You are on page 1of 12

Psychological Reports, 1972, 30, 759-770.

@ Psychological Reports 1972

BEHAVIORISM VERSUS PHENOMENOLOGY:
A NEE3LESS CONCEPTUAL MUDDLE
GEORGE GREAVES
Georgia State University
Summasy.-The perennial debate which has ensued over whether behavioral
or phenomenological approaches to psychology are the more "scientific" and
fruitful rests on fundamental confusions in the way the language and concepts of
these approaches are employed. This issue is analyzed in depth, sources of confusion are analyzed, and how the two approaches may be related is suggested.

The behaviorism-phecomenology issue has become a matter of perennial debate in psychology. Perhaps to write still another article about this area may
seem to be beating a dead horse. But in my view the horse is not dead, no matter how frustrated or tired he may be, nor has sufficient attention been paid to
the conceptzlal base which gives rise to this issue in the first place. I would like
to attend a moment to this conceptual base in order to see if some of the problems, arguments, and frustrations concerning this issue as we now experience
them do not drop away.
W e confuse ourselves so often when we go to talk about things. W e take
our language for granted, assuming that the language we speak is English, or
French, or German, or Russian, and that is that. But, as Wittgenstein has so
convincingly pointed out (1953), the language we speak is actually composed
of many smaller language-games. The appropriate language-game we are to employ is a function of what we want to say. Furthermore, the admixture of Ianguage-games, the interpositioning of the words of one language-game in another,
can lead to logical and conceptual absurdities (Ryle, 1949).
Psychologists, save for such persons as Mandler and Kessen (1959), have
been, by and large, unaware of the pervasiveness of their attinides toward language in the way they go about doing their particular thing. Two languagegames in particular have been the bane of modern psychology, and constitute
the subject matter of this particular piece.
The man-on-the-streex is a naive realist. H e believes in the existence of a
world quite independent of his senses. More accurately, he knows that if he
shrivels up and blows away, there will still be an Empire State Building and the
Green Bay Packers. Not so far as he is concerned, of course, but insofar as the
rest of the world is concernd. And the man-on-the-street employs a particular
language to describe that part of reality which is independent of his senses, a
language which I shall refer to in this piece as extrasentient discourse. "Ships,"
"shoes," "sealing wax," "caK~ages," and "kings," are all extrasentient words. So
also are "brain," "pH level," "sodium-potassium depolarization," and "nerve network pattern." Extrasentient discourse is the language of the "out there," the

But the human confounds us. "How heavy is an idea?" "Where is an idea? In a brain? Then why can't I find an idea when I lop u p a brain? And. W e can discard one or the other language and concept-set altogether. how woiild I even recognize one if I found it?" "How big would an image be just supposing I found one in a brain? A micron in diameter? Ten microns? Perhaps three centimeters?" But it soon becomes obvious that the rules of semantics and syntax in the two languagegames will not permit us to mix the concepts together in this way. one becomes a radical behaviorist. philosophers have been struggling with a perplexing question: "How can a massless." or that he is "working on a great idea. Thus. W e are able to talk about him all day with relative ease. What a troublemaker this human is. as well as nouns and adjectives." the last expressions being adverbial. one clings co extrasentient discourse alone. he becomes a radical phenomenalist. or. . a language which follows different rules of semantics and syntax. If." or is "depressed." and so on. the scientist. too. It is a pseudoq u e s t i o n a n unquestion. in the many scores of years that have passed since Descartes formulated the modern dilemma of interactionism. or into the corner." "mass. If in the discarding of one language mode altogether one keeps experiential discourse as his mode of speech. or we can try to live wich both.760 G. And we begin to riddle as we sit in our laboratories and study our records of operant levels. Not only does he speak extrasencient language as well or nearly as well as we. There are extrasentient verbs." "energy level. These include such examples as "the rat runs. a corporeal substance (body) ?" But the struggle was in vain. however. The above construction forms a sentence which is not a part of any language-game." or "the rat moves left or right. too." or that he has "butterflies in his stomach" and is somewhat "nauseous. as "weight." or "imagining. on the other hand. A person tells us he is "thinking. for it forces one into the position of holding that the mode of discourse one is rejecting is somehow irrelevant." In other words. W e are still faced with a creature who uses two distinctively different language-games in referring to himself. called physical." or "daydreaming. as it were. we are able to get along rather well with the Norway rat in terms of extrasencient disco~use. I n general. for the above question is not a question at all." Such talk! So goyish. he speaks a language of experiences." The semantical and syntactical rules of extrasentient discourse permit of the predication of such properties. There are verbs in this latter language-game." "the rat jumps. or around the cage. Neither of these positions is methodologically appealing. but he utters a second. or produce motion in. The human tells us he "feels tired. To recognize the above as an unquestion is not to resolve the problem. There are obviously only two main directions we can go when faced with the two-language phenomenon. strange language. incorporeal substance (mind) cause activity in. GREAVES "objective." "the rat shrieks.

