Assessing Situational Crisis Communication of The Costa Concordia Crisis

Corporate
Communication
2st semester exam 2012

Master of Arts in Corporate
Communication
Responding to Crisis: Assessing Situational Crisis

Communication of the Costa Concordia Crisis
A case study of the Costa Concordia Crisis January 2012
Student: Tine Grarup 286495
Total number of characters: 32,992
Supervisor:
Steen Michael Hejndorf

Responding to Crisis: Assessing Situational Crisis Communication of the Costa Concordia Crisis
Corporate Communication 2nd semester exam 2012
Master of Arts in Corporate Communication
Table of Contents
1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................... 1
1.1 Problem statement ......................................................................................................................................... 2
1.1.1 Research Questions ............................................................................................................................. 2
1.2 Methodology ..................................................................................................................................................... 2
1.3 Delimitations ..................................................................................................................................................... 3
2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND ......................................................................................................... 4
2.1 Crisis and Crisis Management Defined .................................................................................................. 4
2.2 The Value of Reputation and Stakeholder Relationships .............................................................. 5
2.3 Crisis Response ............................................................................................................................................... 6
2.3.1 The Crisis Situation: Evaluating Responsibility and Reputational Threat .................. 6
2.3.2 Crisis Response Strategies ............................................................................................................... 8
3 CASE STUDY ........................................................................................................................................ 11
3.1 Costa Cruises - Corporate Profile .......................................................................................................... 11
3.2 Stakeholders of Costa Cruises ................................................................................................................ 11
3.3 The Costa Concordia Crisis ..................................................................................................................... 12
3.3.1 The Crisis Situation: Evaluating Responsibility and Reputational Threat ............... 13
4 EMPRICAL ANALYSIS ....................................................................................................................... 16
4.1 Costa Cruises Crisis Responses ............................................................................................................. 16
4.2 Connecting and Reflecting upon the Findings ................................................................................. 21
4.3 Effect on Corporate Reputation ............................................................................................................. 24
5 CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................................................... 28
6 LIST OF REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................... 29
6.1 Books ................................................................................................................................................................. 29
6.2 Articles in Journals ...................................................................................................................................... 30
6.3 Online Articles ............................................................................................................................................... 31
6.4 Other Online Sources .................................................................................................................................. 33
6.5 Costacruises.com/co.uk Sources ........................................................................................................... 34
6.6 Online Videos ................................................................................................................................................. 35
6.6 Other Sources ................................................................................................................................................ 35
7 APPENDIXES
7.1 Appendix 1: Crisis Management Factors ........................................................................................... 36
7.2 Appendix 2: Instructing and Adjusting Information in Crisis Response ............................. 38

7.3 Appendix 3: Coombs Three Crisis Clusters ...................................................................................... 39
7.4 Appendix 4: Image Restoration Strategies by Benoit .................................................................. 41
7.5 Appendix 5: Captains Conversation with the Italian Coastguard .......................................... 43
7.6 Appendix 6: Costa Concordia Crisis Update ..................................................................................... 44
7.7 Appendix 7: Costa Cruises Crises Responses on Twitter ............................................................ 53
7.8 Appendix 8: Costa Cruises Crises Responses on Facebook ....................................................... 56
7.9 Appendix 9: Email Correspondence, Peter Anker Jensen, owner and CEO Fri Ferie ..... 59
7.10 Appendix 10: Three CSR Communication Strategies ................................................................ 63

FIGURES
Figure 1: The crisis situation (own adaption) ............................................................................................ 7
Figure 2: Costa Cruises Vision Statement .................................................................................................. 11
Figure 3: Costa Cruises stakeholder map (own adaption) ................................................................ 12
Figure 4: Outline of the Costa Concordia Wreck .................................................................................... 13
Figure 5: Statement of human error from Costa Cruises .................................................................... 14
Figure 6: Statement of human error from Pier Luigi Foschi, CEO of Costa Cruises ............... 14
Figure 7: Crisis Response Timeline (own adaption) ........................................................................... 16
Figure 8: Extract from first statement from Costa Cruises ................................................................ 17
Figure 9: Tweet from Costa Cruises Twitter account .......................................................................... 17
Figure 10: Extract from second statement from Costa Cruises ....................................................... 17
Figure 11: First post on Costa Cruises Facebook page ....................................................................... 18
Figure 12: Extract from statement: Background of Costas commitment to safety ................ 19
Figure 13: Article from Lovell Communications .................................................................................... 20
Figure 14: Article from news media CP World ....................................................................................... 20
Figure 15: Costa Cruises rejection of discount rumors ...................................................................... 20
Figure 16: Costa Cruises statement on Facebook acknowledging stakeholder requests ..... 21
Figure 17: Great offers for Costa Cruises on Fri Feries website ..................................................... 24
Figure 18: Costa bolstering tweet by Costa Cruises reminding of positive views ................... 25
Figure 19: Carnival Cruises at NY Stock Exchange the days after the crisis .............................. 25
Figure 20: Social Mentions about Costa Cruises ..................................................................................... 26
Figure 21: Captain Francesco Schettinos conversation with the Italian coastguard ............ 43

TABLES
Table 1: Crisis response strategies by the SCCT (own adaption) ...................................................... 8
Table 2: SCCT Recommendations for Crisis Response Selection (own adaption) .............. 9-10
Table 3: Reputational threat, Costas responses & SCCT Recommendations summarized . 22
Table 4: Crisis types by clusters .................................................................................................................... 39
Table 5: Image Restoration Strategies ........................................................................................................ 41

1. Introduction
Several elements and developments breed opportunities for crises, disrupting normal corporate
operations. Crisis management has always been a difficult task bringing along multiple challenges
and the demand for response. Moreover the emergence of social (global) media has complicated the
entire process, requiring practitioners to act faster and more carefully than ever. The important of
crisis management follows societal development, and as we live in a highly developed society
where omnipresent technology means that the chance of a crisis situation arising is greater than it
has ever been1, corporations are faced with new responsibilities towards the more and more aware
stakeholders. Even corporations who track their operations and reputation closely are often
impacted by events outside of their control. No organization is immune to a crisis2, and if badly
managed, a crisis can ruin hard-won reputations or even destroy companies3. Thus ongoing crisis
and reputation management is of utter importance and can help ensure corporate sustainability.
When crisis strike, effective crisis response can turn what could be a disaster into an opportunity or
at least a chance move beyond the threat4.
In January 2012 Costa Cruises faced a crisis when its cruise ship Costa Concordia ran aground and
partially sank off the coast of Italy5. At least 30 people died as a result of the incident6, making it
the largest passenger cruise ship accident since the Titanic7. Facing a crisis further means facing
reputational threats, hence Costa Cruises had to take action in the attempt to minimize potential
damage to reputational assets and corporate endurance. So crisis response strategies had to be
chosen and the goal of this report is to investigate these choices and evaluate the companys
responses in the perspective of situational crisis communication theory.
Anthonissen (2007) p. 9
Coombs (2007). P 1
3
Tench & Yeomans (2009) p. 386
4
Ulmer (2007) p. 33
5
Sloan (2012)
6
Bergman (2012)
7
Sloan (2012
2
Student: Tine Grarup - 286495
Page 1 of 65
1.1 Problem Statement

The goal of this paper is to analyze and discuss Costa Cruises post-crisis management of the recent
Costa Concordia Crisis. The paper will examine Costa Cruises employment of crisis responses in
relation the normative guidelines put forth in the Situational Crisis Communication Theory by
Timothy Coombs. Further the response strategies will be discussed in relation to their impact on
corporate reputation.
1.1.1
Research Questions
RQ1: In the perspective of the Situational Crisis Communication Theory, and normative
guidelines hereof, how did Costa Cruises respond to the recent Costa Concordia Crisis on
international platforms?
RQ2: How did the crisis responses affect corporate reputation of Costa Cruises?
1.2 Methodology
The methodology operates as a basis of the paper, and scientifically it takes a socio-constructive
approach viewing knowledge as grounded in social existence, thus as society change so do ideas,
ideology and values8. An approach that in this paper will cover the central argument of the
corporate communication context, where expression is given through the product of individual and
social interaction, thus changing together with societal occurrences9. The method initiates in the
problem statement, outlining the scientific problem. In the process of testing the research questions
through a case study and empirical analysis of Costa Cruises10, the concept of crisis management
and relevant theory is accounted for11. Coombs Situational Crisis Communication Theory research
is chosen because of its relevance to the topic and the well developed theoretical framework it
provides, as the model has been tested and detailed in many other types of crises and types of
response strategies12. The analysis is characterized by the method of a directed content analysis
an interpretative analytic approach based on existing theory13. It is carried out on the basis of Costa
Cruises crisis responses in relation to the theory put forth, and the data is collected through
exploration of the companys overall external communication.

8
Berger & Luckmann (1966)

Hibberd (2005) p.26
10
Part 3 & 4
11
Part 2
12
Cooley & Cooley (2011) p. 205-206
13
Hsieh & Shannon (2005) p. 1277;1281
9
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1.3 Delimitations
In general an organizations actions and behavior in a crisis situation go far beyond issuing press
releases and making statements online, so to cover all aspects of responses it is recognized that one
would have to include further perspectives. However, due to limitations, the analysis will purely be
based on a selection of external publications visible to salient stakeholders14. It is known that Costa
Cruises further experienced fire on its Allegra cruise ship some months later, which in the long run
also will have an effect on corporate reputation. Yet this paper only focuses on the Concordia crisis,
and how the response hereto affected reputational assets. Moreover due to page restrictions the
analysis does not touch upon the involvement of parent company Carnival Cruises.
This part one has introduced the paper and the understanding of the structure and content. The
following part will set a basis for the case study and analysis, presenting the theoretical background.

14
Fombrun & van Riel a reputation develops through the information stakeholders receive [] (quoted in Coombs,
Protecting (2007) p. 164)
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2. Theoretical Background
While the importance of crisis management and communications is widely agreed upon, the
definition of a crisis is not. In order to set the stage of how the subject is approached in this paper,
the theoretical background will be initiated with a definition of the concept. It will further elaborate
on Coombs situational approach to crisis communication in the clarification of crisis response
theory. This is relevant in order to conduct the analysis and hence evaluate Costa Cruises responses
to the Concordia crisis.
2.1 Crisis and Crisis Management Defined
Despite no agreed upon definition most scholars and corporations would most likely agree that a
crisis is the perception of an unpredictable event that threatens important expectations of
stakeholders and can seriously impact an organizations performance and generate negative
outcomes15. This is the definition by Coombs in the attempt to capture the various perspectives and
common traits of crisis definitions. The definition very well depicts the idea of a crisis being a
fundamental disruption of corporate stability and status quo, which is the essence of most
definitions16, thus it will also be the one pursued by this paper. Coombs further stress the
importance of stakeholder perceptions stating that [i]f stakeholders believe an organization is in
crisis [] stakeholders will react to the organization as if it is in crisis17, meaning that crisis
management is greatly related to stakeholder relationships and the reputational outcome hereof,
which is further discussed in section 2.2. Yet crises do not have to turn into a disaster [a] crisis is
unpredictable but not unexpected18. Corporations are able to limit the damage by engaging in crisis
management, and the approach hereto is often what makes or break the crisis outcome19. Effective
crisis management can turn a crisis into an opportunity. Nevertheless, it is argued that simply
pulling a corporation unharmed through a crisis may not be a sufficient criterion for success. Rather
crisis management is a systematic effort designed to avert crises or to effectively manage those
that do occur20 meaning that effective efforts are the ones where operations are sustained or
resumed, [] stakeholder losses are minimized, and learning occurs so that lessons are transferred

