Stern School of Business

Advanced Microeconomics
Prof. Nicholas Economides
Preliminary Outline
Spring 2006
M 1:00-4:00
Office Hours: Mon. 5-6pm, Tue. 5-6pm
and by appointment, MEC 7-84
Tel. (212) 998-0864, FAX (212) 995-4218
www.stern.nyu.edu/networks
economides@stern.nyu.edu
Required Books
Jean Tirole, (1989), Industrial Organization, M.I.T. Press.
Recommended Books
Ken Arrow and Michael Intrilligator, (1981), Handbook of Mathematical Economics,
North Holland.
Ken Binmore, (1992), Fun and Games: A Text on Game Theory, D.C. Heath.
Augustin Cournot, (1960), Researches into the Mathematical Principles of the Theory of
Wealth, Kelly, NY (English translation by N.T. Bacon).
Jim Friedman, (1977), Oligopoly and the Theory of Games, North Holland.
Jim Friedman, (1983), Oligopoly Theory, Cambridge University Press.
Jim Friedman, (1990), Game Theory With Application to Economics, Oxford University
Press.
Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole, (1991), Game Theory, MIT Press.
John Harsanyi, (1977), Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and
Social Situations, Cambridge University Press.
David Kreps, (1990), A Course in Microeconomic Theory, Princeton University Press.
Kelvin Lancaster, (1979), Variety, Equity and Efficiency, Columbia University Press,
New York.
R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa, (1958), Games and Decisions, John Wiley, N.Y.
Guillermo Owen, (1982), Game Theory, second edition, W. Saunders.
Eric Rasmusen, (1989), Games and Information, Basil Blackwell.
Richard Schmalensee and Robert Willig, (1989), Handbook of Industrial Organization,
North Holland.
Shapiro, Carl, and Hal Varian, Information Rules, Harvard Business School Press, 1999.
Martin Shubik, (1983), Game Theory in the Social Sciences: Concepts and Solutions,
The M.I.T. Press.
John Sutton, Technology and Market Structure (MIT Press, 1998).
Carl von Weiszacker, (1980), Barriers to Entry, Springer Verlag.
Required reading is indicated by (*)

(1977).edu/networks/Friedman_Nash_equilibrium_existence.nyu. vol.edu/networks/Nash_The_Bargaining_Problem. (1951). (1958). http://www. Debreu.stern.pdf 3.pdf (*) 7. vol. M. Games and Information. iii. (1992). at http://www.pdf 4. K. 6. Kreps. 11. Fun and Games. ch. (*) 4. Luce and H. 152-162. vol. Kreps. A Course in Microeconomic Theory.edu/networks/phdcourse/Nash_Two_person_cooperative_ games. (1990).stern. “A Social Equilibrium Existence Theorem. K. Tirole. Shubik. (1990). Oligopoly and the Theory of Games. Binmore.nyu. Games and Decisions. 1.pdf (*) 2. (*) 3.Course Outline I. ch.” in Contributions to the Theory of Games. at http://www. (1950). Raiffa. pp. Rasmusen. at http://www. Games and Decisions.stern.stern.pdf. “Two-Person Cooperative Games. Games in Extensive and Normal Forms 1. Binmore. “A Value for n-Person Games. (1989). at http://www. (1950). ii. (1953). 2. Nash. (1983). D. ch. Raiffa. 2. eds. 9. 45. 6. E. pp. 11.stern. 155-162. J. Nash.” Annals of Mathematics. Fun and Games. pp. (1992). “Equilibrium Points in n-Person Games. Shubik. Game Theory in the Social Sciences. 8. Friedman. Luce and H. J. “The Bargaining Problem.” Econometrica. 3. 886-893. A Course in Microeconomic Theory. J. Cooperative Games 1. Kuhn and A. (1953). 128-140.edu/networks/Nash_Equilibrium_in_N-person_games. 9. 2. 2 . J. M. Nash. ch. 307-317. 38. Industrial Organization. pp. Nash. 286-295.” Econometrica. 7. ch. ch. G. H. Shapley. L. “Non-cooperative Games. 36. 4. Review of Game Theory (1 week) i. D. ch. 21.nyu. 5. J. pp. 3. D. ch. Non-cooperative Games 1. vol. (1952).nyu. vol. Game Theory in the Social Sciences. Tucker. ch. D.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. ch. 7. 18.edu/networks/Shapley_A_value_for_n-person_games. 1.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. vol. J. (*) 2. 12.nyu. (1989). pp. 5.