BEHAVIORISM VERSUS PHENOMENOLOGY 761 at best." Given the one-languege approach as untenable. however. But the whole behavioristic-reductionistic muddle does not end here. one could claim that the concepts of the one language are somehow reducible to the concepts of the other. smiling. if so. however. who have held that experiential utterances about pain are reducible to some set of behavioral concepts. a change in the q~alityof the voice. one way to attempt to live with the two-language problem is to claim that everything that can be said in the one language can be said in the other. imbedded in some nerve or other. In other words. Next. I have learned from past experience to expect certain cotemporaneous behavioral manifestations: perhaps a pallid face. a groan. long before the invention of galvanometers or the science of neurology. After all." Eventually "pain" comes to name the deflection of a galvanometer needle aztached to an eleccrode. Eventually I may come to associate these behavioral manifestations of pain with the word "pain" to the extent that I may hold that "pain" actually names the behavior itself. I have known persons. of course. The problem. joking. especially behavioral grounds. when a person says that he is in pain. a needless duplicacion of the preferred language. Yet this is not necessarily the case. occurs when the needle is deflected but the subject insists that he feels no "pain. a drawn expression. that there is no overt relationship between the two languages. A very intense conceptual and methodological problem is raised when those suffering from the manic drives of reductionism begin attempting to uanslate experiential language into extrasentient terms. the subject is now placed in the position of having to invent a new word altogether to name what he formerly called pain. But. As Bergmam ( 1956) puts it. they take Bridgman at his word and proceed operationally to define "pain. This is made all the more bizarre when one realizes that man knew for centuries that he was periodically in pain. yet who were unable to keep their suffering from the eyes of others. for instance. What . confusing physics with psychology. and carrying on a jovial conversation in which he claims to be in incense pain. Documentary literature and folklore are both filled with stories of persons dying from dread and agonizing diseases." Now the bizarre situation is created in which an experimenter and subject may argue with one another as to whether or not the subject feels pain! And. or at least the only legitimate one. an increased rate of respiration. If a person is laughing. Watson's assertion that there was no such thing as consciousness is philosophically "silly. how do we learn to live with the two-language problem? Certainly we would not want to claim on any grounds. if the experimenter absolutely insists that his definition of pain is the only genuine definition. perspiration of the hands. I have forgotten that the relationship of pain and pain-behavior is a contingent one. I may infer that he is lying or that he misunderstands how the word is commonly used. After all.

