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PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME SYCIP, SALAZAR,

FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO.

who can join an old firm, can initially ride on that old firms reputation established by
deceased partners.

PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME SYCIP, SALAZAR,
FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO.
The court also made the difference from the law firms and business corporations:
July 30, 1979
Facts:
Petitions were filed by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip, who died on May 5,
1975 and by the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who died on February 14, 1976,
praying that they be allowed to continue using, in the names of their firms, the names of
partners who had passed away.
Petitioners contend that the continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner
when permissible by local custom, is not unethical but care should be taken that no
imposition or deception is practiced through this use. They also contend that no local custom
prohibits the continued use of a deceased partners name in a professional firms name; there
is no custom or usage in the Philippines, or at least in the Greater Manila Area, which
recognizes that the name of a law firm necessarily identifies the individual members of the
firm.

A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a mere relationship or
association for a particular purpose. It is not a partnership formed for the purpose of
carrying on trade or business or of holding property. 11 Thus, it has been stated that the
use of a nom de plume, assumed or trade name in law practice is improper.

We find such proof of the existence of a local custom, and of the elements requisite to
constitute the same, wanting herein. Merely because something is done as a matter of
practice does not mean that Courts can rely on the same for purposes of adjudication as a
juridical custom.

Petition suffers legal and ethical impediment.

Issue:
WON the surviving partners may be allowed by the court to retain the name of the partners
who already passed away in the name of the firm? NO
Held:
In the case of Register of Deeds of Manila vs. China Banking Corporation, the SC said:The
Court believes that, in view of the personal and confidential nature of the relations between
attorney and client, and the high standards demanded in the canons of professional ethics, no
practice should be allowed which even in a remote degree could give rise to the possibility of
deception. Said attorneys are accordingly advised to drop the names of the deceased partners
from their firm name.

The public relations value of the use of an old firm name can tend to create undue
advantages and disadvantages in the practice of the profession. An able lawyer without
connections will have to make a name for himself starting from scratch. Another able lawyer,

DACANAY VS BAKER & MCKENZIE


In November 1979, Atty. Vicente Torres sent a letter to one Rosie Clurman, represented by
Atty. Adriano Dacanay, asking Clurman to release some shares to Torres client. The
letterhead contained the name Baker & McKenzie. Dacanay denied Clurmans liability and
at the same time he asked why is Torres using the letterhead Baker & McKenzie, a foreign
partnership established in Chicago, Illinois. No reply was received so Dacanay filed an
administrative complaint enjoining Torres from using Baker & McKenzie.
Later, Torres said that he is an associate of the law firm Guerrero & Torres; that their law firm
is a member of Baker & McKenzie; that the said foreign firm has members in 30 cities all over
the world; that they associated with them in order to make a representation that they can
render legal services of the highest quality to multinational business enterprises and others
engaged in foreign trade and investment.
ISSUE: Whether or not the use of a foreign law office name is allowed.

HELD: No. Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the Philippines.
Such use of foreign law firm name is unethical therefore Torres and his law firm are enjoined
from using Baker & McKenzie in their practice of law.

B.R. ENTERPRISES VS CA

Ouano v aleanor Facts

FACTS:

Private respondent International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (IPI) filed a complaint before the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City against Mercantile Insurance Company, Inc. (Mercantile) and

