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philoSOPHIA, Volume 1, Issue 2, 2011, pp. 239-250 (Article)
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DOI: 10.1353/phi.2011.0014

For additional information about this article
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/phi/summary/v001/1.2.huffer.html

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bomb. —Juana María Rodríguez What I put into words is no longer my possession. . it amounts to saying. This is not the text I intended to produce. Read the white spaces. something that lights up for a moment and then disappears into the series of events to which it belongs. even “at the edge of things”—“I am there as well. or little explosion. swirling through the ether like meteors. Look for multiple. and the shadows of the book—that “I” is fractured and dispossessed: “What I put into words is no longer my possession. Reach for “[t]hat voice at the edge of things. If we take this seriously. and it is not the same as the text you are reading. hear the silences. . the silences. rhizomatic readings. one that splits into questions directed at both the positive and the negative spaces of the book. or multiple bits of book. resistant. Both Hengehold and Winnubst offer a double focus. . peer into the shadows. in the spaces.” I am there as well. as Rodríguez implies: there are multiple books here. —Susan Howe In Mad for Foucault. Chapter_07. But if we think we might still find the “I” who wrote it.Foucault’s Bad Angels of History Lynne Huffer Do not believe everything I say. I make much of the Foucauldian image of book-asfirecracker.” I begin with an evocation of shattered light and the negative spaces it leaves in its wake as a way to organize my response to these inspiring and challenging commentaries on my engagement with Foucault and queer theory in Mad for Foucault.” Rodríguez says.indd 239 12/10/11 11:38 PM . look beyond the margins.

70). and in Part 3 I will explore another silence. Hengehold. In that context. But as I insist in my engagement with Judith Butler in Mad for Foucault. the objet a. But I also want to heed my interlocutors’ invitation to enter the spaces opened up by the book’s unsaids. psychoanalytically driven disruption of identity is not the same as Foucauldian desubjectivation. 373). the Lacanian Real.” First. That dialectical logic is reinforced by an analytical practice which. uses a psychoanalytic interpretive hermeneutic to unlock the unconscious of an analysand—in this case. like “a shadow in a daydream” (Foucault 1978. despite its obvious importance in Foucault’s thinking and in the story he tells about sexuality. the Borromean knot. and the drive can be deployed in myriad contexts for desubjectivating projects of various kinds. Winnubst raises some questions to contest my claims about the place of psychoanalysis in queer theory. we can see this most clearly if we contrast the undoing of subjectivity that madness signals with a Butlerian dialectical logic whereby the political agency of a subject is achieved by virtue of that subject’s failure to cohere as an identity. deathdriven antisocial thesis with “the austerity of a proto-Kantian code. Foucault—in order to reveal the disavowed “truth of the subject in the other who knows” (Foucault 1978. psychoanalysis is an “inexhaustible treasure hoard of experiences and concepts” (Foucault 1970.The positive space—that which leaps off the page. This is not to imply that everything has to be said. as if there were some absolute limit between speech and silence. Nor is it to suggest that.indd 240 12/10/11 11:38 PM . Queer Freudo-Foucauldianism Neither Foucauldian philosophy nor queer theory has paid much attention to History of Madness. provides a link between psychoanalysis and Kant via a queer ­Lacanian. regarding Winnubst’s assertion that many psychoanalytic concepts work toward the same desubjectivation I find in Foucault: I agree that from a certain perspective. 19) dispelled. In Mad for Foucault I argue that not only is anti-identitarian rupture different than Foucauldian desubjectivation. but the stakes of this difference are ethical. As Foucault puts it in The Order of Things. In resecuring the agency of the subject through the universalization 240    philoSophia Chapter_07. in response to Winnubst’s questions. One of the effects of bypassing Madness in both fields has been a lack of clarity about the role of psychoanalysis in Foucault’s critique of the Western subject and in queer antifoundationalist thinking about sexuality. along with ­anthropology. 1. especially in The Psychic Life of Power. the performative. that which makes Winnubst squirm and raises disagreements for Hengehold—is my discussion of the place of Freudo-Lacanian psychoanalysis in Foucault and in queer theory. once spoken. the silence that haunts me will disappear. I will treat this question of queer Freudo-Foucauldianism in Part 1 of my remarks below. for her part. In Part 2 I will address some of Hengehold’s concerns about my silence on Foucault and Kant. the historicity of race.

