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Affinity Cards
Affinity programs target members of groups sharing
common interests. For example, associations of medi-
cal professionals, fans of auto racing, or alumni of the
same university can have the logo of their association,
a picture of their favorite driver, or their school seal
on credit cards. This group loyalty builds a bond to
the card. MBNA is the standout issuer of affinity cards.
April 1, 1996
ABCs of Credit Card ABS
Low-Price Cards 10 years ago and, since then, has achieved notable market
This issuer’s strategy is to attract an interest rate-sensitive penetration. The barriers to entry into this arena are high
borrower with a low “teaser” rate offer, run up the bor- due to significant start-up costs and intense competition.
rower’s balance quickly by offering instant and easy trans- Discover’s card has been extremely successful because of
fers of existing credit card balances from other banks, and the company’s cash rebate for purchases strategy and
keep the cardholder with competitive “go to” rates after the clear, simple pricing structure.
introductory period has ended.
To be successful in the low-price business, an issuer must Retail Cards
have sophisticated risk-based pricing computer models to Many retail stores offer their customers the choice of using
determine the rate it can offer to a particular market a national credit card or the store’s own card. An advan-
segment based on that segment’s risk profile. Advanta, tage to cardholders of using store cards is that available
Capital One, and First USA have grown their portfolios credit on the customers’ other cards is not used up, allowing
dramatically using this strategy. cardholders to “compartmentalize” their debt burden. For
example, a consumer might use a Sears, Roebuck and Co.
Co-Branded Cards card to purchase a new refrigerator and pay it off evenly
Many companies, especially automobile manufacturers, over time without using up a Visa or MasterCard line. The
airlines, and telephone companies, have allied with card- retailer benefits by building customer loyalty and increas-
issuing banks to jointly market cards. The intent is to ing the profitability of its lending operation.
promote the company’s product and increase receivables
for the bank. These co-branded cards reward the card- Other Cards
holder for usage. The rewards may be rebates on new car Travel and entertainment cards, such as American Express
purchases, free airline tickets, or discounts on long dis- and Diners Club, and full-service cards, like Citibank, Chemi-
tance telephone calls. This program also provides an cal, and Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., round out the spec-
incentive for cardholders to pay their bills on time, since trum of card types.
the reward benefits will be revoked if the cardholder
becomes delinquent. Household and General Motors Securitization
Corp. (GM), Citibank, N.A. and American Airlines, and As with credit cards, the use of securitization as a financing
Chemical Bank and Shell Oil Co. are several joint ventures tool has increased in volume and importance. The first
in the co-branded arena. Each program has different deals were done in 1987 to diversify sources of bank
arrangements for expense and revenue sharing. funding. As the banks came under pressure to free up on
balance sheet capital in 1990 and 1991, securitization
Discover Card filled that need. (Bank regulators treat securitization as
Discover is the only significant issuer of general purpose asset sales.) More recently, securitization has been the
credit cards to successfully break into the U.S. market primary funding source for specialized credit card banks.
without relying on Visa or MasterCard associations. Dis- These banks, such as Advanta, Capital One, First USA,
cover developed its own merchant network across the U.S.
and MBNA, benefit from funding at ‘AAA’ rates and low Other efficiencies can be included in a master trust,
capital charges and, in some cases, rely on off balance including sharing of principal and sharing of excess spread
sheet treatment to meet regulatory requirements. Without (see Master Trust Features, page 9).
securitization, some of these banks could not have grown In addition to issuing investor securities, every seller is
as rapidly. As of Dec. 31, 1995, more than $180 billion required to maintain an ownership interest in the trust. This
in credit card securities had been issued. participation performs several critical functions. It acts as a
buffer to absorb seasonal fluctuations in credit card receiv-
Stand-Alone vs. Master Trust ables balance, is allocated all dilutions (balances canceled
A vast majority of card securitizations have been com- due to returned goods) and fraudulently generated receiv-
pleted using two different vehicles — the stand-alone trust ables that have been transferred to the trust, and ensures that
and the master trust. The former is simply a single pool of the seller will maintain the credit quality of the pool since the
receivables sold to a trust and used as collateral for a single seller owns a portion of it. To ensure that the certificateholders’
security, although there may be several classes within that invested amount is always fully invested in credit card receiv-
security. When the issuer intends to issue another security, ables, the size of the seller’s participation must remain at or
it must designate a new pool of card accounts and sell the above a minimum percentage of the trust receivables balance,
receivables in those accounts to a separate trust. This usually 7%. The seller’s participation does not provide credit
structure was used from the first credit card securitization enhancement for the investors.