15
Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 2-3

Seeger et. al. (2005) p. 80
17
Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 3
18
19
Anthonissen (2008) p. 1
20
Pearson & Clair (1998) p. 61
16
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to future incidents21. Coombs divide crisis management into four interrelated factors: (1)
prevention, (2) preparation, (3) response, and (4) revision22, further presented in appendix 1. This
paper will solely discuss the aspect of crisis response, as focus of analysis is put on post-crisis
management, where crisis response is important to recover reputation and stakeholder relationships,
also it is argued to be too early to make a revision of the Concordia crisis.
2.2 The Value of Reputation and Stakeholder Relationships
A reputation is an aggregate evaluation stakeholders make about an organization23 meaning that
positive stakeholder relationships can be an indicator of favorable reputation and vise versa. As
Benoit argues a company must be concerned about reputation when expectations of salient
stakeholders are disturbed24. Reputation is widely recognized as a valuable, intangible asset, linked
to corporate opportunities25 and further directly linked to credibility which in turn is broken, if a gap
occurs between expectations and performance. Thus corporate focus is increasingly moving towards
reputation management in the effort to ensure corporate sustainability, and based on the definition
of crisis above, a corresponding emphasis must be placed on crisis management as a means of
protecting reputational assets26. In his research of the Situational Crisis Communication Theory
(SCCT) Coombs argue that a favorable, prior reputation will benefit a corporation during a crisis,
and when protecting or restoring reputation in the post crisis communication27. Hence a key element
in crisis management is continuous positive interactions with stakeholders, and as stated by Coombs
first priority in any crisis is to protect stakeholders from harm, not to protect the reputation28.
Thus efforts must be initiated by addressing the ethical responsibility of helping stakeholders to
cope with both the physical (instructing information) and psychological (adjusting information)
concerns, before focus is turned to reputation management29. The notions of instructing and
adjusting information are further described in appendix 2. In this context it is important to note that
managing reputation and responding to a crisis involves knowledge and understanding of ones
stakeholders and their reactions30. During a crisis the media will often be the loudest and most

21
Pearson & Clair (1998) p. 60-61

23
24
Benoit in Millar & Heath (2004) p. 264
25
Coombs & Holladay (2006) p. 123
26
27
Further discussed in Section 2.3.1; Coombs & Holladay (2006) p. 123-124
28
Coombs: Protecting (2007) p. 165
29
Sturges (1994) p. 308; Coombs: Protecting (2007) p. 165
30
Ulmer (2007) p. 36-37
22
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demanding group of stakeholders, however, as the media contact often is more short term, the
company must remember all those to whom they must communicate31. Thus identification of
salient stakeholders is crucial, as their reactions and interpretations will gain much power when
information is shared, shaping the outcome of the crisis32. As mentioned above a crisis exists when
stakeholders perceive it to, this situational approach is clarified in the following section.

2.3 Crisis Response

Post-crisis communication is a strong area of research and is mainly identified through crisis
response strategies, being the responsive actions taken on by corporations in crisis to minimize
negative outcomes33. The SCCT is one of the most widely tested theories of crisis communication,
developed and refined by Coombs34. Taking the situational approach to crisis management it is an
attempt to map out post-crisis communication and demonstrate how crisis response strategies can be
used to protect reputational assets. The SCCT embraces three core elements; the crisis situation,
crisis response strategies, and a system of matching the two based on the statement that [a]
strategic communicative response can best protect the reputational resource by assessing the crisis
situation and selecting a crisis response strategy that fits the crisis situation35. These elements will
be clarified in the following sections.
2.3.1 The Crisis Situation: Evaluating Responsibility and the Reputational Threat
Rationally one cannot match crisis response strategies to the reputational threat of a crisis without a
link between the two. Responsibility is what provides this conceptual link as the evaluation of the
reputational threat (the situation) is largely a function of crisis responsibility36. Responsibility
requires accountability37, and crisis response strategies retain these answers. In his research of the
SCCT Coombs argue that three factors are used to evaluate and determine the reputational threat
presented by a crisis: the initial crisis responsibility, the crisis history and the prior relational
reputation38, a situational framing that further serves to guide the choice of crisis response
strategies.

31
Seymour & Moore (2000) p. 116

Lewis (2011) p. 89; Seymour & Moore (2000) p. 77
33
Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 138; Coombs: Protecting (2007) p. 170; Coombs: Attribution (2006) p. 135
34
Cooley & Cooley (2011) p. 205
35
36
37
Weiner (1986) p. 22;70
38
Cooley & Cooley (2011) p. 205; Coombs, Protecting (2007) p. 166; Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 141
32
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Figure 1: The crisis situation (own adaption)
39
The initial crisis responsibility is defined by how much responsibility for the crisis, stakeholders
attribute to the company, the more attributed responsibility the bigger the reputational threat40. Here
Coombs proclaims [...] three crisis clusters based upon attributions of crisis responsibility []41
(1) the victim cluster with very little attributions of responsibility, (2) the accidental cluster with
minimal attributions because of uncontrollability, and (3) the preventable cluster with strong
attributions and severe reputational threat, as the event is considered intentional42. Appendix 3
provides a more detailed elaboration of the crisis clusters and crisis types within. The crisis history
is whether or not an organization had had a similar crisis in the past43 and the prior relational
reputation is how well the organization is perceived to have treated stakeholders earlier44. This is
further related to both the Velcro effect stating that if you have a history, making the same mistakes
number of times, you are also more vulnerable in the future45, and the early adaption of stakeholder
theory by Freeman, where a descriptive approach of existing relationships is associated with the
outcomes of organizational actions46.

39
Coombs & Holiday (2012) p. 181

Coombs, Protecting (2007) p. 168
41
Coombs Protecting (2007) p. 168
42
Cooley & Cooley (2011) p. 205; Coombs: Protecting (2007) p. 167-168
43
Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 142; Coombs: Protecting (2007) p. 167
44
45
Coombs & Holladay (2012) p. 59; 167
46
Lewis (2011) p. 86
40
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2.3.2 Crisis Response Strategies

When the attributions of responsibility have been identified, hence the reputational threat of a crisis,
the organization can begin to consider potential crisis response strategies. Trying to specify the
exact number of crisis response strategies is a losing proposition47. A theorist such as William L.
Benoit has earlier set the stage with his list of 14 image restoration strategies48, which is clarified
in appendix 4. To take a more productive approach Coombs has across theories identified the 10
most common strategies built around the perceived acceptance of responsibility for a crisis
embodied in the response49. His crisis response strategies are illustrated in table 1 below.
Primary crisis response strategies
Denial crisis response strategies

Attack the accuser Management confronts the person or group claiming something is wrong.

Denial
Management asserts that there is no crisis.

Scapegoat
Management blames someone outside for the crisis.

Diminish crisis response strategies

Management minimizes organizational responsibility by denying intent to do
Excuse

harm and/or claiming inability to control the event.
Justification
Managements attempts to minimize the perceived damage caused by the crisis.

Rebuild crisis response strategies

Compensation
Management offers money or other gifts to victims.

Management indicates the organization takes full responsibility for the crisis and
Apology

asks stakeholders for forgiveness.

Secondary crisis response strategies
Bolstering crisis response strategies

Reminder
Telling stakeholders of the past good work of the organization.

Integration
Management praises stakeholders and/or reminds them of past good work.

Victimage
Reminding stakeholders that the organization is a victim of the crisis too.

Table 1: Crisis response strategies by the SCCT (own adaption)
50
Coombs divides the primary SCCT crisis response strategies into four groups; denial, diminish,
rebuild, and bolstering. The deny responses involve, as the title says, a denial of any connection to
the crisis, either by simply denying, claiming a fault, or blaming a third party51. If accepted by
stakeholders the organization is safe for any reputational damage. Diminish response options

47
Benoit (1995) in Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 139

49
50
51
Cooley & Cooley (2011) p. 204; Coombs: Protecting (2007) p. 171; Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 139-140
48
Page 8 of 65
include minimizing the perceived damage and responsibility linked to the crisis, through excuse or
justification, here reputational harm occurs if stakeholders reject the frame set by the organization52.
Rebuild strategies are about generating new reputational assets through compensation or apologies,
both being positive reputational actions, and lastly bolstering strategies function more as secondary
and a supplement, comprising efforts of goodwill from close stakeholders, reminders of past good
work, making the organization a victim etc.53.
The last core element of the SCCT is matching the response strategies with the crisis situation as
discussed in the previous section. When determining the suitable response strategy for the crisis
situation at hand it is, as mentioned, important to understand how stakeholders perceive the crisis
and the crisis outcome. The SCCT embraces this and takes a stakeholder and audience-centered
approach to crisis communication54, arguing that the larger the reputational threat the more
accommodative the response strategies should be55. Table 2 below provides a summary of the
normative guidelines and SCCT recommendations for the use of crisis response strategies.
1. Provide instructing information to all victims or potential victims in the form of warnings
and directions for protecting themselves from harm.
2. Provide adjusting information to victims by expressing concern for them and providing
corrective actions when possible.

Note: Providing instructing and adjusting information alone can be enough when crises
have minimal attributions of crisis responsibility (victim crises), no history of similar
crises and a neutral or positive prior relational reputation.
3. Diminish strategies should be used for crises with minimal attributions of crisis
responsibility (victim crises) couples with a history of similar crises and/or negative prior
relational reputation.
4. Diminish strategies should be used for crises with low attributions of crisis responsibility
(accident crises), which have no history of similar crises, and a neutral or positive prior
relational reputation.
5. Rebuild strategies should be used for crises with low attribution of crisis responsibility
(accident crises), couples with a history of similar crises and/or unfavorable prior relational
reputation.
6. Rebuild strategies should be used for crises with strong attributions of crisis responsibility
(preventable crises) regardless of crisis history or prior relational reputation.
7. Denial strategies should be used in rumor crises.
8. Denial strategies should be used in challenge crisis when the challenge is unwarranted.

52
Coombs: Protecting (2007) p. 171; Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 139-140

Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 139-141; Coombs: Protecting (2007) p. 172
54
55
53
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9. Use corrective action (adjusting information) in challenges when other stakeholders are
likely to support the challenge.
10. Bolstering strategies should be used as supplements to the other response strategies.
11. Victimage response strategy should only be used with the victim cluster.
12. To be consistent, do not mix denial strategies with either diminish or rebuild strategies.
13. Diminish and rebuild strategies can be used in combination with one another.
Table 2: SCCT Recommendations for Crisis Response Selection (own adaption)
56
The above part has set a valuable basis for the forthcoming case study and empirical analysis of
Costa Cruises. The SCCT will be used in the case study accounting for the crisis situation regarding
the Concordia crisis, and in the empirical analysis evaluating Costas use of crisis response
strategies.

56
Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 143; Coombs: Protecting (2007) p. 173
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3. Case Study
This following section is set to paint the picture of Costa Cruises, involving company profile,
stakeholders and elaboration of the Costa Concordia crisis, including crisis situation and type
according to the SCCT, setting the basis for the analysis of crisis responses.
3.1 Costa Cruises Company Profile
The story behind Costa Cruises is at first glance a story of entrepreneurial success57, starting out
as a small trader of fabrics and olive oil Costa now has more than sixty years of tradition in cruise
holidays58. Costa Cruises is the number one cruise company in Europe, and hold 7.2% of world
wide passengers59. In 2000 the company was acquired by Carnival Corporation, and is now one of
eleven more or less independent brands operated by Carnival, accounting for approximately 16% of
the revenue60. Today 65,000 Travel Agencies work with Costa Cruises all over the world and
research from 2010 shows that 98% of all passengers were satisfied clients61. Costa clarifies its
vision by the following statement:
Figure 2: Costa Cruises Vision Statement62
With a mission of having the guests being the best partners for future growth, Costa puts customer
service in focus, which also comes to show in the Costa Touch statement "We all make our Guests'
dreams come true"63.
3.2 Stakeholders of Costa Cruises
The stakeholders of Costa Cruises are many and the most predominant ones are depicted in figure 3.
In this paper focus will be on the external stakeholders, as they merely are the ones targeted in the
crisis responses of analysis and discussion in the following. As mentioned in section 2.2 it is
important to be aware of salient stakeholders in a crisis situation. In terms of external crisis
communication Costa Cruises most salient stakeholders are argued to be consumers and the media.

