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Clandestine cell system

Sleeper cell redirects here. For other uses, see Sleeper passage of time and changes in contemporary thinking
cell (disambiguation).
and technology.[1]
Ocially, the PIRA is hierarchical, but, especially as
British security forces became more eective, changed
to a semiautonomous model for its operational and certain of its support cells (e.g., transportation, intelligence,
cover and security).[2] Its leadership sees itself as guiding and consensus-building. The lowest-level cells, typically of 2-5 people, tend to be built by people with an
existing personal relationship. British counterinsurgents
could fairly easily understand the command structure, but
not the workings of the operational cells.

A clandestine cell structure is a method for organizing a


group of people in such a way that it can more eectively
resist penetration by an opposing organization. Depending on the groups philosophy, its operational area, the
communications technologies available, and the nature of
the mission, it can range from a strict hierarchy to an extremely distributed organization. It is also a method used
by criminal organizations, undercover operatives, and unconventional warfare (UW) led by special forces. Historically, clandestine organizations have avoided electronic
communications, because signals intelligence is a strength
of conventional militaries and counterintelligence organizations.

The IRA has an extensive network of inactive or sleeper


cells, so new ad hoc organizations may appear for any
specic operation.

In the context of tradecraft, covert and clandestine are


not synonymous. As noted in the denition (which has
been used by the United States and NATO since World
War II) in a covert operation the identity of the sponsor is
concealed, while in a clandestine operation the operation
itself is concealed. Put dierently, clandestine means
hidden, while covert means deniable. The adversary
is aware that a covert activity is happening, but does not
know who is doing it, and certainly not their sponsorship. Clandestine activities, however, if successful, are
completely unknown to the adversary, and their function,
such as espionage, would be neutralized if there was any
awareness of the activity. Saying a "covert cell structure
is tantamount to tautology, because the point of the cell
structure is that its details are completely hidden from the
opposition.

1.2 World War II French Resistance


In World War II, Operation Jedburgh teams parachuted
into occupied France to lead unconventional warfare
units.[3][4] They would be composed of two ocers, one
American or British, and the other French, the latter
preferably from the area into which they landed. The
third member of the team was a radio operator.

Especially through the French member, they would contact trusted individuals in the area of operation, and ask
them to recruit a team of trusted subordinates (i.e., a subcell). If the team mission were sabotage, reconnaissance,
or espionage, there was no need to meet in large units.
If the team was to carry out direct action, often an unwise mission unless an appreciable number of the locals
A sleeper cell refers to a cell, or isolated grouping of had military experience, it would be necessary to assemsleeper agents that lies dormant until it receives orders ble into units for combat. Even then, the hideouts of the
or decides to act.
leadership were known only to subcell leaders. The legitimacy of the Jedburgh team came from its known afliation with Allied powers, and it was a structure more
appropriate for UW than for truly clandestine operations.

1.1

History

1.3 National Front for the Liberation of


South Vietnam

Provisional Irish Republican Army

As opposed to the French Resistance, the modern


Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) has a history
going back to Irish revolutionary forces in the early 20th
century, but has little external control. Its doctrine and organization have changed over time, given factors such as
the independence of 26 of Irelands 32 counties, the continued British control of Northern Ireland and the simple

Also known as the Viet Cong, this organization grew from


earlier anticolonial groups ghting the French, as well as
anti-Japanese guerillas during World War II.[5] Its command, control, and communication techniques derived
from the experiences of these earlier insurgent groups.
The group had extensive support from North Vietnam,
1

4 MODELS OF INSURGENCY AND ASSOCIATED CELL CHARACTERISTICS

and, indirectly, from the Soviet Union. It had parallel External support need not be overt. Certain Shi'a groups
political and military structures, often overlapping. See in Iraq, for example, do receive assistance from Iran, but
Viet Cong and PAVN strategy and tactics.
this is not a public position of the government of Iran, and
may even be limited to factions of that government. Early
US support to the Afghan Northern Alliance against the
Taliban used clandestine operators from both the CIA and
United States Army Special Forces. As the latter conict
escalated, the US participation became overt.
Note that both unconventional warfare (UW) (guerrilla
operations) and foreign internal defense (FID) (counterinsurgency) may be covert and use cellular organization.
In a covert FID mission, only selected host nation (HN)
leaders are aware of the foreign support organization. Under Operation White Star, US personnel gave covert FID
assistance to the Royal Lao Army starting in 1959, became overt in 1961, and ceased operations in 1962.
A dual, but sometimes overlapping, Party and Military structure
was top-down

