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FACTS: In the year 1880, Mariano Nable Jose was married in first wedlock
to Doa Paz Borja and had by her the following children: Remedios,
Feliciano, Rocio and Mariano, the first three of whom are now of age,
Remedios is married to Fernando Arce, but the last child, Mariano, is still a
minor and is represented in this suit by the said Fernando Arce as curator
ad litem. Paz Borja died intestate in the year 1898, and left no heirs than
the said four children and her surviving husband, Mariano Nable Jose. The
community partnership between Mariano Nable Jose and his Paz Borja has
not been liquidated since its dissolution in the year 1898. No proceedings
whatever have been had for the judicial administration of the properties of
this partnership. Mariano Nable Jose got indebted and mortgaged the
community properties to Amparo Nable Jose de Lichauco and Asuncion
Nable Jose, niece Carmen Castro, The Standard Oil Company on
September 27, 1909. This property is encumbered by another mortgaged in
favor of Carmen Castro. Paz Borja's heirs had no knowledge mortgages
nor did they give their consent to them. In order to recover payment and
foreclosure of mortgages, Amparo N. Jose de Lichauco and Asuncion H.
Jose, The Standard Oil Company of New York; and then Carmen Castro
commenced actions against Mariano N. Jose y Vinluan.

ISSUE: Whether or not the surviving husband, after the death of his wife
may sell or mortgage the community property acquired during coverture.

HELD: The trial court erred in declaring the mortgage invalid in so far as it
affects the one-half undivided share of said property, which the court
erroneously held to be the property of these heirs. The judgment entered
by the trial judge should be reversed, and that the record should be
returned to the court below, where a new judgment will be entered
disposing of the contentions of the various parties to this litigation as
hereinbefore indicated, and providing for the sale of the mortgaged
property in the form and upon the conditions prescribed by law.


64 PHIL 156
FACTS: Upon the express guaranty of the appellant Fidelity & Surety
Company of the Philippine Islands, the Philippine Trust Company granted
Romarico Agcaoili a credit in current account not to exceed P20,000.
Appellee Angel A. Ansaldo, agreed to indemnify the Fidelity & Surety
Company of the Philippine Islands for all losses and damages that might
sustain by reason of having guaranteed Agcaoili's obligations to the
Philippine Trust Company. Agcaoili, paid the Philippine Trust Company the
sum of P19,065.17 and brought an action against the appellee Angel A.
Ansaldo for the recovery of P19,065.17, after obtaining a judgment on its
favor, caused the sheriff of the City of Manila to levy on the joint savings
account in the name of Angel A. Ansaldo and Margarita Quintos de
Ansaldo in the said Bank amounting to P165.84. The Appellees filed a third
party claim against the sheriff alleging that the money on which he levied
execution was the property of the conjugal partnership between the said
appellees and not liable for the payment of personal obligations of the
appellee, in the Court of First Instance of Manila to nullify the execution
levied by the sheriff. The court sentenced the appellants, to pay the
appellees the sum of P636.80 with interest at the rate of ten percent per
annum from June 6, 1934 until paid, and the costs of suit.

ISSUE: Whether or not a joint savings account and a joint current account
in a bank, of a husband and his wife are liable for the payment of the
obligation of the husband.

HELD: No. The sum of P636.80 was derived from the paraphernal property
of the appellee, Margarita Quintos de Ansaldo, the wife of the other
appellee Angel A. Ansaldo. It therefore belongs to the conjugal partnership
of the said spouses. (Civil Code, art. 1401.) The fruits of the paraphernal
property cannot be subject to the payment of personal obligations of the
husband, unless it be proved that such obligation were productive of some
benefit to the family. But there was no proof that the obligations contracted
by Angel A. Ansaldo, were productive and benefited the family. While the
sum of P636.80 has become the property of the conjugal partnership, the
entitlement of the husband to one-half of the property of the conjugal
partnership does not vest until the dissolution of the marriage when the
conjugal partnership is also dissolved. (Civil Code, arts. 1392 and 1426.)


FACTS: Plaintiff Zulueta, his wife and daughter were passengers aboard
defendants plane from Honolulu to Manila. Upon reaching Wake Island the
passengers were advised that there will be stopover for about 30 minutes.
Plaintiff went to the toilet at the terminal building but upon returning he told
an employee of the defendant that they almost made him miss the flight
because of a defective announcing system. The plane captain or the
terminal manager told that they would open his bags which he refused and
he warned them of the consequences. Just the same they opened his
bags and found nothing prohibited. They forced him to go out the plane
and left him at Wake Island. His wife had to send him money and he was
able to leave Wake Island and return to Manila thru Honolulu and Tokyo
after two days. This action was to recover damages from the defendant.

ISSUE: Whether or not moral damages may be recovered.

