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The geopolitics of Slavic

Union: Russia, Belarus, and
multipolarity
Thomas Ambrosio

Assistant Professor in the Department

of Political Science , North Dakota State
University E-mail:
Published online: 19 Oct 2007.

To cite this article: Thomas Ambrosio (1999) The geopolitics of Slavic

Union: Russia, Belarus, and multipolarity, Geopolitics, 4:3, 73-90, DOI:
10.1080/14650049908407656
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14650049908407656

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The Geopolitics of Slavic Union: Russia,

Belarus, and Multipolarity

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THOMAS AMBROSIO
Whether new 'poles' will rise to challenge American hegemony is an important issue
for international relations theory and policymakers. This article examines the
conscious effort by Russian and Belarusian politicians to promote multipolarity
through the construction of a 'Slavic Union'. Although largely theoretical, this union
is a clear reaction to the sharp, relative increase in American power since the end of
the Cold War and misgivings about its intentions, as evidenced by the expansion of
NATO, the proliferation of US missile attacks, and the recent Kosovo conflict. This
article suggests that American foreign policy is becoming counterproductive to its
position in the international system.

The collapse of the Soviet Union radically transformed the roughly bipolar
international system into one which remains undefined, yet weakly
unipolar.' A good deal of attention has recently focused on whether and how
new 'poles' will rise to challenge American hegemony.2 Two articles in
International Security, in particular, take opposing views on this subject.3
Christopher Layne approaches the problem from a neorealist perspective
and argues that the current 'unipolar moment'4 is merely 'a geopolitical
interlude that will give way to multipolarity between 2000-2010'. 5
According to structural realism, states will necessarily balance against
hegemons, regardless of the relative coerciveness of its policies:
'Invariably, the very fact that others believe a state is excessively powerful
redounds to its disadvantage by provoking others to balance against it.'6
Michael Mastanduno, on the other hand, believes that the United States can
preserve unipolarity through effective diplomacy which would 'dissuade or
at least delay other states from challenging US hegemony and balancing
against the United States'.7 The practical difference between Layne and
Mastanduno is not as great as might at first be perceived. Although Layne
holds that other poles will inevitably emerge, the timing of this development
and the hostility towards the (former) hegemon is variable and dependent
upon the United States' ability both to arrest its relative decline and to avoid
provoking the rising great powers. Similarly, Mastanduno, though resisting
the notion of predetermination, allows for the possibility that the US will
Thomas Ambrosio is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at North
Dakota State University. Email: Thomas.Ambrosio@zeus.wku.edu.
Geopolitics , Vol.4, No.3 (Winter 1999) pp.73-90
PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

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'succumb to the arrogance of power' and 'prompt the balancing behavior

US officials hope to forestall'.8
Despite coming to the issue by significantly different perspectives, the
process both Layne and Mastanduno identify - that challenges to US
hegemony are contingent upon perceptions of US power and policies - is
coming to pass. In this essay I examine the conscious effort by Russian and
Belarusian politicians to promote a multipolar world in order to balance and
resist American domination of the international system. This is being done
in two ways.9 First, Russia has courted states with similar views. Although
there have been no moves to form an explicit anti-American alliance,
resistence to unipolarity has been expressed by a number of important
states, such as India and China. Second, and the central focus of this essay,
Russian and Belarusian politicians have sought the reintegration of their
countries into a Slavic union, which may eventually include Ukraine.
The notion of a Slavic union is not simply another in a long line of
implausible political arrangements within the post-Soviet world, but rather
one with real geopolitical import. Although there are many political,
economic, military, and logistical impediments which must first be overcome,
the construction of an entity resembling another 'pole', which the Slavic
union purports to achieve, has the potential of fundamentally altering strategic
relations on the European continent and beyond. While the predominance of
US political, economic, and military power makes it unlikely that any Slavic
union will be successful in actually balancing the United States or the West,
the perceived need to balance the US indicates that the United States' policy
of dominance is potentially becoming counterproductive to its long range
interests and position within the international system. It is therefore crucial for
Western policymakers and academics to understand the processes occurring
in Moscow and Minsk, not only for their implications within the former
Soviet Union, but also for their global significance.
This essay will proceed as follows. I first introduce the notion of the
perceived need or desire by Russian politicians to foster a multipolar
international system. Specifically, I look at statements by policymakers and
'joint statements' released with other states. Next, I demonstrate the link
between the Slavic union and the aim of multipolarity. I then provide a brief
history of the political progress towards forming the Slavic union, paying
special attention to the impact of NATO expansion, the December 1998
strikes against Iraq, and the war in Kosovo. Lastly, I conclude this essay by
briefly looking at the implications for Western policy.
Before I begin, a word of caution is in order. While this essay examines
the construction of a Slavic union, it is not an expression of Samuel
Huntington's 'clash of civilisations' paradigm.10 It rests neither upon
Huntington's assumptions about the geopolitical existence of civilisations
nor upon the necessity of conflict between them. While close cultural ties

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75

between the Eastern Slavs make the concept of a union state more palatable
(and therefore more plausible), the causal logic behind the proposed Slavic
union is strategic and based upon realpolitik, rather than civilisational.

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Russia and Multipolarity

Discussion within Russia on the need to counter American hegemony
through the development of multipolarity is not a new phenomenon, but
rather a trend in Russian foreign policy circles since 1993, when Russia
began to shift way from its previous close cooperation with the United States
and toward a more confrontational stance.11 The most visible proponent of
multipolarity has been former Russian Prime Minister Yevgeni Primakov.
While Director of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, Primakov
outlined his views of Russia's interests and policies toward the West. On this
issue, he identified two options: '... reliance on cooperation with Russia as
an equal partner...or reliance on a "monopolar" world in which the Russian
Federation is given the role of a country with a very limited range of interests
and tasks'; the second was firmly rejected as 'unacceptable'.12
As Foreign Minister, Primakov was vocal in his opposition to NATO
expansion - which he noted 'creates for us a worsening geopolitical situation'
- and subscribed to the view that Russia must '[find] herself as a great
power'.13 He identified the role that Russia should assume within the
international system as follows: '... Russia in her transition from the bipolar
world to the multipolar one should play the role of a counterweight to the
negative trends that are appearing in international affairs. In the course of this
transition not all power centers, determining this multipolarity, have yet
formed. And somebody wants to dominate in this situation.'14 Although he
refused, for 'diplomatic reasons', to specify the country attempting to dominate
the international system, it was clear that he was referring to the United States.
In a speech before the United Nations General Assembly, Primakov
reiterated this theme when he emphasised the need for a 'transition from
bloc confrontation to multipolarity, economic interdependence, and the
democratisation of international relations'.15 Each of these, if implemented,
would serve to prevent or counter American hegemony. The third point was
the central theme in an article written by Primakov in October 1996.16 For
Primakov, a more 'democratic' international system was one in which the
great powers would enjoy an 'equal partnership' based upon 'coordinated
and "cooperative" efforts'. This would entail 'the rejection of the mentality
of those who lead and those who are led' and 'the tendency of building a
one-polar world'. The subtext of Primakov's article is not one of democracy,
as it is known in the West, but rather 'a guaranteed system of restraints and
counterbalances'17 over outcomes: Russia really wants to have its interests