Eulogio B. Reyes, now deceased, filed an action for damages against the Director of Public
Works and BR Sebastian Enterprises. Trial court found B.R. Sebastian liable for damages but
absolved other defendants. B.R. Sebastian, thru its counsel, the law firm of Baizas, Alberto
and Associates, timely appealed the adverse decision to the respondent Court of Appeals.
During the pendency of the appeal, Eulogio B. Reyes died and was substituted by his heirs. On
February 1974, B.R Sebastian, thru its counsel of record, received notice to file Appellants
Brief within 45 days from receipt thereof; however, it failed to comply. Court of Appeals
issued a Resolution requiring said counsel to show cause why the appeal should not be
dismissed for failure to file the Appellants Brief within the reglementary period. On
September 1974, Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal. On September 1974, petitioner, this
time thru the BAIZAS LAW OFFICE, filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution
dismissing its appeal alleging that as a result of the death of Atty. Crispin Baizas, senior
partner in the law firm. Atty. Rodolfo Espiritu, the lawyer who handled this case in the trial
court and who is believed to have also attended to the preparation of the Appellants Brief
but failed to submit it through oversight and inadvertence, had also left the firm. Court
denied the motion for reconsideration. No action was taken by petitioner from within the
period to file a petition for review, the same became final and executory, and the records of
the case were remanded. Trial court issued a writ of execution. But on November 1975,
petitioner filed with Court of Appeals a Motion to Reinstate Appeal with Prayer for Issuance
of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction but was subsequently denied. Petitioner filed prohibition
and mandamus, with prayer for preliminary injunction with the Supreme Court to Court of
Appeals denial of petitioners motion. SC required them to comment and soon after, some
amendments were made. Ultimately, the petition was denied. But on May 1976, petitioner
filed a motion for its reconsideration claiming that since it was deprived of the right to appeal
without fault on its part, the petition should be given due course. Supreme Court
reconsidered and required both parties to submit simultaneously their respective
Memoranda.

by IPI $hich $ere insured by Mercantile but $ere lost on arrival in Cebu City, allegendy
$er $as filed by the la$ firm of
&edesma, "aludo and !ssociates (&"!) and signed by !tty. Manuel Trinidad of the Cebu office
postpone the hearing stating that the case had *ust been endorsed to him by petitioner

damaged e#

public respondent granted, the petitioner%s cousel, through !tty. Catipay of the Cebu 1ranch

motion for reconsideration of the order granting the $rit of e0ecution alleging that the failure
to file an appeal $as due to e0cusable neglect and slight 2oversight3 claiming that there $as
miscommunication bet$een &"!4Cebu and &"! main office as to $ho $ould file the notice of
appeal. The respondent *udg
appeal on the grounds that there had been a valid service of the decision and that it $as final
and e0
Issue
/hether or not &"! having represented itself to the public as a single firm, be allo$ed to
contend that its main office and its branch office in effect constitute separate la$ firms $ith
separate and distinct personalities and responsibilities.

TOPIC: Legal Ethics, Negligence

ISSUE:
Held
Petitioner%s counsel $as and is the firm of &edesma, "aludo and !ssociates (and not any
particular member or associate of that firm) $hich firm happens to have a main office in
anch office in Cebu City. The Court notes that both the main and branch
offices operate under one and the same name, "aludo &edesma and !ssociates. 'aving
represented itself to the public as comprising a

Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in denying
petitioners motion to reinstate its appeal, previously dismissed for failure to file the
Appellants Brief

HELD:

Board of the municipality of Ilagan, Isabela. He also stated that he would be willing to render
his legal services to the people who have not contracted any other lawyers services.
Issue: Whether or not the suspension of Luis B. Tagorda is meritorious.

No. The Supreme Court held that no fraud is involved in the present case. What was present
was simple negligence on the part of petitioners counsel, which is neither excusable nor
unavoidable. Petitioner thus failed to demonstrate sufficient cause to warrant a favorable
action on its plea. Granting that the power or discretion to reinstate an appeal that had been
dismissed is included in or implied from the power or discretion to dismiss an appeal, still
such power or discretion must be exercised upon a showing of good and sufficient cause, in
like manner as the power or discretion vested in the appellate court to allow extensions of
time for the filing of briefs. There must be such a showing which would call for, prompt and
justify its exercise. Otherwise, it cannot and must not be upheld. The confusion in the office
of the law firm following the death of Atty. Crispin Baizas is not a valid justification for its
failure to file the Brief. With Baizas death, the responsibility of Atty. Alberto and his
Associates to the petitioner as counsel remained until withdrawal by the former of their
appearance in the manner provided by the Rules of Court. The law firm should have reassigned the case to another associate or, it could have withdrawn as counsel in the manner
provided by the Rules of Court so that the petitioner could contract the services of a new
lawyer. The rule is settled that negligence of counsel binds the client. Moreover, petitioner
itself was guilty of negligence when it failed to make inquiries from counsel regarding its case.