57
The Company history

About Costa
59
Market Share
60
Market Share
61
Company Profile
62
Our values
63
Our values
58
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During a crisis consumer reactions are often highly emotional and uncertainty is dominating, thus
this is also what media focus will be on. Even though consumers might distrust both the company
and the media during a crisis64, their perceptions are easily influenced. Being an international
company as Costa Cruises, stakeholders will also differ across markets, and it is thus of utter
importance to align decision making and all communication, in order to keep responses consistent
and trustworthy65.
Figure 3: Costa Cruises stakeholder map (own adaption)
3.3 The Costa Concordia Crisis

On January 13, 2012 Costa Cruises gained international attention, when one of its cruise ships, the
Costa Concordia, ran aground and partially sank overnight off the coast of Italy66. At least 30
people died as a result of the incident, and two are still missing67, making it the largest passenger
cruise ship accident in 100 years, since the Titanic68.

64

66
Sloan (2012)
67
Bergman (2012)
68
Sloan (2012
65
Page 12 of 65
The accident occurred due to a deviation

from the approved route, as depicted in
figure 4. Sailing that close to the shore
on shallow water caused the ship to hit
rocks and tore a large cut in the hull69.
Costa Cruises and prosecutors are
blaming the accident on the ship's
captain, Francesco Schettino, who they
say took the vessel off course70. The
Captain, on the other hand, blames the
collision on the charts claiming that they
did not show the rocks71. The period
after the wreck many news stories and
opinions circulated in the media about
the tragedy, and still do. Along with the
above accusations, failing to report the
Figure 4: Outline of the Costa Concordia Wreck (Agar, 2012)
accident to the coast guard in time, and
abandoning the ship before all passengers had been rescued72, directed much focus towards the
captain, who was arrested the day after the tragedy, accused of manslaughter and abandoning his
ship before all those on board were evacuated73. Schettino is now under house arrest while the
incident is being investigated74. The grounding of Costa Concordia was an event that shocked the
world. The following section will attempt to determine the crisis situation and reputational threat
and thus the crisis type according to the SCCT.
3.3.1 The Crisis Situation: Evaluating Responsibility and Reputational Threat
As mentioned in section 2.3.1 Coombs argue that three factors are used to evaluate and determine
the reputational threat (crisis situation) presented by a crisis and further guide the choice of crisis
response; the initial crisis responsibility, the crisis history and the prior relational reputation75.

69
Pisa (2012)
Sloan (2012); Sky News (2012)
71
BBC News (2012)
72
Appendix 5
73
Bozicevic (2012)
74
Pisa (2012)
75
Coombs, Protecting (2007) p. 166; Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 141; Cooley & Cooley (2011) p. 205
70
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As noted earlier, the media will have a great power in letting other stakeholders know about the
crisis and influencing attitudes hereto, hence, how the media frame the crisis is an important
consideration76. The Costa Concordia crisis created much disturbance in stakeholder expectations
and could most likely have been prevented if other actions had been made, meaning that the
responsibility attributed by stakeholders is high, and the crisis is thus, according to theory, situated
in the preventable cluster pursuing strong attributions of responsibility and a severe reputational
threat77. The crisis type is argued to be a human-error accident78, as human error most likely caused
the accident. Few days after the wreck both a corporate press release and a statement from CEO
Pier Luigi Foschi reported human error, as seen in figure 5 and 6 below.
Figure 5: Statement of human error from Costa Cruises79
Figure 6: Statement of human error from Pier Luigi Foschi, CEO of Costa Cruises 80
One could also argue for the crisis type to be organizational misdeed with injuries, as stakeholders
were placed at risk and injuries occurred. However according to this crisis type the risk should be
placed by management, which is quite debatable in this situation. In both cases the company is
facing severe reputational threat, leading to a certain type of crisis response according to the SCCT.
In the days after the crisis some dialogues referred to the past safety history of the company81, and
not being the first reported accident with injuries, called Costas safety records into question. To
name a few, the very same Costa Concordia hit the dockside in Sicily in 2008, causing damage to

76

Section 2.3.1; Appendix 3; Section 2.2
78
Appendix 3
79
Costa Concordia - Update; Appendix 6
80
Foschi: Press (2012) [2:29-2:38]
81
Foxnews.com (2012)
77
Page 14 of 65
the port82, and more seriously, in 2010 Costa Europa crashed during docking killing three crew
members and injuring four passengers83. Incidents like these and Costs handling hereof will have
great influence on the attribution of responsibility in the recent Concordia crisis. Nevertheless
Costas positioning as the number one cruise company in Europe84 with 98% satisfied passengers85,
provides the company with a positive prior relational reputation, and will of course benefit the
company during the crisis and in the attempt to restore reputational assets86.

82
Paloti (2009); Derbyshire (2012)

SilverStein (2010); Bryant (2010)
84
Section 3.1
85
Section 3.1
86
Coombs & Holladay (2006) p. 123-124; Section 2.2
83
Page 15 of 65
4. Empirical Analysis
Based on the crisis situation accounted for above the Concordia crisis is placed in the preventable
cluster with an existing crisis history and favorable prior reputations. Thus the situation suggests
strong attributions of crisis responsibility and possesses a severe reputational threat87. In such
instances the SCCT recommends the accommodative response strategy of rebuild, as compensation
or full apology would work to improve corporate reputation88. The following section will examine
and discuss the crisis responses used by Costa to see if they are in agreement with the SCCT
recommendations and attempt to determine the overall success of the post-crisis management.
4.1 Costa Cruises Crisis Responses
After the Costa Concordia wreck on January 13th Costa has engaged in different responses in order
to keep stakeholders informed and hopefully retain reputational assets.
Figure 7: Crisis Response Timeline (own adaption)89

87
Section 2.3.1; Section 3.3.1; Appendix 3

Section 2.3.2
89
Appendix 6, 7 & 8; Costa Concordia Update; Costa Cruises on Twitter; Costa Cruises on Facebook
88
Page 16 of 65
From a corporate perspective several statements were made public on the corporate websites, and
some also published as press releases90. From a more consumer perspective Costa also used the
power of social media, including Twitter, Facebook and YouTube, to communicate updates and
company statements. These responses are illustrated and discussed in appendix 6, 7 and 8. The
above figure 7 illustrates the timeline of the different crisis responses.
Figure 8: Extract from first statement from Costa Cruises91
Figure 9: Tweet from Costa Cruises Twitter account92
The first response was a confirmation of the evacuation of Concordia, published around 4 hours
after the wreck as a corporate statement on the website and on twitter as seen in the above two
figures93. Shortly after expressions of condolences and concern was stated on the website and on
Facebook as seen in the below figure 10 and 1194. With consumers as salient stakeholders, it is
argued to be valuable to include social media in the first responses.
Figure 10: Extract from second statement from Costa Cruises95

90
Press
92
Costa Concordia on Twitter; Appendix 7
93
Appendix 6 & 7; Costa Cruises on Twitter; Costa Concordia - Update
94
Costa Concordia - Update; Appendix 6 & 8; Costa Cruises on Facebook
95
91
Page 17 of 65
Figure 11: First post on Costa Cruises Facebook page96
Until this point no real response strategy had been used. Costa only did what Coombs call
instructing and adjusting information to help stakeholders cope with concerns97, as the
communication was solely informative and at the same time somewhat indefinite, as not much was
known yet. In fact Costa waited more than 14 hours before providing a contact number for
assistance to friends and families98. In a time where the media is very much global and news travel
across the world in no time, it is of utter importance to initiate immediate communication with
stakeholders involved99. So despite the little knowledge, Costas timing was unacceptable and
indicates little or no crisis preparation100.
During this first period Costa received several comments and condolences especially on Twitter as
seen in appendix 7, to which Costa also responded contributing to the key element of stakeholder
interaction101. In these first communications Costa supported the captain in stating that [] still
preliminary the ship Costa Concordia under the command of the Master Francesco Schettino was
regularly sailing []102. However only the day after, assessments changed and indications were
now that there may have been significant human error on the part of the ships Master []103.
Alongside reassuring that [a]s all Costa Masters, he has been constantly trained passing all
tests104, this statement is argued to be an attempt to minimize corporate responsibility via

96
Costa Concordia on Twitter; Appendix 8 (facebook)

Section 2.2; Sturges (1994) p. 308; Coombs: Protecting (2007) p. 165
98
99
Section 2.2
100
Section 2.1; Appendix 1
101
Section 2.2
102
103
104
97
Page 18 of 65
justification, using the diminish response strategy105. Further this could even be argued to be an
attempt to shift blame and make the captain the scapegoat, hence touching upon denial strategy106.
In the end of this same statement background information of Costas commitment to safety was
further included, as seen below. This was a reminder of the companys high obligation to and
standards of safety and personnel training, thus a use of the bolstering posture to retain
reputation107.
Figure 12: Extract from statement: Background of Costas commitment to safety108
The following days responses were merely online and through the media coverage of Costas press
conference on January 16 with Chairman and CEO Pier Luigi Foschi, sharing company condolences
and addressing key issues regarding the incident. In this press conference similar response strategies
as above were used109. Watching the video, it is clear that English is not the CEOs first language110,
which affects the impression of concern and engagement required in such a situation, nevertheless it
was an in-person public statement, which until this had not been part of the responses. But it might
have come too late for the company to retain control, because at this time the world media had
already created their own perceptions and rumors were already fluctuating. The CEO was aware of
this and tried to justify his absence with the reason of being abroad and therefore did not have a
direct and immediate knowledge of the facts occurred111. One could argue that someone else
should then have been appointed the role of spokesperson, to make sure that stakeholders got this
in-person information earlier and also to have a spokesperson with more media training and
international plea112. However, this is another discussion which will not be taken in this paper.

105
Section 2.3.2; Coombs: Protecting (2007) p. 171; Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 139-140
Section 2.3.2; Appendix 4
107
Section 2.3.2; Coombs: Protecting (2007) p. 172; Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 139-141
108
109
Foschi: Press (2012)
110
Foschi: Press (2012)
111
Foschi: Senate (2012) [3:19-3:28]
112
Coombs (2007) p. 128;168-169
106
Page 19 of 65
One rumor fluctuating in the media was that Concordia victims were offered 30 percent discount on
their next cruise, being highly criticized as a tasteless compensation to victims still recovering, as
seen in the below articles.
Figure 13: Article from Lovell Communications; PR, crisis comm. and marketing comm. agency113
Figure 14: Article from news media CP World114
Figure 15: Costa Cruises rejection of discount rumors
115
Also seen above these accusations were rejected by Costa in statements shortly after. Not until
January 27th the company itself addressed the issue of compensation and announced a compensation
package for Concordia victims and future cruise guests. Being a part of the rebuilding strategy,
compensation was an appropriate strategy to choose116, however at this point stakeholders had
already had the time to develop another opinion of the companys response, mainly based on

113
Coleman (2012)
Funaro (2012)
115
116
Section 2.3.2
114
Page 20 of 65
groundless assertions in the media, thus the reputational rebuild should have been announced
immediately after the claims, to have the full effect.
After the worst media storm had abated, Costas communication also became less frequent and
merely focused on information about the removal of Costa Concordia, and promise of corrective
actions. Also in the social media channels things were slowly returning back to normal, as the
Facebook post by Costa below illustrate. This also shows how Costa listens to and involves
stakeholders, which is further elaborated on in Appendix 8. This integration of stakeholders is also a
part of the bolstering strategy117.
Figure 16: Costa Cruises statement on Facebook acknowledging stakeholder requests118.