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taken into account and play a key role in the resolution of any significant
global issue, particularly in Europe. The reason why Primakov considers
'the United Nations the key mechanism capable of ensuring a smooth
transition from the bipolar and confrontational world to a multi-polar and
democratic one' is because Russia has veto powers in the Security Council
and can block any resolutions it does not like; thus preserving the status
quo.18 A more 'democratic' international system would give Russia a virtual
veto over American policy and prevent the United States and its allies from
imposing unilateral outcomes.
Part of Primakov's prescription for the establishment of multipolarity
was to further the reintegration of the former Soviet Union. He argued that
the West's misgivings about this process were due to fears that it might
succeed and create a rival: 'The negative attitude towards integration
processes in the Commonwealth (of Independent States) territory and
counteracting them on the part of some forces in the West stems from the
drive to prevent the creation of a powerful centre in the new multi-polar
world which is forming after the end of the Cold War.'19 During a press
conference on Russia's reaction to NATO expansion, Primakov called the
union 'an absolute must'.20
Russia's search for other states which support its views has been rather
successful; though it must be stressed that no formal or even de facto antiAmerican alliance exists at the present date. Discussions with India, South
Africa, France, several African states, and the ASEAN countries, just to
name a few, have yielded verbal agreement on the need for multipolarity.21
More fruitful discussions, with more geopolitical significance, between
Russia and China also stressed the states' joint interest in resisting
unipolarity. During a recent Sino-Russian summit in Beijing, Russian
President Boris Yeltsin's press secretary stated that in discussions with the
Chinese leaders, Yeltsin 'several times returned to the idea of a multipolar
world order ... This was the main theme in bilateral contacts'.22 Although
many of these multipolar discussions were likely diplomatic banter, except
for the Russo-Chinese talks, they indicate seriousness on Russia's part
regarding its quest for multipolarity. On this point, Yeltsin was quite
categorical: 'We are for a multipolar world ... where there is no diktat by
any single country. Let the United States be one pole, Russia - another,
Asia, Europe and so on - still other poles. This is the base for the world to
stand on and ensure common security.'23
Slavic Union and Multipolarity
The construction of a Slavic union plays an important role in the geopolitical
calculations of Moscow and Minsk. While it is unlikely that simply merging
the two countries would qualitatively increase their joint material power, the

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psychological and symbolic benefits of a Slavic union would make the whole
greater than the sum of the parts. It would represent Russia's expansion
towards the West and lengthen the border between Moscow and NATO,
which now only meet at the border of Kaliningrad and Poland. It would also
restore some sense of a Moscow-based empire; the possible inclusion of
Ukraine would fulfil the age-old goal of 'gathering the Russian lands' and
potentially give a boost to Russian nationalism.24 While there are certainly
domestic political reasons for establishing a Slavic union,25 the statements
cited below clearly illustrate the importance of geopolitics.
The notion that Russia should cast off its imperial past and reconstitute
itself in alliance with the two other eastern Slavic peoples - that is, allowing
the non-Slavic republics of the Soviet Union to become independent - has
long been the prescription of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn.26 In the immediate
aftermath of the collapse of the USSR, a number of Russian politicians
advocated the reconstitution of some form of Eurasian political entity
(either a new Russian empire, a new Soviet Union, or some other
formation). Although the goal of reintegrating the successor states of the
former USSR within the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) has been expressed on many occasions, the CIS has largely
been a failure, with even the most basic customs union, a 'ruble zone', and
security cooperation institutions left unimplemented.27 Frustration over the
lack of CIS-wide integration led several successor states to form sub-CIS
regional institutions, such as the relatively successful Central Asian Union.28
Within Russia, there has been a steady shift away from ideas of integration
throughout the entire post-Soviet space and towards a Slavic identity: 'Over
time Russian national identity has increasingly distanced its understanding
of "Russia" from the former USSR while increasingly falling back upon the
image of "Russia" as the east Slavic conundrum of Kyivan Rus'.29
A Slavic union of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine has emerged as the
imperial default to compensate for Russia's loss of empire, and therefore
plays an important part in the construction of a post-Soviet Russian national
identity.30 At the same time, however, the concept of a Slavic union has been
closely connected with the geopolitical aims of important actors in Belarus
and Russia who hope to compensate for Russia's weakness in the face of
American-led Western hegemony. The recent momentum toward the
construction of a Russia-Belarus 'union state' is a reaction to the sharp
(relative) increase in the West's power since the end of the Cold War and
misgivings about its intentions, as evidenced by the expansion of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) into Eastern Europe and the recent
war over Kosovo. Unipolarity, it is assumed, is a deplorable state of affairs
which does not allow for constraints on the dominant power(s), that is, the
United States and its allies. Only through multipolarity can the interests of
the non-West, and Russia in particular, be secured.

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In a trip to Minsk in early 1999, Yeltsin's human rights commissioner,

Oleg Mironov, remarked that Russia would gain 'geopolitically and
strategically' through a Russia-Belarus union; as he argued, 'we must unite
the Slavic lands'.31 Former Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov, who has
been ambivalent about unification with Belarus, conceded that Russia
'would obtain a direct geopolitical and military access to the West' .32 The
most frequent and explicit statements on the geopolitical benefits of the
Slavic union have come from Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenka.
Lukashenka argued that '[m]any countries pin hopes on the Union of
Russia and Belarus for the establishment of balance in the contemporary
multipolar world'.33 His speech before the 10th session of the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Union of Belarus and Russia in January 199934 focused on
the strategic aims of the union and will be quoted here at length:
The policy of drawing our countries closely together is an urgent
need. First of all, it is impossible not to mention its tremendous
geopolitical importance. International events are indicating the
increasingly obvious unipolarity of the world. The United States has
taken a hegemonic stance and purloined the right to substitute for
international organisations. Weak countries will not survive the
confrontation with it on their own. The tragedy of Yugoslavia and
bombardments of certain other countries show that in this world no
one reckons with lonely countries that are weakened by internal
discords and are not using powerful support from their allies.
In this situation, the Union of Belarus and Russia could, and should
become a core around which a powerful civilised center would form
on our planet, an economically independent center with a high level
of self-sufficiency able to efficiently resolve not only economic but
also political problems. The Union of Belarus and Russia should
become an actual counterweight to the unipolar world that has
currently developed, a powerful driving force in breaking the
aggressive transatlantic monopoly, and an international core of the
new unification of countries.
Thinking on a large scale, the strengthening of our unity is a historic
chance of the entire Slavic civilisation to survive under the current
grim conditions of the world's repartition. This is a chance to defend
one's own originality and place on among other communities and
states on an equal footing.
There are several points to note in this excerpt. First, it is clearly directed at
a perceived hegemonic United States. Second, the phrase 'the ...

