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RODULFO MUNSOD, petitioners,
L.S. Osorio & P.B. Castillo and J.C. Espinas & Associates for petitioners.
Demetrio B. Salem & Associates for private respondent.

The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (hereinafter referred to as PBMEO) is a legitimate labor
union composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners Nicanor Tolentino,
Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo
Munsod are officers and members of the petitioner Union.
Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969, in
protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be participated in by the workers in the first shift (from 6 A.M. to 2
P.M.) as well as those in the regular second and third shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M., respectively);
and that they informed the respondent Company of their proposed demonstration.
The questioned order dated September 15, 1969, of Associate Judge Joaquin M. Salvador of the respondent Court
reproduced the following stipulation of facts of the parties — parties —
3. That on March 2, 1969 complainant company learned of the projected mass demonstration at
Malacañang in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig Police Department to be participated by the
first shift (6:00 AM-2:00 PM) workers as well as those working in the regular shifts (7:00 A.M. to 4:00 PM
and 8:00 AM to 5:00 PM) in the morning of March 4, 1969;
4. That a meeting was called by the Company on March 3, 1969 at about 11:00 A.M. at the Company's
canteen, and those present were: for the Company: (1) Mr. Arthur L. Ang (2) Atty. S. de Leon, Jr., (3) and
all department and section heads. For the PBMEO (1) Florencio Padrigano, (2) Rufino Roxas, (3)
Mariano de Leon, (4) Asencion Paciente, (5) Bonifacio Vacuna and (6) Benjamin Pagcu.
5. That the Company asked the union panel to confirm or deny said projected mass demonstration at
Malacañang on March 4, 1969. PBMEO thru Benjamin Pagcu who acted as spokesman of the union
panel, confirmed the planned demonstration and stated that the demonstration or rally cannot be
cancelled because it has already been agreed upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained further that the
demonstration has nothing to do with the Company because the union has no quarrel or dispute with
6. That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO that the
demonstration is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized,
however, that any demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the
Company. For which reason, the Company, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon warned the PBMEO representatives
that workers who belong to the first and regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence approved
by the Company, particularly , the officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall
fail to report for work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure is a
violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike;
7. That at about 5:00 P.M. on March 3, 1969, another meeting was convoked Company represented by
Atty. C.S. de Leon, Jr. The Union panel was composed of: Nicanor Tolentino, Rodolfo Munsod, Benjamin
Pagcu and Florencio Padrigano. In this afternoon meeting of March 3, 1969, Company reiterated and
appealed to the PBMEO representatives that while all workers may join the Malacañang demonstration,
the workers for the first and regular shift of March 4, 1969 should be excused from joining the
demonstration and should report for work; and thus utilize the workers in the 2nd and 3rd shifts in order
not to violate the provisions of the CBA, particularly Article XXIV: NO LOCKOUT — NO STRIKE'. All
those who will not follow this warning of the Company shall be dismiss; De Leon reiterated the

Company's warning that the officers shall be primarily liable being the organizers of the mass
demonstration. The union panel countered that it was rather too late to change their plans inasmuch as
the Malacañang demonstration will be held the following morning; and
8. That a certain Mr. Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of PBMEO sent a cablegram to the Company which was
received 9:50 A.M., March 4, 1969, the contents of which are as follows: 'REITERATING REQUEST
"F", pp. 42-43, rec.)
Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with the demonstration despite the pleas of the
respondent Company that the first shift workers should not be required to participate in the demonstration and that the
workers in the second and third shifts should be utilized for the demonstration from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on March 4, 1969,
respondent Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on March 4, 1969, with the respondent Court, a charge against
petitioners and other employees who composed the first shift, charging them with a "violation of Section 4(a)-6 in relation to
Sections 13 and 14, as well as Section 15, all of Republic Act No. 875, and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No
Lockout.' " (Annex "A", pp. 19-20, rec.). The charge was accompanied by the joint affidavit of Arthur L. Ang and Cesareo de
Leon, Jr. (Annex "B", pp. 21-24, rec.). Thereafter, a corresponding complaint was filed, dated April 18, 1969, by Acting Chief
Prosecutor Antonio T. Tirona and Acting Prosecutor Linda P. Ilagan (Annex "C", pp. 25-30, rec.)
In their answer, dated May 9, 1969, herein petitioners claim that they did not violate the existing CBA because they gave the
respondent Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on March 4, 1969; that the said mass demonstration was a
valid exercise of their constitutional freedom of speech against the alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen; and that their
mass demonstration was not a declaration of strike because it was not directed against the respondent firm (Annex "D", pp.
31-34, rec.)
After considering the aforementioned stipulation of facts submitted by the parties, Judge Joaquin M. Salvador, in an order
dated September 15, 1969, found herein petitioner PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad faith and herein petitioners Florencio
Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu, Nicanor Tolentino and
Rodulfo Munsod as directly responsible for perpetrating the said unfair labor practice and were, as a consequence,
considered to have lost their status as employees of the respondent Company (Annex "F", pp. 42-56, rec.)
Herein petitioners claim that they received on September 23, 1969, the aforesaid order (p. 11, rec.); and that they filed on
September 29, 1969, because September 28, 1969 fell on Sunday (p. 59, rec.), a motion for reconsideration of said order
dated September 15, 1969, on the ground that it is contrary to law and the evidence, as well as asked for ten (10) days
within which to file their arguments pursuant to Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the Rules of the CIR, as amended (Annex "G", pp.
57-60, rec. )
In its opposition dated October 7, 1969, filed on October 11, 1969 (p. 63, rec.), respondent Company averred that herein
petitioners received on September 22, 1969, the order dated September 17 (should be September 15), 1969; that under
Section 15 of the amended Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations, herein petitioners had five (5) days from September
22, 1969 or until September 27, 1969, within which to file their motion for reconsideration; and that because their motion for
reconsideration was two (2) days late, it should be accordingly dismissed, invoking Bien vs. Castillo, 1 which held among

others, that a motion for extension of the five-day period for the filing of a motion for reconsideration
should be filed before the said five-day period elapses (Annex "M", pp. 61-64, rec.).
Subsequently, herein petitioners filed on October 14, 1969 their written arguments dated October 11, 1969, in support of
their motion for reconsideration (Annex "I", pp. 65-73, rec.).
In a resolution dated October 9, 1969, the respondent en banc dismissed the motion for reconsideration of herein petitioners
for being pro forma as it was filed beyond the reglementary period prescribed by its Rules (Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.), which
herein petitioners received on October 28, 196 (pp. 12 & 76, rec.).
At the bottom of the notice of the order dated October 9, 1969, which was released on October 24, 1969 and addressed to
the counsels of the parties (pp. 75-76, rec.), appear the requirements of Sections 15, 16 and 17, as amended, of the Rules
of the Court of Industrial Relations, that a motion for reconsideration shall be filed within five (5) days from receipt of its
decision or order and that an appeal from the decision, resolution or order of the C.I.R., sitting en banc, shall be perfected
within ten (10) days from receipt thereof (p. 76, rec.).
On October 31, 1969, herein petitioners filed with the respondent court a petition for relief from the order dated October 9,
1969, on the ground that their failure to file their motion for reconsideration on time was due to excusable negligence and

honest mistake committed by the president of the petitioner Union and of the office clerk of their counsel, attaching thereto
the affidavits of the said president and clerk (Annexes "K", "K-1" and "K-2", rec.).
Without waiting for any resolution on their petition for relief from the order dated October 9, 1969, herein petitioners filed on
November 3, 1969, with the Supreme Court, a notice of appeal (Annex "L", pp. 88-89, rec.).
There is need of briefly restating basic concepts and principles which underlie the issues posed by the case at bar.
(1) In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity and worth of the human personality is the central core
as well as the cardinal article of faith of our civilization. The inviolable character of man as an individual must be "protected
to the largest possible extent in his thoughts and in his beliefs as the citadel of his person." 2
(2) The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and security "against the assaults of opportunism,
the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small encroachments, and the scorn and derision of those who have no
patience with general principles." 3
In the pithy language of Mr. Justice Robert Jackson, the purpose of the Bill of Rights is to withdraw "certain subjects from the
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials, and to establish them as legal
principles to be applied by the courts. One's rights to life, liberty and property, to free speech, or free press, freedom of
worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to a vote; they depend on the outcome of no
elections." 4 Laski proclaimed that "the happiness of the individual, not the well-being of the State, was the

criterion by which its behaviour was to be judged. His interests, not its power, set the limits to the authority
it was entitled to exercise." 5
(3) The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to petition are included among the immunities reserved
by the sovereign people, in the rhetorical aphorism of Justice Holmes, to protect the ideas that we abhor or hate more than
the ideas we cherish; or as Socrates insinuated, not only to protect the minority who want to talk, but also to benefit the
majority who refuse to listen. 6 And as Justice Douglas cogently stresses it, the liberties of one are the liberties

of all; and the liberties of one are not safe unless the liberties of all are protected. 7
(4) The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but also political rights essential to
man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the citizens can
participate not merely in the periodic establishment of the government through their suffrage but also in the administration of
public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public officers. The citizen is accorded these rights so that he can appeal
to the appropriate governmental officers or agencies for redress and protection as well as for the imposition of the lawful
sanctions on erring public officers and employees.
(5) While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is
recognized. 8 Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our

society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application
of sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive," permitting government regulation only "with narrow
specificity." 9
Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. If human rights are
extinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power of government and ceases
to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the influential and powerful, and of oligarchs —
political, economic or otherwise.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are
essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; 10 and such priority "gives these liberties

the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions."


The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact that a mere reasonable or rational relation
between the means employed by the law and its object or purpose — that the law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor
oppressive — would suffice to validate a law which restricts or impairs property rights. 12 On the other hand, a

constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely existence

of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. So it has
been stressed in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Fernando in Gonzales vs. Comelec and reiterated by the
writer of the opinion inImbong vs. Ferrer. 13 It should be added that Mr. Justice Barredo in Gonzales vs.
Comelec, supra, like Justices Douglas, Black and Goldberg in N.Y. Times Co. vs. Sullivan, 14 believes that
the freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of
grievances are absolute when directed against public officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to
choose the men and women by whom we shall be governed," 15 even as Mr. Justice Castro relies on the
balancing-of-interests test. 16 Chief Justice Vinson is partial to the improbable danger rule formulated by
Chief Judge Learned Hand, viz. — whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies
such invasion of free expression as is necessary to avoid the danger. 17
The respondent Court of Industrial Relations, after opining that the mass demonstration was not a declaration of strike,
concluded that by their "concerted act and the occurrence temporary stoppage of work," herein petitioners are guilty
bargaining in bad faith and hence violated the collective bargaining agreement with private respondent Philippine Blooming
Mills Co., inc.. Set against and tested by foregoing principles governing a democratic society, such conclusion cannot be
sustained. The demonstration held petitioners on March 4, 1969 before Malacañang was against alleged abuses of some
Pasig policemen, not against their employer, herein private respondent firm, said demonstrate was purely and completely an
exercise of their freedom expression in general and of their right of assembly and petition for redress of grievances in
particular before appropriate governmental agency, the Chief Executive, again the police officers of the municipality of
Pasig. They exercise their civil and political rights for their mutual aid protection from what they believe were police
excesses. As matter of fact, it was the duty of herein private respondent firm to protect herein petitioner Union and its
members fro the harassment of local police officers. It was to the interest herein private respondent firm to rally to the
defense of, and take up the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report to work free from harassment, vexation or
peril and as consequence perform more efficiently their respective tasks enhance its productivity as well as profits. Herein
respondent employer did not even offer to intercede for its employees with the local police. Was it securing peace for itself at
the expenses of its workers? Was it also intimidated by the local police or did it encourage the local police to terrorize or vex
its workers? Its failure to defend its own employees all the more weakened the position of its laborers the alleged oppressive
police who might have been all the more emboldened thereby subject its lowly employees to further indignities.
In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well as their right of assembly and of petition against alleged
persecution of local officialdom, the employees and laborers of herein private respondent firm were fighting for their very
survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the Constitution — the untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human
rights. The pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its employees from 6
o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for the preservation merely of their property rights. Such
apprehended loss or damage would not spell the difference between the life and death of the firm or its owners or its
management. The employees' pathetic situation was a stark reality — abused, harassment and persecuted as they believed
they were by the peace officers of the municipality. As above intimated, the condition in which the employees found
themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig, was a matter that vitally affected their right to individual existence as well as
that of their families. Material loss can be repaired or adequately compensated. The debasement of the human being broken
in morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms. The wounds fester and the scars remain to
humiliate him to his dying day, even as he cries in anguish for retribution, denial of which is like rubbing salt on bruised
As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights — freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress
of grievances — over property rights has been sustained. 18 Emphatic reiteration of this basic tenet as a coveted

boon — at once the shield and armor of the dignity and worth of the human personality, the all-consuming
ideal of our enlightened civilization — becomes Our duty, if freedom and social justice have any meaning
at all for him who toils so that capital can produce economic goods that can generate happiness for all. To
regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in
collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the
dismissal from employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of the
collective bargaining agreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as
well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free expression, of peaceful assembly and of
petition. 19
The collective bargaining agreement which fixes the working shifts of the employees, according to the respondent Court
Industrial Relations, in effect imposes on the workers the "duty ... to observe regular working hours." The strain construction
of the Court of Industrial Relations that a stipulated working shifts deny the workers the right to stage mass demonstration

against police abuses during working hours, constitutes a virtual tyranny over the mind and life the workers and deserves
severe condemnation. Renunciation of the freedom should not be predicated on such a slender ground.
The mass demonstration staged by the employees on March 4, 1969 could not have been legally enjoined by any court,
such an injunction would be trenching upon the freedom expression of the workers, even if it legally appears to be illegal
picketing or strike. 20 The respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the case at bar concedes that the mass

demonstration was not a declaration of a strike "as the same not rooted in any industrial dispute although
there is concerted act and the occurrence of a temporary stoppage work." (Annex "F", p. 45, rec.).
The respondent firm claims that there was no need for all its employees to participate in the demonstration and that they
suggested to the Union that only the first and regular shift from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. should report for work in order that loss or
damage to the firm will be averted. This stand failed appreciate the sine qua non of an effective demonstration especially by
a labor union, namely the complete unity of the Union members as well as their total presence at the demonstration site in
order to generate the maximum sympathy for the validity of their cause but also immediately action on the part of the
corresponding government agencies with jurisdiction over the issues they raised against the local police. Circulation is one
of the aspects of freedom of expression. 21 If demonstrators are reduced by one-third, then by that much the

circulation of the issues raised by the demonstration is diminished. The more the participants, the more
persons can be apprised of the purpose of the rally. Moreover, the absence of one-third of their members
will be regarded as a substantial indication of disunity in their ranks which will enervate their position and
abet continued alleged police persecution. At any rate, the Union notified the company two days in
advance of their projected demonstration and the company could have made arrangements to counteract
or prevent whatever losses it might sustain by reason of the absence of its workers for one day,
especially in this case when the Union requested it to excuse only the day-shift employees who will join
the demonstration on March 4, 1969 which request the Union reiterated in their telegram received by the
company at 9:50 in the morning of March 4, 1969, the day of the mass demonstration (pp. 42-43, rec.).
There was a lack of human understanding or compassion on the part of the firm in rejecting the request of
the Union for excuse from work for the day shifts in order to carry out its mass demonstration. And to
regard as a ground for dismissal the mass demonstration held against the Pasig police, not against the
company, is gross vindictiveness on the part of the employer, which is as unchristian as it is
The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice. Because the refusal on the part of the respondent firm to
permit all its employees and workers to join the mass demonstration against alleged police abuses and the subsequent
separation of the eight (8) petitioners from the service constituted an unconstitutional restraint on the freedom of expression,
freedom of assembly and freedom petition for redress of grievances, the respondent firm committed an unfair labor practice
defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8 guarantees to the employees the right "to engage in concert activities for ... mutual aid or
protection"; while Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an employer interfere with, restrain or coerce
employees in the exercise their rights guaranteed in Section Three."
We repeat that the obvious purpose of the mass demonstration staged by the workers of the respondent firm on March 4,
1969, was for their mutual aid and protection against alleged police abuses, denial of which was interference with or restraint
on the right of the employees to engage in such common action to better shield themselves against such alleged police
indignities. The insistence on the part of the respondent firm that the workers for the morning and regular shift should not
participate in the mass demonstration, under pain of dismissal, was as heretofore stated, "a potent means of inhibiting
speech." 22
Such a concerted action for their mutual help and protection deserves at least equal protection as the concerted action of
employees in giving publicity to a letter complaint charging bank president with immorality, nepotism, favoritism an
discrimination in the appointment and promotion of ban employees. 23 We further ruled in the Republic Savings Bank

case, supra, that for the employees to come within the protective mantle of Section 3 in relation to Section
4(a-1) on Republic Act No. 875, "it is not necessary that union activity be involved or that collective
bargaining be contemplated," as long as the concerted activity is for the furtherance of their interests. 24
As stated clearly in the stipulation of facts embodied in the questioned order of respondent Court dated September 15, 1969,
the company, "while expressly acknowledging, that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the Union guaranteed by the
Constitution," nonetheless emphasized that "any demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal

the Court of Industrial Relations ousted itself of jurisdiction and the questioned orders it issued in the instant case are a nullity. Relief from a criminal conviction secured at the sacrifice of constitutional liberties. would be amounting to an illegal strike (. or that penalties were exacted from it by customers whose orders could not be filled that day of the demonstration. habeas corpus is the remedy to obtain the release of an individual.. On the contrary. failed to implement this policy and failed to keep faith with its avowed mission — its raison d'etre — as ordained and directed by the Constitution. But management was adamant in refusing to recognize the superior legitimacy of their right of free speech. The most that could happen to them was to lose a day's wage by reason of their absence from work on the day of the demonstration. it thereby concedes that the evidence of such abuses should properly be submitted to the corresponding authorities having jurisdiction over their complaint and to whom such complaint may be referred by the President of the Philippines for proper investigation and action with a view to disciplining the local police officers involved. particularly the officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration. the very governmental agency designed therefor. or that purchase orders were cancelled by the customers by reason of its failure to deliver the materials ordered. III. V It has been likewise established that a violation of a constitutional right divests the court of jurisdiction. It did not present evidence as to whether it lost expected profits for failure to comply with purchase orders on that day. more especially if he has a family to support. for otherwise these constitutional safeguards would be merely a lot of "meaningless constitutional patter. Having violated these basic human rights of the laborers. and as a consequence its judgment is null and void and confers no rights. Such savings could have amply compensated for unrealized profits or damages it might have sustained by reason of the absence of its workers for only one day. while the respondent Court of Industrial Relations found that the demonstration "paralyzed to a large extent the operations of the complainant company. or that its own equipment or materials or products were damaged due to absence of its workers on March 4. cost of fuel. However. the company saved a sizable amount in the form of wages for its hundreds of workers. Section 5 of Article II of the Constitution imposes upon the State "the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all of the people. they were willing to forego their one-day salary hoping that their demonstration would bring about the desired relief from police abuses. because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and. may be obtained through habeas corpus proceedings even long after the finality of the judgment. the exercise and enjoyment of which must not be nullified by mere procedural . the issues that the employees raised against the local police. Thus. 25or who is denied the right to present evidence in his defense as a deprivation of his liberty without due process of law.)" (p. 26even after the accused has already served sentence for twenty-two years. the Court of Industrial Relations is enjoined to effect the policy of the law "to eliminate the causes of industrial unrest by encouraging and protecting the exercise by employees of their right to self-organization for the purpose of collective bargaining and for the promotion of their moral. Respondent Court of Industrial Relations as an agency of the State is under obligation at all times to give meaning and substance to these constitutional guarantees in favor of the working man. therefore." the respondent Court of Industrial Relations did not make any finding as to the fact of loss actually sustained by the firm. One day's pay means much to a laborer. IV Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of free speech and assembly as well as the right to petition for redress of grievances of the employees.. were more important to them because they had the courage to proceed with the demonstration. 27 Both the respondents Court of Industrial Relations and private firm trenched upon these constitutional immunities of petitioners. Yet. 1969. Such threat of dismissal tended to coerce the employees from joining the mass demonstration. free assembly and the right to petition for redress. social and economic wellbeing.". which violated his constitutional right against self-incrimination. who without previous leave of absence approved by the Company. the dismissal of the eight (8) leaders of the workers for proceeding with the demonstration and consequently being absent from work. despite such threat of dismissal.operation of the company" and "warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to the first and regular shifts." It is most unfortunate in the case at bar that respondent Court of Industrial Relations." which guarantee is emphasized by the other directive in Section 6 of Article XIV of the Constitution that "the State shall afford protection to labor . constitutes a denial of social justice likewise assured by the fundamental law to these lowly employees. Both failed to accord preference to such rights and aggravated the inhumanity to which the aggrieved workers claimed they had been subjected by the municipal police. who shall fail to report for work the following morning (March 4. petitioner's brief). On the other hand. 1969) shall be dismissed. water and electric consumption that day. This significant circumstance can only mean that the firm did not sustain any loss or damage. who is convicted by final judgment through a forced confession. Because the respondent company ostensibly did not find it necessary to demand from the workers proof of the truth of the alleged abuses inflicted on them by the local police." Under the Industrial Peace Act. Recognition and protection of such freedoms are imperative on all public offices including the courts 28 as well as private citizens and corporations.

74-75. pp. even for the first time on appeal. Revised Rules of Court). The delay in the filing of the motion for reconsideration could have been only one day if September 28. when even a law enacted by Congress must yield to the untrammelled enjoyment of these human rights. 10. prevail over constitutional rights? The answer should be obvious in the light of the aforecited cases. 1. the printing of one article or the staging of one demonstration. is not only incompatible with the basic tenet of constitutional government that the Constitution is superior to any statute or subordinate rules and regulations. 1969 (Annex "I". 28-a VI The Court of Industrial Relations rule prescribes that motion for reconsideration of its order or writ should filed within five (5) days from notice thereof and that the arguments in support of said motion shall be filed within ten (10) days from the date of filing of such motion for reconsideration (Sec. so that any cause of action or defense not raised in such pleadings. This fact accentuates the unreasonableness of the Court of Industrial are concerned. 1. 1969 the resolution dated October 9. or where the arguments in suppf such motion are filed beyond the 10 day reglementary period provided for by the Court of Industrial Relations rules. inhumanities to be condemned. As above intimated. A period of five (5) days within which to file a motion for reconsideration is too short. 16 and 17 of the Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations (Annex "G". 29 The motion for reconsideration was filed on September 29. 1969." and likewise prays for an extension of ten (10) days within which to file arguments pursuant to Sections 15. is unreasonable and therefore is beyond the authority granted by the Constitution and the law. In case of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. the latter eventually loses because he cannot employ the best an dedicated counsel who can defend his interest with the required diligence and zeal.). a constitutional issue can be raised any time. the constitutional rights of free expression. Sec. if it appears that the determination of the constitutional issue is necessary to a decision of the case. but it was a Sunday. a period of fifteen (15) days has been fixed for the filing of the motion for re hearing or reconsideration (See.' but instead constrict the same to the point of nullifying the enjoyment thereof by the petitioning employees. pp. Rule 56. free assembly and petition were not involved. although the arguments were actually filed by the herein petitioners on October 14. promulgated as it was pursuant to a mere legislative delegation. does the inadvertent omission to comply with a mere Court of Industrial Relations procedural rule governing the period for filing a motion for reconsideration or appeal in labor cases. 1969 or two (2) days late. However. To accord supremacy to the foregoing rules of the Court of Industrial Relations over basic human rights sheltered by the Constitution. It should be stressed here that the motion for reconsideration dated September 27. rec. the order or decision subject of 29-a reconsideration becomes final and unappealable. rec. 57-60. 1969 dismissing the motion for reconsideration for being pro forma since it was filed beyond the reglementary period (Annex "J". but also does violence to natural reason and logic. is deemed waived. 1969 of the order dated September 15.rule promulgated by the Court Industrial Relations exercising a purely delegate legislative power. The dominance and superiority of the constitutional right over the aforesaid Court of Industrial Relations procedural rule of necessity should be affirmed.). 1969 was not a Sunday. Does the mere fact that the motion for reconsideration was filed two (2) days late defeat the rights of the petitioning employees? Or more directly and concretely. There is no time limit to the exercise of the freedoms.) It is true that We ruled in several cases that where a motion to reconsider is filed out of time. 16). It is a procedural rule that generally all causes of action and defenses presently available must be specifically raised in the complaint or answer. Otherwise these guarantees in the Bill of Rights would be vitiated by rule on procedure prescribing the period for appeal. Such a Court of Industrial Relations rule as applied in this case does not implement or reinforce or strengthen the constitutional rights affected. promulgated pursuant to a legislative delegation. Rule 52. bereft as he is of the financial resources with which to pay for competent legal services. 1969. evidence and facts adduced during the hearing. And in such a contest between an employer and its laborer. The battle then would be reduced to a race for time. 70-73. 1969. But in all these cases. these rules of procedure were promulgated by the Court of Industrial Relations pursuant to a legislative delegation. pp. or seven (7) days from notice on September 22. Rule 51. It is a continuing immunity to be invoked and exercised when exigent and expedient whenever there are errors to be rectified. Herein petitioners received only on October 28. The right to enjoy them is not exhausted by the delivery of one speech. who usually do not have the ready funds to meet the necessary expenses therefor. long after the 10-day period required for the filing of such supporting arguments counted from the filing of the motion for reconsideration. rec. Petitioners claim that they could have filed it on September 28. especially for the aggrieved workers. Said Court of Industrial Relations rule. abuses to be denounced. the very lis mota of the case without the resolution of which no . is based on the ground that the order sought to be reconsidered "is not in accordance with law. Sec.