In this present piece I want to show how we can reject reductionism and still resolve the two-language problem. Implicit in the whole behavioral/phenomenological affair is that these two positions represent two putatively different ways of talking about the organism. the result of concepnral mistakes and preconceptions which can be avoided altogether. that the conceptual scheme I am about to present is an easy one. 1966). let us proceed as best we can. F~lrthermore.it is not the same thing to talk about an organism and to talk about being an organism. 1911) is at best a joke from the psychological perspective. Place (1956). manic-like activity. the ontological dualism which has come down to us with our culture forces certain conceptual sets on us from which it is difficult to escape. is that of ontology. But the above approaches are not the only possible ones in attempting to bridge the gap between the cognitive and non-cognitive methodological positions.762 G. of course. First of all. Furthermore. 1966). that somehow there is one right way to talk about the organism. Yet parallelism and epiphenomenalism each present their own conceptual and logical problems. Smart (1959). 1963). being an organism and talking about an organism are not the same thing. We. the right way has come to mean the behavioral way. Nevertheless. to the docile quiet of Sherlock Holmes whom we are told would simply draw his knees up under his chin in his chair. many psychologists do make parallelistic assumptions in their work. Occasionalism (McDougall. Parallelism (Hospers. GREAVES kind of behavior is named by "thinking" or "problem solving. The language-game here. and Spinoza (1919). T o put it another way. no methodologist can tolerate interactionistic concepts in his work (Marx & Hillix. being strongly influenced by Feigl (1961. I only want to present the view that I think the whole notion of reductionism is untenable and ill-conceived. behavioral/phenomenological positions have been presented as if they are mutually exclusive positions. I am not going to pretend. and hinges on some very dubious assumptions. de facto. that they represent different kinds of concepts or have different kinds of referents. I shall defend this view elsewhere. . we are living organisms. This is why I am now suggesting that this whole affair is a red herring issue. Obviously. close his eyes and sit motionless for long periods of time. as human beings. I do not want to deal any further with the notion of reductionism here. and largely through an accident of history. 1953) is a relatively harmless concept for the purpose of psychological methodology." The idiosyncratic behavior which may accompany problem solving may vary from hyperactive. including parsimonious considerations. Epiphenomenalism is yet another position which would be methodologically quite tenable to most researchers (Greaves. Now. and. however. And neither is it a wholly original one. are caught up in a sort of dilemma when we try to talk about ourselves. of that which exists.

. D o not hang on the word "1. the language used to talk about the organism called I is no different from the language used to talk about other objects. long. This is an important tautology. Could the organism which calls itself I then talk about what it is like to be the organism called I? Given that it has the power of language. let this organism which refers to itself as "I" talk about itself. it calls itself "I. It has hazel eyes. Can we conclude. in order to be the pen. or uses what in grammar we call reflexive language. of course it could. let us allow that the pen with which I am writing exists. rubs its chin. the organism periodically paces. Or. and then again in experiential terms. being this organism? Well. How do I talk about these items? Well. this item here. however. Now. Being the pen means being identical with the pen. looks into the distance." Let us just suppose that an organism is sitting here writing. The pen is 6 in. and his eyes burn. Nor ate these utterances ncnsensical to any other organism which understands the meaning of these words. also. from the basis of the foregoing that because the organism speaks in two different ways that there are two different things: the organism and something called the organism's experiences? The answer is an unequivocal no. in. this in no way logically implies that two different things are being named. the desk at which I sit exists. It is 5 ft. I n other words. I can say that the pen is red and the paper white. and stained in English oak. Now. What is it like. I can say. No problem. Because t t e organism talks first about itself in extrasentient terms. The language mode is extrasentient. It weighs 195 lb. What is all this stuff! Ach! "Excited?" "Tired?" "Eyes burn?" "Crick in the neck?" What kind of nonsense language is this? This is no nonsense at all to the organism which uttered these statements. But he is tired. the paper is 8% X 11 in. or that item there. The organism which calls itself I is writing a paper. tall.BEHAVIORISM VERSUS PHENOMENOLOGY 763 of reality." or a "he. now let the organism called I talk about what it is like to be the pen with which he is writing. also. if you prefer. at this moment this organism is rather excited about what he has to say. let it describe itself behaviorally. the organism called I would have to be the pen. such that when that organism refers to itself." or an "it. Let us not quibble. He has a crick in his neck. then. The desk is made of birch.. or designates itself." which are other existent things. the desk is 3 X 6 ft. Wait a minute. There is not one being called the or- llx ." This is not to name some hidden creature inside the organism. Without any sort of philosophical defense. And let us allow that each of these items is distinct from the other. but to distinguish itself verbally from a "you. Prima facie the organism is not the pen. Now let us hold thae I exist. Thus. the paper on which I am writing exists. All right.