like Foucault. humanist project. 27). One notable exception to this approach to queer subjectivity is precisely the antisocial queer theory Hengehold references in her remarks. More directly to the point of psychoanalysis in Foucault. 164). 74). This amounts to a negative ethics at odds with Foucault’s conception of transgression as “nonpositive affirmation” (Foucault 1998b. the humanist subject is targeted and shattered as a violent speculative ideal. in particular. another historical alterity is rendered invisible: that alterity is “eclipsed” (Foucault 2006. her psychoanalytically driven conception of an intact subject with identity trouble has been nothing less than paradigmatic for many queer thinkers. In view of this difference between psychoanalytic identity-rupture and Foucauldian desubjectivation. Obviously. in No Future Edelman locates the “ethical value” of queerness in the negativity of “the social order’s death drive” (Edelman 2004. I would reiterate Hengehold’s worries about a death-driven Lacanianism subtended by an invisible but nonetheless real historical violence that an ahistorical psycholinguistic structuralism cannot account for. In the work of Leo Bersani and Lee Edelman. I argue that many queer theorists invested in performatively resecuring agency and knowledge are invested in a non-Foucauldian. and as I will argue in Part 2 on Kant. For example.of identity’s failures in an ahistorical conception of alterity that Butler and many other psychoanalytic queer theorists locate in the unconscious. tend to miss. something that queer Freudo-Foucauldians. of the ethical violence that is humanism. History of Madness makes a historical case for the philosophical argument of “A Preface to Transgression” to show that a psychoanalytic negative queer ethics simply situates erotic alternatives to heteronormative pathologization and reproductive futurism within the very psyche that secured those pathologies in the nineteenth century. 3). But if antisocial queer theorists are wary. Along these lines. oddly. as they hammer Chapter_07. to use Foucault’s word for the masking of unreason by the critical consciousness of madness. Further. their answer to the ethics question is an antisocial plunge into the abyss. This brings into view the ethical cost of agentive forms of subjectivity—including queer. In Kantian terms.indd 241 Foucault’s Bad Angels of History     241 12/10/11 11:38 PM . the Foucauldian critique of Kantian critique suggests that those conditions of possibility are not universal and transcendental but historical. I argue that queer Freudo-Foucauldians could be more reflective about the conditions of possibility of their own claims. these worries about psychoanalytic queer thinking do not amount to a demand that we ban psychoanalytic thinking (as if such a thing could be done)! My claim is simply that in queer theory “unreflective amalgamations of Freud with Foucault need to be questioned” (Huffer 2010. And although Butler’s relation to both humanism and queer theory is vexed. kinky ones—that are built on the backs of an alterity—what Irigaray might call the Other of the Other (Irigaray 1985)—that Foucault encounters as an already dead subject in the “infamous lives” struck down and turned to ashes in the archive (Foucault 2000).