edu/networks/phdcourse/Varian_A_model_of_sales_e rrata. 5-8. Varian.edu/networks/phdcourse/Grossman_S_Nash_equilibri um. pp. 101-113. W. at http://www. vol. 243-255. 49. J.edu/networks/phdcourse/Varian_A_model_of_sales. (1989). pp. 651-659. Varian. at http://www. vol. Industrial Organization. 473-486. ch. Oligopoly in Homogeneous Goods (1. Quantity-setting Games a. 112-117. T. H.” Econometrica. 47. Bergstrom and H. at http://www. “Nash Equilibrium and the Industrial Organization of Markets with Large Fixed Costs.nyu. vol. (1981). Friedman. Mixed Strategies a. 22. Sonnenschein. (1976). Novshek. 2. S. A. 4. Sonnenschein.pdf f. J. “Small Efficient Scale as a Foundation for Walrasian Equilibrium.p df . pp.pdf (*) g. (*) e. 2. Novshek and H. 75. J. Researches into the Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth.edu/networks/Roberts_Sonnenschein_On_the_Existen ce_of_Cournot_Equilibrium. J. pp.edu/networks/phdcourse/Roberts_Sonnenschein_On_t he_foundations. Oligopoly and the Theory of Games. W.pdf (*) 4.nyu. Tirole.pdf i.” Economics Letters. J. c. Oligopoly and the Theory of Games.” Journal of Economic Theory. vol.stern. Sonnenschein. Friedman. at http://www. 218-228. Industrial Organization. (1989). “Cournot Equilibrium with Free Entry. “Two Remarks on Cournot Equilibrium. pp.nyu. errata at http://www. pp. Other Strategy Spaces a.stern. 205-216.stern. pp. ch.II.5 week) i. (1977). h. “On the Foundations of the Theory of Monopolistic Competition. Roberts and H.” Econometrica.” Journal of Economic Theory. “On the Existence of Cournot Equilibrium without Concave Profit Functions.pdf (*) 3 . 19. vol.nyu. pp.edu/networks/Novshek_Cournot_Equilibrium_with_Fr ee_Entry. (1980). Non-cooperative Oligopoly Games 1.nyu. Roberts and H. (1981).stern. no. pp. Price-setting Games a. 70. 4. J. 13. vol. d.stern.nyu.stern. b. (*) 3. 1. Grossman. 1149-1172. (1985). Cournot.” Review of Economic Studies. Tirole.” American Economic Review. (1980). “A Model of Sales. vol. at http://www.