Justice Barredo. We can then and there render the appropriate judgment. The suspension of the application of Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules with reference to the case at is also authorized by Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. however. Justice Barredo in his concurring opinion in Estrada vs. It should be stressed that the application in the instant case Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules relied upon by herein respondent firm is unreasonable and therefore such application becomes unconstitutional as it subverts the human rights of petitioning labor union and workers in the light of the peculiar facts and circumstances revealed by the record. the C. 30-c reiterated this principle and added that Under this authority." 30-b Mr. et. without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable. as in the case at bar. no actual material damage has be demonstrated as having been inflicted on its property rights. 103. (Emphasis supplied). If We can disregard our own rules when justice requires it. this Court is enabled to cove with all situations without concerning itself about procedural niceties that do not square with the need to do justice. speaking for the Court. in any case. obedience to the Constitution renders more imperative the suspension of a Court of Industrial Relations rule that clash with the human rights sanctioned and shielded with resolution concern by the specific guarantees outlined in the organic law. provided that the right of the parties to a full day in court is not substantially impaired. If there can be any doubt. In the case at bar. In other words. must be according supremacy over the property rights of their employer firm which has been given a full hearing on this case. on whether or not the errors this Court has found in the decision of the Court of Appeals are short of being jurisdiction nullities or excesses. to reverse in a certain proceed in any error of judgment of a court a quo which cannot be exactly categorized as a flaw of jurisdiction. a creature of Congress. so as to avoid the unnecessary return of this case to the lower court for the sole purpose of pursuing the ordinary course of an appeal. must likewise yield to the constitutional rights invoked by herein petitioners even before the institution of the unfair labor practice charged against them and in their defense to the said charge. In the instant case." On several occasions. without further loss of time. especially when. whenever the purposes of justice require. Domingo. which enjoins the Court of Industrial Relations to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case. etc.R. Hamilton. without regard to technicalities or legal forms . 30 It is thus seen that a procedural rule of Congress or of the Supreme Court gives way to a constitutional right. whose basic human freedoms. 'The Court of Industrial Relations shall adopt its. when all the material facts are spread in the records before Us. etc.. Sto.. Is within the contemplation of this doctrine that as it is perfectly legal and within the power of this Court to strike down in an appeal acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or committed with grave abuse of discretion. 30-d Insistence on the application of the questioned Court industrial Relations rule in this particular case at bar would an unreasoning adherence to "Procedural niceties" which denies justice to the herein laborers. it matters little that the error of the court a quo is of judgment or of jurisdiction. this Court may treat an appeal as a certiorari and vice-versa.. in appropriate cases. is a most compelling reason to deny application of a Court of Industrial Relations rule which impinges on such human rights. this Court would still be on firm legal grounds should it choose to reverse said decision here and now even if such errors can be considered as mere mistakes of judgment or only as faults in the exercise of jurisdiction. in the 1970 case of Kapisanan. enforcement of the basic human freedoms sheltered no less by the organic law. 30-a It is an accepted principle that the Supreme Court has the inherent power to "suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from its operation. including the right to survive." as such term is understood in the rules of procedure for the ordinary courts. Thus. We emphasized this doctrine which was re-stated by Mr. which I do not entertain.' By this provision the industrial court is disengaged from the rigidity of the technicalities applicable to ordinary courts. That in the hearing. and all the parties have been duly heard. Under Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. rules or procedure and shall have such other powers as generally pertain to a court of justice: Provided. Said court is not even restricted to the specific relief demanded by the parties but may issue such orders as . al. 30-e thus: As to the point that the evidence being offered by the petitioners in the motion for new trial is not "newly discovered. charter. We hold that such criterion is not binding upon the Court of Industrial Relations. vs. the procedural rule of the Court of Industrial Relations. it cannot be beyond the admit of its and complete determination of the dispute can be made.I. the Court shall act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case. investigation and determination of any question or controversy and in exercising any duties and power under this Act.. 103.

156. 124 [1936]) was of a similar mind. this Court has remained committed. Counsel for respondent firm insinuates that not all the 400 or so employee participated in the demonstration. 16-20. 1019). of the morning and regular shifts reported for work on March 4.128). Nat. G. No. 3 SCRA 272. which practically is only one day late considering that September 28. 1961.. 31. while at the same time strengthening the oppressive hand of the petty tyrants in the localities. for which reason only the Union and its thirteen (13) officers were specifically named in the unfair labor practice charge (p. 16 Phil. this Court deviated from procedure technicalities when they ceased to be instruments of justice. L-14968.R. Oct. Mr. Chua Kiong v.. respondent's brief). C. 17.) Justice Zaldivar was partial to an earlier formulation of Justice Labrador that rules of procedure "are not to be applied in a very rigid. without regard to the technical meaning of newly discovered evidence. who can ill-afford an alert competent lawyer. 1969 . Potenciano v. . Phil. the Union members who are not officers. 1940. Phil.. 1969 and that.. speaking for a unanimous Court in Palma vs. if not all." (Urbayan v.) To that norm.filed his motion for reconsideration September 29. can no longer seek the sanctuary of human freedoms secured to them by the fundamental law. Villamor (16 Phil. Amon. L-15379.I.) For these reasons. as a consequence." (Ibid. then many. the firm continued in operation that day and did not sustain any damage. We believe that this provision is ample enough to have enabled the respondent court to consider whether or not its previous ruling that petitioners constitute a minority was founded on fact. For him the interpretation of procedural rule should never "sacrifice the ends justice. 46 Phil. rec. 1969. Annexes "A". Labor. p." (Ibid. . 104 Phil. 71 Phil. since as aforestated the Union leaders depend on their wages for their daily sustenance as well as that of their respective families aside from the fact that it is a lethal blow to unionism. but from men of goodwill — good men who allow their proper concerns to blind them to the fact that what they propose to accomplish involves an impairment of liberty. The late Justice Recto in Blanco v. Court of Appeals. 578). The appropriate penalty — if it deserves any penalty at all — should have been simply to charge said one-day absence against their vacation or sick leave. 315. 843) . upon the intercession of the Secretary of Labor.. 600 [1949]. 5 SCRA 1016." While "procedural laws are no other than technicalities" view them in their entirety. when it deserts its proper-office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy. Court of Appeals. in the highly rhetorical language Justice Felix. Aug. Manila Trading & Supply Co. Bank.may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or dispelling any doubts that may give rise to future disputes. "technicality. 27. they "should give way to the realities of the situation. 2 SCRA 675. "B" and "C". were not dismissed and only the Union itself and its thirteen (13) officers were specifically named as respondents in the unfair labor practice charge filed against them by the firm (pp. 30-f Stated: As was so aptly expressed by Justice Moreland in Alonso v. Mr. p. simply because their counsel — erroneously believing that he received a copy of the decision on September 23. In the latest decision in point promulgated in 1968. 14243. Justice Douglas articulated this pointed reminder: The challenge to our liberties comes frequently not from those who consciously seek to destroy our system of Government. (1968. Manotok. 156 [1958] and Uy v. Caltex. Summarizing the jurisprudence on this score." (Potenciano v. But to dismiss the eight (8) leaders of the petitioner Union is a most cruel penalty. 315 [1910]. As succinctly put by Justice Makalintal. June 30. Bernabe. 20. Whitaker. 46496. (Udan v. (emphasis supplied. technical sense".. If that were so.). The respondent Court itself recognized the severity of such a sanction when it did not include the dismissal of the other 393 employees who are members of the same Union and who participated in the demonstration against the Pasig police. p. the dismissal or termination of the employment of the petitioning eight (8) leaders of the Union is harsh for a one-day absence from work. Many a time. but are intended "to help secure substantial justice. deserves scant consideration from courts. 322. pp. 161 [1958]). Feb. v. respondent's Brief. 30-g Even if the questioned Court of Industrial Relations orders and rule were to be given effect. 84 Phil. 1969. 104 Phil. Villamor. 20-30.)..) To apply Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules with "pedantic rigor" in the instant case is to rule in effect that the poor workers. but as means conducive to the realization the administration of the law and of justice (Ibid. 1962.. instead of September 22. 'they were adopted not as ends themselves for the compliance with which courts have organized and function. The Villamor decision was cited with approval in Register of Deeds v. Justice Fernando. 23 SCRA citing McEntee v. Uy. Oreta. to "a sacrifice of substantial rights of a litigant in altar of sophisticated technicalities with impairment of the sacred principles of justice. We have remained steadfastly opposed. for the attainment of which such rules have been devised.R.. As a matter of fact. 124. (Ang Tibay v. decided as far back as 1910. 1961. (63 Phil. (Alonso v. 1969 was a Sunday.

April 29." Therein. nepotism in the appointment and favoritism as well as discrimination in the promotion of bank employees. Assuming that the latter acted in their individual capacities when they wrote the letter-charge they were nonetheless protected for they were engaged in concerted activity... 31 The case at bar is worse.. to the Bank president demanding his resignation on the grounds of immorality. Educ. the Liberties of none are safe unless the liberties of all are protected.. (Emphasis supplied. It is directed solely against the abuse of that right by interfering with the countervailing right of self organization (Phelps Dodge Corp. 793 [1945])..) 33 . The battle over the Bill of Rights is a never ending one.. the right of self-organization of employees is not unlimited (Republic Aviation Corp. We ruled: It will avail the Bank none to gloat over this admission of the respondents. . But even if we should sense no danger to our own liberties..I. The liberties of any person are the liberties of all of us. The only protection against misguided zeal is a constant alertness of the infractions of the guarantees of liberty contained in our Constitution.. larger surrender. identified as an interference with the employees' right of self-organization or as a retaliatory action. but a complete lack of sympathetic understanding of the plight of its laborers who claim that they are being subjected to indignities by the local police. if in furtherance of their interests as such. and/or as a refusal to bargain collectively.) This is the view of some members of this Court. the Bank should have allowed the respondents to air their grievances.. Such opportunism and expediency resorted to by the respondent company assaulted the immunities and welfare of its employees. . 6 A. It was pure and implement selfishness. however. if not greed.S.R. What we must remember. In short. Justice Castro.. Union of Phil. . This is sheer opportunism. vs.. Each surrender of liberty to the demands of the moment makes easier another. in the exercise of their right of self organization that includes concerted activity for mutual aid and protection. (Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act . 32 where the petitioner Bank dismissed eight (8) employees for having written and published "a patently libelous letter . 1960) is undenied. v. even by a small group of employees. thru Mr. C. To be sure. we must recognize that our Bill of Rights is a code of fair play for the less fortunate that we in all honor and good conscience must be observe. NLRB 324 U. Of happy relevance is the 1967 case of Republic Savings Bank vs. constituted an unfair labor practice within the meaning and intendment of section 4(a) of the Industrial Peace Act. L-13773. 2d 416 [1949]).. even if we feel secure because we belong to a group that is important and respected. is a concerted activity protected by the Industrial Peace Act. The Motives of these men are often commendable. 177 [1941]). xxx xxx xxx Instead of stifling criticism. For. as has been aptly stated. It is not necessary that union activity be involved or that collective bargaining be contemplated. A suppression of liberty has the same effect whether the suppress or be a reformer or an outlaw. The Industrial Peace Act does not touch the normal exercise of the right of the employer to select his employees or to discharge them. (Annot. It was more expedient for the firm to conserve its income or profits than to assist its employees in their fight for their freedoms and security against alleged petty tyrannies of local police officers.L. this Court is in unanimity that the Bank's conduct. xxx xxx xxx The Bank defends its action by invoking its right to discipline for what it calls the respondents' libel in giving undue publicity to their letter-charge. Management has shown not only lack of good-will or good intention.. v. as the right of the employer to discharge for cause (Philippine Education Co. NLRB 313 U.. xxx xxx xxx In the final sum and substance.R... is thatpreservation of liberties does not depend on motives. the joining in protests or demands. Employees..S.

Fernando and Esguerra. Jr.: The extent of the authority and power of the Commission on Human Rights ("CHR") is again placed into focus in this petition for prohibition. the CHR issued an Order. sarisari stores and carinderia. was sent to. 1 Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice. and received by. judgement is hereby rendered: (1) setting aside as null and void the orders of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations dated September 15 and October 9. J.If free expression was accorded recognition and protection to fortify labor unionism in the Republic Savings case. With costs against private respondent Philippine Blooming Company. C. 5 the CHR. The petitioners ask us to prohibit public respondent CHR from further hearing and investigating CHR Case No." dated 9 July 1990. the group. AND GENEROSO OCAMPO. et al. AND OTHERS AS JOHN DOES. VITUG.000.. CARLITO ABELARDO. Inc. as well as CHR's own ocular inspection. filed a lettercomplaint (Pinag-samang Sinumpaang Salaysay) with the CHR against the petitioners. respondents. 1969. directing the petitioners "to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending resolution of the vendors/squatters' complaint before the Commission" and ordering said petitioners to appear before the CHR. 4 On the basis of the sworn statements submitted by the private respondents on 31 July 1990. Zaldivar. sari-sari stores. 90-1580.J. ROQUE FERMO. and carinderia along North EDSA. 3 On 23 July 1990. took no part. with full back pay from the date of their separation from the service until re instated. where the mass demonstration was not against the company nor any of its officers. ordered the disbursement of financial assistance of not more than P200. vs.00 in favor of the private respondents to purchase light housing materials and food under the Commission's supervision and again directed the petitioners to "desist from . Castro. In said notice. The complaint was docketed as CHR Case No. signed by Carlos Quimpo (one of the petitioners) in his capacity as an Executive Officer of the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management Council under the Office of the City Mayor. JR. Incorporated). vs. in its resolution of 1 August 1990. the private respondents (being the officers and members of the North EDSA Vendors Association. The City Attorney for petitioners.. WHEREFORE. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS. entitled "Fermo. concur.. with prayer for a restraining order and preliminary injunction." The case all started when a "Demolition Notice. and convinced that on 28 July 1990 the petitioners carried out the demolition of private respondents' stalls. and (2) directing the re instatement of the herein eight (8) petitioners. the respondents were given a grace-period of three (3) days (up to 12 July 1990) within which to vacate the questioned premises of North EDSA. such recognition and protection for free speech. of Quezon City to stop the demolition of the private respondents' stalls. where the complaint assailed the morality and integrity of the bank president no less. CARLOS QUIMPO. asking the late CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter to be addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon. 2 On 12 July 1990. minus one day's pay and whatever earnings they might have realized from other sources during their separation from the service. Makalintal. The Solicitor General for public respondent. et al. SIMON. the private respondents were informed by petitioner Quimpo that their stalls should be removed to give way to the "People's Park". petitioners. free assembly and right to petition are rendered all the more justifiable and more imperative in the case at bar. led by their President Roque Fermo. 90-1580. supra. JJ. BRIGIDO R. Quimpo.

All these brazenly and violently ignored and trampled upon by respondents with little regard at the same time for the basic rights of women and children.00 on each of them. The petitioners likewise manifested that they would bring the case to the courts. . xxx xxx xxx 3. that the City Mayor of Quezon City (had) the sole and exclusive discretion and authority whether or not a certain business establishment (should) be allowed to operate within the jurisdiction of Quezon City. 5. . to life and to dignity. among other things. Quezon City. The motion also averred. On 18 September 1990 a supplemental motion to dismiss was filed by the petitioners. 7 dated 10 September 1990. and that "the rights allegedly violated in this case (were) not civil and political rights. in this wise: Clearly. 4. stating that the Commission's authority should be understood as being confined only to the investigation of violations of civil and political rights. but it (should) be (considered) a quasi-judicial body with the power to provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines . upon grounds clearly specified by law and ordinance. Their actions have psychologically scarred and traumatized the children. (but) their privilege to engage in business. albeit vigorously objected to by petitioners (on the ground that the motion to dismiss was still then unresolved). particularly the sidewalk of EDSA corner North Avenue. that the complainants in this case (were) not poor dwellers but independent business entrepreneurs even this Honorable Office admitted in its resolution of 1 August 1990 that the complainants are indeed. with the warning that violation of said order would lead to a citation for contempt and arrest. that the complainants (were) occupying government land. . . and their health. the motion to dismiss was heard and submitted for resolution. On 1 March 1991.further demolition. the petitioners moved for postponement. that: 1. 12 the CHR issued an Order. . vendors. 11 dated 25 September 1990. . sari-sari stores and carinderia despite the "order to desist". the Commission on Human Rights under its constitutional mandate had jurisdiction over the complaint filed by the squatters-vendors who complained of the gross violations of their human and constitutional rights. safety and welfare. 13 The CHR opined that "it was not the intention of the (Constitutional) Commission to create only a paper tiger limited only to investigating civil and political rights. this case came about due to the alleged violation by the (petitioners) of the Inter-Agency Memorandum of Agreement whereby Metro-Manila Mayors agreed on a moratorium in the demolition of the dwellings of poor dwellers in Metro-Manila." It added: The right to earn a living is a right essential to one's right to development." 6 A motion to dismiss. along with the contempt charge that had meantime been filed by the private respondents. . a perusal of the said Agreement (revealed) that the moratorium referred to therein refers to moratorium in the demolition of the structures of poor dwellers." 9 On 21 September 1990. . if already issued. . 8 During the 12 September 1990 hearing. The motion to dismiss should be and is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. and 6. denying petitioners' motion to dismiss and supplemental motion to dismiss. . and it imposed a fine of P500. to revoke or cancel a permit. who were witness and exposed to such a violent demonstration of Man's inhumanity to man. arguing that the motion to dismiss set for 21 September 1990 had yet to be resolved. the CHR cited the petitioners in contempt for carrying out the demolition of the stalls. . 10 In an Order. questioned CHR's jurisdiction.

however. (3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines. The petition has merit. the Solicitor-General was excused from filing his comment for public respondent CHR. and information to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights. (8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority. The petition was initially dismissed in our resolution 15 of 25 June 1991.000. in our resolution 16 of 18 June 1991. petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied." 17 The petitioners pose the following: Whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction: a) to investigate the alleged violations of the "business rights" of the private respondents whose stalls were demolished by the petitioners at the instance and authority given by the Mayor of Quezon City. in the exercise of her legislative power at the time.00 each on the petitioners. The Commission on Human Rights was created by the 1987 Constitution. 90-1580. b) to impose the fine of P500. in which we also issued a temporary restraining order. The Court also resolved to dispense with the comment of private respondent Roque Fermo. 19 It was formally constituted by then President Corazon Aquino via Executive Order No. requiring such comment. directing the CHR to "CEASE and DESIST from further hearing CHR No. 14 dated 25 April 1991. as well as Filipinos residing abroad. (7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights.In an Order. (2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure. and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection. 20 issued on 5 May 1987. one of its Commissioners. and c) to disburse the amount of P200. this recourse. . It succeeded. the Presidential Committee on Human Rights. who had since failed to comply with the resolution. (5) Establish a continuing program of research. dated 18 July 1991. Samuel Soriano. The latter thus filed its own comment. prisons. Hence. thus: to — (1) Investigate.00 as financial aid to the vendors affected by the demolition. 163. on its own or on complaint by any party. but so superseded as well. (4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails. all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. 21 The powers and functions 22 of the Commission are defined by the 1987 Constitution. (6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for compensation to victims of violations of human rights. education. or detention facilities. or their families. it was subsequently reinstated. 18 through Hon. In the Court's resolution of 10 October 1991. and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court.

Social and Cultural Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. to be elected to public office. freedom of speech. The Court explained: . such as the right to an education. albeit not a few have tried. or agency in the performance of its functions. Let us observe. and (11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law. and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice. social. The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate. . Kenya or Indonesia . This function. to repeat. liberty. and property. 25 Human rights are the entitlement that inhere in the individual person from the sheer fact of his humanity.e. or more specifically. bureau. its is. suggests that the scope of human rights can be ." but that resemblance can in no way be synonymous to the adjudicatory power itself. political. human rights are not granted by the State but can only be recognized and protected by it. of the press. or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. In its Order of 1 March 1991.. After thus laying down at the outset the above rule. . has observed that it is "only the first of the enumerated powers and functions that bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment. could at best be described as inconclusive. receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. sponsored by the University of the Philippines in 1977. office. representing different sectors of the society. economic. 28 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function. Commission on Human Rights. finally and definitively. . and the rights of the accused to due process of law. Because they are inherent. through then Associate Justice. They are part of his natural birth. 26 (Human rights include all) the civil. . the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively. . They are the same in all parts of the world. the Commission does not have. and social rights. 23 This view. i. of religion. and to form political associations and engage in politics. whether the Philippines or England. (10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law. right. however. to determine the extent of CHR's investigative power. have given the following varied answers: Human rights are the basic rights which inhere in man by virtue of his humanity. innate and inalienable. denying petitioners' motion to dismiss. Human rights include civil rights. the United States or Japan. 27 Human rights are rights that pertain to man simply because he is human. we now proceed to the other kernel of this controversy and. one of the questions that has been propounded is "(w)hat do you understand by "human rights?" The participants. such as the right to elect public officials. 24 the Court. political rights. as well as. properly speaking. It can hardly be disputed that the phrase "human rights" is so generic a term that any attempt to define it. Kenya or the Soviet Union. employment. . .(9) Request the assistance of any department. subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. . has not heretofore been shared by this Court. such as the right to life. . the International Covenant on Economic. and cultural rights defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In a symposium on human rights in the Philippines. But fact finding is not adjudication. . (T)he Commission on Human Rights . academic freedom. In Cariño v. now Chief Justice Andres Narvasa. or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter. and social services. was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country. the CHR theorizes that the intention of the members of the Constitutional Commission is to make CHR a quasi-judicial body. To be considered such.

specifically the Bill of Rights and subsequent legislation. impelled the inclusions of those provisions in our fundamental law. BENGZON. cultural. we might diffuse its impact and the precise nature of its task. Many voices have been heard. its effectivity would also be curtailed. comes from Mr. economic. GARCIA. BENGZON. therefore. xxx xxx xxx MR. the right against torture. we will authorize the commission to define its functions. Yes. . the right to fair and public hearing. Press and other mass media were subjected to censorship and short term licensing. It thus seems to closely identify the term to the universally accepted traits and attributes of an individual.understood to include those that relate to an individual's social. Arbitrary action then became the rule. Among those voices. MR. and as I have mentioned." 29 observes: But while the Constitution of 1935 and that of 1973 enshrined in their Bill of Rights most of the human rights expressed in the International Covenant. GARCIA. if we cover such a wide territory in area. aptly represented perhaps of the sentiments expressed by others. Martial law brought with it the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. who. Yes. So were strikes. Individuals by the thousands became subject to arrest upon suspicion. Every single right of an individual involves his civil right or his political right. So as to distinguish this from the other rights that we have? MR. because the other rights will encompass social and economic rights. encompassing almost all aspects of life. The right to petition for the redress of grievances became useless. So. as well as the Constitution. in fact. until ordered released by the Commander-in-Chief or this representative. . along with what is generally considered to be his inherent and inalienable rights. Have these broad concepts been equally contemplated by the framers of our 1986 Constitutional Commission in adopting the specific provisions on human rights and in creating an independent commission to safeguard these rights? It may of value to look back at the country's experience under the martial law regime which may have. without charges. the primacy of its (CHR) task must be made clear in view of the importance of human rights and also because civil and political rights have been determined by many international covenants and human rights legislations in the Philippines. MR. these civil and political rights have been made clear in the language of human rights advocates. Actually. That is precisely my difficulty because civil and political rights are very broad. and there are other violations of rights of citizens which can be addressed to the proper courts and authorities. hence. the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights distinguished this right against torture. and were detained and held for indefinite periods. a respected jurist and an advocate of civil liberties. these rights became unavailable upon the proclamation of Martial Law on 21 September 1972. Converging our attention to the records of the Constitutional Commission. since group actions were forbidden. They were required to submit letters of resignation and were dismissed upon the acceptance thereof. political and civil relations. sometimes for years. So. entitled "Present State of Human Rights in the Philippines. GARCIA . So. would the commissioner say civil and political rights as defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights? MR. Reyes. as well as in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which addresses a number of articles on the right to life. we can see the following discussions during its 26 August 1986 deliberations: MR. and. MR.B. The Article on the Bill of Rights covers civil and political rights. Justice J. in doing that the commission will be authorized to take under its wings cases which perhaps heretofore or at this . BENGZON. except members of the Supreme Court. it is important to delienate the parameters of its tasks so that the commission can be most effective. GARCIA. and judges lost independence and security of tenure. These are very specific rights that are considered enshrined in many international documents and legal instruments as constituting civil and political rights.L. Torture to extort confessions were practiced as declared by international bodies like Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists. in his paper. where do we draw the line? MR. Otherwise. . BENGZON. So. and so on. and these are precisely what we want to defend here.

only those that pertain to civil and political rights. food. I would like to state that in the past regime. they are also enshrined in the Bill of Rights of our Constitution. 4) cases of disappearances. 5) salvagings and hamletting.moment are under the jurisdiction of the ordinary investigative and prosecutorial agencies of the government. BENGZON. Therefore. In connection with the discussion on the scope of human rights. and 6) other crimes committed against the religious. is the Gentleman saying that all the rights under the Bill of Rights covered by human rights? MR. No. Is that the sense of the committee. GUINGONA. GARCIA. I was actually disturbed this morning when the reference was made without qualification to the rights embodied in the universal Declaration of Human Rights. MR. Thank You Madam President. I would like to continue and respond also to repeated points raised by the previous speaker. SARMIENTO. GARCIA. In fact. We have already mentioned earlier that we would like to define the specific parameters which cover civil and political rights as covered by the international standards governing the behavior of governments regarding the particular political and civil rights of citizens. they had defended the rights of people to decent living. They are integral parts of that. This particular aspect we have experienced during martial law which we would now like to safeguard. GARCIA. Therefore. I think we should really limit the definition of human rights to political rights. Yes. after mentioning the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. perhaps. No. Am I correct? MR. xxx xxx xxx The PRESIDENT. Those are the rights that we envision here? MR. If I remember correctly. Madam President. at the proper time we could specify all those rights stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and defined as human rights. 3) fair and public trials. delimit as much as possible. without prejudice to future expansion. mentioned or linked the concept of human right with other human rights specified in other convention which I do not remember. especially of political detainees or prisoners. this was qualified to refer to civil and political rights contained therein. 2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures. There are actually six areas where this Commission on Human Rights could act effectively: 1) protection of rights of political detainees. BENGZON. although later on. I would like to start by saying that I agree with Commissioner Garcia that we should. what we are really trying to say is. I go back to that question that I had. So. Madam President. everytime we invoke the violation of human rights. as a matter of fact. Am I correct? . RAMA. the Marcos regime came out with the defense that. The coverage of the concept and jurisdictional area of the term "human rights". Commissioner Guingona is recognized. MR. Yes. in order to make the proposed Commission more effective. Then. Commissioner Garcia. xxx xxx xxx MR. so as not to confuse the issue? MR. decent housing and a life consistent with human dignity. GARCIA. MR. MR.