in 1987 until 1991, when the master trust became the The seller is obligated to add credit card accounts to the
preferred vehicle. trust if the amount of its participation falls below the
The master trust structure allows an issuer to sell multiple required minimum. If the seller cannot provide additional
securities from the same trust, all of which rely on the same accounts, an amortization event will occur (see Amortiza-
pool of receivables as collateral. For example, an issuer tion Triggers, page 5). In most circumstances, the seller
could transfer the receivables from one million accounts must receive rating agency approval before any accounts
(representing $1 billion of receivables) to a trust, then issue can be added. Sellers do not need approval when the
multiple securities in various denominations and sizes. addition is a small percentage of the trust (10%–15%) or
When more financing is needed, the issuer transfers re- when the minimum seller’s participation level has been
ceivables from more accounts to the same trust. It can then breached. Of course, rating agencies will receive notifica-
issue more securities. The receivables are not segregated tion of these events.
in any way to indicate which series of securities they
support. Instead, all the accounts support all the securities. Structures
This structure allows the issuer much more flexibility,
Regardless of whether the trust is a stand-alone or a master
since the cost and effort involved with issuing a new series
trust, the same general structure is used for every deal. The
from a master trust is lower than creating a new trust for
typical setup has three different cash flow periods: revolv-
every issue. In addition, credit evaluation of each series in
ing, controlled amortization (in some cases, controlled
a master trust is easier since the pool of receivables will be
accumulation), and early amortization. Each period per-
larger and not as subject to seasonal or demographic
forms a different function and allocates cash flows differ-
concentrations. For example, if an issuer transferred only
ently. This structure is designed to mimic a traditional bond,
receivables from accounts originated in 1989 into a stand-
in which interest payments are made every month and
alone trust and the next year transferred all the receivables
principal is paid in a single “bullet” payment on the
from 1990 accounts into a different trust, the two would
maturity date.
perform differently based on the underwriting standards
Since the average life of a credit card receivable is a
used, the terms (annual payment rate [APR] and minimum
short five to 10 months, an amortizing structure, like the
monthly payment) offered, and the competing offers avail-
ones used in automobile and mortgage deals, does not
able at that time.
work very well. In this type of structure, the principal and
If a master trust had been used in the same example,
interest collections on the pool of loans are passed directly
both series would depend on the same pool of accounts,
through to investors on a monthly basis. An amortizing
one-half of which were originated in 1989 and one-half
structure for credit card-backed securities would result in a
of which were originated in 1990. Credit differences
short average life and lumpy, unpredictable repayment to
between the two series would be contained in the structure
investors. Use of a revolving structure gives the issuer
of the deal, rather than the receivables. Investors must keep
medium- to long-term financing, and it gives the investor
in mind, however, that the makeup of accounts in a master
a predictable schedule of principal and interest payments.
trust pool may change dramatically over time as new
All collections on the receivables are split into finance
accounts are added and as some existing cardholders
charge income and principal payments. Each of the three
cancel or stop using their accounts.
periods treats finance charge income in the same manner. Early Amortization
Monthly finance charges are used to pay the investor Severe asset deterioration, problems with the seller or
coupon and servicing fees, as well as to cover any receiv- servicer, or certain legal troubles can trigger early amortiza-
ables that have been charged off in the month. Any income tion at any point in the deal, whether it is revolving, amortiz-
remaining after paying these expenses is usually called ing, or accumulating. The box on page 5 shows common
excess spread and is released to the seller. Principal collec- amortization triggers. In such cases, the deal automatically
tions, however, are allocated differently during each of the enters the early amortization period and begins to repay
periods. investors immediately. This feature helps protect investors from
a long exposure to a deteriorating transaction.
Revolving Period
During the revolving period, monthly principal collections Fast Pay Allocation
are used to purchase new receivables generated in the In the event that an early amortization is triggered and not
designated accounts or to purchase a portion of the seller’s cured, the investors will begin to be repaid immediately on
participation if there are no new receivables. If there are
not enough new receivables to reinvest in, an early amor-
tization will be triggered because the seller’s participation
has fallen below the required minimum, or, in some cases,
the excess principal collections will be deposited in an
excess funding account and held until the seller can gen-
erate more credit card receivables. The risk of early amor-
tization gives the seller adequate incentive to maintain the
seller’s participation at a level well above the minimum. The
revolving period continues for a predetermined length of
time, which has ranged from two to 11 years. Investors will
receive only interest payments during this period.