vol.edu/networks/phdcourse/Dixit_A_model_of_duopoly.stern. MIT Press. “Nash Equilibrium Existence in Duopoly with Products Defined by Two Characteristics.-F.stern. Variety. vol.nyu. Mathewson (eds.-P. Lancaster.” Econometrica. Polemarchakis.edu/networks/Stable_Cartels. 20-32. no. 431-439. 1145-1150. (1979). pp. no. 4 .nyu. 10. pdf (*) b. at http://www. vol. C. (1989).” Rand Journal of Economics.5. H. pp. 345-368. Oligopoly a. Novshek. 75.” International Economic Review. Economides and H.nyu. pp.nyu. (1986). vol. pp. A. at http://www.” Economic Journal.nyu. 39. no. (1979). (1979). pp. Porter. Economides. N. ii. at http://www. K. 317-327. (1986).edu/networks/phdcourse/Hotelling_Stability_in_comp etition. at http://www. 17.edu/networks/Nash_Equilibrium_in_Duopoly. “Stability in Competition.” European Economic Review. Stiglitz and C. (*) e. 41-57. “Finding All n-Firm Equilibria. Jaskold-Gabszewicz and J. J.” in J. 24. Asymmetric Cournot Games. “The Principle of Minimum Differentiation Revisited. “Stable Cartels. Thisse. at http://www. Von Stackelberg Paradigm. 25.pdf 2.nyu. (1929). vol. C. a. “Oligopoly and the Incentive for Horizontal Merger. pp. “On Hotelling’s ‘Stability in Competition’. W. D’Aspremont. F. N. Perry and R. Variety Differentiation 1. “On the Stability of Collusion. Equity and Efficiency. vol. Jaskold-Gabszewicz. Tirole. 2. Industrial Organization. Coordination and Coalition Formation 1. J. N.edu/networks/phdcourse/DAspremont_Gabszewicz_T hisse_On_Hotellings_Stability_in_Competition.pdf (*) 2. (1986). Duopoly a. (1984). vol. Economides.” American Economic Review. (1984). “A Model of Duopoly Suggesting a Theory of Entry Barriers. Collusion. Asymmetric Oligopoly Games. Oligopoly in Differentiated Products (2 weeks) i.” Bell Journal of Economics. Hotelling.stern.stern.pdf (*) b. at http://www.” International Economic Review. 1.) New Developments in the Analysis of Market Structure.edu/networks/The_Principle_of_Minimum_Differenti ation_Revisited. 277-282. 22.stern. Donsimoni. 219-227. D’Aspremont and J. 3. (1985). III.pdf (*) d. Dixit. pp. M.stern. 3.pdf (*) c. M. pp. vol. 47. 61-70.

U. (1979). 63-82. 297-308. 289-295.” American Economic Review. J.nyu.nyu.pd f (*) i.stern. Papers and Proceedings. Informational Advertising. Tirole. “Monopolistic Competition in the Spirit of Chamberlin: A General Model. 67. S.edu/networks/SeqlocAugust2002. 529-546.pdf (*) b. pp.” Review of Economic Studies. 298-300. 286-295.” Bell Journal of Economics. J.” Journal of Economic Theory. Industrial Organization. 217-236. 52.edu/networks/phdcourse/Spence_Product_selection. pp.Y. (1980). vol. 1. Sequential Decisions a. “Product Differentiation and Welfare.pdf (*) c. 10. (1977). Shapiro. “Equilibrium in Simple Spatial (or Differentiated Product) Models. (1985). Hart. “Informative Advertising with Differentiated Products. (*) 5 .edu/networks/phdcourse/Salop_Monopolistic_competi tion. vol. at http://www. no. 22. b. M.stern. pp.stern. Novshek. 407-414. (2002). Howell and S.nyu. 282-289 (*) f. Prescott and M. Market Failure.edu/networks/phdcourse/Dixit_Stiglitz_Monopolistic_ competition. Economides. vol. vol.pdf (*) e. (1989).nyu.141-156. Salop.” Bell Journal of Economics. 243-248. A. Industrial Organization. W. Spence. 66. at http://www. “Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity.stern. “Sequential Location Among Firms with Foresight.. vol. 1. Stiglitz. pp. Visscher.nyu. vol. Meza. N. vol. pp. pp. “Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods. Stern School of Business. “Does it Pay to be First? Sequential Locational Choice and Foreclosure. “Symmetric Equilibrium Existence and Optimality in Differentiated Products Markets. 178-194. Dixit and J. J. E. 3. Tirole. 106-126.nyu. (1989).” Journal of Economic Theory. (1989).” Review of Economic Studies. pp. pp. G. at http://www.b. pp. d. Spence. (1976). pp. 43.” American Economic Review. at http://www. O. (1984).stern.” Review of Economic Studies. M. h.pdf (*) 4. 2.stern. no. J. Economides.pdf j. 47. pp. vol.stern. “Product Selection. at http://www. (1977). Tirole. N. at http://www. Industrial Organization.pdf g. Grossman and C. vol.edu/networks/Symmetric_Equilibrium_Existence. (1976).nyu. at http://www. Fixed Costs and Monopolistic Competition. (1989).” Discussion Paper EC-0219. N. Moral Hazard a. 8.edu/networks/phdcourse/Spence_Product_differentiati on_and_welfare.edu/networks/phdcourse/Prescott_Visscher_Sequential _location.