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bombardments of certain other countries' is likely a reference to US and

British airstrikes and missile attacks on Iraq the previous December; though
it could also include US missile attacks against Sudan and Afghanistan.
This event was perceived outside the West (and even within it) as an
example of the new world order under American hegemony. Third, the new
union is meant to act as a 'counterweight' against this hegemony in order to
foster the development of a multipolar international system.
These points are consistent with earlier remarks made by Lukashenka,
which have only increased in tone and frequency in 1999. He called for the
establishment of 'a new superpower' and 'an all-powerful, strong and
mighty Empire, a Union of fraternal peoples' which would overcome 'US
hegemony' and 'destructive uni-polarity'; 'Only we, Russia and
Byelorussia can save [the multipolar] system'.35 Making an explicit tie
between the Slavic union and the former USSR, Lukashenka recalled:
'When Nikita Khrushchev hit the UN rostrum with the heel of his shoe, the
world cowered.'36 In an interview with Iranian television journalists,
Lukashenka called for the creation of an anti-American alliance between
Russia (enlarged with Belarus), Iran, India, and China which 'must discard
their differences and come to an agreement, because this alone can create a
counterbalance to the NATO and US block [sic]'. He bemoaned the fact that
'The entire world system has stood on one leg' since the collapse of the
USSR and, while the Soviet Union existed, 'America did not even think
about behaving the way it does today'.37
The proposed Slavic union has a strong geopolitical foundation.
Lukashenka's comments, coupled with the Russian quest for multipolarity,
establish an important future self-styled role for the Slavic union within the
international system. The potential military implications of this were evident
during the 'West-99' military exercises held by Russian and Belarusian
troops. Although the possible violation of Icelandic airspace by Russian
bombers got the bulk of the press in the West,38 the exercise also reportedly
simulated a joint Russian-Belarusian counterattack, which included the use of
nuclear weapons, to aggression 'from the West' (that is, NATO).39
How the Belarusian-Russian union would successfully counteract
American hegemony, given the weakness of the militaries and economies of
both states, is unclear. Given the already close military cooperation between
Russia and Belarus,40 the formal unification of the two states will not
substantively add to Moscow's military or material power. Nevertheless,
three points are important to note. First, there will likely be a significant
psychological benefit to those longing for a return to the perceived glories
of Soviet superpower status. Second, there is clearly a sense of weakness in
the face of growing American power and assertiveness in Iraq and Kosovo.
It is hoped that a Slavic union would somehow act as a signal that Russia
refuses to play a subordinate role to the West - a concern plaguing Russian

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foreign policy since the collapse of the Soviet Union.41 Finally, the Slavic
union has not remained in the realm of policy pronouncements or institutional
fantasies. While its construction has been hampered by a number of political
factors and disagreements about the final form the union will take, there has
been a sharp increase in the seriousness of the union project over the past year,
loosely corresponding to the foreign policy of the United States. The next
section will briefly trace the history of the Slavic union with special attention
being paid to the connection to geopolitical considerations.

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Formation of the Slavic Union

Meetings held outside Minsk in December 1991 between the leaders of
Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus led to the formal dissolution of the Soviet
Union and the formation of the CIS. Despite the fact that only the Slavic
republics of the USSR were represented, Yeltsin explicitly denied that the
CIS was a Slavic entity and stated that it was open to all former Soviet
republics. However, the CIS soon became a vehicle to 'carry out this
divorce in a calm and civilised manner', rather than an institutional
framework for the reintegration of the former Soviet republics.42 In
response, politicians from Belarus, which generally lacks a cohesive
national identity,43 began to agitate for the unification of Russia and Belarus,
beginning in the economic realm. To this end, a number of interstate treaties
were signed between the leaders of the two countries.44 However, there were
very serious problems of implementation and it quickly became clear that
the transition towards economic unity and the exclusive use of the ruble
would be 'considerably protracted'.45
The monetary union kept hitting economic and political snags
throughout the rest of 1994 and into the summer of 1995. However, with the
election of Alexander Lukashenka as President of Belarus and the
worsening of Belarus' economic woes, the issue of monetary union was
placed back on the political agenda, this time in terms of a pseudo-Slavic
union: Lukashenka said that he had 'voiced a firm intention to renew good
relations above all between the former Soviet Slav republics'; that his
policies are 'aimed at unification of the Slavic people', whose 'common
Slavic code' determined their 'common future'; and that Belarus has been
'preordained by fate itself ... to implement Slav unity' .46 An agreement on
a currency payments union in the early autumn of 1995 marked the return
to the idea of economic and political integration, which intensified in 1996.
Rumours that the Slavic union was linked to the 1996 Russian
presidential campaign47 were given some credence during the spring of 1996
when a concerted effort was made by Moscow to further integration: a joint
statement, which called for the process of integration to intensify, was

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signed by Lukashenka and Yeltsin in March; and a joint parliamentary

group was established with the task of preparing economic laws needed to
promote closer integration between the two countries. This culminated in
the April 1996 treaty establishing a 'Community' between the two
countries. The treaty did not create a new state, but rather 'supranational
bodies, symbols and an anthem';48 and both states retained their sovereignty,
remaining '[independent] subjects of international law'.49
The notion of greater integration did not go away after the election,
however. If anything, support for it within the Russian government
remained high. Aman Tuleyev, the Russian Minister for CIS Affairs, argued
that Russia and Belarus 'should seek a single budget, single army, single
border, single taxation system, single transportation system and single
energy system'; he also hoped that the Community would 'eventually draw
in Ukraine'.50 In January 1997, Yeltsin sent a letter to Lukashenka in which
he implied that a referendum should be held on unifying the two countries
in the near future. This initiative received broad support from the Russian
Duma. Nevertheless, integration again stalled over economic issues and the
design of the future Belarusian-Russian state.51
Despite some problems,52 Yeltsin and Lukashenka signed a detailed
'Charter of the Union of Belarus and Russia' in May 1997 - ideally
transforming the 'community' into a 'union'. This document established
joint institutions and 'union' citizenship; and set out as one of its chief aims
the 'consistent progress toward voluntary unification'.53 During the second
half of 1997 and the first half of 1998, the provisions of the Union Charter
began to be implemented: the Parliamentary Assembly of Belarus and
Russia opened in Kaliningrad and passed a number of draft laws and
resolutions; the Belarusian parliament brought its excise taxes into line with
Russia's; a Union budget was adopted; Yeltsin decreed that 'an expert
coordinating council of Justice Ministry representatives of Russia and
Belarus be set up with a view to unification in the legal fields of civil, tax,
customs, family, and housing legislation.'54
A crucial reason why the notion of a Belarus-Russian union remained
alive during this period, independent of domestic political factors, was
Russian and Belarusian resistance to NATO expansion.55 Russian Duma
Speaker Gennadiy Seleznev forewarned that 'a powerful alliance of Slavic
states may appear' to counteract NATO expansion;56 and Russian Deputy
Prime Minister Sergei Shakhrai told reporters that 'real unification between
Russia and Belarus' would be 'the most effective answer to NATO's
expansion'.57 At a signing ceremony for an agreement on closer military
cooperation between Russia and Belarus, Russian Defence Minister Yuri
Sergeyev called NATO expansion 'a destabilizing process, threatening our
states' security'.58 Although senior Russian and Belarusian officials claimed
that greater military cooperation between the two countries was not directed

