of 172
Page 32 of 172
counterclaim,
defendant
moved
to
declare
him
Notwithstanding notice of the motion, plaintiff did
opposition.
in
not
default.
file an
What is a counterclaim?
(2%)
b.
c.
A, who is engaged in tile installation business, was sued
by EE Industries for breach of contract for installing different marble
tiles in its offices as provided in their contract.
Without filing any
motion to dismiss, A filed its Answer with Counterclaim theorizing that
EE Industries has no legal capacity to sue because it is not a duly
registered corporation. By way of counterclaim, A asked for moral and
actual damages as her business depleted as a result of the withdrawal
and cancellation by her clients of their contracts due to the filing of
the case. The case was dismissed after the trial court found that EE
Industries is not a registered corporation and therefore has no legal
Page 33 of 172
file
third-party
complaint
against
for
indemnity?
Page 34 of 172
Answer:
1) No, because what B should file is a crossclaim against his codefendant A,
Civil procedure; cross-claims/third party claims
1997 No. 2:
B and C borrowed P400,000.00 fromA. The promissory note was
executed by B and C in a Joint and several capacity. B, who received the
money from A, gave C P200,000.00. C, in turn, loaned P100,000.00 out of
the P200,000.00 he received to D.
(a)
In an action filed by A against B and C with the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, can B file a cross-claim against C for the
amount of P200,000.00?
(b) Can C file a third party complaint against D for the amount
of P 100,000.00?
Answer:
(a)
Yes. B can file a cross-claim against C for the amount of
200,000.00 given to C. A cross-claim is a claim filed by one party
against a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is
the subject matter of the original action or a counterclaim therein and
may include a claim that the party against whom it is asserted is or may
be liable to the cross-claimant for all or part of a claim asserted
against the cross-claimant. (Sec. 7 of former Rule 6; Sec. 8 of new Rule
6. Rules of Court).
(b) No, C cannot file a third-parly complaint against D because
the loan of P100,000 has no connection with the opponent's claim.
C
could have loaned the money out of other funds in his possession.
Alternative Answer;
(b) X Yes, C can file a third-party complaint against D because
the loan of 100,000.00 was taken out of the P200,000 received from B and
hence the loan seeks contribution in respect to his opponent's claim.
(Sec. 12 of former Rule 6; Sec. 11 of new Rule 6)
Civil procedure; death of a party; effect
1999 No. XVI
a.
What is the effect of the death of a party upon a pending
action? (2%)
b.
When A (buyer) failed to pay the remaining balance of the
contract price after it became due and demand-able, B (seller) sued him
for collection before the RTC. After both parties submitted their
respective evidence, A perished in a plane accident.
Consequently, his
heirs brought an action for the settlement of his estate and moved for
the dismissal of the collection suit.
1.
(2%)
2.
Will your answer be the same if A died while the case is
already on appeal to the Court of Appeals? Explain. (2%)
3.
In the same case, what is the effect if B died before the
RTC has rendered judgment? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a. When the claim in a pending action is purely personal, the
death of either of the parties extinguishes the claim and the action is
dismissed. When the claim is not purely personal and is not thereby
extinguished, the party should be substituted by his heirs or his
executor or administrator. (Sec. 16, Rule 3, 1997 Rules) If the action
is for recovery of money arising from contract, express or implied, and
the defendant dies before entry of final judgment in the court in which
the action was pending at the time of such death, it shall not be
dismissed but shall instead be allowed to continue until entry of final
Page 35 of 172
2.
Did the failure of counsel X to inform the court of B's
death constitute direct contempt? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1. As counsel of C, I would more to set aside the writ of
execution and the judgment for lack of jurisdiction and lack of due
process in the same court because the judgment to void. If X had
notified the court of B's death, the court would have ordered the
substitution of the deceased by C, the sole heir of B. (Sec. 16 of Rule
3) The court acquired no jurisdiction over C upon whom the trial and the
judgment are not binding. (Ferreira us. Ibarra Vda. de Gonzales, 104
Phil. 143; Vda. de la Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, 88 SCRA 695; Lawas us.
Court of Appeals, 146 SCRA 173.) I could also file an action to annul
the judgment for lack of jurisdiction because C, as the successor of B,
was deprived of due process and should have been heard before judgment.
(Rule 47, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
1.
While there are decisions of the Supreme Court which hold
that if the lawyer failed to notify the court of his client's death, the
court may proceed even without substitution of heirs and the judgment is
valid and binding on the heirs of the deceased (Florendo vs. Coloma, 129
SCRA 304 and other cases.), as counsel of C, I will assail the judgment
and execution for lack of due process.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
2.
No. It is not direct contempt under Sec. 1 of Rule 71,
but it is indirect contempt within the purview of Sec 3 of Rule 71. The
lawyer can also be the subject of disciplinary action. (Sec. 16, Rule 3,
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.)
Civil procedure; default
1999 No. V
a.
(2%)
b.
c.
For failure to seasonably file his Answer despite due
notice, A was declared in default in a case instituted against him by B,
The following day, A's mistress who is working as a clerk in the sala of
the Judge before whom his case is pending, informed him of the
declaration of default. On the same day, A presented a motion under oath
Page 36 of 172
to set aside the order of default on the ground that his failure to
answer was due to fraud and he has a meritorious defense. Thereafter, he
went abroad.
After his return a week later, with the case still
undecided, he received the order declaring him in default. The motion to
set aside default was opposed by B on the ground that it was filed
before A received notice of his having been declared in default, citing
the rule that the motion to set aside may be made at anytime after
notice but before judgment. Resolve the Motion.
(2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a.
A party may be declared in default when he fails to answer
within the time allowed therefor, and upon motion of the claiming party
with notice to the defending party, and proof of such failure. (Sec. 3,
Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules)
b.
The effect of an Order of Default is that the court may
proceed to render judgment granting the claimant such relief as his
pleading may warrant unless the court in its discretion requires the
claimant to submit evidence
(Id.) The party in default cannot take
part in the trial but shall be entitled to notice of subsequent
proceedings. (Sec. 3[A]. Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules)
c. Assuming that the motion to set aside complies with the other
requirements of the rule, it should be granted. Although such a motion
may be made after notice but before judgment (Sec. 3[B] of Rule 9), with
more reason may it be filed after discovery even before receipt of the
order of default.
Civil procedure; default
2000 No. XII.
Defendant was declared in default by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC). Plaintiff was allowed to present evidence in support of his
complaint. Photocopies of official receipts and original copies of
affidavits were presented in court, identified by plaintiff on the
witness stand and marked as exhibits. Said documents were offered by
plaintiff and admitted in evidence by the court on the basis of which
the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, pursuant to the
relief prayed for. Upon receipt of the judgment, defendant appeals to
the Court of Appeals claiming that the judgment is not valid because the
RTC based its judgment on mere photocopies and affidavits of persons not
presented in court.
(a)
Page 37 of 172
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a)
In order to justify the setting aside of the order of
default, Mario should state in his motion that his failure to answer was
due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence and that he has
a meritorious defense. [Sec. 3(b) of Rule 9, 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure].
b)
Page 38 of 172
Page 39 of 172
Page 40 of 172
Agustin, who was of legal age, and Intr-City Transit. Hence, the
Release of Claim executed by him is valid. (Baliwag Transit vs. CA,
January 31, 1989).
Another Acceptable Answer:
Motion to dismiss is granted only with respect to Agustin. The
parents of Agustin have a cause of action against Inter-City to the
extent of the expenses incurred by them due to the recklessness of the
driver.
Civil procedure; dismissal without prejudice
1989 (4)
4.2) Lawrence filed a complaint against Grace to collect a loan of
P50,000. Later, because of their intimate relationship in the past,
Lawrence filed a notice of dismissal of his complaint. Subsequently, the
two had a serious misunderstanding so that Lawrence again filed a
complaint against Grace to collect another loan of P100,000. Lawrence
and Grace reconciled after which, the former withdraw his complaint
before the latter could file her answer or a motion for summary
judgment. Was the dismissal of the second complaint with or without
prejudice? Explain.
Answer:
The dismissal of the second complain is without prejudice because
it is based on another claim of P100,000. If the dismissal was based on
the same claim of P50,000 it would be with prejudice.
Civil procedure; effect of failure to answer
1989 (17)
17.2) Distinguish between the effects of the failure to file an
answer in civil case governed by the Summary Rules and in civil case
governed by the regular provisions of the Rules of Court.
Answer:
Under Summary Procedure Rules, upon the failure to file an answer
in a civil case, the court, motu propio or upon the motion of the
plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts
alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein
except as to the amount of damages which the court may reduce in its
discretion. (Sec.5)
Under the regular procedure, upon the failure to file an answer,
the court shall, upon the motion of the plaintiff and proof of such
failure, declare the defendant in default. Thereupon, the court shall
proceed to receive the plaintiffs evidence and render judgment granting
him such relief as the complaint and the facts proven may warrant. Such
judgment shall not exceed the amount or
different in kind from that
prayed for. (Sec.1 and 5 of Rule 18).
Civil procedure; error of judgment vs error of jurisdiction
1989 (10)
10.1) Distinguish
jurisdiction.
between
error
of
judgment
and
error
of
Answer:
An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the
exercise of its jurisdiction. Such an error does not deprive the court
of jurisdiction and is correctible only by appeal; whereas an error of
jurisdiction is one where the court acts without or in excess of its
jurisdiction. Such an error renders an order or judgment void or
voidable and is correctible by the special civil action of certiorari.
(De la Cruz vs. Moir, 36 Phil. 213; Cochingyan vs. Cloribel, 76 SCRA
361).
Civil procedure; execution of judgments; 5-year period
Page 41 of 172
(a)
A can enforce the judgment by another action reviving the
Judgment because it can no longer be enforced by motion as the five-year
period within which a judgment may be enforced by motion has already
expired. (Sec. 6 of former and new Rule 39).
(b) A may institute the proceedings in the Regional Trial Court
in accordance with the rules of venue because the enforcement of the
Judgment is a personal action Incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Alternative Answer:
(b) A may institute the proceeding in a Metropolitan Trial Court
which has jurisdiction over the area where the real property involved is
situated. (Sec. 1 of Rule 4).
Civil procedure; execution of judgments; effect of death of losing party
1992 No. V:
(a) Plaintiff sued to recover an unpaid loan and was awarded
P333.000.00 by the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Defendant did not
appeal within the period allowed by law. He died six days after the
lapse of the period to appeal. Forthwith, a petition for the settlement
of his estate was properly filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Pampanga where an Inventory of all his assets was filed and correspond
-ingly approved. Thereafter, plaintiff filed a motion for execution with
the Manila court, contending therein that the motion was legally
justified because the defendant died after the Judgment In the Manila
court had become final. Resolve the motion and state your reasons.
Suggested Answer:
a] Motion for execution denied.
Although the defendant died after the Judgment had become final
and executory, it cannot be enforced by a writ of execution against the
estate of the deceased which is in custodia legts. The Judgment should
be filed as a proven money claim with the Regional Trial Court of
Pampanga. (Paredes v. Moya, 61 SCRA 527)
b) Under the same set of facts as (a), a writ of execution was
issued by the Manila court upon proper motion three days after the lapse
of the period to appeal. The corresponding levy on execution was duly
effected on defendant's parcel of land worth P666,000.00 a day before
the defendant died. Would it be proper, on motion, to lift the levy on
defendant's property? State the reasons for your answer.
Suggested Answer:
b) No, since the levy on execution was duly effected on
defendant's parcel of land a day before the defendant died, it was
valid. The land may be sold for the satisfaction of the judgment and the
surplus shall be accounted for by the sheriff to the corresponding
executor or administrator. [Sec. 7-C of Rule 39)
Civil procedure; execution of judgments; examination of defendant
2002 No. I.
The plaintiff, a Manila resident, sued the defendant, a resident
of Malolos Bulacan, in the RTC-Manila for a sum of money. When the
sheriff tried to serve the summons with a copy of the complaint on the
Page 42 of 172
defendant at his Bulacan residence, the sheriff was told that the
defendant had gone to Manila for business and would not be back until
the evening of that day. So, the sheriff served the summons, together
with a copy of the complaint, on the defendants 18-year-old daughter,
who was a college student. For the defendants failure to answer the
complaint within the reglementary period, the trial court, on motion of
the plaintiff, declared the defendant in default. A month later, the
trial court rendered judgment holding the defendant liable for the
entire amount prayed for in the complaint.
A.
After the judgment had become final, a writ of execution was
issued by the court. As the writ was returned unsatisfied, the plaintiff
filed a motion for an order requiring the defendant to appear before it
and to be examined regarding his property and income. How should the
court resolve the motion? (2%)
Civil procedure; Execution of judgments; rights of pledgee
1987 No (3)
A obtained a judgment for money against B. The sheriff enforcing
the corresponding writ went to C who, is the pledgee of a ring B had
given as a security for a loan and insisted on taking possession of the
ring for the purpose of eventually selling it at the execution sale to
satisfy the judgment debt of B to A.
Has
Explain.
the
obligation
to
surrender
the
ring
to
the
sheriff?
Answer:
No. C has no obligation to surrender the ring to the sheriff
because C has the right to retain the ring in his possession until the
loan is paid. (Art. 2098 Civil Code). If the sheriff should take
possession of the ring, C may file a third-party claim.
Civil procedure; execution of judgments; writ of execution
1987 No (13)
A obtained a judgment against B for the payment of money. For
failure to appeal, the judgment became final on July 5, 1975. Writs of
execution were returned unsatisfied, for the sheriff was unable to find
property of B subject to execution. On June 30, 1984, A located some
property of B. Whereupon A immediately filed in July 1984 a motion for
the issuance of an alias writ of execution.
If you were the judge, will you grant the writ? Why?
Answer:
No, because a motion for the issuance of an alias writ of
execution may be granted only within five (5) years from the entry of
the judgment on July 5, 1975. It will be necessary for A to file an
action to enforce or revive the judgment before the lapse of ten (10)
years.
Civil procedure; execution of judgments; writ of execution
1988 (6)
Writ of execution were returned unsatisfied by the sheriff on the
execution of a final judgment rendered in favor of A for a sum of money
against B on June 5, 1983. On June 30, 1988, A found some property in
the name of B so that he immediately filed on July 1, 1988 a motion for
an issuance of an alias writ of execution.
6.a) As the judge, will you grant the writ? Explain.
6.b) May a judgment in a civil case be executed pending appeal?
Explain.
Answer:
6.a) The answer depends on when the judgment was entered. If the
final judgment was entered on June 5, 1983, I will not grant the writ
Page 43 of 172
because more than 5 years had elapsed from the date of entry of
judgment or from the date it became final and executory. However, if
final judgment rendered on June 5, 1983 was entered or became final
executory after July 1, 1983, I would grant the writ. (Sec.6 of Rule
the
the
and
39)
Alternative Answer:
6.a) Since the question did not specify the date when the judgment
was entered, which date of the reckoning of the 5-year period within
which judgment may be executed by motion, the motion may be granted on
the assumption that the entry of judgment was made after July 1, 1983.
In this case, the 5-year period from entry of judgment has not yet
elapsed. Hence, the judgment ccan still be executed by mere motion.
Committees Recommendation:
As the facts of the case given used the word rendered and not
entered, the examinees should not be blamed.
6.b) Yes, upon good reasons to be stated in a special order.
(Sec.2 of Rule 39). The motion for execution pending appeal should be
filed before the perfection of an appeal. (Delgado vs. IAC, 14 SCRA 258)
Other Answer:
6.b) (1) the motion for execution pending appeal may be granted
upon good reasons by the appellate court. (Phil. British Assurance Co.
vs. IAC, 150 SCRA 520).
(2) A judgment in an action for injunction, receivership and
accounting is executory pending appeal, unless otherwise granted by the
court. (Sec.4 of Rule 39)
(3) A judgment rendered against the defendant in an action for
forcible entry or illegal detainer is immediately executory. (Sec.8 of
Rule 70)
Civil procedure; execution of judgments; writ of execution
1993 No (15)
As the decision of the Regional Trial Court became final and
executory n November 15, 1987, plaintiff, the prevailing party, filed a
motion for a writ of execution. The writ of execution was issued on
December 1, 1987.
Pursuant to the writ, the sheriff levied upon the house and lot of
defendant and scheduled the sale thereof for public auction on January
26, 1988. The auction sale was repeatedly postponed upon request of
defendant who, in the meantime, was making partial payment to plaintiff.
The last scheduled auction sale was on November 3,1992 but the
same did not materialize because of the request of the defendant which
was granted by plaintiff on account of the partial payment made by
defendant on the date.
As there still remained an unpaid balance as of July 15, 1993,
plaintiff filed a motion for the issuance of alias writ of execution of
that date. Defendant opposed the motion on the ground that more than
five years had lapsed form the finality of the decision such that
plaintiffs remedy is to file a new action for revival of judgment.
Should the motion for issuance of an alias writ of execution be
granted? Explain.
Answer:
Yes, because the running of the five-year period from
decision became final and executory on November 15,1987,
the judgment could be executed on motion, was interrupted
by the agreement of the parties to suspend enforcement of
on account of partial payments made by defendant.
Alternative Answer:
Page 44 of 172
Since there was already a levy on execution, there was no need for
an alias writ of execution.
Civil procedure; execution of judgments; writ of execution
1995 No. 5:
1.
The lifetime of a writ of execution is sixty (60) days from
its receipt by the officer required to enforce it. Suppose on the 60th
day of the life of the writ the sheriff levied on the property of the
judgment debtor and sold it only a month after. Is the sale valid?
Explain.
2.
A writ of execution was served by a sheriff upon defendant
so that plaintiff may be placed in possession of the property held by
the former. The defendant refused to vacate and surrender the premises
to plaintiff.
Can defendant be held for indirect contempt for
disobedience of, or resistance to a lawful writ issued by the court?
Explain.
3.
Suppose that by virtue of an execution of the judgment in
an ejectment case defendant was successfully ousted from the property in
litigation and plaintiff was lawfully placed in possession thereof, but
seven (7) years later defendant re-entered the property and forcibly
took over possession, can plaintiff move that defendant be declared in
indirect contempt? Explain.
Answer;
1.
The writ of execution may be levied at any time up to and
including the last day of the writ. After the writ has been levied on
the property within the lifetime of the writ, it may be sold thereafter.
(Alagar vs. Pio de Roda, 29 Phil. 129)
Alternative Answer;
The property may even be sold beyond the five-year period within
which the judgment may be executed on motion, but not beyond the tenyear period of prescription of judgments. [Government vs. Echaus, 71
Phil. 318; Jalandoni vs. Philippine National Bank, 105 SCRA 102)
2.
No, because it is the sheriff who must enforce the writ of
execution for the delivery of property by ousting therefrom the person
against whom the judgment is rendered and placing the judgment creditor
in possession. (Sec. 13, Rule 39). The writ of possession was directed
to the Sheriff who was to deliver the property to the plaintiff. The
writ did not command the plaintiff to do anything, hence he could not be
held guilty of indirect contempt. (Barrete vs. Amila, 230 SCRA 219)
3.
Yes, because the defendant violated Sec. 3(b) of Rule 71
when after being ousted from the property in litigation and the
plaintiff was lawfully placed in possession, he re-enters the property
and forcibly took over possession.
Civil procedure; execution pending appeal
2002 No. III B
B.
The trial court rendered judgment ordering the defendant to
pay the plaintiff moral and exemplary damages. The judgment was served
on the plaintiff on October 1, 2001 and on the defendant on October 5,
2001. On October 8, 2001, the defendant filed a notice of appeal from
the judgment, but the following day, October 9, 2001, the plaintiff
moved for the execution of the judgment pending appeal. The trial court
granted the motion upon the posting by the plaintiff of a bond to
indemnify the defendant for damages it may suffer as a result of the
execution. The court gave as a special reason for its order the imminent
insolvency of the defendant.
Is the order of execution pending appeal correct? Why? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Page 45 of 172
B.
No, because awards for moral and exemplary damages cannot be
the subject of execution pending appeal. The execution of any award for
moral and exemplary damages is dependent on the outcome of the main
case. Liabilities for moral and exemplary damages, as well as the exact
amounts remain uncertain and indefinite pending resolution by the Court
of Appeals or Supreme Court. [RCPI v. Lantin, 134 SCRA 395 (1985);
International School, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 309 SCRA 474 (1999)].
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
B.Yes, because only moral and exemplary damages are awarded in
the judgment and they are not dependent on other types of damages.
Moreover, the motion for execution was filed while the court had
jurisdiction over the case and was in possession of the original record.
It is based on good reason which is the imminent insolvency of
the defendant. (Rule 39, sec. 2)
Civil procedure; failure to tender an issue
2004 NO. VI
B. In his complaint for foreclosure of mortgage to which was duly
attached a copy of the mortgage deed, plaintiff PP alleged inter alia as
follows: (1) that defendant DD duly executed the mortgage deed, copy of
which is Annex A of the complaint and made an integral part thereof;
and (2) that to prosecute his complaint, plaintiff contracted a lawyer,
CC, for a fee of P50,000. In his answer, defendant alleged, inter alia,
that he had no knowledge of the mortgage deed, and he also denied any
liability for plaintiffs contracting with a lawyer for a fee.
Does defendants answer as to plaintiffs allegation no. 1 as well
as no. 2 sufficiently raise an issue of fact? Reason briefly. (5%)
Civil procedure; filing of pleadings; periods
1991 No. VIII:
The defendant in a civil action received a note of the judgment
of the Municipal Trial Court on 10 December.
(a) What is his last day for appealing?
Answer:
(a)
(b) Can he validly move for extension of the period for filing a
motion for reconsideration of the decision in view of the Christmas
holidays?
Answer;
(b) No. a motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration is not allowed. (Habaluyas Ent. v. Jopson, 142 SCRA 208)
(c)
Answer:
(c) The appeal will be deemed perfected upon the expiration of
the last day to appeal by any party. (Sec. 23 of Interim Rules)
Civil procedure; forum shopping
1996 No. 1:
1) What is forum-shopping? What are the sanctions imposed for its
violation?
Answer;
1) Forum-shopping is the filing of multiple petitions, complaints
or other initiatory pleadings involving the same issues in the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals or other tribunals or agencies, with the
result that said courts, tribunals or agencies have to resolve the same
issues.
Page 46 of 172
(2)
(3)
or
prejudice
the
2)
The complaint filed before
Manila states two (2) causes of action,
and the other for the recovery of
(P100,000.00), both of which arose out of
Page 47 of 172
Page 48 of 172
(2%)
b.
A's Answer admits the material allegations of B's
Complaint.
May the court motu proprio
render judgment on the
pleadings? Explain.
(2%)
c.
A brought an action against her husband B for annulment
of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity,
B filed
his Answer to the Complaint admitting all the allegations therein
contained. May A move for judgment on the pleadings? Explain.
(2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a.
The grounds for judgment on the pleadings are where an
answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material
allegations of the adverse party's pleading.
(Sec. 1, Rule 34 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
b.
No, a motion must be filed by the adverse party. (Sec. 1,
Rule 34 of the 1997 Rules)
The court cannot motu proprio render
judgment on the pleadings.
c.
No, because even if B's answer to A's complaint for
annulment of their marriage admits all the allegations therein
contained, the material facts alleged in the complaint must always be
proved. (Sec. 1 of Rule 34.)