stern. 2. 273-289.stern. 327-338.stern. Multi-product Firms a. (1990). 34-55.edu/networks/phdcourse/Shaked_Sutton_Relaxing_pri ce_competition. “Multiproduct Firms and Market Structure. vol. 6 . vol.stern.stern.pdf (*) c. pp. “Relaxing Price Competition Through Product Differentiation.edu/networks/Mussa_Rosen_Monopoly_and_Product_ Quality.edu/networks/Shaked_Sutton_Multiproduct_Firms. (1980). 18.pdf (*) b. (1978).edu/networks/Gabszewicz_Thisse_Price_Competition _Quality_and_Income_Disparities.Y.” Rand Journal of Economics. vol. pp.stern.-F. Tirole. at http://www. Shaked.” Journal of Economic Theory. Shaked and J. Shaked and J. at http://www. 340-359. (1995). pp.” Discussion Paper no. Jaskold-Gabszewicz and J. 3-14. Sutton. Mussa and S. d. at http://www. Perfect Competition and Monopoly a. Economides.nyu. no.nyu. 82. at http://www. Rosen. N.5. (1982). at http://www. (1989).pdf . Thisse. 39. Quality Differentiation 1. (1974). b. Stern School of Business. vol. “Entry (and Exit) in a Differentiated Industry.-F. J.edu/networks/phdcourse/Rosen_Hedonic_prices. vol. J.pdf (*) b. (*) 3. Thisse. 22. A.nyu.” Journal of Economic Theory. A. J. at http://www. 301-317. “On Product Quality. S.stern. Jaskold-Gabszewicz.nyu. 1.edu/networks/Gabszewicz_Shaked_Sutton_Thisse_Se gmenting_the_Market.” Review of Economic Studies. Duopoly and Income Disparities. at http://www. J.nyu. Jaskold-Gabszewicz and J. 296-298.U.edu/networks/Gabszewicz_Thisse_Entry_and_Exit_in _a_Differentiated_Industry. 21. vol. Sutton.pdf .pdf ii. 45-62. 20. “The Incentive of a Multiproduct Monopolist to Provide All Goods. Oligopoly a. “Hedonic Prices and Implicit Markets: Product Differentiation in Pure Competition. pp. “Segmenting the Market: The Monopolist’s Optimal Product Mix. M.nyu. 49. N. pp.” Journal of Political Economy.pdf . (1986). “Monopoly and Product Quality. Duopoly a. A. pp. pp.” Journal of Economic Theory. Thisse.-F. (1979). Industrial Organization.” Journal of Economic Theory. J. Rosen. Sutton and J. pp.nyu. EC-95-09. vol.