Thank you. It is not a civil right? MR. GUINGONA. MR. MR. MR. Madam President. So. MR. Correct. GUINGONA. we are not opening it up to all of the definite areas. GUINGONA. GARCIA. For example. the other one is the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights of which we are signatory. Madam President.MR. But it does not mean that we will refer to each and every specific article therein. MR. before the period of amendments. GUINGONA. I was referring to an international instrument. There are two international covenants: the International Covenant and Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic. the Committee. housing. xxx xxx xxx . The second covenant contains all the different rights-the rights of labor to organize. Social and Cultural Rights. I do not know. Is Commissioner Guingona referring to the Declaration of Torture of 1985? MR." rather than specify the rights contained in the convention. as we understand it in this Commission on Human Rights. could specify to us which of these articles in the Declaration will fall within the concept of civil and political rights. salvagings. I know. MR. but the commissioner mentioned another. the Gentlemen is no longer linking his concept or the concept of the Committee on Human Rights with the so-called civil or political rights as contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. GUINGONA. without prejudice to expansion later on. MR. MR. right to fair and public trials. I do not have a copy of the other covenant mentioned. GARCIA. and therefore. As far as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is concerned. I am not even clear as to the distinction between civil and social rights. the right to education. not for the purpose of including these in the proposed constitutional article. GARCIA. MR. et cetera. hamlettings and collective violations. there was no definite reply to the question of Commissioner Regalado as to whether the right to marry would be considered a civil or a social right. When I mentioned earlier the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. GARCIA. Therefore. but only to those that pertain to the civil and politically related. GUINGONA. shelter. So we are just limiting at the moment the sense of the committee to those that the Gentlemen has specified. I have to repeat the various specific civil and political rights that we felt must be envisioned initially by this provision — freedom from political detention and arrest prevention of torture. although I have a copy of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights here. as well as crimes involving disappearance. Madam President. GUINGONA. but to give the sense of the Commission as to what human rights would be included. The only problem is that. it is limited to politically related crimes precisely to protect the civil and political rights of a specific group of individuals. GARCIA. It is quite possible that there are rights specified in that other convention which may not be specified here. to civil and political rights. just for the record. if the need arises. I see. GARCIA. Yes. I was wondering whether it would be wise to link our concept of human rights to general terms like "convention. MR. GARCIA. MR.

More than that. instead. from the standpoint of the victims of human rights. unreasonable searches and seizures. Delegate Garcia. . for instance. we are not prepared to conclude that the order for the demolition of the stalls. or. On its contempt powers. And so. in the establishment or administration of government. TAN. 1). (4) cases of disappearances. sari-saristores and carinderia. housing and health. even be invoked. Therefore. this Human Rights Commission must be independent. . in the first place. all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights" (Sec. in general. and to impose the appropriate penalties in accordance with the procedure and sanctions provided for in the Rules of Court. etc. that "Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human rights that should fall within the authority of the Commission.SR. of the 1987 Constitution. Or. It is indeed paradoxical that a right which is claimed to have been violated is one that cannot. 34 Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. (3) fair and public trials. the right of suffrage. . the CHR acted within its authority in providing in its revised rules. religious persecution. . (2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures. and are not connected with the organization or administration of the government. . the delegates did not apparently take comfort in peremptorily making a conclusive delineation of the CHR's scope of investigatorial jurisdiction. I cannot stress more on how much we need a Commission on Human Rights. as otherwise defined civil rights are rights appertaining to a person by virtue of his citizenship in a state or community. in fact. Also quite often mentioned are the guarantees against involuntary servitude." That power to . is a busy national highway. taking into account its recommendation. to all its inhabitants. and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court. the cases involved are very delicate — torture. . In any event. and (6) other crimes committed against the religious. we will have no place to go again and we will not receive any response. . 33 on the other hand. They cannot pay and very few lawyers will accept clients who do not pay. men in the military and big shots. They have thus seen it fit to resolve. this Court can take judicial notice of. erected by private respondents on a land which is planned to be developed into a "People's Park". directly or indirectly. more than just expressing a statement of priority. as well as temporary shanties. it is. especially for the little Filipino. extant. aforequoted. the little individual who needs this kind of help and cannot get it." While the enumeration has not likely been meant to have any preclusive effect. marriage. picking up without any warrant of arrest. in its general sense. is a provision empowering the Commission on Human Rights to "investigate. the right of petition and. Be that as it may. and imprisonment for debt. now written as Section 18. equal protection of the laws." 35 In the particular case at hand. . to rights capable of being enforced or redressed in a civil action. are said to refer to the right to participate. Another reason is. mentioned such areas as the "(1) protection of rights of political detainees. on its own or on complaint by any party. freedom of contract." Accordingly. the rights appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis the management of government. nonetheless." 31 has been defined as referring — (t)o those (rights) that belong to every citizen of the state or country. in wider sense. 30 (emphasis supplied) The final outcome. The term "civil rights. Article XIII. salvaging. sari-sari stores and carinderia of the private respondents can fall within the compartment of "human rights violations involving civil and political rights" intended by the Constitution. they are the ones more abused and oppressed. Such term may also refer. The consequent danger to life and limb is not thus to be likewise simply ignored. Madam President. its power "to cite or hold any person in direct or indirect contempt. human rights victims are usually penniless. (5) salvagings and hamletting. there is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished are the stalls. They include the rights of property. I would like very much to emphasize how much we need this commission. if it is. 32 Political rights. the CHR is constitutionally authorized to "adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure. And I think we should concentrate only on civil and political violations because if we open this to land. looking at the standards hereinabove discoursed vis-a-vis the circumstances obtaining in this instance. it is readily apparent that the delegates envisioned a Commission on Human Rights that would focus its attention to the more severe cases of human rights violations. . the land adjoins the North EDSA of Quezon City which. massacre — and the persons who are allegedly guilty are people in power like politicians. the right to hold public office. significant for the tone it has set.

is not investigatorial in character but prescinds from an adjudicative power that it does not possess. Cruz. Romero. petitioners-appellees. vs.00 by way of financial aid to the vendors affected by the demolition is not an appropriate issue in the instant petition. and GO CHIU. It is true that prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an act about to be done. its findings and recommendations to any appropriate agency of government. however. said Commission admittedly has yet to promulgate its resolution in CHR Case No. JJ. Commission on Human Rights. or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals. for appropriate action. J. 39 WHEREFORE. The Commission does have legal standing to indorse. Not being a court of justice. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause. . It is never derived by implication.: The principal question in this appeal from a judgment of the lower court in an action for prohibition is whether Ordinance No. The Commission on Human Rights is hereby prohibited from further proceeding with CHR Case No. Aruego. THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA. Evidently. "Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law". for the preservation or protection of the rights and interests of a party thereto. or who unduly withhold relevant information. 36 the Court. A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. VICTOR ALABANZA." (footnotes omitted). HOTEL DEL MAR INC. M. It is available only in a pending principal action. The temporary restraining order heretofore issued by this Court is made permanent. however. Abad and Associates Law Office for respondent-appellant. explained: The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection" may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for. for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued "by the judge of any court in which the action is pending [within his district]. Davide. . the matter lies with the appropriate administrative agencies concerned to initially consider. .. Narvasa. Tenchavez and Associates for intervenor-appellee. J. the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ.. intervenor-appellee. the writ prayed for in this petition is GRANTED. C. Nocon. The public respondent explains that this petition for prohibition filed by the petitioners has become moot and academic since the case before it (CHR Case No.000. In Export Processing Zone Authority vs. 90-1580. Regalado. To exemplify. Jr.00 fine for contempt. in pursuing its investigative work. Panganiban. Bellosillo. 90-1580) has already been fully heard. ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION. or who decline to honor summons. respondent-appellant. 90-1580 and from implementing the P500. among other things. FERNANDO. and that the matter is merely awaiting final resolution. concur. and the like. the power to cite for contempt could be exercised against persons who refuse to cooperate with the said body. and not intended to provide a remedy for an act already accomplished.cite for contempt.J.. The lower court held that it is and adjudged it . however. SO ORDERED. No costs. The instant petition has been intended. Quiason and Puno. it that were the intention. 38 Here. and for no other purpose. the Constitution would have expressly said so. Melo. Bidin. or of the Supreme Court. Feliciano. The "order to desist" (a semantic interplay for a restraining order) in the instance before us. to also prevent CHR from precisely doing that. should be understood to apply only to violations of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure essential to carry out its investigatorial powers. 37 The challenge on the CHR's disbursement of the amount of P200. more importantly. INC. speaking through Madame Justice Carolina Griño-Aquino. Not only is there lack of locus standion the part of the petitioners to question the disbursement but. the "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the Constitution refer to extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a writ of preliminary injunction) which the CHR may seek from proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights violations..

That the petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association.00 fee per annum for first class motels and P4. the nationality. restaurant and laundry similarly offends against the due process clause for being arbitrary. therefore. motel. on the ground that in the revised charter of the City of Manila or in any other law. 1963 issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering respondent Mayor to refrain from enforcing said Ordinance No."1 (par. with the name. It was then alleged that on June 13. There was the assertion of its being beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact insofar as it would regulate motels. the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. The lower court on July 6. manager. unreasonable and oppressive. 1). tavern or common inn unless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and making it unlawful for the owner. and a certain Go Chiu. motels and lodging houses would be open for inspection either by the City Mayor. one of its members. coupled with a certification that a person signing such form has personally filled it up and affixed his signature in the presence of such owner. who was at the time acting as Mayor of the City of Manila. cause the automatic cancellation of the license of the offended party. which is to curb immorality. are duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. that the provision in the same section which would require the owner. 3). manager. in effect causing the destruction of the business and loss of its investments. employing and giving livelihood to not less than 2. The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 1963. with such registration forms and records kept and bound together. keeper or duly authorized representative of such establishments to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours. a conclusion which applies to the portion of the ordinance requiring second class motels to have a dining room. the sex." For reasons to be more specifically set forth. its dissolution and the dismissal of the petition. the length of stay and the number of companions in the room. wherein the surname. Instead of evidence being offered by both parties. and that insofar as the penalty provided for in Section 4 of the challenged ordinance for a subsequent conviction would. manager. 4760. there was submitted a stipulation of facts dated September 28. Inc. runs counter to the due process guaranty for lack of certainty and for its unreasonable. 1963 by the then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga. Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association. not only for being arbitrary. Hotel del Mar Inc. After which the alleged grievances against the ordinance were set forth in detail. with data furnished as to his residence certificate as well as his passport number. (par. there is once again a transgression of the due process clause. there was an admission of the personal circumstances regarding the respondent Mayor and of the fact that petitioners are licensed to engage in the hotel or motel business in the City of Manila. arbitrary and oppressive character. the date of birth. indefinite and uncertain. which reads: 1. characterized as legitimate businesses duly licensed by both national and city authorities.00 for second class motels. to a proper purpose. that Section 2 of the challenged ordinance classifying motels into two classes and requiring the maintenance of certain minimum facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room. motels. with the assertion that the issuance of the preliminary injunction ex parte was contrary to law. that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance is unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violative of due process insofar as it would impose P6. while the petitioner . It was alleged that the petitioner non-stock corporation is dedicated to the promotion and protection of the interest of its eighteen (18) members "operating hotels and motels. such judgment must be reversed. In the a answer filed on August 3. or their duly authorized representatives is unconstitutional and void again on due process grounds. or lodging house to refrain from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or letting any room or other quarter to any person or persons without his filling up the prescribed form in a lobby open to public view at all times and in his presence. who is "the president and general manager of the second petitioner" against the respondent Mayor of the City of Manila who was sued in his capacity as such "charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances.. both with offices in the City of Manila. if any. or the Chief of Police." (par. whether on statutory or constitutional grounds. There was a plea for the issuance of preliminary injunction and for a final judgment declaring the above ordinance null and void and unenforceable. if any. keeper or duly authorized representative of a hotel. keeper or duly authorized representative. the address. regularly paying taxes. unreasonable or oppressive but also for being vague. and Hotel del Mar Inc.500. approved on June 14.000. it also being provided that the premises and facilities of such hotels. relationship. and. age and sex would be specified. 4760 was filed on July 5. 4760 from and after July 8. no reference is made to motels. 2)."unconstitutional. the occupation. given name and middle name. 1964. null and void. of the provisions of the cited Ordinance but a denial of its alleged nullity. 1963. 1963 by the petitioners. lodging houses. respondent Mayor prayed for. there being a failure of the requisite showing to sustain an attack against its validity. After setting forth that the petition did fail to state a cause of action and that the challenged ordinance bears a reasonable relation. and likewise for the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against self-incrimination. a dining room or. a valid and proper exercise of the police power and that only the guests or customers not before the court could complain of the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against self incrimination. that the provision of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance prohibiting a person less than 18 years old from being accepted in such hotels.500 person and representing an investment of more than P3 million. 1963.

Such a memorandum likewise refuted point by point the arguments advanced by petitioners against its validity. 5. As was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of validity x x x . The principle has been nowhere better expressed than in the leading case of O'Gorman & Young v. null and void. Its decision cannot be allowed to stand.S. 4760 of the City of Manila. the necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable. the decision passed upon the alleged infirmity on constitutional grounds of the challenged ordinance. Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any evidence to offset the presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No.2 It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity. That the City of Manila derived in 1963 an annual income of P101. 1963. in the very nature of things. which was approved on June 14. 1965. After referring to the motels and hotels. dismissing as is undoubtedly right and proper the untenable objection on the alleged lack of authority of the City of Manila to regulate motels. 3. then the acting City Mayor of Manila. That the petitioners are duly licensed to engage in the business of operating hotels and motels in Malate and Ermita districts in Manila. 6. 1965. 668-b and 669 of the compilation of the ordinances of the City of Manila besides inserting therein three new sections. 1963. consistently with what has hitherto been the accepted standards of constitutional adjudication. That the explanatory note signed by then Councilor Herminio Astorga was submitted with the proposed ordinance (now Ordinance 4760) to the Municipal Board. the memorandum for petitioners was filed reiterating in detail what was set forth in the petition. with the nod of the Court. That on June 13. 668-a. to submit the case for decision of the Court.05 from license fees paid by the 105 hotels and motels (including herein petitioners) operating in the City of Manila. with citations of what they considered to be applicable American authorities and praying for a judgment declaring the challenged ordinance "null and void and unenforceable" and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction issued. the lower court observed: "The only remaining issue here being purely a question of law. As noted at the outset. The councilors must. 4. citing not only U. in the absence of the respondent regular City Mayor. the judgment must be reversed. amending sections 661.. all having the capacity to sue and be sued.. the parties. v. has in effect given notice that the regulations are essential to the well being of the people x x x . would be unconstitutional and. and referring to the alleged constitutional questions raised by the party. by Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga. 1äw phï1. unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face which is not the case here." It made permanent the preliminary injunction issued against respondent Mayor and his agents "to restrain him from enforcing the ordinance in question. therefore. the burden of showing its lack of conformity to the Constitution resting on the party who assails it.Go Chin is the president and general manager of Hotel del Mar Inc. by enacting the ordinance. The action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. Salaveria. but likewise applicable American authorities. The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation. which are members of the petitioners association. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.ñët Thereafter came a memorandum for respondent on January 22. That the respondent Mayor is the duly elected and incumbent City Mayor and chief executive of the City of Manila charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances. agreed to file memoranda and thereafter. and came to the conclusion that "the challenged Ordinance No. in both procedural and substantive aspects. 662. 2." Hence this appeal. This ordinance is similar to the one vetoed by the respondent Mayor (Annex A) for the reasons stated in its 4th Indorsement dated February 15. on February 4. 4760. Then barely two weeks later.904. copy of which is attached hereto as Annex C. The local legislative body.3 where the American Supreme Court through Justice Brandeis tersely and succinctly summed up the matter thus: The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power. A decent regard for constitutional doctrines of a fundamental character ought to have admonished the lower court against such a sweeping condemnation of the challenged ordinance. 1963 (Annex B). and the intervenor Victor Alabanza is a resident of Baguio City. wherein stress was laid on the presumption of the validity of the challenged ordinance. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law." It does appear obvious then that without any evidence submitted by the parties. be familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality and with all the facts and circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate action. As .

conducting or maintaining an opium joint or visiting a place where opium is smoked or otherwise used. ordinances punishing vagrancy and classifying a pimp or procurer as a vagrant. official action. from the imputation of legal infirmity sufficient to spell its doom? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason. almost shrill tone." The challenged ordinance then proposes to check the clandestine harboring of transients and guests of these establishments by requiring these transients and guests to fill up a registration form. in a lobby open to public view at all times. safety and general welfare of the people. to increase "the income of the city government. which." No such factual foundation being laid in the present case. a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guaranty may call for correction by the courts. This particular manifestation of a police power measure being specifically aimed to safeguard public morals is immune from such imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. or any governmental action for that matter. public safety and the genera welfare. Due process is thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of reasonableness. liberty or property. We are thus led to considering the insistent. be valid.8 provide a license tax for and regulating the maintenance or operation of public dance halls. the Municipal Board of the City of Manila felt the need for a remedial measure. In view of the requirements of due process. place and circumstances. argues eloquently for it. It would seem that what should be deemed unreasonable and what would amount to an abdication of the power to govern is inaction in the face of an admitted deterioration of the state of public morals. It is a fact worth noting that this Court has invariably stamped with the seal of its approval. the presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set aside. peace.9 prohibiting gambling. the lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts. far from sustaining any attack against the validity of the ordinance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as the most essential. 14 and prohibiting any person from keeping." 5 It would be. in each appropriate case. liberty or property of any person is subject to judicial inquiry. 4 extending as it does "to all the great public needs. 6 Negatively put. whimsical.11 and monte.underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character. insistent and the least limitable of powers. must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression. A strong case must be found in . presence and exit" and thus become the "ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers." 20 Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or phrases. What then is the standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural and a substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance.16 There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It is the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play." It would appear therefore that the stipulation of facts. which "provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry. and welfare of society. to destroy the very purpose of the state if it could be deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of its competence to promote public health. is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health. The explanatory note of the Councilor Herminio Astorga included as annex to the stipulation of facts. public morals. The mantle of protection associated with the due process guaranty does not cover petitioners. 21 It would thus be an affront to reason to stigmatize an ordinance enacted precisely to meet what a municipal lawmaking body considers an evil of rather serious proportion an arbitrary and capricious exercise of authority. prepared for the purpose. good order. Negatively put.12prohibiting playing of panguingui on days other than Sundays or legal holidays.10 prohibiting jueteng. arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its face the ordinance is fatally defective as being repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution. On the legislative organs of the government. the increase in the licensed fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other than legal" and at the same time. police power is "that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all that is hurt full to the comfort." Moreover. Correctly it has been identified as freedom from arbitrariness. safety." 19 decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our society.17 It exacts fealty "to those strivings for justice" and judges the act of officialdom of whatever branch "in the light of reason drawn from considerations of fairness that reflect [democratic] traditions of legal and political thought. the resumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute. it cannot be too often emphasized. speaks of the alarming increase in the rate of prostitution. 15 all of which are intended to protect public morals. to paraphrase another leading decision. morals." 18 It is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed content unrelated to time.13 prohibiting the operation of pinball machines. and by introducing several other amendatory provisions calculated to shatter the privacy that characterizes the registration of transients and guests. to paraphrase Cardozo. equal protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties however. the exercise of such police power insofar as it may affect the life. To satisfy the due process requirement. primarily rest the exercise of the police power. To be more specific. It furnishes though a standard to which the governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life. obedience to the dictates of justice. It provided it with the enactment of the challenged ordinance. adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part to the existence of motels. in which the objection is raised to the question of due process. whether national or local. unjust or unreasonable.7 There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. Where such exercise of police power may be considered as either capricious.