ANOTHER ANSWER:
c. No. The court shall order the prosecutor to investigate
whether or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if there is
no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the
evidence submitted is not fabricated. (Sec. 3[E], Rule 9 of the 1997
Rules) Evidence must have to be presented in accordance with the
requirements set down by the Supreme Court in Republic vs. Court of
Appeals and Molina (268 SCRA 198.)
Civil procedure; kinds of civil actions
1994 No (1)
Distinguish:
1.a) an action in rem from an action quasi in rem.
1.b) An action quasi in rem from an action in personam.
1.c) An action in personam from a personal action.
1.d) An action in rem from a real action.
Page 49 of 172
local action.
Answer:
1.a) An action in rem is an action against all who might be minded
to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be
established, while an action quasi in rem is an action against an
individual although the purpose of the suit is to subject his interest
in a particular property to the obligation or lien burdening the
property.
The judgment rendered in actions in rem binds the whole world,
while the judgment rendered in actions quasi in rem is conclusive only
between the parties.
1.b) An action quasi in rem, as stated, is an action against a
person over a particular property or claims relating thereto, while an
action in personam is an action to establish a claim against a person
with a judgment that binds him personally.
1.c) An action in personam, as stated, is an action against a
person on the basis of his personal liability while a personal action is
an action where the plaintiff seeks the recovery of personal property,
the enforcement or resolution of a contract or the recovery of damages.
1.d) An action in rem is as stated above, while a real action is
an action affecting title to real property or for the recovery of
possession, or for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of a
mortgage on, real property. (Rule 4, sec. 2a).
1.e) A personal action is as stated above, while a local action is
that which must be brought in a particular place.
Plaintiff in a personal action may file it in the place where he
resides or where the defendant resides, while in a local action,
plaintiff has no choice except to file the action in the place where the
property is located.
Civil procedure; mandamus
2001 No. III.
Petitioner Fabian was appointed Election Registrar of the
Municipality of Sevilla supposedly to replace the respondent Election
Registrar Pablo who was transferred to another municipality without his
consent and who refused to accept his aforesaid transfer, much less to
vacate his position in Bogo town as election registrar, as in fact he
continued to occupy his aforesaid position and exercise his functions
thereto. Petitioner Fabian then filed a petition for mandamus against
Pablo but the trial court dismissed Fabians petition contending that
quo warranto is the proper remedy.
Is the court correct in its ruling? Why? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the court is correct in its ruling. Mandamus will not lie.
This remedy applies only where petitioners right is founded clearly in
law, not when it is doubtful. Pablo was transferred without his consent
which is tantamount to removal without cause, contrary to the
fundamental guarantee on non-removal except for cause. Considering that
Pedro continued to occupy the disputed position and exercise his
functions therein, the proper remedy is quo warranto, not mandamus.
{Garces v. Court of Appeals, 259 SCRA 99 (1996)]
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Yes, the court is correct in its ruling. Mandamus lies when the
respondent unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a
right or office to which such other is entitled. (Sec. 2, Rule 65) In
this case, Pablo has not unlawfully excluded Fabian from the Office of
Election Registrar. The remedy of Fabian is to file an action of quo
warranto in his name against Pablo for usurping the office. (Sec. 5,
Rule 66)
Page 50 of 172
Page 51 of 172
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Page 53 of 172
Page 54 of 172
acquired by their parents during their marriage, hence, their father had
no right to include in the sale the childrens interest in the property
as heirs of their mother, such children not having consented to the
sale.
C moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of bar by former
judgment.
Resolve the motion to dismiss. Explain.
Answer:
Motion to dismiss denied. There is no bar by former judgment
because there is no identity of causes of action. The cause of action of
the children of A and B is different from the cause of action of A. A
had no right to sell the parcel of land inasmuch as the same was
conjugal property of A and B. A could legally sell only his conjugal
share of said property and could not legally sell the conjugal share of
his deceased wife which inherited by their children without their
consent.
Civil procedure; motion to dismiss; res judicata
1989 (6)
6.1) Evelyn filed a complaint for a sum of money against Joan but
the complaint was later dismissed for failure to prosecute within a
reasonable length of time. Thereafter, Evelyn filed another case based
on the same facts against Joan. Joan moved to dismiss the same on the
ground that the cause of action is barred by prior judgment (res
judicata). Evelyn opposed the motion claiming that res judicata has not
set in since Joan was not served with summons and the complaint in the
first case was earlier dismissed, so that the trial court never acquired
jurisdiction over her person and consequently, over the case. How would
you decide the motion of Joan? Explain.
Answer:
The motion to dismiss is denied. One of the essential requisites
of res judicata is jurisdiction over the parties. Inasmuch as Joan was
not served with the summons in the first case which was earlier
dismissed, the court did not acquire jurisdiction over her person and,
hence, the dismissal was without prejudice to the filing of another
action against her. (Republic Planters Bank vs. Molina, Sept. 28, 1988)
Civil procedure; motion to dismiss; res judicata
2000 No. IV.
AB, as mother and in her capacity as legal guardian of her
legitimate minor son, CD, brought action for support against EF, as
father of CD and ABs lawfully wedded husband. EF filed his answer
denying his paternity with counterclaim for damages. Subsequently, AB
filed a manifestation in court that in view of the denial made by EF, it
would be futile to pursue the case against EF. AB agreed to move for the
dismissal of the complaint, subject to the condition that EF will
withdraw his counter claim for damages. AB and EF filed a joint motion
to dismiss. The court dismissed the case with prejudice. Later on, minor
son CD, represented by AB, filed another complaint for support against
EF. EF filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata.
A.
Is res judicata a valid ground for dismissal of the second
complaint? Explain your answer (3%)
B.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) No, res judicata is not a defense in an action for support
even if the first case was dismissed with prejudice on a joint motion to
dismiss. The plaintiffs mother agreed to the dismissal of the complaint
for support in view of the defendants answer denying his paternity with
a counterclaim for damages. This was in the nature of a compromise of
Page 55 of 172
the right of support which is prohibited by law. (Art, 2035, Civil Code;
De Asis v. Court of Appeals, 303 SCRA 176 [1999]).
(b)
(1)
(2) the court rendering the same must have jurisdiction of the
subject matter and of the parties;
(3)
the
motion
to
set
aside
the
order
of
execution,
with
Suggested Answer;
Motion to set aside order of execution denied.
A motion for execution of a final and executory Judgment is not a
contentious motion that requires a three-day notice before resolution.
Such a motion may be granted ex parte. [Far Eastern Surety & Insurance
Co. vs. Hernandez, 67 SCRA 256)
The sheriffs return is a public document made in the performance
of a duty by a public officer and is prima facie evidence of the facts
stated therein. [Sec. 23 of Rule 132) Hence there was no need for the
sheriff to testify unless defendant had presented evidence contradicting
the sheriff's return.
Civil procedure; new-trial; grounds
1998 No XVIII
Give the requisites of:
1.
SUGGESTED ANSWER;
1. The requisites of newly discovered evidence are: (a) the
evidence was discovered after the trial; (b) such evidence could not
have been discovered and produced at the trial with reasonable
diligence; and (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative,
Page 56 of 172
Page 57 of 172
1)
A filed an action against B for recovery of possession of
apiece of land. B in his answer specifically denied A's claim and
interposed as counterclaim the amount of P150,000.00, arising from
another transaction, consisting of the price of the car he sold and
delivered to A and which the latter failed to pay.
Is B's counterclaim allowed under the rules? Explain.
Answer;
1)
B's counterclaim is a permissive counterclaim inasmuch as it
arises out of another transaction that is the subject-matter of A's
complaint. It is allowed if it is within the jurisdiction of the court.
(Sec. 8 of Rule 6)
Alternative Answer:
The question does not
the assessed value of the
action may be filed in a
counterclaim of P150,000.00
within its jurisdiction.
If the assessed value does not exceed P50,000.00, the action may
be filed in a Metropolitan Trial Court, in which case the counterclaim
of P150,000.00 may be allowed inasmuch as it is within its jurisdiction.
(Sec. 33 of BP 129 as amended by RA No. 7691)
If the assessed value exceeds P50,000.00, the action may be filed
in a Regional Trial Court. If filed in Metro Manila, the counterclaim of
P150,000.00 may not be allowed, but if filed outside Metro Manila, it
may be allowed. (Sec. 19 of BP 129 as amended by RA 7691)
Civil procedure; permissive joinder of parties
1989 (1)
1.2) Marissa brought an action against Dely and Inday in one
complaint before the RTC of Manila. As her first cause of action,
Marissa alleges that Dely purchased from her on various occasions truck
tires worth P12,000 but refused to pay the said amount despite several
demands. As her second cause of action, Marissa alleges that Inday
likewise purchased from her on several occasions truck tires worth
P10,000 but refused to pay the said amount despite repeated demands. The
total amount of Marissas demands against the two is P22,000. Both Dely
and Inday now separately move to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case. How would you resolve
these motions? Explain.
Answer:
I would grant said motions to dismiss, because the totality rule
is subject to the rule on permissive joinder of parties. In this case,
there is misjoinder of parties defendant inasmuch as the claims against
the two defendants are separate and distinct from each other and cannot
be joined in a single complaint. Neither claims falls within the
jurisdiction of the RTC. (Flores vs. Mallare-Philipps, 142 SCRA 377).
Civil procedure; petition for certiorari
2000 No. XV.
AB mortgaged his property to CD. AB failed to pay his obligation
and CD filed an action for foreclosure of mortgage. After trial, the
court issued an Order granting CDs prayer for foreclosure of mortgage
and ordering AB to pay CD the full amount of the mortgage debt including
interest and other charges not later than 120 days from date of receipt
of the Order. AB received the Order on August 10, 1999. No other
proceeding took place thereafter. On December 20, 1999, AB tendered the
full amount adjudged by the court to CD but the latter refused to accept
it on the ground that the amount was tendered beyond the 120-day period
granted by the court. AB filed a motion in the same court praying that
CD be directed to receive the amount tendered by him on the ground that
Page 58 of 172
the Order does not comply with the provisions of Section 2, Rule 68 of
the Rules of Court which give AB 120 days from entry of judgment, and
not from date of receipt of the Order. The court denied his motion on
the ground that the Order had already become final and can no longer be
amended to conform with Section 2, Rule 68. Aggrieved, AB files a
petition for certiorari against the Court and CD. Will the petition for
certiorari prosper? Explain. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. The court erred in issuing an Order granting CDs prayer for
foreclosure of mortgage and ordering AB to pay CD the full amount of the
mortgage debt including interest and other charges not later than 120
days from receipt of the Order. The court should have rendered a
judgment which is appealable. Since no appeal was taken, the judgment
became final on August 25, 1999, which is the date of entry of judgment.
(Sec 2, Rule 36, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure)
Hence, AB had up to
December 24, 1999 within which to pay the amount due. (Sec. 2, Rule 68,
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) The court gravely abused its discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying ABs motion
praying that CD be directed to receive the amount tendered.
Civil procedure; petition for certiorari; motion for recon
1996 No. 10:
1)
Is the failure to file a motion for reconsideration in the
lower court as a condition precedent for the granting of the writ of
certiorari or prohibition always fatal? Explain.
Answer:
1)
a)
The question of jurisdiction was squarely raised before and
decided by the respondent court.
b)
c)
Case of urgency
d)
e)
f)
Deprivation of right to due process (Cochingyan vs.
Cloribel 76 SCRA 361; Palea us. PAL,
111 SCRA 215)
Civil procedure; petition for relief
2002 No. VII.
A.
May an order denying the probate of a will still be
overturned after the period to appeal therefrom has lapsed? Why? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A.
Yes, an order denying the probate of a will may be
overturned after the period to appeal therefrom has lapsed. A petition
for relief may be filed on the grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence within a period of sixty (60) days after the
petitioner learns of the judgment or final order and not more than six
(6) months after such judgment or final order was entered [Rule 38,
secs. 1 & 3; Soriano v. Asi, 100 Phil. 785 (1957)]. An action for
annulment may also be filed on the ground of extrinsic fraud within four
(4) years from its discovery, and if based on lack of jurisdiction,
before it is barred by laches or estoppel. (Rule 47, secs. 2 & 3)
Civil procedure; petition for relief; injunction
2002 No. VI.
A.
A default judgment was rendered by the RTC ordering D to
P a sum of money. The judgment became final, but D filed a petition
relief and obtained a writ of preliminary injunction staying
enforcement of the judgment. After hearing, the RTC dismissed
pay
for
the
Ds
Page 59 of 172
of
the
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A.
Ps immediate motion for execution of the judgment in his
favor should be granted because the dismissal of Ds petition for relief
also dissolves the writ of preliminary injunction staying the
enforcement of the judgment, even if the dismissal is not yet final.
[Golez v. Leonidas, 107 SCRA 187 (1981)].
Civil procedure; pleadings
1992 No III:
Is a "motion to dismiss with counterclaim" sanctioned by the
Rules of Court?
a)
b)
If your answer is NO, give your reasons and state what the
defendant should instead file in court to preserve his counterclaim
while maintaining the ground asserted in his motion to dismiss as an
issue that should be the subject of a preliminary hearing.
Suggested Answer:
No, because a counterclaim is contained in an answer and not in a
motion to dismiss.
What the defendant should do is to plead the ground of his motion
to dismiss (except improper venue) as an affirmative defense in his
answer, together with his counterclaim, and ask for a preliminary
hearing on his affirmative defense as if a motion to dismiss had been
filed. (Sec. 5 of Rule 16)
Civil procedure; pleadings; reply
1996 No. 5:
2)
A sued B for damages. B in his answer alleged as new matter
the issue of prescription. No reply thereto was filed by A.
Can the action be dismissed for failure of A to controvert the
new matter set up by B? Explain.
Answer;
2)
No, because if no reply is filed, all the new matters
alleged in the answer are deemed controverted. (Sec. 11 of Rule 6)
Civil procedure; pleadings; verification
1996 No. 2;
1)
2)
3)
pleadings?
Answer;
1)
The pleadings allowed by the rules are the complaint, the
answer, the counterclaim, the crossclaim, the reply, the third-party
(fourth-party etc.) complaint. (Sec. 2 of Rule 6)
2)
a)
65)
Page 60 of 172
e)
Page 61 of 172
2)
A sold five thousand piculs of sugar to B, payable on
demand. Upon delivery of the sugar to B, however, the latter did not pay
its purchase price. After the lapse of some time from the date of
delivery of the sugar to B. A brought an action for the recission of the
contract of sale and as incident of this action, asked for the manual
delivery (replevin) of the sugar to him.
May the remedy of replevin prayed for by A be granted? Explain.
3) ABC Cattle Corporation is the holder of a pasture lease
agreement since 1990 covering 1,000 hectares of pasture land surrounded
with fences. In 1992, D was issued a pasture lease agreement covering
930 hectares of land adjacent to ABC's. A relocation survey showed that
the boundaries of D's land extended 580 hectares into ABC's pasture
land. Thereupon, D removed ABC's fence and started to set up his own
boundary fence 580 hectares into ABC's pasture area. As ABC persistently
Page 62 of 172
b.
c.
d.
In a case, the property of an incompetent under
guardianship was in custodia legis.
Can it be attached? Explain.
(2%)
e.
May damages be claimed by a party prejudiced by a
wrongful attachment even if the judgment is adverse to him? Explain.
(2%)
f.
Before the RTC, A was charged with rape of his 16-year
old daughter. During the pendency of the case, the daughter gave birth
to a child allegedly as a consequence of the rape. Thereafter, she asked
the accused to support the child, and when he refused, the former filed
a petition for support pendente lite. The accused, however, insists that
Page 63 of 172
Page 64 of 172
Page 65 of 172
surety
cannot
exceed
the
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a)
Yes, an order of attachment may be issued ex-parte or upon
motion with notice and hearing. (Sec. 2 of Rule 57, Rules of Civil
Procedure) The reason why the order may be issued ex parte is: that
requiring notice to the adverse party and a hearing would defeat the
purpose of the provisional remedy and enable the adverse party to
abscond or dispose of his property before a writ of attachment issues.
(Mindanao Savings and Loan Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 172
SCRA 480).
b)
No, a writ of preliminary injunction may not be issued ex
parte. As provided in the Rules, no preliminary injunction shall be
granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought
to be enjoined. (Sec. 5 of Rule 58, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) The
reason is that a preliminary injunction may cause grave and irreparable
injury to the party enjoined.
Civil procedure; provisional remedies; injunction
2003 No. XI.
Can a suit for injunction be aptly filed with the Supreme Court
to stop the President of the Philippines from entering into a peace
agreement with the National Democratic Front? (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Page 66 of 172
No, a suit for injunction cannot aptly be filed with the Supreme
Court to stop the President of the Philippines from entering into a
peace agreement with the National Democratic Front, which is a purely
political question. (Madarang v. Santamaria, 37 Phil. 304 [1917]). The
President of the Philippines is immune from suit.
Civil procedure; provisional remedies; preliminary attachments
1988 (7)
C, with D as bondsman, secured the attachment of the properties of
defendant, X, who by filing a counterbond, had the attachment dissolved.
Defendant X after judgment rendered in his favor now holds D
liable on his bond for the damages he (X) suffered for the unwarranted
suit and the wrongful and malicious attachment.
D moves to dismiss the damage suit on the ground that the
dissolution of the attachment rendered the attachment bond void and
ineffective under Sec.12 of Rule 57, which provides that upon the filing
of the counterbond, the attachment is discharged or dissolved.
(a) Decide the case with reason.
(b) Who may issue an order of attachment and what are the contents
of such order?
Answer:
(a) If the claim for damages was made in the same action before
the judgment became final and executory, I would deny the motion to
dismiss the claim for damages, because the dissolution of the attachment
by the filing of a counterbond does not invalidate the attachment bond,
which remains liable for damages suffered by reason of the wrongful
attachment. (Calderon vs. IAC, Nov. 11, 1987).
However, if the claim for damages was made in a separate action
(which the question seems to imply because of the word damage suit), I
would grant the motion to dismiss, because such a claim can only be made
in the same action. (Sec. 20 of Rule 57; Pioneer Insurance and Surety
vs. Hontanosas, 78 SCRA 447).
(b) An order of attachment may be granted by the judge of any
court in which the action is pending, or by a Justice of the CA or the
SC, and must require the sheriff or other proper officer of the province
to attach all the property of the party against whom it is issued within
the province not exempt from execution, or so much thereof as may be
sufficient to satisfy the applicants demand, the amount of which must be
stated in the order, unless such party makes deposits or gives bond as
herein after provided in an amount sufficient to satisfy such demand,
besides costs, or in an amount equal to the value of the property which
is about to be attached. Several order may be issued at the same time to
the sheriffs or other proper officers of different provinces. (Sec. 2 of
Rule 57)
Civil procedure; provisional remedies; receivership
2001 No. XIII.
Joaquin filed a complaint against Jose for the foreclosure of a
mortgage of a furniture factory with a large number of machinery and
equipment. During the pendency of the foreclosure suit, Joaquin learned
from reliable sources that Jose was quietly and gradually disposing of
some of his machinery and equipment to a businessman friend who was also
engaged in furniture manufacturing such that from confirmed reports
Joaquin gathered, the machinery and equipment left with Jose were no
longer sufficient to answer for the latters mortgage indebtedness. In
the meantime judgment was rendered by the court in favor of Joaquin but
the same is not yet final.
Knowing what Jose has been doing. If you were Joaquins lawyer,
what action would you take to preserve whatever remaining machinery and
equipment are left with Jose? Why? (5%)
Page 67 of 172
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
To preserve whatever remaining machinery and equipment are left
with Jose, Joaquins lawyer should file a verified application for the
appointment by the court of one or more receivers. The Rules provide
that receivership is proper in an action by the mortgagee for the
foreclosure of a mortgage when it appears that the property is in danger
of being wasted or dissipated or materially injured and that its value
is probably insufficient to discharge the mortgage debt. (Sec. 1
of
Rule 59, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
Civil procedure; provisional remedies; special civil action; replevin vs
foreclosure
1989 (8)
8.1) Mia obtained a loan to buy machineries for her garment
business. She executed a chattel mortgage over said machineries. Due to
business reverses, she defaulted in the payment of her obligation.
Mario, the mortgagee, sought the delivery of the machineries so that
they can be sold at the foreclosure sale but Mia refused, contending
that it would result in the stoppage of her business. Mario seeks your
advice regarding his problem. What is legal opinion on the matter?
Answer:
I would advise Mario either to file an action for the recovery of
said machineries with an application for a writ of replevin or delivery
of personal property upon the filing of the bond double the value
thereof as a preliminary step to an extrajudicial foreclosure, or to
file an action of judicial foreclosure of chattel mortgage. (Northern
Motors vs. Herrera, 49 SCRA 392; Rule 60; Sec.8 of Rule 68). Inasmuch as
Mia executed a chattel mortgage over said machineries, she would be
estopped from opposing the writ of replevin on the ground that only
personal property may be subject thereof. (Makati Leasing and Finance
Corp. vs. Wearever Textile Mills, Inc., 122 SCRA 296)
Civil procedure; provisional remedies; support
2001 No. X.
Modesto was accused of seduction by Virginia, a poor, unemployed
young girl, who has a child by Modesto. Virginia was in dire need of
pecuniary assistance to keep her child, not to say of herself, alive.
The criminal case is still pending in court and although the civil
liability aspect of the crime has not been waived or reserved for a
separate civil action, the trial for the case was foreseen to take two
long years because of the heavily clogged court calendar before the
judgment may be rendered.
If you were the lawyer of Virginia, what action should you take
to help Virginia in the meantime especially with the problem of feeding
the child? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
To help Virginia in the meantime, her lawyer should apply for
support pendente lite as provided in the Rules. In criminal actions
where the civil liability included support for the offspring as a
consequence of the crime and the civil aspect thereof has not been
waived or reserved for a separate civil action, the accused may be
ordered to provide support pendent elite to the child born to the
offended party. (Sec. 6 of Rule 61, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure)
Civil procedure; provisional remedies; TRO
1988 (19)
(a) What is a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)?
(b) How does it differ from a writ of preliminary injunction?
(c) What is the duration of a TRO issued by (I) RTC, (ii) CA, and
(iii) the SC?
Page 68 of 172
Answer:
(a) A Temporary Restraining Order is the order to maintain the
subject of the controversy in status quo until hearing for the
application for preliminary injunction can be held. (Board of
Transportation vs. Castro 125 SCRA 410)
(b) A Writ of Preliminary Injunction cannot be granted without
notice to the defendant or adverse party, whereas a TRO maybe issued if
it shall appear from the facts shown by affidavits or by the verified
complaint that great and irreparable injury would result to the
applicant before the matter can br heard on notice. (BP 224)
A writ of preliminary injunction requires a bond to be filed by
the applicant. (Sec. 4 of Rule 58), whereas a TRO does not.
(c) Duration of TRO issued by:
(1) RTC - 20 days (BP 224)
(2) CA - 20 days (Delbros Corp. vs. IAC, April 12, 1988)
(c)
SC - no time limit
Page 69 of 172
motion
to
dismiss
plaintiff
Yogis
Page 70 of 172
filed a motion for new trial under Rule 37 alleging vitiation of his
consent due to mistake and prayed that the agreement be set aside.
Resolve the motion.