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at NATO, the timing of NATO expansion and the military treaty was
certainly not coincidental.59
The process of integration increased rather dramatically after the
US-UK strikes on Iraq in December 1998, which were sharply criticised in
both Belarus and Russia.60 In response, Yeltsin remarked that Russia had its
'own concept' to address the issue: 'The concept is that neither one nor two
countries should command the world. We favour a multi-polar world, that is
there should be several poles on the globe ...'." Lukashenka, for his part,
made the connection between the strikes and the union: he argued that if
Belarus and Russia had remained together after 1991, 'there would not have
been slaps to the face such as the air strikes against Iraq or sanctions against
Yugoslavia'; 'Together, we can make the West take us seriously. I don't
want to scare anybody, but the Slavs are a proud nation. Our unity is our
strength.'62 At this time, the two presidents signed a declaration 'On the
Further Unification of Russia and Belarus', in which both sides emphasised
their desire for a closer relationship.63
NATO's war with Yugoslavia over Kosovo was a watershed in relations
between Russia and Belarus, on the one hand, and the West on the other.
Despite the ethnic, cultural, and religious ties between Russians and Serbs
(a fact that was much emphasised in the Western press), Russia's inability
to stop the air strikes and the near-effortless victory on the part of NATO
made plain Russia's geopolitical weakness. As Yeltsin asserted:
'Establishing a multi-polar principle would meet the interests of
international stability and steady development. ... The Yugoslav crisis
demonstrated yet again the reasons for our disapproval of NATO's eastward
expansion. NATO's attempts to act as a substitute for the United Nations
and the OSCE and its imposition of the use of force in Europe and outside
it are unacceptable.'64 This crisis, Yeltsin asserted, was putting US-Russian
relations through 'a dramatic period - some are directly provoking us into
new confrontations'.65 Former Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said that Russia
must 'draw serious conclusions from the Balkan events' in regard to
actively promoting multipolarity.66 Konstantin Zatulin, Director of the CIS
Institute, argued that the war in the Balkans made the idea of a Slavic union
'urgent'.67 Russian Duma Speaker and Chairman of the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Union of Belarus and Russia, Gennadiy Seleznev, told the
Union Assembly that 'in order to oppose NATO['s] geostrategic plans, our
union should strengthen day in day out'; he emphasised the importance of
the union in serving as 'an adequate geostrategic reply to the ambitious
plans of world domination nurtured by the USA and its allies ...\ 68
Around this time, there was a noticeable push to further the stalled
union; as one Russian political commentator put it: 'The Union of Russia
and Belarus has a real motive for its existence, for the first time since the
signing of the basic documents on the establishing this union three years ago

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... The motive is to counter NATO politically and militarily, irrespective of

whether an Utopian idea of admitting Yugoslavia in the union is carried into
life or not.'69 To this end, Lukashenka and Yeltsin coordinated their
respective foreign and military policies towards NATO, including breaking
off military relations with the alliance. At the celebration of the third
anniversary of the establishment of the 'Community' between the two
states, Primakov declared that the union could act as a deterrent to further
NATO aggression.70
Although the much discussed inclusion of Yugoslavia in the union was
not much more than political and diplomatic grandstanding, the upper house
of the Russian Duma ratified an agreement which gave equal rights to
citizens of Belarus and Russia and plans got underway to establish 'a single
defence order' between the two countries.71 Just days before a visit to
Moscow by Lukashenka, Vladimir Putin, then Secretary of the Russian
Security Council, put forth a 'blueprint' for a union treaty establishing a
suprastate, which gave particular attention to defence and security issues.
As Putin said: 'Today's strategic and economic realities call for speeding up
the process of rapprochement between Russia and Belarus ... [especially]
urgent issues of economic development and reform, the strategic task of
strengthening security and resisting any infringement of our countries'
interests.'72 While in Moscow, Lukashenka and Yeltsin signed eleven
documents on the union.73 Although progress on a full unification treaty
continued to be stymied by disputes over the structure of the future union
state, support for the union remained high in public opinion polls.74
Although there was some fear that Yeltsin's firing of Prime Minister
Primakov would damage progress towards a union treaty, his replacement,
Sergei Stepashin, was made personally responsible for the concluding the
treaty.75 A draft Treaty of Russian-Belarusian Union was approved by the
Union's Parliamentary Assembly in early July 1999, though it was
described as 'shallow' because it left a number of issues undecided.76
Lukashenka's brief flirtation with the West, designed to push the Kremlin
leadership towards agreeing to the establishment of a Union President,77
seemingly worked because there was a renewed commitment by Stepashin
to draw up a 'serious, concrete' agreement and to have a treaty ready to sign
by the autumn.78 Stepashin's replacement by Putin delayed the process
somewhat, but a new Union Treaty, with a rough timetable for
implementation, was signed in early December 1999.79 At the signing
ceremony, Yeltsin joked that the union was 'not targeted against anyone,
even against Clinton'.80 However, this 'joke' took a more ominous tone in
light of events just days after the agreement was signed. Belarus and Russia
signed a separate agreement to adopt a joint military doctrine in 2000 and
'to form a powerful military grouping in the west' in order to protect

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81

Belarus's western sector. Days later, Yeltsin seemed to put forth a thinly
veiled threat in response to US criticism of Russia's handling of the
Chechnya conflict; Yeltsin noted that 'Russia has a full arsenal of nuclear
weapons' at its disposal which Clinton must keep in mind before he decides
'to flex his muscles' in the future.82 Finally, Yeltsin's comments came during
a summit with China in which both sides lashed out at US domination of the
international system.83