Controlled Amortization/Accumulation
At the end of the revolving period, the controlled amor-
tization or controlled accumulation period begins. In the
case of controlled amortization (see chart above), which
typically runs for 12 months, principal collections are no
longer reinvested but are paid to investors in 12 equal
controlled amortization payments. The payments are sized
at exactly one-twelfth of the invested amount so investors
Gross Portfolio Yield 18 Available excess spread may be shared with other series,
Investor Coupon (7) used to pay fees to credit enhancers, deposited into a
Servicing Expense (2) spread account for the benefit of the enhancers, or released
Chargeoffs (5) to the seller.
Excess Spread 4 If the deal is performing as expected, the cash flow from
the pool of credit cards will be sufficient to make all
principal and interest payments to investors and to pay all in cash needed to pay interest, principal, or servicing.
expenses, with plenty of excess remaining. In the example Usage as a form of enhancement was discontinued when
on page 5, the 4% excess spread would have to be depleted a number of banks providing LOCs were downgraded and
(i.e. decrease in yield, increase in coupon, and/or increase the transactions they enhanced were downgraded as a
in chargeoffs) before there would be a cash shortfall. If, result. The CCA was developed to remove downgrade risk
however, excess falls below zero, other credit enhancement caused by enhancer credit quality, and this marked the end
must be available to make up the shortfall. of the use of LOCs in credit card transactions.
hypothetical industry benchmark. The major variables in- which varies from 1%–2% annually. Most of these compo-
fluencing credit enhancement levels are chargeoffs, port- nents are relatively stable and only comprise a small
folio yield, monthly payment rate (MPR), and investor percentage of the yield. APR, on the other hand, accounts
coupon. for a large majority of the yield and is the most volatile.
In stressing a portfolio’s yield, competitive position is a
Chargeoffs critical factor, since a highly priced portfolio will be under
Credit cards are unique among loans in that the credit pressure to reduce rates to maintain market share. Another
quality of each cardholder is reflected in the cardholder’s important factor is the possibility of a federally imposed
credit limit and annual percentage rate (APR), which are interest rate cap on credit card APRs. In November 1991,
based on the cardholder’s ability to meet debt payments the U.S. Senate proposed a measure to lower credit card
(i.e. the higher the risk, the lower the credit limit and the interest rates to a cap of 14%. If the measure had been
higher the APR). Many issuers use sophisticated credit- enacted, some portfolios would have suffered a reduction
scoring models, or well trained credit analysts, to determine in yield of more than 30%.
the cardholder’s probability of default. This probability dic-
tates what credit limit should be granted, and at what APR. Monthly Payment Rate
Examining the credit limits and APRs of a portfolio, The MPR includes monthly collections of principal, finance
however, does not always give a true picture of the issuer’s charges, and fees paid by the cardholder and is stated as
total risk. Some issuers might be more aggressive in as- a percentage of the outstanding balance as of the begin-
signing high limits to lower credit quality borrowers. Some ning of the month. Reductions in MPR may come from a
might not have well developed scoring models. Finally, decrease in the number of cardholders who pay off their
some may try to gain market share by offering very low entire bill every month and from cardholders making
interest rates, possibly at the expense of credit quality. smaller monthly payments.
All these factors must be analyzed when determining the
appropriate chargeoff stress to apply to a portfolio. The Fitch Credit Card Default Model
stress level shown in the benchmark table below indicates When run through Fitch’s default model, the benchmark
that one in every four or five cardholders defaults on their scenario in the table at left gives a generic ‘AAA’ level for
obligation to pay. a portfolio. However, since every credit card is not created
equal, more attention must be paid to the dynamics of each
variable stressed in context with that portfolio and Fitch’s
Benchmark Stress Scenarios benchmark. For example, the stress test outlined in the table
AAA A below applies to the Household Affinity Credit Card Master
Trust, which is made up solely of GM co-branded cards.
Chargeoffs 5.00x Multiple 3.00x Multiple Household’s underwriting criteria is strong, and, to date,
Portfolio Yield 35% Decline 25% Decline the trust’s performance has been better than expected. How-
Monthly Payment Rate 50% Decline 35% Decline ever, since Household’s portfolio is not heavily seasoned and
has not been tested during a recessionary environment, Fitch
imposes a slightly more conservative chargeoff multiple. As
Portfolio Yield
Yield is made up of periodic APR charges, annual fees, late the average age of the accounts increases, Fitch will revisit
payment fees, overlimit fees, and, in some cases, recoveries on this stress and adjust it accordingly.
charged-off accounts and interchange. Interchange is income The payment rate stress on this portfolio is also very
from the card associations (Visa, MasterCard, and Novus, conservative. Since all the accounts are under the GM
among others) that is paid to the issuing bank as compensation relationship, it is important to keep in mind what would
for taking credit risk and funding receivables, the amount of happen if the co-branding agreement were canceled.