police reports. asking about Kant’s place in Madness becomes less an investigation of Kant’s philosophical system as it appears in Foucault than an inquiry into the relation between Foucault’s ethical practice as a thinker and his distinct. which Foucault famously mentions as part of Nietzsche’s work in “What Is An Author?” As an ethical question. and Hegel’s Phenomenology on the same plane as artistic and literary works. To draw on the Benjaminian repertoire of images Hengehold invokes with the figure of a Foucauldian angel of history watching the wreckage with something like love.indd 242 12/10/11 11:38 PM . what is the place of Kant—the quintessential modern philosopher of reason—in a history of madness? This question reframes a tension in my book between what Winnubst calls “figure-centered scholarship.” as the other rationalists I name: Descartes.” on the one hand and. we must do a genealogy of our own psychoanalytic and anthropological knowledge. but it is how we think from within that matters. not only to psychoanalysis but also to Kant. from an ethical perspective. proposals for reform. That universalization of psychic alterity not only makes Freudo-Foucauldians Kantian in a pre-Foucauldian sense—that is. Foucault may be an angel. theoretically. royal edicts. Hengehold argues that “Kant is [as] crucial to the story [I tell]. 35)—but it is also ethically problematic. Specifically. 5) normativity-resisting psyche. but he’s also a rag picker: the historian-poet who finds in the “trash” of modernity as it existed in the “actuality of everyday life” the same resources of critical possibility as those 242    philoSophia Chapter_07. they’ve missed the Foucauldian transformation of the transcendental a priori into the historical a priori (Allen 2008. democratizing. statistical inventories. architectural plans. on the other. like the rise of “man. archival desubjectivation that puts Descartes’s Meditations. correspondingly. kinda hegemonic” (Sedgwick and Frank 1995. 3). No one can stand outside psyche-logos any more than one can stand outside the transcendental-empirical doublet that defines the modern episteme. and. 2. Foucault’s response.” must be historicized. Kantian Reason in a History of Madness In recounting the story I tell in Mad for Foucault about the silencing of unreason in the Classical Age. This forces us. “queers us all” (Dean and Lane 2001. medical treatises. We have no choice but to think from within. and Freud. hospital regulations and rules of order. Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. as Tim Dean and Christopher Lane put it. indeed unique philosophico-historical archival practice. is that the rise of the psyche. a horizontalizing. Nietzsche’s laundry list. physician’s case histories. Let me begin here with a question inspired by what I view as Foucault’s commitment to history as an ethical practice. to confront ethics as a historical question.away at what Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and Adam Frank call a “kinda subversive. Hegel. Many psychoanalytic queer theorists want to think from within the psyche as an ahistorical site of alterity and rupture that.

He is crucial. I mention him once. as Hengehold puts it. is part of a dedialectizing horizontalization of the conceptual and practical resources on which we draw for thinking. in fact. archival.indd 243 Foucault’s Bad Angels of History     243 12/10/11 11:38 PM . he is also crucial. 79) —the language of the side-by-side that fractures the philosophical subject and opens the possibility of the mad philosopher—Kant emerges as a discursive. but in Part I. In a second appearance.” He cites it. we might see Kant in Madness as one of the fragmented bits of firecracker residue in a historical spatialization of thought rendered formless by the alterity of time. even though Kant had demonstrated the division between them” (Foucault 1970. In this chapter. not in its “final” form when Kant incorporated it into The Conflict of the Faculties (1798). Foucault calls this spatiotemporal hammering of thought “eventialization”: the bringing to light of ruptures of evidence that give us “history” not with a Sartrean capital H. . in footnote 8 on page 300. . 128) that overly simplifies retrospective descriptions of madness during this period. But if Kant is marginalized in Madness.” That trash-sifting ars erotica works to undo the Kantian transcendentalempirical doublet “whose confusion. Foucault names him twice. Kant is a peripheral figure both in my book and in History of Madness.we can find in Kantian critique. epistolary scrap of Kant. “runs through thought from the early nineteenth century.” at the heart of the seventeenth-century Great Confinement. as Hengehold argues. is “On the Power of the Mind to Master its Morbid Feelings by Sheer Resolution. The text Foucault mentions. Foucault blames the Kantian Aufklärung for creating a “mythical unity” (Foucault 2006. Kant emerges here not at the end of Madness as we might expect.” Foucault says. So how exactly are these Kant fragments reconfigured in Madness? In Madness—in “a language stripped of dialectics” (Foucault 1998b. significantly. Foucault is a philosophical rag picker whose commitment to history as an ethical practice engages him in an erotic art that is. Christoph Wilhelm Friedrich Hufeland. characterized only by a Great Confinement and a Cartesian lockdown that excludes madness from reason. in “Experiences of Madness. but as the Nietzschean ­emergence of forces called genealogy. on pages 123 and 126 in the new English translation of his 600-page History of Madness. 1 Thus. Significantly. but in its raw appearance as a letter Kant sent in response to the eminent German physician. 341). throughout his work. Foucault’s approach to Kant in Madness and. I would argue. “ethically solicitous of the multiplicity in ourselves and others. the unity of the Aufklärung’s backward glance masks a split or fracture between two different conceptions and experiences of Chapter_07. only in a footnote. Specifically. precisely in his demotion to something other than an Enlightenment philosopher-king. Kant complicates the unnuanced story Foucault’s less attentive interpreters often tell about a Classical History of Madness that is purely repressive. regarding the role of medical authority in assessments of insanity. at its late-eighteenth-century chronological close.