a heart. Why. but they do not talk about the organism in the same way. My reply is that both of the assertions are true. The organism is not mentally frail. however.. their fears. of describing our being. This also applies to the organism called I. if the organism is referring to one thing. bloodstream. and what it is like to be an organism are different tasks for which we employ different language. does it need two languages? It is not a question of need in any motivational sense. On the other hand. if we perceive our task to be the regarding of the organism referred to as "I" as subject. W e have no particular difficulty in regarding ourselves as an object in the world of objects nor of speaking of ourselves in appropriate extrasentient terms. co mention only a few choice omissions in the pen. lungs. It is curious that the concept of a Paramecium within a Paramecium. the organism. theologically speaking. has not caught on like the little invisible man within the man.764 G. Animals are automata. But just because I do have the necessary equipment does not make me any less unified than the pen. viz. a Paramecium. from the pen it is holding. their aspirations. let alone talk about such. or a toad within a toad.e. within which we find ourselves. whether this organism is referring to itself in experiential or extrasentient language. and a brain.. GREAVES ganism and another being called experiences-yet this is exactly what traditional dualism has been conning us to believe. The confusion these two modes of discourse have caused is boundless! All right. It is unfortunate chat gorillas and pigs do not discourse in language we can understand. we choose extrasentient language. This organism is a being (thing) in the same way a pen is a being (thing). we select experiential language. their feelings. Wait another minute. a toad. then. we should have to talk about gorillas within gorillas and pigs within pigs using our logic. Did we not just state above that when we talk about the organism we use extrasentient discourse? Now you are saying that experiential language also talks about the organism. If we perceive our task to be that of describing the "out there. what exactly are we talking about when we use experiential discourse? My assertion is that the referent of experiential language is the organism. but of need in a logical sense. This organism is quite different. What ultimately determines whether we utter experiential or extrasentient language is the structure of the situation. Nevertheless. the question follows. It simply does not have the necessary equipment for experiencing and talking about it. i." the object world. man has a soul. then. T o put it another way: describing what an organism is like. It does not suffer from a . it is still referring to this organism. When they began to tell us about their aches and pains. The pen cannot tell us about its being because it is not the right kind of thing to be aware of its being. And. or a walrus. This organism has limbs. or the frame of reference. it is curious chat when one reaches the phyletic level of man a soul suddenly appears.

and vice versa. T o attempt the identity-reduction commits a semantical error. it is a factual link. however. while at the same time having a common link. or orientations. we can infer the other. Suppose that I am imagining the proverbial patch of green and a neurologist who is probing my brain says that he has isolated a characteristic pattern of neural activity when I do this. Hence. it is logically impossible for me to construct a legitimate statement of the sort: "The patch of green i s the change in the electrical potential in the brain of the organism called I. for as in all factual schemas. for I am first regarding myself a s the experiencer of the patch of green and then as the object whose brain is doing so and so." There is. But this is hardly a handicap. our factual relationship allows us to infer certain neurological processes are present and vice versa. as one must do if he is to avoid a tautologous statement. viz. The inadequacies of this view are immediately evident. that this link does not permit of linguistic reductionism. at once. Am I not now in both frames of reference at once? No.BEHAVIORISM VERSUS PHENOMENOLOGY 763 lack of wit. and we do not intend to convey the same things by them. the legitimate statement of the form: "When a certain pattern of brain activity is present in the brain of chis organism. given that the subject reports a patch of green. Instead of holding that "ideas" and "brain processes" are identical concepts. some aspect of the organism. however. for the link between the two languages is not a linguistic link. given one element of the factual relationship. It simply is incapable of being simultaneously in a subjective and objective orientation or frame of reference. There is a slightly different approach which both preserves the integriry of the modes of discourse and allows us to be monistic. as surely no one would seriously attempt to do. W e do not arrive at extrasentient and experiential concepts in the same way. N o matter how quickly I alternate from one orientation to another. one can maintain the logical independence of the words.. Suppose he arranges mirrors so I can see what is going on in my head end on the oscilloscopes to which I am attached such that I can also witness the characteristic neural patterns which occur when I imagine a patch of green." My objection to identity-statements of the "an image is a brain process" sort is that they fail to preserve the orientation or frame of reference distinction which is at the root of experiential and extrasentient discourse. Attempts to "reduce" data about consciousness to behavior lead to ridiculous assertions about an individual's inferring certain data of consciousness from his behavior. It should be evident. one can argue that the word "idea" and the word "brain processes" name the same actual process in the brain. and again represent . this same organism experiences a patch of green. It should be made clear at the onset exactly who is doing the inferring. On this view a person infers that he is in pain by referencing his behavior. Consequently. I am never in both frames of reference. In ocher words.

