Frank uy vs bir

Search and Seizure Requisites of a Valid Search Warrant

In Sept 1993, Rodrigo Abos, a former employee of UPC reported to the BIR that Uy Chin Ho
aka Frank Uy, manager of UPC, was selling thousands of cartons of canned cartons without
issuing a report. This is a violation of Sec 253 & 263 of the Internal Revenue Code. In Oct
1993, the BIR requested before RTC Cebu to issue a search warrant. Judge Gozo-Dadole
issued a warrant on the same day. A second warrant was issued which contains the same
substance but has only one page, the same was dated Oct 1st 2003. These warrants were
issued for the alleged violation by Uy of Sec 253. A third warrant was issued on the same
day for the alleged violation of Uy of Sec 238 in relation to sec 263. On the strength of
these warrants, agents of the BIR, accompanied by members of the PNP, on 2 Oct 1993,
searched the premises of the UPC. They seized, among other things, the records and
documents of UPC. A return of said search was duly made by Labaria with the RTC of Cebu.
UPC filed a motion to quash the warrants which was denied by the RTC. They appealed
before the CA via certiorari. The CA dismissed the appeal for a certiorari is not the proper
remedy.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid search warrant issued.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of UPC and Uy in a way for it ordered the return of the seized
items but sustained the validity of the warrant. The SC ruled that the search warrant issued
has not met some basic requisites of validity. A search warrant must conform strictly to the
requirements of the foregoing constitutional and statutory provisions. These requirements,
in outline form, are:
(1) the warrant must be issued upon probable cause;
(2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or
any other person;
(3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or
affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and
(4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or
things to be seized.
The SC noted that there has been inconsistencies in the description of the place to be
searched as indicated in the said warrants. Also the thing to be seized was not clearly
defined by the judge. He used generic itineraries. The warrants were also inconsistent as to
who should be searched. One warrant was directed only against Uy and the other was
against Uy and UPC. The SC however noted that the inconsistencies wered cured by the
issuance of the latter warrant as it has revoked the two others.
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution guarantees the right of the people against
unreasonable searches and seizures:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation

of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Read full text here.

NOTES
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 3. Requisite for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue but upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be
seized.
SEC. 4. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under
oath the complainant and any witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them
and attach to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted.

People vs aruta
Search and Seizure Informers Tip
In the morning of 13 Dec 1988, the law enforcement officers received information from an
informant named Benjie that a certain Aling Rosa would be leaving for Baguio City on 14
Dec 1988 and would be back in the afternoon of the same day carrying with her a large
volume of marijuana; At 6:30 in the evening of 14 Dec 1988, Aruta alighted from a Victory
Liner Bus carrying a travelling bag even as the informant pointed her out to the law
enforcement officers; NARCOM officers approached her and introduced themselves as
NARCOM agents; When asked by Lt. Abello about the contents of her travelling bag, she
gave the same to him; When they opened the same, they found dried marijuana leaves;
Aruta was then brought to the NARCOM office for investigation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conducted search and seizure is constitutional.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Aruta and has noted that some drug traffickers are being
freed due to technicalities. Aruta cannot be said to be committing a crime. Neither was she
about to commit one nor had she just committed a crime. Aruta was merely crossing the
street and was not acting in any manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the
NARCOM agents to suspect and conclude that she was committing a crime. It was only
when the informant pointed to Aruta and identified her to the agents as the carrier of the
marijuana that she was singled out as the suspect. The NARCOM agents would not have
apprehended Aruta were it not for the furtive finger of the informant because, as clearly
illustrated by the evidence on record, there was no reason whatsoever for them to suspect
that accused-appellant was committing a crime, except for the pointing finger of the
informant. The SC could neither sanction nor tolerate as it is a clear violation of the
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure. Neither was there any
semblance of any compliance with the rigid requirements of probable cause and warrantless
arrests. Consequently, there was no legal basis for the NARCOM agents to effect a
warrantless search of Arutas bag, there being no probable cause and the accused-appellant
not having been lawfully arrested. Stated otherwise, the arrest being incipiently illegal, it
logically follows that the subsequent search was similarly illegal, it being not incidental to a
lawful arrest. The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure must
perforce operate in favor of accused-appellant. As such, the articles seized could not be
used as evidence against accused-appellant for these are fruits of a poisoned tree and,
therefore, must be rejected, pursuant to Article III, Sec. 3(2) of the Constitution.