Many cardholders using their cards to generate GM rebate rising investor coupon and lagging floating-rate or low
points would cease making purchases, and payment rates fixed-rate credit cards, where trust expenses increase faster
would fall dramatically. than trust earnings. This risk is issuer- and deal-specific and
As another example of customizing stresses, the table is estimated based on credit card interest rates, frequency
above shows a scenario applied to the Sears Credit Card of credit card floating-rate resets, investor coupon index,
Master Trust. frequency of investor coupon resets, and, to a limited
Since more than 60% of Sears’s accounts are greater extent, the issuer’s ability to change credit card interest
than five years old, portfolio statistics are very consistent. rates. The amount of additional enhancement required
Even during the 1990–1991 recession, Fitch gives Sears may vary from 2.5% to more than 4.0%.
credit for stable underwriting and reduces the company’s For example, if the ABS investor’s coupon floats off the
worst-case multiple. In addition, payment rates cannot fall one-month London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR), a deal
much farther, even under severe economic stress. with credit cards that are priced off the prime rate and reset
monthly would be exposed to less interest rate risk than a
Investor Coupon deal with cards that are fixed rate or reset quarterly.
For fixed-rate ABS, Fitch uses the expected pricing level of Therefore, the monthly reset portfolio would require less
the securities as the transaction’s investor coupon expense. additional credit enhancement than the portfolio with
For floating-rate ABS, Fitch assumes that the investor cou- fixed-rate cards.
pon will increase dramatically. The interest rate environ-
ment of the early 1980s — specifically, the second half of Receivables Balance
1980 — is used as a stress scenario, since that was the An additional variable that must be examined is the pool’s
most volatile period of the last 20 years. receivables balance. If the outstanding principal receiv-
Additional credit enhancement is needed to cover the ables of the portfolio decline, especially during early
potential basis risk and interest rate risk between a rapidly amortization, the amount of principal collections reallo-
cated from the seller’s participation would be drastically
reduced. This results in a longer payout period and in-
creased exposure to a deteriorating pool. The primary
concern is how cardholders will behave with regard to the
solvency of the seller.
For credit cards issued by small, regional retailers, Fitch
believes that if the retailer files bankruptcy under Chapter 7
of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, consumers would no longer
be able to use their cards since all the stores have been
closed or sold, and the principal receivables balance of the
trust will decline in lockstep with the amortization of the
securitization. Exceptions may be made if the retailer is
unlikely to file under Chapter 7.
For well underwritten, geographically diverse, general-
purpose card portfolios, insolvency of the seller will not
have such a dramatic effect. Most consumers probably will
not even know that their bank has gone into insolvency and
will continue to use their cards. With the profitability of the
card business, the heavy premiums at which pools of
accounts are bought and sold, and the aggressive compe-
tition for market share, Fitch believes that portfolios such the largest amount of excess spread. This amount will be
as these should continue to remain active, with consumers available for reallocation to other series, particularly high-
continuing to charge and the portfolio continuing to be coupon series, if their excess spread is reduced to zero.
serviced, even if not by the original servicer.
Some issuers fall between these two extremes. For exam- Discount Option
ple, a portfolio that is heavily concentrated in a single Many trusts permit the transfer of receivables to the trust at
co-branding relationship or affinity group may experience a discount, which increases the portfolio’s yield by includ-
heavy runoff if that relationship is canceled or becomes less ing principal collections as finance charge collections. This
a value to cardholders. It is unlikely, however, that all allows an issuer to artificially increase excess spread. A
cardholders would simultaneously cease using their cards, potential risk of discounting is that a deteriorating pool of
as they would for a bankrupt retailer. assets can continue to revolve with deeper discounts, which
increases potential economic exposure during early amor-
Master Trust Features tization. The issuer must obtain rating agency approval
prior to discounting or changing the discount rate.
Master trusts may be set up with one or several reallocation
groups. For example, AT&T Universal Card Master Trust Fixed Allocation of Finance Charges
currently has two groups: Group I for series with fixed-rate This innovative feature permits a larger percentage of
coupons and Group II for series with floating-rate coupons. finance charge collections to be allocated to investors after
Most other trusts have only one group, in which all series an amortization event, when cash is needed most. Before
are included. Depending on the structure of the trust, series early amortization, investors receive their pro rata share
within the same group may share principal and/or excess of finance charge collections, and the seller receives its pro
spread, have the ability to discount, or fix allocations of rata share. After an event is triggered, a portion of the
finance charges. seller’s share will be made available to cover shortfalls in
interest or servicing expense, or chargeoffs, in the inves-
Principal Sharing tors’ share. Cash flow simulations show that, even under
For all series in the same group, the trust allows distribution
stressful scenarios, this overallocation of finance charges
of excess principal collections to any series in its accumu-
provides a significant amount of support, thus reducing the
lation or amortization period. Since a series in its revolving
need for credit enhancement.