Answer:
2) A judgment by compromise is not appealable. Hence a motion for
new trial is not proper. Y should file a motion to set aside the
agreement on the ground of mistake. (Reyes vs. Ugarte, 75 Phil. 505), or
he could file a petition for relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court
or file a new action to annul the agreement within the prescriptive
period (Saminiada vs. Mata, 92 Phil. 426). (not in regalado)
Civil procedure; remedies
1998 No V.
What are the available remedies of a party declared In default:
1.
2.
3.
Page 71 of 172
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court alleging therein that
the trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting the
motion to dismiss.
(a)
Answer:
(a) No, because the proper remedy was an appeal from the order of
dismissal. The special civil action of certiorari cannot take the place
of a lost appeal. (Limpot v CA, 170 SCRA 367)
Civil procedure; remedies; appeal
1999 No. IX
a.
When is an appeal from the Regional Trial Court to the
Court of Appeals deemed perfected? (2%}
b,
XXX received a copy of the RTC decision on June 9, 1999;
YYY received it on the next day, June 10, 1999. XXX filed a Notice of
Appeal on June 15, 1999. The parties entered into a compromise on June
16, 1999. On June 13, 1999, YYY, who did not appeal, filed with the RTC
a motion for approval of the Compromise Agreement.
XXX changed his
mind and opposed the motion on the ground that the RTC has no more
jurisdiction.
Rule on the motion assuming that the records have not
yet been forwarded to the CA. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a.
An appeal from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of
Appeals is deemed perfected as to the appellant upon the filing of a
notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court in due time or within the
reglementary period of appeal.
An appeal by record on appeal is deemed
perfected as to the appellant with respect to the subject matter thereof
upon the approval of the record on appeal filed in due time. (Sec. 9,
Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules)
b.
The contention of XXX that the RTC has no more
jurisdiction over the case is not correct because at the time that the
motion to approve the compromise had been filed, the period of appeal of
YYY had not yet expired. Besides, even if that period had already
expired, the records of the case had not yet been forwarded to the Court
of Appeals.
The rules provide that in appeals by notice of appeal, the
court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the
appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of
the other parties.
(Sec. 9, third par., Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules)
Thie rules also provide that prior to the transmittal of the
record, the court may, among others, approve compromises. (Sec. 9, fifth
par., Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules) (Note: June 13, the date of the filing
of the motion for approval of the Compromise Agreement, appears to be a
clerical error)
Civil procedure; remedies; appeal to SC; appeals to CA
2002 No. XV.
A.
B.
Comment on a proposal to amend Rule 122, Section 2(b), in
relation to Section 3(c), of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure to
provide for appeal to the Court of Appeals from the decisions of the
Regional Trial Court in criminal cases, where the penalty imposed is
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, subject to the right of the
accused to appeal to the Supreme Court. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A.
The modes of appeal to the Supreme Court are: (a) appeal by
certiorari on pure questions of law under Rule 45 through a petition for
review on certiorari; and (b) ordinary appeal in criminal cases through
a notice of appeal from convictions imposing reclusion perpetuator life
Page 72 of 172
Page 73 of 172
my client was prevented from fully presenting her case in court through
fraudulent acts of the prevailing party. (Sec. 9(2), BP 129)
Alternative Answer;
I would file a petition for relief under Rule 38 on the ground
that my client's failure to appeal on time was due to the death of her
lawyer one day after she left for Canada.
Civil procedure; remedies; modes of appeal
1992 No. XI:
By sheer coincidence, Atty. Lopez was on the same day, June 30,
1991, served with adverse decisions of the Court of Appeals and the
Regional
Trial Court.
In each
case, he
filed a
motion for
reconsideration simultaneously on July 10, 1991. He received notices of
the denial of his two motions for reconsideration on August 15, 1991.
If Atty. Lopez decides to appeal in each of the two cases
(a) What mode of appeal should he pursue in each case?
Suggested Answer:
(1) From the Court
certiorari under Rule 45,
of
Appeals
to
Supreme
Court
appeal
by
Suggested Answer:
(1) From Court of Appeals to Supreme Court, by filing a petition
for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court and serving a copy on
the Court of Appeals and the adverse party.
(2) From Regional Trial Court to Court of Appeals, by filing a
notice of appeal with Regional Trial Court and serving a copy on the
adverse party.
(3)
From Regional Trial Court to Supreme Court, by filing a
petition for review on certiorari with Supreme Court and serving a copy
on the lower court and the adverse party.
(c) Within what time should each appeal be perfected?
Suggested Answer:
(1) From Court of Appeals to Supreme Court, on or before August
30, 1991, or fifteen days from notice of the denial of the motion for
reconsideration. (Sec. 1 of Rule 45)
(2) From Regional Trial Court to Court of Appeals, on or before
August 21, 1991, or the remaining period of 6 days counted from notice
of denial, since from June 30 to July 10, nine days had elapsed. (De Las
Alas vs. Court of Appeals, 83 SCRA 200)
(3)
From Regional Trial Court to Supreme Court, on or before
August 30, 1991, as in appeal from Court of Appeals to Supreme Court,
(RA 5440)
Civil procedure; remedies; modes of appeal
1994 No (5)
State the steps for bringing up to the Supreme Court:
1. a decision
ejectment case.
of
the
Municipal
Trial
Court
of
Manila
in
Page 74 of 172
2. Within
appeal? [3%]
what
time
and
in
what
court
should
you
file
your
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1.
The mode of appeal is by petition for review under Rule
42, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
2,
The period of appeal is within fifteen [15] days from
notice of the decision subject of the appeal or of the denial of a
motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time. The appeal
shall be filed in the Court of
Appeals. (Sec.1, Rule 42, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.)
Civil procedure; remedies; petition for relief
1990 (11)
A money judgment against Ernesto in favor of Geraldine was
rendered by the RTC of Binan, Laguna. The decision was received by Atty.
Maco, counsel for Ernesto, on March 4, 1990. Atty. Maco did not inform
Ernesto about the judgment. On March 10, 1990, Atty. Maco migrated with
his entire family to California, USA. Entry of judgment was made on
March 20, 1990. Ernesto learned of the decision only on June 17, 1990
when the court sheriff arrived at his residence to levy on his
properties. You are consulted by Ernesto on July 31, 1990.
Assuming Ernesto has a meritorious case, what legal remedies you
may avail of in order to protect his interest? Explain your answer.
Answer:
I will file a petition for relief from judgment with the RTC of
Bian, Laguna. Such a petition should be filed within 60 days after the
petitioner learns of the judgment and not more than 6 months after its
entry. (Sec.3 of Rule 38). Since the entry of judgment was made on March
20, 1990, the period of 6 months had not yet expired on July 31, 1990
Page 75 of 172
for
Answer:
(b) The recourse of Mario from the order of denial is not an
immediate appeal because the order is interlocutory. However, since the
issue raised is lack of jurisdiction over his person, he may file a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. (Newsweek
vs. IAC, 142 SCRA 171)
Civil procedure; reply
2000 No. I-a
a)
X files a complaint in the Regional Trial Court for the
recovery of a sum of money with damages against Y. Y files his answer
denying liability under the contract of sale and praying for the
dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action
because the contract of sale was superseded by a contract of lease,
Page 76 of 172
executed and signed by X and Y two weeks after the contract of sale was
executed. The contract of lease was attached to the answer. X does not
file a reply. What is the effect of the non-filing of a reply? Explain.
(3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) A reply is generally optional. If it is not filed, the new
matters alleged in the answer are deemed controverted. (Sec. 10 of Rule
6, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). However, since the contract of lease
attached to the answer is the basis of the defense, by not filing a
reply denying under oath the genuineness and due execution of said
contract, the plaintiff is deemed to have admitted the genuineness and
due execution thereof. (Secs. 7 and 8 Rule 8, 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure; Toribio v. Bidin, 132 SCRA 162 [1985]).
Civil procedure; Rule 45 vs Rule
65
1999 No. X
a.
Distinguish a petition for certiorari as a mode of appeal
from a special civil action for certiorari. (2%)
b.
May a party resort to certiorari when appeal is still
available? Explain.
(2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a.
A petition for review on certiorari as a mode of appeal
may be distinguished from a special civil action for certiorari in that
the petition for certiorari as a mode of appeal is governed by Rule 45
and is filed from a judgment or final order of the Regional Trial Court,
the Sandiganbayan or the Court of Appeals, within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the judgment appealed from or of the denial of the motion for
new trial or reconsideration filed in due time on questions of law only
(Secs. 1 and 2); special civil action for certiorari is governed by Rule
65 and is filed to annul or modify judgments, orders or resolutions
rendered or issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction, when
there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, to be filed within sixty (60) days from notice
of the judgment, order or resolution subject of the petition. (Secs. 1
and 4.)
ADDITIONAL ANSWER;
1) In appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, the petitioner and
respondent are the original parties to the action and the lower court is
not impleaded. In certiorari, under Rule 65, the lower court is
impleaded.
2) In appeal by certiorari, the filing of a motion for
reconsideration is not required, while in the special civil action of
certiorari, such a motion is generally required.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
b.
No, because as a general rule, certiorari is proper if
there is no appeal.
(Sec. 1 of Rule 65.)
However, if appeal is not a
speedy and adequate remedy, certiorari may be resorted to.
(Echaus v.
Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 381.)
Certiorari is sanctioned, even if
appeal is available, on the basis of a patent, capricious and whimsical
exercise of discretion by a trial judge as when an appeal will not
promptly relieve petitioner from the injurious effects of the disputed
order (Vasquez vs. Robilla-Alenio, 271 SCRA 67)
Civil procedure; Rule 45 vs Rule 65
1988 (12)
12.a) What are the contents of a petition for review by certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from a judgment of the CA to the SC?
12.b)
When
must
this
petition
for
review
under
paragraph
(a)
Page 77 of 172
hereof be filed? How does this period differ from that required for
filing the requisite petition in a special civil action for certiorari?
12.c) State the three (3) grounds upon which the SC may dismiss
the petition under paragraph (a) herein-above.
Answer:
12.a) The petition shall contain a concise statement of the
matters involved, the assignment of errors made by the court below, and
the reasons relied on for the allowance of the petition, and it should
be accompanied with a true copy of the judgment sought to be reviewed,
together with the twelve (12) copies of the record on appeal, if any,
and of the petitioners brief as filed in the CA. A verified statement
of the date when notice of judgment and denial of the motion for
reconsideration, if any, were received shall accompany the petition.
(Sec. 2 of Rule 45)
12.b) Within 15 days from notice of judgment or denial of the
motion for reconsideration. (Sec. 1 of Rule 45)
There is no reglementary period for
certiorari as a special civil action. Only
required.
reconsideration
may
be
dispensed
with
in
the
Page 78 of 172
2.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1.
No. X's defense is not tenable if the action is filed by a
lessor against a lessee. However, if the right of possession of the
plaintiff depends on his ownership then the defense is tenable.
2.
The counterclaim is within the jurisdiction of the
Municipal Trial Court which does not exceed P100,000, because the
principal demand is P80,000, exclusive of interest and attorney's fees.
(Sec. 33, B.P. Big. 129, as amended.) However. Inasmuch as all actions
of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are subject to summary procedure
and since the counterclaim is only permissive, it cannot be entertained
by the Municipal Court. (Sees. 1AU) and 3(A) of Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure.)
Civil procedure; special civil action; foreclosure
2003 No. VI.
Page 79 of 172
(b)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) In judicial foreclosure by banks such as DBP, the mortgagor
or debtor whose real property has been sold on foreclosure has the right
to redeem the property sold within one year after the sale (or
registration of the sale). However, the purchaser at the auction sale
has the right to obtain a writ of possession after the finality of the
order confirming the sale. (Sec. 3 of Rule 68; Sec. 47 of RA 8791. The
General Banking Law of 2000). The motion for writ of possession,
however, cannot be filed ex parte. There must be a notice of hearing.
(b) The deficiency claim of the bank may be enforced against the
mortgage debtor A, but it cannot be enforced against B, the owner of the
mortgaged property, who did not assume personal liability for the loan.
Civil procedure; special civil action; petition for certiorari
1991 No. III;
(c) May a special civil action for certiorari prosper in case of
a denial of a motion to dismiss or a motion to quash? If so, in what
instance or instances?
Answer:
(c) Yes, if it can be shown that the trial court acted without or
in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, since the
order of denial is interlocutory and not immediately appealable. (Manalo
v. Mariano, 69 SCRA 800; Tacas v. Cariaso, 72 SCRA 171; Newsweek v. IAC,
142 SCRA 171)
Civil procedure; special civil action; petition for certiorari
2002 No. IV.
The defendant was declared in default in the RTC for his failure
to file an answer to a complaint for a sum of money. On the basis of the
plaintiffs ex parte presentation of evidence, judgment by default was
rendered against the defendant. The default judgment was served on the
defendant on October 1, 2001. on October 10, 2001, he files a verified
motion to lift the order of default and to set aside the judgment. In
his motion, the defendant alleged that, immediately upon receipt of the
summon, he saw the plaintiff and confronted him with his receipt
evidencing his payment and that the plaintiff assured him that he would
instruct his lawyer to withdraw the complaint. The trial court denied
the defendants motion because it was not accompanied by an affidavit of
merit. The defendant filed a special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 challenging the denial order.
A.
Page 80 of 172
B.
Did the trial court abuse its discretion or act without or
in excess of its jurisdiction in denying the defendants motion to lift
the order of default judgment? Why? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A.
The petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed by the
defendant is the proper remedy because appeal is not a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In appeal, the defendant
in default can only question the decision in the light of the evidence
of the plaintiff. The defendant cannot invoke the receipt to prove
payment of his obligation to the plaintiff.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
A.Under ordinary circumstances, the proper remedy of a party
wrongly declared in default is either to appeal from the judgment by
default or file a petition for relief from judgment. [Jao, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals, 251 SCRA 391 (1995)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
B.
Yes, the trial court gravely abused its discretion or acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction in denying the defendants motion
because it was not accompanied by a separate affidavit of merit. In his
verified motion to lift the order of default and to set aside the
judgment, the defendant alleged that immediately upon the receipt of the
summons, he saw the plaintiff and confronted him with his receipt
showing payment and that the plaintiff assured him that he would
instruct his lawyer to withdraw the complaint. Since the good defense of
the defendant was already incorporated in the verified motion, there was
not need for a separate affidavit of merit. [Capuz v. Court of Appeals,
233 SCRA 471 (1994); Mago v. Court of Appeals, 303 SCRA 600 (1999)].
Civil procedure; special civil action; quo warranto
2001 No. XI.
A group of businessmen formed an association in Cebu City calling
itself Cars C. to distribute / sell cars in said city. It did not
incorporate itself under the law nor did it have any government permit
or license to conduct its business as such. The Solicitor General filed
before a Regional Trial Court in Manila a verified petition for quo
warranto questioning and seeking to stop the operations of Cars Co. The
latter filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground of improper
venue claiming that its main office and operations are in Cebu city and
not in Manila.
Is the contention of Cars Co. correct? Why? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. As expressly provided in the Rules, when the Solicitor
General commences the action for quo warranto, it may be brought in a
Regional Trial Court in the City of Manila, as in this case, in the
Court of Appeals or in the Supreme Court. (Sec. 7 of Rule 66, 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure)
Civil procedure; special civil action;contempt
1993 No (13)
In an action for injunction and damages, the plaintiff applied for
a temporary restraining order or (TRO) and preliminary injunction.
Upon filing the complaint, the court issued a TRO and set the
application for preliminary injunction for hearing.
As the 20-day lifetime (January 3-23,1993) of the TRO was about to
expire, the court issued and order dated Jan 21,1993 extending the
effectivity of the TRO for another twenty days (January 24,1993 to
February 13,1993).
On March 5,1993, the court, after hearing, denied the application
for preliminary injunction.
Page 81 of 172
Another Answer:
Consignation and deposit should be included because it involves
rentals (although this is not an ejectment case) to protect LTAs
interest.
Civil procedure; special civil actions; interpleader
1996 No. 10:
3)
A lost the cashier's check she purchased from XYZ Bank. Upon
being notified of the loss, XYZ Bank immediately issued a "STOP PAYMENT"
order. Here comes B trying to encash that same cashier's check but XYZ
Bank refused payment.
As precautionary measure, what remedy may XYZ Bank avail of with
respect to the conflicting claims of A and b over the cashier's check?
Explain.
Answer:
3)
XYZ Bank may file a complaint for interpleader so that the
court may resolve the conflicting claims of A and B over the cashier's
check.
Civil procedure; special civil actions; interpleader; declaratory relief
1998 No VIII.
1.
2.
A student files action for declaratory relief against his
school to determine whether he deserves to graduate with Latin honors.
Is this action tenable? [3%]
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1.
An action for interpleader is a special civil action which
is filed whenever conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or
may be made against a person who claims no interest whatever in the
subject matter, or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed
by the claimants, in which case, he may bring the action against the
conflicting claimants to compel them to interplead and litigate their
several claims among themselves. (Sec 1, Rule 62,1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.)
Page 82 of 172
2.
No.
The action for declaratory relief is not tenable.
Whether the student deserves to graduate with Latin honors does not fall
within the matters subject to declaratory relief, namely, a deed, will
contract or other written instrument, or a statute, executive order or
regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation. (Sec. 1 of
Rule 63, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.)
Civil procedure; subpoena
1997 No 4;
In an admiralty case filed by A against Y Shipping Lines (whose
principal offices are in Manila) in the Regional Trial Court, Davao
City, the court issued a subpoena duces tecum directing Y, the president
of the shipping company, to appear and testify at the trial and to bring
with him several documents.
(a)
On what valid
subpoena duces tecum?
ground
can
refuse
to
comply
with
the
(b) How can A take the testimony of Y and present the documents
as exhibits other than through the subpoena from the Regional Trial
Court?
Answer:
(a) Y can refuse to comply with the subpoena duces tecum on the
ground that he resides more than 50 (now 100} kilometers from the place
where he is to testify,
(Sec. 9 of former Rule 23; Sec. 10 of new Rule
21).
(b) A can take the testimony of Y and present the documents as
exhibits by taking his deposition through oral examination or written
interrogatories. (Rule 24; new Rule 23) He may also file a motion for
the production or inspection of documents. (Rule 27).
Alternative Answer;
(a) The witness can also refuse to comply with the subpoena duces
tecum on the ground that the documents are not relevant and there was no
tender of fees for one day's attendance and the kilometrage allowed by
the rules.
Civil procedure; summary judgment
1996 No. 7;
3) A's motion for summary judgment was granted by the Regional
Trial Court but reversed by the Court of Appeals on the ground that A
made no effort to adduce testimonial evidence in addition to his
affidavits to prove absence of any genuine issue as to any material
fact.
Is the decision of the Court of Appeals correct? Explain.
Answer:
3) No, because testimonial evidence is not required to prove the
absence of any genuine issue as to any material fact. This is shown by
the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with the affidavits.
(Sec. 3 of Rule 34)
Civil procedure; summary judgments
2004 NO. VII
A. After defendant has served and filed his answer to plaintiffs
complaint for damages before the proper Regional Trial Court, plaintiff
served and filed a motion (with supporting affidavits) for a summary
judgment in his favor upon all of his claims.
Defendant served and
filed his opposition (with supporting affidavits) to the motion. After
due hearing, the court issued an order (1) stating that the court has
found no genuine issue as to any material fact and thus concluded that
plaintiff is entitled to judgment in his favor as a matter of law except
as to the amount of damages recoverable, and (2) accordingly ordering
Page 83 of 172
that plaintiff shall have judgment summarily against defendant for such
amount as may be found due plaintiff for damages, to be ascertained by
trial on October 7, 2004, at 8:30 oclock in the morning.
May defendant properly take an appeal from said order? Or, may
defendant properly challenge said order thru a special civil action for
certiorari? Reason. (5%)
Civil procedure; summary judgments; judgment on the pleadings
1989 (9)
What do you understand by a Summary
distinguished from a Judgment on the Pleadings?
Judgment?
How
is
it
Answer:
A summary judgment is one rendered by a Court without a trial on
motion of either a claimant or a defending party, with at least 10 days
notice before the time specified for the hearing, when the pleadings,
supporting affidavits made on personal knowledge which are not rebutted
by opposing affidavits, depositions or admissions, show that, except as
to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.
It is distinguished from a judgment on the pleadings in that the
latter is based on the pleadings alone. A judgment may be rendered when
the answer to the complain, counterclaim, cross-claim or third party
complaint fails to tender an issue or otherwise admits the material
allegations of the adverse partys pleading. (Rules 19 and 34).
Civil procedure; summons
1989 (2)
2.1) Are the rules on summons under Rule 14 of the Rules of Court
applicable equally in actions before the RTCs as well as in the
MetroTCs, MTCs and MCTCs?
Answer:
Yes, because the procedure to be observed in the MetroTCs, MTCs
and MCTCs is the same as that observed in the RTCs, and Rule 5 which
conveyed procedure in inferior courts including summons, was repealed.
(Sec.8 of Interim Rules).
2.2) When is extra-territorial service of summons proper?
Answer:
Extra-territorial service of summons is proper when the defendant
does not reside and is not found in the Philippines and the action
affects the personal status of the plaintiff or relates to, or the
subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in which the
defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, or in
which the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the
defendant from any interest therein, or the property of the defendant
has been attached within the Philippines. (Sec.17 of Rule 14). It is
also
proper when
the defendant
ordinarily resides
within the
Philippines, but is temporarily out of it. (Sec.18 of Rule 14)
Civil procedure; summons
1999 No. VI
a.
What is the effect of absence of summons on the judgment
rendered in the case? (2%)
b.
When additional defendant is impleaded in the action, is
it necessary that summons be served upon him? Explain.
(2%)
c.
Is summons required to be served upon a defendant who was
substituted for the deceased? Explain. (2%)
Page 84 of 172
d.
A sued XX Corporation (XXC), a corporation organized
under Philippine laws, for specific performance when the latter failed
to deliver T-shirts to the former as stipulated in their contract of
sale.
Summons was served on the corporation's cashier and director.
Would you consider service of summons on either officer sufficient?
Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER;
a.
The effect of the absence of summons on a judgment would
make the judgment null and void because the court would not have
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, but if the defendant
voluntarily appeared before the court, his appearance is equivalent to
the service of summons. (Sec. 20, Rule 14, 1997 Rules)
b.
Yes. Summons must be served on an additional defendant
impleaded in the action so that the court can acquire jurisdiction over
him, unless he makes a voluntary appearance.
c.
No.
A defendant who was substituted for the deceased
need not be served with summons because it is the court which orders him
as the legal representative of the deceased to appear and substitute the
deceased. (Sec. 16 of Rule 3.)
d.
Summons on a domestic corporation through its cashier and
director are not valid under the present rules.
(Sec. 11, Rule 14,
Rules of Court.)
They have been removed from those who can be served
with summons for a domestic corporation.
Cashier was substituted by
treasurer. (Id.)
Civil procedure; summons
B.
Seven years after the entry of judgment, the plaintiff filed
an action for its revival. Can the defendant successfully oppose the
revival of the judgment by contending that it is null and void because
the RTC-Manila did not acquire jurisdiction over his person? Why? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A.
The RTC-Manila should deny the motion because it is in
violation of the rule that no judgment obligor shall be required to
appear before a court, for the purpose of examination concerning his
property and income, outside the province or city in which such obligor
resides. In this case the judgment obligor resides in Bulacan. (Rule 39,
sec.36).
B.