Read full text here.

NOTES:
When is a warrantless search allowed?
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of
the Rules of Court 8 and by prevailing jurisprudence;
2. Seizure of evidence in plain view, the elements of which are:

(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are
legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where
they are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicles inherent
mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares
furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant
committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.

People vs mantilla
Political Law Search and Seizure Informers Tip Warrantless Arrest
On 19 June 1994 at about 2pm, police officers Talingting and Clarin were informed by an
asset that a drug courier would be arriving from Baguio to Dasmarias carrying an
undetermined amount of marijuana. The next day, the informant pointed at Montilla as the
courier who was waiting in a waiting shed Brgy Salitran, Dasmarias. Montilla was then
apprehended and he was caught in possession of a bag and a carton worth 28 kilos of
marijuana. Montilla denied the allegation and he said he came to Cavite from Baguio for
work and he does not have any effects with him at that time except for some pocket
money. He was sentenced to death thereafter. He averred that the search and seizure
conducted was illegal for there was no warrant and that he should have been given the
opportunity to cross examine the informant. He said that if the informant has given the cops
the information about his arrival as early as the day before his apprehension, the cops
should have ample time to secure a search warrant.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest conducted is legal.
HELD: The SC ruled that the warrantless arrest is legal and so was the warrantless search.
Sec 2 Art 3 of the Constitution has its exception when it comes to warrantless searches,
they are:
(1) customs searches;
(2) searches of moving vehicles,
(3) seizure of evidence in plain view;
(4) consented searches;
(5) searches incidental to a lawful arrest;
(6) stop and frisk measures have been invariably recognized as the traditional
exceptions.
In the case at bar, it should be noted that the information relayed by informant to the cops
was that there would be delivery of marijuana at Barangay Salitran by a courier coming
from Baguio in the early morning of June 20, 1994. Even assuming that the policemen
were not pressed for time, this would be beside the point for, under these circumstances,
the information relayed was too sketchy and not detailed enough for the obtention of the
corresponding arrest or search warrant. While there is an indication that the informant knew
the courier, the records do not reveal that he knew him by name.
On such bare information, the police authorities could not have properly applied for a
warrant, assuming that they could readily have access to a judge or a court that was still
open by the time they could make preparations for applying therefor, and on which there is
no evidence presented by the defense. In determining the opportunity for obtaining
warrants, not only the intervening time is controlling but all the coincident and ambient
circumstances should be considered, especially in rural areas.
A legitimate warrantless arrest, as above contemplated, necessarily cloaks the arresting
police officer with authority to validly search and seize from the offender

(1) dangerous weapons, and

(2) those that may be used as proof of the commission of an offense.