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Conclusion
American hegemony in what remains essentially a unipolar international
system has been firmly rejected by policymakers in both Russia and Belarus
on the basis that an unrestricted superpower will run roughshod over the
interests of other powers. Instead of bandwaggoning with the United States,84
as it had done during 1992 under Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, this essay
has shown that Russia's response to its strategic position has been directed at
constructing global multipolarity. The formation of a Slavic union, consisting
of Russia, Belarus, and (possibly) Ukraine, aims at establishing another 'pole'
in the international system. How the unification of two states which are
economically and militarily weak will fulfil this goal is unclear. Nevertheless,
the Slavic union has definite geopolitical aims. The sharp increase in progress
towards integration, corresponding with a more assertive United States, is well
summarised in a statement made by Lukashenka in July 1999: "The relations
of Belarus with Russia improved to the same extent as they worsened with the
West'.85 Thus, the process both Layne and Mastanduno identify is supported:
US policy has seemingly sparked something resembling balancing behaviour
in Russia and a desire to transform unipolarity into multipolarity.
What does this mean for the West generally and the United States in
particular? Even if the Slavic union does not come to pass, the fact that the
need for multipolarity is becoming a prominent theme in Russia, and indeed
throughout the world, indicates that Western86 policies have become
counterproductive in the sense that they have caused powers in the nonWest to search for ways to resist Western hegemony. In many cases, the
West is perceived as arrogant and preoccupied with bolstering its own
power and influence. Even if its intentions are perceived as altruistic in
Western capitals, situations like the 1999 war in Yugoslavia, in which
NATO bypassed the United Nations by using a weakly defined claim to
collective self-defence, cause a negative reaction in many quarters of the
globe. The very attempt to establish multipolarity through the Slavic union
should be a warning to the West that its actions have long-term implications.
If the Slavic union is established in the near future, the ramifications for
the West are likely to be fourfold. First, Lukashenka, who will most

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85

definitely play a prominent role in the new union, has proven himself to be
anything but a democrat. His rise to power in Moscow will most likely spell
the end of democratisation and economic reform in Russia.
Second, the West could be confronting a newly-invigorated power on its
eastern border. While integration will not significantly increase Moscow's
material or military power, the emotional and nationalistic gains should not
be underestimated. The concept that the Russian people, humiliated by the
collapse of its inner and outer empire, have, at least on paper, restored their
greatness and imperial traditions may serve as an effective mobilising tool.
Third, these feelings could spread to neighbouring Ukraine and serve as
a catalyst towards its accession to the union. Any union of the Eastern Slavs
would be woefully incomplete without Ukraine, the seat of the mediaeval
Kyivan Rus' and the spiritual heartland of the Russian people; as Zbigniew
Brzezinski, US President Jimmy Carter's former National Security Advisor,
posited: 'Without Ukraine...Russia ceases to be a Eurasian empire'.87 The
failure of Ukraine to 'return to Europe' has led some in Ukraine to look
toward the East.88 During a trip to Kiev, Gennadiy Seleznev urged Ukraine
to join the Belarus-Russian Union. Although he met with a negative
reaction from the executive branch and the rightist (nationalist) opposition,
'the leftist majority in the Supreme Council and speaker Aleksandr
Tkachenko fully approved of Seleznyov's speech'.89 In a 1998 poll, 57 per
cent of respondents would vote for any politician or party which supported
Ukraine's admission into the Union of Russia and Belarus.90 US policies
driving Russian-Belarusian integration are also having an impact in
Ukraine; as Ivanna Klympush, a NATO expert at the East-West Institute in
Kiev, put it: 'With the Kosovo crisis, it is a lot harder for pro-westerners to
raise arguments for European integration now [that] the people are
emotionally engaged with their Slavic brethren'.91 Although several
candidates for the 1999 presidential elections in Ukraine supported the
reunification of Belarus, Russia and Ukraine,92 the victory of pro-Western
Leonid Kuchma means that Ukraine will stay out of the Slavic union for the
time being.93 Nevertheless, the possibility of a tripartite Slavic union
remains quite real. If this were to come to pass, the future debate in Western
capitals may be 'Who lost Ukraine?'
Finally, the formation of the Slavic union would establish a new dividing
line in Europe between the expanded 'West' and those attempting to balance
Western influence; thus dispelling the notion of a Europe whole and free.
What can the US and the West do about this situation? It is likely that
the window of opportunity has passed for bringing Russia into the United
States' hegemonic 'coalition' - which includes Western Europe and Japan.
Whether or not this was ever truly possible - despite the euphoric optimism
of the first half of 1992 - is a matter of debate. Nevertheless, the

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GEOPOLITICS

relationship between the US and Russia will likely be a mix between

cooperation (largely due to Russiasia's continued dependence on foreign
aid) and confrontation; with the latter becoming increasingly frequent.
There appear to be two broad foreign policy strategies that the US can
undertake: first, continue with its policy of global dominance; second, alter
its policy to stress consensus over imposing outcomes. Unfortunately for the
United States' position in the international system, neither option is likely
to be positive: the former will most likely hasten the pattern of balancing
against US hegemony; while the latter will, in essence, allow for a
multipolar system to be established through the 'democratisation' of global
politics. In sum, it appears that Western policy has passed a threshold in
which the process Layne finds inevitable and Mastanduno fears will shape
the international system in the next century. Moves by Moscow and Minsk
to form a Slavic union are likely to be a harbinger of things to come.

NOTES
1. The qualification of the post-Cold War period as 'weakly unipolar' is a reflection of the
seeming reluctance of the United States to act like a hegemon. Stanley R. Sloan, The United
States and the Use of Force in the Post-Cold War World: Toward Self-Deterrence?
(Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office 1994) p.3.
The current international configuration could also be called 'unipolarity without
hegemony' in which 'the preponderant capability of a single state is not matched by a
predominant influence'. David Wilkinson, 'Unipolarity Without Hegemony', International
Studies Review 1/2 (Summer 1999) pp.141-72 (p.143).
2. For some of the more recent literature on the current unipolar international system and
systemic change within it, see Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Gregory A. Raymond (eds.) A
Multipolar Peace? (New York: St. Martin's Press 1994); Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas
Risse-Kappen (eds.), International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War (New
York: Columbia UP 1995); Michael E. Brown et al. (eds.) America's Strategic Choices
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1997); Werner Kaltefleiter and Ulrike Schumacher (eds.), The
Rise of a Multipolar World (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lange 1997); Ethan B. Kapstein and
Michael Mastanduno (eds.), Unipolar Politics (New York: Columbia UP 1999).
3. Christopher Layne, 'The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise',
International Security 17/4 (1993) pp.5-49; Michael Mastanduno, 'Preserving the Unipolar
Moment: Realist Theories and US Grand Strategy After the Cold War', International
Security 21/4 (1997) pp.49-88.
4. Charles Krauthammer, 'The Unipolar Moment', Foreign Affairs 70/1 (1990/91) pp.23-33.
5. Layne (note 3) p.7.
6. Ibid., p.14.
7. Mastanduno (note 3) p.86.
8. Ibid., p.88.
9. According to realism and neorealism, states will attempt to balance through external or
internal means; the former refers to building alliances, while, in cases of the latter, the state
in question attempts to augment its own power. Both foreign policy programmes cited in the
text are examples of external balancing. Although there have been signals that Russia may
rethink its military strategy and needed force-levels to counteract Western and in particular
American power, the Russian Federation's economic and industrial turmoil precludes
internal balancing. Thus Russia is compelled to find external allies.

