CASE 117: JOCSON v.

ROBLES
FACTS: Gloria G. Jocson files for annulment of marriage on the ground that it was bigamous. It was stated
in the complaint that prior to his marriage to plaintiff on May 27, 1958, defendant Robles had contracted a
first marriage with Josefina Fausto, who had instituted a criminal action for Bigamy against the same
defendant in the Court of First Instance of Manila. Defendant Robles also assailed the validity of the
marriage but he charged Jocsons parents for compelling him by force, threat and intimidation, to contract
that marriage with her, despite their knowledge that he is a married man; and that said threat and
intimidation allegedly continued until January, 1963 when he was finally able to get away and live apart from
Jocson.
ISSUE: WON the marriage of Jocsin and Robles can be granted annulment
HELD: No, they cannot be given annulment
RATIO: The Supreme court denied the annulment on grounds that judgment rendering a marriage annulled
cannot be made upon stipulation of facts or confession of judgment (confession here being that the
respondent himself admitted to being forced into the marriage). For petitions for nullity and annulment, the
case cannot be decided on mere submissions of pleadings because the parties must prove their claims in
court
CASE 122: WIEGEL v. SEMPIO-DY
FACTS: Respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel asked for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage with petitioner
Lilia Oliva Wiegel on the ground of Lilia's previous existing marriage to one Eduardo A. Maxion. Lilia
admitted the existence of her subsisting marriage but claimed that her marriage to Maxion was null and void
on the grounds that they were forced to enter said marital union. In the pre-trial that ensued, the issue
agreed upon by both parties was the status of the first marriage. Contesting the validity of the pre-trial order,
Lilia asked the respondent court for an opportunity to present evidence, these evidences were (1) that the
first marriage was vitiated by force exercised upon both her and the first husband; and (2) that the first
husband was at the time of the marriage in 1972 already married to someone else.
Respondent judge ruled against the presentation of evidence because the existence of force exerted on
both parties of the first marriage had already been agreed upon. Hence, the present petition for certiorari
assailing the following Orders of the respondent Judge (1) the Order dated March 17, 1980 in which the
parties were compelled to submit the case for resolution based on "agreed facts;" and (2) the Order dated
April 14, 1980, denying petitioner's motion to allow her to present evidence in her favor.
ISSUE: W/N the Lilia Wiegels marriage to Karl Wiegel is valid
HELD: The marriage of Lilia Weigel and Karl Weigel is invalid.
RATIO: Lilia Weigel could not remarry because of her subsisting marriage to one Eduardo Maxion. The
respondent courts decision is affirmed because both parties agreed in the existence of the marriage of Lilia
and Eduardo. Their marriage is merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid until annulled.
Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married respondent she was still validly
married to her first husband, therefore, her marriage to respondent is void (Art. 80, Civil Code).
CASE 127: DINO v. DINO
FACTS: Alain M. Dio (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Dio (respondent) were childhood friends and
sweethearts. They started living together in 1984 until they decided to separate in 1994. In 1996, they
decided to live together again. On 14 January 1998, they were married before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of
Las Pias City. On 30 May 2001, petitioner then filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against
respondent, citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Petitioner alleged that
respondent failed in her marital obligation to give love and support to him, and had abandoned her
responsibility to the family, choosing instead to go on shopping sprees and traveling with her friends that
depleted the family assets. Petitioner further alleged that respondent was not faithful, and would at times
become violent and hurt him.
Extrajudicial service of summons was effected upon respondent who, at the time of the filing of the petition,
was already living in the United States of America. Despite receipt of the summons, respondent did not file