People vs. Racho

626 SCRA 633, August 3, 2010
Facts:
On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular phone with
appellant for the purchase of shabu. The agent reported the transaction to the police authorities who
immediately formed a team to apprehend the appellant. The team members posted themselves along
thenational highway in Baler, Aurora, and at around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, a Genesis bus arrived
inBaler. When appellant alighted from the bus, the confidential agent pointed to him as the person
hetransacted with, and when the latter was about to board a tricycle, the team approached him and
invitedhim to the police station as he was suspected of carrying shabu. When he pulled out his hands from
his
pants pocket, a white envelope slipped therefrom which, when opened
, yielded a small sachet containingthe suspected drug. The team then brought appellant to the police station
for investigation and theconfiscated specimen was marked in the presence of appellant. The field test and
laboratory examinationson the contents of the confiscated sachet yielded positive results for
methamphetamine hydrochloride.Appellant was charged in two separate informations, one for violation of
Section 5 of R.A. 9165, for transporting or delivering; and the second, of Section 11 of the same law for
possessing, dangerous drugs.During the arraignment, appellant pleaded "Not Guilty" to both charges.
On July 8, 2004, the RTCrendered a Joint Judgment convicting appellant of Violation of Section 5, Article
II, R.A. 9165 butacquitted him of the charge of Violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A. 9165. On appeal, the
CA affirmedthe RTC decision. The appellant brought the case to SC assailing for the first time he legality of his
arrestand the validity of the subsequent warrantless search.
Issue:
Whether or not the appellant has a ground to assail the validity of his arrest.
Held:
The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that "reliable information" alone is not sufficient to justify a
warrantless arrest. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act
thatwould indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
Wefind no cogent reason to depart from this well-established doctrine.Appellant herein was not
committing a crime in the presence of the police officers. Neither did thearresting officers have personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested hadcommitted, was committing, or about to
commit an offense. At the time of the arrest, appellant had justalighted from the Gemini bus and was waiting
for a tricycle. Appellant was not acting in any suspiciousmanner that would engender a reasonable ground for
the police officers to suspect and conclude that hewas committing or intending to commit a crime. Were it
not for the information given by the informant,appellant would not have been apprehended and no search
would have been made, and consequently, thesachet of shabu would not have been confiscated. Neither
was the arresting officers impelled by any urgency that would allow them to do away with
therequisite warrant. As testified to by Police Officer 1 Aurelio Iniwan, a member of the arresting team,
their office received the "tipped information" on May 19, 2003. They likewise learned from the informant not
only the appellants physical description but also his name. Although it was not certain that appellant
would arrive on the same day (May 19), there was an assurance that he would be there the following
day(May 20). Clearly, the police had ample opportunity to apply for a warrant.

People v. Claudio
G.R. No. 72564, April 15, 198

FACTS:
Regional Trial Court of Olongapo Cityconvicted the accused Anita Claudio y Bagtangfor violating
Sec. 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Prosecutions witness DanelObia, a policeman, testified that
while on board the Victory Liner heading back to his home in Olongapo, Claudio boarded the same bus
and took the seat in front of him after placing a woven buri bagmade of plastic containing some
vegetables she was carrying at the back of Obias seat. With the feeling that there was some unusual,
he had the urge to search the woven plastic bag so when they reached San Fernando, Pampanga, he
inserted one of his fingers in a plastic bag located at the bottom of the woven bag and smelt marijuana.
He could recognize the smell of marijuana because he was assigned at that time at the ANTI-NARCOTICS
Unit. He did not, however, do anything after he discovered that there was marijuana inside the plastic
bag of the accused until they reached Olongapo City and the accused alighted from the bus.
Obinaintercepted her and showed her his ID Identifying himself as a policeman and told her he will
search her bag because of the suspicion that she was carrying marijuana inside said bag. Claudio replied,
"Please go with me, let us settle this at home." However, the witness did not heed her plea and instead
handcuffed her right hand and with her, boarded a tricycle right away and brought the suspect to the
police headquarters with her bag appearing to contain vegetables.
At the police headquarters Investigation Section, the bag was searched in the presence of
Investigator Cpl. Tiongco,Obia, Claudio and Sgt. LeoncioBagang. Inside the plastic bag was found a big
bundle of plastic containing marijuana weighing about one kilo.

ISSUE:WON Claudios warrantless search, seizure and apprehension were unlawful?

RULING:
NO, the warrantless search, seizure and apprehension were lawful.
Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) of the said Rules provides for the in flagrante delicto arrest, that is, a peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to
be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
Meanwhile, its Rule 126, Sec. 12 provides for a warrantless search incidental to lawful arrest to
be lawful. In other words, a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.
Here, Claudio was caughtin flagrante delicto transporting prohibited drugs. Thus, Pat. Daniel
Obia did not need a warrant to arrest Claudio. The warrantless search being an incident to a lawful
arrest is in itself lawful (Nolasco v. Pano, 147 SCRA 509). Therefore, there was no infirmity in the seizure
of the 1.1 kilos of marijuana.
The warrantless search, seizure and apprehension were lawful.

EVIDENCE
PEOPLE vs. AMINUDIN
163 SCRA 402

FACTS: The police agents in Iloilo City received a tip from a reliable informer that the accused,
Aminnudin, was on a vessel bound for Iloilo and is carrying with him marijuana. The said vessel
was to arrive few days after such tip.
On the day of the arrival, the agents then waited at the port for the vessel. Upon arrival
of the vessel and when the suspect disembarked, they immediately frisked him and searched his
bag which contained the marijuana. Subsequently, the Aminnudin was arrested.
During the trial, the accused that alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and immediately
handcuffed and that his bag was confiscated without a search warrant.