29 . It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. then. oppressive. As was said in a case. Precisely it was intended to curb the opportunity for the immoral or illegitimate use to which such premises could be. this Court had occasion to affirm that the broad taxing authority conferred by the Local Autonomy Act of 1959 to cities and municipalities is sufficiently plenary to cover a wide range of subjects with the only limitation that the tax so levied is for public purposes. with a proviso that in all cases full payment shall be charged. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty. as far back as 1922 that municipal license fees could be classified into those imposed for regulating occupations or regular enterprises. in order to secure the general comfort. The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through education and personal discipline. common inn or the like. Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual license fees provided for by the challenged ordinance for hotels and motels. especially in of licenses for the sale of liquors. call for a different conclusion." here the license fee of the operator of a massage clinic. Only the other day. and.25 As a matter of fact. as has been set forth. Nor does it lend any semblance even of deceptive plausibility to petitioners' indictment of Ordinance No. motel. in the latter cases the fees have rarely been declared unreasonable. even if it were viewed purely as a police power measure. none is even attempted here to attach to an ordinance of such character the taint of nullity for an alleged failure to meet the due process requirement.26 The discussion of this particular matter may fitly close with this pertinent citation from another decision of significance: "It is urged on behalf of the plaintiffs-appellees that the enforcement of the ordinance could deprive them of their lawful occupation and means of livelihood because they can not rent stalls in the public markets. Thus: "One thought which runs through all these different conceptions of liberty is plainly apparent. It has been the settled law however. health. 22 As was explained more in detail in the above Cu Unjieng case: (2) Licenses for non-useful occupations are also incidental to the police power and the right to exact a fee may be implied from the power to license and regulate. 23 Moreover in the equally leading case of Lutz v. 4760 on due process grounds to single out such features as the increased fees for motels and hotels. or of the public order and safety. the curtailment of the area of freedom to contract. and. which means peace and order and happiness for all. manager. but in fixing amount of the license fees the municipal corporations are allowed a much wider discretion in this class of cases than in the former. Moreover.500 yearly. tavern. in certain particulars. is not license. persons licensed to pursue occupations which may in the public need and interest be affected by the exercise of the police power embark in these occupations subject to the disadvantages which may result from the legal exercise of that power. or otherwise within the proper scope of the police power. to lease or rent room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours. declined to interfere with such discretion. Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens. But it appears that plaintiffs are also dealers in refrigerated or cold storage meat. Again. Hence license fees clearly in the nature of privilege taxes for revenue have frequently been upheld. Araneta24 this Court affirmed the doctrine earlier announced by the American Supreme Court that taxation may be made to implement the state's police power. And surely. and. the sale of which outside the city markets under certain conditions is permitted x x x . lodging house." 28 A similar observation was made by Justice Laurel: "Public welfare. 150% for the former and over 200% for the latter. so that there may be established the resultant equilibrium. or tyrannical."27 Nor does the restriction on the freedom to contract. but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy.the records. it is 'liberty regulated by law. of course. and with business and occupations. first-class motels being required to pay a P6. Every man must renounce unbridled license. and aside from applying the well-known legal principle that municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable. for the regulation or restriction of non-useful occupations or enterprises and for revenue purposes only. as a general rule. P4. generally an important factor in the determination of the amount of this kind of license fee. petitioners cannot be unaware that every regulation of conduct amounts to curtailment of liberty which as pointed out by Justice Malcolm cannot be absolute. with property. such a limitation cannot be viewed as a transgression against the command of due process. The desirability of imposing restraint upon the number of persons who might otherwise engage in non-useful enterprises is. lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law. No man can do exactly as he pleases. even without reference to the wide latitude enjoyed by the City of Manila in imposing licenses for revenue. its alleged vagueness.000 annual fee and second-class motels. that some individuals in the community may be deprived of their present business or a particular mode of earning a living cannot prevent the exercise of the police power. insofar as the challenged ordinance makes it unlawful for the owner.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being. it has been explicitly held in one case that "much discretion is given to municipal corporations in determining the amount. and prosperity of the state x x x To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the individual are subordinated. the mere fact. The right of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law for the common good x x x The liberty of the citizen may be restrained in the interest of the public health. according to the explanatory note. It is this: 'Liberty' as understood in democracies. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery. courts have. In fact. just and uniform. keeper or duly authorized representative of any hotel. How could it then be arbitrary or oppressive when there appears a correspondence between the undeniable existence of an undesirable situation and the legislative attempt at correction. are being devoted.

Pomar. Wherefore. Petitioners. VILLEGAS. Cruz. September 17. J.30 no longer "retains its virtuality as a living principle. Respect for constitutional law principles so uniformly held and so uninterruptedly adhered to by this Court compels a reversal of the appealed decision. the dispositive portion of winch reads. Felix C.L.33 toAdderley v. with all due allowance for the arguments pressed with such vigor and determination. another proviso which from their standpoint would require a guess as to whether the "full rate of payment" to be charged for every such lease thereof means a full day's or merely a half-day's rate. Wherefore.: This is a petition for certiorari to review tile decision dated September 17. 32 How justify then the allegation of a denial of due process? Lastly. 72797. vs. FERNANDEZ. 6 37 of the City of Manila null and void. J. Sanchez. but where the liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of property. Makalintal. Florida. Castro and Angeles. Angel C. and Dizon. MAYOR ANTONIO J. People v. Reyes. Far from it.P. Is this the situation before us? A citation from Justice Holmes would prove illuminating: "We agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit but there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean. SO ORDERED.B. Philippines. respondents. the standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting. 1968." 35 That is all then that this case presents.. C. petitioner. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent given way to the assumption by the government of the right of intervention even in contractual relations affected with public interest. Concepcion. Sotero H. (SGD. Laurel for respondents. are on leave. Ejercito. however. there is the attempt to impugn the ordinance on another due process ground by invoking the principles of vagueness or uncertainty. Branch I. As it stands. point to the requirement that a guest should give the name.31 What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person.It is noteworthy that the only decision of this Court nullifying legislation because of undue deprivation of freedom to contract. From Connally v. General Construction Co. declaring Ordinance No. the attack against the validity of the challenged ordinance cannot be considered a success.. JJ. the permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider. The preliminary injunction is made permanent. the judgment of the lower court is reversed and the injunction issued lifted forthwith. a proviso in one of its sections which cast doubt as to whether the maintenance of a restaurant in a motel is dependent upon the discretion of its owners or operators. age and sex of the companion or companions as indefinite and uncertain in view of the necessity for determining whether the companion or companions referred to are those arriving with the customer or guest at the time of the registry or entering the room With him at about the same time or coming at any indefinite time later to join him.. J. No pronouncement as to cost. 1968 of respondent Judge Francisco Arca of the Court of First Instance of Manila. relationship. Chaves & Jose Laureta for petitioner. judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner and against the respondents. HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO and JUDGE FRANCISCO ARCA. Zaldivar.J. concur. It would appear from a recital in the petition itself that what seems to be the gravamen of the alleged grievance is that the provisions are too detailed and specific rather than vague or uncertain. Manila. Bengzon.) FRANCI . J.34 the principle has been consistently upheld that what makes a statute susceptible to such a charge is an enactment either forbidding or requiring the doing of an act that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. do these allegations suffice to render the ordinance void on its face for alleged vagueness or uncertainty? To ask the question is to answer it.. With costs. Gregorio A. in Civil Case No. It may be asked.

1968 rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No.00 or both such fine and imprisonment.00 employment permit. sect or denomination. and members of religious orders or congregations. upon conviction. who are not paid monetarily or in kind. Ordinance No. BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION WITHIN THE CITY OF MANILA WITHOUT FIRST SECURING AN EMPLOYMENT PERMIT FROM THE MAYOR OF MANILA. then Mayor Antonio J. 5 On May 4. Villegas filed the present petition on March 27. 6 In this petition.00 except persons employed in the diplomatic or consular missions of foreign countries. 7 On May 24. deprived of their rights to life. being applied only to aliens who are thus. or in the technical assistance programs of both the Philippine Government and any foreign government. 72797. praying for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the enforcement of Ordinance No. it makes no distinction between useful and non-useful occupations. 6537 is discriminatory and violative of the rule of the uniformity in taxation. oppressive and unreasonable. liberty and property and therefore. 2 City Ordinance No. thus. 6537 null and void.1968: 9 . whether permanent. Branch I. 3 Section 1 of said Ordinance No. imposing a fixed P50. violating the fundamental principle on illegal delegation of legislative powers: 3) It is arbitrary. and those working in their respective households. temporary or casual. which is out of proportion to the cost of registration and that it fails to prescribe any standard to guide and/or limit the action of the Mayor. 2) As a police power measure. 1968 and signed by the herein petitioner Mayor Antonio J. denominated as Civil Case No. without first securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of P50. private respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho who was employed in Manila. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila on February 22. AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. Villegas of Manila on March 27. 6537 null and void and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction. 6537 is entitled: AN ORDINANCE MAKING IT UNLAWFUL FOR ANY PERSON NOT A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES TO BE EMPLOYED IN ANY PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT OR TO BE ENGAGED IN ANY KIND OF TRADE. 1968. 6537 as well as for a judgment declaring said Ordinance No. Violations of this ordinance is punishable by an imprisonment of not less than three (3) months to six (6) months or fine of not less than P100. filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Manila. 1968. 6537 4 prohibits aliens from being employed or to engage or participate in any position or occupation or business enumerated therein.SCO ARCA J u d g e 1 The controverted Ordinance No. Petitioner assigned the following as errors allegedly committed by respondent Judge in the latter's decision of September 17. 8 Contesting the aforecited decision of respondent Judge. 1968.00 but not more than P200. respondent Judge issued the writ of preliminary injunction and on September 17. 1969. violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho assigned the following as his grounds for wanting the ordinance declared null and void: 1) As a revenue measure imposed on aliens employed in the City of Manila.

part time or full time or whether he is a lowly employee or a highly paid executive Ordinance No.I THE RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND PATENT ERROR OF LAW IN RULING THAT ORDINANCE NO. 6537 is not a tax or revenue measure but is an exercise of the police power of the state. The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution. 6537 does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion. enumerates no conditions for its grant or refusal. 6537 VIOLATED THE CARDINAL RULE OF UNIFORMITY OF TAXATION. The P50. II RESPONDENT JUDGE LIKEWISE COMMITTED A GRAVE AND PATENT ERROR OF LAW IN RULING THAT ORDINANCE NO. being an undefined and unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an activity per se lawful. It is obvious that the purpose of the ordinance is to raise money under the guise of regulation. or standard from which it can be measured or controlled. thus conferring upon the Mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant or deny the issuance of building permits. 6537 is void because it does not contain or suggest any standard or criterion to guide the mayor in the exercise of the power which has been granted to him by the ordinance. Price Stabilization Board. It has been held that where an ordinance of a municipality fails to state any policy or to set up any standard to guide or limit the mayor's action. 11 where a law granted a government agency power to determine the allocation of wheat flour among importers. . It was also held in Primicias vs. Although the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification.00 from aliens who have been cleared for employment. 6537 cannot be declared null and void on the ground that it violated the rule on uniformity of taxation because the rule on uniformity of taxation applies only to purely tax or revenue measures and that Ordinance No. III RESPONDENT JUDGE FURTHER COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND PATENT ERROR OF LAW IN RULING THAT ORDINANCE NO. There is no logic or justification in exacting P50. and entirely lacks standard.00 is being collected from every employed alien whether he is casual or permanent. expresses no purpose to be attained by requiring a permit. Petitioner Mayor Villegas argues that Ordinance No. The contention that Ordinance No. rule. the Supreme Court ruled against the interpretation of uncontrolled power as it vested in the administrative officer an arbitrary discretion to be exercised without a policy. Ordinance No. Fugoso 12 that the authority and discretion to grant and refuse permits of all classes conferred upon the Mayor of Manila by the Revised Charter of Manila is not uncontrolled discretion but legal discretion to be exercised within the limits of the law. 6537 VIOLATED THE PRINCIPLE AGAINST UNDUE DESIGNATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER. it is imperative that the classification should be based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation. 6537 is not a purely tax or revenue measure because its principal purpose is regulatory in nature has no merit. 6537 VIOLATED THE DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES OF THE CONSTITUTION. 10 In Chinese Flour Importers Association vs. The same amount of P50.00 as employee's fee is not regulatory but a revenue measure. such ordinance is invalid. While it is true that the first part which requires that the alien shall secure an employment permit from the Mayor involves the exercise of discretion and judgment in the processing and approval or disapproval of applications for employment permits and therefore is regulatory in character the second part which requires the payment of P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but because it fails to consider valid substantial differences in situation among individual aliens who are required to pay it. it being principally a regulatory measure in nature.

the provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 13 The trial court did not commit the errors assigned. the first luminary of American jurisprudence. defendant. next to give a history of the so called "non-Christians. 1917. is of the deepest interest. Antonio and Aquino. 515). vs. Williams & Filemon Sotto for plaintiff. no successful result will be obtained toward educating these people. ET AL. INTRODUCTION. To imitate still further the opinion of the Chief Justice. in every point of view in which it can be placed. RUBI. began his opinion (relating to the status of an Indian) with words which. THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO. Juan Morente. Mindoro. J. the rights if they have any. Jr. D.Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. 25 which is as follows: The provincial governor. lastly. Santos and Guerrero. both aliens and citizens. Jr. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. presented the following resolution: "Whereas several attempts and schemes have been made for the advancement of the non-Christian people of Mindoro. C.. concur. JJ. MALCOLM. 6 Pet. Fernando. The legislative power of state. Georgia [1832]. which were all a failure. (manguianes). The shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons.J. SO ORDERED. J. Office of the Solicitor-General Paredes for defendant. This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro. Concepcion. The return of the Solicitor-General alleges: 1. the political existence of a people.: In one of the cases which denote a landmark in American Constitutional History (Worcester vs. WHEREFORE. the personal liberty of a citizen.." next to compare the status of the "non-Christians" with that of the American Indians. the controlling power of the constitution and laws. Chief Justice Marshall. plaintiffs. once an alien is admitted. "Whereas it has been found out and proved that unless some other measure is taken for the Mangyan work of this province. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory.. with a slight change in phraseology.. Makasiar. R. are all involved in the subject now to be considered. . and. Hon. Castro. we adopt his outline and proceed first. took no part. concur in the result. to resolve the constitutional questions presented. JJ. Barredo. Muñoz Palma. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao. he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law.. against their will. the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed.. can be made to introduce the present opinion — This cause. without pronouncement as to costs. It is alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province.. and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away form the reservation. That on February 1. to introduce the facts and the issues. I.

2711. therefore. in accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code. the Secretary of the Interior. and to introduce civilized customs among them. That Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punished in accordance with section 2759 of Act No. 2711. That said resolution No. "Whereas the provincial governor is of the opinion that the sitio of Tigbao on Lake Naujan is a place most convenient for the Mangyanes to live on. to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao. pursuant to the provisions of section 2145 of the revised Administrative Code. that under section 2077 of the Administrative Code. "Whereas said resolution has been duly approve by the Honorable. 1917." 4. becomes the paramount question which the court is called upon the decide. has selected a site in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. 5. the provincial governor of Mindoro issued executive order No. not later than December 31. 25. That on December 4. current series. Petitioners. 800 hectares of public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro subject to the approval of the Honorable Secretary of the Interior. The action was taken in accordance with section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917.. That Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this reservation providing that said homestead applications are previously recommended by the provincial governor. by Resolution No. and "Resolved further. jr. therefore. therefore be it "Resolved. and was duly approved by the Secretary of the Interior as required by said action. Now."Whereas it is deemed necessary to obliged them to live in one place in order to make a permanent settlement. selected by the provincial governor and approved by the provincial board. on February 21. 3. 6. challenge the validity of this section of the Administrative Code. 1917. 1917. when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order. 25 (series 1917) of the provincial board of Mindoro was approved by the Secretary of the Interior of February 21." 2. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows: . It thus appears that the provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof directed the Manguianes in question to take up their habitation in Tigbao. That the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro copied in paragraph 1 and the executive order of the governor of the same province copied in paragraph 3. "Now. That the undersigned has not information that Doroteo Dabalos is being detained by the sheriff of Mindoro but if he is so detained it must be by virtue of the provisions of articles Nos. Juan Morente. do hereby direct that all the Mangyans in the townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan. "Whereas the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized. 2 which says: "Whereas the provincial board. This. a site on the shore of Lake Naujan. were necessary measures for the protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they roam. however. Naujan Lake. 1917. provincial governor of Mindoro. "Any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not exceed in sixty days. to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board. 2145 and 2759 of Act No. I.

with great care and special attention. In the forest of Segovia on September 13. 1560. notably of Act No. Philip II at Toledo. Refusal of a non-Christian to take up appointed habitation. presidents. wherein they are deprived of all spiritual and temporal benefits and wherein they cannot profit from the aid of our ministers and from that which gives rise to those human necessities which men are obliged to give one another. BEFORE ACQUISITION OF THE PHILIPPINE BY THE UNITED STATES. there should be noted section 2759 of the same Code. 2145. 1551. and not to live in places divided and separated from one another by sierras and mountains. to use all the means most convenient to the attainment of these purposes. it is well first of all to set down a skeleton history of the attitude assumed by the authorities towards these "non-Christians. have entrusted and ordered the viceroys. it has always been endeavored.SEC. our kings. and governors to execute with great care and moderation the concentration of the indios intoreducciones. on February 19. by different orders. xxx xxx xxx . — Any non-Christian who shall refuse to comply with the directions lawfully given by a provincial governor. 2759. The substance of what is now found in said section 2145 is not new to Philippine law. at Cigales. II. so that those who would not presently settle and who would see the good treatment and the protection of those already in settlements would. The most important of the laws of the Indies having reference to the subject at hand are compiled in Book VI. we hereby order and decree that the same be complied with in all the remaining parts of the Indies. Administrative Code of 1916. which read as follows: SEC. In the Escorial on November 10. and in order to understand the policy of the Government of the Philippine Islands with reference to the uncivilized elements of the Islands. 547. In order to put the phrase in its proper category. Title III. in the following language. In connection with the above-quoted provisions. our predecessors. and the encomederos shall entreat compliance thereof in the manner and form prescribed by the laws of this title. is also found in varying forms in other laws of the Philippine Islands. Act No. and it is ordained that they be not required to pay taxes more than what is ordered. section 69. without causing inconveniences." with particular regard for the legislation on the subject. Act No. At these meetings it was resolved that indios be made to live in communities. as will later be disclosed. The Emperor Charles and the Prince. — With the prior approval of the Department Head. to take up habitation upon a site designated by said governor shall upon conviction be imprisonment for a period not exceeding sixty days. 1578. THAT THE "INDIOS" BE REDUCED INTO "POBLACIONES" COMMUNITIES). when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order. LAW I. and to deal with their doctrine with such forbearance and gentleness. and in order that they may forget the blunders of their ancient rites and ceremonies to the end that they may live in harmony and in a civilized manner. specifically relating to the Manguianes. section 2 of various special provincial laws. Because the above has been executed in the greater part of our Indies. 1397. the prelates of new Spain assembled by order of Emperor Charles V of glorious memory in the year one thousand five hundred and forty-six — all of which meetings were actuated with a desire to serve God an our Kingdom. on March 21. HISTORY. A. The genealogical tree of this section. of their own accord. Establishment of non-Christina upon sites selected by provincial governor. the governor. Ordinance 149 of the poblaciones of 1573. Having realized that convenience of this resolution. pursuant to section two thousand one hundred and forty-five of this Code. our Council of the Indies and other religious persons met at various times. to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him an approved by the provincial board. To carry out this work with success. In order that the indios may be instructed in the Sacred Catholic Faith and the evangelical law. Section 2145 and its antecedent laws make use of the term "non-Christians. section 62. 1568. 387. if we may be permitted to use such terminology. on May 20. 1565. present themselves. the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized. would read: Section 2077. In San Lorenzo." This word.

lands. The penalty of one thousand pesos shall be imposed upon the judge or encomendero who should violate this law. ingress and egress. without our express order or that of the viceroy. 1646. at Madrid. nevertheless. THE SAME AS ABOVE. there should be two mayors and two aldermen. has the right to alter or to remove thepueblos or the reducciones once constituted and founded. THAT THERE BE MAYORS AND ALDERMEN IN THE "REDUCTIONES. as is the practice in town inhabited by Spaniards and indios. or magistrate. If there be less than eighty indios but not less than forty. NEGROES. LAW XXI. or any other court. THAT THE "INDIOS" IN "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT DEPRIVED OF THE LANDS PREVIOUSLY HELD BY THEM. in Madrid. at Todesillas. With more good-will and promptness. because these claims are often made for private interests and not for those of the indios. and mountains. or the royal district court. wherein the indios can have their live stock that they may not be mixed with those of the Spaniards. and on November 25. who should be an indio of the same reduccion. the indios shall be concentrated in reducciones. 1600." We order that in each town and reduccion there be a mayor. on October 1 and December 17." WHO SHALL BE "INDIOS. also indios. On May 2. THAT THE "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT REMOVED WITHOUT ORDER OF THE KING. Tit. THAT IN THE TOWNS OF THE "INDIOS. And. October 10. 4. on October 10. OR COURT. 1956. see Law I. Philip II at the Pardo. on July 12. 1563. there should. or alcalde mayor. president. if there be more than eighty houses. otherwise the change will be considered fraudulently obtained. No governor. Philip III at Madrid. For this law and the one following. ." THERE SHALL LIVE NO SPANIARDS. 1573. THE "REDUCCTIONES" BE MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONDITIONS OF THIS LAW. on May 8. LAW IX. even if the town be a big one." AND MULATTOES. 1581. priests. xxx xxx xxx LAW XIII. or indios request such a change or consent to it by offering or giving information to that en. 1589. VICEROY. "MESTIZOS.LAW VIII. At Tomar. Philip II. in the presence of the priests . and that they be allowed to retain the lands held by them previously so that they may cultivate them and profit therefrom. LAW XV. provided. The places wherein the pueblos and reducciones shall be formed should have the facilities of waters. however. Philip II at Toledo. Book 7. on January 10. on February 19. that the encomenderos. we hereby order that this law be always complied with. on December 1. husbandry and passageway of one league long. 1618. We hereby order that no change shall be made in this respect. Philip III. Provided they shall not be deprived of the lands and granaries which they may have in the places left by them. At Madrid. be more than two mayors and four aldermen. who should annually elect nine others. there should be not more than one mayor and one alderman. and. 1578. 1618. Philip IV. Philip III at Madrid.

they all not be affected by this law. After hearing the illustrious opinions of all the local authorities. We hereby order the imposition of grave penalties upon the commission of the acts above-mentioned which should not be tolerated in the towns. another. lack of all the nations which enable them to grasp the moral and material advantages that may be acquired in those towns under the protection and vigilance afforded them by the same laws. I hereby promulgate the following: DECREE. negroes. thus giving and customs of isolation. and which living in the obscurity of ignorance. besides maltreating them and utilizing their services. the Bishops of Jaro and Cebu. of dirty ways of living. because it has been found that some Spaniards who deal. idleness. I have arrived at an intimate conviction of the inevitable necessity of proceeding in a practical manner for the submission of the said pagan and isolated races. reading as follows: It is a legal principle as well as a national right that every inhabitant of a territory recognized as an integral part of a nation should respect and obey the laws in force therein. of those mountain and rebellious pagans — shall be published in their respective dialects. vol. save those exceptions prescribed in this decree which are bases upon the differences of instructions." is found in the Decree of the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands of January 14. For the reasons above stated and for the purpose of carrying out these objects. to avoid the wrongs done them. priests. Agustinians. to allow any longer the commission of depredations. in its efforts to improve the condition of the less advanced inhabitants of the Islands by concentrating them in "reducciones. Recoletos. robbers. increase. and of the necessities of the different pagan races which occupy a part of its territory. and the officials. and missionaries of the provinces wherein they are found are hereby entrusted in the work of having these races . of the customs. and that much has been heretofore accomplished with the help and self-denial of the missionary fathers who have even sacrificed their lives to the end that those degenerate races might be brought to the principles of Christianity. It is equally highly depressive to our national honor to tolerate any longer the separation and isolation of the nonChristian races from the social life of the civilized and Christian towns.We hereby prohibit and forbid Spaniards. 2. 231. metropolis. I have proceeded in the premises by giving the most careful study of this serious question which involves important interests for civilization. The diverse rules which should be promulgated for each of these races — which may be divided into three classes. and the negroes. it appearing to be a harsh thing to separate them from their parents. and mulattoes. one. 228. (Law of the Indies. mulattores. presidents. Franciscans.) A clear exposition of the purposes of the Spanish government. taking into account the prestige which the country demands and the inevitable duty which every government has in enforcing respect and obedience to the national laws on the part of all who reside within the territory under its control. Neither have the punishments imposed been sufficient in certain cases and in those which have not been guarded against. and who are to inherit their houses andhaciendas. and also some of their blunders and vices which may corrupt and pervert the goal which we desire to reach with regard to their salvation. All the indian inhabitants (indios) of the Islands of Luzon are. live. governors. and also after finding the unanimous conformity of the meeting held with the Archbishop of Manila. contaminate them with their bad customs. 229. the indios would leave their towns and provinces. precisely in the Island of Luzon wherein is located the seat of the representative of the Government of the. and tranquillity. and the third. to be governed by the common law. as well as of the manner and the only form of accomplishing such a task. and the provincial prelates of the orders of the Dominicans. on other hand. and missionaries of the provinces of Northern Luzon. pp. and associate with the indios are men of troublesome nature. 1. who are children of indias and born among them. ecclesiastics. it is the duty to conscience and to humanity for all governments to civilize those backward races that might exist in the nation. from this date. while. held for the object so indicated. 1881. gamblers. As it is impossible to consent to the continuation of such a lamentable state of things. It is but just to admit the fact that all the governments have occupied themselves with this most important question. and that the viceroys. mestizos. and courts take great care in executing the law within their powers and avail themselves of the cooperation of the ministers who are truly honest. and. made up of those subdued pagans who have not as yet entered completely the social life. 230. 2. trade. As regards the mestizos and Indian and Chinese half-breeds (zambaigos). or mestizos to live to live in the reduccionesand towns and towns of the indios. but the means and the preaching employed to allure them have been insufficient to complete the work undertaken. and vicious and useless men. and Jesuits as also of the meeting of the Council of Authorities. from the moral and material as well as the political standpoints. which comprises those which live isolated and roaming about without forming a town nor a home.