Held: Respondent Luis B. Tagorda was suspended from the practice as an attorney-at-law for
the period of one month. The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for
disbarment or suspension. (Canon 27 & 28, Code of Ethics) By Junelli Moreno
Atty. Ismael G. Khan Jr. vs. Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo
Facts:
Simbillo advertised himself as an Annulment of Marriage Specialist. These advertisements
appearedin the July 5, 2000 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, and further research
showed that similaradvertisements were published in the Manila Bulletin in August 2 and 6,
2000 and in the Philippine Star inAugust 5, 2000.In September 1, 2000, Simbillo was charged
for improper advertising and solicitation of legal services, filed byAssistant Court
Administrator and Chief of Public Information Office, Atty. Ismael G, Khan.Simbillos
advertisement undermined the stability and sanctity of marriage, and violated rules 2.03 and
3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and Rule 138, Sec. 27 of the Rules of
Court.Simbillo professed repentance and beg for the Courts indulgence, this rings hollow as
he again advertised hisservices in an issue of Buy and Sell Free Ads Newspaper in August 14,
2001, and again in October 5, 2001.

Petition DISMISSED.
Issue:
53 Phil 37 In re LUIS B. TAGORDA March 23, 1929
Nature of the case: The case is a suspension from the practice of law.
Facts:The respondent, Luis B. Tagorda, a practising attorney and a member of the provincial
board of Isabela, that he made use of a card written in Spanish and Ilocano, which, in
translation, reads as follows: LUIS B. TAGORDA
Attorney

WON Atty. Rizalino Simbillo is guilty of violating Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of
ProfessionalResponsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of theRules of Court
Rulings:
Rizalino Simbillo was found to have violated Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of
ProfessionalResponsibilty, and Rule 138, section 27 of the Rules of Court, and therefore,
suspended from the practice of Law for One year. Repetition of the same or similar offense
will be dealt with more severely

Notary Public
CANDIDATE FOR THIRD MEMBER
Province of Isabela. Respondent also admitted having written a letter in Ilocano addressed to
a lieutenant in his home municipality (Echague, Isabela) in which he stated his continued
exercise of his profession as a lawer and a notary public, besides being a Member of the

Held: Petitioner was suspended from the practice of law for one year and was sternly warned
that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely Ratio: The
practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money is
the primary considerationReasoning:-Rule 2.03 - A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done
any act designed primarily to solicit legal business- Rule 3.01 - A lawyer shall not use or permit

the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair
statement orclaim regarding his qualifications or legal services.- Rule 138, Sec 27 of the Rules
of Court states: Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court,
groundstherefore. A member of the bar may bedisbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grosslyimmoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moralturpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
theadmission to practice, or for a willfuldisobedience appearing as attorney for a party
without authority to do so.- The following elements distinguish legal profession from
business:1. A duty of public service2. A relation as an officer of the court to the
administration of justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability 3. A relation to
clients in the highest degree of fiduciary 4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by
candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current business methods of
advertisingandencroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients.Respondent advertised himself as an Annulment Specialist, and by this he undermined the
stability and sanctity of marriage encouraging peoplewhomight have otherwise been
disinclined and would have refrained form dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so.Solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed, however, for solicitation to be
proper, it must be compatible withthe dignity of thelegalprofession

[A. C. No. 5485. March 16, 2005]


ELMER CANOY, complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSE MAX ORTIZ,respondent
.Canoy was among those low-income clients whom Atty. Ortiz deigned to represent. He
claims having preparedthe position paper of Canoy, but before he could submit the same, the
Labor Arbiter had already issued theorder dismissing the case. Atty. Ortiz admits though that
the period within which to file the position paper hadalready lapsed. He attributes this failure
to timely file the position paper to the fact that after his election as Councilor because he was
too busy. Eventually, he withdrew from his other cases and his free legal
services.Complainant filed this complaint but later on withdrew .
Held: SUSPENDED: (1) month, with WARNING that a repetition of the same negligence will be
dealt with moreseverely.Still, the severance of the relation of attorney-client is not effective
until a notice of discharge by the client or a manifestation clearly indicating that purpose is
filed with the court or tribunal, and a copy thereof served uponthe adverse party, and until
then, the lawyer continues to be counsel in the case.Assuming that Atty. Ortiz was justified in
terminating his services, he, however, cannot just do so and leavecomplainant in the cold
unprotected. Indeed, Rule 22.02 requires that a lawyer who withdraws or is dischargedshall,
subject to a lien, immediately turn over all papers and property to which the client is entitled,