4.2 Connecting and Reflecting upon the Findings
Due to strong attributions of crisis responsibility, Costa should, as earlier established119, use rebuild
response strategies generating new reputational assets through compensation or apologies120.
Despite the theoretical suggestion, Costas first reaction to the crisis was not to apologize, but rather
to minimize responsibility by use of the diminish posture of justification and excuse. In fact the
company never provided a full apology. Even though compensation was given, initiating a rebuild
response, the companys main strategy was to make the captain the scapegoat, thus Costa displayed
itself as a victim of the captains mistakes and denied responsibility. Costa further tried to bolster
the corporate image by reminding stakeholders of its high obligation to safety, and integrating
stakeholders via social media.
In the first statements from Costa one can tick off some of the key elements in crisis
communication; concern for stakeholders and actions addressing the situation, but the overt attempt

117
Section 2.3.2
Costa Cruises on Facebook; Appendix 8
119
Section 2.3.2; 3.3.1
120
Section 2.3.2
118
Page 21 of 65
to blame the captain could be a very risky strategy, as it creates the impression of a business
willing to jump to conclusions before all the facts are known, rather than keeping a cool head121.
Theory further argues that at this early stage Costas focus should be on the human impact and not
protecting commercial interests122. Shifting the blame and thus touching upon denial strategy123
might not be appropriate in a situation where the crisis possibly could have been prevented by the
company124, as the CEO also stated himself this is a tragic accident which shouldnt have occurred
and could have been avoided125. So, even if the accusation of the captain holds true, corporate
changes will have to be made in order to fully retain reputation, as these changes will further impact
stakeholders due to the ripple effect126. As stated by Ian Mitroff, crisis management expert, its
easy to put the finger on just one bad apple but you still have to ask, what about the whole
system?127. Further Costa could stand in front of severe reputational damage if investigations later
conclude that the captain was not to blame128.

Reputational threat of
crisis situation
Costa Cruises' responses
SCCT recommendations
Costa Concordia
wreck January '12
Strong attributions of crisis

responsibility = severe
reputational threat
Diminish crisis response strategy:
Rebuild crisis response strategy:
Justification
Excuse
Denial crisis response strategy:

Scapegoat
Bolstering crisis response strategy:

Reminder
Integration
Rebuild crisis response strategy:

Compensation
Compensation
Apology

Bolstering crisis response strategy:

Reminder
Integration
Table 3: Reputational threat, Costa Cruises responses & SCCT Recommendations summarized129.
Reviewing the summarization in table 3, Costa made use of various response strategies in its crisis
communication. The use of the rebuild strategy of compensation and the secondary bolstering

121
Hemus (2012)
Section 2.2; Coombs: Protecting (2007) p. 165
123
124
Section 3.3.1
125
Foschi: Senate (2012) [3:07-3:14]
126
Lewis (2011) p. 8-9
127
Booton (2012)
128
Section 2.2
129
Summarized from above sections
122
Page 22 of 65
strategies reminder and ingratiation are coherent with the SCCT recommendations130. However
neither the deny nor the diminish strategy match these recommendations, thus Costas overall crisis
response did not follow prescriptions. While the crisis situation classified the crisis as a severe
reputational threat, Costa mainly responded with strategies suitable for victim crises and accident
crises131. Also mixing the denial with diminish and rebuild strategies will, according to the SCCT,
create critical inconsistency132, and thus erode the effectiveness of the overall response133.
Particularly also in Costas case, being an international company with stakeholders across many
markets, it is of utter importance to align responses134. Nevertheless one could argue that the
complexity of crises, not being static, changing with society occurrences135, might create a need for
corporate preparedness to change response if necessary during the crisis period to protect
reputation136. Thus the SCCTs incorporation of guidelines recommending consistency in crisis
response could be understood in different ways, and Costa might not have been as inconsistent as
first stated.
Also the lack of apology could be discussed, as one could argue that Costa gave a partial apology
through the use of regret and concern, possibly with the reasoning that it would not hold the same
liabilities. Even though full apology would have had a greater effect on the reputational rebuild,
accepting responsibility could also put Costa in a worse off position in potential lawsuits related to
the crisis137, and it might in the long run benefit Costa and its corporate image not to use full
apology. Further, by not explicitly apologizing, Costa was able to focus discussion on corrective
actions, which is further included in the normative guidelines of instructing and adjusting
information138, and would address the priority of protecting stakeholders from harm139. At the same
time this is aligned with consumer focus in Costas vision and mission140, but it does not change the
fact that Costa has damaged reputational credibility when creating a gap between the mission/vision

130
Section 2.3.2
132
Section 2.3.2; Figure x
133
Section 2.3.2; Coombs: Protecting (2007) 173
134
Section 3.2
135
Section 1 & 1.2
136
Heath & Coombs (2006) p. 206; Coombs: Protecting (2007) p. 173
137
138
Section 2.3.2; Heath & Coombs (2006) p. 206; Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 143
139
Section 2.2
140
Section 3.1; Our values
131
Page 23 of 65
expectations and actual performance141. This leads on to the following section determining the
reputational effect of Costas responses.
4.3 Effect on Corporate Reputation
According to theory, Costa Cruises should have suffered severe reputational damage. Several media
have too proclaimed that Costa might not survive, and that travelers would abandon the idea of
cruising142. However, none of this has yet occurred, as agents are largely reporting that cruise sales
are business as usual143. As stated by Peter Anker Jensen, CEO of the Danish travel agency Fri
Ferie, I have heard comments like now it must surely be the world's safest cruise line - and
people forget quickly144. Peter further stated that despite the tragedy, prices is still what matters
most, we did not sell many cruise holidays before the accident. It's scary but true, Costa sat down
prices - and then we sold very well!145. As depicted below, Fri Ferie is now promoting great cruise
offers on their website. Thus indications show that the old notion of bad press is better than no
press might be true in the long run.
Figure 17: Great offers for Costa Cruises on Fri Feries website146
The above is further supported by statements from consumers. One even wrote an article on how
the media buzz had opened his eyes for cruise holidays, and not just any cruise a Costa cruise,

141
Section 2.2
Walker (2012); MacMillan (2012)
143
Turen (2012); Appendix 9
144
Appendix 9
145
Appendix 9
146
Fri Ferie Cruise
142
Page 24 of 65
stating that he guessed that there's probably no safer time to travel on Costa than right now147.
This article was also highlighted by Costa in the tweet below.
Figure 18: Costa bolstering tweet by Costa Cruises reminding of positive views148.
Also the stocks of parent company Carnival Cruises149 did not suffer as much as one might have
feared. Naturally they initially did go down, as illustrated in the figure below the stocks made a
steep drop on the opening bell on January 17150. This was only anticipated in the situation of crisis,
however, it is notable that already on the first day of trading the stock was starting to balance out,
and at the end of the third day of trading the stock was slowly ascending again.
Figure 19: Carnival Cruises at NY Stock Exchange the days after the crisis151
Using a monitoring tool to check the social mentions of Costa Cruises, one can assess the sentiment
of the company, being the ratio of positive conversations happening online verses the amount of
negative152. From the time around the crisis and till now, the sentiment has, as seen in the figure 20
below, gone from having one negative conversation for every one positive, to now having only one
for every eleven positive conversation. Further the strength shows that the media buzz around
company have abated, and the likelihood of Costa being discussed in social media has gone from 25

147
Serminara (2012)
Costa Cruises on Twitter
149
Which as well indicate the situation of Costa Cruises
150
Which was the first day of trading after the wreck, as Monday was a holiday (NYSE trading hours)
151
NYSE Carnival Corporation
152
Hayes (2012); SocialMention FAQ
148
Page 25 of 65
to 3 percent. This support the statement above that people might quickly forget, and indicate that
Costa might not suffer as much from the crisis as first assumed.
Figure 20: Social Mentions about Costa Cruises153
So, even though Costa acted somewhat contrary to what the SCCT recommends in similar crises,
and was criticized in the media, consumer interaction and investor affairs imply that the cruise
operator will make it through the crisis. Naturally, there are limitations on the ability to explain the
exact influences of the crisis on Costas reputation, and the included data might say more about the
image than the long term reputation. However, the Costa image appears to be in the process of
repair as the attitude among salient stakeholders seems to be turning. Further Costa is launching
new initiatives and a new flagship liner, hoping to rebuild reputation154. This puts forth Benoits
view on crisis management in taking restorative actions to cope with the image threat155. Though it
is argued to be image repair and not restoration, as the image not necessarily is restored back to its
former stage, but rather repaired to a new stage for future endurance. Whether or not these actions
will result in the full repair of consumer confidence is yet to be seen, as the holiday season unfold,
and thus beyond the scope of this paper.
Concluding one could argue for crisis preparation to be of utter importance, by being better
prepared for a crisis situation, Costa would have been able to respond much faster and more
specific156. When being the center of tragedy, one must be ahead of the PR battle on every front. A
great part of PR is reputation management, which includes continuous monitoring (social) media

153
Hayes (2012); SocialMention Costa Cruises

Sinha (2012)
155
Appendix 4
156
Section 2.1; Appendix 1
154
Page 26 of 65
activity for any possible dissatisfied consumer157, as it will change along individual and social
interactions158. In time this monitoring could prevent an episode as the Concordia wreck from
developing into an image damaging incident. As stated earlier effective crisis management is
where operations are sustained or resumed, [] stakeholder losses are minimized, and learning
occurs so that lessons are transferred to future incidents159, making the revision factor of crisis
management important as well, learning from the crisis and using this for both the prevention of and
preparation for future crises160.

157
Baldelomar (2012)
Section 1.2
159
Section 2.1; Pearson & Clair (1998) p. 60-61
160
Appendix 1
158
Page 27 of 65
5. Conclusion
The paper has been built on an interest in post-crisis management theory, and its relation to the
reality of crisis management by corporations such as Costa Cruises. Based on an understanding of
the concept, a situational perspective was taken through the clarification of Coombs Situational
Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT). With the aim of testing the normative crisis response
guidelines hereof, a case analysis of Costas crisis responses has been carried out. Through the
analysis it was found that Costa did not follow theoretical recommendations, as the company used a
combination of strategies from all the different crisis response postures in no specific or thought
through order. However despite Costas mismatch responses, certain measures indicate that Costa
might not suffer as much damage to its corporate reputation as first assumed.
Mixing different strategies and taking the position as a victim of the captains mistakes, Costa
places itself in the same situation as most stakeholders, creating sympathy and minimizing
responsibility. In its own form Costa engaged in situational crisis responses when choosing its
responses according to the context and media coverage at hand, and the threat that followed.
Whether or not this was intentional and a planned strategy or merely just a lucky strike for a
company that was not at all prepared for a crisis, one can only guess. Nevertheless, it can be argued
that theoretical recommendations might not be essential in all types of crisis situations. Again had
the SCCT prescriptions been followed, Costa would most likely not have been target for the many
critiques and negative discussions, and would thus be in a better reputational position going through
the crisis. In conclusion, the paper has provided a basis for the discussion of whether or not
theoretical guidelines always should be followed and questions remain of how the reputational
situation of Costa would have been, had the company followed the SCCT prescriptions.
Page 28 of 65
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Pearson, Christine M. and Judith A. Clair. Reframing Crisis Management Academy of

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Concordia Disaster. International Business Times. 7 May 2012. 14 May 2012.
<http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/articles/338012/20120507/costa-concordia-tragedy-cruises-newship-fascinosa.htm>
Sloan, Gene. Italy cruise ship disaster could take toll on industry. USA Today. 17 Jan.
2012. 21 Apr. 2012. <http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/travel/story/2012-0117/Cruise-disaster-could-take-toll-on-industry/52622068/1>
Sky News Ship Was Too Close To Shore. Sky News. 6 Feb. 2012. 21. Apr. 2012.
<http://news.sky.com/home/world-news/article/16149523>
Squires, Nick. Cruise disaster: company say errors made by ship's captain may have caused
crash. The Telegraph. 16 Jan. 2012. 21 Apr. 2012.
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/italy/9017326/Cruise-disastercompany-say-errors-made-by-ships-captain-may-have-caused-crash.html>
Turen, Richard. Media bullies and the Concordia. Travel Weekly. 12 Apr. 2012. 5 May
2012. <http://www.travelweekly.com/Richard-Turen/Media-bullies-and-the-Concordia/>
Walker, Jim. Will the Costa Cruise Brand Survive? Cruise Law News. 19 Feb. 2012. 13
May 2012. <http://www.cruiselawnews.com/2012/02/articles/social-media-1/will-the-costacruise-brand-survive/>
6.4 Other Online Sources:

Carnival, press room. 2012. Carnival Cruises. 05 May 2012. <http://carnivalnews.com/press-room/>

Page 33 of 65
Market Share: 2012 World Wide Market Share. 2012. Cruise Market Watch. 20 Apr. 2012.
<http://www.cruisemarketwatch.com/market-share/>
Costa Cruises on Twitter. 2012. Twitter.com. 30 Apr. 2012.