and only in case of absolute necessity shall a new residence be fixed for them. 11. the location of these towns be distant from their actual residences. labors. 8. and with the prohibition against these new towns as well as the others from engaging in commerce of any other transaction with the rebellious indios. 7. the limits of the territory of the rebellious indiosshall be fixed. all by this fact along be exempt for eight years from rendering personal labor. and for the opening or fixing up of means of communication. in conjunction with the rural guards (cuadrilleros). as to their compliance. continue in their rebellious attitude on the first of next April. respect for their habits and customs in so far as the same are not opposed to natural law. the inhabitants thereof shall not be obliged to move their dwelling-houses. beginning with the first day of next April. 3. they shall destroy their dwelling-houses. with all the means which their zeal may suggest to them. 9. an effort must be made to establish their homes with the reach of the sound of the bell. schools. the establishment of missions and families of recognized honesty who shall teach. that. and shall adopt the necessary regulations for the appointment of local authorities. the exemption from contributions and tributes for ten years and from thequintas (a kind of tax) for twenty years. and. and whoever should go beyond the said limits shall be detained and assigned governmentally wherever convenient. with the only exception that in the first two years they shall not be obliged to render personal services other than those previously indicated. protection. and provided further the putting of families in a place so selected by them be authorized in the towns already constituted. These rules shall have executive character. freedom to decide of their own accord as to whether they want to be Christians or not. provided. support during a year. there shall be established an armed force composed precisely of native Christian. shall have to enter the territory of such tribes. the purchase or facility of the sale of their harvests. in either of these cases. For the protection and defense of these new towns. The races indicated in the preceding article. protect. and implements. they must be observed in the manner prescribed below. So long as these subdued towns or settlements are located infertile lands appropriate for cultivation. direct. 4. the violation of which shall be punished with deportation. and advantages offered them. and clothes upon effecting submission. 6. concession of good lands and the right to cultivate them in the manner they wish and in the way them deem most productive. For the purpose of assisting in the conversion of the pagans into the fraternity of the Catholic Church. in return. Such a punishment shall necessarily be repeated twice a year. The authorities shall offer in the name of the State to the races not subdued (aetas and mountains igorrots the following advantages in returns for their voluntary submission: to live in towns. that those who are governed by the local authorities as the ones who elect such officials under the direct charge of the authorities of the province or district. of constructing their town hall. and for this purpose the military headquarters shall . choosing for this purpose the place most convenient for them and which prejudices the least their interest. The authorities shall see to it that the inhabitants of the new towns understand all the rights and duties affecting them and the liberty which they have as to where and now they shall till their lands and sell the products thereof. from now on. as regards the administrative organization of the said towns or settlements. In order to properly carry out this express prohibition. and confiscate their products and cattle. On the expiration of the term.learn these rules. The provincial authorities in conjunction with the priests shall proceed. have the obligation of constituting their new towns. and lastly. 10. and country roads which place them in communication with one another and with the Christians. to the taking of the census of the inhabitants of the towns or settlement already subdued. and for the this purposes. so that at the beginning of the fiscal year they shall have the same rights and obligations which affect the remaining towns of the archipelago. shall. and. the organization and service of which shall be determined in a regulations based upon that of the abolished Tercios de Policia (division of the Guardia Civil). for the construction of courts and schools. who voluntarily admit the advantages offered. the Captain General's Office shall proceed with the organization of the divisions of the Army which. if there be none as yet. endeavoring. and give them security and trust them. committing from now on the crimes and vexations against the Christian towns. when the latter do not have the good conditions of location and cultivations. The armed force shall proceed to the prosecution and punishment of the tribes. disregarding the peace. 5. with the only exception of the tobacco which shall be bought by the Hacienda at the same price and conditions allowed other producers. unity among their families. that this be finished before the first day of next July.

1900. 13. namely: In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands. The Philippine Commission was to retain exclusive jurisdiction of that part of said Islands inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes. No. nearest to a Constitution for the Philippines. the Act of Congress of July 1. The chiefs of provinces. Statute law. (Gaceta de Manila. was to have jurisdiction over the Christian portion of the Islands. Vice-Royal Patron. Nueva Vizcaya. 12. a council or permanent commission which shall attend to and decide all the questions relative to the application of the foregoing regulations that may be brought to it for consultations by the chiefs of provinces and priests and missionaries. local authorities. 14. the question as to the best method for dealing with the primitive inhabitants has been a perplexing one. and the Department of Mindanao and Sulu. AFTER ACQUISITON OF THE PHILIPPINES BY THE UNITED STATES. shall be promulgated by the respective official centers within their respective jurisdictions. later expressly approved and ratified by section 1 of the Philippine Bill. that is. One paragraph of particular interest should here be quoted. in brining about due compliance with this decree. The Philippine Legislature. The latest Act of Congress. without undue or petty interference. 1902. 12). Portions of these instructions have remained undisturbed by subsequent congressional legislation. vol. shall give the most effective aid and cooperation to the said forces in all that is within the attributes and the scope of the authority of each. It divided the Philippine Islands into twelve senatorial districts. under my presidency as Governor-General. and the territory which is inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes. the Commission should adopt the same course followed by Congress in permitting the tribes of our North American Indians to maintain their tribal organization and government and under which many of these tribes are now living in peace and contentment. Next comes the Philippine Bill. The Governor-General of the Philippine Islands was authorized to appoint senators and representatives for the territory which. and other subordinates to my authorities. civil as well as military authorities.) B. 16). The purpose of section 7 of the Philippine Bill was to provide for a legislative body and. therefore. priests. The first order of an organic character after the inauguration of the American Government in the Philippines was President McKinley's Instructions to the Commission of April 7. There shall be created. as a complement to the foregoing. in the nature of an Organic Act for the Philippines. commonly known as the Jones Law. Such tribal governments should. . composed of the Philippine Commission and the Philippine Assembly. 1916. 1902. which I intend to visit. pp. and the territory which Moros or other non-Christian tribes. constant and active effort should be exercised to prevent barbarous practices and introduce civilized customs. 7. local authorities. 15) (Diccionario de la Administracion. The law establish a bureau to be known as the "Bureau of non-Christian Tribes" which shall have general supervision over the public affairs of the inhabitants which are represented in the Legislature by appointed senators and representatives( sec. is the Act of Congress of August 29. and missioners. and. with this end in view. Ever since the acquisition of the Philippine Islands by the United States. The secondary provisions which may be necessary. 22).immediately order a detachment of the military staff to study the zones where such operations shall take place and everything conducive to the successful accomplishment of the same. 15. Organic law. surrounded by civilization to which they are unable or unwilling to conform. the Act of Congress of July 1. was not represented in the Philippine Assembly. 128-134. the preceding provisions shall conveniently be applied to them. the twelfth district to be composed of the Mountain Province. This transferred the exclusive legislative jurisdiction and authority theretofore exercised by the Philippine Commission. to the Philippine Legislature (sec. however. Baguio. at the time of the passage of the Jones Law. be subjected to wise and firm regulation. for the twelfth district (sec. 2. With respect to the reduccion of the pagan races found in some of the provinces in the southern part of the Archipelago. be said to recognized a dividing line between the territory not inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes. Philippine organic law may. and other subordinates to may authority. 1. to name the prerequisites for the organization of the Philippine Assembly.

The constant aim of the governor shall be to aid the Manguianes of his province to acquire the knowledge and experience necessary for successful local popular government. as a township.Local governments in the Philippines have been provided for by various acts of the Philippine Commission and Legislature. in dealing with these Manguianes to appoint officers from among them. 1902. Manguianes who refuse to comply with such directions shall upon conviction be imprisonment for a period not exceeding sixty days. . 83. 1902. Act No. if they of the non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippines and a settled and consistent practice with reference to the methods to be followed for their advancement. and Zambales. Beginning with Act No. Act No. Misamis. relating to the organization of settlements. 1963. when he deems such a course necessary in the interest of law and order. providing for the organization and government of the Moro Province. Nueva Vizcaya. the Organic Act of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu. 753. Act No. Act No. 1396 and 1397. 5. 445. an to the end that law and order and individual freedom shall be maintained. the Provincial Government Act. The two Administrative Codes retained the provisions in questions. 547: No. Acts Nos. All of these special laws. SEC. subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior. Tayabas.' passed September twenty-sixth. 6. SEC. In turn. sections 68-71. TERMINOLOGY. and the geographical limits of such township shall be fixed by the provincial board. and to prescribe their powers and duties: Provided. the Baguio charger. 579. Lepanto-Bontoc. it may be organized under the provisions of sections one to sixtyseven. . the Township Government Act. 549. Antique. C. 4568. 4111. Act No. 2. These different laws. Act No. Paragua (Palawan). be it enacted by the Philippine Commission. 548. 1306 were enacted for the provinces of Abra. 183. the provincial governor is further authorized. Bataan. 1145. the passage of the same is hereby expedited in accordance with section two of 'An Act prescribing the order of procedure by the Commission in the enactment of laws. the Municipal Code. 1306. 1667." SEC. By authority of the United States. of Act Numbered three hundred and eighty-seven. Act No. 387. nineteen hundred. 7887. 1113. Isabela. having reference to the Province of Nueva Vizcaya. Mindoro. — AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF LOCAL CIVIL GOVERNMENTS FOR THE MANGUIANES IN THE PROVINCE OF MINDORO. The most notable are Acts Nos. and Act No. The major portion of these laws have been carried forward into the Administrative Codes of 1916 an d1917. That the powers and duties thus prescribed shall not be in excess of those conferred upon township officers by Act Numbered Three hundred and eighty-seven entitled "An Act providing for the establishment of local civil Governments in the townships and settlements of Nueva Vizcaya. This Act shall take effect on its passage. by the United States Philippine Commission. enacted on April 9. 547. 3. and his supervision and control over them shall be exercised to this end. the Character of the city of Manila. because referring to the Manguianes. Pangasinan. were repealed by Act No. the Special Provincial Government Act. The public good requiring the speedy enactment of this bill. 48 and 49 concerning the Province of Benguet and the Igorots. 547. 550. Whereas the Manguianes of the Provinces of Mindoro have not progressed sufficiently in civilization to make it practicable to bring them under any form of municipal government.Act no. Act NO. Ilocos Sur. to direct such Manguianes to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board. Subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior. As an example of these laws. we insert Act No. When in the opinion of the provincial board of Mindoro any settlement of Manguianes has advanced sufficiently to make such a course practicable. to fix their designations and badges of office. the provincial governor is authorized. 1396. with the exception of Act No. 2408. that: SECTION 1. 1397 was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1916. Tarlac. SEC. December 4. 1397. inclusive. 4. Ilocos Norte. Enacted. 500. The last named Act incorporated and embodied the provisions in general language. Of more particular interest are certain special laws concerning the government of the primitive peoples. 82. 422. 855. SEC.

346. "The Philippine Islands. Section 2145. They are also to be found in Act No. 2404. according to the Philippine Bill. 107. makes the provisions of the article applicable only in specially organized provinces. and Palawan. we shall investigate further to ascertain what is its true meaning. third session on H. Batanes.) D." If we were to follow the literal meaning of the word "non-Christian. 2561. 2435. United States Senate." These words are to be found in section 7 of the Philippine Bill and in section 22 of the Jones Law. and in Acts Nos. exactly coincide with the portion of the Philippines which is not granted popular representation. vol. 2077. the Jones Law confers similar recognition in the authorization of the twelfth senatorial district for the "territory not now represented in the Philippine Assembly. but the whole intent of the law is predicated n the civilization or lack of civilization of the inhabitants. 1639. 2394. Administrative Code of 1917. speaks of the "backward Philippine peoples.The terms made use of by these laws. The most commonly accepted usage has sanctioned the term "non-Christian tribes. as well as in Act No. 351. adopted acts making certain other acts applicable to that "part" of the Philippine Islands inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes. ( Sec. "Uncivilized tribes" is the denomination in President McKinley's instruction to the Commission. Sixty-third Congress. sec. organic and statutory. p. 387.R. Thus. 2422."' (See Hearings before the Committee on the Philippines. "non-Christian" is an awkward and unsatisfactory word. Administrative Code of 1917. reestablishing this Bureau. "The Origin of Malayan Filipinos. 2426. 18459. I." (See Blair & Robertson. 547. "Philippine Tribes and Languages. 3. Administrative Code of 1917." and Dr. 2408. N. They do not. The Administrative Code specifically provides that the term "non-Christian" shall include Mohammedans and pagans. 128. III. the authority of the Philippine Assembly was recognized in the "territory" of the Islands not inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes. Nevertheless. the word can have a geographical signification. recognizing the difficulty of selecting an exact designation. (Sec." "non-Christian inhabitants. Christian would be those who profess the Christian religion. Mindoro. taken from Act No. Nueva Vizcaya. letter of the Secretary of the Interior of June 30. "Non-Christian people. 548. 253 of the Philippines Commission. preceding section 2145. commonly known as the 'non-Christian tribes. 2422. At most. Among other laws which contain the phrase. 2390. M. 1906. as Zuñiga. would be those who do not profess the Christian religion.) If the religious conception is not satisfactory. In partial corroboration of this view. because of their religion. or to a particular province because of its location. MEANING OF TERM "NON-CHRISTIAN. Administrative Code of 1916. 2444. however. p. Administrative Code of 1916." and "non-Christian Filipinos" have been the favorite nomenclature. 1397." Professor Ferdinand Blumentritt. In fact. 300. "Estadismo de las Islas Filipinas. and 2551. 2576. time and again. are found in varying forms. Craig-Benitez." The Philippines Legislature has. there could also be cited section 2576 of the last Administrative Code and certain well-known authorities. The reason it that the motive of the law relates not to a particular people. The Secretary of the Interior who for so many years had these people under his jurisdiction." since the coming into being of a Filipinized legislature. 2674 of the Philippine Legislatures. Obviously." 1493-1898. it is still a geographical description. Apologetic words usually introduce the term. sec. circulated by the Executive Secretary. in lieu of the unpopular word "tribes. 550. These terms can be found in sections 2076. "Philippine Progress prior to 1898. and non-Christians." vol. there live persons some of who are Christians and some of whom are not Christians. there can be mentioned Acts Nos. note. "The so-called non-Christian" is a favorite expression. Again. 2145. establishing a Bureau of non-Christian Tribes and in Act No." it would of course result in giving to it a religious signification. This is plainly to be seen by the provisions of many laws. In one sense. is found in article XII of the Provincial Law of the Administrative Code. so against the geographical conception is likewise inadquate.) . 2674 of the Philippine Legislature. Saleeby.) Not content with the apparent definition of the word. sections 701-705. These are the provinces to which the Philippine Legislature has never seen fit to give all the powers of local self-government. the law specifically recognizes this. The first section of this article. The specially organized provinces are the Mountain Province. An Act to declare the purpose of the People of the United States as to the future political status of the Philippine Islands and to provide a more autonomous government for the Islands. 549. 127. 1667 of the Philippine Commission. It is well-known that within the specially organized provinces. pp. etc. carried forward into sections 701-705 of the Administrative Code of 1917.

It was finally decided to adopt the designation 'non-Christians' as the one most satisfactory. (Internal Revenue Manual. and 2674. Phil. Another official who was concerned with the status of the non-Christians. In discussing the point. The question here arose as to the effect of a tribal marriage in connection with article 423 of the Penal code concerning the husband who surprises his wife in the act of adultery. The determining factor in deciding whether they are to be allowed to remain under the jurisdiction of regularly organized municipalities or what form of government shall be afforded to them should be the degree of civilization to which they have attained and you are requested to govern yourself accordingly. It has been extremely difficult. and sections 2422 et seq. the court makes use of the following language: . 1906. 29. reading as follows: Sir: Within the past few months. 68. uncultured and uneducated. the view of the .. Of much more moment is the uniform construction of execution officials who have been called upon to interpret and enforce the law. a letter which later received recognition by the Governor-General and was circulated by the Executive Secretary. . I believe the term carries the same meaning as the expressed in the letter of the Secretary of the Interior (of June 30. . 434). . but while no other better classification has as yet been made the present classification should be allowed to stand . celebrated within that province without compliance with the requisites prescribed by General Orders no. in a memorandum furnished a member of this court. for the purposes of Act 1396 and 1397. 1667. the question has arisen as to whether people who were originally non-Christian but have recently been baptized or who are children of persons who have been recently baptized are. p. as a member of the Philippine Commission. this official addressed a letter to all governor of provinces. For practical purposes. The legislative intent is borne out by Acts Nos. For instance. herein quoted). Under date of June 30. in framing legislation for the tribes in these islands which are not advanced far in civilization. The number of individual tribes is so great that it is almost out of the question to enumerate all of them in an Act. judicial. 214. Tubban [Kalinga] ([1915]. to hit upon any suitable designation which will fit all cases.The idea that the term "non-Christian" is intended to relate to degree of civilization. . was the former Secretary of the Interior. The mere act of baptism does not. has the following to say on the subject: As far as names are concerned the classification is indeed unfortunate. It is indicative of the degree of civilization rather than of religious denomination. I have discussed this matter with the Honorable. The official who. Thereupon. and sections 701 et seq. . was the Collector of Internal Revenue. . we are not advised of any provision of law which recognizes as legal a tribal marriage of so-called nonChristians or members of uncivilized tribes. . 253 charged the Bureau of non-Christian tribes to conduct "systematic investigations with reference to non-Christian tribes ." As authority of a judicial nature is the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of United States vs. to be considered Christian or non-Christians. of course. drafted much of the legislation relating to the so-called Christians and who had these people under his authority. .) The present Secretary of the Interior. is substantiated by reference to legislative. to their own advantage. 387. . the Governor-General. We hold also that the fact that the accused is shown to be a member of an uncivilized tribe. The question arose for ruling relatives to the cedula taxation of the Manobos and the Aetas. Act No. of a low order of intelligence. 253. in itself change the degree of civilization to which the person baptized has attained at the time the act of baptism is performed. 1906. therefore. be brought under the Provincial Government Act and the Municipal Code. 48. you will give the member of so-called "wild tribes" of your province the benefit of the doubt even though they may recently have embraced Christianity. organized under the Special Provincial Government Act. with special view to determining the most practicable means for bringing about their advancement in civilization and material property prosperity. and executive authority. of the Administrative Code of 1917. who concurs in the opinion above expressed and who will have the necessary instructions given to the governors of the provinces organized under the Provincial Government Act. but the real purpose of the Commission was not so much to legislate for people having any particular religious belief as for those lacking sufficient advancement so that they could. should be taken into consideration as a second marked extenuating circumstance. for the hold that it is indicative of religious denomination will make the law invalid as against that Constitutional guaranty of religious freedom.

Collector of Internal Revenue.Secretary of the Interior was requested on the point. 1910. 327. So far. (Sgd. etc. however. HORD. For this reason so called "Remontados" and "Montescos" will be classed by this office as members of non-Christian tribes in so far as the application of the Internal Revenue Law is concerned. by return indorsement. Very respectfully. Quite a large proportion of the cedula taxes paid in this city are paid by men belonging to the nationalities mentioned. In other words. Arabs and other s are quite widely scattered throughout the Islands.. The Collector of Internal Revenue has interpreted this provision of law to mean not that persons who profess some form of Christian worship are alone subject to the cedula tax. severs whatever tribal relations he may have had and attaches himself civilized community. 1907. degree of advancement and so forth are practically the same as those of the Igorrots and members of other recognized non-Christina tribes. F. (Sgd. On September 17. the following clarification of the laws governing such questions and digest of rulings thereunder is hereby published for the information of all concerned: Non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippine Islands are so classed. This Office. Mohammedans. D. . Chinamen.) JNO. This Construction of the Collector of Internal Revenue can be found in circular letter No. Arabs. the Collector of Internal Revenue addressed circular letter No. their mode of life. inasmuch as he was not a Christian. Chinamen. he has interpreted it to mean that all persons preserving tribal relations with the so-called non-Christian tribes are exempt from the cedula tax. it is more dependent on whether he is living in a civilized manner or is associated with the mountain tribes.) ELLIS CROMWELL. even though they belong to no well recognized tribe.. or in the country in a civilized condition. approved by the Secretary of Finance and Justice. etc. 214): The internal revenue law exempts "members of non-Christian tribes" from the payment of cedula taxes. this question has not come up as to whether a Christian. Collector of Internal Revenue. . Confucians. since. who. agreed with the interpretation of the Collector of Internal Revenue. residing in Manila. should be furnished him without penalty and without requiring him to pay the tax for former years. he thereby makes himself subject to precisely the same law that governs the other members of that community and from and after the date when he so attaches himself to the community the same cedula and other taxes are due from him as from other members thereof. and that all others. p. or H cedula. but because of their uncivilized mode of life and low state of development. would or would not be subject to the cedula tax. it is not so much a matter of a man's form of religious worship or profession that decides whether or not he is subject to the cedula tax. and a regular class A. to all provincial treasurers. nor even his maintenance of or failure to maintain tribal relations with some of the well known wild tribes. including Jews. and non-civilized people preserving their tribal relations are not subject thereto. . continued to collect cedula taxes from all the Jews. but his mode of life. 188 of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. as the case may be. In conclusion. Buddists. it should be borne in mind that the prime factors in determining whether or not a man is subject to the regular cedula tax is not the circumstance that he does or does not profess Christianity. Whenever any member of an non-Christian tribe leaves his wild and uncivilized mode of life. On one occasion a prominent Hebrew of Manila claimed to this office that he was exempt from the cedula tax. East Indians. dated June 11. This letter in part reads: In view of the many questions that have been raised by provincial treasurers regarding cedula taxes due from members of non-Christian tribes when they come in from the hills for the purposes of settling down and becoming members of the body politic of the Philippine Islands. are subject to said tax so long as they live in cities or towns. and that all other person are exempt. reading as follows (Internal Revenue Manual. either as a member thereof or as a recruit. All inhabitants of the Philippine Islands classed as members of non-Christian tribes may be divided into three classes in so far as the cedula tax law is concerned . degree of advancement in civilization and connection or lack of connection with some civilized community. S. Cedula taxes are therefore being collected by this Office in all parts of these Islands on the broad ground that civilized people are subject to such taxes. not by reason of the fact that they do not profess Christianity. If he comes in after the expiration of the delinquency period the same rule should apply to him as to persons arriving from foreign countries or reaching the age of eighteen subsequent to the expiration of such period. belonging a member of the body politic. maintaining his religious belief. but throwing his lot and living with a non-Christian tribe. and a condition similar to that which exist in Manila also exists in most of the large provincial towns.