HELD: Yes. The records establish plaintiffs right to recover both moral and
exemplary damages, like the rude and rough reception plaintiff received at
the hands of Sitton or Captain Zentner; the menacing attitude of Zentner or
Sitton and the supercilious manner in which he had asked plaintiff to open
his bags (open your bag, and when told that a fourth bag was missing, the
abusive language and highly scornful reference to plaintiffs as monkeys by
one of the PAN-AM employees (who turning to Mrs. Zulueta remarked, will
you pull these three monkeys out of here?); the ugly stares and unkind
remarks to which plaintiffs were subjected, and their being cordoned by
men in uniform as if they were criminals, the airline officials refusal to allow
plaintiff to board the plane on the pretext that he was hiding a bomb in his
luggage and their arbitrary decision to leave him in Wake; Mrs. Zuluetas
having suffered a nervous breakdown for which she was hospitalized as a
result of the embarrassment, insults and humiliations to which plaintiffs
were exposed by the conduct of PAN AMs employees; all these justify an
award for moral damages resulting from mental anguish, serious anxiety,
wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation thereby suffered by
plaintiffs. Plaintiffs were awarded Pesos 500,000.00 and moral damages,
Pesos 200,000.00 exemplary damages, Pesos 75,000.00 attorneys fees
and Pesos 5,502.85 actual damages.


Facts: Daniel Jovellanos and Philamlife entered into a lease and conditional
sale agreement over a house and lot when Daniel Jovellanos was married to
Leonor Dizon, with whom he had three children, the petitioners. When Leonor
Dizon died, Daniel married private respondent Annette with whom he begot
two children. The daughter from the 1st marriage Mercy Jovellanos married
Gil Martinez and at the behest of Daniel Jovellanos, they built a house on the
back portion of the premises. With the lease amounts having been paid,
Philamlife executed to Daniel Jovellanos a deed of absolute sale and, on the
next day, the latter donated to herein petitioners all his rights, title and
interests over the lot and bungalow thereon. In 1985, Daniel died. Private
respondent Annette H. Jovellanos claimed in the lower court that the
aforestated property was acquired by her deceased husband while their
marriage was still subsisting and which forms part of the conjugal partnership
of the second marriage. Petitioners contend that the property, were acquired
by their parents during the existence of the first marriage under their lease
and conditional sale agreement with Philamlife of September 2, 1955.

Issue: Whether or not the house and lot pertains to the second marriage?

Held: Yes. The conditional sale agreement in said contract is, therefore, also
in the nature of a contract to sell, as contradistinguished from a contract of
sale. In a contract to sell or a conditional sale, ownership is not transferred
upon delivery of the property but upon full payment of the purchase price.
Generally, ownership is transferred upon delivery, but even if delivered, the
ownership may still be with the seller until full payment of the price is made, if
there is stipulation to this effect, usually known as a pactum reservati dominii,
or contractual reservation of title, and is common in sales on the installment
plan. Compliance with the stipulated payments is a suspensive condition.
Upon the execution of said deed of absolute sale, full ownership was vested in
Daniel Jovellanos when he was already married to Annette H. Jovellanos, this
property necessarily belonged to his conjugal partnership with his said second
wife. But the second wife is still liable to pay the corresponding
reimbursements to the petitioners who helped pay for the amortization of the
house and lot as stated in Article 118 of the Family Code on property bought
on installments, where ownership is vested during the marriage, such property
shall belong to the conjugal partnership.


Jose Flores, deceased, had been three times married and left children
surviving from each of said marriages. In the settlement of his estate,
various questions have arisen as to the nature of the property to be divided.
Now, the children of the 2nd marriage, Sotero and Agueda insisted in the
lower court that all of the property acquired by the testator during his 2 nd
marriage pertained to the conjugal partnership w/c should be liquidated &
that the half pertaining to their mother should be segregated before any
general distribution of the estate should occur. It appears that after the
death of 2nd wife, Flores instituted proceedings to register said lands and
procured the Torrens certificate of title thereto in his sole name. This had
the effect of making these lands the exclusive property of Flores and of
extinguishing their character as conjugal property of the prior marriage.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said land w/ Torrens certificate of title is part of
conjugal property of the second marriage.
HELD: The property acquired during the 2nd marriage pertains to the
conjugal partnership of said marriage regardless of the form in which the
title is then or there afterwards taken. The surviving husband is ex-officio
manager, or administrator, of the conjugal estate. He has the power to
alienate the property for the purpose of liquidating the estate and the
purchaser under him undoubtedly gets valid title. But as long as the
husband retains the property in whatever form, he holds it in the character
of administrator and is virtually a trustee for those interested in the conjugal
partnership. It is clearly shown that the registration of property in the name
of one who holds in a trust character does not extinguish the trust or
destroy the rights of the beneficiary.


