The two most frequently made objections to skepticism target these theses.

The f
irst is that the skeptic's commitment to our epistemic limitations is inconsiste
nt. He cannot consistently claim to know, for example, that knowledge is not pos
sible; neither can he consistently claim that we should suspend judgment regardi
ng all matters insofar as this claim is itself a judgment. The second sort of ob
jection is that the alleged epistemic limitations and/or the suggestion that we
should suspend judgment would make life unlivable. For, the business of day-to-d
ay life requires that we make choices and this requires making judgments. Simila
rly, one might point out that our apparent success in interacting with the world
and each other entails that we must know some things. Some responses by ancient
skeptics to these objections are considered in the following discussion.
This is the crux on which the decision between the two main lines of interpretat
ion of Pyrrho's philosophy turns. The remainder of the Aristocles passage, and i
ndeed the remainder of the evidence on Pyrrho in general, can be read so as to f
it with either the metaphysical or the epistemological reading of his answer to
the question about the nature of things. The Aristocles passage continues with t
he answer to the second question, namely the question of the attitude we should
adopt given the answer to the first question. We are told, first, that we should
not trust our sensations and opinions, but should adopt an unopinionated attitu
de. On the epistemological reading, the significance of this is obvious. But on
the metaphysical reading, too, we have already been told that our sensations and
opinions are not true, which is presumably reason enough for us not to trust th
em; and the unopinionated attitude that is here recommended may be understood as
one in which one refrains from positing any definite characteristics as inheren
t in the nature of things given that their real nature is wholly indefinite. (To t
he objection that this thesis of indefiniteness is itself an opinion, it may be
replied that doxa, opinion , is regularly used in earlier Greek philosophy, especia
lly in Parmenides and Plato, to refer to those opinions misguided opinions, in the
view of these authors that take on trust a view of the world as conforming more o
r less to the way it appears in ordinary experience. In this usage, the claim th
at reality is indefinite would not be a (mere) opinion, but would be a statement
of the truth.)
The passage now introduces a certain form of speech that is supposed to reflect
this unopinionated attitude. We are supposed to say about each single thing that
it no more is than is not or both is and is not or neither is nor is not . There a
re a number of intricate questions about the exact relations between the various
parts of this complicated utterance, and especially about the role and signific
ance of the both and neither components. But it is clear that this too is susceptibl
e of being read along the lines of either of the two interpretations introduced
above. On the metaphysical interpretation, we are being asked to adopt a form of
words that reflects the utter indefiniteness of the way things are; we should n
ot say of anything that it is any particular way any more than that it is not th
at way (with is being understood, as commonly in Greek philosophy, as shorthand fo
r is F , where F stands for any arbitrary predicate). On the epistemological interp
retation, we are being asked to use a manner of speaking that expresses our susp
ension of judgement about how things are.
Finally, in answer to the third question, we are told that the result for those
who adopt the unopinionated attitude just recommended is first aphasia and then
ataraxia. Ataraxia, freedom from worry , is familiar to us from later Pyrrhonism; t
his is said by the later Pyrrhonists to be the result of the suspension of judge
ment that they claimed to be able to induce. The precise sense of aphasia is les
s clear. Beckwith (2011) actually argues that the transmitted text is erroneous,
and that we should instead read apatheia, "lack of passion". This is an attract
ive suggestion; apatheia is indeed a term used not infrequently of Pyrrho's untr
oubled attitude (see section 5), whereas a reference to aphasia would be unparal
leled in the other evidence on Pyrrho. However, the proposal is inevitably specu
lative, and aphasia is a term in use in later Pyrrhonism; it seems worth trying

to elucidate it on the assumption that the transmitted text is correct. It might

mean non-assertion , as in Sextus that is, a refusal to commit oneself to definite a
lternatives; or it might mean, more literally, speechlessness , which could in turn
be taken to be an initial reaction of stunned silence to the radical position w
ith which one has been presented (an uncomfortable reaction that is subsequently
replaced by ataraxia the passage does say that aphasia comes first and ataraxia c
omes later). But the decision between these two ways of understanding the term i
s independent of the broader interpretive issues bearing upon the passage as a w
hole. For some form of non-assertion is clearly licensed by either the metaphysica
l or the epistemological interpretation; and on either interpretation, the view
proposed might indeed render someone (initially) uncomfortable to the point of sp
eechlessness . The important point, though, is that ataraxia is the end result; an
d this links back to the introductory remark to the effect that the train of tho
ught to be summarized has the effect of making one happy.
We have, then, two major possibilities. On the one hand, Pyrrho can be read as a
dvancing a sweeping metaphysical thesis, that things are in their real nature in
definite or indeterminate, and encouraging us to embrace the consequences of tha
t thesis by refusing to attribute any definite features to things (at least, as
belonging to their real nature) and by refusing to accept at face value (again,
as revelatory of the real nature of things) those myriad aspects of our ordinary
experience that represent things as having certain definite features. Or, on th
e other hand, Pyrrho can be read as declaring that the nature of things is inacc
essible to us, and encouraging us to withdraw our trust (and to speak in such a
way as to express our withdrawal of trust) in ordinary experience as a guide to
the nature of things. As noted earlier, the second, epistemological interpretati
on makes Pyrrho's outlook a great deal closer to that of the later Pyrrhonists w
ho took him as an inspiration. But that is not in itself any reason for favoring
this interpretation over the other, metaphysical one. For on either interpretat
ion Pyrrho is said to promise ataraxia, the later Pyrrhonists' goal, and to prom
ise it as a result of a certain kind of withdrawal of trust in the veracity of o
ur everyday impressions of things; the connection between these two points align
s Pyrrho with the later Pyrrhonists, and sets him apart from every other Greek p
hilosophical movement that preceded later Pyrrhonism. The fact that this later s
ceptical tradition took Pyrrho as an inspiration is therefore readily understand
able whichever of the two interpretations is correct (or whichever they thought
was correct). It is also true that, on the metaphysical interpretation of the pa
ssage, the grounds on which Pyrrho advanced his metaphysical thesis of indetermi
nacy are never specified; this too, like the precise character of the thesis its
elf, must be a matter for speculative reconstruction. But Aristocles only purpor
ts to be giving the key points of Timon's summary; the lack of detail, though di
sappointing, would not be surprising.