Indeed. We will miss. Rather. the book’s purpose is to rethink queer theory’s Foucauldian foundations by redirecting the sexuality question from Sexuality One to Madness. to make such a claim would be to reauthorize him with an “eminent sovereignty” (Foucault 2006. Indeed. how the racialization of the Age of Reason might alter the specifically Foucauldian historicity I theorize. the light-bringing Kantian system is epistemologically and ethically unstable. 3. Kant does matter.3 It is precisely Foucault’s archival method—an ars erotica he performs in the humanist trash heap of history—that fractures the philosophical subject of reason and opens the possibility of an other-than-Kantian. for example. Queering Race in Foucault Winnubst worries about the absence of race in my account of queer theory and asks. and so on. But in asking how he matters. This is not to say that Kant is responsible for both the split and the Aufklärung unification or synthesis into what Foucault calls “the positivist medicine of the 19th century” (128). xxxviii) at odds with a desubjectivating archiveology 2 that leaves bits of “Kant” scattered across an Enlightenment landscape strewn with the traces of famous and infamous lives alike. as the subtitle suggests. in Madness and elsewhere. the paradoxical twists of time through which a physician’s ethics manual written by Kant’s eminent correspondent. In responding to this concern. conceptual. in that context. the archives Foucault consulted in writing 244    philoSophia Chapter_07. nor is it an archiveology of queer sex. indirectly. postmoral ethics. to Foucault’s philosophical challenge to the rational morality of a humanism many of Foucault’s most eminent detractors continue to defend in synthesizing Kantian terms. the love letters to Jean Barraqué. unpublished lecture courses. epistolary appearance suggests is that. the book’s other archives are. I want to clarify that the purpose of my book is not to do a genealogy of queer theory per se: it is not an excavation of the queer archive. my only archive is the one that bears Foucault’s name—the unpublished interviews. if we only focus on the systematic. What Kant’s elusive. rag-picking practice will be distorted. First. our picture of Foucault’s ethics as a historical. conceptual “work” of “Kant” as he relates to “Foucault” in that great evolutionary “chain of being” called Western philosophy. I will start with the question of the historicity of the archive as it informs my account of queer theory and then move to the question of race specifically.indd 244 12/10/11 11:38 PM . as I conceive it. Hufeland. Viewed from this perspective. ends up being cited as justification for the Nazi Final Solution. finely differentiated consciousness of madness aligned with an older tradition of Christian canon law.madness in the Classical Age: one that is social and practical—an avatar of the repressive Cartesian logic of the Great Confinement—and another that is juridico-medical—a productive. as a historical question.

and various hospital archives throughout France relating to the internment of the mad and the ordering of the social world in the Classical Age. of Kant and the traces of the lives locked up in Bicêtre. 289–90). performs an archiveology of its own in its engagement with the few unpublished. Differentiating himself from structuralists. “On the Ways of Writing History”: “My object is not language but the archive. is not akin either to geology (as the analysis of substrata) or to genealogy (as the description of beginnings and successions). or a demand for a counter-memory as an alternative “description of beginnings and successions. conceptually. 254). methodologically. Archeology. and the Salpétrière.History of Madness: primary documents from the Bastille. As Foucault puts it in a 1967 interview. and those discourses can be anything from a Henry James novel to cybersex chat rooms to Aristotle’s Physics to Halberstam’s “silly archive” of Hollywood cartoon characters such as Nemo. indeed historian’s sense: not official histories or published books that are codified as part of our store of knowledge.” From the perspective of genealogy in the Nietzschean sense. the Parliamentary Archives. In light of these clarifications. This clarification highlights a second. 294). 253). but the cast-off remains of an official past (Huffer 2010. I want to suggest that Winnubst’s questions about the historicity of my queer archive may be somewhat at odds with a conception of archival genealogy as an engagement with the accumulated existence of the cast-off remains of history. that understanding of the archive is crucial to the methodological point I made earlier about the dedialectizing language of the famous and the infamous. the Archives of Public Assistance. cast-off remains of the Chapter_07.indd 245 Foucault’s Bad Angels of History     245 12/10/11 11:38 PM . it is the analysis of discourse in its archival form” (Foucault 1998a. This leads me to ask if Winnubst’s question about race—“What happens if we begin with a very different genealogy of queer theory?”—is a genealogical question in the Nietzschean sense to which Foucault refers. how Foucault’s readers can understand genealogy as a Nietzschean archival practice and also. intensified locus of the violence of rationalist morality because it is in the archive understood in that sense that we see the traces of life struck down and passed into knowledge (Huffer 2010. St Lazarre. As the site where those cast-off remains are deposited. which is to say. the Bibliothèque de l’Arsenal. Third. But I mean archive in a very particular. I see my book as a double intervention into historical archiveology: it both clarifies. the archive is a particularly dense. technical point about invocations of historicity: I know the word archive has come to be used in the broadest sense possible—to reference the discourses we use to make our arguments. Foucault continues: “My archeology owes more to Nietzschean genealogy than to ­structuralism properly so called” (Foucault 1998a. as I understand it. the Bibliothèque Nationale de France. the National Assembly archives. the accumulated existence of discourses. Foucauldian.