FACTS:The late Lim Hoc, a former employee of the Yuyitung Publishing
Company, was, at the time of his death on November 3, 1957, a member of
the System. In the SSS-Form E-1 accomplished and filed by him with the
System, he gave his civil status as married, but made no mention of the
members of his family or other relatives. Instead, he designated therein the
petitioner Jose P. Tecson, reportedly a friend and his co-worker as his
beneficiary. After the death of Lim Hoc, petitioner, in his capacity as the
designated beneficiary, filed with the System a claim for death benefits.
(ROA, p. 31). The Social Security Commission denied the payment of
death benefits to Jose P. Tecson, the designated beneficiary of Lim Hoc
who is an employee of Yuyitung Publishing Company.

ISSUE: Whether or not the System is liable to pay the benefits to Jose P.
Tecson, a friend and co- worker of Lim Hoc whom he designated as his

HELD: Yes, the contribution of the employer is for the benefit of the
employee. Hence the beneficiary should primarily be the one to profit by
such contributions. It may be true that the purpose of the coverage under
the Social Security System is protection of the employee as well as of his
family, but this purpose or intention of the law cannot be enforced to the
extent of contradicting the very provisions of said law as contained in
Section 13, thereof, as follows:
Section 13. Upon the covered employee's death or total and permanent
disability under such conditions as the Commission may define, before
becoming eligible for retirement and if either such death or disability is not
compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act, he or, in case of his
death, his beneficiaries as recorded by his employer shall be entitled to the
following benefit: ... (R.A. 1161 as amended.)
It is to be noted also that the funeral expenses of Lim Hoc are to be paid
from the benefits, so that what is to be paid to Tecson would be greatly


FACTS: The spouses Estanislao Santos and Marcela Tizon lived together
in the Province of Pampanga until in the year 1914, when Estanislao
Santos died. The widow, Da. Marcela Tizon, died in December 1917.
Since the couple has no children, the interested persons in their properties
are the collateral heirs of the two spouse respectively. Eliseo Santos
became administrator of the community property of the two spouses. When
the Court of First Instance of Pampanga ordered Eliseo Santos, as
administrator to submit a project for a division of the property pertaining to
the estate on June 12, 1921, Eliseo Santos presented a project,
accompanied by a general inventory which included seven items, lettered
respectively (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), ( f ), and (g), representing valid charges
against Marcela Tizon in the liquidation of the ganancial property. The trial
judge admitted the property of items (a) and (b) in the project of partition
submitted by Eliseo Santos, as valid charges against Marcela Tizon,
however, items lettered (c), (d), (e), ( f ), and (g), were disallowed as they
did not constitute legal charges against Marcela Tizon.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial Judge erred in disallowing items (c), (d),
(e), ( f ), and (g) for it not constitute legal charge against the interest of
Marcela Tizon.

HELD: Yes, the Judge erred in holding that items (c), (d), (e), ( f ), and (g)
could not constitute a legal charge against the interest of Marcela Tizon.
The amount paid out to redeem the property should be charged against the
one-half portion pertaining to Marcela Tizon, and it remained as the
particular property of Marcela Tizon, for if the right of redemption pertained
to her, so also must the property belong to her after redemption. (Civ.
Code, arts. 1337-2; 1396-3.) An irrigation system beneficial to real property
is a useful expenditure with the contemplation of article 1404 of the Civil
Code and, if financed from the community assets, is chargeable against the
party benefit when the time comes for the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership. The maintenance and support of Marcela Tizon during
widowhood, was properly borne by the administrator of the deceased
husband, but this expenditure was in the nature of a mere advancement
and under article 1430 of the Civil Code.


FACTS: Prior to 1910 the marriage of Magdalena Clemente and Manuel
Lorenzo, both have contracted first marriage on their deceased former
spouses. Magdalena and Lorenzo died having no child. However in their
first marriage, the spouses left as Heirs the petitioners in this case. Now,
the deceased spouses left parcels of land on w/c the issue is raised as to
its nature. As to Parcel of land No. 6, it was purchased on installment basis
in her own name by Magdalena prior to her marriage with Manuel Lorenzo.
The amount spent for the payments of installments due during the
marriage, or obligations affecting the separate property is certainly a useful
expenditures because it preserves her right to the ownership of the land,
therefore, a credit which belongs to the conjugal partnership, and must be
reimbursed to it by her. As to Parcel of land No. 5, it was also purchased on
installment by Magdalena before marriage. Payments on account of the
installments were made by her. 4 years after the death of Manuel, the
final certificate of sale was executed by the Director of Lands in her favor
and in her name.

ISSUE: Whether or not the parcels of land held to be a paraphernal

properties of Magdalena Clemente.

HELD: In case of death of a holder of a certificate which is only an

agreement to sell it is not the heirs but the widow who succeeds in the
parcels of land to be sold by the Government. Only do the heirs succeed in
the rights of the deceased holder of a certificate if no widow survives him.
The petitioner, the heirs of the late Manuel Lorenzo, are not entitled to onehalf of the two parcels of land. But the installments paid during coverture
are deemed conjugal, there being no evidence that they were paid out of
funds belonging exclusively to the late Magdalena Clemente. Upon these
grounds and reasons the judgment of the Court of Appeals under review is
affirmed, without cost.