GREAVES the confusion which inevitably results from equating or identifying behavioral and phenomenal concepts. to design an experiment which could ever validate any sort of identityhypothesis. and many others. the study of so-called psychophysical co-ordinates of behavior has become an area of considerable importance. Conversely. because we can compare con- . however. Especially during and after World Wars I and 11. This does not permit us to claim. rather. Suppose I find a perfect correlation between the presence of knives and forks at every place setting in a large banquet hall. the organism itself is the referent for each kind of discourse. The concepts of experiential discourse and talk about conscio~~sness that of extrasentient discourse are quite logically independent and in no way imply one another except as a contingency. for our discourse will not permit of such constructions (herein I differ sharply from Place and Smart). Malcolm (1964). it is routinely pointed out that it would be impossible. or orientations. There is no need to duplicate their efforts. In other words. The first link-up of the two conceptual sets occurred through the process of correlation. this is quite another matter. W e can equate things only if we can show that they are conceptually or operationally equivalent or if we can locate them at the same place at the same time. largely through brain-damage studies. From this I cannot assert that a knife is a fork. that images and neurological events have a common reference in terms of the organism. certain types of brain lesions were seen to be accompanied by certain changes in experiential reports as well as in behavior. to review some of the conceptual problems implicit in this frame of reference scheme as I have presented it here. culminating in the work of such important researchers as Luria (1966). As was pointed out before. that an image. however. The problems involved in acquiring such knowledge have been extensively explored by such writers as Ayer (1964). The claim is. is the same thing as a neurological event. The intention of the subject when using experiential discourse is not to refer to some neurological event or other. O n the other hand. Furthermore. the organism as subject and the organism as object. if we wish to argue that an "outside" observer somehow makes certain inferences about a subject's phenomenal experiences on the basis of the subject's behavior. viz.. for instance. The theoretical stand being taken is that certain neurological events referred to in extrasentient language are the same events referred to in certain experiential language.766 G. the intention of the neurophysiologist is not to or images. and differ in their conceptual character as a function of their being grounded in two different and mutually exclusive frames of reference. however. experiential discourse existed for centuries before anything was known about brains or nerves or synapses. In the past forty years. I can say that an e q w s is a horse. even one-to-one correlation to any form of identity-hypothesis. It is often pointed out. that one cannot argue from a large correlation. in principle. Let us look again at our claim. It is important to our discussion.

The strongest empirical hypothesis I can ever validate concerning the relation of images and neural events. The conditions of our existence and the repertoire of our possible experiences impose certain limits on our ability to reason about the world. Or. not an hypothesis. is that when one is temporally present. Still another problem arises out of the peculiar conceptual status of the term organism in my approach to the problem of the two modes of discourse. the other is also. extrasentient discourse. On the other hand. and more. The two terms ate conce~tuallyfar different and. the organism is simultaneously a subjective and objective being or thing. since I cannot apply spatial predicates to experiential language. aware of these difficulties. regardless how much it is complicated. The empirical objections in terms of the invalidatability of identity or double-aspect hypotheses do not bother me. however. I n this respect I am very much a Kantian. be verified or falsified. Even the coveted principle of parsimony. and vice versa. The ultimate justification of a theory is to be found solely in pragmatic considerations. a language neither experiential or extrasentient. yet a language to which each is reducible. They are good or bad. W e ate. after all. however. however. Later we shall explore some of the predictions of the present theory and see that they can. productive or unproductive. Ex hypothesi. I can never p i n t to a common referent in space.BEHAKORISM VERSUS PHENOMENOLOGY 767 cepts and find them to be the same. the theory I have described is a double-aspect theory in which organism becomes a primitive. The pendulum has swung smugly from materialisni to idealism a . experiential language describes only t h subjective ~ stams or orientation in regard to the organism. Norhing has so much occupied the history of the problem of knowledge as the dichotomy between subject and object. is justified only on pragmatic grounds.. in principle. The organism. of course. I n the case of images and neural events. but I am not sure exactly how important they are. I am.. for it refers to only one aspect of the organism. constitute a parallelism and not a monism. This would. so often used as a conceptual ax. The concepmal problems are another matter and I should best deal with them in this way. working with a theory here.. Eliteness has no intrinsic value. I have no such ability. its objective status or orientation. i. Theories ate not capable of being true or false. is viewed as lying in both frames of reference at once. viz. fails to completely describe the organism. i. The closest we could ever come to describing an organism would be through the conjoining of all possible correlatable experiential and extrasentient statements. Yet it is logically inconceivable that any language could be devised which could describe the organism qua organism. undefinable concept.e.e. To put it another way. we can point to an object in a field somewhere and find that we give it a different name. A theory is said to be validatable if it predicts previously unobserved events and explains and organizes already existent data. although the names have an identical referent.