without dwelling on the difficulties which later would be occasioned by the phrase. 1915. usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities.Approved: (Sgd. The present Director of the Census. David P. H. whether Filipino or strangers. a sub-division under the title non-Christian tribes is. by Honorable Victorino Mapa. 1639. does he commit an infraction of the law and does the person selling same lay himself liable under the provision of Act No. then "Chief of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes. and. the Legislature and the Judiciary. inferentially. adopted the expression which the Spanish legislation employed to designate the uncivilized portion of the inhabitants of the Philippines. THE MANGUIANES. more directly. pp. The phrase 'non-Christian inhabitants' used in the provisions of articles 2077 and 2741 of Act No. The Philippine Commission in denominating in its laws that portion of the inhabitants of the Philippines which live in tribes as non-Christian tribes." which sufficiently shows that the terms refers to culture and not to religion. 1639?" The opinion of Attorney-General Avanceña. to natives of the Philippine Islands of a law grade of civilization. 411 et seq). vol. in purchasing intoxicating liquors both he and the person selling the same make themselves liable to prosecution under the provisions of Act No." divides the population in the Christian or Civilized Tribes. we submit that said phrase does not have its natural meaning which would include all non-Christian inhabitants of the Islands. The so-called non-Christians are in various state approaching civilization. Of the derivation of the name "Manguian" Dr.) GREGORIO ARANETA. not only because this is the evident intention of the law. but. civilized or uncivilized. . and non-Christian or Wild Tribes. living without home or fixed residence. in a way . but simply refers to those uncivilized members of the non-Christian tribes of the Philippines who. E. Ignacio Villamor. Secretary of Finance and Justice. 1. The Chief of Constabulary request the opinion of the Attorney-General as to the status of a non-Christian who has been baptized by a minister of the Gospel. prepared in the Bureau of Insular Affairs. but because to give it its lateral meaning would make the law null and unconstitutional as making distinctions base the religion of the individual. says: . after quoting the same authorities hereinbefore set out. it is probable that is probable that the person in question remains a non-Christian. Solicitor-General Paredes in his brief in this case says: With respect to the meaning which the phrase non-Christian inhabitants has in the provisions of the Administrative code which we are studying. The precise questions were these: "Does he remain non-Christian or is he entitled to the privileges of a Christian? By purchasing intoxicating liquors. did not intended to establish a distinction based on the religious beliefs of the individual. join in the proposition that the term "non-Christian" refers. as distinguished from the common Filipinos which carry on a social and civilized life. The Philippine Census of 1903 divided them into four classes. At least." In a Pronouncing Gazetteer and Geographical Dictionary of the Philippine Islands. writes that the classification likely to be used in the Census now being taken is: "Filipinos and Primitive Filipinos. but. 2657 (articles 2145 and 2759) should be understood as equivalent to members of uncivilized tribes of the Philippines. Section 30 of the regulations is practically a transcript of Circular Letter No. In resume. and approved on April 16. in the portion written by no less an authority than De. The Official Census of 1903. The subject has come before the Attorney-General for consideration. Hon. Acting Collector of Internal Revenue. concludes: In conformity with the above quoted constructions. The two circular above quoted have since been repealed by Bureau of Internal Revenue Regulations No. I advise you that these should be the constructions place upon the law until a court shall hold otherwise. Pardo de Tavera in his Etimilogia de los nombres de Rozas de Filipinas. Secretary of Finance and Justice. roam in the mountains. . beyond the reach of law and order . (Census of the Philippine Islands [1903]. Barrows. promulgated by Venancio Concepcion. specifically. 327. are the Manguianes (or Mangyans) of Mindoro. War Department. "Physical and Political Characteristics of the non-Christian Tribes. Of the third class. so that. and different executive officials. T. therefore. 1. to geographical area. not to religious belief.

can be derived by an investigation of the American-Indian policy." "pagan. Following the policy of the European Governments in the discovery of American towards the Indians who were found here. hereinbefore mentioned. From their very weakness and helplessness. pp. and receive from the no protection. 460. 22. and Visaya. Kagama ([1886]. (See Census of the Philippine (Islands [1903]." from which we can deduce that the name was applied to men considered to be the ancient inhabitants." A leading case which discusses the status of the Indians is that of the United States vs. to be practically identical with that followed by the United States Government in its dealings with the Indian tribes. semi-nomadic people. the opinion goes on — "This act avowedly contemplates the preservation of the Indian nations as an object sought by the United States. and always have been." It may be that the use of this word is applicable to a great number of Filipinos. These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. They have considerable Negrito blood and have not advanced beyond the Negritos in civilization." The recognized relation between the Government of the United States and the Indians may be described as that of guardian and ward. not as States. to make such a purchase by treaty or otherwise. the colonies before the Revolution and the States and the United States since. regarded as having a semi-independent position when they preserved their tribal relations.. Valuable lessons. But they asserted an ultimate title in the land itself. The Indians are always subject to the plenary authority of the United States. so largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal Government . Dependent for their political rights. not as nation not a possessed of the fall attributes of sovereignty. primitive.000. 375). With the Indians themselves these relation are equally difficult to define. but as a separate people. or any part of it. or in other nations." "negro. or the State or the United States wished to purchase it. and that these men were pushed back into the interior by the modern invaders. Georgia. They number approximately 15. and thus far not brought under the laws of the Union or of the State within whose limits they resided. Reference is herein made to the clause of the United States Constitution which gives Congress "power to regulate commerce with foreign nations.In Tagalog. and with the Indian tribes. Because of the local ill feeling. the people of the States where they are found are often their deadliest enemies.) III. and among the several States. The methods followed by the Government of the Philippines Islands in its dealings with the so-called nonChristian people is said. have not progressed sufficiently in civilization to make it practicable to bring them under any form of municipal government." The court then proceeds to indicate a brief history of the position of the Indians in the United States (a more extended account of which can be found in Marshall's opinion in Worcester vs. The United States recognized no right in private persons. as indicated in the preamble to Act No. They were. in whose language they were called the "ancients." "mountainer." The Manguianes are very low in culture. The manguianes have shown no desire for community life. From the beginning of the United States. When a tribe wished to dispose of its lands. The opinion then continues: It seems to us that this (effect of the law) is within the competency of Congress. vol. and proposes to effect this object by civilizing and converting them from hunters into agriculturists." After quoting the Act. In Pampango this ending still exists and signifies "ancient. 23. It is for the Congress to determine when and how the guardianship shall be terminated. and. dependent largely for their daily food. but its employed in three Filipino languages shows that the radical ngian had in all these languages a sense to-day forgotten. COMPARATIVE — THE AMERICAN INDIANS. Even in primitive times without doubt this name was given to those of that island who bear it to-day. as follows: The relation of the Indian tribes living within the borders of the United States. They owe no allegiance to the States. Manguian signifies "savage. Chief Justice Marshall in his opinion in Worcester vs. have recognized in the Indians a possessory right to the soil over which they roamed and hunted and established occasional villages. I. timid. a treaty with the tribe was the only mode in which this could be done. but nevertheless it has been applied only to certain inhabitants of Mindoro. both before and since the Revolution. tells how the Congress passed an Act in 1819 "for promoting those humane designs of civilizing the neighboring Indians. on argument. Bicol. has always been an anomalous one and of a complex character. The are communities dependent on the United States. Georgia. 547. and even before. to the people of the United States.S. supra). 118 U. They are a peaceful. with the power of regulating their internal and social relations. by which the Indian tribes were forbidden to sell or transfer it to other nations or peoples without the consent of this paramount authority. the Indians have been treated as "in a state of pupilage. Reference was made in the Presidents' instructions to the Commission to the policy adopted by the United States for the Indian Tribes. it is insisted.

R.S. the subject has always been deemed political in nature. whenever the question has arisen . need not be questioned. pursuant to the said order.S. Fed. 264. The court looked to the reports of the different superintendent charged with guarding their interests and founds that these Indians are dependent upon the fostering care and protection of the government "like reservation Indians in general. Rogers [1846]. the right to sue out a writ of habeas corpus in a federal court. 216 U. or before a federal judge. the court said "that during the Spanish dominion. where subjected to restraints and official supervisions in the alienation of their property. Lone Wolf vs.vs. 29 Okla.S. formerly belonging to the Ponca Tribe of Indians. that whilst they were thus engaged. Conley vs. now weak and diminished in numbers. Tiger vs. because it has never been denied." With reference to laws affecting the Indians. It is enough to know that the power rightfully exists. it has been held that it is not within the power of the courts to overrule the judgment of Congress. not subject to the jurisdiction of the judicial department of the government. . for the purpose of being returned to the Indian Territory from which it was alleged the Indian escaped. the General of the Army had issued an order which required the respondent to arrest and return the relators to their tribe in the Indian Territory. the court reviewed the policy the Government had adopted in its dealing with the friendly tribe of Poncase.S... confer upon certain officers of the Government almost unlimited power over the persons who go upon the reservations without lawful authority . and without aid or assistance from the general government.S.. and. Sandoval ([1913]. is necessary to their protection. Wallace vs. the Indians of the pueblos were treated as wards requiring special protection. Bollinger [1910]. supra.. 84. vs. 168 U. because the theater of its exercise is within the geographical limits of the United States. 488. 14891). Walker (1911]. that they had fled or escaped form a reservation situated some place within the limits of the Indian Territory — had departed therefrom without permission from the Government. Lane [1913]. and whether within or without the limits of a state. and for the purpose of regulating trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes.]. and were then endeavoring to maintain themselves by their own exertions. 616. and that. Sandoval. 553. The only case which is even remotely in point and which." The decision concluded as follows: The reasoning advanced in support of my views. Georgia. 4 How.. 218. In discussing this question. if followed literally.) Whenever. therefore. . The power of the General Government over these remnants of race once powerful. it must exist in that government. supra. U. 28) the question to be considered was whether the status of the Pueblo Indians and their lands was such that Congress could prohibit the introduction of intoxicating liquor into those lands notwithstanding the admission of New Mexico to statehood. 415. of much greater importance. This was a hearing upon return to a writ of habeas corpus issued against Brigadier General George Crook at the relation of Standing Bear and other Indians.S. because it never has existed anywhere else. related to the right of the Government to arrest and hold the relators for a time. 286. and. The petition alleged in substance that the relators are Indians who have formerly belonged to the Ponca tribe of Indians. Gay [1898]. (U.S. where existing. vs..S. the United States sets apart any public land as an Indian reservation. Burney [1897].. U. In the later case of United States vs.A. Crook ([1879].. vs. that an Indian is a 'person' within the meaning of the laws of the United States. U.. vs. we not the following: "Not only does the Constitution expressly authorize Congress to regulate commerce with the Indians tribes. the court said: "Laws passed for the government of the Indian country. Adams [1907]. 35 L. and without being guilty of violating any of the laws of the United States. No. 795. Thomas [1894]. 232 U. at the request of the Secretary of the Interior. Cyr vs. Hitchcock[1903]. and connected with. 281. For very good reason. Celestine [1909].S.S. and because it alone can enforce its laws on all the tribes. and has. it has full authority to pass such laws and authorize such measures as may be necessary to give to the Indians thereon full protection in their persons and property. 577. Western Invest. and an unbroken line of judicial decisions. but long-continued legislative and executive usage and an unbroken current of judicial decisions have attributed to the United States as a superior and civilized nation the power and the duty of exercising a fostering care and protection over all dependent Indian communities within its borders. The first question was whether an Indian can test the validity of an illegal imprisonment by habeas corpus. George Crook. Then. therefore. continuing. 278. 187 U. 169 U. he had caused the relators to be arrested on the Omaha Indian Territory. Roff vs. . [N. Cas. U.. that they had some time previously withdrawn from the tribe." Continuing.S. and by this court. 598. The substance of the return to the writ was that the relators are individual members of....S. there arise the duty of protection. is that of United States vs. Thomasvs. they were arrested and restrained of their liberty by order of the respondent. and with it the power. S. the Cherokee Tobacco [1871]. the Ponca tribe of Indians. Worcester vs. .with them and the treaties in which it has been promised. whether within its original territory or territory subsequently acquired.S.S. 204 U. as well as to the safety of those among whom they dwell. 11 Wall. in all cases where he may be confined . and completely severed their tribal relations therewith.S. 151 U. 567. now located in the Indian Territory. 231 U. (Matter of Heff [1905].S. 215 U. Whether such an extensive discretionary power is wisely vested in the commissioner of Indian affairs or not . This has always been recognized by the Executive and by Congress. the exercise of the power must be upheld. [1911].. 221 U." And finally. 197 U. might result in the issuance of habeas corpus. The second question. and had adopted the general habits of the whites. Co. leads me to conclude: 1.) All this borne out by long-continued legislative and executive usage.

and of all matters arising out to the Indian relations. 88. the respondent. and have the inalienable right to "life. Being restrained of liberty under color of authority of the United States. The rule has nowhere been better stated than in the early Ohio case decided by Judge Ranney. Comm'rs. IV. vs. the Manguian petitioner. entitled to sue out a writ in the Philippine courts. An understanding of the rule will. And. vs. and that. have the management of all Indian affairs. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS. to the later no valid objection can be made. final on questions of fact. 80) was a petition for mandamus to require the Secretary of the Interior to approve the selection and taking of one hundred and sixty acres by the relator out of the lands ceded to the United States by the Wichita and affiliated bands of Indians. A.) The growing tendency in the decision is to give prominence to the "necessity" of the case. as held by Chief Justice Marshall in Wayman vs. As far as the first point is concerned. disclose that it has not bee violated in his instance. it is that the determination of this policy is for the legislative and executive branches of the government and that when once so decided upon. with the approval of the provincial board and the Department Head. 598. and it is so ordered. is a "person" within the meaning of theHabeas Corpus Act. That n rightful authority exists for removing by force any of the relators to the Indian Territory. As to the second point the facts in the Standing Bear case an the Rubi case are not exactly identical. That the maxim of Constitutional Law forbidding the delegation of legislative power should be zealously protected. Section 463 of the United States Revised Statutes provided: "The Commissioner of Indian Affairs shall. and as such. and the pursuit of happiness. under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior. it is contended. that Indians have been taken from different parts of the country and placed on these reservation. the decision just quoted could be used as authority to determine that Rubi. 248 Fed. under color of authority of the United States. But even admitting similarity of facts." so long as they obey the laws and do not trespass on forbidden ground. ([1906]. 5. 4. 1) may be committed by the Legislature to an executive department or official. 141. The first cannot be done. 2. DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.) Discretion.. has the custody of the relators. The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments of subordinate official thereof. namely: "The true distinction therefore is between the delegation of power to make the law. 10 Wheat. and a citizen of the Philippine Islands. the relators must be discharged from custody. the Philippine Legislature has abdicated its authority and avoided its full responsibility. and since followed in a multitude of case.) We so decide. when once so located. Hitchock. a Filipino. If any lesson can be drawn form the Indian policy of the United States. (See also In re Race Horse [1895]. to whom t has committed the execution of certain acts. and agreeably to such regulations as the President may prescribe. we agree. (U. as the respondent has been directed to do. however. and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution. which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be.S. Perhaps...S. Is not all this exactly what the Legislature has attempted to accomplish by the enactment of section 21454 of the Administrative Code? Has not the Legislature merely conferred upon the provincial governor. R. and in violation of the laws therefore.. they have been made to remain on the reservation for their own good and for the general good of the country." Justice . W. 1 Ohio S. That General George Crook. 3. Kinkead [1918]. being commander of the military department of the Platte. that the Indians possess the inherent right of expatriation. to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.t. the courts should not interfere to upset a carefully planned governmental system. yet it is known to all that Indian reservations do exist in the United States. just as may forceful reasons exists for the segregation as existed for the segregation of the different Indian tribes in the United States. without any previous consultation as to their own wishes. discretionary authority as to the execution of the law? Is not this "necessary"? The case of West vs. & Z. Southard ([1825]. Co. Clinton County [1852]. and in violation of the laws thereof.or in custody under color of authority of the United States or where he is restrained of liberty in violation of the constitution or laws of the United States. In so attempting. 205 U. 70 Fed. The first constitutional objection which confronts us is that the Legislature could not delegate this power to provincial authorities. liberty." (Cincinnati. as well as the more fortunate white race.

. The conception of civil liberty has been variously expressed thus: Every man may claim the fullest liberty to exercise his faculties. says that — "The statute is perfectly clear and unambiguous. The third constitutional argument is grounded on those portions of the President's instructions of to the Commission. it provides for the segregation of 'non-Christians' and none other.. An exception to the general rule. (Spencer. But. that man is free who is protected from injury. in a truly remarkable brief. [1907]. LIBERTY.S. to be exercised by the provincial governor and the provincial board. RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION The attorney de officio. and never can understand. and Q. The Indians have been treated as wards of the nation. them. the offspring of high civilization. essentially different from that authorized licentiousness that trespasses on right. B.S. Social Statistics. 364.) . In the absence of special provisions naturally it would be exercised by the Indian Department. (II Webster's Works. 204 U. the statute has violated this constitutional guaranty. 118 U. which the savage never understood. Lane [1914]. it any is needed. p. We hold that the term "nonChristian" refers to natives of the Philippines Islands of a low grade of civilization." Counsel's premise once being conceded. his arguments is answerable — the Legislature must be understood to mean what it has plainly expressed. before saying that this language was not broad enough to warrant a regulation obviously made for the welfare of the rather helpless people concerned.) There is another aspect of the question. unconstitutional. It is a legal and a refined idea. In limpid English.. liberty." (See also as corroborative authority.. providing "That no law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any person of life. sanctioned by immemorial practice." The inevitable result. permits the central legislative body to delegate legislative powers to local authorities. Liberty exists in proportion to wholesome restraint. The power of Congress is not doubted. is that the law "constitutes an attempt by the Legislature to discriminate between individuals because of their religious beliefs. the more restraint on others to keep off from us. the Philippine Bill. That authorized licentiousness that trespasses on right. vs. consequently. who but they are better fitted to select sites which have the conditions most favorable for improving the people who have the misfortune of being in a backward state? Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation of legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to provincial official and a department head.) Liberty consists in the ability to do what one caught to desire and in not being forced to do what one ought not do desire. 598. without regard to any differences of race. submitted on behalf of his unknown clients. especially as classification of inhabitants according to religious belief leads the court to what it should avoid. Who but the provincial governor and the provincial board. especially in view of the long established practice of the Department. of color. and that section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917. compatible with the possession of like liberty by every other. 232 U. p. U. the nullification of legislative action. as the official representatives of the province. and in words as plain and unequivocal as language can express. 356. and the Jones Law.) The protection afforded the individual is then as much for the non-Christian as for the Christian. .S.) Liberty is the creature of law. E. D. it has been said "are universal in their application. or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws. does not discriminate between individuals an account of religious differences. the more liberty we have . The Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority upon the Province of Mindoro." This constitutional limitation is derived from the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution — and these provisions. (Montesque.. or property without due process of law. to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction. reviewing the previous decisions of the United States Supreme Court: U. 393.S. are better qualified to judge "when such as course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order?" As officials charged with the administration of the province and the protection of its inhabitants.Holmes said: "We should hesitate a good deal. we do not feel free to discard the long continued meaning given to a common expression. which once accepted. for petitioners. as hereinbefore stated. is decisive. 94. and is. or of nationality. EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.Hopkins [1886]. religious equality is demanded by the Organic Law." (Yick Wo vs. judicial construction is then excluded. spirit of the Laws. Some such supervision was necessary. Union Bridge Co.S. DUE PROCESS OF LAW. C. and has been exercised. is invalid. vs.

State vs. the greatest of all rights. Fears [1900]. must be held to be due process of law. Whenever and wherever the natural rights of citizen would. under the pressure of great dangers. p. since a classic in forensic literature. regardless of the injury that may be done to others ..L." as has been often held. at all times and in all circumstances.. 4 Wall. Christensen [1890]. 627. which regards and preserves these principles of liberty and justice.. Society based on the rule that each one is a law unto himself would soon be confronted with disorder and anarchy. . whether in respect of his person or his property. or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power. It is this: "Liberty" as understood in democracies. it may be said that Liberty means the opportunity to do those things which are ordinarily done by free men.. 277. of course. ." (U. 530. 137 U.." (Hurtado vs. consistently with the peaceful enjoyment of like freedom in others. 86..C. In some instances. is not license. subject only to such restraints as are necessary for the common welfare. to live an work where he will.. but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the faculties with which he has been endowed by this Creator. wholly freed from restraint. a sphere with which the individual may asserts the supremacy of his own will.S. vs. a judicial proceeding is not always necessary. 114 Wis. 165.S.Even liberty itself. Real liberty for all could not exist under the operation of a principle which recognizes the right of each individual person to use his own. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen. that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed. or of the public order and safety.S. In general. 66. The right of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law for the common good. it is ever guided by reason and the upright and honorable conscience of the individual. or otherwise within the proper scope of the police power. 516. whether sanctioned by age and customs. such assumed rights must yield to the regulation of law. an for that purpose. (See McGehee. (Apolinario Mabini. in furtherance of the public good.) None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law. 104. vs.S.. 274. (There can be noted Cummings vs. the right to labor. As enunciated in a long array of authorities including epoch-making decisions of the United States Supreme Court. U. Allgeyer vs. 189 Al.) Civil Liberty may be said to mean that measure of freedom which may be enjoyed in a civilized community. "first. Wilkinson vs. and essential to his carrying out these purposes to a successful conclusion. 212 U.S. it is "Liberty regulated by law.. There is.) "Due process of law" means simply . Williams vs.. to earn his livelihood by an lawful calling.) Neither is due process a stationary and blind sentinel of liberty.) Liberty does not import "an absolute right in each person to be. 1) "What is due process of law depends on circumstances." To constitute "due process of law.. California [1883]. Due Process of Law. 539. organized society could not exist with safety to its members.) . in the course of the argument in the Dartmouth College Case before the United States Supreme Court. J. J. 371. necessary. even a hearing and notice are not requisite a rule which is especially true where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officers in applying a law to particular cases. "Any legal proceeding enforced by public authority.) Liberty is freedom to do right and never wrong. that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the Government. 10 Phil. as the safety of the general public may demand. 258. In Jacobson vs. U. to enter into all contracts which may be proper. On any other basis. the rights of the individual in respect of his liberty may at times." (Harlan.. It is only freedom from restraint under conditions essential to the equal enjoyment of the same right by others.. 11.Cruz [1914]. and the right of locomotion. said that the meaning of "due process of law" is. Louisiana [1896]. (See Hall vs.S.. third. Massachusetts [1905] 197 U. Geiger-Jones [1916]. 2 Pet. The chief elements of the guaranty are the right to contract." Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being. Hardie-Tynes Manufacturing Co. be subjected to such restraint to be enforced by reasonable regulations. deprive other citizens of rights which are also and equally natural. in Crowley vs." (Moyer vs. an immunities under the protection of the general rules which govern society. that it shall be applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to all of a class. 179 U. the right to choose one's employment. . Ling Su Fan [1908]. It varies with the subject-matter and necessities of the situation. 261. No man can do exactly as he pleases. But it is equally true that in very well-ordered society charged with the duty of conserving the safety of its members. affirmed on appeal to the United States Supreme Court.) One thought which runs through all these different conceptions of Liberty is plainly apparent. Leland [1829]. Daniel Webster. and rightfully dispute the authority of any human government — especially of any free government existing under a written Constitution — to interfere with the exercise of that will. S. Every man must renounce unbridled license. liberty. Liberty includes the right of the citizens to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways. 578. 242 U. second. The right to Liberty guaranteed by the Constitution includes the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude. . property. (Field. 82. Kreutzberg [1902]. See 6 R.S. Missouri [1866]. that this law shall be reasonable in its operation. if exercises without restraint. There are manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for the common good. that "every citizen shall hold his life. and fourth. 110. Peablody [1909]. to pursue any avocations. is no unrestricted license to ac according to one's own will. The Liberty of the citizens may be restrained in the interest of the public health.

together wit their corollary. nor shall involuntary servitude exist except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted. the Philippine Legislature has. There he found that the site selected is a good one. . before finally deciding whether any constitutional provision has indeed been violated by section 2145 of the Administrative Code." one court has said.S. 219. 113 U..S. 219 U." (Churchill and Tait vs. "There can be not doubt that the exercise of the police power of the Philippine Government belongs to the Legislature and that this power is limited only by the Acts of Congress and those fundamental principles which lie at the foundation of all republican forms of government. leaving the logical deductions to be made later on.. The Government of the Philippine Islands has both on reason and authority the right to exercise the sovereign police power in the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest.) Carried onward by the current of legislation. Pompeya [1915].. 1. education. it will be remembered. We break off with the foregoing statement. compulsory service of one to another. It has been applied to any servitude in fact involuntary. Rose Hill Cemetery Co. and good order of the people. with necessary modifications." It is quite possible that the Thirteenth Amendment.. Alabama [1910]. "is a power coextensive with self-protection. However this may be. peace. D.) What we are not interested in is the right of the government to restrain liberty by the exercise of the police power. The preamble of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro which set apart the Tigbao reservation. [1906]. that .S. since reaching to "any place subject to" the "jurisdiction" of the United States. The present Secretary of the Interior says of the Tigbao reservation and of the motives for its selection. F.) With the foregoing approximation of the applicable basic principles before us. Rafferty [1915].S. LEGISLATIVE INTENT. made a trip to the place.S. vs. The fourth constitutional contention of petitioner relates to the Thirteen Amendment to the United States Constitution particularly as found in those portions of Philippine Organic Law providing "That slavery shall not exist in said Islands. Next must come a description of the police power under which the State must act if section 2145 is to be held valid. 245. and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the State. . 32 Phil. . The classification must have a reasonable basis and cannot be purely arbitrary in nature. 203 U.The pledge that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws is not infringed by a statute which is applicable to all of a class." (Lake View vs. E.. and that among its purposes is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health. morals. THE POLICE POWER. assigned as reasons fort the action. The Solicitor-General adds the following. U. has force in the Philippine. safety and welfare of society. the judiciary rarely attempt to dam the on rushing power of legislative discretion. SLAVERY AND INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE. (Bailey vs. (3) The protection of the Manguianes. prescribed the punishment for these crimes. 31 Phil. and is not inaptly termed the 'law of overruling necessity. we should endeavor to ascertain the intention of the Legislature in enacting this section. and (2) the only successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a permanent settlement." (Hodges vs. 70 Ill. of sections 268 to 271 inclusive of the United States Criminal Code. If legally possible. Not attempting to phrase a definition of police power. Slavery and involuntary servitude. 27. (See Barbier vs. no matter under what form such servitude may have been disguised. the Secretary of the Interior on June 10 to 13. by adoption. the following: (1) The failure of former attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian people of the province.' It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort. [1873]. the following: To inform himself of the conditions of those Manguianes who were taken together to Tigbao.. 580. such legislative intention should be effectuated. Connolly [1884]. that it has become almost possible to limit its weep. provided the purposes of the law do not go beyond the great principles that mean security for the public welfare or do not arbitrarily interfere with the right of the individual. "The police power of the State. (4) the protection of the public forests in which they roam. (5) the necessity of introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes. 191. 1918.) So much for an analysis of those constitutional provisions on which petitioners rely for their freedom. U. all denote "a condition of enforced.) The term of broadest scope is possibly involuntary servitude. develop its resources and add to is wealth and prosperity. peonage. all that it is necessary to note at this moment is the farreaching scope of the power.