Yes, because the
serve summons personally on
hence the RTC-Manila did not
14, sec. 6 & 7; De Guzman v.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
B. No, the defendant is deemed to have waived the lack of
jurisdiction over his person because he did not raise this issue: 1) in
opposing the motion to declare him in default; 2) in motion for
reconsideration of or appeal from the judgment by default; and 3) in
opposing the motion requiring him to appear and be examined regarding
his property.
Civil procedure; summons
2004 NO. III
A. Summons was issued by the MM Regional Trial Court and actually
received on time by defendant from his wife at their residence.
The
sheriff earlier that day had delivered the summons to her at said
residence because defendant was not home at the time.
The sheriffs
return or proof of service filed with the court in sum states that the
summons, with attached copy of the complaint, was served on defendant at
his residence thru his wife, a person of suitable age and discretion
then residing therein.
Defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that
the court had no jurisdiction over his person as there was no valid
Page 85 of 172
Page 86 of 172
Answer:
No. Although substituted service of summons on Bs brother was not
valid inasmuch as B was not a resident of the Philippines, the motion to
dismiss filed by Bs lawyer constituted a voluntary appearance, inasmuch
as it does not only question the jurisdiction of the court over his
person, but also alleged prescription and a claim for litigation
expenses. (Note: The claim for litigation expenses may properly be made
in a counterclaim)
Civil procedure; summons; waiver of improper service
1990 (8)
While the trial was ongoing, the lawyer of Mario discovered that
there was improper service of summons, the summons having been sent by
registered mail. He filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
court had not acquired jurisdiction over the person of Mario.
Should the said motion be granted? Explain your answer.
Answer:
No, because by filing his answer and going to trial without
previous objection to the lack of jurisdiction over his person, Mario is
deemed to have waived the defect of improper service of summons. (Sec.
23 of Rule 14).
Civil procedure; supplemental pleadings
2000 No. III.
The Regional Trial Court rendered judgment against ST, copy of
which was received by his counsel on February 28, 2000. On March 10,
2000. ST, through counsel, filed a motion for reconsideration of the
decision with notice to the Clerk of Court submitting the motion for the
consideration of the court. On March 15, 2000, realizing that the Motion
lacked a notice of hearing, STs counsel filed a supplemental pleading.
Was the motion for Reconsideration filed within the reglementary period?
Explain. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, because the last day of filing a motion for reconsideration
was March 15 if February had 28 days or March 16 if February had 29
days. Although the original motion for reconsideration was defective
because it lacked a notice of hearing, the defect was cured on time by
its filing on March 15 of a supplemental pleading, provided that motion
was set for hearing and served on the adverse party at least three (3)
days before the date of hearing. (Sec. 4, Rule 15, 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Since the supplemental pleading was not set for hearing, it did
not cure the defect of the original motion.
Civil procedure; third party claim
2000 No. XVI.
JKs real property is being attached by the sheriff in a civil
action for damages against LM. JK claims that he is not a party to the
case; that his property is not involved in said case; and that he is the
sole registered owner of said property. Under the Rules of Court, what
must JK do to prevent the Sheriff from attaching his property? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSER:
If the real property has been attached, the remedy is to file a
third-party claim. The third-party claimant should make an affidavit of
his title to the property attached, stating the grounds of his title
thereto, and serve such affidavit upon the sheriff while the latter has
possession of the attached property, and a copy thereof upon the
attaching party. (Sec. 14, Rule 57, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.) The
Page 87 of 172
Page 88 of 172
2.
Rule on the motion to dismiss the counterclaim on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. [2%]
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1.
There is improper venue. The case for a sum of money,
which was
filed in Quezon City, is a personal action.
It must be
filed in the residence of either the plaintiff, which is in Pangasinan,
or of the defendant, which is in San Fernando, La Union,
(Sec. 2 of
Rule 4. 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.) The fact that it was not raised
in a motion to dismiss does not matter because the rule that if improper
venue is not raised in a motion to dismiss it is deemed waived was
removed from the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The new Rules provide
that if no motion to dismiss has been filed, any of the grounds for
dismissal may be pleaded as an affirmative defense in the answer. (Sec.
6 of Rule 16.)
2.
The motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter should be denied. The counterclaim
for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation is a compulsory
counterclaim because It necessarily arose out of and is connected with
the complaint. In an original action before the Regional Trial Court,
the counterclaim may be considered compulsory regardless of the amount.
(Sec. 7 of Rule 6, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.)
Civil procedure; venue; legal capacity to sue
1988 (4)
4.a) A complaint entitled A as attorney-in-fact for X, plaintiff,
versus B, defendant was filed to recover a car in the possession of B.
As power of attorney expressly authorized him (A) to sue for the
recovery of the car.
B files a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of capacity to
sue.
Decide the motion. Explain.
4.b) A and B, both residents of Batangas, entered into a contract
of lease over a parcel of land belonging to B, located in Calapan,
Mindoro.
A filed a complaint before the RTC, Batangas for the rescission of
the lease contract of the land in Mindoro.
B filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Batangas Court did
not have jurisdiction over the subject matter, the land being located in
Mindoro. B however did not allege improper venue in his motion.
Decide with reasons.
Answer:
4.a) Motion to dismiss is denied. A has a legal capacity to sue
but is not the real party in interest. The ground of the motion to
dismiss should have been that the complaint states no cause if action
because it was filed by A as attorney-in-fact for X. The complaint
should have been filed in the name of X as plaintiff. (Arroyo vs.
Granada, 18 Phil. 484)
4.b) Motion to dismiss is denied. The fact that the land is
Page 89 of 172
located in Mindoro does not affect the jurisdiction of the RTC sitting
in Batangas. The proper venue of the action is the RTC in Mindoro.
However, since B did not object to the improper venue in his motion,
that ground is deemed waived. (Sec.4 of Rule 4)
Civil procedure; venue; personal actions
1997 No. 3:
X, a resident of Angeles City, borrowed P300,000.00 from A, a
resident of Pasay City. In the loan agreement, the parties stipulated
that "the parties agree to sue and be sued in the City of Manila."
(a) In case of non-payment of the loan, can A file his complaint
to collect the loan from X in Angeles City?
(b) Suppose the parties did not stipulate in the loan agreement
as to the venue, where can A file his complaint against X?
(c)
Suppose the parties stipulated in their loan agreement that
"venue for all suits arising from this contract shall be the courts in
Quezon City," can A file his complaint against X in Pasay City?
Answer:
(a) Yes, because the stipulation in the loan agreement that "the
parties agree to sue and be sued in the City of Manila" does not make
Manila the "exclusive venue thereof." (Sec, 4 of Rule 4, as amended by
Circular No. 13-95: Sec. 4 of new Rule 4) Hence, A can file his
complaint in Angeles City where he resides, (Sec, 2 of Rule 4).
(b)
If the parties did not stipulate on the venue, A can file
his complaint either in Angeles City where he resides or in Pasay City
where X resides, (Id).
(c)
Yes, because the wording of the stipulation does not make
Quezon City the exclusive venue.
(Philbanking v. Tensuan. 230 SCRA
413; Unimasters Conglomeration, Inc. v. CA. CR-119657, Feb. 7, 1997),
Alternative Answer:
(c) No. If the parties stipulated that the venue "shall be in the
courts in Quezon City", A cannot file his complaint in Pasay City
because the use of the word "shall" makes Quezon City the exclusive
venue thereof. (Id. See also Hoechst Philippines vs. Torres, 83 SCRA
297).
Summary Procedure
Summary procedure; coverage
1988 (14)
(a) In what civil cases is the Summary Procedure before MetroTC,
MTC, and MCTC applicable?
(b) In what criminal cases
MetroTC, MTC, and MCTC applicable?
is
the
Summary
Procedure
before
Answer:
(a) Summary Procedure is applicable in the following civil cases:
(1) Cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer, except where
the question of ownership is involved, or where the damages or unpaid
rentals sought to be recovered by the plaintiff exceed twenty thousand
(20,000) pesos at the time of the filing of the complaint;
(2) All other civil cases, except probate proceedings, falling
within the jurisdiction of the abovementioned courts, where the total
amount of the plaintiffs claim does not exceed ten thousand (10,000)
pesos, exclusive of interests and costs. (Sec. 1-A)
(b) It is applicable in the following criminal cases:
(1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
(2) Violations of the rental law;
Page 90 of 172
(a) Is prior referral to the Lupon under P.D. No. 1508 necessary?
Answer;
Page 91 of 172
(a) No, because the law applies only to disputes between natural
person and does not apply to juridical person such as the estate of a
deceased. (Vda, de Borromeo v. Pogoy, 126 SCRA 217)
(b) What is the court of proper jurisdiction and venue of the
intended action?
Answer;
(b) The Court of proper jurisdiction and venue is the Municipal
Trial Court of Davao City, since this is an action of illegal detainer
and the leased premises are located in Davao City.
Another Answer;
If the action filed is for recovery of possession or accion
publiciana, the Regional Trial Court of Davao City would have
jurisdiction and the venue would also be in Davao City.
(c)
Supposing that referral is necessary, but the complaint is
filed without such referral, may it be dismissed on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction?
Answer:
(c) No, because lack of referral affects only the cause of
action, not jurisdiction, and the former may be deemed waived if not
raised in a motion to dismiss or an answer. (Ebol v. Amin 135 SCRA 438)
Another Answer;
No, because lack of referral would merely render
premature for failure to comply with a condition precedent.
the
action
(d) If the case is filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), is it covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure?
Answer;
(d)
No, it is not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure in
any of the lower courts, because the unpaid rentals exceed P20,000.00
(Sec, 1-A-l of Rule on Summary Procedure)
(e)
Supposing that A filed the complaint in the MTCC, and X
filed an Answer wherein he interposed a counterclaim for moral damages
In the amount of P50,000 alleging that the complaint is unfounded and
malicious, would the MTCC have jurisdiction over the counterclaim? If X
did not setup the counterclaim, can he file a separate action to recover
the damages? Can A file a counterclaim to the counterclaim?
Answer;
(e) No, because
amount of P20,000.00.
the
counterclaim
exceeds
the
jurisdictional
Since the claim for damages is not within the jurisdiction of the
MTCC, it is not a compulsory counterclaim and X can file a separate
action in the RTC to recover the damages. (Reyes v. CA, 38 SCRA 130)
Yes, A can include a counterclaim in his answer to counterclaim.
(Sec. 10 of Rule 6).
Another Answer:
The MTCC would have jurisdiction over the counterclaim if the
excess of the amount thereof over P20,000.00 is waived by X. (Agustin v.
Bocalan. 135 SCRA 340)
Summary procedure; ejectment; execution pending appeal
1995 No. 3:
1.
In an illegal detainer case the Municipal Trial Court ruled
in favor of plaintiff-lessor who, not being satisfied with the increase
of rentals granted him by the court, appealed praying for further
increase thereof. Defendant-lessee did not appeal.
Page 92 of 172
a)
Can plaintiff-lessor, as appellant, move for execution
pending appeal? Explain.
b)
Can defendant-lessee, as appellee,
immediate execution of the judgment? Explain.
validly
resist
the
2.
In his appellee's brief, defendant-lessee not only
controverted the issue on rentals raised by plaintiff-lessor but also
assailed the Judgment of the trial court on the ground that the same was
totally contrary to the admitted evidence showing him to be the owner of
the property entitled to possession of the premises.
Can the appellate court consider the issue of ownership raised by
the appellee? Discuss fully.
Answer:
1.
a) Yes, if defendant fails to pay or deposit the amount of
rentals adjudged by the court within the reglementary period. (City of
Manila vs. CA, 149 SCRA 143)
b) Yes, as long as he pays or deposits the amount of rentals
adjudged.
2.
No, because as lessee he is estopped from raising the
question of ownership. (Art. 1456. Civil Code; Sec. 2(b), Rule 131; Fije
vs. CA, 233 SCRA 587)
Summary procedure; ejectment; issues of ownership
1995 No, 13:
Albert forcibly entered and occupied the house and lot in Quezon
City owned by his neighbor Carissa. Carissa immediately sued Albert for
recovery of the property. She also claimed damages amounting to
P100,000.00, other undetermined losses as a result of the forcible
entry, and attorney's fees of P25,000.00. Albert sets up affirmative
defenses in his answer without questioning Carissa's title over the
property.
1.
Is the case triable under summary
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City? Explain.
2.
procedure
by
the
1.
Yes, because all actions for forcible entry and unlawful
detainer are subject to summary procedure irrespective of the amount of
damages claimed, but the attorney's fees should not exceed P20,000.00.
2.
Yes, but only to determine the question of possession.
129 as amended).
(BP
3.
Albert may raise the issue of lack of barangay conciliation
prior to the filing of the complaint.
Summary procedure; ejectment; jurisdiction and remedies
1988 (10)
Andres filed a case for unlawful detainer before the Metropolitan
Court of Manila against Lito for refusing to vacate the leased premises
after the expiration of his lease contract and for non-payment of
rentals. As counterclaim, Lito claim moral damages in the amount of
P15,000.
10.a) May the Metropolitan Court proceed to try and decide the
case including the claim of P15,000? Explain.
10.b) In case Lito is adjudged to vacate the leased premises and
to pay the accrued rentals in arrears, how can he stay the execution of
the judgment?
10.c) How does unlawful detainer differ from forcible entry?
Answer:
10.a) Yes, because the amount of the counterclaim, P15,000, is
Page 93 of 172
within the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Court which has also the
exclusive original jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case.
(Agustin vs. Bocalan, 135 SCRA 340).
10.b) Lito must appeal; file a supersedeas bond in an amount
equivalent to the rents, damages and costs accruing down to the time of
the judgment; and deposit with the RTC the amount of the reasonable
value of the use and occupation of the premises for the preceding month
or period at the rate determine by the judgment, on or before the tenth
day of each succeeding month or period. (Sec. 8, of Rule70)
10.c) In
beginning but
termination of
the possession
made by force,
the
court
grant
the
immediate
execution?
Decide
with
Answer:
No, because a supersedeas bond covers only the rent unpaid up to
the time of the judgment. Since Juan deposited all the current rentals
while the ejectment case was pending, a supersedeas bond is not
required. (Once vs. Gonzales, 76 SCRA 258). Attorneys fees are not
required to be deposited in order to stay execution. (Sec. 8 of Rule
70).
Summary procedure; immediately executory
1996 No. 7;
2)
In a case for illegal detainer under the Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure, the Municipal Trial Court rendered a decision in
Page 94 of 172
Page 95 of 172
Page 96 of 172
2004 NO. II
B. Charged with the offense of slight physical injuries under an
information duly filed with the MeTC in Manila which in the meantime had
duly issued an order declaring that the case shall be governed by the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, the accused filed with said court a
motion to quash on the sole ground that the officer who filed the
information had no authority to do so. The MeTC denied the motion on
the ground that it is a prohibited motion under the said Rule.
The accused thereupon filed with the RTC in Manila a petition for
certiorari in sum assailing and seeking the nullification of the MeTCs
denial of his motion to quash.
The RTC in due time issued an order
denying due course to the certiorari petition on the ground that it is
not allowed by the said Rule. The accused forthwith filed with said RTC
a motion for reconsideration of its said order. The RTC in time denied
said motion for reconsideration on the ground that the same is also a
prohibited motion under the said Rule.
Were the RTCs orders denying due course to the petition as well
as denying the motion for reconsideration correct? Reason. (5%)
Summary procedure; prohibited pleadings; remedies
1996 No. 7;
1)
A brought an action for unlawful detainer against B in the
Municipal Trial Court. B filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack
of cause of action for failure to first refer the dispute to the
Barangay Lupon. Acting on B's motion, the case was dismissed. A files a
petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial court assailing the
Municipal Trial Court's dismissal order on the ground that B's motion to
dismiss is a prohibited motion under the Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure.
a)
b)
Answer:
1. a) No, because the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure allows a
motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to comply with the provision
on referral to Lupon. (Sec. 19-A)
b) No, because the
dismissal order is correct.
proper
remedy
is
appeal.
Moreover,
the
Page 97 of 172
Criminal Procedure
Criminal procedure; acquittal; effect
2002 No. XIII.
A.
Delia sued Victor for personal injuries which she allegedly
sustained when she was struck by a car driven by Victor. May the court
receive in evidence, over proper and timely objection by Delia, a
certified true copy of a judgment of acquittal in a criminal prosecution
charging Victor with hit-and-run driving in connection with Delias
injuries? Why? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A.
the act or
exist, the
[Rule 111,
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
If the judgment of acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, the
court may receive it in evidence because in such case, the civil action
for damages which may be instituted requires only a preponderance of the
evidence. (Art. 29, Civil Code).
Criminal procedure; allegations of aggravating circumstances
2001 No. VII.
The prosecution filed an information against Jose for slight
physical injuries alleging the acts constituting the offense but without
anymore alleging that it was committed after Joses unlawful entry in
the complainants abode.
Was the information correctly prepared by the prosecution? Why?
(5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. The aggravating circumstance of unlawful entry in the
complainants abode has to be specified in the information; otherwise,
it cannot be considered as aggravating. (Sec. 8 of Rule 110, Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The information prepared by the prosecutor is not correct because
the accused should have been charged with qualified trespass to
dwelling.
Criminal procedure; amendment and substitution of information
1994 No (3)
3.a) Within the context of the rule on Criminal Procedure,
distinguish an amendment from a substitution of an information.
Answer:
3.a) An amendment may be made in substance and form, without leave
of court, at any time before an accused pleads, and thereafter and
during the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at the
Page 98 of 172
discretion of the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to
the rights of the accused. Substitution may be made if it appears at any
time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper
offense, in which case, the court shall dismiss the complaint or
information upon filing of a new one charging the proper offense in
accordance with Rule 119, Sec. 11, provided that the accused would not
be placed thereby in double jeopardy and may also require the witnesses
to give bail for their appearance at the trial. )Sec. 14, Rule 110).
Criminal procedure; amendment of information
2001 No. VIII.
Amando was charged with frustrated homicide. Before he entered
his plea and upon the advice of his counsel, he manifested his
willingness to admit having committed the offense of serious physical
injuries. The prosecution then filed an amended information for serious
physical injuries against Amando.
What steps or action should the prosecution take so that the
amended information against Amando which downgrades the nature of the
offense could be validly made? Why? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
In order that the amended information which downgrades the nature
of the offense could be validly made, the prosecution should file a
motion to ask for leave of court with notice to the offended party.
(Sec.14 of Rule 110, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure). The new rule
is for the protection of the interest of the offended party and to
prevent possible abuse by the prosecution.
Criminal Procedure; amendment of information; double jeopary; bail;
change of plea
2002 No. IX.
A.
D and E were charged with homicide in one information.
Before they could be arraigned, the prosecution moved to amend the
information to exclude E therefrom. Can the court grant the motion to
amend? Why? (2%)
B.
On the facts above stated, suppose the prosecution, instead
of filing a motion to amend, moved to withdraw the information
altogether and its motion was granted. Can the prosecution re-file the
information although this time for murder? Explain (3%)
C.
If an information was filed in the RTC-Manila charging D
with homicide and he was arrested in Quezon City, in what court or
courts may he apply for bail? Explain. (3%)
D.
D was charged with theft of an article worth p15,000.00.
Upon being arraigned, he pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.
Thereafter, before trial commenced, he asked the court to allow him to
change his plea of not guilty to a plea of guilt but only to estafa
involving P5,000.00. Can the court allow D to change his plea? Why? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A.
Yes, provided notice is given to the offended party and the
court states its reasons for granting the same. (Rule 110, sec. 14).
B.
Yes, the prosecution can re-file the information for murder
in substitution of the information for homicide because no double
jeopardy has as yet attached. [Galvez v. Court of Appeals, 237 SCRA 685
(1994)].
C.
D may apply for bail in the RTC-Manila where the information
was filed or in the RTC-Quezon City where he was arrested, or if no
judge, thereof is available, with any metropolitan trial judge,
municipal trial judge or municipal circuit trial judge therein. (Rule
114, sec. 17).
Page 99 of 172
D.
No, because a plea of guilty to a lesser offense may be
allowed if the lesser offense is necessarily included in the offense
charged. (Rule 116, sec. 2). Estafa involving P5,000.00 is not
necessarily included in theft of an article worth P15,000.00
Criminal procedure; amendment of information; supervening events
1997 No. 9:
A was accused of homicide for the killing of B. During the trial,
the public prosecutor received a copy of the marriage certificate of A
and B.
(a)
Can the public prosecutor move for the amendment of the
information to charge A with the crime of parricide?
(b)
Suppose instead of moving for the amendment of the
information, the public
prosecutor
presented
in evidence the
marriage certificate without objection on the part of the defense, could
Abe convicted of parricide?
Answer:
(a) No. The Information cannot be amended to change the offense
charged from homicide to parricide. Firstly, the marriage is not a
supervening fact arising from the act constituting the charge of
homicide. (Sec. 7[a] of Rule 117). Secondly, after plea, amendments may
be done only as to matters of form. The amendment is substantial because
It will change the nature of the offense. (Sec. 14 of Rule 110; Dionaldo
us. Dacuycuy. 108 SCRA 736).
(b) No.
A can be convicted only of homicide not of parricide
which is a graver offense. The accused has the constitutional rights of
due process and to be Informed of the nature and the cause of the
accusation against him. (Secs. 1, 14 (1) and (2} Art. III. 1987
Constitution),
Criminal procedure; bail
1991 No. II:
Claudio Ty was charged with murder in an information filed with
the Regional Trial Court in Dumaguete City. Through counsel, he filed an
application for bail. Without conducting a hearing on said application
and without giving the prosecution an opportunity to comment thereon,
the judge granted bail to Ty after examining the complaint and the
affidavit attached to the bail application which. In the evaluation of
the judge, tend to show that the evidence of guilt is not strong. The
prosecution moved for reconsideration of the order granting ball,
contending that the procedure followed by the judge was irregular,
(a) Was the procedure followed by the judge in granting bail
correct?
Answer;
(a) No, because the prosecution should have been given an
opportunity to comment on the application and to present strong evidence
of guilt. [People v. Sola, 103 SCRA 393)
(b)
If
the
judge
denies
the
prosecution's
motion
for
reconsideration, what remedy or remedies may the prosecution pursue if
it wishes to assail the order before the appellate court?
Answer;
(b) The prosecution may file a petition for certiorari and
mandamus with the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court in order to
nullify the order of the RTC and to compel it to hold a hearing. It may
also ask for a writ of preliminary inj unction against the order
granting ball.
(c) Supposing that Ty, after trial, was found guilty of murder
and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua, and he appealed to the Supreme
Court, is he entitled to bail during the pendency of such appeal?
Answer:
(c) No, Ty is not entitled to bail as a matter of right because
the evidence of his guilt is so strong that it resulted in his
conviction by the trial court. However, on exceptional grounds, he may
be granted bail on appeal at the discretion of the court. (Teehankee v.
Director of Prisons, 76 Phil. 756)
(d) Supposing that Ty was convicted of the lesser offense of
homicide and was sentenced to a penalty, the maximum of which is within
the range of reclusion temporal and he appealed to the Court of Appeals,
is he entitled to bail during the pendency of such appeal?
Answer:
(d) No, he is not entitled to bail as a matter of right, because
he may on appeal be found guilty of murder and sentenced to reclusion
perpetua.
(e) In relation to (d) above, the Court of Appeals did not affirm
or modify the Judgment.