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10. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order (New
York: Simon & Schuster 1996).
11. Suzanne Crow, 'Russia Adopts a More Active Policy', RFE/RL Research Report 2/12 (19
March 1993) pp.1-6; idem, 'Why Has Russian Foreign Policy Changed?', RFE/RL Research
Report 3/18 (6 May 1994) pp.1-6.
12. 'Russia-CIS: Does the West's Position Need Modification?', Rossiyskaya Gazeta 22 Sept.
1994, p.l, reproduced in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (BBCSWB) 26 Sept. 1994,
SU/2110/B.
13. 'Russia is Looking for a New Place in the World', Official Kremlin International News
Broadcast, 6 March 1996.
14. Ibid.
15. 'Address by Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeni Primakov to the 51st General Assembly of
the United Nations', Federal News Service (US State Department), 24 Sept. 1996.
16. 'There is a Multipolar World on the Horizon', Official Kremlin International News
Broadcast, 22 Oct. 1996.
17. Stanislav Kondrashov, 'Russia's "Eastward Push"', Izvestia 11 Nov. 1996, p.4, reproduced
in Russian Press Digest 11 Nov. 1996.
18. 'There is a Multipolar World on the Horizon' (note 16).
19. Alexander Valiyev et al., 'Russian Foreign Policy Focusing on CIS B Primakov', ITAR-TASS
29 July 1996.
20. Russian TV (Moscow) 24 May 1997, 18:50 GMT, reproduced as 'Foreign Minister
Primakov: NATO Deal Victory for Russia's National Interests', in BBCSWB 27 May 1997,
SU/D2929/B.
21. 'Russia, India to Deepen Ties to Create Multipolar World', TASS 22 April 1999; 'Yeltsin:
Russia, South Africa have same Attitudes toward International Problems', Interfax Russian
News 29 April 1999; TASS 13 May 1999, 08:25 GMT, reproduced as 'Yeltsin and Chirac
Call for Multipolar World Structure', in BBCSWB 14 May 1999, SU/D3534/B; Taisiya
Nikitenko, 'African Leaders Support Multipolar World Order', TASS 22 July 1999; Andrei
Bychkov and Aleksei Golyayev, Alvanov Outlines Russia's Stand on Regional Security in
Asia', TASS 26 July 1999.
22. 'Yeltsin Satisfied with Visit to China', TASS 10 Dec. 1999.
23. Yeltsin quoted in 'It Was So Under Peter The Great, It Will Be So Under Boris',
Nezavisimaya Gazeta pp.1-2, reproduced in Russian Press Digest 19 Sept. 1997.
24. See Jaroslaw Pelenski, The Contest for the Legacy of Kievan Rus' (Boulder, CO: East
European Monographs 1998).
25. The Slavic union is potentially in the political interests of both Yeltsin and Lukashenka.
Lukashenka is clearly ambitious and wants to become either president or vice president of any
Moscow-centered Slavic union. His power and prestige could be bolstered by being identified
as the main engine behind Slavic reunification. At the same time, Belarus' dire economic
condition would likely be bolstered by shifting some of the costs of Lukashenka's 'economic
experiments' (merely a cover for a complete lack of reforms and the continuation of the
paternalistic state) to the Russian people. On the other hand, Yeltsin is constitutionally barred
from running for a third term as Russian president. It has been rumoured that Yeltsin may follow
a path similar to Milosevic in order to keep power: by becoming president of the Slavic union
- just as Milosevic became president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from his previous
position as president of Serbia - Yeltsin could prevent his constitutionally enforced retirement.
26. Although the supporters of Solzhenitsyn and the members of the Red-Brown coalition (the
neo-nationalists) are able to find common ground in their joint opposition to Westernisation,
the two camps are fundamentally divided on the former's opposition to empire. According
to Solzhenitsyn, the only parts of the Soviet Union which should remain together are the
three 'branches of the Russian people' joined in a Russian union (Rossiiskii soyuz): the
Russians, the Belarusians, and the Ukrainians; all three subgroups of the Eastern Slavs are
one people who sprang forth from Kievan Rus. Rebuilding Russia, trans. Alexis Kilmoff
(New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux 1991).
Solzhenitsyn has reiterated his call for a Slavic union soon after returning to Russia in the
mid-1990s. 'Solzhenitsyn Calls for a Slavic Union', Deutsche Presse-Agentur 21 July 1994.