pdf IV. Gabszewicz. “Quality Variations in the Circular Model of Differentiated Products. vol. (1988). “The Division of Markets is Limited by the Extent of Liquidity.edu/networks/Quality_Variations_in_The_Circular_M odel_of_Differentiated_Products. pp. Wolsey.pdf d. pp. pp. 5. N.” American Economic Review. pp. (1989).nyu. N. Schwartz (ed. at http://www. (1983). Network Effects and Vertical Integration i. 235-257.” Journal of Regional Science vol. Economides and J.” American Economic Review. N.edu/networks/how.edu/networks/phdcourse/Shaked_Sutton_Natural_olig opolies. (1992). N. 82. at http://www. 23.pdf (*) d.pdf b. 2. “On Quality and Variety Competition. 38 (1998).-F. Schwartz. 10-18. “Electronic Call Market Trading.” Econometrica. 21-29.edu/networks/96-10.” Journal of Portfolio Management. New York: 1994. Ansari.stern. at http://www. 21. 19. 1469-1484. at http://www. pp. (1993). (1995). Economides and R. vol.stern. Economides and A. “Network Economics with Application to Finance.edu/networks/phdcourse/Klemperer_Head_to_head_c ompetition. 207-230. N.pdf c. Endogenous Market Creation (0. at http://www. A. (1995). N.edu/networks/Electronic_Call_Market_Trading. “Quality Variations and Maximal Product Differentiation. at http://www. (1990).nyu. 1. J.nyu. d. 51. vol. pp.nyu.nyu. pp. 78. Institutions & Instruments. D. at http://www.c. Shaked and J.edu/networks/Quality_Variations_and_Maximal_Vari ety_Differentiation. at http://www.nyu.stern. Econometrics and Optimization.” in Economic Decision-Making: Games.stern.nyu.edu/networks/aer88. Economides. “Natural Oligopolies. “Equilibrium Product Lines: Competing Head-to Head May be Less Competitive.pdf 4.5 weeks) a. P.pdf (*) b. Klemperer.” Regional Science and Urban Economics.” 7 .stern.nyu. vol. Neven and J. Economides.stern. J. Steckel. 108-121.” Regional Science and Urban Economics. vol. (1993). no.pdf e. Siow. 2. vol. 740-755.stern. Schwartz. 89-97.J. Economides.) Global Equity Markets. Coordination. N.” in R. no. “Equity Trading Practices and Market Structure: Assessing Asset Managers’ Demand for Immediacy. vol.A.stern.-F. “How to Enhance Market Liquidity. Economides and R. (1998) “The Max-Min-Min Principle of Product Differentiation. Thisse. Combination of Variety and Quality Differentiation a. Sutton.stern. Economides. no. Irwin Professional. pp. 4. N. Richard and L. no.nyu. at http://www.edu/networks/fmii93. A. 3 (Spring 1995). no. eds.” Financial Markets.pdf (*) c.

(1996). (1981).pdf ii.edu/networks/phdcourse/Farrell_Saloner_Standardiiza tion_compatibility_and_innovation.” Bell Journal of Economics. pp.” in Opening Networks to Competition: The Regulation and Pricing of Access. and C. “The Economics of Networks. “One-Way Networks. Economides. at http://www.nyu. J. Smith. at http://www.stern. (1986). pp. at http://www. at http://www. 12. at http://www. and Antitrust. Rohlfs. S. and Invitations to Enter.stern. 16. “A Theory of Interdependent Demand for a Communications Service. pp.U.nyu. J. (1995).stern. Compatibility.stern.” European Journal of Political Economy.” International Journal of Industrial Organization. 211-232. Complementarities.pdf (*) c.nyu.Y. at http://www.stern. Network Economics under Compatibility (1 week) a. and Innovation. pp. vol.stern. 5. “Standardization. (1974).edu/networks/Equity_Trading_Practices. “Critical Mass and Tariff Structure in Electronic Communications Markets. at http://www.edu/networks/93-14. pp. (1985).edu/networks/95-11. Tirole. at http://www. Choice of Compatibility (1 week) a.” Discussion Paper no.. EC-9511. Institutions & Instruments.nyu. Oren and S. Saloner.pdf c. vol. no. no. (1996). 404-409.pdf b.pdf (*) b.p df 3. vol. J.nyu.pdf (*) 8 .nyu. Economides. “Critical Mass and Network Size with Application to the US Fax Market. N. (*) 2. White. J. Farrell and G.edu/networks/94-24. vol.pdf d. 76. 12.stern. Industrial Organization. vol.J. The Economics of Compatibility and Networks 1. 14.” American Economic Review. N. “Network Externalities.edu/networks/phdcourse/Oren_Smith_Critical_mass. pp.stern. pp. (1996). Economides and L. Farrell and G. 940-955.” Bell Journal of Economics. Two-Way Networks. 1-47.edu/networks/phdcourse/Rohlfs_A_theory_of_interde pendent_demand. vol. 70-83. Introduction and Surveys (1 week) a. Economides. 2. 16-37. “Installed Base and Compatibility: Innovation.nyu. Product Pre-announcement.Financial Markets. 467-487.” Rand Journal of Economics. at http://www.stern. N. Saloner. N. N. 675-699. Kluwer Academic Press. and Predation. no. pp. 4.edu/networks/Network_externalities_EJPE_1996.pdf (*) b. 4.nyu.edu/networks/phdcourse/Farrell_Saloner_Installed_ba se_and_compatibility. vol. Stern School of Business. Himmelberg. David Gabel and David Weiman (eds). (1989).nyu. Compatibility. 2.