an answer to the petition within the reglementary period. Petitioner later learned that respondent filed a
petition for divorce/dissolution of her marriage with petitioner, which was granted by the Superior Court of
California on 25 May 2001. Petitioner also learned that on 5 October 2001, respondent married a certain
Manuel V. Alcantara.
The trial court ruled that petitioner was able to establish respondent's psychological incapacity therefore
declaring their marriage void ab initio. The court ruled that A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE shall only be issued upon compliance with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code. It later
altered it to A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after liquidation, partition
and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code
ISSUE: W/N the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be
issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family
Code
HELD: Yes, the court erred.
RATIO: The petitioners marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 3615 of the Family Code
and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by
petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In the case of Valdes v RTC, the Court ruled that
the property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of cohabitation are governed either by
Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the
spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article
496 of the Civil Code, partition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings.
It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity
of marriage.
CASE 132: REMO v. DFA
FACTS: The petitioner Maria Virginia V. Remo is a married Filipino citizen whose passport was expiring on
October 27, 2000. The following entries appear in her passport: Rallonza as her surname, Maria Virginia
as her given name and Remo as her middle name. Petitioner who at that time her marriage still subsists,
applied for the renewal of her passport with the Department of Foreign Affairs in Chicago, Illinois.
On August 28, 2000, the DFA, through Assistant Secretary Belen F. Anota denied the request to revert the
use of her maiden name, thus stating; that the Passport Act of 1996 clearly defines the conditions when a
woman applicant may revert to her maiden name, that is, only in cases of annulment, divorce and death of
the husband. Ms. Remos case does not meet any of these conditions. Petitioners motion for
reconsideration of the above-letter resolution was denied in a letter dated 13 October 2000. The Office of the
President also dismissed the appeal on July 27, 2004. Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court of Appeals denied the petition
and affirmed the ruling of the Office of the President.
ISSUE: W/N the petitioner can revert to the use of her maiden name in the replacement passport, despite
the subsistence of her marriage.
HELD: No, the petitioner should not resume her maiden name in the replacement passport. A married
womans reversion to the use of her maiden name must be based only on the severance of the marriage.
RATIO: Once a married woman opted to adopt her husbands surname in her passport, she may not revert
to the use of her maiden name, except in the cases enumerated in section 5(d) of RA 8239. These are (1)
death of husband, (2) divorce, (3) annulment, or (4) nullity of marriage. Since petitioners marriage to her
husband subsists, she many not resume her maiden name in the replacement passport.
Even assuming RA 8239 conflicts with the civil code, the provisions of RA 8239 which is a special law
specifically dealing with passport issuance must prevail over the provisions of the title XIII of the civil code
which is the general law on the use of surnames. A basic tenet in statutory construction is that a special law
prevails over a general law.
The petitioner consciously chose to use her husbands surname before, in her previous passport application,
and now desires to resume her maiden name. If the court allows petitioners present request, nothing
prevents her in the future from requesting to revert to the use of her husbands surname. Such unjustified
changes in one's name and identity in a passport, which is considered superior to all other official

documents, cannot be countenanced. Undue confusion and inconsistency in the records of passport
holders will arise. Thus, for passport issuance purposes, a married woman, such as petitioner, whose
marriage subsists, may not change her family name at will.
CASE 137: MOE v. DINKINS
FACTS: Plaintiff Raoul Roe, 18, and Plaintiff Maria Moe, 15. They have a 1 yr. old son named Ricardo Roe.
Plaintiffs live together as a family unit and desire to be married to fortify their family unit and remove the
humiliation of illegitimacy from their son. Maria requested consent from her widowed mother to marry Raoul,
but she refused because she wished to continue receiving welfare benefits for Maria.
Plaintiffs were prohibited from entering into marriage because there is a New York law which requires
minors to obtain parental consent prior to marriage. Plaintiffs brought suit claiming the law (Section 15.3)
violated the Due Process Clause of the US Constitution.
ISSUE: W/N the law requiring parental consent to marry deprived plaintiffs in unconstitutional
HELD: No, the law is constitutional because the State has a legitimate interest in protecting minors from
immature decision-making.
RATIO: The New York Domestic Relations Law being assailed provided that all male marriage license
applicants between 16 and 18 and all female applicants between 14 and 18 must obtain written consent
from both parents (that are living). It requires women between the ages of 14 and 16 to obtain judicial
approval of the marriage in addition to parental consent.
The law should not be examined under a strict scrutiny standard, but rather it must be determined if there is
a rational relationship between the means chosen and the legitimate state interests advanced. The parental
consent requirement ensures that at least one mature person will participate in the marriage decision.
Because of this and minors lack of experience, perspective, and judgment, the law is rationally related to a
legitimate state interest. The law assumes that parents will act in the best interests of their children.
There is no denial of right to marry. The Statue merely delays plaintiff access to the institution of marriage
until they comply with the necessary requirements of parental consent, or emancipation.
CASE 142: ANAYA v. PALAROAN
FACTS: Aurora Anaya and Fernando Palaroan were married in 1953. Respondent Palaroan filed an action
for annulment of the marriage in 1954 on the ground that his consent was obtained through force and
intimidation. The complaint was dismissed upholding the validity of the marriage and granting Auroras
counterclaim. While the amount of counterclaim was being negotiated, Fernando divulged to petitioner
Anaya that several months prior to their marriage, he had pre-marital relationship with a close relative of his.
According to her, the non-divulgement to her of such pre-marital secret constituted fraud in obtaining her
consent. She prayed for the annulment of her marriage and for moral damages with Fernando on such
ground.
Defendant Fernando denied the allegation and denied having had pre-marital relationship with a close
relative; he argued that under no circumstance would he live with Aurora, as he had escaped from her and
from her relatives the day following their marriage on 4 December 1953; that he denied having committed
any fraud against her. He counterclaimed for damages for the malicious filing of the suit. Defendant
Fernando did not pray for the dismissal of the complaint but for its dismissal "with respect to the alleged
moral damages."
ISSUE: WON the non-divulgement to petitioner Anaya of such pre-marital secret constituted fraud
HELD: No, Auroras allegation of the Fraud was legally insufficient to invalidate her marriage to Palaroan.
RATIO: Concealment of premarital relations was not among the kinds of fraud stated in the Civil Code
(Family Code). The pertinent provision is not subject to interpretation as it was also expressly stated no
other misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud. Therefore the case at bar does not constitute fraud
and therefore would not warrant an annulment of marriage.