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GEOPOLITICS

27. hvestia 10 Dec. 1998, reproduced as 'CIS Customs Union Unable to Deal with
"Fundamental Issues'", in BBCSWB 14 Dec. 1998, SU/D3409/B.
28. Sergei Kozlov, 'Central Asian Version of the Union Between Moscow and Minsk?',
Nezavisimaya Gazeta 10 April 1997, 3, reproduced in Current Digest of the Post-Soviet
Press (CDPSP) 49/15, 14 May 1997, p.21.
29. Taras Kuzio, 'National Identity and Foreign Policy: The East Slavic Conundrum', in Taras
Kuzio (ed.), Contemporary Ukraine (New York: M.E. Sharpe 1998) pp.221-44 (p.227).
30. See Thomas Ambrosio, 'Irredentism: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics' (PhD diss.,
University of Virginia 1999) chapter 6.
31. 'Kremlin Takes Soviet View of Human Rights in Belarus', Monitor 5/3, 6 Jan. 1999.
32. 'Russia's and Yeltsin's Stakes in Union with Belarus', Monitor 5/6, 11 Jan. 1999.
33. ITAR-TASS 23 Oct. 1998, 13:45 GMT, reproduced as 'Belarusian Leader Predicts Ukraine
to Join Slav Union, Says No to Enlarged NATO', in BBC-FSU 23 Oct. 1998.
34. 'A New Stage in Uniting the Fraternal Belarusian and Russian Peoples Has Begun',
Narodnaya Hazeta (Minsk) 22 Jan. 1999, pp. 1-2, reproduced in World News Connection,
FBIS-SOV-1999-0210.
35. Nataliya Panshina, 'Lukashenko Speaks in Favour of Superpower', TASS 2 April 1999.
36. 'Lukashenka Covets Union Presidency, Military Strength', Monitor 5/32, 16 Feb. 1999.
37. 'Lukashenko Advocates Union Between Russia, Iran, India, China', Interfax Russian News,
22 Feb. 1999.
38. Dana Priest, 'Russian Bombers Make Iceland Foray', Washington Post 1 July 1999, p.Al.
39. 'Large Military Exercises Conducted in Russia', Defense and Security, 28 June 1999.
40. Segodnya, 29 June 1999, p.l, reproduced as 'Belarus to Vote for Yeltsin with Bayonets', in
Defense and Security, 2 July 1999.
41. Alexei G. Arbatov, 'Russia's Foreign Policy Alternatives', International Security, 18/2
(1993), pp.5-43.
42. Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev quoted in Ostankino Channel 1 TV (Moscow)
15 Dec. 1992, 19:45 GMT, reproduced as 'Nazarbayev: CIS leaders Should "Carry Out
Divorce" at Minsk in Civilized Manner', in BBCSWB 21 Dec. 1992, SU/1569/B/1.
43. David R. Marples, Belarus: A Denationalized Nation (Australia: Harwood 1999).
44. These included 'On the Creation of an Economic Union', 'On Practical Measures to Create
a New-Type Ruble Zone', and 'On Uniting the Monetary Systems of the Republic of Belarus
and the Russian Federation'. Vitaly Tsygankov, 'Russia and Belarus Unite Monetary
Systems', Nezavisimaya Gazeta 20 Nov. 1993, p.3, reproduced in CDPSP 45/47, 22 Dec.
1993, p.23.
45. Belarussian Foreign Ministry Press Release (Minsk) 12 Jan. 1994, 16:33 GMT, reproduced
as 'Remaining Difficulties in Merge of Belarussian and Russian Monetary Systems', in
BBCSWB 14 Jan. 1994, SU/1895/B.
46. Slovakia 1 Radio (Bratislava) 28 Dec. 1994, 11:00 GMT, reproduced as 'Interview with
Lukashenka on Unification Trends and Ethnic Tension', in BBCSWB, 3 Jan. 1995,
SU/2191/D; Russian TV (Moscow) 3 July 1995, 18:00 GMT, reproduced as 'President
Lukashenka Interviewed on Corruption, Integration with Russia', in BBCSWB, 5 July 1995,
SU/2347/D; ITAR-TASS, 5 Dec. 1995, 21:13 GMT, reproduced as 'Lukashenka Urges Closer
Ties with Russia", in BBCSWB, 8 Dec. 1995, EE/D2482/D; Belapan News Agency (Minsk)
12 May 1997, 14:20 GMT, reproduced in BBCSWB, 14 May 1997, SU/D2918/D.
47. It was believed that this would serve as a reason for the unpopular Yeltsin to cancel the
Russian presidential elections 'under the pretext of the setting of a new state formation'. NTV
(Moscow) 1 Oct. 1995, 18:00 GMT, reproduced as 'NTV Speculates Over Reasons for
President Lukashenka's Surprise Visit to Russia', in BBCSWB, 4 Oct. 1995, EE/D2425/D.
48. Georgy Bovt, 'Supranational Bodies, Symbols and Anthem', Kommersant-Daily 26 March
1996, p.4, reproduced in CDPSP 48/12, 17 April 1996, p.9.
49. Pavel Shinkarenko, 'Community of Sovereign States is Created', Rossiiskiye Vesti, 3 April
1996, p.l, reproduced in CDPSP 48/14, 1 May 1996, p.6.
50. Interfax News Agency, 22 Dec. 1996, 14:39 GMT, reproduced as 'Russian Minister Urges
Authorities to Go for Unification with Belarus', in BBCSWB 24 Dec. 1996, SU/D2803/B.
51. The constitutional design of a Slavic union is a contentious matter. Under some plans,

THE GEOPOLITICS OF SLAVIC UNION

52.
53.
54.

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55.
56.
57.

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

64.
65.

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

71.
72.
73.
74.

89

Belarus would remain a sovereign state linked to Russia in a confederation; in others, a new
state would be established in which Russia and Belarus would both be constituent units of a
Slavic union (similar to the current design of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in which
Serbia and Montenegro are linked in a federal relationship through Yugoslav institutions);
another option would see Belarus simply annexed by Russia and become one or more
Russian provinces.
Yelena Tregubova, 'Gennady Seleznyov: The Union with Belarus is a Small Bridge to the
USSR', Kommersant-Daily, 2 April 1997, p.2, reproduced in CDPSP 49/14, 7 May 1997,
p.5.
ITAR-TASS 23 May 1997, 12:23 GMT, reproduced as 'Text of Russia-Belarus Union
Charter', in BBCSWB, 26 May 1997, SU/D2928/S2.
ITAR-TASS 3 Feb. 1998, 08:56 GMT, reproduced as 'Yeltsin Instructs Expert Body to Look
into Legal Harmonisation with Belarus', in BBCSWB, 5 Feb. 1998, SU/D3143/B.
For an overview, see J.L. Black, Russia Faces NATO Expansion: Bearing Gifts or Bearing
Arms? (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 1999).
Belapan News Agency (Minsk) 12 July 1996, 06:17 GMT, reproduced as 'Belarusian and
Russian Parliament Chiefs Oppose NATO Expansion', BBCSWB, 15 July 1996,
EE/D2664/D.
Quoted in Richard Boudreauz, 'Russia Urges Belarus to Move Toward Union', The Ottawa
Citizen 14 Jan. 1997, p.A7. Also see 'Boris Yeltsin Offers Aleksandr Lukashenko De Facto
Unification of Russia And Belarus', Nezavisimaya Gazeta 14 Jan. 1997, pp.1, 3, reproduced
in CDPSP 49/2, 12 Feb. 1997, p.7.
Quoted in 'Belarus, Russia Sign Military Accord, Express Concern Over NATO', Deutsche
Presse-Agentur, 19 Dec. 1997.
See Sergeyev's comments in 'NATO Expansion East Threatens Russia Defense Minister',
Interfax Russian, 30 Jan. 1998.
John Thornhill, 'Iraq Conflict Sparks Alarm in Russia over World Role', Financial Times
(London), 23 Dec. 1998, p.2.
'Yeltsin Favours Multi-polar World', TASS, 26 Dec. 1998.
Interfax 30 Dec. 1998, 15:35 GMT, reproduced as 'Belarusian President Says CIS Should
Step Up Military Integration', in BBCSWB, 1 Jan. 1999, SU/D3422/B.
ITAR-TASS 25 Dec. 1998, 11:59 GMT, reproduced as 'Text of Declaration on the Further
Integration of Russia and Belarus', in BBCSWB 31 Dec. 1998, SU/D3421/B.
'Yeltsin: Conflict to be Settled via Political Means Alone', Interfax Russian News 30 March
1999.
'Yeltsin for Multi-polar World, not Russia's Self-Isolation', Interfax Russian News 15 March
1999.
Interfax News Agency 29 July 1999, 08:57, reproduced as 'Ivanov Says Relations with USA
Crucial for World's Stability', in BBCSWB 1 July 1999, SU/D3575/B.
'Putin Hints Yeltsin will Head Russia-Belarus Union', Monitor 5/86, 4 May 1999.
RIA News Agency (Moscow) 2 July 1999, 15:02 GMT, reproduced as 'Russian Speaker Says
Russian-Belarusian Union Needed as Counter to West', BBCSWB 6 July 1999, SU/D3579/D.
Semyon Novoprudsky, 'Union of Struggle and Labor', Izvestia 29 April 1999, p.l,
reproduced in Russian Press Digest.
'Russia-Belarus Union Celebrates Third Anniversary of Founding', Xinhua News Agency 3
April 1999, No.0403059.
'Russian Parliament Ratifies Agreement with Belarus', Associated Press 22 April 1999;
'Russia, Belarus to Set Up Regional Military Group: Minister', ITAR-TASS 26 April 1999.
Interfax News Agency 26 April 1999, 12:31 GMT, reproduced as 'Russian Security Advisor
Urges Quicker Integration with Belarus', in BBC-FSU 27 April 1999.
Vyacheslav Bantin, 'Yeltsin, Lukashenko Sign 11 Documents on Union', ITAR-TASS 28
April 1999.
There is significant public backing for a Slavic union in both Russia and Belarus: 62 per cent
of those polled in Russia and 67 per cent of Belarusian respondents would have voted for the
creation of the union if a referendum was held during the first six months of 1999; another
poll in May 1999 found 72 per cent of Russians in favor of unification with Belarus, up from