” Journal of Political Economy. A. Regibeau.nyu. 9-36. Economides. 549-570.nyu. “Market Structure in Network Industries. Shapiro. vol.5 weeks) a. at http://www.stern.) Shampine. 3.” at http://www.edu/networks/phdcourse/Katz_Shapiro_Network_exte rnalities_competition_and_compatibility.edu/networks/phdcourse/Katz_Sharpiro_Technology_ adoption. (1986). 54188.U. Stern School of Business. Vertical Structure with Network Effects (1 week) a.pdf (*) b. N. (1992). Competition and Compatibility. pp. (1985). Matutes and P. vol.” Journal of Law and Economics.. (1999). f. pp.nyu.” in (Ed. 822-841.edu/networks/tragic. “Mix and Match: Product Compatibility Without Network Externalities. Nova Science Publishers. Compatibility. Tirole. Economides.Y.p df 4. “Cooperation Among Competitors. N.nyu. “ mimeo.nyu. New York. at http://www. no. no.stern.” Journal of Industrial Economics. Woroch. vol.stern. vol. Flyer. at http://www. Rochet and J.c. and the Control of Interfaces. http://www. M. 219-234.pdf (*) e.edu/networks/phdcourse/Rochet_Tirole_Cooperation_ among_competitors. vol. N. pp. “Strategic Commitments and the Principle of Reciprocity in Interconnection Pricing. N. Technical Change with Network Effects (0. vol.stern. “Network Externalities.pdf 5.” Discussion Paper EC-98-02.nyu. at http://www.. 2. (1998). N. Saloner. (1983). (1988).edu/networks/Baxter_Bank_interchange_of_transactio nal_paper. “Bank Interchange of Transactional Paper: Legal and Economic Perspectives.edu/networks/98-02.stern. J.pdf (*) d. pp.pdf (*) d. J. (2003).pdf 9 . “Converters. Lopomo and G. W. 94. 26. 40. no. “Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities.pdf (*) c.” Rand Journal of Economics. pp. and F.edu/networks/phdcourse/Matutes_Regibeau_Mix_and _match. Economides.pdf (*) 6. pp.stern. 19. Baxter. Shapiro. Interconnection Pricing (1 week) a. G. at http://www.” American Economic Review. 33. C. Katz and C.edu/networks/phdcourse/Farrell_Saloner_Converters. Inc. 424-440.stern.stern. 75.nyu. M.stern.nyu.edu/networks/96-13. “The Tragic Inefficiency of M-ECPR. at http://www. 1.nyu. at http://www. Katz and C. Farrell and G. Economides.” Rand Journal of Economics. “Compatibility and Market Structure for Network Goods. Down to the Wire: Studies in the Diffusion and Regulation of Telecommunications Technologies.-C.

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