<https://twitter.com/#!/costacruises>
Costa Cruises on Facebook. 2012. Facebook.com. 30 Apr. 2012.

<http://www.facebook.com/costacruises.na>
Fri Ferie Cruise. 2012. Danskfriferie.dk. 14 May 2012.

<http://www.danskfriferie.dk/cruise>
NYSE Carnival Corporation. 2012. New York Stock Exchange. 14 May 2012.
<http://www.nyse.com/about/listed/lcddata.html?ticker=ccl&fq=D&ezd=1Y&index=5>
NYSE trading hours. 2012. New York Stock Exchange. 14 May 2012.
<http://www.nyx.com/holidays-and-hours/nyse>
SocialMention FAQ. 2012. SocialMention.com. 13 May. 2012.

<http://socialmention.com/faq>
SocialMention Costa Cruises. 2012. SocialMention.com. 13 May 2012.

<http://www.socialmention.com/search?q=costa+cruises&t=all&btnG=Search>
6.5 Costacruises.com/co.uk Sources:
About Costa. 2012. Costa Cruises. 20 Apr. 2012.

<http://www.costacruises.co.uk/B2C/GB/Corporate/The+company/thecompany.htm>
Company Profile. 2012. Costa Cruises. 20 Apr. 2012.

<http://www.costacruise.com/B2C/USA/Corporate/The+company/aboutourselves/aboutours
elves.htm>
Costa Concordia update. 2012. Costa Cruises. 21 Apr. 2012.

<http://www.costacruises.co.uk/B2C/GB/Info/concordia_statement.htm>
Our values. 2012. Costa Cruises. 20 Apr. 2012.

<http://www.costacruise.com/B2C/USA/Corporate/The+company/aboutourselves/ourvalues
/ourvalues.htm>
Press. 2012. Costa Cruises. 30 Apr. 2012.

<http://www.costacruise.com/B2C/USA/Press/default.htm>
Page 34 of 65
The Company history. Costa Cruises. 19 Apr. 2012.

<http://www.costacruises.co.uk/contents/corporate/STORIA_COMPLETA_UK_EU.pdf>
6.6 Online Videos
Foschi, Pier Luigi. Press Conference Costa Concordia - Introduction Speech. 16 Jan. 2012.
Costa Cruises on YouTube. 21 Apr. 2012.
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KNqAq2bHtFc>
Foschi, Pier Luigi. Senate of the Italian Republic - VIII Permanent Commission for Public
Works - Senate of the Italian Republic - Hearing of Wednesday 25th January, 2012. 25 Jan.
2012. Costa Cruises on YouTube. 21 Apr. 2012.
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=1yvWGFcI4Sg#!>
6.7 Other Sources

Grarup, Tine. Gaining Sustainable Competitive Advantages through CSR Engagement and
Communication. Corporate Communication 1st semester exam 2011/2012 at Master of Arts
in Corporate Communication
Page 35 of 65
7.1 Appendix 1: Crisis Management Factors

Coombs divide crisis management into four interrelated factors arguing that crisis management is a
process of preventing, preparing for, responding, and revising from crises161. The two factors of
prevention and preparation both are part of the precrisis stage involving actions before a crisis in
come across. The factors of response and revision belong to the postcrisis stage being key activities
that must take place after the crisis. For the postcrisis stage to begin the crisis need to be recognized
including information of how the incident is understood and accepted as crisis.
Prevention represents what management and the organization in general should do in order to
avoid crises. This involves detecting different warning signs and taking actions accordingly to
prevent a possible crisis situation. The news media rarely uncover crisis that did not happen.162
Preparation is the best way to avoid problems related to crisis situations that cannot be prevented,
such as harming stakeholders, damaging reputation, losing market share etc. Preparation involves
making a crisis management plan (CMP) that should help the organization select and train
spokespersons and public employees, it should help diagnose vulnerabilities and on this basis build
and improve a crisis communication system.163
Response in a crisis situation is vital for the subsequent survival of the organization/brand. Here the
components from the preparation factor above should be applied to the actual crisis situation. The
better the preparation the better outcome, as organizations crisis response often is discussed and
critiqued in the media. Communication with stakeholders through words and action is a essential
part of this crisis management response phase.164 An element of the response is further recovery,
being the organizations attempt to return to normal operations165.
Revision is all about evaluating crisis management and learning from the crisis. Ideally the
organization will learn from mistakes and be able to prepare more appropriate actions. Other

161

163
164
165
162
Page 36 of 65
postcrisis actions further include follow up communication with stakeholders and continuous
corrective actions.166
As Coombs argue it is all linked in a spiral [i]f prevention fails, preparation is required for optimal
performance. Revision is derived from performance and informs both the prevention of and
preparation for future crises. In turn, improving preparation should improve response167. It is thus
important to remember that crisis management is an ongoing process that must be an integrated part
of the regular operations of an organization.

166
167

Page 37 of 65
7.2 Appendix 2: Instructing and Adjusting Information in Crisis Response

According to Coombs and the SCCT research the first priority in a crisis is to protect stakeholders
from harm, which involves addressing the ethical responsibility of helping stakeholders to cope
with both the physical (instructing information) and psychological (adjusting information) concerns,
before focus is turned to reputation management168.
The notion of instructing information is to provide stakeholders with information about what they
can do to protect themselves from harm and threat put forth in the crisis situation169. Examples of
instructing information would be telling stakeholders how to evacuate an area, not to buy faulty
goods, how to return the goods if they have already bought it, how to get help and/or assistance and
so forth. Instructing information can be delivered directly to stakeholders (eg, sirens) or through
the news media (e.g. recall alerts)170. By instructing information stakeholders receive the
information needed to protect themselves and at the same time give the perception of an
organization in control.
Adjusting information is responses that help stakeholders cope with the psychological concerns in a
crisis situation where uncertainty most likely will be the dominating emotion. Adjusting
information is all about telling stakeholders what happened and what is going on.171 The uncertainty
among stakeholders can be decreased by communicating what corrective actions the organization
has initiated in order to prevent a similar crisis in the future, which will further reassure
stakeholders that they are the first priority. However, corrective actions demands sound knowledge
about the situation for it not to be just speculation, meaning that such information often will take a
long time to develop, losing some of its usefulness in situations where information is needed
straight away172.

168
Sturges (1994) p. 308; Coombs: Protecting (2007) p. 165

Coombs: Protecting (2007) p. 165; Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 133-134
170
171
Coombs: Ongoing(2007) p. 135
172
169
Page 38 of 65
7.3 Appendix 3: Coombs Three Crisis Clusters

Identifying the crisis type or placing an event in a crisis cluster is the initial step in assessing crisis
responsibility. SCCT research has identified three crisis clusters based upon attributions of crisis
responsibility by crisis type173, meaning that the amount of responsibility that stakeholders attribute
to the organization determines the crisis cluster and specific crisis type. The three clusters are the
victim, accidental and preventable cluster see table 4 below.
Table 4: Crisis types by clusters174
Crises in the victim cluster have very weak attributions of crisis responsibility and the organization
is merely seen as a victim of the crisis, hence the reputational threat is mild175. Within this crisis
cluster the types of crises are natural disasters, rumor, workplace violence, and product tampering.
The accidental cluster has minimal attributions of crisis responsibility as the event is considered

173

175
174
Page 39 of 65
unintentional, thus the reputational threat will be moderate176. The cluster includes challenges,
technical- error accident and technical-error product harm. The crises within the preventable
cluster are crises that could have been prevented if other decisions had been made177. Here the
organization is looking at a big reputational threat. These intentional crises involve human-error
accident, human-error product harm and organizational misdeed.
It is important to note that severity and performance history factors have a great influence on the
crisis responsibility adjustment process, as this could change the crisis cluster178. As argued by
Coombs & Holladay; repeated or severe technical breakdown accidents should perhaps be treated
more like the preventable cluster than the accident cluster179. The crisis clusters are developed in
order to simplify the choice of crisis response strategies. Seeing that the crises types within each
cluster will generate similar attributions of responsibility, thus one can use similar response
strategies to address all crises types within the same cluster.

176

178
179
177
Page 40 of 65
7.4 Appendix 4: Image Restoration Strategies by Benoit

Professor William L. Benoit has introduced a theory of image restoration strategies based on
apologia. He believes that image is essential to any organization especially when responding to
attacks, instigating a crisis180. According to Benoit an attack that instigates a corporate crisis, has
two critical components - (1) the accused is held responsible for an act; (2) the act is portrayed as
offensive - and image restoration strategies are organized accordingly181. It is important to note that
stakeholder perceptions are more important than reality and the greater the (perceived)
offensiveness of the act and, perhaps, the greater the (apparent) responsibility of the accused for that
act, the greater the damage to the image182. Benoit has set up five strategies for addressing issues
of responsibility and reducing the act's perceived offensiveness, which are shown in table 5 below.
Table 5: Image Restoration Strategies183

180

182
Benoit in Millar & Heath (2004) p. 264-265
183
181
Page 41 of 65
Denial is, as the word prescribes, response by simply denying the offensive act and rejecting
responsibility, or by shifting blame184, much similar to Coombs posture of same name185. Evasion
of responsibility is the attempt to reduce responsibility of the offensive act through one of four
following grounds; reasonable reaction to provocation, alleging lack of information or control,
claim action occurred by accident, or good intentions186. Similar to Coombs excusing in the
diminish posture187. Reducing offensiveness of the event is a general image repair strategy with the
six versions of bolstering to strengthen positive stakeholder attitudes, differentiation to seem less
offensive, transcendence to place the act in a more positive context, minimization of negative
feelings associated, attacking ones accuser to damage credibility of the source, and compensation
to soften negative views188. All forms comparable to Coombs diminish, rebuild, and bolstering
strategies189. Corrective actions play down the negative effects by willingness to correct actions
and/or prevent recurrence190. Mortification is admitting responsibility and asking forgiveness191,
and parallel to Coombs rebuild in form of apology192.
Often it can be difficult to separate the individual strategies from each other, seeing that one
expression can serve as or be interpreted as several strategies, which Benoit also points out.
Moreover he stresses that it is possible and appropriate to combine the strategies193.
Benoit further include suggestions for effective crisis communication within an image repair
discourse, stating the importance of identification and understanding of the crisis and relevant
audiences, in order to modify the messages as a key part of persuasion194. When restoring the image
Benoit suggests that an organization should admit responsibility immediately if they are at fault, in
order to avoid litigation.