ISSUE: Is the marijuana found in the accused bag admissible evidence?

HELD: No. The police agents had enough time to secure a warrant to arrest and search the
accused but did not do so. In addition to this, the arrest did not fall into any of the exceptions of
a valid warrantless arrest because the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest,
committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so.

People v. Malmstedt
On Malmstedts way from Sagada to Angeles City, the police boarded the bus where he was riding. A bulge was
spotted on Malmstedts waist and, when opened, 4 suspicious-looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape were

found. When said objects were opened, the wrapped objects turned out to be hashish, a derivative of marijuana.
Moreover, in each of his bags, teddy bears contained hashish.
Facts:
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

On May 11, 1989, the Commanding Officer (Capt. Alen Vasco) of the First Regional Command (NARCOM)
ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province.
Said checkpoint was for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region and was
prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other
prohibited drugs. Moreover, the Commanding Officer received an information that a Caucasian (Mikael
Malmstedt) coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs.
In the afternoon of same day, the bus where Malmstedt was riding was stopped. Malmstedt was on his
way to Angeles City and would then proceed to Manila to catch his flight out of the country two days
later. In the bus, 2 NARCOM officers (Sgt. Fider and CIC Galutan) boarded the bus and announced that
they were members of the NARCOM and that they would conduct an inspection. Said officers started
their inspection from the front going towards the rear of the bus where the accused was seated.
Galutan noticed a bulge on Malmstedts waist. He suspected that said bulge was a gun, thus he asked for
the latters passport and other identification papers to which he (Malmstedt) failed to comply. For failure
to comply with presenting passport and identification papers, Galutan required Malmstedt to bring out
whatever it was that was bulging on his waist. It turned out that the bulging object was a pouch bag and
when Malmstedt opened the said bag as ordered, the officer noticed 4 suspicious-looking objects
wrapped in brown packing tape. When opened, the wrapped objects turned out to contain hashish, a
derivative of marijuana.
Malmstedt was invited for questioning outside. But before leaving the bus, he stopped to get 2 travelling
bags. The officers, upon Malmstedts alighting from the bus, got the bags and opened them. A teddy
bear, having bulges, was found in each bag. After the bags were opened, it was then that Malmstedt
presented his passport.
Malmstedt was brought to the headquarters of NARCOM at Camp Dangwas, La Trinidad, Benguet for
further investigation. At the investigation room, the officers opened the teddy bears and found to contain
hashish.
An information was filed against Malmstedt for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Malmstedt
raised the issue of illegal search of his personal effects.

Ruling:
1.

2.

There are exceptions where a search may be made pursuant to a lawful arrest which need not to obtain a
search warrant. These circumstances include: (a) when the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing or is attempting to commit an offense, in the presence of a peace officer or a private
person; (b) when the offense was committed and the peace officer/private person has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) when the person to
be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal institution/place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another. In the case at bar, accused was searched and arrested while transporting
prohibited drugs. A crime was actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante
delicto. Thus, the search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under the first circumstance
provided by the law which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.
The acts of the NARCOM officers in requiring the accused to open his pouch bag and in opening one of the
wrapped objects inside said bag as well as the two travel bags containing 2 teddy bears with hashish
stuffed inside them, were prompted by Malmstedts own attempt to hide his identity by refusing to
present his passport, and by the information received by the NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from
Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession. To deprive the NARCOM agents of the ability and facility
to act accordingly, including, to search even without warrant, in the light of such circumstance, would be
to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of society.