The problem. I am not claiming that organism is a mystical term. however. for only humans seem to use language to any appreciable extent. The one possible exception to this claim is that experience referred to as the "mystical state" in which the predominant description is a "feeling of oneness. for the I-thou/I-it distinction does nor seem to be prevalent in newborn children and is developed only through perceptual experience. Obviously. My claim is simply that when we attempt to dissolve the subject-object dichotomy. this has never been a problem in our discussion. though I am sure some reader might have some fun with this notion. is that the condition of our existence imposes the subject-object dichotomy on us inescapably. 1902). the sharpness of the I-thou distinction seems to be largely dissolved through training in Zen. 1902). or plain old mystical states. The entity is a logical construct made necessary by the demands of the language-games we play. through religious experiences. one is immediately moved to ask what the entity is like. Just because the dictates of our language which reflect the conditions of our existence compel us to deal with the problem in this way. or whether the dissolution takes the form of a common.768 G. I am an organism." or a "feeling of unity with the All" (James. You are an organism. Even so. Furthermore. autohypnosis. There is nothing to bemoan in this state of affairs. The One or the All in mystical language thus takes on the same quality of the primitive and undefinable as our concept organism. GREAVES number of times and in a number of guises. Given that the terms ideas and neural events are not reducible to one another but refer to a common entity. I certainly do not make light of such claims. The person involved in the mystical experience is generally quite cognizant of his linguistic limitations and knowingly resorts to the use of metaphors. this does not mean that organisms do not exist. we are more likely to regard such language as metaphorical or projective. The reason I cannot devise a reductionistic language in which to describe myself is that the conditions of my existence prohibit any possibility of entering into an experiential world in which I am neither subject nor object or into an extrasentient world in which I am one with all objects. Our problem is not whether organisms exist. we dissolve our language as well. But there are no words. is that we cannot talk about the organism . if it be a problem at all. and from which we cannot escape. and when a person under the influence of LSD claims to be One with the flower petals at which he is gazing or claims to be the flower itself. This is just as true whether the dissolution takes the form of reductionism to materialistic or phenomenalistic terms. W e are simultaneously an object in a world of objects and an experiencing being. What I am suggesting. through the effects of such drugs as LSD. I exist. you exist. Universally the claim is found that the "pure" mystical experience is ineffable (James. Only humans seem to have this problem. underlying monism. and scores of attempts have been made to reduce subject-object language either to one another or to a common language. written or oral discourse while in these various states still maintains its dualistic flavor.