Instead, it expressed the opinion that the
crime committed is murder and that the penalty should be reclusion
perpetua, and. accordingly certified the case to the Supreme Court for
final determination. Did it act properly?
Answer:
(e) No, the Court of Appeals should have rendered judgment
imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua, refrained from entering
judgment, and certified the entire record to the Supreme Court for
review. (People v. Daniel, 86 SCRA 367; Sec. 13 of Rule 124)
Criminal procedure; bail
1993 No (9)
Accused was charged with the crime of kidnapping with murder. The
information recommended no bail, the charge being a capital offense
which is non-bailable.
After entering a plead of not guilty, accused filed an application
for bail. The application was opposed by the prosecution.
While the prosecution was still presenting evidence in support of
its opposition to the application for bail, the trial judge issued an
order fixing bail of P100,000.00 for the provisional liberty of accused.
The order reads.
After due consideration of the testimonial and documentary
evidence presented by the prosecution, this Court finds reasonable
ground to believe that no strong evidence exists against accused.
WHEREFORE, the application for bail is granted. Accused is granted
bail, which is fixed P100,000.00, for his provisional liberty>
Did the trial judge act correctly?Why?
Answer:
No, because since the accused was charged with an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or higher, he is not entitled to bail
as a matter of right when evidence of guilt is strong. It was premature
for the court to grant bail while the prosecution was still presenting
evidence in support of its opposition to the application for bail. The
prosecution had the right to present all evidence to show the guilt of
the accused before the court resolved the motion for bail.
Criminal procedure; bail
1994 No (12)
Ana is the lone eye witness to the brutal murder of Bruno
allegedly committed by accused Carlo. She deliberately refuses to appear
on the scheduled dates for the taking of her testimony for fear of
reprisal from Carlos die-hard followers.
b.
c.
When the accused is entitled as a matter of right to
bail, may the Court refuse to grant him bail on the ground that there
exists a high degree of probability that he will abscond or escape?
Explain. (2%)
d.
your answer,
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a.
of
Appeal's
denial
of
A's
2.
Can B and C be benefited by the decision of the Court of
Appeals? [3%]
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1,
Yes, the Court of Appeals properly denied A's application
for ball. The court had the discretion to do so. Although A was
convicted of homicide only, since he was charged with a capital offense,
on appeal he could be convicted of the capital offense.
(Obosa vs.
Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 281.)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Under Circular No. 2-92, A is entitled to bail because he was
convicted of homicide and hence the evidence of guilt of murder is not
strong.
SUGGESTED ANSWER;
2.
B, who did not appeal, can be benefited by the decision of
the Court of Appeals which is favorable and applicable to him.
(Sec.
11 [a]. Rule 122, Rules of Criminal Procedure.) The benefit will also
apply to C even if his appeal is dismissed because of his escape.
Criminal procedure; bail; reduction
1989 (13)
1989 13.2) Florentino was charged with bigamy in the RTC of
Manila, Branch 15. The trial judge issued the corresponding warrant of
arrest and fixed the bail at P12,000. Subsequently, Florentino was
arrested in San Fernado, Pampanga, and detained in the municipal jail of
the said town. He requested the judge of the MTC of San Fernando,
Pampanga, to order his release on a reduce bail. The MTC judge agreed to
reduce the amount of the bail to P1,000 provided that the same be posted
in cash, which the accused did. Was the reduction of the bail proper?
Explain.
Answer:
No, because the MTC Judge of San Fernado, Pampanga had no
authority to approve the bail, much less to reduce the amount thereof
even if posted in cash. Since Florentino was arrested in San Fernado,
Pampanga, he should have filed the bail in any RTC of said place, and
only if there is no judge thereof available could he have filed it with
the MTC Judge of San Fernando, Pampanga.
Criminal procedure; bail; where to apply
1989 (13)
13.1) Abraham was charged with homicide in the RTC of Manila,
Branch 10. The trial judge issued the corresponding warrant of arrest
and fixed the bail at P30,000. Before Abraham could be arrested, he
filed the fixed bail with the MetroTC of Manila, Branch 3, and the judge
thereof approved the same. Was the approval of the bail regular? Is the
bail valid? Explain.
Answer:
No, because the bail should have been filed with the RTC of
Manila, Branch 10, where the case was pending, or, in the absence or
unavailability of the judge thereof, with another branch of the same
court in Manila. The MetroTC of Manila had no authority to approve the
bail. (Secs.14 and 16 of Rule 114)
Criminal procedure; BP22; civil action deemed included
2001 No. IV.
order
granting
the
motion
for
reconsideration
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the courts order granting the motion for reconsideration is
correct. The Rules provide that the criminal action for violation of
B.P. Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action,
and that no reservation to file such civil action separately shall be
allowed. [Sec. 1(b), Rule 111, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure]
Criminal procedure; BP22; demurrer to evidence
2003 No. XII.
In an action for violation of Batas Pambansa Big. 22, the court
granted the accuseds demurrer to evidence which he filed without leave
of court. Although he was acquitted of the crime charged, he, however,
was required by the court to pay the private complaint the face value of
the check. The accused filed a Motion of Reconsideration regarding the
order to pay the face value of the check on the following grounds:
(a) the demurrer
aspect of the case; and
to
evidence
applied
only
too
the
criminal
(2%)
b.
A filed with the Office of the Fiscal a Complaint for
estafa against B.
After the preliminary investigation, the Fiscal
dismissed the Complaint for lack of merit.
May the Fiscal be compelled
by mandamus to file the case in court? Explain.
(2%)
c.
Will injunction lie to restrain the commencement of a
criminal action? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a.
In criminal procedure, a complaint is a sworn written
statement charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the offended
party, any peace officer or other peace officer charged with the
enforcement of the law violated.
(Sec. 3, Rule 110, 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure); while an information is an accusation in writing
charging a person with an offense subscribed by the prosecutor and filed
with the court. (Sec. 4, Id.)
b.
No.
The public prosecutor may not be compelled by
mandamus to file the case in court because the determination of probable
cause is within the discretion of the prosecutor. The remedy is an
appeal to the Secretary of Justice. (Sec. 4 Rule 112.)
c.
As a general rule, injunction will not lie to restrain a
criminal prosecution except:
(1)
To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights
of the accused;
(2)
When necessary for the orderly administration of justice
or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions;
(3)
(4)
Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by
the lust for vengeance;
(5)
Where there is clearly no prima facie case against the
accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied.
(See cases cited in Roberts, Jr., vs. Court of Appeals, 254 SCRA
307 [1996] and Brocka v. Enrile, 192 SCRA 183 [1990].)
Criminal procedure; complex crimes; jurisdiction
2003 No. XIII.
In complex crimes, how is the jurisdiction of a court determined?
4%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
In a complex crime, jurisdiction over the whole complex crime
must be lodged with the trial court having jurisdiction to impose the
maximum and most serious penalty imposable on an offense forming part of
the complex crime. (Cuyos v. Garcia, 160 SCRA 302 [1988]).
Criminal procedure; corpus delicti
1990 (19)
Charged with murder, Jorge filed a demurrer to the evidence after
the prosecution rested on the ground that there is no evidence of the
corpus delicti. Several witnesses testified that the accused shot the
victim and threw the body into the ocean. Notwithstanding a diligent
search, the body was not found. Evidence was introduce to the effect
that the waters where the body was thrown is shark-infested.
Is the demurrer tenable? Explain your answer.
Answer:
denies
said
motion,
may
the
accused
adduce
Answer;
A. (a) If the accused had obtained prior leave of court to file a
demurrer to the evidence, he may adduce evidence in his defense upon
denial of his motion for dismissal.
Is
the
rule
on
demurrer
to
evidence
the
same
in
civil
Answer:
(b) No. In civil cases, the defendant has the right to adduce
evidence if his motion for dismissal is denied. However, if the motion
is granted and the order of dismissal is reversed on appeal, he loses
his right to present evidence. (Sec. 1 of Rule 35)
Criminal procedure; demurrer to evidence
1994 No (13)
After the government has rested its case of Rauls trial for
Qualified Theft, Raul, with leave of court, filed a Motion to Acquit
on the ground of lack of evidence proving his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. The motion was denied on the ground that Raul should have filed a
demurrer to evidence, not a Motion to Acquit. On the same day, without
giving him the opportunity to present his defense, Raul was convicted on
the basis of the evidence adduced by the prosecution.
13.a) Did the trial court correctly deny Rauls motion?
13.b) Was Rauls conviction proper?
Answer:
13.a) No. The court did not correctly deny Rauls motion to
acquit. Demurrer to the evidence and motion to acquit are one and the
same thing. Demurrer to evidence is actually a motion to dismiss the
case based on the insufficiency of the evidence of the prosecution. If
the court finds that the evidence is insufficient, it may dismiss the
case on the ground, and that amounts to an acquittal of the accused.
(Sec. 15, Rule 119).
13.b) No, Rauls, conviction was not proper because he was not
given the opportunity to present his defense. The rule is that if the
court denies the motion for dismissal filed with prior leave of court,
the accused may adduce evidence in his defense. It is only when the
accused files such motion to dismiss without express leave of court that
he waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for
judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution.
Criminal procedure; demurrer to evidence
1996 No. 10:
2)
A was charged with the crime of kidnapping with murder.
After the prosecution rested its case. A filed a demurrer to evidence on
ground of insufficiency of evidence to sustain his conviction. The
prosecution filed an opposition. The trial court denied the demurrer and
the motion for reconsideration thereafter filed. A filed a petition for
certio-rari with the Court of Appeals alleging that the denial of the
demurrer to evidence, when there is no evidence against him, constitutes
grave abuse of discretion, and prayed that the Court of Appeals render
judgment acquitting him.
May the trial court's denial of the demurrer to evidence be
properly assailed by a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals?
Explain.
Answer:
2)
The question does not state that A had obtained prior leave
of court to file a demurrer to evidence. Without such leave of court, A
has waived his right to present evidence and has submitted the case for
judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. (Sec. 15 of
Rule 119)
Alternative Answer:
No, because the question of sufficiency of evidence to sustain a
conviction may not be raised in a petition for certiorari. The remedy of
A is to present his evidence and in the event of conviction to appeal.
(Joseph us. Villaluz, 89 SCRA 824)
Criminal procedure; demurrer to evidence
1998 No XIV.
Facing a charge of Murder, X filed a petition for ball. The
petition was opposed by the prosecution but after hearing. the court
granted bail to X. On the first scheduled hearing on the merits, the
prosecution manifested that it was not adducing additional evidence and
that it was resting its case. X filed a demurrer to evidence without
leave of court but it was denied by the court.
1.
Did the court have the discretion to deny the demurrer to
evidence under the circumstances mentioned above? (2%)
2.
If the answer to the preceding question is in the
affirmative, can X adduce evidence in his defense after the denial of
his demurrer to evidence? [1%]
3.
Without further proceeding and on the sole basis of the
evidence of the prosecution, can the court legally convict X for Murder?
(2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1.
Yes. The Court had the discretion to deny the demurrer to
the evidence, because although the evidence presented by the prosecution
at the hearing for bail was not strong, without any evidence for the
defense, it could be sufficient for conviction.
2.
No.
Because he filed the demurrer to the evidence
without leave.
(Sec. 15, Rule 119, Rules of Criminal Procedure.)
However, the trial court should inquire as to why the accused filed the
demurrer without leave and whether his lawyer knew that the effect of
filing it without leave is to waive the presentation of the evidence for
the accused. (People vs. Flores, 269 SCRA 62.)
3.
Yes. Without any evidence from the accused, the prima facie
evidence of the prosecution has been converted to proof beyond
reasonable doubt.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
If the evidence of guilt is not strong and beyond reasonable
doubt then the court cannot legally convict X for murder.
Criminal procedure; demurrer to evidence
2001 No. I.
Carlos, the accused in a theft case, filed a demurrer to evidence
without leave of court. The court denied the demurrer to evidence and
Carlos moved to present his evidence. The court denied Carlos motion to
present evidence and instead judgment on the basis of the evidence for
the prosecution.
Was the court correct in preventing Carlos from presenting his
evidence and rendering judgment on the basis of the evidence for the
prosecution? Why? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, because the demurrer to the evidence was filed without leave
of court. The Rules provide that when the demurrer to evidence is filed
without leave of court, the accused waives the right to present evidence
and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the
prosecution. (Sec. 23 of Rule 119, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure)
Criminal procedure; demurrer to evidence
the
the
due
the
him
Reason. (5%)
on nolle
is called
not bar a
Court of
the dismissal of the original complaint upon the filing of a new one
charging the proper offense can only be done provided the accused would
not be placed in double jeopardy. In this case the accused would be
placed in double jeopardy. (Sec. 14, Rule 114; People vs. Mogul, 131
SCRA 296)
(b) Motion denied. With more reason should the motion be denied if
the intent to kill is indicated in the affidavits which were the basis
for the filing of the complaint, because not only is the intent to kill
not a new supervening fact, but it is not even a subsequent discovered
fact. (Sec. 7, Rule 117)
Another Alternative Answer:
(a) Motion granted. While intent to kill is not a new supervening
fact which constitute an exception to the rule on identity of offenses
in double jeopardy (People vs, Besa, 74 Phil. 57), an additional
exception has been added in the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure;
namely, when the facts constituting the graver charge became known or
were discovered only after the filing of the former complaint or
information. In this case, the intent to kill was discovered only during
the trial of the case, and hence, a new complaint may be filed for
frustrated murder without placing the accused in double jeopardy. (Sec.
7(b) of Rule 117)
(b) Motion denied. The resolution would be different, because in
such case the intent to kill would not fall under the additional
exception of subsequently discovered fact.
Criminal procedure; double jeopardy
1988 (16)
George was charged with falsification. On the date of initial
trial, the fiscal moved for postponement on the ground that the case had
been assigned to a special prosecutor of the DOJ who was out of town to
attend to an urgent case, and who had wired him to request for the
postponement. The fiscal manifested that he was not ready for trial
because he was unfamiliar with the case. The judge then asked the
accused as well as his counsel wether they were amenable to a
postponement. Both George and his counsel insisted on a trial. The judge
ordered the case dismissed.
Upon learning thereof, the special prosecutor file a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 alleging that the dismissal was capricious and
deprived the Government of due process. George opposed the petition
invoking double jeopardy.
(a) Is double jeopardy a bar to the petition? Explain.
(b) Suppose that trial on the merits had in fact proceeded and the
trial judge, finding the evidence to be insufficient, dismissed the
case, would your answer be the same? Explain.
Answer:
(a) No, because this is not an appeal by the prosecution asserting
a dismissal to be erroneous. It is a petition for certiorari which
assails the order of dismissal as invalid and a nullity because it was
capricious and deprived the Government of due process. Considering that
this was the first motion for postponement of the trial filed by the
fiscal and the ground was meritorious, the judge gravely abuse his
discretion in ordering the case dismissed. If there is no valid
dismissal or termination of the case, there is no basis for invoking
double jeopardy. (People vs. Gomez, 20 SCRA 293)
(b) No, because in such a case, the order of dismissal would be
valid, even if erroneous, and wold be tantamount to an acquittal.
Criminal procedure; double jeopardy
1993 No (6)
For firing a machine gun which caused panic among the people
present and physical injuries to one, two separate information( one for
serious public disturbance and the other for reckless imprudence
resulting in physical injuries) were filed against the accused.
As he pleaded guilty to the charge of reckless imprudence
resulting in physical injuries, the accused was convicted and sentenced
accordingly.
Later the accused sought to dismiss the charge of serious public
disturbance on the ground of double jeopardy.
Is there double jeopardy?Why?
Answer:
No, because the protection against double jeopardy is only for the
same offense. A single act may be an offense against two different
provisions of law and if one provision requires proof of an additional
fact which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction under one does
not bar prosecution under the other.
In this case, the act of firing a machine gun violated two
articles of the Revised Penal Code. Consequently, conviction for one
does not bar prosecution for the other.
Alternative Answer:
Yes, because only one offense of reckless imprudence resulting in
physical injuries and serious public disturbance was committed.
Criminal procedure; double jeopardy
1994 No (4)
4.b) In a case of a prosecution of an accused for estate after his
acquittal of the crime of the crime of illegal recruitment, but which
involves the same set of facts as the first case, can the accused raised
the defense of double jeopardy?
How about res judicata?
Answer:
4.b) N0, the accused cannot raise the defense of double jeopardy
because the offenses of estafa and illegal recruitment are separate
offenses though they involve the same set of facts.
Res judicata is not applicable in the case at bar.
Criminal procedure; double jeopardy
2004 NO. VII
B. SPO1 CNC filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court in Quezon City
(MeTC-QC) a sworn written statement duly subscribed by him, charging RGR
(an actual resident of Cebu City) with the offense of slight physical
injuries allegedly inflicted on SPS (an actual resident of Quezon City).
The Judge of the branch to which the case was raffled thereupon issued
an order declaring that the case shall be governed by the Rule on
Summary Procedure in criminal cases. Soon thereafter, the Judge ordered
the dismissal of the case for the reason that it was not commenced by
information, as required by said Rule.
Sometime later, based on the same facts giving rise to the slight
physical injuries case, the City Prosecutor filed with the same MeTC-QC
an information for attempted homicide against the same RGR.
In due
time, before arraignment, RGR moved to quash the information on the
ground of double jeopardy and after due hearing, the Judge granted his
motion.
Was the dismissal of the complaint for slight physical injuries
proper?
Was the grant of the motion to quash the attempted homicide
information correct? Reason. (5%)
Criminal procedure; double jeopardy; provisional dismissal; bail
2002 No. X.
A.
D was charged with slight physical injuries in the MTC. He
pleaded not guilty and went to trial. After the prosecution had
presented its evidence, the trial court set the continuation of the
hearing on another date. On the date scheduled for hearing, the
prosecutor failed to appear, whereupon the court, on motion of D,
dismissed the case. A few minutes later, the prosecutor arrived and
opposed the dismissal of the case. The court reconsidered its order and
directed D to present his evidence. Before the next date of trial came,
however, D moved that the last order be set aside on the ground that the
reinstatement of the case had placed him twice in jeopardy. Acceding to
this motion, the court again dismissed the case. The prosecutor then
filed an information in the RTC, charging D with direct assault based on
the same facts alleged in the information for slight physical injuries
but with the added allegation that D inflicted the injuries out of
resentment for what the complainant had done in the performance of his
duties as chairman of the board of election inspectors. D moved to quash
the second information on the ground that its filing had placed him in
double jeopardy. How should Ds motion to quash be resolved? (4%)
B.
In a prosecution for robbery against D, the prosecutor moved
for the postponement of the first scheduled hearing on the ground that
he had lost his records of the case. The court granted the motion but,
when the new date of trial arrived, the prosecutor, alleging that he
could not locate his witnesses, moved for the provisional dismissal of
the case. If Ds counsel does not object, may the court grant the motion
of the prosecutor? Why/ (3%)
C.
D was charged with murder, a capital offense. After
arraignment, he applied for bail. The trial court ordered the
prosecution to present its evidence in full on the ground that only on
the basis of such presentation could it determine whether the evidence
of Ds guilt was strong for purposes of bail. Is the ruling correct?
Why? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A.
Ds motion to quash should be granted on the ground of
double jeopardy because the first offense charged is necessarily
included in the second offense charged. [Draculan v. Donato, 140 SCRA
425 (1985)].
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Ds motion to quash should be denied because the two dismissals
of the case against him were on his motion (hence with his express
consent) and his right to a speedy trial was not violated.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
B.
No, because a case cannot be provisionally dismissed except
upon the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended
party. (Rule 117, sec. 8).
C.
No, the prosecution is only required to present as much
evidence as is necessary to determine whether the evidence of Ds guilt
is strong for purposes of bail.(Rule 114, sec. 8).
Criminal procedure; effect of death of accused
1995 No. 9:
Donald was convicted of serious physical injuries inflicted on
his househelp Paula. He appealed but died during the pendency of his
appeal.
1.
What is the effect of the death of Donald on his criminal
liability? Explain.
2.
What is the effect of his death on his civil liability based
solely on his criminal act? Explain.
3.
What Is the effect of his death on his civil liability based
on a quasi-delict or tort? Explain.
4.
What is the effect of his death if in the criminal case
Paula did not make the necessary reservation to file a separate civil
action for damages? Explain.
5.
What Is the effect of his death If Paula reserved her right
to file a separate civil action but had not yet done so when Donald
died? Explain.
Answer:
1.
Donald's criminal liability is extinguished by his death.
[Art. 89(1], RPC)
2.
The death of Donald pending appeal extinguishes not only his
criminal liability but also the civil liability based solely thereon.
(People vs. Bayotas, 236 SCRA 239)
3.
His death does not affect his civil liability based on
quasi-delict or tort, [Id.)
4.
If Paula did not make the necessary reservation to file a
separate civil action for damages, she could still file a separate civil
action against the executor/administrator or heirs of the estate of the
accused. (Id.}
Alternative Answer:
Despite the dismissal of the criminal action, the appeal shall
continue with respect to the civil liability for damages of the accused
who will be substituted by his executor/ administrator or heirs. Since
despite the acquittal of an accused he can be made civilly liable under
Sec. 2 of Rule 120 (Roy Padilla vs. CA, 129 SCRA 588; People vs.
Jalandoni, 131 SCRA 454, etc.) a similar rule should be applied in case
of death of an accused.
5.
The death of Donald will not affect Paula's right to file a
separate civil action against the executor/administrator or heirs of
Donald.
Criminal procedure; effect of filing of information
1991 No. XI:
After reviewing the record of a preliminary Investigation of a
homicide case, the Secretary of Justice reversed the resolution of the
Provincial Prosecutor and directed the latter to move for the dismissal
of the Information which had been filed in the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig. The Provincial Prosecutor thus filed such motion.
(a)
May the RTC judge refuse to order the dismissal of the
criminal case and insist on the arraignment and trial of the accused?
Answer:
(a) Yes. Upon the filing of the information, the court acquires
jurisdiction over the criminal action. The subsequent filing of a motion
for dismissal, even upon the direction of the Secretary of Justice, is
addressed for the consideration of the court, and the court in the
exercise of its discretion may grant the motion or deny it and require
the arraignment and trial of the accused to proceed. (Crespo v. Mogul
151 SCRA 462).
(b) If the judge refuses to grant the Provincial Prosecutor's
motion to dismiss,
may a special civil action for mandamus lie to
compel the judge to grant the motion?
Answer:
(b) No, mandamus will not lie because the court has discretion
whether to grant or deny the motion.
Criminal procedure; effect of plea of guilty
1993 No (2)
Charged with the crime of murder before the Regional Trial Court
of Bulacan, the accused assisted by counsel, pleaded guilty to the
charge. Thereupon, the trial court rendered a judgment convicting the
accused for the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer reclusion
perpetual and to pay civil indemnity to the heirs of the victim.
Did the trial court act properly?Why?
Answer:
Yes, because it is only when the accused is charged with a capital
offense punishable with death that the court shall conduct a searching
inquiry into the voluntaries and full comprehension of the consequences
of the plea of guilty and require the prosecution to prove his guilt
beyond the precise degree of culpability. The crime charged of murder is
not a capital offense, because the death penalty cannot be imposed under
the Constitution.
