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Related Background Information

This document is part of a series in which gross misconduct by U.S. Dist. Judge Donald L. Graham and Magistrate Frank Lynch Jr. is documented at,,,and These websites allege and document gross misconduct which would otherwise be incredulous and beyond belief. These websites demonstrate that federal judges will lie to protect themselves and each other and conceal their misconduct through the use of unpublished decisions. A long list of misconduct and abusive behavior by U.S. Dist. Judge Donald L. Graham is fully documented at: Chief Judge J.L. Edmondson, Eleventh Circuit, U.S. Court of Appeal, has stated that intentionally usurping legal authority is not misconduct. See Judge J.L. Edmondson Mocks the Judicial Misconduct and Disability Act at

U.S. Magistrate Judge Frank Lynch, Jr. issues two orders on June 19, 2000, (D.E. # 201) and July 25, 2000, (D.E. # 246), that mark the dates that the first prior restraints on pure speech were ever implemented in the entire history of the United States. These orders were issued by a mere Magistrate Judge, Frank Lynch, Jr., in US Dist. Ct. Case No. 99-14027-Graham/Lynch, U.S. Dist. Judge Donald L. Graham, presiding. These documents were assigned Docket Nos. 201 and 246. The second of these two orders, (D.E. # 246) is even more expansive because the federal Magistrate asserts jurisdiction over the administration of Florida Public Records. Incidentally a Magistrate may not issue an injunction. “A judge may designate a magistrate to hear and determine any pretrial matter pending before the court, except a motion for injunctive relief…” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.” Amendment I, U.S. Const. For more information on this matter see These orders prohibit direct communication with the government by a non-lawyer. These orders required Marcellus M. Mason to seek the permission of Allen, Norton &Blue, a law firm in Tampa, Fl to talk to his local government, Highlands County Board of County Commissioners. Tampa, Florida is approximately 90 miles from Sebring, Florida, the county seat of Highlands County and residency of Marcellus Mason. U.S. Dist Judge Donald L. Graham, S.D.Fla., in a secret opinion has that this injunction is not clear error. Judge Graham has expressly stated that the issuance of the injunctions by Magistrate Judge Frank Lynch, Jr. was not "clearly erroneous nor is it contrary to law." See Docket Entry No. 407. This prior restraint is discussed more fully at These orders clearly implicate the First Amendment and the "Petition Clause".

The attached order prohibits direct communication with the government by a mere pro se litigant, Marcellus M. Mason and states: “[T]he Plaintiff shall be prohibited from contacting any of the Defendants, including their supervisory employees and/or the individual Defendants, regarding any matter related to this case. Plaintiff shall correspond only with Defendants' counsel.” The Defendants being referred to are government entities and their employees. ie. Highlands County Board of County Commissioners, Heartland Library Cooperative, “The term "prior restraint" describes orders forbidding certain communications that are issued before the communications occur. “ . Temporary restraining orders and permanent injunctions -- i. e., court orders that actually forbid speech activities -- are classic examples of prior restraints.” Alexander v. United States 509 U.S. 544,550 (1993). “Prior restraint has traditionally been defined as a "predetermined judicial prohibition restraining specified expression…” Bernard v. Gulf-Oil Co., 619 F.2d 459, 476 (5th Cir. 1980) According to the United States Supreme Court, a prior restraint comes to the Court with a heavy presumption against its validity. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971). This presumption is so strong it has been described a virtually insurmountable. In re Providence Journal Company, 820 F.2d 1342 (1st Cir. 1986)(“pure speech--speech not connected with any conduct--the presumption of unconstitutionality is virtually insurmountable.”). In over two hundred years, the U.S. Supreme Court composed of nine Article III Judges, has never upheld a prior restraint on pure speech, In re Providence Journal Company, supra, however, a mere Magistrate, Frank Lynch, Jr, issues these injunctions with ease.

Eleventh Circuit Refuses To Review These Orders For Validity
The Eleventh Circuit, U.S. Court of Appeal has refused to review these orders for validity on multiple occasions. The Eleventh Circuit has used trickery and unpublished opinions to avoid reviewing these orders for validity: • U. S. Circuit Judge Ed Carnes stated that he could not review these order s for validity because a mere Magistrate deemed them “not injunctions per se” but discovery orders”. See US Circuit Judge Ed Carnes Undermines U.S. Supreme Court By Imposing Hobson’s Choice . • A colleague, U.S. Dist. Judge Vanessa D Gilmore, of Judge Donald L. Graham was overruled on appeal for entering a similar order. See Judge Graham Disagrees With The Fifth Circuit, U.S. Court of Appeals. • Eleventh Circuit Case No. 01-13664-A, a direct appeal, the Eleventh Circuit refused to review the validity of these injunctions; however, they spend 14 pages talking about Marcellus Mason’s violations of these clearly illegal injunctions. This appeal has been called the appeal from hell. See Eleventh Circuit Case No. 01-13664: The Appeal From Hell. • The Eleventh Circuit has long history of refusing to review these orders for validity. See A Federal Magistrate May Issue An Injunction So Long As He Does Not Call it An Injunction section entitled “Appellate Odyssey and Gauntlet”.



CASE NO .9-14027CIVDM5vs

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' RENEWED MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION (Motion filed July 12, 2000) AND DEFENDANTS ' MOTION FOR CONTEMPT AND SANCTIONS (DE ##23' j THIS CAUSE having come on to be heard upon the aforementione d Motions, and this Court having reviewed the Motions and Plaintiff' s response, and noting that this Court is considering this issue a s a pretrial discovery issue and not an injunction issue per se, an d further noting that this Court issued an order on June 19, 2000 , prohibiting the Plaintiff from contacting any Defendants includin g their supervisory employees, and further noting that Plaintif f

continues to contact various supervisors and individual Defendants ,
and being otherwise advised in the premises, it is hereby

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendants' Renewed Motion fo r Preliminary Injunction is GRANTED in that the Plaintiff shall b e prohibited from contacting any of the Defendants, including thei r supervisory employees and/or the individual Defendants, regardin g any matter related to this case, it is further

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff shall correspond only with Defendants' counsel including any requests for public records, it is furthe r ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff shall be prohibited fro m contacting any of the named Defendants in this case, including their supervisory employees and/or the individual Defendants, wh o are parties in other actions (Fellin, St . Germain, etc .) and are

represented by counsel in those other actions regarding any matte r related to those cases since Plaintiff is not an attorney or th e attorney of record for the plaintiffs in those other cases, it is furthe r ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendants° Motion for Contempt an d Sanctions is DENIED, however any future violations of this order will result in this Court imposing sanctions against the Plaintiff , including a recommendation of dismissal with prejudice as to al l claims . DONE AND ORDERED 1n Chambers at Fort Pierce, Florida, thi s -day of July, 2000 .

cc : Marcellus M . Mason, Jr ., Pro S e Maria N . Sorolis, Esq .