90

75.
76.
77.

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78.
79.
80.
81.

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

89.
90.

91.
92.
93.

GEOPOLITICS
65 per cent in April 1997. However, 47 per cent said their final opinion would depend on the
conditions for the joint state; though 30 per cent of Russians would vote for the union under
any circumstances. Support for the Russia-Belarus union does not automatically indicate
pro-imperial aspirations; the dynamics at the elite level (in regard to the geopolitical issues)
may not necessarily be found amongst the masses. Ekonomichesky Soyuz (supplement to the
Rossiiskaya Gazeta) 26 June 1999, p.l, reproduced as 'Opinion Polls in Russia and Belarus
Concerning the Union', in What the Papers Say, 6 July 1999; 'Poll: 72% of Russians Support
Union with Belarus', Interfax Russian News 28 May 1999.
Vyacheslav Bantin, 'Stepashin Made "Personally Responsible" for RF-Belarus Treaty',
ITAR-TASS 5 July 1999.
'Stepashin Backs Russian-Belarussian Union', Interfax Russian News 3 July 1999.
Yury Chubchenko, 'Lukashenko Tries to Blackmail Moscow B By Threatening to Go West',
Kommersant 3 July 1999, p.3.
'Stepashin in New Push for Accord on Unification', Financial Times (London) 6 July 1999,
p.3.
ITAR-TASS 8 Dec. 1999, 13:53 GMT, reproduced as 'Agency Outlines Main Stages of
Formation of Russia-Belarus Union State', in BBCSWB 10 Dec. 1999, SU/D3714/B.
'Russian and Belarussian Presidents Sign Union Treaty', Russian Business Monitor 10 Dec.
1999.
Lukashenka quoted in 'Russia, Belarus to Join Defences in West - President Lukashenka',
ITAR-TASS 8 Dec. 1999, 13:50 GMT, reproduced in BBCSWB 10 Dec. 1999, SU/D3714/B.
Also see Anatoly Yurkin, 'Russia, Belarus to Adopt Union State Military Doctrine in 2000',
TASS 10 Dec. 1999.
'Yeltsin Growls a Warning at Clinton', The Moscow Times 10 Dec. 1999.
Robert J. Saiget, 'China, Russia Lay Basis for 21st Century Partnernship', Agence France
Presse 10 Dec. 1999.
The classic work on the differences between balancing and bandwaggoning is Stephen M.
Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithica, NY: Cornell UP 1987).
'Steps to Improve Ties with West Don't Mean Rejection of Russia B Minsk', Interfax
Russian News 24 July 1999.
The term 'Western' in this context refers to the United States and its West European allies.
'Ukraine's Two Minds', Economist 5 June 1999.
According to Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma, whose victory in the 1994 Ukrainians
presidential elections indicated both the split within Ukrainian society and the slight
advantage of those favourable to Russia, if Europe appears to close the door to Ukraine, then
it may have to turn toward Russia: '... if there continue to be only declarations on
cooperation with Ukraine [by the EU] and integration into Europe, it may have very negative
consequences...the course that Belarus has taken will certainly be repeated.' Die Presse
(Vienna), reproduced as APresident Kuchma Gives Interview on NATO, EU Membership,
Domestic Policy', in BBCSWB 24 July 1997, SU/D2979/D [emphasis added].
Boris Volkhonsky, 'Gennady Seleznyov Booed in Kiev', Kommersant-Daily 30 Sept. 1998,
p.4, reproduced in CDPSP 50/39, 28 Oct. 1998, p.17.
ITAR-TASS 5 March 1998, 10:33 GMT, reproduced as 'Poll Claims Most Ukrainians Want
to Join Union of Russia and Belarus', in BBCSWB 7 March 1998, SU/D3169/D. This is up
from some 23 per cent of those polled in Kiev who said in 1995 that they supported Ukraine
and Russia uniting into a single state. Radio Ukraine (Kiev) 31 July 1995, 10:00 GMT,
reproduced as 'Over 20 per cent of Kiev Residents Favour Reunification with Russia', in
BBCSWB 2 Aug. 1995, SU/2371/D.
Charles Clover, 'Ukraine Caught Between West and Slav Brethren', Financial Times
(London) 8 May 1999, p.3.
'Grim Choices', Economist 10 July 1999, p.47.
'Ukraine President Skeptical About Proposed Ukraine-Russia-Belarus Union', Interfax
Russian News 4 Dec. 1999; Andrei Nisamutdinov, 'Kuchma: Ukraine Not to Join RussianByelorussian Union', TASS 8 Dec. 1999.