Criminal procedure; effect of plea of guilty
1995 No. 11:
Crisanto is charged with murder. At his arraignment the
prosecution witnesses appeared in court together with the heirs of the
victim. Realizing the gravity of the offense and the number of witnesses
against htm Crisanto consulted his counsel de oficio who explained to
him the nature of the charge and the consequences of his plea. Crisanto
then manifested his readiness for arraignment. The information was read
to him in a language he clearly understood after which he pleaded
guilty. To be sure, the Judge forthwith asked him if indeed he fully
understood the implications of his plea and Crisanto readily and without
hesitation answered in the affirmative. The judge, fully convinced that
the plea of the accused was made with the latter's full knowledge of the
meaning and consequences of his plea, then pronounced sentence on the
accused.
1.
2.
Suppose Crisanto with the assistance of counsel waives the
presentation of evidence by the prosecution saying that, after all, he
has already entered his plea, may the court insist on the presentation
of the evidence for the prosecution? Explain.
3.
Suppose upon plea bargaining Crisanto decides to plead
guilty to the lesser offense of homicide, may the court still require
presentation of evidence? Explain,
4.
After the information was read to Crisanto upon arraignment
and he pleaded guilty to the charge but the facts did not sufficiently
constitute an offense, did his plea of guilt, which has already been
entered in the records, have the effect of supplying what was not
alleged in the information to complete the elements of the offense to
justify his conviction? Explain.
Answer:
1. The Judge erred in pronouncing sentence on the accused without
previously conducting a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and
full comprehension of the consequences of the plea of guilty and
requiring the prosecution to prove the guilt and the precise degree of
culpability. (Sec, 3. Rule 116)
2.
3.
Although Crisanto pleads guilty to a non-capital offense the
court may still require evidence to determine the penalty to be imposed.
(Sec. 4, Rule 116)
4.
No, his plea of guilty did not have the effect of supplying
what was not alleged in the information to complete the elements of the
offense to justify his conviction. His plea merely admits the truth of
the facts alleged in the information.
b)
May the prosecution dispense with the
evidence despite the waiver of the accused? Explain.
presentation
of
Answer;
2. a) No, the plea of guilty by X with the qualification "Hindi
ko sinadya patayin" was a conditional plea of guilty and hence a plea of
not guilty should be entered for him. (Sec. 1-C of Rule 116]
Alternative Answer;
No, because when the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense,
the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and
full comprehension of the consequences of his plea. The court should not
rely on the assurance of the counsel of the accused for this purpose.
(Sec. 3 of Rule 116}
b) No. the court should require the prosecution to prove the
guilt and precise degree of culpability of the accused. (Id.}
Criminal procedure; enjoinment of criminal cases; when allowed
1989 (12)
12.1) May the prosecution of a criminal case be enjoined? Explain.
Answer:
The prosecution of a
following exceptional cases:
criminal
case
may
be
enjoined
in
the
the
strong
arm
of
the
law
in
an
cases,
when
the
statute
relied
upon
is
Was there a legal basis for the court to deny the motion?
(b) If you were the counsel for the accused, what remedies, if
any, would you pursue?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a.
Yes, there is a legal basis for the court to deny the motion
to quash the warrant of arrest and to withdraw the information. The
court is not bound by the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice.
(Crespo v. Mogul, 151 SCRA 462 [1987]).
b.
If I were the counsel for the accused, I would surrender the
accused and apply for bail because the offense is merely homicide, a
non-capital offense. At the pre-trial, I would make a stipulation of
facts with the prosecution which would show that no offense was
committed.
Criminal procedure; insufficient information
1992 No. VII;
An information was filed in the proper court against Arturo
charging him with theft of 300 blocks of industrial aluminum worth
P999,000.00 allegedly committed "on or about the period from January
l986 to December23, 1991." Arturo filed a motion to quash the
information on the ground that it was grossly insufficient and fatally
defective since there is such a great gap in the inclusive period of the
alleged commission of the offense. He is, in effect, being deprived of a
reasonable opportunity to defend himself.
In resolving the motion to quash, what basic and ancillary
rulings should the court make so that it can extend to the accused
optimum and adequate relief. Discuss fully.
Suggested Answer;
The court may grant the motion to quash on the ground that the
allegation of the time of commission of the offense is defective because
the period from January 1986 to December 23, 1991, or almost six years,
is too indefinite to give the accused an opportunity to prepare his
defense; or the court may order the amendment of the information or the
submission of a bill of particulars so as to allege the actual date or
at least as near to it as possible in order not to surprise and
substantially prejudice the accused.
Criminal procedure; insufficient information; remedies and effects
1994 No (11)
Chato is charged with the murder of Velay. Before arraignment,
you, as counsel de oficio of Chato discovered that the information
failed to allege any qualifying circumstances.
11.a) How may you properly object to the insufficiency of the
information, and on what ground?
11.b) May you still avail of that remedy after Chato has entered
her plea?
11.c) What course or courses of action may the court take if it
sustains the remedy you seek?
Answer:
11.a) As counsel de oficio for the accused, I can file a motion to
quash based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute the
crime of murder there being no qualifying circumstances alleged.
(Sec.3a, Rule 117).
Alternative Answer:
11.a) As counsel de oficio for the accused, I will not file a
motion to quash because it will only aggravate the crime charged. As it
is charged, Chato can be convicted only of homicide.
11.b) After Chato has entered her plea, she may no longer move to
quash because she is barred from doing so. (Sec. 1, Rule 117).
11.c) If the court sustains the motion to quash, the court may
order that another information be filed. If the accused is in custody,
he shall remain so unless he shall be admitted to bail. If the
information is not filed within the time specified or within the time
specified in the order, or within such further time as the court may
allow for good cause shown, the accused, if in custody, shall be
discharged therefrom, unless he is also in custody on some other charge.
(Sec.5, Rule 117).
Criminal procedure; jurisdiction over BP22 cases
1989 (12)
12.2) On January 2, 1989, Ernani purchased construction materials
for his new building in Calamba, Laguna, from a hardware store located
in Batangas City and owned by Daniel. On the same date and in payment of
the materials, Ernani issued a Metrobank check (Calamba branch) for
P500,000 which was drawn and signed by him in Calamba. Daniel deposited
the check with the Metrobank, Batangas City branch, but the same was
dishonored for insufficient funds. Despite several demands, Ernani
failed to make good his check so that a case for violation of BP 22 (The
Bouncing Checks Law), after a preliminary investigation thereof was
conducted, was filed with the RTC of Batangas. Ernani moved to quash the
case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, contending that the case
should have been filed with the RTC of Calamba, Laguna, since the check
was drawn and signed in Calamba. How would you decide the motion?
Explain.
Answer:
Motion to quash is denied. Violation of BP 22 is a transitory or
continuing offense which may be validly tried either in the place where
the check was issued or in the place where the check was dishonored.
Since the check in question was dishonored by the Metrobank in Batangas,
the RTC of Batangas has jurisdiction over the case. (People vs. Grospe,
157 SCRA 154)
Criminal procedure; modification of judgment
1989 (15)
15.2) After the trial of the case involving damage to property
through reckless imprudence, the judge rendered judgment sentencing the
accused to pay a fine of P9,000. Two days after the promulgation of the
decision and before the accused could appeal, the judge, motu propio,
modified the judgment to read as follows: to pay a fine of P9,000 with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to indemnify the
offended party in the amount of P3,000 as actual damages. The accused
contends that this modification is improper. Decide.
Answer:
The modification of the judgment of conviction by imposing
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency is improper, inasmuch as
the new Rules in Criminal Procedure provide that a judgment of
conviction may be modified only on motion of the accused. (This
changes the ruling in People vs. Tamayo, 89 Phil. 209 and People vs.
Espaol, 114 SCRA 911).
However, the modification of the judgment for the indemnification
of the offended party could properly be made upon timely motion of the
prosecution or the offended party. (Ramos vs. Gonong, 72 SCRA 561)
Criminal procedure; motion to quash
2000 No. X.
BC is charged with illegal possession of firearms under an
Information signed by a Provincial Prosecutor. After arraignment but
before pre-trial, BC found out that the Provincial Prosecutor had
no
authority to sign and file the information as it was the City Prosecutor
who has such authority. During the pre-trial, BC moves that the case
against him be dismissed on the ground that the Information is defective
2.
If the Information is not accompanied by a certification
that a preliminary investigation has been conducted. Is the Information
void? [3%]
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1.
(a)
(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the
offense charged or the person of the accused.
Note: The other grounds are:
(c)
to do so;
(d)
form;
(e) That more than one offense is charged except in those cases
in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various
offenses;
(f)
extinguished;
That
the
criminal
action
or
liability
has
been
If you were the judge, how would you resolve the motion?
2.
Suppose that Alex filed a complaint for nullity of his
marriage with Jenny on the ground that his consent was obtained at
gunpoint, would your answer be the same? Explain.
3.
Suppose that after Alex was charged with bigamy he filed a
complaint for declaration of nullity of his marriage with Evita. Could
Alex have the bigamy proceedings suspended by invoking prejudicial
question claiming that the outcome of the bigamy case would depend on
whether there was a prior valid and existing marriage, which constitutes
an element of the crime? Explain.
Answer:
1.
I would deny the motion of Alex. When Alex married Jenny
despite his existing marriage with Evita, he was guilty of bigamy. His
subsequent action for declaration of nullity when he discovered that
Jenny had a prior valid and existing marriage with Brando cannot be
raised as a prejudicial question in the bigamy case.
2.
No. the complaint of Alex for nullity of his marriage with
Jenny, on the ground that his consent was obtained at gunpoint, is a
valid prejudicial question. (Prado us. People, 133 SCRA 602)
3.
No, because the fact that he married Jenny before his former
marriage with Evita had been legally dissolved makes him guilty of
bigamy. {Art. 347, RPC)
Alternative Answer:
Yes, because if the first marriage of Alex is declared void ab
initio he did not commit bigamy.
Criminal procedure; prejudicial question
1999 No. XIII
a.
b.
A allegedly sold to B a parcel of land which A later also
sold to X. B brought a civil action for nullification of the second sale
and asked that the sale made by A in his favor be declared valid.
A
theorized that he never sold the property to B and his purported
signatures appearing in the first deed of sale were forgeries.
Thereafter, an Information for estafa was filed against A based on the
same double sale that was the subject of the civil action. A filed a
"Motion for Suspension of Action" in the criminal case, contending that
the resolution of the issue in the civil case would necessarily be
determinative of his guilt or innocence.
Is the suspension of the
criminal action in order? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a. A prejudicial question is an issue involved in a civil action
which is similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
slander and sentenced her to pay a fine of P100.00 plus moral damages,
attorneys fees and costs.
On appeal, Julie contended that she may not be convicted of the
crime of light slander because it has already prescribed.
However, the prosecution countered that as Julie did not move for
the quashal of the information on the ground of prescription, she is
deemed to have waived such defense.
How should the appeal be resolved? Explain?
Answer:
The appeal should be resolved in favor of Julie.
Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended, prescription
waived for failure of the accused to assert such ground
quash before he pleads to a complaint or information and
be raised on appeal.
Alternative Answer:
The appeal should be resolved against Julie because the filing of
the complaint with the fiscals office in 1990 interrupted the period of
prescription of the offense charged.
Criminal procedure; prescription of offenses
1987 No (10)
The accused filed a motion to quash the information on two
grounds, to wit, the facts charged do not constitute an offense and
there are averments in the information which, if true, would constitute
a legal justification. Eventually, the accused was convicted. He
appealed to the CA. The new defense counsel discovered that the
information was filed on a Monday and that the last day for the filing
of the information actually fell on the preceding Sunday.
Had the offense prescribed? If it had, could the defense invoke
for the first time on appeal as error, the trial courts non-dismissal
of the information on the ground of prescription?
Answer:
Yes. The offense had prescribed. Where the last day for the filing
of an information falls on a Sunday or legal holiday, the period of
prescription cannot be extended up to the next working day as
prescription automatically sets in. (Yapdiangco vs. Buencamino, 122 SCRA
713)
Yes. The defense may invoke for the first time on appeal the nondismissal of the information on the ground of prescription, inasmuch as
under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure extinction of criminal action
or liability, which includes prescription, is not deemed waived by
failure to move to quash on that ground. (Sec. 8 Rule 117)
Criminal procedure; prescription of offenses
1990 (13)
On February 21, 1990, Magno was stabbed on the right arm by Reyes
at Balara, Quezon City. A complaint for physical injuries was filed
against Reyes with the office of the City Prosecutor on February 28,
1990 as the injuries required five (5) days of medical attendance. The
information for slight physical injuries was filed on May 12, 1990 with
the Quezon Metropolitan Trial Court. Reyes moved to quash the
information on the ground of prescription as it was filed on the 80 th
day, whereas the prescriptive period for slight physical injuries is 60
days.
Should the motion to quash be granted? Decide with reasons.
Answer:
No, because under the 1988 Amendments to the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the filing of the complaint with the Office of the City
Reason. (5%)
the
(b)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) The provisional dismissal of the case was proper because the
accused gave his express consent thereto and the offended party was
notified. It was not necessary for the offended party to give her
consent thereto. (Sec. 8 of Rule 117).
(b) The motion to quash the information should be denied
because, while the provisional dismissal had already become permanent,
the prescriptive period for filing the murder charge had not prescribed.
There was no double jeopardy because the first case was dismissed before
the accused had pleaded to the charge. (Sec. 7 of Rule 117).
Criminal procedure; remedies; appeal
1993 No (12)
A decision adverse to defendant was rendered by the trial court in
action for recovery of possession of a piece of land. Defendant wanted
to appeal the decision but his lawyer begged off from rendering further
professional services. Within the period of appeal, however, defendant
came to know a man who introduced himself as Atty. Manuel Palma and
volunteered to handle his case.
Thereafter, defendant engaged the services of Atty. Palma and
paid him the professional fee for the handling of his appeal.
Immediately, Atty. Palma filed a notice of appeal. In due course, the
Court of Appeals sent a notice to Atty. Palma giving him forty-five
days within which to file the appellants brief for defendant. However,
the 45-day period expired without the appellants brief being filed.
Directed to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for
failure to file the appellants brief within the reglementary period,
Atty. Palma took no action. Consequently, the Court of Appeals
dismissed defendants appeal.
Only after the Court of Appeals resolution dismissing the appeal
had already become final and executory did defendant learn of such
dismissal.
Subsequently investigation made by a friend of defendant disclosed
that Atty. Palma is not a lawyer. Accordingly defendant asked the
court of Appeals to nullify the resolution dismissing his appeal. He
asserted that his representation by a fake lawyer amounted to
deprivation of the right to appeal and, hence, a denial of due process.
On the other hand, the adverse party (plaintiff in the
reconveyance suit) contended that the resolution dismissing the appeal
can no longer be set aside as it had long become final and executory,
and the defendant had lost his right to appeal due to the negligence of
his lawyer (referring to Atty. Palma) for which he must suffer the
consequence.
Should the defendants plea for nullification of the dismissal of
the appeal be granted? Why?
Answer:
Yes, because defendant had not been accorded due process of law
when he lost his right to appeal due to the actions of Atty. Palma who
was not a lawyer. While a client is generally bound by the action of his
counsel, even by the attorneys mistake or negligence, this rule will
not apply where the lawyer turned out to be fake.
681)
Criminal procedure; state witnesses
1994 No (10)
Louise is being charged with the frustrated murder of Roy. The
prosecutions lone witness, Mariter, testified to having seen Louse
prepare the poison which she later surreptitiously poured into Roys
wine glass. Louise sought the disqualification of Mariter as witness on
account of her previous conviction for perjury.
1. Rule on Louises contention.
2. Can Mariter be utilized as state witness if she is a co-accused
in the criminal case?
Answer:
1. The contention of Louise is not correct. Mariter cannot be
disqualified from being a witness on account of her previous conviction
of perjury.. Previous conviction is not a disqualification because, in
this case, it is not so provided by law. (Sec.20, Rule 130).
2. Mariter, however, cannot be utilized as a state witness if she
is a co-accused in a criminal case because an accused can be discharged
as a state witness if, among five requirements, the accused has not at
any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude. (Sec.
9, Rule 119).
Criminal procedure; searches and seizures; Terry search
1995 No. 1:
2. What is a Terry search (or so-called "stop and frisk")? Is it
Justified under existing law and Jurisprudence? Explain.
Answer;
2.
A Terry search is a stop-and-search without a warrant. It is
justified when conducted by police officers on the bases of prior
confidential information which were reasonably corroborated by other
attendant matters. [Aniag, Jr. vs. Comelec, 237 SCRA 424]
Alternative Answer:
A Terry search is one conducted without a search warrant and is
designed either to determine the identity of a suspicious individual or
to maintain the status quo while the police officer is obtaining more
information. (Posadas us. CA. 188 SCRA 288).
Criminal procedure; third-party claims; intervention
1996 No. 13:
3)
X, driver of Y Bus Co, was charged with homicide, serious
physical injuries and damage to property through reckless imprudence. Y
Bus Co., as employer of X, intervened and filed a third party complaint
against Z, the Insurer of the bus, for subrogation and/or contribution
in the event X is convicted and Y Bus Co is made subsidiarily liable for
damages.
May Y Bus Co. intervene and file said complaint? Explain.
Answer;
3) No, Y Bus Co. may not intervene in the criminal action because
it is not the offended party and It cannot be impleaded as an accused
together with X. Its remedy is to file a separate action against Z. the
Insurer of the bus, in the event X is convicted and Y Bus Co. is made
subsidiarily liable.
Alternative Answer;
Yes, Y Bus Co. may be allowed to intervene Inasmuch as If X were
convicted it would be subsidiarily liable for damages. Under the ruling
in Pajarito vs. Seneris (87 SCRA 275), the judgment against X for
damages may be enforced by execution against Y Bus Co.
Criminal procedure; trial in absentia; automatic review of conviction
1998 No X
1.
2.
If an accused who was sentenced to death escapes, is there
still a legal necessity for the Supreme Court to review the decision of
conviction? [3%]
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1.
The requisites of trial in absentia are: (a) the accused
has already been arraigned; (b) he has been duly notified of the trial;
and (c) his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
(Sec.
14 [2],
Article III. Constitution; Parada vs. Veneracion, 269 SCRA 371 [1997].)
2.
Yes, there is still a legal necessity for the Supreme Court
to review the decision of conviction sentencing the accused to death,
because he is entitled to an automatic review of the death sentence.
(Sees. 3[e] and 10, Rule 122, Rules of Criminal Procedure; People vs.
Espargas, 260 SCRA 539.)
Criminal procedure; venue
1997 No. 18:
Where is the proper venue for the filing of an information in the
following cases?
(a)
The theft of a car in Pasig City which was brought to
Obando, Bulacan, where it was cannibalized.
(b) The theft by X, a bill collector of ABC Company, with main
offices in Makati City, of his collections from customers in Tagaytay
City.
In the contract of employment, X was detailed to the Calamba
branch office, Laguna, where he was to turn in his collections.
(c)
The malversation of public funds by a Philippine consul
detailed in the Philippine Embassy in London,
Answer;
(a) The proper venue is in Pasig City where the theft of the car
was committed, not in Obando where it was cannibalized. Theft is not a
continuing offense. (People v Mercado, 65 Phil 665).
(b) If the crime charged is theft, the venue is in Calamba where
he did not turn in his collections. If the crime of X is estafa, the
essential ingredients of the offense took place in Tagaytay City where
he received his collections, in Calamba where he should have turned in
his collections, and in Makatl City where the ABC Company was based. The
information may therefore be filed in Tagaytay City or Calamba or Makati
which have concurrent territorial Jurisdiction. (Catingub vs. Court of
Appeals, 121 SCRA 106).
(c) The proper court is the Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction
over crimes committed by a consul or higher official in the diplomatic
service.
(Sec. 4(c). PD 1606, as amended by RA. No. 7975). The
Sandiganbayan is a national court. (Nunez v. Sandiganbayan, 111 SCRA 433
[1982]. It has only one venue at present, which is in Metro Manila,
until RA. No. 7975, providing for two other branches in Cebu and in
Cagayan de Oro, is implemented.
Alternative Answers;
(b) The information may be filed either in Calamba or in Makati
City, not in Tagaytay City where no offense had as yet been committed,
(c)
Assuming that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction, the
proper venue is the first Regional Trial Court in which the charge is
filed (Sec. 15(d). Rule 110, Rules of Court).
Reason. (5%)
Answer:
(a)
No. The gun seized during the search of the house of B
without a search warrant is not admissible in evidence. (Secs. 2 and
3[2], Art. III of Constitution).
Moreover, the search was not an
incident to a lawful arrest of a person under Sec. 12 of Rule 126.
(b) No. A warrantless arrest requires that the crime has in fact
just been committed and the police arresting has personal knowledge of
facts that the person to be arrested has committed it. (Sec. 5, Rule
113). Here, the crime has not just been committed since a period of two
days had already lapsed, and the police arresting has no such personal
knowledge because he was not present when the incident happened. (Go vs.
Court of Appeals. 206 SCRA 138).
(c)
Yes. The gun is not indispensable in the conviction of A
because the court may rely on testimonial or other evidence.
Criminal procedure; warrantless arrests and seizures
2003 No. X.
(b)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) Yes, the seizure of the firearm was valid because it was
seized in the course of a valid arrest in a buy-bust operation. (Sec. 12
and 13 of Rule 126) A search warrant was not necessary. (People v.
Salazar, 266 SCRA 607 [1997]).
(b) The denial of the motion to dismiss was not proper. The
court had no authority to issue the writ of replevin whether the firearm
was in custodia legis or not. The motion to recover the firearm should
be filed in the court where the criminal action is pending.
Criminal procedure; warrantless arrests; objection
2000 No. VII.
FG was arrested without a warrant by policemen while he was
walking in a busy street. After preliminary investigation, he was
charged with rape and the corresponding information was filed in the
Regional Trial Court. On arraignment, he pleaded not guilty. Trial on
the merits ensued. The court rendered judgment convicting him. On
appeal, FG claims that the judgment is void because he was illegally
arrested. If you were the Solicitor General, counsel for the People of
the Philippines, how would you refute said claim? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Any objection to the illegality of the arrest of the accused
without a warrant is deemed waived when he pleaded not guilty at the
arraignment without raising the question. T is too late to complain
about a warrantless arrest after trial is commenced and completed and a
judgment of conviction rendered against the accused. (People v. Cabiles,
284 SCRA 199, [1999])
Criminal procedure; warrantless arrests; prel. inves.
2004 NO. VIII
B. AX swindled RY in the amount of P10,000 sometime in mid-2003.
On the strength of the sworn statement given by RY personally to SPO1
Juan Ramos sometime in mid-2004, and without securing a warrant, the
police officer arrested AX. Forthwith the police officer filed with the
City Prosecutor of Manila a complaint for estafa supported by RYs sworn
statement and other documentary evidence.
After due inquest, the
prosecutor filed the requisite information with the MM Regional Trial
Court.
No preliminary investigation was conducted either before or
after the filing of the information and the accused at no time asked for
such an investigation. However, before arraignment, the accused moved
to quash the information on the ground that the prosecutor suffered from
a want of authority to file the information because of his failure to
conduct a preliminary investigation before filing the information, as
required by the Rules of Court.
Is he entitled to a
of the information?
Special Proceedings
Special proceedings
1996 No. 11;
1) Distinguish special proceeding from an ordinary action.