Freudianism). in my account of queer theory. To be sure. but the relation between sexual freedom and gender normativity—between queer and feminist—can be read in other-than-repressive terms through Madness’s story about reason’s relation to sexual morality. where queer sexuality frees itself from a normative. my archiveology of Foucault demonstrates that the queer feminist split stems from a story driven by what we might call a Cartesian.” This canonical story is not “my” story about queer theory. just as I think. as “hermaphrodites with attitude.” My “Foucault” archive. is relatively limited. then. This renarration of the story I tell about feminism and queer theory is related to Winnubst’s questions about race in my discussion of Foucault’s intellectual habitus. In this way the canonical story about the feminist birth of queer theory as sexuality’s split from gender and morality can be retold as a story about the queer as a non-self-identical split from reason that leaves the question of ethics unaddressed. and in History of Madness. there are important reasons for speaking as women. they both disregard the nuances of Foucault’s thinking. repeating in 2006 a move made by Gayle Rubin (Rubin 1993) in the mid 1980s. around 1990. thereby establishing “sexuality” as a field of study distinct from “gender. not for the identity-rupturing reasons queer theorists have put forward. in certain contexts. and as subalterns of various kinds. how the racialization of the Age of Reason might alter its historicity in History of Madness is an important question. is the canonical story about queer Foucauldians who split from feminism.indd 246 12/10/11 11:38 PM . Certainly.” “the traces left by words that were spoken. Not only are gender and sexuality part of the same configuration Foucault calls a dense transfer point of power. there are important political reasons for speaking as queers of color. moralistic.” as people with disabilities. feminist gender. But these categories are philosophically fraught. yes and no logic of the repressive hypothesis (namely. I do agree that in its production as an identity-formation such as “queer of color. Specifically.official “Foucault”: “discourse in its archival form. takes a queer “break from feminism” (Halley 2006) precisely in reaction to what she calls a pervasive feminist moralism. This logic helps to explain why Janet Halley. But I use this double intervention—archiveology as both a concept and a method—to disrupt the story official queer theory tells about itself as a story of beginnings and successions. 4 Although I do not agree with Winnubst that race is a quintessentially American concept. but because of Foucault’s historical argument about the inseparability of race and sexuality in the productive mode 246    philoSophia Chapter_07. That story. the one I take up. but I retell it as a way to focus on the problem of ethics in queer theory. Although both Halley’s and Rubin’s moves are authorized by invocations of Foucault.” race takes on a specifically American meaning that grows out of an American identity politics I distinguish in the book from the French republicanism that informs Foucault’s views.