CASE 147: ALCAZAR v. ALCAZAR

FACTS: Petitioner Veronica alleged in her Complaint that she was married to respondent Rey on October
11, 2000 at the latters residence. After their wedding, petitioner and respondent lived for five days in San
Jose, Occidental Mindoro. Then, the newlyweds went back to Manila, but respondent did not live with
petitioner at the latters abode. On October 23, 2000, the respondent left for Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. While
working there, the respondent did not communicate with petitioner by phone or by letter. Veronica tried to
call Rey for five times but he never answered. About a year and a half after respondent left for Riyadh, a coteacher informed petitioner that respondent was about to come home to the Philippines. Petitioner was
surprised why the respondent did not tell her of his arrival.
Petitioner also averred in her Complaint that when respondent arrived in the Philippines, the latter did not go
home to petitioner. Instead, respondent proceeded to his parents house in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro.
Petitioner traveled to Occidental Mindoro, where she was informed that respondent had been living with his
parents since his arrival in March 2002. Petitioner asserted that from the time respondent arrived in
the Philippines, he never contacted her. Thus, petitioner concluded that respondent was physically
incapable of consummating his marriage with her, providing sufficient cause for annulment of their marriage
pursuant to paragraph 5, Article 45 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code). There was also no
more possibility of reconciliation between petitioner and respondent.
RTC and CA denied her petition. As a last-ditch effort to have her marriage to respondent declared null,
petitioner pleads abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondent. Petitioner claims that she was
informed by one Jacinto Fordonez, who is residing in the same barangay as respondent in Occidental
Mindoro, that respondent is living-in with another woman named Sally.
ISSUE: W/N the respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations
HELD: No, respondent Rex Alcazar is not psychologically incapacitated.
RATIO: Sexual infidelity does not constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family
Code. Again, petitioner must be able to establish that respondents unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a
disordered personality, which makes him completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the
marital state.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. Presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage. Petitioner failed to
persuade that respondents failure to communicate with petitioner since leaving for Saudi Arabia to work,
and to live with petitioner after returning to the country, are grave psychological maladies that are keeping
him from knowing and/or complying with the essential obligations of marriage.
Incapacity to consummate denotes the permanent physical inability on the part of the spouses to perform
the complete act of sexual intercourse or impotency

CASE 153: VALDEZ v. REPUBLIC

FACTS: Angelita Valdez married Sofio in January 1971. She gave birth to a baby girl named Nancy. They
argued regularly because Sofio was unemployed and did not provide for the family. In March 1972, the latter
left their house. Angelita and her child waited until in May 1972, the mother and daughter decided to go back
to her parents home. 3 years have passed without any word from Sofio until in October 1975 when he
showed up and they agreed to separate and executed a document to that effect. It was the last time they
saw each other and had never heard of ever since.
Believing that Sofio was already dead, petitioner married Virgilio Reyes in June 1985. Virgilios application
for naturalization in US was denied because petitioners marriage with Sofio was subsisting. Hence, in
March 2007, petitioner filed a petition seeking declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners marriage with Virgilio is valid despite lack of declaration of presumptive
death of Sofio.
HELD: Yes, the marriage is valid under paragraph 2 of Article 83 of the Civil Code.
RATIO: Civil Code of Art. 83 states that Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the
lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and
void from its performance, unless: (2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the