the fertile regions of Mindanao and Sulu. has adopted as the polaris of his administration — "the advancement of the non-Christian elements of our population to equality and unification with the highly civilized Christian inhabitants. These people are being taught and guided to improve their living conditions in order that they may fully appreciate the benefits of civilization. 2208. 2444. He also gathered the impression that the results obtained during the period of less than one year since the beginning of the institution definitely justify its continuance and development. ( f ) The encouragement of immigration into. (d) Construction of roads and trials between one place and another among non-Christians. especially agriculture. Those of them who are still given to nomadic habits are being persuaded to abandon their wild habitat and settle in organized settlements.. and complete manner the moral. social. Of course. to aid them to live and work. etc. who is the official charged with the supervision of all the non-Christian people. (c) The extention of public works throughout the Mohammedan regions to facilitate their development and the extention of government control. upon his return to Manila. They are being made to understand that it is the purpose of the Government to organize them politically into fixed and per manent communities.) The fundamental objective of governmental policy is to establish friendly relations with the so-called non-Christians. (b) The extension of the public school system and the system of public health throughout the regions inhabited by the non-Christian people. 2674 in reestablishing the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes. (Note Acts Nos. to promote social and commercial intercourse and maintain amicable relations among them and with the Christian people. economic. and show them the advantages of leading a civilized life with their civilized brothers. rapid. and unification with the more highly civilized inhabitants of the country. (e) Pursuance of the development of natural economic resources. The Government will follow its policy to organize them into political communities and to educate their children with the object of making them useful citizens of this country. and of the investment of private capital in. work of a civilizing influence have been continued among the non-Christian people.creditable progress has been made in the clearing of forests. and economic development and advancement in civilization. and to promote their educational. and political equality. they are being impressed with the purposes and objectives of the Government of leading them to economic. The Secretary adds: To attain the end desired. material. But the Secretary of the Interior. made the following statement to the press: "It is not deemed wise to abandon the present policy over those who prefer to live a nomadic life and evade the influence of civilization. defines the aim of the Government towards the non-Christian people in the following unequivocal terms: It shall be the duty of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes to continue the work for advancement and liberty in favor of the region inhabited by non-Christian Filipinos and foster by all adequate means and in a systematical. they will commit crimes and make depredation. and political development of those regions. agricultural. (See Report of the Department for 1917. Such was naturally to be expected. social. or if not they will be subject to involuntary servitude by those who may want to abuse them. In short. industrial." The Secretary of the Interior. always . there were many who were protesting against that segregation. educate their children. thus bringing them under the control of the Government. that there appears to be encouraging reaction by the boys to the work of the school the requirements of which they appear to meet with enthusiastic interest after the first weeks which are necessarily a somewhat trying period for children wholly unaccustomed to orderly behaviour and habit of life. protect them from involuntary servitude and abuse." This is carried on by the adoption of the following measures: (a) Pursuance of the closer settlement policy whereby people of seminomadic race are induced to leave their wild habitat and settle in organized communities. 2404. To permit them to live a wayfaring life will ultimately result in a burden to the state and on account of their ignorance. construction of buildings.) Act No.

they are citizens. because it required. in the case at bar. all the Christian and non-Christian elements populating the provinces of the Archipelago.) May the Manguianes not be considered. as yet. leading a nomadic life. or they will leave the country. as civilized men are free. the purpose of the Government is evident. The Manguianes. In so far as the relation of the Manguianes to the State is concerned. On these few reservations there live under restraint in some cases. they are Filipinos. and of the executive branch in enforcing it. one may assert that all men are created free and equal. proper wards of the Filipino people? By the fostering care of a wise Government. Waste people do not advance the interest of the State. Segregation really constitutes protection for the manguianes. But just as surely. "bringing under the bells." The same idea adapted to the existing situation. What the Government wished to do by bringing than into a reservation was to gather together the children for educational purposes. may not these unfortunates advance in the "habits and arts of civilization?" Would it be advisable for the courts to intrude upon a plan. 3. carefully formulated. and Filipinos who are a drag upon the progress of the State. are not free. uneducated in the ways of civilization. the Government must be in a position to guarantee peace and order. Waste lands do not produce wealth. that they be gathered together. Not bringing any benefit to the State but instead injuring and damaging its interests. Not knowing what true liberty is and not practising the same rightfully. Illiteracy and thriftlessness are not conducive to homogeneity. the Manguianes. It is no argument to say that such crimes are punished by the Penal Code. and in other instances voluntarily. and they are not the equals of their more fortunate brothers. how can they allege that they are being deprived thereof without due process of law? xxx xxx xxx But does the Constitutional guaranty that 'no person shall be deprived of his liberty without due process of law' apply to a class of persons who do not have a correct idea of what liberty is and do not practise liberty in a rightful way? To say that it does will mean to sanction and defend an erroneous idea of such class of persons as to what liberty is. and apparently working out for the ultimate good of these people? In so far as the Manguianes themselves are concerned. if they are to be improved. this method was termed in Spanish times. burning and destroying forests and making illegal caiñgins thereon. Theoretically. we know that the axiom is not precisely accurate.having in view the aim of rendering permanent the mutual intelligence between. and doing nothing for the advancement of the Philippine Islands. they (the manguianes) are engaged in the works of destruction — burning and destroying the forests and making illegal caiñgins thereon. Here. True. that the Government should not adopt any measures looking to the welfare and advancement of the class of persons in question. indeed. the purposes of the Legislature in enacting the law. to begin the process of civilization. a few thousands of the uncivilized people. It will mean. and its. Settlers in Mindoro must have their crops and persons protected from predatory men. or if not they will be subjected to involuntary servitude by those who may want to abuse them. If immigrants are to be encouraged to develop the resources of the great Islands of Mindoro. They understand liberty as the right to do anything they will — going from one place to another in the mountains. we have on the Island of Mindoro. the Manguianes are citizens of a low degree of intelligence. because these penalties are imposed after commission of the offense and not before. making depredations on their more fortunate neighbors. Practically. what will ultimately become of these people with the sort of liberty they wish to preserve and for which they are now fighting in court? They will ultimately become a heavy burden to the State and on account of their ignorance they will commit crimes and make depredations. and to improve the health and morals — was in fine. for instance. unproductive regions. (Sec. has been followed with reference to the Manguianes and other peoples of the same class. as are the Indians in the United States. indeed. And true. To quote again from the instructive memorandum of the Secretary of the Interior: Living a nomadic and a wayfaring life and evading the influence of civilization. are again plain. It will mean that this people should be let along in the mountains . There is no doubt in my mind that this people a right conception of liberty and does not practice liberty in a rightful way. and complete fusion of. The State to protect itself from destruction must prod on the laggard and the sluggard. with many but not all the rights which citizenship implies. The great law of overwhelming necessity is all convincing.

we leave this weak and defenseless people confined as in a prison at the mercy of unscrupulous official. xxx xxx xxx The national legislation on the subject of non-Christian people has tended more and more towards the education and civilization of such people and fitting them to be citizens. They are being aided to live and work. instead of permitting them to roam all over the entire territory? This measure is necessary both in the interest of the public as owner of the lands about which they are roving and for the proper accomplishment of the purposes and objectives of the government. it is argued that the citizen has the right. The early Act of Congress of 1802 (2 U. It is said that. APPLICATION AND CONCLUSION. believing that their personal interests would be injured by such a measure has come forward and challenged the authority of the Government to lead this people in the pat of civilization? Shall we. They move from one place to another as the conditions of living warrants. Wandering from one place to another on the public lands. Attention in this connection is invited to the fact that this people. on the contrary. after expending sweat. G. The manguianes in question have been directed to live together at Tigbao. For as people accustomed to nomadic habit. the Government has been placed in the alternative of either letting them alone or guiding them in the path of civilization. they did ill-treat any person thus confined. Those citizens certainly did not possess absolute freedom of locomotion. it would seems that the Judiciary should not unnecessarily hamper the Government in the accomplishment of its laudable purpose. there always exists the power of removal in the hands of superior officers.S. why can not the government adopt a measure to concentrate them in a certain fixed place on the public lands. if we hold this section to be constitutional.and in a permanent state of savagery without even the remotest hope of coming to understand liberty in its true and noble sense. be kept away from certain localities ? To furnish an example from the Indian legislation. The latter measure was adopted as the one more in accord with humanity and with national conscience. nay challenge. indeed. this law and other similar were accepted and followed time and again without question. The progress of those people under the tutelage of the Government is indeed encouraging and the signs of the times point to a day which is not far distant when they will become useful citizens. only the validity of the law is generally challenged and no particular case of oppression is called to the attention of the courts. In the light of what has already been accomplished which has been winning the gratitude of most of the backward people. Our exhaustive study should have left us in a position to answer specific objections and to reach a general conclusion. living a nomadic and wayfaring life. There is. the ability of the nation to deal with our backward brothers. however. They will thus left in a permanent state of savagery and become a vulnerable point to attack by those who doubt. generally speaking. they will always long to return to the mountains and follow a wayfaring life. to go where he pleases. now willingly retire because there has been erroneously invoked in their favor that Constitutional guaranty that no person shall be deprived of his liberty without due process of law? To allow them to successfully invoke that Constitutional guaranty at this time will leave the Government without recourse to pursue the works of civilizing them and making them useful citizens. like the Manguianes. Again the same law provided for the apprehension of marauding Indians. Their children are being educated in a school especially established for them. In the first place. Stat. and the entire space where they are roving about is the property of the nation. When. and even blood only to redeem this people from the claws of ignorance and superstition. and unless a penalty is provinced for. would be the remedy of any oppressed Manguian? The answer would naturally be that the official into whose hands are given the enforcement of the law would have little or not motive to oppress these people. . at L. however. the greater part being lands of public domain. and the courts are always open for a redress of grievances. Could be not. In dealing with the backward population. no involuntary servitude. the presumption would all be that they would endeavor to carry out the purposes of the law intelligently and patriotically. it is asked. Without any doubt. do not have permanent individual property. But they are compelled to live there and prohibited from emigrating to some other places under penalty of imprisonment. everything is being done from them in order that their advancement in civilization and material prosperity may be assured. you can not make them live together and the noble intention of the Government of organizing them politically will come to naught. There they are being taught and guided to improve their living conditions. They do not work for anybody but for themselves. shall we give up the noble work simply because a certain element. therefore. Certainly their living together in Tigbao does not make them slaves or put them in a condition compelled to do services for another. In short. p. treasure. 141) Indian reservation. If. They are being made to understand that they object of the government is to organize them politically into fixed and permanent communities.. What.

If all are to be equal before the law. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional. Further. therefore. a coordinate branch. all must be approximately equal in intelligence. 222 U. and with a view to the court's performing its duty in no narrow and bigoted sense. if we fail to realize that a consistent governmental policy has been effective in the Philippines from early days to the present. Mindoro must be populated. said that "constitutional law.) If in the final decision of the many grave questions which this case presents. How far. Every really new question that comes before the courts is. has to take some chances. So ordered. The Manguianes." (Blinn vs. Distinctions must be made from time to time as sound reason and a true sense of justice may dictate. Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty." it should be with a view to upholding the law. The public policy of the Government of the Philippine Islands is shaped with a view to benefit the Filipino people as a whole. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been followed. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. and for a along time to come will be. To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the law. impossible for the courts to determine. dependent. when not determined by differentiation of the principle of a prior case or line of cases. and it applies alike to all of a class. determined on that theory. Now purely an ethical or philosophical subject. on the necessities of the class attempted to be benefited. it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed. in order to fulfill this governmental policy. The doctrines of laissez faire and of unrestricted freedom of the individual. it the attitude which the courts should assume towards the settled policy of the Government. be exercised. Habeas corpus can. We are of the opinion that action pursuant to section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his liberty without due process of law and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws. in the last analysis. like other mortal contrivances. are of the past. the courts cannot fairly say that the Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority. This is the true ruling of the court. . in one of the aphorisms for which he is justly famous. We are further of the opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power. 510) the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Tennessee writes: We can seen objection to the application of public policy as a ratio decidendi. consistently with freedom. If the Philippines is to be a rich and powerful country.The question is above all one of sociology. and that confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. But a great malady requires an equally drastic remedy. in case of doubt. for their own good and the good of the country. there exists a law . Gambles vs. it is. may the right and liberties of the individual members of society be subordinated to the will of the Government? It is a question which has assailed the very existence of government from the beginning of time. the Judiciary must realize that the very existence of government renders imperatives a power to restrain the individual to some extent. Vanderbilt University (200 Southwestern Reporter. somewhat analogous to the Indian policy of the United States. 1. In resolving such an issue. As a point which has been left for the end of this decision and which. indeed. The courts unfortunately have sometimes seemed to trial after the other two branches of the government in this progressive march. it has been transferred to the peaceful forum of the Judiciary. But public policy is not a thing inflexible. Nelson [1911]." Our attempt at giving a brief history of the Philippines with reference to the so-called non-Christians has been in vain.S. No court is wise enough to forecast its influence in all possible contingencies. would lead to the determination that section 2145 is valid. Most cautiously should the power of this court to overrule the judgment of the Philippine Legislature. The idea to unify the people of the Philippines so that they may approach the highest conception of nationality. purely as an exercise of the police power. one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. nor now to be decided by force. Considered. of course. that one is perceived to tip the scales which the court believes will best promote the public welfare in its probable operation as a general rule or principle. In a late decision with which we are in full accord. or by the aid of analogies furnished by such prior case.. Costs shall be taxes against petitioners. In balancing conflicting solutions. not issue. the courts must take "a chance. this is. As to the particular degree to which the Legislature and the Executive can go in interfering with the rights of the citizen. The modern period has shown as widespread belief in the amplest possible demonstration of governmental activity. and its fertile regions must be developed. an unusual exercise of that power. the law seems to be reasonable. Justice Holmes. must be confined for a time. as axioms of economics and political theory. but with that broad conception which will make the courts as progressive and effective a force as are the other departments of the Government. therefore. with a view to the effectuation of the general governmental policy. The whole tendency of the best considered case is toward non-interference on the part of the courts whenever political ideas are the moving consideration. as we have said.

Vice-Gov. Gerna and Generoso A. Barbo. accused Gov. was a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of that province prior to the 11 May 1992 elections. prevent and exclude Agustin B. Eastern Samar. Department of Interior and Local Government. Yu. From the orders. CONTRARY TO LAW. to the damage and prejudice of Agustin B. 2 Accused Barbo and Libanan filed their respective motions for reconsideration.J. Alar as the official replacement of aforesaid deceased member. Capito. Docena. Ismael G. on 25 May 1992. Sacmar & Associates for petitioner. Libanan appealed. dated 26 July 1993. through evident bad faith and manifest partiality. Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Hon. MARCELINO C. accused Lutgardo B. wherein accused expressed their recognition of Atty. from exercising his rights and prerogatives as a member of the said body. 1 On motion of the prosecution for the suspension of the accused public officials pendente lite. Vice-Governor of same province. Civil Service Commission. and Sangguniang Panlalawigan members Nonato A. Sangguniang Panlalawigan Members Marcos B. to the following effect: WHEREFORE. 17756. for their information and guidance and they are hereby directed to inform this Court within ten (10) days from receipt hereof of any action they have undertaken on the matter. JJ. and for sometime thereafter. did then and there. which the Sandiganbayan denied in its resolution of 30 September 1993. C. petitioner. and Generoso A. THE ORDER OF SUSPENSION IF EXECUTED WOULD CONSTITUTE AN AFFRONT ON PETITIONER(‘S) CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS. or from any other public office that they may be holding. SO ORDERED. vs. He was among those charged before the Sandiganbayan. SANDIGANBAYAN and AGUSTIN B. Lutgardo Barbo. Torres and Avanceña. of the same province. 01. Libanan. respondents. Marcelino C. RESOLUTION VITUG. to wit: That — I. and finding that said accused were charged under a valid information. Docena. Alido.. Pimentel. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. Marcelino C. Semaco P. and the Hon. LIBANAN. with having violated Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. concur. conspiring with one another. docketed Criminal Case No. stating— That on or about 08 January 1991. Petitioner presents three grounds to support his appeal. by promulgating in their official capacities Sangguniang Panlalawigan Resolution No. Series of 1991. Camenforte. Libanan. Yu are hereby suspended from their respective public positions. Nonato A.: Petitioner Marcelino C. Socrates B. Libanan. 3019 in an information. Gerna. notwithstanding the recall of his appointment by the Department of Local Government. Commissioner. in Borongan.Arellano. wilfully and unlawfully. the incumbent Vice-Governor of Eastern Samar. Secretary. Camilo A. J. the same to commence upon their receipt hereof and for a period of ninety (90) days thereafter. . Kho. DOCENA. a duly appointed and Qualified replacement of deceased Sangguniang Panlalawigan member Luis A. Nicolas O. premises considered. Governor of Eastern Samar.. the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution.

Republic Act No. is pending in court. concur. THE REASONS SOUGHT TO BE PREVENTED BY THE SUSPENSION ORDERPENDENTE LITE NO LONGER EXIST. When the statute is clear and explicit. at the time of issuance of the suspension order. he further claims. JJ. 13. . Public office is "a public agency or trust. there is hardly room for any extended court ratiocination or rationalization of the law. Obviously. — Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under title 7. Prior to Deloso. This Court has repeatedly held that such preventive suspension is mandatory. was already occupying the office of governor and not the position of municipal mayor that he held previously when charged with having violated the Anti-Graft Law. shall be suspended from office.II.. MARCELINO C. The amendatory provision of Section 13. Villaluz. the suspension order cannot amount to a deprivation of property without due process of law. Sandiganbayan. 7 we have said: Since the criminal prosecution against petitioner-accused is concededly not abated by the fact of his reelection. 9 WHEREFORE. in Bayot vs. . The assailed resolution of respondent Sandiganbayan is AFFIRMED in toto. 4 the suspension of then Cavite mayor Bayot was also sustained even as he was charged for acts committed as a government auditor of the Commission on Audit. provides: Sec. The implementation of the suspension order. In Deloso vs. . Republic Act No. Sandiganbayan. book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation. the pendency of such criminal case under a valid information under Republic Act 3019 may clearly be and supplies the legal basis for his suspension from office in a subsequent term in the event of his reelection by virtue of the provisions of section 13 of the Act. or the equivalent of. LIBANAN BY THE PEOPLE OF EASTERN SAMAR. . Suspension and Loss of Benefits. 3019 unequivocally mandates the suspension of a public official from office pending a criminal prosecution against him. III. Bidin. the petition is DISMISSED. His so-called "covenant" with the people of Eastern Samar is far from being synonymous to." 5 and it is not the property envisioned by the Constitutional provision 6 which petitioner invokes. The third assigned error raised by petitioner need not be delved into. being predicated on his acts supposedly committed while still a member of the Sangguniang Bayan. this Court ruled that the term "office" used in the law could apply to any office which the officer charged might currently be holding and not necessarily the particular office under which he was charged. 3019. Petitioner contends that the order of suspension. THE ORDER OF SUSPENSION ONCE IMPLEMENTED WOULD AMOUNT TO AN ASSAULT OF THE SACRED COVENANT REPOSED ON PETITIONER VICEGOVERNOR. In Oliveros vs. here applicable. SO ORDERED. Libanan’s second contention neither holds water. In both instances. 8 and there are no "ifs" and "buts" about it. can no longer attach to him now that he is the duly elected and incumbent Vice-Governor of Eastern Samar. Feliciano. The petition is without merit. Romero and Melo. and it is not one that can cut athwart the long arm of the law. would amount to a deprivation of property without due process of law. 3 this Court rejected a similar argument advanced by Governor Deloso who. license.

On October 29.000. Psd-42965. 1âwphi 1. Regional Trial Court. who purchased a portion of Lot 707-A-2. (c) to replace the removed concrete monuments removed by defendants. Lising Realty and subdivided them into smaller lots. namely. Block 1 of the subdivision plan (LRC). respectively. 1991. Tandang Sora. 1998. petitioners received a Special Order dated March 30. and other third persons. Lot 5. Branch 77. On August 21. praying for the issuance of an Order directing the Deputy Sheriff to cause the removal and/or . through counsel. 16951 and 16952. to remove the house they constructed on the land they were occupying. COURT OF APPEALS. the trial court finally adjudged defendants Pedro and Lising jointly and severally liable for encroaching on plaintiff’s land and ordered them: (a) to solidarily pay the plaintiff Tandang Sora Dev. vs. docketed as Civil Case No. the Deputy Sheriff of Quezon City directed petitioners. actual damages in the amount of P20. Quezon City. BACLIG. (b) to remove all construction. (d) to pay attorney’s fees in the amount of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5. The parcel is now #33 Doña Regina St. (e) to relocate the boundaries to conform with the Commissioners’ Report. Q-12918. in February 1998. On April 2.VICTOR ORQUIOLA and HONORATA ORQUIOLA. QUISUMBING. Annexes "A" and "B" thereof. This parcel of land was adjacent to certain portions of Lot 707 of the Piedad Estates. spouses Victor and Honorata Orquiola. Also assailed is the resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals dated December 29. THE SHERIFF OF QUEZON CITY and HIS/HER DEPUTIES and PURA KALAW LEDESMA. Trial continued for three decades.R. at the expense of the defendants. registered in the name of Herminigilda Pedro under TCT Nos. particularly. Corp. The other portions were registered in the name of the heirs of Pedro. from the trial court stating as follows: Before the Court for resolution is the "Ex-Parte Motion For The Issuance of A Writ of Demolition.00) with interest computed from the date of filing of the complaint. from issuing a writ of demolition against petitioners. illegally constructed by defendants on plaintiff’s property at defendants’ expense. Regina Village. petitioners." filed by plaintiff. Tandang Sora Development Corporation replaced Pura Kalaw Ledesma as plaintiff by virtue of an assignment of Lot 689 made by Ledesma in favor of said corporation. During the pendency of the action.B. VIVENCIO S. Lot 707-A and 707-B. The facts are as follows: Pura Kalaw Ledesma was the registered owner of Lot 689. Quezon City. respondents. 1999 which denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. Branch 77. Quezon City. Herminigilda sold Lot 707-A and 707-B to Mariano Lising who then registered both lots and Lot 707-C in the name of M. Sometime in 1969. 1999 in CA-G. Pura Kalaw Ledesma filed a complaint. covered by TCT Nos. 111267 and 111266.3 As a result.nêt Certain portions of the subdivided lots were sold to third persons including herein petitioners.. which dismissed the petition to prohibit Judge Vivencio Baclig of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. 47422. at their own expense. HON. heirs of Lising. with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City against Herminigilda Pedro and Mariano Lising for allegedly encroaching upon Lot 689. substituted by TANDANG SORA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION. Presiding Judge. through an alias writ of execution. 1998.000 with interest from date of filing of the complaint. including barbed wires and fences. and the sheriff and deputy sheriff of the same court from implementing an alias writ of execution. HON. in Tandang Sora.: This petition for review seeks the reversal of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated January 28. J. SP No. 1964.