Stonehill vs diokno

Search and Seizure General Warrants Abandonment of the Moncado Doctrine

Stonehill et al and the corporation they form were alleged to have committed acts in violation of
Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal
Code. By the strength of this allegation a search warrant was issued against their persons and
their corporation. The warrant provides authority to search the persons above-named and/or the
premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the
following personal property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business
transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and
Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).
The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question
may be split into (2) major groups, namely:
(a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and
(b) those found seized in the residences of petitioners herein.
Stonehill averred that the warrant is illegal for:
(1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized;
(2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized;
(3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in
deportation cases filed against them;
(4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and
(5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the
warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law.
The prosecution counters, invoking the Moncado doctrine, that the defects of said warrants, if
any, were cured by petitioners consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are
admissible in evidence against them. In short, the criminal cannot be set free just because the
government blunders.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant issued is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Stonehill et al. The SC emphasized however that Stonehill et al
cannot assail the validity of the search warrant issued against their corporation for Stonehill are
not the proper party hence has no cause of action. It should be raised by the officers or board
members of the corporation. The constitution protects the peoples right against unreasonable

search and seizure. It provides; (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall
particularly describe the things to be seized. In the case at bar, none of these are met. The
warrant was issued from mere allegation that Stonehill et al committed a violation of Central
Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code. In
other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof
with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the
judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same
presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has
performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our
criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any
specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be a legal heresy, of the highest order, to
convict anybody of a violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code, as alleged in the aforementioned applications
without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or codes.
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants
was compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to
wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business
transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss
statements.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business
transactions of Stonehill et al, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The
warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of Stonehill et al and the aforementioned
corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of the Bill of
Rights that the things to be seized be particularly described as well as tending to defeat its
major objective: the elimination of general warrants. The Moncado doctrine is likewise
abandoned and the right of the accused against a defective search warrant is emphasized.

Bache vs ruiz

Search and Seizure Personal Examination of the Judge

On 24 Feb 1970, Commissioner Vera of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter addressed to J Ruiz
requesting the issuance of a search warrant against petitioners for violation of Sec 46(a) of the
NIRC, in relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof, particularly Sects 53, 72, 73, 208 and
209, and authorizing Revenue Examiner de Leon make and file the application for search
warrant which was attached to the letter. The next day, de Leon and his witnesses went to CFI
Rizal to obtain the search warrant. At that time J Ruiz was hearing a certain case; so, by means
of a note, he instructed his Deputy Clerk of Court to take the depositions of De Leon and
Logronio. After the session had adjourned, J Ruiz was informed that the depositions had already
been taken. The stenographer read to him her stenographic notes; and thereafter, J Ruiz asked
respondent Logronio to take the oath and warned him that if his deposition was found to be false
and without legal basis, he could be charged for perjury. J Ruiz signed de Leons application for
search warrant and Logronios deposition. The search was subsequently conducted.
ISSUE: Whether or not there had been a valid search warrant.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Bache on three grounds.
1. J Ruiz failed to personally examine the complainant and his witness.
Personal examination by the judge of the complainant and his witnesses is necessary to enable
him to determine the existence or non-existence of a probable cause.
2. The search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense.
The search warrant in question was issued for at least four distinct offenses under the Tax Code.
As ruled in Stonehill Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with
the disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the
former Rules of Court that a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense. Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added
thereto a paragraph, directing that no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific
offense.
3. The search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be seized.
The documents, papers and effects sought to be seized are described in the Search Warrant
Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers, journals, columnars, receipts and
disbursements books, customers ledgers); receipts for payments received; certificates of stocks
and securities; contracts, promissory notes and deeds of sale; telex and coded messages; business
communications, accounting and business records; checks and check stubs; records of bank
deposits and withdrawals; and records of foreign remittances, covering the years 1966 to 1970.

The description does not meet the requirement in Art III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution, and of Sec.
3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, that the warrant should particularly describe the
things to be seized.
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the
description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow or when the
description expresses a conclusion of fact not of law by which the warrant officer may be guided
in making the search and seizure or when the things described are limited to those which bear
direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued.