experiments which might take this important hypothesis to task. Furthermore. Suppose we take two subjects. and c. When the juncture is made we can conceptually no longer speak of "the right optical cortex of A or "the left optical cortex of B. certain phenomenal states can be inferred and vice versa. in fact. Suppose now that B closes his eyes and we show a red card to A. speaks. based on prior correlational data. writes music. The conceptual basis for hypothesis e may be understood in terms of a thought-experiment which I will refer to as the "Siamese brain" experiment. etc. W e can predicate literally thousands of things about organisms. ( e ) Phenomenological experiences are not. and to argue that since one report came from A's . Given these conditions there would be no logical basis on which to assert that A had an experience and B had an experience. W e can talk about characteristics of the organism all night: it chinks. ( c ) Phenomenological experiences and specifiable neural activities are always exactly cotempraneous occurrences. making two experiences in all. for its refutation would strike a telling blow to our theory. This is also true of hypotheses a. Admittedly. swims. A and B. sleeps. and attach the left optical cortex of A to the right optical cortex of B. One might describe them as "old hat. W e show A a blue card. as well as being at odds with our common-sense view of personal identity. etc. feels. Then we turn the situation around and show the cards to B and ask for A's report. If the science-fiction and grand guignol aspects of psychic research could be thrown away. hypochesis e is thoroughly at odds with our folklore. runs. and B reports blue." but only of the "common cortex" of A and B. hypotheses a. eats. both in and out of psychology. In other words. moves. To do so would be to confuse the perceptual report with the perceptual event. from a common neurological event we cannot argue that two different perceptual events occurred. Buc we cannot predicate organismic essences of organisms. The verification of such elusive "phenomena" as astral projection or clairvoyance would be significant in the rejection of this hypothesis. some meaningful experiments might be performed in this area.BEHAVIORISM VERSUS PHENOMENOLOGY 769 qua organism because of the impossibility of devising such a language. 6. and c are neither particularly exciting or revealing. listens to music. Hypothesis e is as crucial to the support of the theory as hypothesis d. What empirical hypotheses follow from our theory? Let us list just a few: ( a ) Given certain brain states of an organism. would predict precisely the opposite. jumps. Hypothesis e is especially interescing since no form of Cartesian dualism would predict it. though they would be somewhat harder to refute based on technological limitations. ( d ) Phenomenological activity could nor take place apart from the locus of the organism. Then -suppose we ask B what he is experiencing and he tells us he experiences something red." Yet hypothesis d is of crucial importance. in principle. ( b ) The repetition of a given neural patcern would be cotemporaneous with the repetition of a given phenomenological pattern. private experiences. 6.

1911. represents a great oversimplification. Mind-body.770 G. it will not be far off before some experimental tests of hypothesis e will be realized. IS consciousnes~a brain process? British Journal of Psychology. 365-376. . 1966. J. T. All this. 48. London: Bell. Green. Hook (Ed. Psychological Review. 1972. 1964. G.W . 1956. W I ~ G E N S T EL. of the issues. There were only two reports. 1961. 63. New York: Wiley. G. New York: Barnes & Noble.). 141156. of Georgia. Dimensions of mind. of course. Accepted February 28. I N . & HILLIX. 1964. Yet with our vastly accelerating knowledge of neurophysiology and ne~~rophysiological techniques. monism. insofar as I become neurologically hooked u p with you. 346-364. Mind. and mecapsychology.M. 1953. Pp. T h e concept of mind. Gustafson (Ed.). LURIA. Insofar as I become merged with your system. the most important aspect. In laying a firm theoretical foundation which removes the dualistic stigma from our heritage without doing injustice to our language. New York: McGraw-Hill. There are yet other conceptual problems which have led to the behavioral/ phenomenological split. PLACE. FEIGL. PD. The contribution of John B. In D. as it were.W. New York: Prentice-Hall. 1963. The brain. 1919.A. Watson. It is designed to test and explore concepts. W. New York: Collier. we still have not resolved all of the main problems associated with behavioral/phenomenological issues. HOSPERS. 44-50. In S. BERGMANN. 1949. New York: Anchor. MANDLER. Essays in philosophical psychology. 265-276. after all. Univer. 1953. 1956. MARX. REFERENCES AYER. Essays in philosophical psychology. to that extent would we have common experiences. W.U. Systems and theories in psychology.. SMART. not a pseudo problem. 1959. 47.. An introduction to philosophical analysis. New York: Longmans.B. The point I am making.A. therefore. Unpublished Master's thesis. RYLE. 1959. London: Methuen. Knowledge of other minds. C. J.H.G . there were two events. Philosophical Review. Higher cortical functions i n man. MALCOLM. Gustafson (Ed. 1902. Body and mind. One's knowledge of other minds. 1966. New York: Anchor.J.). Sensations and brain processes. W e have treated only one aspect. is that the reason I do not experience what you experience simply by looking at your brain activity is that I am not a part of your system. T h e Iangaage of psychology. is easily viewed as a system of closed circuits. GREAVES. JAMES. A thought-experiment is not in any way designed to be a laboratory experiment or to substitute for it. 33-44. In D. Ethics. MCDOUGALL.N. New York: Basic Books.Philosophical investigations. T h e varieties of religious experience: a study in human nature. or rather as a closed electrical system. SPINOZA. J. New York: Macmillan. & KESSEN. To some of these we will later turn our attention. G. Pp. GREAVES mouth and another from B's. of course.