and shallcooperate with his successor in the orderly transfer of the matter. Atty. Ortiz claims
that the reason why hetook no further action on the case was that he was informed that
Canoy had acquired the services of anothercounsel. Assuming that were true, there was no
apparent coordination between Atty. Ortiz and this newcounsel.There are no good reasons
that would justify a lawyer virtually abandoning the cause of the client in the midstof
litigation without even informing the client of the fact or cause of desertion. That the lawyer
forsook his legalpractice on account of what might be perceived as a higher calling, election
to public office, does not mitigatethe dereliction of professional duty. Suspension from the
practice is the usual penalty, and there is no reason todeviate from the norm in this case.
LINSANGAN vs. TOLENTINO
Facts:
A complaint for disbarment was filed by Pedro Linsangan against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino
for solicitation of clients and encroachment of professional services. Complaint alleged that
respondent, withthe help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his clients to transfer legal
representation. Respondent promised them financial assistance and expeditious collection on
their claims. To induce them to hire hisservices, he persistently called them and sent them
text messages. To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit of James
Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations
with complainant and utilize respondents services instead, in exchange for aloan of P50,
000.00. Complainant also attached respondents calling card. Respondent, in his
defense,denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulation of the said
calling card.
Issue:
Whether or not Tolentinos actions warrant disbarment.
Held:
Yes. Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides that a lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any
actdesigned primarily to solicit legal business. Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting
cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers. Such
actuation constitutesmalpractice, a ground for disbarment. Rule 2.03 should be read in
connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides that lawyer, shall not for any corrupt
motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceedingor delay any mans cause. This rule
proscribes ambulance chasing (the solicitation of almost any kindof legal business by an
attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain employment) as ameasure to
protect the community from barratry and champerty. In the case at bar, complainant
presentedsubstantial evidence (consisting of the sworn statements of the very same persons

coaxed by Labiano andreferred to respondents office) to prove that respondent indeed


solicited legal business as well as profitedfrom referrals suits. Through Labianos actions,
respondents law practice was benefited. Haplessseamen were enticed to transfer
representation on the strength of Labianos word that respondent could produce a more
favorable result. Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employmentviolating
Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court. Any act of solicitations constitutes malpractice which calls for the exercise of the
Courtsdisciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statues warrants serious sanctions for
initiating contactwith a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining employment. Thus in
this jurisdiction, the Courtadheres to the rule to protect the public from the Machiavellian
machinations of unscrupulous lawyersand to uphold the nobility of the legal profession.Canon
2: A lawyer shall make his legal services available in an efficient and convenient manner
compatible with the independence, integrity and effectiveness of the profession. Rule 2.03: A
lawyer shallnot do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business

Despite demands from Sta. Maria to turn over the money to him or to the sheriff, respondent
failed to comply and contempt proceedings were instituted against Tuason. The matter was
referred to the Office of the Solicitor General who made the findings and recommendation
that: respondent Tuason was not in connivance with his uncle Chincuanco in depriving
petitioner of his lawful share in the liquidation of partnership assets, however, the collection
of P10,000 as attorneys fees after the case was terminated after one brief hearing is
unreasonable. There was also no evidence presented to show that Tuason actually spent
P1,648 for the expenses.

The Sol. Gen. recommended that instead of a more severe penalty which he would otherwise
deserve, respondent be reprimanded for professional indiscretion, with a warning that a
more severe penalty be imposed for the repetition of the same of similar acts.

STA. MARIA VS. TUASON 11 SCRA 562 (Ethics)


January 29, 2010 at 9:24 am

(1)
ISSUE : Whether respondent committed acts that would merit his disbarment.

FACTS:

RULING:
This is a petition for the disbarment of Atty. Eduardo M. Tuason, instituted by Emilio Sta.
Maria.

Sometime in June 1955, Atty. Tuason represented the partnership of Sta. Maria, Guanzon and
Chincuanco in a collection case against Enriqueta de Hidalgo, involving a promissory note of
P50,000.00. Defendant Hidalgo in this case was declared in default and was ordered to pay.
By virtue of a writ of execution, the provincial sheriff of Pampanga was able to obtain the
amount of P22,930.64.