184

Section 2.3.2
186
187
Section 2.3.2
188
189
Section 2.3.2
190
191
192
Section 2.3.2
193
194
185
Page 42 of 65
7.5 Appendix 5: Captain Francesco Schettinos Conversation with the Italian Coastguard
The below figure 20 depict a full transcript between Italian coastguard and Captain Francesco
Schettino on the night of the wreck. The transcript show the cruise captain as a coward, and support
accusations of failing to report the accident to the coast guard in time, and abandoning the ship
before all passengers had been rescued.
Figure 21: Captain Francesco Schettinos conversation with the Italian coastguard195

195
Evans et. al. (2012)
Page 43 of 65
7.6 Appendix 6: Costa Concordia Crisis Update

Below is the list of corporate statements made by Costa Cruises regarding the Costa Concordia
crisis. It is a direct copy from the corporate website, which is listen in the list of references as Costa
Concordia - Update.
Friday, February 17th 2012

Time 5.30 pm (CET)
With regard to the story uncovered and reported by the Italian TV program Striscia la Notizia, regarding an
Italian woman who allegedly suffered a miscarriage caused when the Costa Concordia ran aground, the
Company has announced that it intends to file a complaint with the legal authorities and that it will take
similar action in response to any similar scams or attempts at profiteering in the wake of the Concordia
tragedy.
The Company has confirmed that neither the woman nor her husband was on the Costa Concordia's Guest
list on January 13.
During the editions broadcast on February 14, 15 and 16, Striscia la Notizia discussed the case of a couple
of self-styled survivors of the Costa Concordia shipwreck and their lawyer. They have appeared on various
TV programs and their story has also received substantial coverage on websites, in newspapers and in
agency press releases both in Italy and abroad. Through their lawyer the couple asked Costa Crociere 1
million euros in damages. The woman was purportedly five months' pregnant when she went on the cruise
and lost her baby several days after escaping the stranded ship off the coast of the island of Giglio.
Striscia la Notizia investigated the claims and discovered that the whole story was in fact made up: the
couple were using false identities and neither of them had been on board the Concordia on the day of the
shipwreck.
Time 4.00 pm (CET)
The Concordia Emergency Commissioner's Office and Costa Crociere have announced that the pumping of
fuel from the cruise ship Costa Concordia has been continuing around the clock since 5 pm on February 12,
in accordance with the plan devised by the Neri/Smit Salvage team.
From the time defueling began until 7 am on February 17, a total of 952 cubic meters of fuel had been
pumped out of 4 tanks located in the forward part of the ship.
A total of 1,428 cubic meters of fuel is still to be removed from 13 tanks, of which 576 cubic meters in the
forward part of the ship. According to the schedule drawn up by the Neri/Smit Salvage experts, if the sea
and weather conditions remain favorable, all of the fuel still on board the Costa Concordia should be
extracted within 3 working weeks.
Since the outset Costa Crociere's priorities have been to guarantee maximum safety, the least possible
environmental impact and protection of the environment of Giglio and the island's tourism industry, while
carrying out defueling within a reasonable length of time.
Both the defueling procedure and the other operations scheduled on Costa Concordia are being conducted
jointly with full cooperation between Costa Crociere and the Concordia Emergency Commissioner's Office.
Thursday, February 16th 2012

In response to the decision by the Italian consumer association Codacons to lodge a complaint against the
Chairman & CEO of Costa Crociere and other Company executives, reported by the Italian Ansa news
Page 44 of 65
agency on Wednesday, February 15, 2012, the Company reserves the right to take any and all steps
necessary including any legal action required to protect its reputation and that of its executive officers.
Tuesday, February 14th 2012

Costa Crociere confirms the extension of the terms for the compensation proposal to March 31st 2012.
Such decision has been taken in order to offer all passengers with more time to evaluate the proposal and to
exercise their claims with due tranquility. While extending the date for accepting the proposal the Company
confirms the simple, effective and easy to redeem compensation package as it was offered from last Jan
27th, 2012.
The extension of the deadline will not have any impact on the claiming process but it is intended to meet the
requests expressed by some of our guests.
The compensation package applies only to guests who have returned home.
The families of the victims and those guests who were wounded or permanently injured, will be covered
under a separate proposal that will take into account their individual circumstances.
Monday, February 13th 2012

Time 2.30 pm (CET)
This morning at 9.00 am it has been completed the pumping of the 103 m3 of fuel from the first tank of the
ship. The pumping operations are now going on with the second tank. Pumping, which was started yesterday
afternoon at 5 pm by Neri/ Smit Salvage engineers, is carried on at a speed of 10 m3 per hour, thanks to
good weather conditions.
Costa Concordia January 13th, 2012. Never forget.
One month after that terrible night, we all at Costa Crociere renew our sincere condolences to the families
and friends of our Guests and crew members who lost their lives in this tragic incident. In the history of our
Company, for sure these have been the saddest days of ever. We have all experienced, and with us who
knows us, a dismay, a sadness, a deep pain, that we not envisioned to be possible. This tragic incident
should not be happened. We will never forget those who lost their lives and those who have experienced
moments of fear in front of Giglio Island. We commit to make this will not happen never again.
Thursday, February 2nd 2012

Time 7.00 pm (CET)
Costa Crociere has worked from the hours immediately after the Costa Concordia accident to ensure the
least possible environmental impact and to safeguard the island of Giglios business activities and tourism.
Right from the outset, the measures drawn up by the Company have constantly been shared with and
approved by the competent Italian authorities, in a spirit of full, transparent and total cooperation.
After engaging leading international salvage experts Smit Salvage BV to remove the fuel contained in the
Costa Concordias tanks, and presenting a plan to remove other materials and potential pollutants, which is
ready to get under way as soon as weather conditions permit, Costa Cruises is also working with the utmost
commitment and speed on the plan to remove the ship itself, fully aware that this is a priority to protect the
environment on Giglio and the islands tourism
The Company has set up a technical committee, with representatives from Costa Cruises, Carnival
Corporation & plc, Fincantieri, Rina and sector experts, including academics, who will work fo the best
possible drawing up of the plan, on a joint basis with the competent authorities.
Page 45 of 65
As anticipated in a letter sent to Costa Concordia Emergency Commissioner Franco Gabrielli, Costa Cruises
has called for tenders 10 companies throughout the world to present a working plan to enterely remove the
hull of the Costa Concordia.
The invitation has been sent to the worlds leading operators, who have the capabilities to perform the work
in the shortest time possible, while ensuring maximum safety and the least possible environmental impact: 1)
Smit Salvage BV, 2) Svitzer Salvage BV, 3) Mammoet Salvage BV, 4) Titan Salvage, 5) Resolve Marine
Group Inc., 6) T&T Marine Salvage Inc., 7) Donjon Marine Inc., 8) Tito Neri S.r.l., 9) Fukada Salvage &
Marine Works Co. Ltd., 10) The Nippon Salvage Co Ltd.
The plans must be presented to Costa Cruises by the beginning of March 2012, for joint assessment with the
Civil Protection Scientific Committee, in order to allow the best one to be selected by the end of March 2012.
This timeline represents the best possible outcome in a situation of this kind, although it cannot be excluded
that there will be delays given the complexity of the operation.
Tuesday, January 31st 2012

Time 2.00 pm (CET)
VIII Permanent Commission for Public Works
Senate of the Italian Republic
Hearing of Pier Luigi Foschi, Chairman and CEO Costa Crociere
Listen to the Hearing
Friday, January 27th 2012

Time 4.00 pm (CET)
Costa Crociere announced a compensation proposal for guests that have returned home after the tragic
196
Costa Concordia accident on January 13. Costa Crociere would like to express its profound condolences
to the families of the victims, our continued sympathy to the families of the missing, and our deep regret and
sorrow for the damages and hardship the Costa Concordia accident caused to all its guests.
This proposal is also the result of negotiations that Costa Crociere began with the consumer associations
protecting guests interests, and with the support of multiple tourism/travel-industry associations. In Italy, the
company has already reached an agreement with the National Council of Consumers and Users, a nationally
representative organization.
The families of the deceased and guests who were injured and required medical treatment on site will be
covered under a separate proposal that will take into account their individual circumstances.
The proposed compensation package for the guests who have returned home includes all of the following:
a lump sum of 11,000 Euros per person as indemnification, covering all patrimonial and non-patrimonial
damages, including loss of baggage and personal effects, psychological distress and loss of enjoyment of
the cruise vacation;
reimbursement of the value of the cruise, including harbour taxes;
reimbursement of the air and bus transfers included in the cruise package;
full reimbursement of travel expenses to reach the port of embarkation and to return home;
reimbursement of any medical expenses borne;
reimbursement of expenses onboard during the cruise.
This compensation package is higher than the current indemnification limits that are provided for in
international conventions and the laws currently in force. The 11,000 Euro lump-sum payment will be offered
to all passengers, including non-paying children, regardless of their age. Costa has also pledged not to

196
Compensation package for Concordia victims and future cruise guests a use of the rebuilding strategy, but maybe
too late. (discussed on page 20)
Page 46 of 65
deduct any amount paid by any insurance policy stipulated by the guests from this sum. In addition, the
company will return all goods stored in the cabin safes, where retrieval is possible.
Costa Crociere has also pledged to provide a program for psychological assistance to any guests that
request it. The company has further agreed to offer customers the ability to cancel any upcoming cruise
booked before January 13, on any of its routes, without penalty through February 7, 2012.
Two dedicated operation units will handle the claims to ensure timely resolution. The payments will be
credited by the company within seven days of receipt of the acceptance of the proposal.
A dedicated e-mail address ReimbursementsConcordia@costa.it will be provided to assist with inquiries.
Wednesday, January 25th 2012

Time 2.30 pm (CET)
VIII Permanent Commission for Public Works
Senate of the Italian Republic
Hearing of Pier Luigi Foschi, Chairman and CEO Costa Crociere
Watch the Hearing
Tuesday, January 24th 2012

Time 3.00 pm (CET)
With reference to news reports on discounts and promotional offers, Costa Cruises feels bound to point out
that the company has never offered any discount on future cruises to guests who were on board the Costa
oncordia for the cruise of January 13th and involved in the tragic accident. The information published by a
newspaper and reported in various news outlets is totally unfounded, as is confirmed by the English
197
passenger who was quoted by the newspaper.
Costa Cruises reiterates that after the tragic accident the companys priority has always been to provide the
maximum possible assistance and solace to the people involved. From the outset the company has been
fully aware of and saddened by the suffering and hardship endured by guests and crew members and has
acted with this firmly borne in mind.
On a joint basis with rescue teams, the Company worked to provide evacuated passengers and crew
members with all the necessary assistance to ensure they were able to return home. Subsequently it
contacted guests by telephone, after they had returned home, to check on their physical and emotional
wellbeing, and to confirm that they will receive a refund for the cruise and all material expenses relating to it.
As already announced, the company welcomes discussion with its guests and all consumer protection
associations to determine indemnity for the hardship endured, with the support of tourism sector trade
associations with which it has been in contact for days.
Driven by its sense of ethics and the values of fairness and responsibility which guide it, the Company has
also given all customers with bookings for future Costa cruises the possibility, if feeling afraid, to cancel their
cruise booking by giving notice no later than February 7th. All travel agents who work with the Company
were informed of this days ago.
Costa Cruises would also like to clarify that starting on the day after the accident, all advertising initiatives
planned were cancelled out of respect for those affected by this tragedy. The Company was unable to stop
only one postal promotion which had already been sent to some customers at the end of December.
Costa Cruises is incredulous at the disgraceful and unfounded assertions made about the Company without
any form of verification.

197
Rejection of accusations of 30 percent discount to Concordia victims (discussed on page 20)
Page 47 of 65
Time 9.30 am (CET)

Costa Cruises clarifies that the company has extremely strict systems in place to control access to ships, in
addition to the port area access controls performed by the authorities before embarkation.
Access on board is granted only on the basis of:
- a ticket and an identity check for cruise customers;
- an optically read ID card for crew members;
- the entry of the persons name on the visitor list, after approval by the Company and the Staff Captain, in
addition to the presentation of a valid identity document which is retained on embarkation.
The name of any person who departs with the ship is registered in on board systems. In addition, a
photograph is taken of passengers on embarkation, which is then associated with an ID bar code found on
the embarkation form and the Costa Card given to passengers when on board (this card acts as each
passengers personal identification badge for entering and leaving the ship and for making use of on board
services).
No one on board has the power to waive security procedures. The company takes severe disciplinary action
in the event of violation.
Precise lists of every person embarked on the ship and who departed with it (guests, crew and any
engineers) are transmitted to the Company immediately after departure.
In the case of the accident involving the Costa Concordia, these precise lists have been given to the
authorities in relation to operations to identify the survivors, victims and missing.
Furthermore, the company categorically denies the rumour that there were clandestine workers on board.
Costa Cruises applies the highest possible standards of security, safety and social accountability. The
company is certified as regards social accountability (SA 8000) and safety (OHSAS 18001) by RINA in the
framework of BEST4 certification, which also covers the environment and quality, and is subject to
inspections by the certification society and the maritime authorities in Italy and in the countries visited by its
ships.
Monday, January 23rd 2012

Time 12.30 pm (CET)
These days, we are receiving many messages of condolence for the victims and their families as well as
many expressions of appreciation for the professionalism and competence of our crew. The Company
shares the mourning and it is grateful to each demonstration of solidarity to men and women of Costa
Crociere. Your expressions of closeness are really precious in such a delicate moment. Your demonstrations
are touching, and they encourage us to do more to continue to deserve the trust you are granting us.
Wednesday, January 18th 2012