Answer;
1)
A special proceeding is a remedy to establish the status or
right of a party or a particular fact, while an ordinary action is one
by which one party prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection
of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong. (Secs. 1 and 2 of
Rule 2)
Special proceedings; change of name
1992 No. X:
Pernito, also known in the community as Peregrino, filed a
petition for change of name to Pedro. The name Peregrino appeared in the
body of the petition but not in the caption. When the petition was
published, the caption and the body of the petition were merely lifted
verbatim, so that as published, the petition's caption still did not
contain Peregrino as the petitioner's alias. The government lawyer filed
a motion to dismiss on the ground that, notwithstanding publication for
the requisite number of times, the court did not acquire Jurisdiction
over the petition because petitioner's alias (Peregrino) did not appear
in the published caption. The court denied the motion to dismiss with
the ruling that there was substantial compliance with the law and that
the omission of the alias in the caption may be deemed de minimis
because the alias was clearly set forth in the petition itself.
Was the court correct in denying the motion to dismiss? Explain.
Suggested Answer:
No, the failure of the petitioner to include his alias
(Peregrino) in the caption is a jurisdictional defect and the Inclusion
of the alias in the body of the petition does not cure said defect. The
reason for the rule is that the ordinary reader only glances fleetingly
at the caption in a special proceeding and only if the caption strikes
him does he proceed to read the body of the petition; hence, he will
probably not notice the other names or aliases of the petitioner. (Gil
Co vs. Republic. 77 SCRA 65)
Special proceedings; claims against the estate
1987 No (15)
In a claim for money filed in a proceeding for the settlement of
the estate of a deceased, the claimant has promissory note purporting to
have been signed by the deceased as debtor and the claimant as creditor.
The claimant also has a check for the same amount as in the promissory
note and issued on the same date as in the promissory note. The check
drawn by the claimant and issued in the name of the deceased as payee,
bears on its back a signature purportedly belonging to the deceased and
other writings indicating that the check had been deposited in a bank
and credited to the account of the payee.
Can this money claim against the estate be proved? If so, how?
Explain.
Answer:
Yes. The claimant should attach a copy of the promissory note
executed by the deceased in his favor to his claim and serve a copy
thereof on the executor or administrator. If the executor or
administrator admits or does not deny the claim in his answer, the court
may approve the same.
If the executor or administrator or heir opposes the claim, the
same may be proved by the testimony of a witness who can authenticate
the promissory note. A witness other than the claimant from the bank may
also testify that the check of the claimant for the same amount as the
promissory note was endorsed by the deceased and deposited to his
account in the bank.
Another Alternative Answer:
The claimant himself may authenticate the promissory note since
this is not covered by the rule on surviving parties or the dead mans
statute. Authentication is not a matter of fact on which the claimants
lips are sealed.
Special proceedings; correction of entries
1993 No (16)
On May 12, 1990, Roman Agcaoili filed a petition in the Regional
Trial Court to correct his birth certificate by changing his citizenship
from Chinese to Filipino and his status from legitimate to
illegitimate. The Local Civil Registrar was named respondent in the
petition.
Copy of the notice hearing was served on the Solicitor General.
The notice was published in a newspaper of general circulation once a
week for three consecutive weeks.
Before the scheduled hearing, the Solicitor entered his appearance
as counsel for the Republic of the Philippines and authorized the
Provincial Prosecutor to appear in the case. However, the prosecutor did
not file an opposition to the petition. Instead, he appeared at, and
participated in, the trial and even cross-examined Agcaoili and his
witnesses.
There was a full-blown trial where Agcaoili presented testimonial
and documentary evidence proving that he is a Filipino citizen, being an
illegitimate child of Tan Keh (Chinese) and Cayetana Agcaoili (Filipino)
who were never married. However, the Republic presented no evidence.
After hearing, the trial court ordered the Local Civil Registrar
to make the corrections sought by Agcaoili.
The Solicitor General appealed. He argued that substantial changes
in the civil registry cannot be made under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. Is the contention correct? Why?
Answer:
No, because proceedings under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court may
be either summary or adversary in nature. If the correction sought to be
citation
in
cases
1.
Yes. W, the live-in partner of A, has the personality to
file the petition for habeas corpus because it may be filed by "some
person in his behalf." (Sec. 3. Rule 102. Rules of Court.)
2.
No. The petition is not tenable because the warrant of
arrest was issued by a court which had Jurisdiction to issue it (Sec. 4,
Rule 102 Rules of Court)
Special proceedings; partition
2000 No. XII.
Linda and spouses Arnulfo and Regina Ceres were co-owners of a
parcel of land. Linda died intestate and without any issue. Ten (10)
persons headed by Jocelyn, claiming to be the collateral relatives of
the deceased Linda, filed an action for partition with the Regional
Trial Court praying for the segregation of Lindas share, submitting
in support of their petition the baptismal certificates of seven of the
petitioners, a family bible belonging to Linda in which the names of the
petitioners have been entered, a photocopy of the birth certificate of
Jocelyn, and a certification of the local civil registrar that its
office had been completely razed by fire. The spouses Ceres refused to
partition on the following grounds: 1) the baptismal certificates of the
parish priest are evidence only of the administration of the sacrament
of baptism and they do not prove filiation of the alleged collateral
relatives of the deceased; 2) entry in the family bible is hearsay; 3)
the certification of the registrar on non-availability of the records of
birth does not prove filiation: 4) in partition cases where filiation to
the deceased is in dispute, prior and separate judicial declaration of
heirship in a settlement of estate proceedings is necessary; and 5)
there is need for publication as real property is involved. As counsel
for Jocelyn and her co-petitioners, argue against the objections of the
spouses Ceres so as to convince the court to allow the partition.
Discuss each of the five (5) arguments briefly but completely. (10%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(1) The baptismal certificate can show filiation or prove
pedigree. It is one of the other means allowed under the Rules of Court
(1)
established;
the
execution
and
validity
of
the
same
should
be
(2)
the will must have been in existence at the time of the
death of the testator, or shown to have been fraudulently or
accidentally destroyed in the lifetime of the testator without his
knowledge; and
(3)
its provisions are clearly and distinctly proved by at
least two credible
witnesses.
(Sec. 6, Rule 76 of the Rules of
Court)
b.
No.
The allowance of the will from which no appeal was
taken is conclusive as to its due execution. (Sec. 1 of Rule 75.)
Due
execution includes a finding that the will is genuine and not a forgery.
Accordingly, the due execution of the will cannot again be questioned in
a subsequent proceeding, not even in a criminal action for forgery of
the will.
Special proceedings; probate; mandatory character
1992 No. IX:
The last will and testament of the deceased was presented in the
proceeding to settle his estate, and in due course, hearing was set for
the probate of the will. Before evidence, thereon could be presented,
the legal heirs of the deceased, his widow and two surviving daughters,
filed a manifestation that the probate of the will would no longer be
necessary since they had already agreed to divide the net estate
differently in accordance with a project of partition attached to their
manifestation. Consequently, they moved that the project of partition be
approved and forthwith implemented without probate of the decedent's
will.
Should the court grant the heirs motion and accordingly approve
their project of partition without probate of the will? Explain.
Suggested Answer:
No, the court may not approve the project of partition without
probate of the will, because no will shall pass either real or personal
estate unless It Is proved and allowed In the proper court. (Sec. 1 of
Rule 75) The law and public policy require the probate of the will
because otherwise, the right of a person to dispose of his property by
will may be rendered nugatory. (Ralla vs. Untalan, 172 SCRA 858)
Special proceedings; probate; mandatory nature
2002 No. VII.
B.
What should the court do if, in the course of intestate
proceedings, a will is found and it is submitted for probate? Explain.
(2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
B.
If a will is found in the course of intestate proceedings
and it is submitted for probate, the intestate proceedings will be
suspended until the will is probated. Upon the probate of the will, the
intestate proceedings will be terminated. (Rule 82, sec. 1).
Special proceedings; settlement of estate
1988 (11)
In the special proceeding for the settlement of the intestate
estate of the deceased Johnny, his widow by his second marriage,
Carmelita, moved for her appointment as Administratrix of the estate.
This was opposed by Manda, the son of Johnny by his first wife, who
moved for his appointment instead. The court appointed Carmelita, the
widow, as Administratrix.
11.a) How may Manda contest that appointment of Carmelita?
Instead
of
administratrix,
Carmelita
was
appointed
Special
Administratrix.
11.b) Is the same remedy available to the oppositor, Manda? Why or
why not?
11.c) If Johnny Left a holographic will, how may it be probated?
Explain.
Answer:
11.a) By appeal, because the appointment of an administrator is a
final order under Rule 109.
11.b) No, because no appeal is allowed from the appointment of a
special administrator. Sec. 1(e) of Rule 109.
11.c) A holographic will may be probated by filing a petition for
the allowance of said will. If it is not contested, at least one
competent witness who knows the hand writing and signature of the
testator should explicitly declare that the will and the signature are
in the handwriting of the testator. In the absence of any such competent
witness, and if the court deems it necessary, expert testimony may be
resorted to. If it is contested, at least 3 witnesses who know the
handwriting of the testator should explicitly declare that the will and
the signature are in the handwriting of the testator. In the absence of
any competent witness, and if the court deems it necessary, expert
testimony may be resorted to. (Sec. 1, 5 and 11 of Rule 76)
Special proceedings; settlement of estate
2001 No. XV
The rules on special proceedings ordinarily require that the
estate of the deceased should be judicially administered thru an
administrator or executor.
What are the two exceptions to said requirements? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The two exceptions to the requirement are:
(a) Where the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs
are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal
representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may without
securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves
by means of public instrument filed in the office of the register of
deeds, or should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of
partition. If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the
entire estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the
register of deeds. The parties or the sole heir shall file
simultaneously abound with the register of deeds, in an amount
equivalent to the value of the personal property as certified to under
oath by the parties and conditioned upon the payment of any just claim
that may be filed later. The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or
administration shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation
in the province once a week for three consecutive weeks. (Sec. 1 of Rule
74, Rules of Court)
(b) Whenever the gross value of the estate of a deceased person,
whether he died testate or intestate, does not exceed ten thousand
pesos, and that fact is made to appear to the Regional Trial Court
having jurisdiction or the estate by the petition of an interested
person and upon hearing, which shall be held not less than one (1) month
nor more than three (3) months from the date of the last publication of
a notice which shall be published once a week for three consecutive
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province, and after
such other notice to interested persons as the court may direct, the
court may proceed summarily, without the appointment of an executor or
administrator, to settle the estate. (Sec. 2 of Rule 74, Rules of Court)
Special proceedings; settlement of estate
2002 No. VIII.
A.
X filed a claim in the intestate proceedings of D. Ds
administrator denied liability and filed a counterclaim against X. Xs
claim was disallowed.
(1) Does the probate court still have jurisdiction to allow the
claim of Ds administrator by way of offset? Why? (2%)
(2) Suppose Ds administrator did not allege any claim against X
by way of offset, can Ds administrator prosecute the claim in an
independent proceeding/ why/ (3%)
B.
A, B and C, the only heirs in Ds intestate proceedings,
submitted a project of partition to the partition, two lots were
assigned to C, who immediately entered into the possession of the lots.
Thereafter, C died and proceedings for the settlement of his estate were
filed in the RTC-Quezon City. Ds administrator then filed a motion in
the probate court (RTC-Manila), praying that one of the lots assigned to
C in the project of partition be turned over to him to satisfy debts
corresponding to Cs portion. The motion was opposed by the
administrator of Cs estate. How should the RTC-Manila resolve the
motion of Ds administrator? Explain. (3%)
C.
Suppose the property of D was declared escheated on July 1,
1990 in escheat proceedings brought by the Solicitor General. Now, X,
who claims to be an heir of D, filed an action to recover the escheated
property. Is the action viable? Why? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A.
(1) No, because since the claim of X was disallowed, there
is no amount against which to offset the claim of Ds administrator.
(2) Yes, Ds administrator can prosecute the claim in an
independent proceeding since the claim of X was disallowed. If X had a
valid claim and Ds administrator did not allege any claim against X by
way of offset, his failure to do so would bar his claim forever. (Rule
86, sec. 10).
B.
assignment
estate had
19 SCRA 85
C.
No, the action is not viable. The action to recover
escheated property must be filed within five years from July 1, 1990 or
be forever barred. (Rule 91, sec. 4).
Special proceedings; settlement of estate; administrator
1998 No XII
A, claiming to be an illegitimate child of the deceased D,
instituted an Intestate proceeding to settle the estate of the latter.
He also prayed that he be appointed administrator of said estate. S, the
surviving spouse, opposed the petition and A's application to be
appointed the administrator on the ground that he was not the child of
her deceased husband D. The court, however, appointed A as the
administrator of said estate. Subsequently, S, claiming to be the sole
heir of D. executed an Affidavit of Adjudication, adjudicating unto
herself the entire estate of her deceased husband D. S then sold the
entire estate to X.
1.
2.
Was the action of S in adjudicating the entire estate of
her late husband to herself legal? [3%]
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1.
Yes, unless it is shown that the court gravely-abused its
discretion in appointing the illegitimate child as administrator,
instead of the spouse. While the spouse enjoys preference, it appears
that the spouse has neglected to apply for letters of administration
within thirty (30) days from the death of the decendent. (Sec. 6, Rule
78, Rules of Court; Gaspay, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals. 238 SCRA 163.)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
S.
the
surviving
spouse,
should
have
been
appointed
administratrix of the estate, in as much as she enjoys first preference
in such appointment under the rules. (Sec. 6(a) of Rule 78, Rules of
Court.)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
2.
No. An affidavit of self-adjudication is allowed only if
the affiant is the sole heir of the. deceased. (Sec. 1, Rule 74, Rules
of Court). In this case, A also claims to be an heir.
Moreover, it is
not legal because there is already a pending juridical proceeding for
the settlement of the estate.
Special proceedings; settlement of estate; issues on ownership
1990 (12)
Sammy Magdalo, executor of the estate of the deceased Rolando
Aceron, submitted an inventory which includes a ten-hectare lot occupied
by Carlos Domingo. Domingo opposed inclusion in the inventory of the
property claiming ownership thereof. The probate court directed the
executor and Domingo to present evidence of ownership. Domingo refused
to participate in the proceedings, asserting lack of jurisdiction on the
part of the probate court. The probate court nonetheless proceeded with
the hearing, and rendered judgment declaring the deceased to be the
owner of the question property. The probate court directed Domingo to
vacate the premises.
Is the judgment correct? Explain your answer.
Answer:
No, because the probate court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate
title to properties claimed to be part of the estate of the deceased and
also claimed by third parties. (Cuison vs. Ramolete, 129 SCRA 495). It
may only make a provisional determination for the purpose of inclusion
in the inventory of the estate. (Bolisay vs. Alcid, 85 SCRA 213)
Special proceedings; settlement of estate; issues on ownership
1996 No. 11;
2)
A and B are brothers
Their late father, during his
lifetime, donated his only real estate property to B. Thereafter, B sold
the property to C who had it titled. C died intestate and was survived
by his son, D. A, claiming that his legitime had been impaired, filed a
case for annulment of donation and sale, cancellation of title and
recovery of possession of the property before Branch 85 of the Regional
Trial Court. D filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that there is a pending intestate estate proceeding before Branch 87
involving the estate of C, his father, which included the subject real
property. A opposed the motion arguing that Branch 85 has jurisdiction
since ownership of the land is involved and the said branch has
jurisdiction to resolve the question of ownership,
As judge of Branch 85, resolve the motion to dismiss.
Answer;
2)
I would deny the motion because it is Branch 85 of the
Regional Trial Court that has Jurisdiction to decide the question of
ownership of said property.
Special proceedings; settlement of estate; modes
1994 No (6)
Rene died intestate, leaving
property here in the Philippines.
several
heirs
and
substantial
Answer:
(a) The venue of the escheat proceedings of a parcel of land in
this case is the place where the deceased last resided. (Sec. 1. Rule
91, Rules of Court).
(b) The venue for the appointment of an administrator over land
and building of an American citizen residing in California, declared
Incompetent by an American Court, is the Regional Trial Court of the
place where his property or part thereof is situated. (Sec. 1. Rule 92).
(c)
The venue of a petition for the adoption of a minor
residing in Pampanga is the Regional Trial Court of the place in which
the petitioner resides. (Sec. 1. Rule 99),
Evidence
Evidence
2004 NO. VI
A.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
(5%)
Evidence; admissibility
1998 No XVII.
The barangay captain reported to the police that X was illegally
keeping in his house in the barangay an Armalite M16 rifle. On the
strength of that information, the police conducted a search of the house
of X and indeed found said rifle. The police raiders seized the rifle
and brought X to the police station. During the investigation, he
voluntarily signed a Sworn Statement that he was possessing said rifle
without license or authority to possess, and a Waiver of Right to
Counsel. During the trial of X for illegal possession of firearm, the
prosecution submitted in evidence the rifle. Sworn Statement and Waiver
of Right to Counsel, individually rule on the admissibility in evidence
of the:
a)
Rifle; [2%]
b)
c)
1.
The rifle is not admissible in evidence because it was
seized without a proper search warrant.
A warrantless search is not
justified. There was time to secure a search warrant. (People us.
Encinada G.R. No. 116720, October 2. 1997 and other cases)
2.
The sworn statement is not admissible in evidence because
it was taken without informing him of his custodial rights and without
the assistance of counsel which should be independent and competent and
preferably of the choice of the accused. (People us. Januario, 267 SCRA
608.)
3.
The waiver of his right to counsel is not admissible
because it was made without the assistance of counsel of his choice.
(People us. Gomez, 270 SCRA 433.)
Evidence; admissibility
2002 No. XI.
Acting on a tip by an informant, police officers stopped a car
being driven by D and ordered him to open the trunk. The officers found
a bag containing several kilos of cocaine. They seized the car and the
cocaine as evidence and placed D under arrest. Without advising him of
his right to remain silent and to have the assistance of an attorney,
they questioned him regarding the cocaine. In reply, D said, I dont
know anything about it. It isnt even my car. D was charged with
illegal possession of cocaine, a prohibited drug. Upon motion of D, the
court suppressed the use of cocaine as evidence and dismissed the
charges against him. D commenced proceedings against the police for the
recovery of his car. In his direct examination, D testified that he
owned the car but had registered it in the name of a friend for
Reason. (5%)
and the cause of the death was not the stabbing by Danilo. [Secs. 37 and
42 of Rule 130)
Evidence; admissibility of evidence
1994 No (8)
At the homicide trial, the prosecution proposed that accused Joey
undergo a series of paraffin tests to determine whether he fired his
service pistol at the time the victim, Lyn, was shot to death. The
defense objected on the ground that Joeys submission of his hands for
paraffin test, or the inspection of any part of his body for that
matter, would violate his right against self-incrimination.
1. How would you rule on the objection?
2. Is the result of the paraffin test admissible in evidence?
Answer:
1. The objection should be overruled. Submission to the paraffin
test is not a violation of the right against self-incrimination because
it involves only an examination of a part of the body. What violates the
right against self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion.
2. The result of the paraffin test is admissible in evidence that
should be considered.
Evidence; admissibility of evidence; objections
1994 No (3)
3.c) What is the difference between a broadside objection and a
specific objection to the admission of documentary evidence?
Answer:
3.c) A broadside objection to the admission of documentary
evidence is to be distinguished from a specific objection in that a
broadside objection is a general objection such as incompetent,
irrelevant and immaterial, while a specific objection is limited to a
particular ground.
Alternative Answer:
A broadside objection is one, which does not specify any ground.
Evidence; admissibility; anti-wire tapping act
1996 No. 15:
5)
A sued for annulment of his marriage with B. During trial, A
offered in evidence cassette tapes of alleged telephone conversations of
B with her lover. The tapes were recordings made by tapping A's
telephone line, with A's consent and obviously without B's or her
lover's. B vehemently objected to their admission, on the ground
that
neither B nor her lover consented to the wire tap. The court admitted
the tapes, ruling that the recorded conversations are nonetheless
relevant to the issues involved.
Was the court
evidence? Explain,
correct
in
admitting
the
cassette
tapes
in
Answer:
5)
No, because the tape recordings made by tapping A's
telephone line without the consent of B or that of her lover was a
violation of the Anti-Wire Tapping Law. (RA No. 4200; Salcedo-Ortanez
vs. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 111)
Evidence; admissibility; objections
1997 No. 11:
What are the two kinds of objections? Explain each briefly. Given
an example of each.
Answer:
objections:
Example:
parol
evidence
and
best
Evidence; admissions/confessions
1996 No. 14:
1)
Distinguish
extrajudicial admission from extra-judicial
confession in criminal cases.
Answer;
1)
An extrajudicial admission is a statement of fact which does
not directly involve an acknowledgment of guilt or criminal intent,
while an extrajudicial confession is a declaration of an accused that he
has committed or participated In the commission of a crime.
Evidence; authentic documents
1990 (16)
In the trial court of a case on July 5, 1990, plaintiff offered an
evidence a receipt dated July 7, 1959 issued by defendant company which
was found in a cabinet for receipts of payment. It is without any
blemish or alteration. As no witness testified in the execution and
authenticity of the document, defendant moved for the exclusion of this
receipt notwithstanding that it is a private writing.
hands
of
the
parties
be
As counsel for A, how will you prove the loan given to A and
B?
Answer:
(a)
The copy that was signed and lost is the only "original"
copy for purposes of the Best Evidence Rule. (Sec.
4 [b] of Rule 130).
(b) No, They are not duplicate original copies because there are
photocopies which were not signed (Mahilum v. Court of Appeals, 17 SCRA
482), They constitute secondary evidence. (Sec. 5 of Rule 130).
(c) The loan given by A to B may be proved by secondary evidence
through the xeroxed copies of the promissory note. The rules provide
that when the original document is lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, the offerer, upon proof of its execution or existence
and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may
prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some
authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order
stated. (Sec. 5 of Rule 130).
Evidence; best evidence rule; parol evidence rule
1988 (13)
(a) State or explain briefly the Best Evidence Rule.
(b) State or explain briefly the Parol Evidence Rule.
Answer:
(a) The Best Evidence Rule provides that there can be no evidence
(3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A.
The prosecution may introduce evidence of the good or even
bad moral character of the victim if it tends to establish in any
reasonable degree the probability or improbability of the offense
charged. [Rule 130, sec. 51 a (3)]. In this case, the evidence is not
relevant.
B.
Yes, D may introduce evidence of specific violent acts by V.
Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not
admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or a similar
thing at another time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent
or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage,
and the like. (Rule 130, sec. 34).
Evidence; confession; affidavit of recantation
1998 No XIX.
1. If the accused on the witness stand repeats his earlier
uncounseled extrajudicial confession implicating his co-accused in the
crime charged, is that testimony admissible in evidence against the
latter? [3%]
2.
What is the probative value of a witness' Affidavit of
Recantation? [2%]
SUGGESTED AJVSWEK;
he made a
him. When
if he is
were very
are
the
requisites
to
admissibility
of
dying
Answer:
(b)
1)
It
must
concern
circumstances of declarant's death;
2)
the
cause
and
the
surrounding
that the aforesaid statement was made by the victim under consciousness
of an impending death.
Can the subject statement be considered a dying declaration?Why?