time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, of if the
absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and
believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the
absentee is presumed dead according to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in
any of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court.
Law establishes under the Civil Code the presumption of death and no court declaration is needed for the
presumption to arise. Since death is presumed to have taken place by the seventh year of absence, Sofio is
to be presumed dead starting October 1982. The Civil Code governs during 1971 and not Family Code
where at least 7 consecutive years of absence is only needed. Thus, petitioner was capacitated to marry
Virgilio and their marriage is legal and valid.
(NOTE: The Petition was dismissed since no decree on the presumption of Sofios death can be granted
under the Civil Code, the same presumption having arisen by operation of law)
CASE 158: LLORENTE v. CA
FACTS: The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United States Navy from
March 10, 1927 to September 30, 1957. On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente were
married in Nabua, Camarines Sur. Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United
States and Paula stayed in the conjugal home in barrio Nabua, Camarines Sur. On November 30, 1943,
Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and Certificate of Naturalization. After the liberation of the
Philippines he went home and visited his wife to which he discovered that his wife was pregnant and was
having an adulterous relationship.
Lorenzo returned to the US and filed for divorce. Lorenzo married Alicia LLorente; they lived together for 25
years and begot 3 children. Lorenzo on his last will and testament gave all his property to Alicia and their 3
children. Paula filed a petition for letters administration over Lorenzos estate. The RTC ruled in favor of
Paula. On appeal, the decision was modified declaring Alicia as co-owner of whatever properties they have
acquired. Hence, this petition to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: (1) W/N the divorce obtained by Lorenzo capacitated him to remarry.
(2) Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo Llorente?
HELD: (1) Yes, Lorenzo is capacitated to remarry. (2) The Court remands the cases to the court of origin for
determination of the intrinsic validity of Llorentes will and determination of the parties successional rights
allowing proof of foreign law with instructions that the trial court shall proceed with all deliberate dispatch to
settle the estate of the deceased within the framework of the Rules of Court.
RATIO: (1) The Supreme Court held that divorce obtained by Lorenzo from his first wife Paula was valid and
recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. In the case of Van Dorn vs Ramillo Jr. the Supreme
Court held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorce. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens
may obtain divorce abroad provided that they are valid according to their national law.
(2) The Civil Code provides: Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public
instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.
The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children by her is glaringly
shown in the will he executed. The court does not wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was a foreigner, not
covered by our laws on family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity. Whether the will is
intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved by foreign law which must be
pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance with the formalities required is answered
by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated.
As a guide, the trial court should note that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our
system of legitimes, Congress did not intend to extend the same to the succession of foreign
nationals. Congress specifically left the amount of successional rights to the decedent's national law
CASE 163: AMOR-CATALAN v. CA
FACTS: Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June 4, 1950 in Mabini,
Pangasinan. Then, they migrated to the United States of America and allegedly became naturalized citizens
thereof. After 38 years of marriage, Felicitas and Orlando divorced in April 1988.

On June 16, 1988, Orlando married respondent Merope in Calasiao, Pangasinan. Petitioner contends that
the marriage was bigamous since Merope had a prior subsisting marriage with Eusebio Bristol. She filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with damages in the RTC of Dagupan City against Orlando and
Merope.
ISSUE: W/N the petitioner has the personality to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage of the
respondents on the ground of bigamy
HELD: It is still yet to be decided. However, a petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other
actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest and must be based on a
cause of action.
RATIO: Solely the husband or the wife may file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage. Petitioners personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be ascertained
because of the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it.
It was the petitioner who alleged in her complaint that they acquired American citizenship and that
respondent Orlando obtained a judicial divorce decree. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the
burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence. Thus, a remand of the case to the trial court for
reception of additional evidence is necessary to determine whether respondent Orlando was granted a
divorce decree and whether the foreign law which granted the same allows or restricts remarriage.
If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained which allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial court
must dismiss the instant petition to declare nullity of marriage on the ground that petitioner Felicitas AmorCatalan lacks legal personality to file the same.
CASE 168: GORAYEB v. HASHIM
FACTS: Plaintiff Gorayeb and defendant Hashim were married in Syria. They were separated for more than
twelve years. The Plaintiff instituted civil case to compel the defendant to pay her alimony. The Court of First
Instance on December 24, 1923 decided in favor of the Plaintiff awarding her alimony of P500.00 per month.
While the decision of the plaintiffs claim of support was still undetermined, the defendant went to the United
States where he was able to procure a divorce decree from the State of Nevada. He went back to the
Philippines and the plaintiff filed a motion alleging that the defendant had failed to pay the pension of P500
per month, which had been awarded to her in the decision of December 24, 1923, and praying that he be
declared to be in contempt of court and that he be fined and sentenced to imprisonment for six months and
until he should comply with the order. As defense, the defendant pleaded the divorce decree from Nevada,
asserting that because of such decree, his marriage to the plaintiff was already dissolved therefore releasing
him from the judgment of the lower court. The Court of appeals decided that despite the divorce decree the
defendant should continue paying the plaintiff P100 per month
ISSUE: W/N the foreign decree of divorce can be recognized by Philippine court
HELD: No, the Philippine Court does not recognize the foreign divorce acquired by Hashim.
RATIO: In the case of Ramirez vs. Gmur the court of a country in which neither of the spouses is domiciled
and to which one or both of them may resort merely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce has no jurisdiction
to determine their matrimonial status; and a divorce granted by such a court is not entitled to recognition
elsewhere. The voluntary appearance of the defendant before such a tribunal does not invest the court with
jurisdiction. The court also says: "It follows that, to give a court jurisdiction on the ground of the plaintiff's
residence in the State or country of the judicial forum, his residence must be bona fide. If a spouse leaves
the family domicile and goes to another State for the sole purpose of obtaining a divorce, and with no
intention of remaining, his residence there is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the courts of that State.
This is especially true where the cause of divorce is one not recognized by the laws of the State of his own
domicile.