In Mad for Foucault I ask about this lacuna in queer theory and. “History is only possible. 124): “a space in which it is once more possible to think” (Foucault 1970. There he find the traces of an asymmetrical biopolitics that fosters the life of some at the expense of others. again and again. Madness “itself ” is an alterity that cannot speak and to make it speak is to betray it. as it is in the negativity of Edelman’s future-less ethics. Oddly. 537). a Butlerian reading of biopower as a denial of death in modernity that simply misses what Foucault actually says about the modern eugenic ordering of life (Foucault 1978. 124). more than any other of Foucault’s books. again and again. have tended to miss in their focus on discourse and disciplinary power. we see that collapse as Nietzsche slumped over or flinging his arms around the neck of a horse: the shattered subject Foucault evokes in “A Preface to Transgression” as “the cries of the madman in the streets of Chapter_07. “against the backdrop of the absence of history” (Foucault 2006. as both promise and task” (Foucault 1970. That sexualized and racialized ordering of life is the violent “history of the present” Foucault writes and rewrites. 342). 342).indd 247 Foucault’s Bad Angels of History     247 12/10/11 11:38 PM . this historical point Foucault makes in what we might call the bible of queer theory—The History of Sexuality: Volume One—is a point most queer theorists. specifically. 138). in The Order of Things. No critique—including that of queers of color—will make those infamous. . the racial other—is a haunting. through an ars erotica performed in the archival site of that violence. as so many police reports. case studies. In this end-as-beginning it is worth remembering that insistent point about a future thinking which comes out of the collapse of thought. as a Nietzschean collapse of thought—gives us. a “future. that stuns us with the implications of this nonredemptive conception of history writing. To believe this can be done is to indulge in a Kantian “anthropological illusion” and a Hegelian redemptive conception of history that Foucault spent his life dismantling. . but it is what Foucault calls on the last page of Madness a “question without an answer” (Foucault 2006. 141) where the “ancient right to take life or let live” is superseded by “a power to foster life or disallow it to the point of death” (Foucault 1978. irresolvable historical question. In its tragic mode. which opens “an unhealable wound that the world is forced to address” (Foucault 2006.” he writes. That unanswerable ethical question—figured by Foucault. xxxi) that is the archive of madness. 537). Our ethical relation to that eclipsed other—the sexual other. “disallowed” historical others that unreason names live again. and psychology textbooks have done.of power he links to biopower. including queer theorists of color. 144): a distribution of the living made possible by “the entry of life into history” (Foucault 1978. but rather what Foucault calls in his 1961 complementary thesis on Kant’s Anthropology “that camber and knot in time when the end is in fact the beginning” (Foucault 2008. And it is History of Madness. That future “is not an end” (Foucault 2008.

of Dionysos. xxiv). Sheth articulates a link between race and a psychiatric conception of madness as deviance that plays itself out as “new forms of ‘ethnic racism’ in the U. its instability. I’ve tried to restore to queer theory’s ground the Foucauldian disturbance of “its rifts. and McWhorter traces a Foucauldian genealogy of race and sexuality in 248    philoSophia Chapter_07. of the Return” in order to be awakened from the “confused sleep of dialectics and of anthropology” (Foucault 1998b. dissolve with laughter as Diogenes the Cynic “pisses on the guests like a dog” (in Huffer 2010. xxiv): its sodomites and heretics. of the Superman approaching with the steps of a dove. Two philosophical works on race that seem especially relevant to the concerns I raise in Mad for Foucault are Falguni Sheth’s Toward a Political Philosophy of Race and Ladelle McWhorter’s Racism and Sexual Oppression in Anglo-America. Stuart Elden coins this term to describe Foucault’s uniquely philosophical archival practice in Mapping the Present (Elden 2001. 266). Hufeland’s ethical manual for doctors. and vagabonds. its flaws” (Foucault 1970. was published in 1939 with an introduction by the Nazi doctor. 270). of the death of God. of the philosopher’s hammer. As Roberto Esposito points out in Bíos. Western philosophy needed “the Nietzschean figures of tragedy. I know this braying laughter is unsettling. 3. substituted “the play of contradiction and totality” for “the questioning of being and limits” we find in “transgression” (Foucault 1998b. What I offer in Mad for Foucault is less a counter-memory of queer theory than a peculiarly Foucauldian restoration of a soil those bad angels of history 5 can make stir again under our feet (Foucault 1970. or that of his equally militant fame-mocking Cynic. In “A Preface to Transgression. his students. There the tragic. 81). The Physician’s Ethos. 2. but I think we need the ­disturbance it brings. —Emory University Notes 1. 76).” in the echo-less “I-A of the Nietzschean ass” (Foucault 1998b.indd 248 12/10/11 11:38 PM . rag-picking angel of history makes us. In that spirit. right to the end as he’s dying of AIDS. And I’ve tried to perform this passion play in the serious and ludic mode Foucault teaches. who oversaw the distribution of Zyklon-B at Auschwitz and was later condemned and executed at Nuremberg. its witches and hermaphrodites. 267) of a dialectical thinking that still clings to metaphysics after Kant’s own critical opening and anthropological closing of Western thought. Joachim Mrugowsky. 279).” Foucault writes. 95).Turin” (Foucault 1998b. 76). blasphemers. in his final lecture course on the ancient Cynics. In its ludic mode. we hear it in the laughter of Foucault’s militant hysteric. or again in “A Preface to Transgression.” Foucault blames Kant for the “indefinite respite” (Foucault 1998b. 4. its onanists. “Dialectics. beggars.S” (Sheth 2009.