Answer:
Yes, the statement that it was Gonzales who stabbed him can be
considered a dying declaration because it concerned the crime and
surrounding circumstances of declarants death; it was made with
consciousness of impending death as shown by the fact that he died while
undergoing surgery at the hospital; the declarant was competent as a
witness; and the declaration was offered in a criminal case in which
declarant was the victim.
Alternative Answer:
Even if the statement cannot be considered a dying declaration, it
was admissible as part of the res gestae.
Evidence; dying declaration
1998 No XVIII
2.
SUGGESTED ANSWER;
2. The requisites for the admissibility of a dying declaration
are: (a) the declaration is made by the deceased under the consciousness
of his impending death; (b) the deceased was at the time competent as a
witness; (c) the declaration concerns the cause and surrounding
circumstances of the declarant's death; and (d) the declaration is
offered in a (criminal) case wherein the declarant's death is the
subject of inquiry. (People vs. Santos, 270 SCRA 650.)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The declaration of a dying person, made under the consciousness
of an impending death, may be received in any case wherein his death is
the subject of Inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding
circumstances of such death. (Sec. 37 of Rule 13O.)
Evidence; effect of an offer of compromise
1989 (11)
Pedro was charged with homicide for having hacked Ramon to death.
Before the case could be tried, the heirs of Ramon sought out Pedro and
discussed with him the possibility of settlement of the case. Pedro
agreed to a settlement. When the heirs asked how much he was willing to
pay, Pedro offered P30,000 which the heirs accepted. Is the agreement to
settle as well as the offer to pay P30,000 by Pedro admissible in
evidence against him as an implied admission of guilt? Explain.
Answer:
Yes. Under the Rules on Evidence, in criminal cases which are not
allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused
nay be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. Since a
criminal case for homicide is not allowed by law to be compromised,
Pedros offer of P30,000 for the settlement of the case, which the heirs
accepted, is admissible in evidence against him as an implied admission
of guilt. (Sec.24 of Rule 130)
Evidence; effect of offer of settlement
1996 No. 15:
3)
X,
charged
with
rape
with
homicide,
offered
P100,000.00 as amicable settlement to the family of the victim. The
family refused. During the trial, the prosecution presented in evidence
X's offer of compromise.
What is the legal implication of such offer? Explain.
Answer:
3)
The offer of P100,000.00 as amicable settlement in a
criminal case for rape with homicide is an implied admission of guilt.
It does not fall within the exceptions of quasl-offenses or those
allowed by law to be compromised. (Sec, 2 7 of Rule 130)
Evidence; electronic evidence
2003 No. XIX.
(a)
evidence.
State
the
rule
on
the
admissibility
of
an
electronic
the
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a)
document,
such term
in these
effective
(c)
After plaintiff has formally submitted his evidence, he
realized that he had forgotten to present what he considered an
important evidence. Can he recall a witness?
Answer:
(a] Yes, on redirect examination, questions on matters not dealt
with during the cross-examination may be allowed by the court in its
discretion. (Sec. 7 of Rule 132).
(b)
Yes, the opponent in his re-cross-examination may also ask
questions on such other matters as may be allowed by the court in its
discretion. (Sec. 8. Rule 132).
(c)
Yes, after formally submitting his evidence, the plaintiff
can recall a witness with leave of court. The court may grant or
withhold leave in its discretion as the interests of justice may
require. (Sec. 9. Rule 132).
Evidence; examination of witnesses
2002 No. XIII.
B.
Is this question on direct examination objectionable: What
happened on July 12,1999? Why? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
B.
The question is objectionable because it has no
unless before the question is asked the proper basis is laid.
basis,
Decide.
Answer:
2)
Motion for reconsideration is denied. There was no need to
formally offer for admission the bill of lading, because the failure of
Y to deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of the bill of
lading which was an actionable document constituted an admission
thereof. (Sec. 8 of Rule 8)
Evidence; formal offer of evidence
1997 No. 12:
A trial court cannot take into consideration in deciding a case
an evidence that has not been "formally offered". When are the following
pieces of evidence formally offered?
(a) Testimonial evidence
(b) Documentary evidence
(c) Object evidence Answer;
(a)
Testimonial evidence is formally offered at the time the
witness is called to testify. (Rule 132. Sec. 35, first par.).
(b)
Documentary evidence is formally offered after the
presentation of the testimonial evidence. (Rule 132, Sec. 35, second
par.).
(c) The same is true with object evidence.
after the presentation of the testimonial evidence.
It is also offered
Explain.
Answer:
1)
I will deny the prosecution's motion. The testimony of X is
admissible as a dying declaration, which is an exception to the hearsay
rule. (Sec. 37 of Rule 130) Moreover, it is not a privileged marital
communication. (Sec. 24-A of Rule 130}
Evidence; hearsay rule
1999 No. XVII
a.
b.
c.
A overheard B call X a thief. In an action for defamation
filed by X against B, is the testimony of A offered to prove the fact of
utterance i.e., that B called X a thief, admissible in evidence?
Explain.
(2%)
d.
The accused was charged with robbery and homicide.
The
victim suffered several stab wounds.
It appears that eleven (11) hours
after the crime, while the victim was being brought to the hospital in a
jeep, with his brother and a policeman as companions, the victim was
asked certain questions which he answered, pointing to the accused as
his assailant.
His answers were put down in writing, but since he was
a in a critical condition, his brother and the policeman signed the
statement.
Is the statement admissible as a dying declaration?
Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a.
Hearsay evidence may be defined as evidence that consists
of testimony not coming from personal knowledge (Sec. 36, Rule 130,
Rules of Court). Hearsay testimony is the testimony of a witness as to
what he has heard other persons say about the facts in issue.
b.
The exceptions to the hearsay rule are:
dying
declaration, declaration against interest, act or declaration about
pedigree, family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree, common
reputation, part of the res gestae, entries in the course of business,
entries in official records, commercial lists and the like, learned
treatises, and testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. (Sees.
37 to 47, Rule 13O, Rules of Court)
c.
Yes. The testimony of A who overheard B call X a thief is
admissible in evidence as an independently relevant statement. It is
offered in evidence only to prove the tenor thereof, not to prove the
truth of the facts asserted therein.
Independently relevant
statements include statements which are on the very facts in issue or
those which are circumstantial evidence thereof. The hearsay rule does
not apply. (See People vs. Gaddi, 170 SCRA 649.|
d.
Yes.
The statement is admissible as a dying declaration
if the victim subsequently died and his answers were made under the
consciousness of impending death.
(Sec. 37 of Rule 130|
The fact
that he did not sign the statement point to the accused as his
assailant, because he was in critical condition, does not affect its
admissibility as a dying declaration. A dying declaration need not be in
writing (People v. Viovicente, 286 SCRA 1)
Evidence; hearsay rule; exceptions
when
Philippine
court
can
take
(c)
Suppose a foreign law was pleaded as part of the defense of
defendant but no evidence was presented to prove the existence of said
law, what is the presumption to be taken by the court as to the wordings
of said law"?
Answer:
(a)
The three instances when a Philippine court can take
judicial notice of a foreign law are: (1) when the Philippine courts are
evidently familiar with the foreign law (Moran. Vol. 5, p. 34, 1980
edition); (2) when the foreign law refers to the law of nations (Sec. 1
of Rule 129) and (3) when it refers to a published treatise, periodical
or pamphlet on the subject of law if the court takes judicial notice of
the fact that the writer thereof is recognized in his profession or
calling as expert on the subject (Sec. 46. Rule 130).
(b)
A written foreign law may be evidenced by an official
publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the
legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied. If the
record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such
officer has the custody, if the office in which the record is kept is in
a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular
agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office (Sec. 24, Rule 132, Zalamea v.
CA, 228 SCRA 23),
(c) The presumption is that the wordings of the foreign law are
the same as the local law. (Northwest Orient Airlines v. Court of
Appeals, 241 SCRA 192; Moran, Vol. 6. page 34, 1980 edition; Lim v.
Collector of Customs, 36 Phil. 472). This Is known as the processual
presumption.
Alternative Answers;
(a) The Philippine court can also take judicial notice of a
foreign law: 1) when the foreign statute is accepted by the Philippine
government (Rep. v. Guanzon, 61 SCRA 360); 2) when a foreign judgment
containing foreign law is recognized for enforcement (Sec. 48, Rule 39);
and 3) if it refers to common law doctrines and rules from which many of
our laws were derived (Alzua v Johnson [21 Phil. 308]).
(b) A written foreign law is proved by presenting a published
treatise, periodical or pamphlet on said foreign law if the court may
take judicial notice, or a witness expert in the subject testifies. that
the writer of the statement in the treatise, periodical or pamphlet is
recognized in his profession or calling as expert in the subject (Sec.
46. Rule 130).
Evidence; kinds; admissibility
1994 No (9)
At the trial of Ace for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the
prosecution offers in evidence a photocopy of the marked P100.00 bills
used in the buy-bust operation. Ace objects to the introduction of the
photocopy on the ground that the Best Evidence Rule prohibits the
introduction of secondary evidence in lieu of the original.
9.a)
evidence?
Is
the
photocopy
real
(object)
evidence
or
documentary
descendants or ascendants. (Sec, 22, Rule 130, Rules of Court). The case
falls under this exception because Selma is the direct descendant of the
spouse Vide.
(b) No. The marital disqualification rule applies this time. The
exception provided by the rules is in a civil case by one spouse against
the other. The case here involves a case by Selmo for the recovery of
personal property against Vidas spouse, Romeo.
Evidence; marital disqualification; privileged communication
1995 No. 2:
Allan and Narita were married on 1 August 1989. After two months
Narita told Allan in confidence that 10-year old Liza whom she claimed
to be her niece was actually her daughter by a certain Basilio, a
married man.
In 1992 Narita obtained a judicial decree of nullity of her
marriage with Allan on the latter's psychological incapacity to fulfill
his marital obligations. When the decree became final, Liza, assisted by
Narita, filed ten (10) cases of rape against Allan purportedly committed
in 1991. During the trial Narita was called to the witness stand to
testify as a witness against Allan who objected thereto on the ground of
marital disqualification.
1.
Explain.
2.
Suppose Narita's testimony was offered while the decision
nullifying her marriage to Allan was pending appeal, would your answer
be different? Explain.
3.
Suppose Narita died during the pendency of the appeal, and
soon after, the legal wife of Basilio sued for legal separation on
sexual infidelity in view of Basilio's love affair with Narita. At the
trial Allan was called by Basilio's wife to testify that Narita confided
to him (Allan) during their marriage that Liza was her love child by
Basilio.
As counsel for Basilio, can you validly object
presentation of Allan as a witness for the plaintiff? Explain.
to
the
Answer;
1.
The objection should be overruled because the ground of
marital disqualification may be invoked only during the marriage. When
Narita was called to the witness stand, the judicial decree of nullity
of her marriage had already become final. (Sec. 22, Rule 130)
2.
No, because this ground may not be invoked in a criminal
case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter's
direct descendants or ascendants. In this case Liza was the daughter of
Narita. (Sec. 24 (a). Rule 130)
3.
Yes. I could validly object to the presentation of Allan as
a witness on the ground that the communication of Narita was a
privileged marital communication which could be invoked during or after
the marriage. Moreover, the testimony of Allan would be hearsay.
Evidence; marital privilege rule
2004 NO. IX
B. XYZ, an alien, was criminally charged of promoting and
facilitating child prostitution and other sexual abuses under Rep. Act
No. 7610. The principal witness against him was his Filipina wife, ABC.
Earlier, she had complained that XYZs hotel was being used as a center
for sex tourism and child trafficking.
The defense counsel for XYZ
objected to the testimony of ABC at the trial of the child prostitution
case and the introduction of the affidavits she executed against her
husband as a violation of espousal confidentiality and marital privilege
rule. It turned out that DEF, the minor daughter of ABC by her first
May the court admit the testimony and affidavits of the wife, ABC,
against her husband, XYZ, in the criminal case involving child
prostitution? Reason. (5%)
Evidence; marital privilege; parental privilege; privileged
communication
1998 No XX
C is the child of the spouses H and W. H sued his wife W for
judicial declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code. In the trial, the following testified over the objection of
W: C, H and D. a doctor of medicine who used to treat W. Rule on W's
objections which are the following:
1.
H cannot testify against her because of the rule on
marital privilege; [1%]
2.
C cannot testify against her because of the doctrine on
parental privilege; and [2%]
3.
D cannot testify against her because of the doctrine of
privileged communication between patient and physician. [2%]
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1.
The rule of marital privilege cannot be invoked in the
annulment case under Rule 36 of the Family Code because it is a civil
case filed by one against the other, (Sec. 22 ,
Rule 130. Rules of
Court.)
2.
The doctrine of parental privilege cannot likewise be
Invoked by W as against the testimony of C, their child. C may not be
compelled to testify but is free to testify against her.
(Sec. 25.
Rule 130. Rules of Court; Art. 215, Family Code.)
3.
D, as a doctor who used to treat W, is disqualified to
testify against W over her objection as to any advice or treatment given
by him or any information which he may have acquired in his professional
capacity. (Sec. 24 [c], Rule 130. Rules of Court.)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
If the doctor's testimony is pursuant to the requirement of
establishing the psychological incapacity of W, and he is the expert
called upon to testify for the purpose, then it should be allowed.
(Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina, 26S SCRA 198.)
Evidence; memorandum
1996 No. 14:
3)
X states on direct examination that he once knew the facts
being asked but he cannot recall them now. When handed a written record
of the facts he testifies that the facts are correctly stated, but that
he has never seen the writing before.
Is the writing admissible as past recollection recorded? Explain,
Answer;
3) No, because for the written record to be admissible as past
recollection recorded. It must have been written or recorded by X or
under his direction at the time when the fact occurred, or immediately
thereafter, or at any other time when the fact was fresh in his memory
and he knew that the same was correctly written or recorded. (Sec. 16 of
Rule 132) But in this case X has never seen the writing before.
Evidence; offer to marry; circumstantial evidence
1998 No XVI.
A was accused of having raped X.
2.
a pair of short pants allegedly left by A at the crime
which the court, over the objection of A, required him to put on, and
when he did, it fit him well. [2%]
SUGGESTED ANSWER;
1.
A's offer to marry X is admissible in evidence as an
Implied admission of guilt because rape cases are not allowed to be
compromised. (Sec. 27 of Rule 13O; People vs. Domingo, 226 SCRA 156.)
2.
The pair of short pants, which fit the accused well, is
circumstantial evidence of his guilt,
although standing alone it
cannot be the basis of conviction. The accused cannot object to the
court requiring him to put the short pants on. It is not part of his
right against self-incrimination because it is a mere physical act.
Evidence; offer to pay expenses; effect
1997 No. 14:
A, while driving his car, ran over B. A visited B at the hospital
and offered to pay for his hospitalization expenses. After the filing of
the criminal case against A for serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence. A's insurance carrier offered to pay for the
injuries and damages suffered by B. The offer was rejected because B
considered the amount offered as inadequate.
(a) Is the offer by A to pay the hospitalization expenses of B
admissible in evidence?
(b)
Is the offer by A's insurance carrier
injuries and damages of B admissible in evidence?
to
pay
for
the
Answer:
(a) The offer by A to pay the hospitalization expenses of B is
not admissible in evidence to prove his guilt in both the civil and
criminal cases. (Rule 130, Sec. 27, fourth par.).
(b)
No. It is irrelevant. The obligation of the insurance
company is based on the contract of insurance and is not admissible in
evidence against the accused because it was not offered by the accused
but by the insurance company which is not his agent.
Evidence; offfer of evidence; testimonial and documentary
1994 No (3)
3.b) What is the difference between
evidence an offer of documentary evidence?
an
offer
of
testimonial
Answer:
3.b) An offer of testimonial evidence is made at the time the
witness is called to testify, while an offer of documentary evidence is
made after the presentation of a partys testimonial evidence. (Sec. 35,
Rule 132).
Evidence; opinion rule
1994 No (19)
At Nolans trial for possession and use of the prohibited drug,
known as shabu:, his girlfriend Kim, testified that on a particular
day, he would see Nolan very prim and proper, alert and sharp, but that
three days after, he would appear haggard, tired and overly nervous at
the slightest sound he would hear. Nolan objects to the admissibility of
Kims testimony on the ground that Kim merely stated her opinion without
having been first qualified as expert witness.
Should you, as judge, exclude the testimony of Kim?
Answer:
No. The testimony of Kim should not be excluded. Even though Kim
is not an expert witness, Kim may testify on her impressions of the
emotion, behavior, condition or appearance of a person. (Sec. 50, last
par., Rule 130).
Evidence; parol evidence rule
2001 No. XVI
Pedro filed a complaint against Lucio for the recovery of a sum
of money based on a promissory note executed by Lucio. In his complaint,
Pedro alleged that although the promissory note says that it is payable
within 120 days, the truth is that the note is payable immediately after
90 days but that if Pedro is willing, he may, upon request of Lucio give
the latter up to 120 days to pay the note. During the hearing, Pedro
testified that the truth is that the agreement between him and Lucio is
for the latter to pay immediately after ninety days time. Also, since
the original note was with Lucio and the latter would not surrender to
Pedro the original note which
Lucio kept in a place about one days
trip from where he received the notice to produce the note and in spite
of such notice to produce the same within six hours from receipt of such
notice, Lucio failed to do so. Pedro presented a copy of the note which
was executed at the same time as the original and with identical
contents.
a)
Over the objection of Lucio, will Pedro be allowed to
testify as to the true agreement or contents of the promissory note?
Why? (2%)
b)
Over the objection of Lucio, can Pedro present a copy of the
promissory note and have it admitted as valid evidence in his favor?
Why? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a)
Yes, because Pedro has alleged in his complaint that the
promissory note does not express the true intent and agreement of the
parties. This is an exception to the parol evidence rule. [Sec. 9(b) of
Rule 130, Rules of Court]
b)
Yes, the copy in the possession of Pedro is a
original and with identical contents. [Sec. 4(b) of Rule 130].
the failure of Lucio to produce the original of the note is
because he was not given reasonable notice, as requirement
Rules before secondary evidence may be presented. (Sec. 6 of
Rules of Court)
duplicate
Moreover,
excusable
under the
Rule 130,
1994 No (10)
Louise is being charged with the frustrated murder of Roy. The
prosecutions lone witness, Mariter, testified to having seen Louse
prepare the poison which she later surreptitiously poured into Roys
wine glass. Louise sought the disqualification of Mariter as witness on
account of her previous conviction for perjury.
3. Rule on Louises contention.
4. Can Mariter be utilized as state witness if she is a co-accused
in the criminal case?
Answer:
3. The contention of Louise is not correct. Mariter cannot be
disqualified from being a witness on account of her previous conviction
of perjury.. Previous conviction is not a disqualification because, in
this case, it is not so provided by law. (Sec.20, Rule 130).
4. Mariter, however, cannot be utilized as a state witness if she
is a co-accused in a criminal case because an accused can be discharged
as a state witness if, among five requirements, the accused has not at
any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude. (Sec.
9, Rule 119).
Evidence; qualifications of witnesses; weight of evidence
1994 No (7)
Al was accused of raping Lourdes. Only Lourdes testified on how
the crime was perpetrated. On the other hand, the defense presented Als
wife, son and daughter to testify that Al was with them when the alleged
crime took place. The prosecution interposed timely objection to the
testimonies on the ground of obvious bias due to the witnesses close
relationship with the accused.
If you were the judge:
1. How would you rule on the objection?
2. Will the fact that the version of the defense is corroborated
by three witnesses suffice to acquit Al? Why?
Answer:
1. Of I were the judge, I would overrule the objection. Close
relationship to a party is not a ground to disqualify a witness.
(Sec.20, Rule 130)
2. No.
Witnesses
are
not
numbered
but
weighed.
Positive
identification prevails over the defense of alibi. Alibi is easily
fabricated and must be proved clearly and convincingly.
Evidence; res gestae; dying declaration
1988 (17)
(a) When Tomas was stabbed on the chest during a street brawl, he
instinctively shouted for help. Emil who was nearby heard the shout and
rushed to Tomas side who when asked by Emil what happened, stated that
Kulas stabbed him.
Tomas died on account of stab wound.
(1) Could Emils testimony be received to identify Kulas? Explain.
(b) The day before the stabbing victim died, he identified
positively to the police the person who stabbed him. When he was asked
by the police if he was going to die because of his wounds, he answered
that he did not know.
(1) Is the identification by the deceased admissible as an antemortem statement and an exception to the hearsay rule? Explain.
(2) State 5 other exceptions to the hearsay rule.
Answer:
part
of
the
res
Answer:
(b) Neither could it be considered as a dying declaration because
it was not made under consciousness of impending death, since he died
ten days later.
Another Answer:
It could be considered as a dying declaration if the gravity of
the wounds inflicted would indicate that the statement was made under
consciousness of impending death.
(c) If the testimony of A as to the revelation of Lt. Yap is not
admissible for being hearsay, may it be admitted as an independently
relevant statement?
Answer:
(c) It may not be considered as an Independently relevant
statement, because the same is being presented to establish the truth of
the fact asserted therein and not merely the tenor thereof. (People vs.
Gaddi, 170 SCRA 649]
Evidence; res inter alios rule
1991 No. XIII:
During custodial investigation at the Western Police District,
Mario Margal was informed of his constitutional right to remain silent
and to have competent and independent counsel. He decided to waive his
right to counsel and proceeded to make a statement admitting commission
of a robbery. In the same statement, he implicated Antonio Carreon, his
co-conspirator in the crime.
(b) Is it admissible against Carreon as an exception to the res
inter alios acta rule?
Answer;
(b) No, because even assuming that the conspiracy is shown by
evidence other than the statement of Margal, the statement was made
after the conspiracy had ceased. (Sec. 30 of Rule 130; People v.
Cabrera, 57 SCRA 714)
Evidence; right to cross examine
1987 No (7)
In a criminal case, the prosecution presented a witness. Midway
towards the cross-examination by the defense counsel, the defense moved
for the continuance upon the ground that it was essential that some
inquiry be made by the defense from the outside sources before the
cross-examiner could intelligently continue on the remaining factual
matters in the direct testimony. The motion was granted and the trial
was reset to another date. But the witness died so that he could not be
presented for the continuation of the cross-examination. The defense
moved to strike out the entire testimony of the deceased witness upon
the ground that otherwise the accused would be denied full enjoyment of
his right to confrontation and cross-examination.
(a) If you were the fiscal, what arguments will you offer to
oppose the motion?
(b) If you were the judge, how would you rule on the motion? Why?
Answer:
(a) As the fiscal, I would argue that the defense had waived its
right to cross-examine the witness by not continuing the crossexamination and moving for continuance at the middle thereof; and that
even assuming there was no waiver, the entire testimony of the deceased
witness should not be stricken off the record because that portion of
the testimony on which the defense had been able to cross-examine the
witness is admissible in evidence.
(b) As the judge, I would rule that there was no waiver of the
right of cross-examination on the part of the defense inasmuch as the
court granted its motion for continuance without objection on the part
of the prosecution. However, I would deny the motion to strike out the
entire testimony of the deceased witness and admit in evidence that
portion of the testimony on which the defense had been able to crossexamine the witness. (People vs. Seeres, 99 SCRA 92)
Evidence; rules of admissibility
1997 No. 15:
Give the reasons underlying the adoption of the following rules
of evidence:
(a) Dead Man Rule?
(b) Parol Evidence Rule
(c)
(d)
The rule against
extrajudicial confession
the
admission
of
illegally
obtained