Sec vs marcos

Search and Seizure

On March 31, 1971, Amansec went to Baguio and passed by a house at 47 Ledesma Street,
Baguio; he was attracted by the sight of several persons inside the house; he peeped from outside
the house and when the curtain was moved he saw a Buddha that was inside the house; he
observed what was going on inside the house and he heard someone say that the golden Buddha
was actually for sale and when he observed them closer he overheard that it was being offered
for sale for 100,000 pesos by Rogelio Roxas; he saw the Buddha and firearms and some bullets
inside the house. By these facts, Colonel Calano requested for a warrant from J Marcos at about
12 midnight on Apr 4, 1971. Due to the urgency he issued the warrant. And eventually the
golden Buddha and some firearms were seized from Roxass house. Santos assailed the warrant
averring that the search warrant was not limited to one offense covering both illegal possession
of firearms and violation of Central Bank rules and regulations; that it did not particularly
describe the property to be seized; that he did not carefully examine under oath the applicant and
his witnesses; that articles not mentioned were taken; and that thereafter the return and the
inventory although appearing to have been prepared on said date were not actually submitted to
respondent Judge until April 13, 1971 and the objects seized delivered only about a week later on
April 19.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant issued by Judge Marcos is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor Judge Marcos and had basically affirmed the decision of appellate
Judge Gatamaitan. Taking into consideration to nature of the articles so described, it is clear
that no other more adequate and detailed description could be given, particularly because it is
difficult to give a particular description of the contents thereof, The description so made
substantially complies with the legal provisions because the officer of the law who executed the
warrant was thereby placed in a position enabling him to Identify the articles in question, which
he did, so that here, since certainly, no one would be mistaken in Identifying the Buddha,
whose image is well known, and even the firearms and ammunition because these were those
without permit to possess, and all located at 47 Ledesma St., Baguio City, so far as description
was concerned, the search warrant perhaps could not be said to have suffered fatal defects.

Castro vs pabalan
Posted by taxcasesdigest on Tuesday, July 14, 2009
Labels: constitutional law, search and seizure, search warrant
Facts: Judge Pabalan ordered the issuance of a search warrant despite failure of the
application of Lumang or the warrant itself to specify the offense, to examine the
applicant as well as his witnesses on the part of the Judge, and to describe with
particularity the place to be searched and the things to be seized. Judge never
refuted the assertions when required to answer. Application alleged that applicants
wee informed and claimed that they verified the report that Maria Castro and Co
Ling are in possession of narcotics and other contraband in Barrio Padasil, Bangar,
La Union without specifying the particular place in the Barrio. No complete
description of the goods and inquiry was brief. Upon actual search, it turned out
that it was in Barrio Ma. Cristina and not in Padasil.
Issue: Whether or not the search warrant is validly issued.
Held: Search warrant issued illegal for violation of the 1935 Constitution and the
Rules of Court because the two basic requirements are not complied with: (a) no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, (b) the warrant shall particularly
describe the things to be seized, thus, a general warrant. However, things seized
cannot be returned and shall be destroyed, except the liquors, playing cards,
distilled water and five bottles of Streptomycin.

Collector vs villaluz

Viduya vs. Berdiago, 73 SCRA 553

Post under case digests, Taxation at Monday, January 30, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind
Facts: The search warrant issued by petitioner Viduya who was the former Collector of Customs is
quashed by the lower court upon motion by private respondent Berdiago. The warrant of seizure and
detention was issued on the basis of reliable intelligence that fraudulent documents were used by
Berdiago in securing the release from the Bureau of Customs of a Rolls Royce, it being made to appear
that such car was a 1961 model instead of a 1966, thus enabling respondent to pay lower custom duties.
There was a demand for the correct amount due and Respondent expressed his willingness to pay.
Unfortunately, he was not able to live up to his promise so a search warrant was issued, pursuant to
Section 2099 of the Tariff and Customs Code which requires a search warrant if such goods are located
in a dwelling house because the car was located in the Yabut Compound. Moreover, it was not shown
that Berdiago did not own the dwelling house which was searched. Nonetheless, respondent judge
quashed
the
warrant.
Issue: Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the judge in quashing the
search
warrant?
Yes
Held: Petition is granted. As the car was kept in a dwelling house in Wakas, Barrio San Dionisio,
Paraaque, Rizal, petitioner through two of his officers in the Customs Police Service applied for and was
able to obtain the search warrant. Had there been no such move on the part of petitioner, the duties
expressly enjoined on him by law namely to assess and collect all lawful revenues, to prevent and
suppress smuggling and other frauds, and to enforce tariff and customs law would not have been
performed.