Respondent Tuason got the whole amount from the sheriff and applied it in the following
manner : P10,000 attorneys fees, P1,648 supposed expenses of litigation which he claimed to
have advanced during the prosecution and the balance of P11,282.64 to Fausto Chincuanco,
his uncle.

The fact that the respondent placed his private and personal interest over and above that of
his clients constitutes a breach of the lawyers oath, to say the least. Call it professional
indiscretion or any other name, but the cold fact remains that the act is not conducive to the
health growth of the legal profession. Respondent is hereby admonished that a repetition of
similar acts will merit more drastic action.
Regala vs. Sandiganbayan

PCGG want to build up their case against Eduardo Coujuanco for the anomalies in the COCO
LEVY FUNDS. PCGG wants petitioners divulge that Cojuangco indeed was a client of their firm,
as well as other information regarding Cojuangco.

Issue: Can the PCGG compel petitioners to divulge its clients name?

PEOPLE VS. SANDIGAN BAYAN


Held: NO.

As a matter of public policy, a clients identity should not be shrouded in mystery. The general
is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of his
client.

1) the court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is sought to be
protected is flesh and blood.
2) the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has been established.
The attorney-client privilege does not attach until there is a client.
3) the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship.

Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing party should, as a general rule,
know his adversary. A party suing or sued is entitled to know who his opponent is. He
cannot be obliged to grope in the dark against unknown forces.

Except:
1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the clients
name would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyers advice.
2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is privileged.
3) Where the governments lawyers have no case against an attorneys client unless, by
revealing the clients name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form the
chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the clients name is
privileged.
That client identity is privileged in those instances where a strong probability exists that the
disclosure of the client's identity would implicate the client in the very criminal activity for
which the lawyers legal advice was obtained.

In July 1987, Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) Bienvenido Tan, Jr. issued an
assessment against San Miguel Corporation (SMC) demanding payment of P342 million in
taxes. SMC filed a request for reinvestigation. Tan granted the request and eventually he
reduced the tax liability to P302 million. But in October 1987, without any word from SMC,
Tan referred the case to the Legal Service Division of the BIR. Various BIR officials reviewed
the case and they recommended that SMCs tax liability be reduced to P22 million (a
significant reduction from the original P342 million). The reduction was justified by the BIR
officials on the ground that the tax examiners had made some errors in computing SMCs tax
liability.
So SMC was demanded to pay P22 million but then SMC asked for a compromise of P10
million. Again, the matter was referred to various BIR officials who agreed and recommended
to Tan that he should accept the compromise offer. Tan accepted the P10 million compromise
offer. This resulted to a criminal case against Tan for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. Allegedly, his act of accepting the P10 million compromise offer caused undue
injury to the government and it gave SMC unwarranted benefits due to the significantly
reduced tax liability. The Sandiganbayan originally convicted Tan but it reversed its own
decision upon motion of Tan.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tan should have been convicted of the crime charged.
HELD: No. It was found by the Sandiganbayan that there was an improper computation in the
tax liability of SMC. The error basically imposed tax on top of another tax which if allowed
would be unfair to the taxpayer. It was therefore proper to have the tax be reduced from
P302 million to P22 million.
But is it proper for Tan to accept the P10 million compromise by SMC?
Tan is well within his power to accept the P10 million compromise offer. This is actually
abatement (not compromise as termed by SMC). Tan is actually prudent to accept the P10
million offer so as to avoid a protracted and costly litigation. Abatement is the diminution or
decrease in the amount of tax imposed. It refers to the act of eliminating or nullifying; of
lessening or moderating. To abate is to nullify or reduce in value or amount. The CIR has the
power to abate or cancel the whole or any unpaid portion of a tax liability, inclusive of
increments, if its assessment is excessive or erroneous, or if the administration costs involved
do not justify the collection of the amount due. No mutual concessions need be made,
because an excessive or erroneous tax is not compromised; it is abated or canceled. Only
correct taxes should be paid. Further, Tan cannot be said to have acted in bad faith. He acted
upon concurrence and recommendation of the various BIR officials.

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