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PEOPLE V PINEDA

FACTS:
Defendants are charged with five criminal cases of murder by the City Fiscal. However,
two of the defendants moved to consolidate the five criminal cases into one and
disregard the other four. Their plea is that said cases arose out of the same incident and
motivated by one impulse. The respondent Judge approved the motion and directed the
City Fiscal to unify all the five criminal cases, and to file one single information and drop
the other four cases. The City Fiscal sought reconsideration thereof. . The respondent
Judge denied the motion to reconsider. Hence, City Fiscal, in behalf of the People,
moved this case for certiorari.
ISSUE
WON the certiorari should be granted

RULING
NO. The question of instituting a criminal charge is one addressed to the sound
discretion of the investigating Fiscal. It stands to reason then to say that in a clash of
views between the judge who did not investigate and the fiscal who did, or between the
fiscal and the offended party or the defendant, those of the Fiscal's should normally
prevail. In this regard, he cannot ordinarily be subject to dictation. It should not to be
understood as saying that criminal prosecution may not be blocked in exceptional
cases. A relief in equity "may be availed of to stop it purported enforcement of a criminal
law where it is necessary (a) for the orderly administration of justice; (b) to prevent the
use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner; (c) to avoid
multiplicity of actions; (d) to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights; and (e) in
proper cases, because the statute relied upon is unconstitutional or was 'held invalid.' "
Upon the record as it stands, the writ of certiorari prayed for is hereby granted

Misamin vs. San Juan (Adm Case 1418 August 31, 1976)

Facts: Herein respondent admits having appeared as


counsel for the New Cesars Bakery in the proceeding
before the NLRC while he held office as captain in the
Manila Metropolitan Police. Respondent contends that the
law did not prohibit him from such isolated exercise of his
profession. He contends that his appearance as counsel
while holding a government position is not among the
grounds provided by the Rules of Court for the suspension

or

removal

of

attorneys.

Issue: Whether or not the administrative case against the


defendant should prosper
Held: The court ruled in the negative. The court ruled that
the matter is to be decided in an administrative proceeding
as noted in the recommendation of the Solicitor General.
Nonetheless, the court held that while the charges have to
be dismissed, still it would not be inappropriate for
respondent member of the bar to avoid all appearances of
impropriety. Certainly, the fact that the suspicion could be
entertained that far from living true to the concept of a
public office being a public trust, he did make use, not so
much of whatever legal knowledge he possessed, but the
influence that laymen could assume was inherent in the
office held not only to frustrate the beneficent
statutory scheme that labor be justly compensated but
also to be at the beck and call of what the complainant
called alien interest, is a matter that should not pass
unnoticed. Respondent, in his future actuations as a
member of the bar should refrain from laying
himself open to such doubts and misgivings as to his
fitness not only for the position occupied by him but also
for membership in the bar. He is not worthy of
membership in an honorable profession who does not
even take care that hishonor remains unsullied.

VITRIOLO V DASIG
FACTS:
1.
This is an administrative case for disbarment filed against Atty. Felina S. Dasig,
an official of CHED. They allege Vitriolo committed acts that are grounds for disbarment under
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; attempted to extort sums of money; violated her oath
as attorney-at-law; instigated the commission of a crime; authored and sent to then President
Joseph Estrada a libelous and unfair report, which maligned the good names and reputation of
CHED Directors.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent attorney-at-law, may be disciplined by this Court for her malfeasance
violative of CPR 6.02
RULING:
Yes, said acts constitute a breach of Rule 6.02 of the Code which bars lawyers in government service
from promoting their private interests. Promotion of private interests includes soliciting gifts or anything of
monetary value in any transaction requiring the approval of his office or which may be affected by the
functions of his office. Respondent was found liable for gross misconduct and dishonesty in violation of the
Attorneys Oath as well as the Code of Professional Responsibility, and was ordered DISBARRED

DIANA RAMOS, complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSE R. IMBANG respondent.

Facts:
This is a disbarment or suspension case against Atty. Jose R. Imbang for multiple violations of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Ramos sought the assistance of Atty. Imbang in filing civil and criminal actions.
Ramos tried to attend the scheduled hearings of her cases against the Jovellanoses. Imbang never allowed
her to enter the courtroom and always told her to wait outside. He would then come out after several
hours to inform her that the hearing had been cancelled and rescheduled. This happened six times and for
each appearance in court, respondent charged her P350. Ramos was shocked to learn that Imbang never
filed any case against the Jovellanoses and that he was in fact employed in the Public Attorney's Office
(PAO)
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Imbang should be disbarred.
RULING:

YES, Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves with honesty and integrity. More specifically, lawyers in
government service are expected to be more conscientious of their actuations as they are subject to public
scrutiny. Every lawyer is obligated to uphold the law. This undertaking includes the observance of the
above-mentioned prohibitions blatantly violated by Imbang when he accepted the complainant's cases and
received attorney's fees in consideration of his legal services. Consequently, Imbang's acceptance of the

cases was also a breach of Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility because the prohibition on
the private practice of profession disqualified him from acting as Ramos' counsel.