Mapping the Present: Heidegger. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e). 1978. Autonomy. New York: New Press. Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology. 88). Vol. 2000. “Lives of Infamous Men. Howe. “like ­homosexuality itself ” (Foucault 2006.” In Homosexuality and Psychoanalysis. Foucault. Foucault contrasts a premodern juridical authority grounded in religious law—sodomites are also heretics—with the “purely moral grounds” on which later condemnations of sodomy. 1: An Introduction. Edelman. Tim. Foucault. Durham: Duke University Press. 279–96. 319. Stuart. 1985. Judith. Roberto. Stanford: Stanford University Press. “Homosexuality and Psychoanalysis: An Introduction. 14). the author of a Tableau de l’inconstance des mauvais anges [Tableau of the Inconstancy of Bad Angels] (1612). ed. ed. 1998a. . Princeton: Princeton University Press. 2001. New York: Columbia University Press.” In Essential Works of Foucault. 2008. Paul Rabinow. Translated by Jonathan Murphy and Jean Khalfa. 1998b. Esposito. 157–75. Translated by Roberto Nigro and Kate Briggs. 2008. New York: Vintage. and the Project of a Spatial History. . 2006. “On the Ways of Writing History.” In Essential Works of Foucault. Michel. Bíos: Biopolitics and Philosophy. In History of Madness. New York: Random House. 1954–1984 2. 2001. No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive. New York: New Press. and Gender in Contemporary Political Theory. Split Decisions: How and Why to Take a Break from Feminism. and Christopher Lane. ed. Amy. Elden. were based. Janet. My Emily Dickenson. 605n20) to Pierre de Lancre. .indd 249 Foucault’s Bad Angels of History     249 12/10/11 11:38 PM . Butler. Dean. ed. 5.” In Essential Works of Foucault. 1970. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Translated by Robert Hurley. .Anglo-America in order to argue that they “are utterly inseparable”: “historically codependent and mutually determinative” (McWhorter 2009. . Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Berkeley: North Atlantic. 1954–1984 3. Chapter_07. London: Routledge. “A Preface to Transgression. New York: New Press. Foucault refers three times (12. 2004. 1954–1984 2. 3–42. 2008. History of Madness. 69–88. London: Continuum. which describes the condemnation of sodomites and witches as heretics in the Renaissance. 2006. The Politics of Ourselves: Power. The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection. The History of Sexuality. 1997. . Paul Rabinow. Susan. Bibliography Allen. Halley. Lee. The Order of Things: An Archeology of the Human Sciences. Translated by Timothy ­Campbell. Paul Rabinow. Tim Dean and Christopher Lane.

1–44. Juana María. New York: New York University Press. 250    philoSophia Chapter_07. 2009. Falguni. Toward a Political Philosophy of Race. Albany: State University of New York Press. Mad for Foucault: Rethinking the Foundations of Queer Theory.indd 250 12/10/11 11:38 PM . Queer Latinidad: Identity Practices. 1995. 2010. Ladelle. Racism and Sexual Oppression in Anglo-America: A Genealogy. Rodriguéz. 1993. and David M. 2009. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Speculum of the Other Woman. 1985. Lynne. Luce. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Sheth.Huffer. 2003. Henry Abelove. and Adam Frank. Rubin. Sedgwick. Discursive Spaces. Shame and Its Sisters: A Silvan Tomkins Reader. Halperin. Gayle. McWhorter. Translated by Gillian Gill.” In The Lesbian and Gay Studies Reader. “Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality. Eve Kosofsky. New York: Routledge. ed. Michèle Aina Barale. Irigaray. New York: Columbia University Press. Durham: Duke University Press.