Time 9.15 pm (CET)
Costa Cruises confirms that it is contacting all guests on the Costa Concordia at the time of the tragic
accident to make sure they have returned home and are well, and to confirm that they will receive a refund
for the cruise and all material expenses relating to it. Costa Crociere also reiterates that it is in contact with
its guests and all consumer protection associations to determine indemnity for the hardship endured, with the
support of the tour operator association of each country.
Costa Cruises confirms both the constant commitment and care it devotes every day to safety and its
dedication to relations with the guests who represent the companys most important asset, as they have
done for more than sixty years.
Costa Cruises would like once again to express its great sadness over the victims and its support for their
families
Page 48 of 65
Time 7.45 pm (CET)

For Costa Cruises protecting the environment is an integral part of its corporate mission, as it has
demonstrated by obtaining the most stringent international certifications (UNIEN ISO 14001). The company
therefore immediately understood the need to promptly address issues concerning the protection of the
marine environment.
In the hours immediately after the accident, Costa Cruises therefore commissioned worldwide leading
salvage experts Smit Salvage BV to draw up a plan to recover the reserves of fuel from the Costa
Concordia. Right from the outset, this plan has been shared with the competent authorities and, as a result
of full cooperation with them, will be put into effect by the end of the week.
Time 0.01 am (CET)
We are deeply saddened to learn that additional people have been found during the search of the Concordia
and extend our heartfelt sympathies to their families. We continue to cooperate with authorities to support
the rescue and recovery efforts, and to help secure the vessel to ensure that there is no environmental
impact. Our main priority remains the location of those passengers and crew who have not yet been
accounted for. While rescue efforts continue we are reaching out to all our guests and their families to offer
further assistance.
Sunday, January 15th 2012

Time 8.15 pm (CET)
We at Costa Cruises are deeply saddened by this tragedy, and our hearts and prayers go out to everyone
affected and offer the determined victims families her heartfelt condolences.
Over the past 48 hours, more than 1,100 Costa employees have been working tirelessly in the wake of this
terrible event. We are working closely with the authorities to support ongoing search and rescue operations,
and are focusing on ensuring that all guests and crewmembers return home safely.
Our immediate priority is to account for all passengers and crew and to secure the vessel to ensure that
there are no environmental impacts. We have engaged the services of a worldwide leader specialized
salvage company to develop an action plan and help establish a protection perimeter around the ship. It
should be noted that the Prosecutor in charge has seized the ship and the DVR-- so called black box
containing all navigation data and the vessel can be accessed by Costa only with permission from the
authorities.
We are working with investigators to find out precisely what went wrong aboard the Costa Concordia. While
the investigation is ongoing, preliminary indications are that there may have been significant human error on
198
the part of the ships Master, Captain Francesco Schettino, which resulted in these grave consequences.
199
The route of the vessel appears to have been too close to the shore, and the Captains judgment in
handling the emergency appears to have not followed standard Costa procedures. We are aware that the
lead Prosecutor has leveled serious accusations against the ships Captain, who joined Costa Crociere in
2002 as a Safety Officer and was appointed Captain in 2006, after acting as Staff Captain as well. As all

198
An attempt to minimize corporate responsibility via justification, using the diminish response strategy, and further an
attempt to shift blame and make the captain the scapegoat, hence touching upon denial strategy (discussed on page 1819)
199
Statement of human error, placing the crisis within the preventable crisis cluster with strong attributions of
responsibility and a severe reputational threat (discussed on page 14)
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Costa Masters, he has been constantly trained passing all tests. In light of these accusations and the
200
continuing investigation, it would be inappropriate for us to comment further at this time.
As we are learning more about the event itself and the evacuation, however, it is becoming clear that the
crew of the Costa Concordia acted bravely and swiftly to help evacuate more than 4,000 individuals during a
very challenging situation. We are very grateful for all they have done.
Costa is committed to ensuring that no such incident ever occurs again. Our number one priority is always
the safety and security of our guests and crew and we comply with all safety regulations. (See background
on Costa safety below).
Background on Costas commitment to safety
Costa complies very strictly with all safety regulations and our personnel are committed, first and foremost,
201
to guest safety and security.
All crew members hold a BST (Basic Safety Training) certificate and are trained and prepared to emergency
management and to assist passengers abandoning the ship with numerous drills. Roles, responsibilities and
duties are clearly assigned to all crew members. Every two weeks all crewmembers perform a ship
evacuation simulation. A lifeboat and evacuation drill for all guests is conducted within 24 hours of
embarking, as required by law. Costa has a computerised system which ensures all passengers undergo this
drill.
The skills of Costa crew are periodically tested by Coastguard authorities and an independent classification
organization as per SMS (Safety Management Systems) requirements.
There are lifeboats and jackets on board in excess of the number required for all passengers and crew.
Lifeboats are equipped with food and water supplies, first aid kits and communication and signalling
equipment. All life-saving appliances are aligned to international standards and are subject to close, regular
inspection by shipboard personnel and certification authorities. All Costa ships are certified by RINA and
have been built to the highest standards and technologies.
Saturday, January 14th 2012
Time 5.30 pm (CET)

" I want to express our deep sorrow for this terrible tragedy that devastates us - said Gianni Onorato
President Costa Crociere- I am here only now because, as you will understand, I have been from the down
until now on the Isola del Giglio to be close to the rescue operations.
First at all, I would like to thank all the authorities, law enforcement and volunteers who made all efforts to
help and assist our Guests involved in this terrible event."
We are not at this time able to provide an answer to all the questions, because the competent authority are
trying with our cooperative efforts to understand the reasons for this incident.

200
An attempt to minimize corporate responsibility via justification, using the diminish response strategy (discussed on
page 18-19)
201
Background information of Costas commitment to safety - a reminder of the companys high obligation to and
standards of safety and personnel training, thus a use of the bolstering posture to retain reputation (discussed on page
19)
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On the basis of the first evidences, still preliminary the ship Costa Concordia under the command of the
Master Francesco Schettino was regularly sailing from Civitavecchia to Savona, when suddenly the ship
202
struck a rock.
The Master who was on the bridge at that time, understood the severity of the situation immediately
performed a maneuver aimed to secure Guests and crew, and started the security procedures in order to
prepare for an eventual ship evacuation.
Unfortunately, this operation was complicated as result of a sudden tilt of the ship that has made difficult the
disembarkation.
Thanks to the commitment of all forces coordinated by the Coast Guard, from that moment on, rescue
operations have been further strengthened.
From the first time the company mobilized all its resources ashore to put in to assist our guests and crew
members and prevent possible environmental impacts.
Time 12.00 pm (CET)
The Costa Concordia accident happened tonight its a tragedy that deeply shocked our company.
Our first thought goes to the victims and we would like to express our deepest condolences to their families
and friends.
Were close to the people who have been injured and were following their progress.
All our efforts are now concentrated in assisting the guests and the crew who were on board, to bring them
home as soon as possible.
The Costa Cruises customer service has already started contacting by phone all the guests who were
supposed to board today in Savona and starting from tomorrow in the scheduled ports.
At the moment no changes have been planned to the schedule of the other Costa Cruises ships.
203
People looking for assistance can contact the call centre number 08453510552.
All the Costa Cruises people would like to thank from the deepest of their hearts the Guardia Costiera, the
authorities and the citizens of the Giglio Island and of Porto Santo Stefano who helped and assisted the
guests and the crew.
They also thank the doctors who are assisting the injured and anyone in need of assistance.
The Company is cooperating with the Authorities that are investigating on the accident.
Time 5.00 am (CET)
It is a tragedy that deeply affects our company. Our first thoughts go to the victims and we would like to
204
express our condolences and our closeness to their families and friends. In this moment all our efforts are
focused on the completion of the last emergency operations, besides providing assistance to the guests and
the crew who were onboard in order to have them going back home as soon as possible. The emergency
procedures started promptly to evacuate the ship. The slope, gradually taken over by the ship, made the
evacuation extremely difficult. We would like to express our profound gratitude to the Coast Guard and all
the forces co-ordinated by the Coast Guard, including the authorities and citizens of the island Isola del
Giglio, who have been involved in the rescue and assistance to guests and crew members. The company
will fully co-operate with the relevant Authorities in order to determine the causes of what happened.
Time 1.00 am (CET)
Costa Cruises confirms the evacuation of about 3,200 passengers and 1,000 crew members on board of the
205
Costa Concordia. An incident occured near the island 'Isola del Giglio' of the coast of Italy. The evacuation
started promptly, but the position of the ship has worsened, making it more complicated to complete the last

202
In the first communications Costa supported the captain (discussed on page 18)
Contact number for assistance to friends and families (instructing and adjusting information, discussed on page 18)
204
Expressions of condolences and concern (instructing and adjusting information, discussed on page 17-18)
205
First Crisis response from Costa Cruises conforming the evacuation of Costa Concordia (instructing and adjusting
information, discussed on page 17)
203
Page 51 of 65
part of the evacuation. At this moment, the cause of the incident cannot yet be confirmed. The Company is
currently working with the highest commitment to provide all the needed assistance. The Costa Concordia
was sailing across the Mediterranean Sea, starting from Civitavecchia with scheduled calls to Savona,
Marseille, Barcelona, Palma de Mallorca, Cagliari and Palermo. About 1.000 passengers of Italian nationality
were onboard, as well as more of 500 Germans, about 160 French and about 1.000 crew members.
The Guests had to embark today in Savona and in subsequent ports will be contacted directly by Costa
Cruises.
Page 52 of 65
7.7 Appendix 7: Costa Cruises Crises Responses on Twitter

After the wreck of Costa Concordia the company behind, Costa Cruises, also responded to the crisis
on through its Twitter account. Below some of the responses are listed. First a tweet confirming the
evacuation of the cruise ship the day after the wreck and then a tweet thanking the coastguard. The
following tweets are an extract of the many responses to and conversations with people tweeting
about the accident. Hereafter the tweets were information about the press conferences, statements
and ongoing work due to the accident. It is notable that no tweets where made with condolences to
those involved and the families of the dead, except one with a link to the press conference.
Page 53 of 65
Page 54 of 65
Source: Costa Cruises on Twitter
Page 55 of 65
7.8 Appendix 8: Costa Cruises Crises Responses on Facebook

After the wreck of Costa Concordia the company behind, Costa Cruises, also responded to the crisis
on through its Facebook account. Below these responses are listed.
Page 56 of 65
The companys facebook communication can be argued to draw parallels to Morsing and Schultz
stakeholder response strategy and stakeholder involvement strategy206, as Costa Cruises customers
and other stakeholders are able to like the facebook page and then like, comment and/or share all
the postings made by the company, thus stakeholders are able to respond. It is however, important
to note that Morsing and Schultz question and elaborate on the strategy arguing that what aspires

206
Morsing and Schultz (2006) p. 325; Appendix 10
Page 57 of 65
to be a two-way communication mechanism is really [sender oriented and] a one-way method for
supporting and reinforcing corporate actions and identity207. Thus using this strategy, Costa
Cruises need to carefully choose their communication to engage stakeholders, as they need their
endorsement in order to rebound from the crisis. The involvement strategy comes to show in the
post from February 17th below where the company shows that it listens and thus involve
stakeholders.
Source: Costa Cruises on Facebook
Here the company is influenced by stakeholders and change accordingly, through this mutual
dialogue Costa Cruises is able to keep up with the development of stakeholder expectations and
further the company own ability to meet these208. It is argued that these communication strategies
by Morsing and Schultz are applicable to other communication than solely CSR communication,
thus the linking here. Using these strategies will most certainly benefit the company in the crisis
situation, as the communication then aspires goodwill and consideration, hence it can help build
reputation209. As Coombs states [i]t is the regular, two-way communication that helps an
organization to understand the expectations of its stakeholders. [] The goal is to determine when
an expectation gap occurs210. Both stakeholder strategies above further takes an evaluative mode,
as the feedback from stakeholders can help determine response choices and future initiatives211.