Q12918 even though they were not impleaded as parties thereto. Considering that the decision rendered in the instant case had become final and executory. Thus. 1997. this Court will issue a writ of demolition against them. 6 Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied. However. The defendants-heirs of Herminigilda Pedro filed their comment on the said Motion. 1998. petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for prohibition with prayer for a restraining order and preliminary injunction on April 17. there is now a need to demolish the structures in order to implement the said decision. In 1949. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT UPHOLDING PETITIONERS’ TITLE DESPITE THEIR BEING BUILDER IN GOOD FAITH AND INNOCENT PURCHASER AND FOR VALUE. the defendants are hereby directed to remove. petitioners claim that the alias writ of execution cannot be enforced against them. Q-12918. 5 Petitioners alleged that they bought the subject parcel of land in good faith and for value. II. this petition. which defendants constructed on plaintiff’s property. SO ORDERED. otherwise. as per the Partial Sheriff’s Return. III. WHEREFORE. On the first issue. Hence. 1999. despite the service of the said writ to all the defendants and the present occupants of the subject property. In Medina. 1998. the writ of demolition issued in connection therewith cannot be enforced against them because to do so would amount to deprivation of property without due process of law. They argue that the appellate court erred when it relied heavily on our ruling in Vda. It held that as buyers and successors-in-interest of Mariano Lising. they were parties in interest. and as such.demolition of the structures on the plaintiff’s property constructed by defendants and/or the present occupants. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DECISION IN CIVIL CASE NO. Q12918 CAN ALSO BE ENFORCED AGAINST THE PETITIONERS EVEN IF THEY WERE NOT IMPLEADED AS PARTIES THERETO. directed the issuance of an alias writ of execution for the enforcement of the said decision. in its Order of November 14. Q-12918. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on January 28. Benedicta Mangahas and Francisco . issued by the Deputy Sheriff of this branch of the Court.4 To prohibit Judge Vivencio Baclig of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City from issuing a writ of demolition and the Quezon City sheriff from implementing the alias writ of execution. dated February 9. Since they were not impleaded in Civil Case No. they failed to comply therewith. all constructions. the property in dispute was registered under Land Registration Act No.7 For our resolution are the following issues: (1) whether the alias writ of execution may be enforced against petitioners. 496 in 1916 and Original Certificate of Title No. and (2) whether petitioners were innocent purchasers for value and builders in good faith. Petitioners submit that Medina is not applicable in this case because the circumstances therein are different from the circumstances in the present case. Thus. including barbed wires and fences. petitioners were considered privies who derived their rights from Lising by virtue of the sale and could be reached by the execution order in Civil Case No. PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO INJUNCTIVE RELIEF CONSIDERING THAT THEY STAND TO SUFFER GRAVE AND IRREPARABLE INJURY IF ALIAS WRIT OF EXECUTION AND THE SPECIAL ORDER ISSUED BY THE COURT A QUO IN CIVIL CASE NO. de Medina vs. they can be reached by the order of execution in Civil Case No. Cruz8 in holding that petitioners are successors-in-interest of Mariano Lising. 868 was issued in the name of Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC). the Court. at their expense. within fifteen (15) days from notice of this Order. where petitioners aver that: I. hence. Q-12918 FOR THE DEMOLITION OF ALL THE STRUCTURES ON THE DISPUTED PROPERTY WERE ENFORCED AGAINST THE PETITIONERS WHO WERE NOT EVEN GIVEN THEIR DAY IN COURT. the petition was ordered dismissed. for lack of merit.

if properly considered. The Court of Appeals overlooked the fact that the purchase of the land took place prior to the institution of Civil Case No. Petitioners could reasonably rely on Mariano Lising’s Certificate of Title which at the time of purchase was still free from any third party claim. C-120. As a general rule. the applicable rule is that a person dealing with the registered property need not go beyond the certificate of title. or other title existing prior to the issuance thereof not annotated on the Torrens title. while the right over the land of the predecessors-in-interest of herein petitioners is based on a fully recognized Torrens title. petitioners in this case acquired the registered title in their own names. When Magbanua had paid for the land in full. petitioners acquired the lot before the commencement of Civil Case No. PRC executed a deed of absolute sale in her favor and a new title was consequently issued in her name. while the petitioner in Medina merely relied on the title of her predecessor-in-interest and tax declarations to prove her alleged ownership of the land. C-120. claiming that she was not a party in Civil Case No. We must stress that where a case like the present one involves a sale of a parcel of land under the Torrens system. 9 It is our view here that the petitioners. She said that she bought the houses from spouses Ricardo and Eufrocinia de Guzman. 4136. petitioner spouses acquired the land in question without knowledge of any defect in the title of Mariano Lising. who in turn sold them to Medina. Q-12918 was commenced sometime in 1969. Medina argued that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over her. the petitioner in Medina acquired the right over the houses and lot subject of the dispute after the original action was commenced and became final and executory. A Torrens title is incontrovertible against any informacion possessoria. are fully entitled to the legal protection of their lot by the Torrens system. considering the circumstances of this case.10 The determination of whether one is a buyer in good faith is a factual issue which generally is outside the province of this Court to determine in a petition for review. justice. allegedly a Titulo de Composicion Con El Estado issued by the Spanish Government in favor of one Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban. he can rely solely on the title and he is charged with notice only of such burdens and claims as are annotated on the title. could be enforced against petitioner even though she was not a party thereto.Second. Moreover. and is ignorant of any defect or flaw in his title. would justify a different conclusion. In other words. when the . we deem it proper that this issue be resolved now. were petitioners purchasers in good faith and for value? A buyer in good faith is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in such property. We found that the houses on the subject lot were formerly owned by Mangahas and Ramos who sold them to spouses de Guzman. Magbanua then sought the execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. In the present case. and a strong presumption exists that a Torrens title was regularly issued and valid. PRC sold the lot to Remedios Magbanua. petitioners purchased the subject land in 1964 from Mariano Lising. 13 Nevertheless. Medina markedly differs from the present case on major points. dated April 29.Ramos occupied and built houses on the lot without the PRC’s consent. Fair play. we sustained Magbanua’s ownership over it. This was opposed by petitioner Medina who alleged that she owned the houses and lot subject of the dispute. Coming now to the second issue. thus. we conclude that petitioners acquired the land subject of this dispute in good faith and for value. and due process dictate that parties should not raise for the first time on appeal issues that they could have raised but never did during trial and even during proceedings before the Court of Appeals. As found by the Court of Appeals and not refuted by private respondent. The judgment became final and executory. Third. Mangahas and Ramos opposed and instituted Civil Case No.14 As earlier discussed. she being the holder of a Torrens title. 12 Civil Case No. Q-12918. When Medina reached this Court. this could not be done. He is a buyer for value if he pays a full and fair price at the time of the purchase or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other person in the property. Under the circumstances. unlike the petitioner in the Medina case who merely relied on a mere Titulo de Composicion. C-120. 11 The instant case is covered by this exception to the general rule. which had long become final and executory. In opposing the execution. A builder in good faith is one who builds with the belief that the land he is building on is his. In 1959. the right over the disputed land of the predecessors-in-interest of the petitioner in Medina was based on a title of doubtful authenticity. Shortly afterwards. As to the lot under dispute. An exception is when the Court of Appeals failed to take into account certain relevant facts which. Q-12918. Hence. to avoid circuitous litigation and further delay in the disposition of this case. On this score. the sale to petitioners was made before Pura Kalaw Ledesma claimed the lot. and thus Medina could be reached by the order of execution and writ of demolition issued against the two. we held that the decision in Civil Case No. The final question now is: could we consider petitioners builders in good faith? We note that this is the first time that petitioners have raised this issue. We declared that a Torrens title is generally conclusive evidence of ownership of the land referred to therein. she could not be considered as "a person claiming under" Ramos and Mangahas. while she purchased the lot from the heirs of the late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban. It was only in 1998. persons dealing with property covered by a Torrens certificate of title are not required to go beyond what appears on its face. The trial court dismissed the complaint and ordered Mangahas and Ramos to vacate the lot and surrender possession thereof to Magbanua. they built their conjugal home on said land. 1894. C-120 to annul the sale and to compel PRC to execute a contract of sale in their favor. spouses Victor and Honorata Orquiola. The latter held the land by virtue of a Titulo de Composicion Con El Estado Num. we find that petitioners are indeed builders in good faith. First. petitioner was privy to the two judgment debtors Mangahas and Ramos.

the informations uniformly alleged: That on or about 3 February 1978 in the Municipality of Botolan. the Tanodbayan filed five (5) separate informations. Q-12918. While he occupied the position of mayor. The petitioner was the duly elected mayor of Botolan. and its resolution dated December 29. DELOSO.. and strangers to a case are not bound by any judgment rendered by the court. The complaint with respect to the award of licenses to operate fish corrals was dismissed. in CA-G. Mendoza. are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. GOVERNOR AMOR D. Concepcion. which is tantamount to a deprivation of property without due process of law. unlawfully and feloniously give unwarranted benefits to Daniel Ferrer thru manifest partiality and evident bad faith in the discharge of his official functions by issuing to him a tractor purchased by the Municipality of Botolan thru a loan financed by the Land Bank of the Philippines . The Office of the Solicitor General for public respondent. all dated May 30. Zambales. petitioner. Q-12918 through a writ of execution and order of demolition issued against petitioners. that they had notice of private respondent’s adverse claim. GUTIERREZ. JJ. and Corona. 9200 to 9204 which preventively suspended petitioner Amor D. As builders in good faith and innocent purchasers for value. 47422. No man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger. DELOSO. did then and there wilfully. Except for the names of the individuals who were allegedly favored by the petitioner and the dates when these favors were made. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. of the Anti-Graft Law with the Sandiganbayan.. Zambales during the period 1976 to 1978 and the issuance of five (5) tractors of the municipality to certain individuals allegedly without any agreement as to the payment of rentals. Only real parties in interest in an action are bound by the judgment therein and by writs of execution and demolition issued pursuant thereto. Regala & Cruz for petitioner. Deloso (accused in the criminal cases) pendente lite from his position as provincial governor of Zambales and from any office that he may be holding. 9200-9204. J. SP No. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 1999. vs. Since they failed to do so. 15 Consequently. Costs against private respondent.16 In our view. 1999. concur.sheriff of Quezon City tried to execute the judgment in Civil Case No. and THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT. Abello. 1989 in Criminal Cases Nos. accused AMOR D. 1984 accusing the petitioner of violation of Section 3(e). JR. respondents. Bellosillo. Zambales in the local elections of November 1971. taking advantage of his public and official position. In the same manner. a public officer being then the Municipal Mayor of the Municipality of Botolan. Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. Zambales. Angara. the petition is GRANTED. Q-12918. SO ORDERED. The institution of Civil Case No. a certain Juan Villanueva filed a letter complaint with the Tanodbayan accusing him of having committed acts in violation of the Anti-Graft Law (Republic Act 3019) in relation to the award of licenses to operate fish corrals in the municipal waters of Botolan. 1âwphi1. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 28. petitioners cannot be reached by the decision in said case.: This petition for certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated February 10. the spouses Victor and Honorata Orquiola have valid and meritorious cause to resist the demolition of their house on their own titled lot. a writ of execution can be issued only against a party and not against one who did not have his day in court.R. THE SANDIGANBAYAN. Respondents are hereby enjoined from enforcing the decision in Civil Case No. private respondents should have impleaded them in Civil Case No. Q-12918 cannot serve as notice of such adverse claim to petitioners since they were not impleaded therein as parties. petitioners have rights over the subject property and hence they are proper parties in interest in any case thereon.nêt WHEREFORE. As regards the other complaint.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the Secretary of the Department of Local Government for implementation and for him to inform this Court of the action he has taken thereon within five (5) days from receipt hereof. 1989 resolution of the Sandiganbayan. 1989. the Court must also be contend with its own calendar. the petitioner filed an urgent motion with the Sandiganbayan requesting that the execution and implementation of the February 10. decided the case in relation to the principles of due process and equal protection of the law.R. the Sandiganbayan said: The Court notes that these cases have already been set for May 15. no other earlier setting can be granted to the accused without making that setting merely a sham since other cases which have been set earlier will naturally have a right to expect priority. 6 and 7. (Rollo. The Office of the Special Prosecutor then filed a motion to suspend the petitioner pendente lite pursuant to Section 13 of Republic Act No. the Court ruled that the petition need not be resolved through a ruling on the validity of the provision on mandatory suspension. . (Rollo. 94) The day following his receipt of the resolution. 1989 at 8:00 o'clock in the morning and 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon. 3019). However. He pleaded NOT GUILTY to the charges against him. the Sandiganbayan issued the questioned resolution. While the accused claims that this period is ordinately far. such a setting will be best a pretence since other cases have already been set between now and May 15 where in many instances the accused themselves are also under suspension by reason of the same provision of law. the Secretary of Local Government and Community Development. 1989. we dismissed the petition for lack of merit. 1989 before the Sandiganbayan. 69963-67) to annul the Sandiganbayan's resolutions denying the petitioner's motion to quash and motion for reconsideration. On February 10. the petitioner filed the instant petition. Under the above circumstances. A motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. The motion was denied prompting the petitioner to ask the Court for an earlier setting of the trial of the cases which was denied in an order dated February 22. (Rollo. and all those acting in their behalf from executing and implementing the February 10. The petitioner was arraigned on January 6.for lease to local farmers at reasonable cost. After considering the facts as well as the merits of the case.1988. the petitioner filed an urgent supplemental application for temporary restraining order and/ or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the Sandiganbayan. 1988. p. or on February 16. 3019. without any agreement as to the payment of rentals for the use of tractor by Daniel Ferrer thereby causing undue injury to the Municipality of Botolan. 135) In view of this development. On February 17. We treat the respondent's Comment as an answer and decide this petition on its merits. p. p. 16 and 17 as well as June 5. Sandiganbayan (136 SCRA 536 [1985]). 1989. Deloso is suspended pendente lite from his position as Provincial Governor of Zambales and from any other office that he may now be holding. It will be easy enough for this Court to give the accused an earlier setting. Nos. We instead. In a resolution dated July 28. The petitioner then filed a petition before us (G. This same issue was raised in the case of Layno v. the accused Amor D. In denying the plea for an earlier schedule of the trial of the cases. the dispositive portion of which reads: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING. The resolution became final and executory on October 17. 1989. 30) A motion to quash the informations was denied by the Sandiganbayan. The petitioner questions the constitutionality of the suspension provision of Section 13 of the Anti-Graft Law (Republic Act No. 1989 suspension order be held in abeyance pending determination of the merits of the petition.

however. (Section 8. Villaluz. 1988 local elections. It is not quite becoming of judicial magistrates to shunt aside a suggestion that the interplay of legal provisions be carefully studied and analyzed. In the deliberations of the Court on this case. that I find abhorrent and therefore deplore " (Oliveros v. and sought a definitive answer to the question. I also pointedly brought out the matter of the notorious delay in the courts of justice which could effectively frustrate an elected or re-elected local official from discharging the duties of his office for the entire term of his office. As we ruled in Layno. according to Senator Ganzon. And so it is that. I bewail the apathy of the majority of the Court toward efforts to seek enlightenment on legal issues of grave importance from the deliberations of Congress upon the said issues. we apply anew the ruling in the Layno case and decide the instant petition in relation to the principles of due process and equal protection without having to declare categorically whether or not the suspension provision of Republic Act 3019 should be struck down as invalid.Faced with similar factual circumstances in the instant petition. I likewise asked the Court to consider the situation where an elective local official runs for the National Assembly and is elected despite the fact that he is under suspension under the authority of the provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. In no uncertain words did I focus the attention of the Court on the serious ever-present possibility of harassment of an elective local official taking the form of the filing of a valid information against him under the provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act after his exoneration in an administrative case involving the same offense. 57 SCRA 163. under the circumstances of this case. Constitution). As of October 26. Article XVIII. Were it not for this information and the suspension decreed by the Sandiganbayan according to the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. (supra): Petitioner is a duly elected municipal mayor of Lianga. an indefinite suspension becomes unreasonable. on the basis of my discussion above. The order of suspension does not have a definite period so that the petitioner may be suspended for the rest of his term of office unless his case is terminated sooner. Parenthetically. Under these circumstances the preventive suspension which initially may be justified becomes unreasonable thus raising a due process question. It is the ex cathedra attitude. which. it must be stated that while there was an exchange of views between Senator Ganzon and Senator Manglapus on the Anti-Graft Law. Sandiganbayan. 1983. he would have been all this while in the full discharge of his functions as such municipal mayor. As early as 1974. The regular term of a governor is only 3 years although he shall serve until noon of June 30. he has . I suggested that we examine the possible delimiting effects of the provisions of the first sentence of section 5 of the Decentralization Act on the provisions of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act insofar as the suspension from office of an elective local official is concerned. 3019 by virtue of the criminal charges filed against him. Surigao del Sur. then Justice Fred Ruiz Castro expressed in a separate opinion the mischief which would result if the Court allows the indefinite suspension of elective local officials charged with violations of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act: The central point of Senator Padilla's position is that the penalty of suspension is definitely much lower than that of removal and it would be incongruous if we give to the penalty of suspension more serious consequences than are attached to the penalty of removal. 1992 by special provision of the Constitution. 197-198 [1974]) Petitioner Deloso was elected governor of the Province of Zambales in the January 18. v. He was elected precisely to do so. His term of office does not expire until 1986. Article X. Senator Padilla opted for the immediate restoration of the respondent to his position once the favorable result of the election is known. He was. Sr. Section 2. cannot be made within one year prior to an election. the exchange was limited to the matter of the commencement of the investigation of the charges. and thus nullify the will of the people who elected him. We limit ourselves to ascertaining whether or not. ordered suspended from performing his duties as governor by the Sandiganbayan pursuant to Section 13 of Republic Act No. What then would happen to the suspension meted out to him since it is the National Assembly that determines whether he should assume and continue in office? All these and other germane questions were brushed aside by the majority of the Court with the sweeping statement that the provisions of the Decentralization Act apply only to administrative cases. this kind of slothful thinking. An extended suspension is a distinct possibility considering that the Sandiganbayan denied the petitioner's plea for earlier dates of trial of his cases on the ground that there are other cases set earlier which have a right to expect priority.

the policy of the law mandated by the Constitution frowns at a suspension of indefinite duration. when the gravity of the offense so warrants. Its continuance. The guarantee to an equal protection of the law necessitates the application of the ruling in the Garcia v. Secretary (116 Phil.. in effect. as in this instance. Thus. when there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts complained of. In either case.' (Batas Pambansa Blg. Moreover.. 8-9) The question that now arises is whether or not the ruling in the Garcia case where the suspension was ordered by no less than the President of the Philippines is applicable to an elective official facing criminal charges under the Anti-Graft Law and suspended under Section 13. the petitioner in the cited case was the Chairman of the National Science Development Board appointed by the President of the Philippines.' (Ibid. he was suspended by the Executive Secretary by authority of the President. 352) Clearly then. in violation of the Constitution . he is entitled to the constitutional presumption of innocence. 337. if there be a criminal action. or when the continuance in office of the respondent influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence'). Hon. . Paulino Garcia. the protracted continuance of this preventive suspension had outrun the bounds of reason and resulted in sheer oppression. It may be recalled that the principle against indefinite suspension applies equally to national government officials. thereof.. facing administrative charges can be preventively suspended indefinitely.' (Ibid. They were deprived of the services of the man they had elected to serve as mayor. In view of his indefinite suspension. his term of office could be shortened and he could in effect. when the evidence of culpability is strong.been unable to. in the earlier case of Garcia v.. his term of office could be shortened and he could. The respondents opposed the petition on the ground that the petitioner was a presidential appointee and therefore not covered by the 60-day preventive suspension limit under Section 35 of the then Civil Service Act. be proceeded against administratively or. In this particular case. last sentence. preventive suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days after the start of said suspension. facing administrative charges. provided in Section 35 of the Civil Service Act of 1959 (Republic Act 2260) is illegal and void. any of them could. XII. Constitution of the Philippines]) and the Civil Service Law (No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law and after due process). 542) . 4. Sec. in the meanwhile his right to hold office had been nullified. criminally.. In the guise of a preventive suspension. the mere fact that petitioner is facing a charge under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act does not justify a different rule of law.. It is therein clearly provided that while preventive suspension is allowable for the causes therein enumerated. to wit: . It is to avoid such an unconstitutional application that the order of suspension should be lifted. 351-352) Further: 'In the guise of a preventive suspension. be removed without a finding of a cause duly established after due hearing. for an unreasonable length of time raises a due process question. So it was held in the leading case of Garcia v. In ruling in favor of the petitioner. there is this emphatic limitation on the duration thereof. For even if thereafter he were acquitted. to paraphrase Justice Cardozo. If the case against petitioner Layno were administrative in character the Local Government Code would be applicable. the Court stated: To adopt the theory of respondents that an officer appointed by the President. be removed without a finding of a cause duly established after due hearing. (6 SCRA 1 [1962]) we ruled on the issue as to whether the preventive suspension beyond the maximum period of 60 days. The first sentence reads as follows: 'Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined. In that sense. he filed a petition praying in effect that the 60day period prescribed in the Civil Service Law for preventive suspension having already expired. contrary to the express mandate of the Constitution and the Civil Service Law. 348 [1962]). According to the opinion of Justice Barrera: 'To adopt the theory of respondents that an officer appointed by the President. in effect. (at pp. The respondents maintained that the petitioner could be indefinitely suspended. in violation of the Constitution. we explained in the Layno case. Clearly. A denial of due process is thus quite manifest. It is a basic assumption of the electoral process implicit in the right of suffrage that the people are entitled to the services of elective officials of their choice. his culpability must be established. Section 63 (2). Pending investigation of the administrative charges against him. He was charged with electioneering and dishonesty in office. Executive Secretary. be the penalty itself without a finding of guilt after due hearing. in effect. [Art. would be to countenance a situation where the preventive suspension can. of course. there would be in such a case an injustice suffered by him. 'In all cases. however. The Executive Secretary. be the penalty itself without a finding of guilt after due hearing. A preventive suspension may be justified. There is injustice inflicted likewise on the people of Lianga. can be preventively suspended indefinitely. To do so would be to negate the safeguard of the equal protection guarantee. contrary to the express mandate of the Constitution (No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law. Nor is he the only victim. (at p. For misfeasance or malfeasance. would be to countenance a situation where the preventive suspension can. Moreover. he be reinstated in the service pursuant to Section 35 of the said Act.

807. the position wherein he was charged under the Anti-Graft Law. The amendatory provision clearly states that any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under Republic Act 3019 or for any offense involving fraud upon the government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage or execution and mode of participation. One last point. is pending in court. This argument is untenable. Further. the Civil Service Decree. The order dated February 10. and not only the particular office under which he was charged. The preventive suspension imposed on petitioner Amor D. Should the purposes behind preventive suspensions such as preventing the abuse of the prerogatives of the office. which period also appears reasonable and appropriate under the circumstances of this case. Deloso by . murder.. The petitioner may still be suspended but for specifically expressed reasons and not from an automatic application of Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. It would be most unfair to the people of Zambales who elected the petitioner to the highest provincial office in their command if they are deprived of his services for an indefinite period with the termination of his case possibly extending beyond his entire term simply because the big number of sequestration. shall be suspended from office. the respondent court is not bereft of remedies or sanctions. The petitioner also questions the applicability of Section 13 of Republic Act 3019 as amended by Batasan Pambansa Blg. The issue was settled in the case of Bayot v. 192 to him. in this wise: . The interests of the sovereign electorate and the province of Zambales cannot be subordinated to the heavy case load of the Sandiganbayan and of this Court. intimidation of witnesses. by the use of the word office the same applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding. the instant petition is GRANTED. malversation of public finds and other more serious offenses plus incidents and resolutions that may be brought to the Supreme Court prevents the expedited determination of his innocence or guilt. Thus. etc. 1989 suspending the petitioner without a definite period can not be sanctioned. the claim of petitioner that he cannot be suspended because he is presently occupying a position different from that under which he is charged is untenable.. WHEREFORE. We rule that henceforth a preventive suspension of an elective public officer under Section 13 of Republic Act 3019 should be limited to the ninety (90) days under Section 42 of Presidential Decree No. He opines that the suspension provision as amended which qualifies the public officer as incumbent does not apply to him since he is now occupying the position of governor and not mayor.The application of the Garcia injunction against preventive suspensions for an unreasonable period of time applies with greater force to elective officials and especially to the petitioner whose term is a relatively short one. become manifest. Sandiganbayan (128 SCRA 383 (1984). ill-gotten wealth..