period has no principal payment requirements, principal
collections allocated to that series are available for reallo-
cation. In addition, principal collections in excess of a Early Amortization Risk
series’ controlled amount are available for reallocation. Fitch ratings address the likelihood of repayment of all
The principal reallocation feature provides investors with principal and interest in a full and timely manner as
more assurance of timely principal repayment, with no promised. Credit card transactions, however, do not prom-
additional risk to other series. ise repayment of principal on any specific date. Instead,
they define an expected payment date, and caveat that
Excess Spread Sharing principal may be paid earlier or later than that date. The
There are several ways excess spread may be shared circumstance that would lead to earlier payment would be
within series of a group. Some groups may be set up as a commencement of an early amortization. Later repayment
“socialized” group, whereby finance charge collections could be caused by very low payment rates, which would
are allocated to each series based on need. The interest mean that controlled amortization or controlled accumula-
expense for all series in the group will be the weighted tion payments would not be made in full, and extra months
average expense for each series. Thus, the highest coupon of collection would be needed to pay off the entire invested
series will receive the largest allocation, and the lowest amount. Every series defines a termination date, which is
coupon will receive the smallest allocation. The excess usually set 24–36 months after the expected payment date.
spread for each series will be the same, since each has the All principal must be paid on or before this date. It is
same coupon expense. In effect, socialized groups share extremely unlikely that MPR would be so slow that principal
excess spread at the top of the cash flow waterfall. AT&T would not be repaid by the series termination date.
Universal Credit Card Master Trust, Household Affinity The amount of enhancement any deal has does not affect
Credit Card Master Trust, and Citibank Credit Card Master the probability of early amortization. And investors must
Trust are examples of socialized trusts. keep in mind that ratings do not reflect the likelihood of this
Other trusts may allocate finance charge collections on occurrence. In fact, it is possible that a deal’s ’AAA’ rating
a pro rata basis, based on size. Thus, each series will would be affirmed if an early amortization commenced.
receive the same proportionate amount of finance charges, Early amortization risk is not a focus of investors when
and the series with the lowest coupon expense will have deals perform strongly. However, before consumer delin-
quencies and chargeoffs increase, portfolio yields come — Fixed- or floating-rate investor coupon.
down dramatically, or interest rates shoot up, investors — Seller/servicer strength.
should look very closely at their investments to determine — Ability to discount new receivables into trust.
their exposure to prepayment risk. Several topics should — Sharing of excess spread.
be considered when evaluating early amortization risk, — Percentage of total bank receivables that have been
including: securitized.
— Variability of chargeoffs. — Existence of variable funding, extendible, or commer-
— APR pricing position (competitive or not). cial paper series.
Copyright © 1996 by Fitch Investors Service, L.P., One State Street Plaza, NY, NY 10004
Telephone 1-800-75 FITCH, (212) 908-0500, Fax (212) 480-4435
Barbara A. Besen, Publisher; John Forde, Editor-in-Chief; Madeline O’Connell, Director, Subscriber Services; Diane Lupi, Nicholas T. Tresniowski,
Managing Editors; Terry Peters, Editor; Kelly Briney, Sr. Publishing Specialist; Richard L. Farruggio, Martin E. Guzman, Paula M. Sirard, Linda Trudeau,
Publishing Specialists. Printed by American Direct Mail Co., Inc. NY, NY 10014. Reproduction in whole or in part prohibited except by permission.
Fitch ratings are based on information obtained from issuers, other obligors, underwriters, their experts, and other sources Fitch believes to be reliable. Fitch
does not audit or verify the truth or accuracy of such information. Ratings may be changed, suspended, or withdrawn as a result of changes in, or the unavailability
of, information or for other reasons. Ratings are not a recommendation to buy, sell, or hold any security. Ratings do not comment on the adequacy of market
price, the suitability of any security for a particular investor, or the tax-exempt nature or taxability of payments made in respect to any security. Fitch receives
fees from issuers, insurers, guarantors, other obligors, and underwriters for rating securities. Such fees generally vary from $1,000 to $750,000 per issue. In
certain cases, Fitch will rate all or a number of issues issued by a particular issuer, or insured or guaranteed by a particular insurer or guarantor, for a single
annual fee. Such fees are expected to vary from $10,000 to $1,500,000. The assignment, publication, or dissemination of a rating by Fitch shall not constitute
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