207
Morsing & Schultz (2006) p. 328

Morsing & Schultz (2006) p. 328; Appendix 10
209
Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 8, 24
210
Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 59-60
211
Appendix 1
208
Page 58 of 65
7.9 Appendix 9: Email Correspondence with Peter Anker Jensen, owner and CEO Fri Ferie
The following is a translation of an interview with Peter Anker Jensen, Owner and CEO of the
Danish travel agency Fri Ferie. The interview was handled via email in Danish, and the
correspondence is depicted below the transcription.
Question: How do you think that this crisis has affected the Costa Cruises' reputation?
Answer:
It is evident that the reputation has been damaged - but I have heard comments like
"Now it must surely be the world's safest cruise line" - and people forget quickly.
Question: How have your clients reacted to the crisis? Have you as a travel agency seen any
insecurity and/or decline in sales of cruise traveling?
Answer:
We did not sell many cruise holidays before the accident. It's scary but true, Costa sat
down prices - and then we have sold very well! - The prices are obviously the most
important. And Simon Spies thesis about "bad press is better than no press" has held
true in this case.
Question: How has Costa Cruises communicated the crisis and their responsibility to you as B2B
customer? Was the communication and the information provided sufficient for you?
Answer:
They handled it very professionally B2B, much information, etc.
Question: How have you handled the crisis in relation to your customers?
Answer:
We had very few cruse customers BEFORE the crisis - and some of them have
contacted us - but no one has canceled.
Question:
How do you think that Costa Cruises has handled the crisis in general to those
involved, their customers and the media?
Answer:
It is difficult to have a serious view on this - there is so much we do not know in this
case - I would rather not comment based on articles in newspapers, TV etc. I consider
the media in general as far less serious than in the company as Costa.
Page 59 of 65
Question: Do you see any problems or doubts in continuing to cooperate with Costa Cruises? Do
you know how other agencies look at this?
Answer:
No, I do not - and as a professional "observer" of what other agencies do - I cannot see
that anyone have picked them off the shelf".
Email correspondence in Danish:
From: Peter Anker Jensen

Sent: Wednesday, April 25, 2012 4:34 PM
To: Tine Grarup
Subject: Re: Hvordan har Costa Concordia krisen pvirker Fri Ferie's salg af cruise rejser

Se mine svar nedenfor.

/Peter

Den 17/04/2012 kl. 21.29 skrev Tine Grarup:

Hej Peter,
Mange tak fordi du tager dig tiden, det er en stor hjlp! Nedenfor er et par sprgsml jeg hber
du kan svare p.
Hvordan mener du/i at denne krise har pvirket Costa Cruises omdmme?

Det er klart at omdmmet har taget skade - men jeg har hrt kommentarer som "Nu m det da
vre verdens sikreste krydstogtsselskab" - og folk glemmer hurtigt

Hvordan har jeres kunder reageret p krisen? Har i som rejsebureau set en utryghed
og/eller nedgang i salg af cruise rejser?

Vi har ikke solgt ret meget cruise fr ulykken, det er uhyggeligt men sandt, Costa satte priserne
ned!! - og s har vi solgt helt fantastisk!! - priserne er benbart det vigtigste. Og Simons Spies tese
om "At drlig presse er bedre end ingen presse " har holdt i dette tilflde

Hvordan har Costa Cruises kommunikeret krisen og deres ansvar til jer som B2B kunde? Var
kommunikationen og den givne information tilstrkkelig for jer?

De har hndteret det meget professionelt B2B, meget information m.m

Page 60 of 65
Hvordan har i hndteret krisen i forhold til jeres kunder?

Vi havde kun ganske f kunder FR krisen - og nogle af dem har kontaktet os - men ingen har
afbestilt

Hvordan mener du/i at Costa Cruises har hndteret krisen generelt overfor de involverede,
deres kunder og i medierne?

Det er svr at have et serist synspunkt p det - der er s meget vi ikke ved i denne sag - jeg
udtaler mig helst ikke p baggrund af artikler i Ekstra Bladet, TV2 m.v. Jeg betragter medier
generelt som langt mindre serise end i selskab som Costa

Ser i nogle problemer i eller skrupler ved fortsat at samarbejde med Costa Cruises? Ved du
hvordan andre bureauer ser p dette?

Nej det ser jeg ikke - og som professionel "observatr" p hvad andre bureauer gr - kan jeg ikke
se at der er nogen som "har pillet dem af hylden"
Hvis du selv har yderligere kommentarer til emnet, s m du endelige sende dem ogs.
Mange tak for hjlpen.
Med venlig hilsen
Tine

From: Peter Anker Jensen
Sent: Tuesday, April 10, 2012 12:15 PM
To: Tine Grarup
Subject: Re: Hvordan har Costa Concordia krisen pvirker Fri Ferie's salg af cruise rejser

Hej Tine

Du m godt sende mig nogle sprgsml - men jeg har meget at lave s jeg kommer til at svare kort.

/Peter

Den 29/03/2012 kl. 16.36 skrev Tine Grarup:

Hej Peter,

Jeg har fet din mail af din kollega tidligere idag.
Jeg er kandidat studerende p Handelshjskolen i Aarhus, og er igang med at skrive
semesteropgave omkring crisis managment og Costa Concordia krisen.

Page 61 of 65
Jeg ved at i samarbejder med Costa Cruises i forbindelse med jeres udbud af cruise rejser, og
kunne i den forbindelse godt tnke mig, at hre hvordan krisen har pvirket jeres salg af cruise
rejser.

Jeg vil stte pris p hvis jeg mtte sende dig nogle sprgsml via mail, ellers hvis jeg m ringe og f
en snak om det.

Ser frem til at hre fra dig.

-Med venlig hilsen / Best regards
Tine Grarup
Stud.cand.ling.merc Corporate Communication

Aarhus University, Business and Social Sciences
Page 62 of 65
7.10 Appendix 10: Three CSR Communication Strategies

Below appendix is an extraction from the Corporate Communication paper on 1st semester212.
Based on Grunig and Hunts characterization of public relations models (1984) being; press
agentry, public information, two way asymmetric, and two way symmetric213, Morsing and Schultz
have developed three types of stakeholder relations for the communication used by corporations
when engaging in CSR. Namely the stakeholder information strategy, the stakeholder response
strategy, and the stakeholder involvement strategy as visualized in figure 4 below214. The full table
developed by Morsing and Schultz is to be found in appendix 3, including a more thorough
explanation.
Figure: Three CSR communication strategies (own adaption)
The stakeholder information strategy is a one-way flow of information from corporation to

stakeholders, and is similar to Grunig and Hunts public information model. This strategy has the
purpose of distributing information, in order to inform the general public about the corporations
favorable CSR initiatives as objectively as possible. Focus is here on the design of the concept
message, in the attempt to ensure positive stakeholder support.215 However such an approach might
run the risk of the self-promoters paradox as credibility of the communication originates from the
corporation itself216.
The stakeholder response strategy is based on Grunig and Hunts two-way asymmetric
communication, where communication flows to and from the external stakeholders. Being
asymmetric the corporation however still attempts to modify public attitude and behavior, and does

212
Grarup (2011) p. 12-14

Grunig & Hunt (1984) p. 21-25
214
215
216
213
Page 63 of 65
not change as a result of public relations217. This strategy takes an evaluative mode, where the focus
of CSR initiatives is decided upon feedback from the public. This model is frequently used by
corporations, however in is important to note that Morsing and Schultz question and elaborate on
the model arguing that what aspires to be a two-way communication mechanism is really [sender
oriented and] a one-way method for supporting and reinforcing corporate actions and identity218.
Thus using this strategy, corporations need to carefully choose their communication to engage
stakeholders, as they need their endorsement.
The stakeholder involvement strategy does in contrast engage in real mutual dialogue, as persuasion
comes from both the corporation itself and its external stakeholders. This implies that corporations
might also be influenced by stakeholders and thus must change when necessary. By engaging in
these dialogues corporations explore mutually beneficial actions, and are able to keep up with the
development of stakeholder expectations and further the corporations own ability to meet these219.
The CSR initiative hereby depends on its ability to integrate both internal and external CSR
concerns in a continuous dialogue.
The stakeholder involvement strategy is further interlinked with the two above strategies, however
it argues that informing and evaluating is not sufficient alone. Hence, the corporations must ensure
a concurrent interaction with stakeholders in order to bring about mutual understanding and rational
agreement220.
On the basis of CSR being a continuously developing concept demanding continuously adaption,
Morsing and Schultz highlight that stakeholder involvement becomes increasingly more important
for ensuring that a company stays in tune with concurrently changing stakeholder expectations221.
Thus the three strategies cover the development of stakeholder relationships. While one-way
communication of CSR initiatives is necessary in giving sense to stakeholders, it can no longer
stand alone. In order to survive, stakeholders, whom corporations are depending on, need to be
engaged in long-term value creation. This interaction will generate long-term mutual relationships,
being another source of competitive advantage222. Having a positive recognition from stakeholders

217

219
220
221
222
Morsing & Schultz in Morsing & Beckmann (2006) p. 139
218
Page 64 of 65
and being perceived as a legitimate corporation further cause a smaller need for loud CSR
communication223. Reputation surveys indicate that subtle CSR communication such as annual
reports and websites are the preferred means of CSR communication by stakeholders224. Such a
communication strategy might have little public display, yet it allows for a stronger focus on
content. Morsing and Schultz, however, also suggest that such minimal releases would very much
benefit from adding stakeholder involvement, as allowing for stakeholder expression of support
and/or thoughts about the CSR initiative, will then generate the needed visibility225.
Comment:
In practice communication with stakeholders is costly and time-consuming, thus the

stakeholder dialogue is likely to be located somewhere between the extremes of the
above strategies, making the complexity of the environment manageable, by focusing
maybe on a limited number of stakeholders and issues (Pedersen (2006) p. 142-143).

223

225
224
Page 65 of 65

Assessing Situational Crisis Communication of The Costa Concordia Crisis

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2st semester exam 2012

Responding to Crisis: Assessing Situational Crisis

Student: Tine Grarup 286495

Total number of characters: 32,992

7.2 Appendix 2: Instructing and Adjusting Information in Crisis Response ............................. 38

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1.1 Problem Statement

Berger & Luckmann (1966)

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Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 2-3

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Pearson & Clair (1998) p. 60-61

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2.3 Crisis Response

Seymour & Moore (2000) p. 116

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Figure 1: The crisis situation (own adaption)

Coombs & Holiday (2012) p. 181

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2.3.2 Crisis Response Strategies

Table 1: Crisis response strategies by the SCCT (own adaption)

Benoit (1995) in Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 139

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Coombs: Protecting (2007) p. 171; Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 139-140

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Coombs: Ongoing (2007) p. 143; Coombs: Protecting (2007) p. 173

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Figure 2: Costa Cruises Vision Statement62

The Company history

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Figure 3: Costa Cruises stakeholder map (own adaption)

3.3 The Costa Concordia Crisis

Seymour & Moore (2000) p. 79

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The accident occurred due to a deviation

accident to the coast guard in time, and

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Figure 5: Statement of human error from Costa Cruises79

Coombs, Protecting (2007) p. 173

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Paloti (2009); Derbyshire (2012)

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Figure 7: Crisis Response Timeline (own adaption)89

Section 2.3.1; Section 3.3.1; Appendix 3

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Figure 8: Extract from first statement from Costa Cruises91

Figure 9: Tweet from Costa Cruises Twitter account92

Figure 10: Extract from second statement from Costa Cruises95

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Figure 11: First post on Costa Cruises Facebook page96

Costa Concordia on Twitter; Appendix 8 (facebook)

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Figure 12: Extract from statement: Background of Costas commitment to safety108

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Figure 14: Article from news media CP World114

Figure 15: Costa Cruises rejection of discount rumors

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Figure 16: Costa Cruises statement on Facebook acknowledging stakeholder requests118.

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Costa Cruises' responses

Strong attributions of crisis