4 Models of insurgency and associ-

The lowest level consisted of three-person cells who opated cell characteristics
erated quite closely, and engaging in the sort of selfcriticism common, as a bonding method, to Communist
While dierent kinds of insurgency dier in where they
organizations.
place clandestine or covert cells, when certain types of insurgency grow in power, the cell system is deemphasized.
Cells still may be used for leadership security, but, if overt
2 Parallel organizations
violence by organized units becomes signicant, cells are
less important. In Maos three-stage doctrine,[7] cells are
The NLF and PIRA, as well as other movements, have still useful in Phase II to give cover to part-time guerillas,
chosen to have parallel political and military organiza- but, as the insurgency creates full-time military units in
tions. In the case of the NLF, other than some individuals Phase III, the main units are the focus, not the cells. The
with sanctuary in North Vietnam, the political organiza- Eighth Route Army did not run on a cell model.
tion could not be overt during the Vietnam War. After When considering where cells exist with respect to the
the war ended, surviving NLF ocials held high oce.
existing government, the type of insurgency needs to be
considered. One US Army reference was Field Manual
100-20, which has been superseded by FM3-07.[8] Drawing on this work, Nyberg (a United States Marine Corps
ocer) extended the ideas to describe four types of cell
system, although his descriptions also encompass types of
The overt political-covert military split avoided the inexinsurgencies that the cell system supports.[9] At present,
ibility of a completely secret organization. Once an active
there is a new type associated with transnational terrorist
insurgency began, the secrecy could limited freedom of
insurgencies.
action, distort information about goals and ideals, and restrict communication within the insurgency.[6] In a split
1. Traditional: the slowest to form, this reects a prinorganization the public issues can be addressed overtly,
cipally indigenous insurgency, initially with limited
while military actions were kept covert and intelligence
goals. It is more secure than others, as it tends to
functions stay clandestine.
grow from people with social, cultural or family ties.
The insurgents resent a government that has failed to
recognize tribal, racial, religious or linguistic groups
3 External support
who perceive that the government has denied their
rights and interests and work to establish or restore
Many cell systems still receive, with due attention to sethem. They seldom seek to overthrow the governcurity, support from the outside. This can range from
ment or control the whole society; however, they freleaders, trainers and supplies (such as the Jedburgh assisquently attempt to withdraw from government contance to the French Resistance), or a safe haven for overt
trol through autonomy or semiautonomy. The Muactivities (such as the NLF spokesmen in Hanoi).
jahideen in Afghanistan and the Kurdish revolt in
In the case of the PIRA, its political wing, Sinn Fin, became increasingly overt, and then a full participant in politics. Hamas and Hezbollah also have variants of overt
political/social service and covert military wings.

3
Iraq illustrate the traditional pattern of insurgency.
al-Qaeda generally operates in this mode, but if they
become strong enough in a given area, they may
change to the mass-oriented form.

cell systems work from within the government, the


mass-oriented builds a government completely outside the existing one, with the intention of replacing it. Such insurgents patiently construct a base of
passive and active political supporters, while simultaneously building a large armed element of guerrilla and regular forces. They plan a protracted campaign of increasing violence to destroy the government and its institutions from the outside. They have
a well-developed ideology and carefully determine
their objectives. They are highly organized and effectively use propaganda and guerrilla action to mobilize forces for a direct political and military challenge to the government. The revolution that produced the Peoples Republic of China, the American
Revolution, and the Shining Path insurgency in Peru
are examples of the mass-oriented model. Once established, this type of insurgency is extremely dicult to defeat because of its great depth of organization.

2. Subversive: Usually driven by an organization that


contains at least some of the governing elite, some
being sympathizers already in place, and others who
penetrate the government. When they use violence,
it has a specic purpose, such as coercing voters,
intimidating ocials, and disrupting and discrediting the government. Typically, there is a political
arm (such as Sinn Fin or the National Liberation
Front) that directs the military in planning carefully
coordinated violence. Employment of violence is
designed to show the system to be incompetent and
to provoke the government to an excessively violent
response which further undermines its legitimacy.
The Nazi rise to power, in the 1930s, is another example of subversion. Nazi members of parliament
and street ghters were hardly clandestine, but the
overall plan of the Nazi leadership to gain control
of the nation was hidden. A subversive insurgency
is suited to a more permissive political environment 5 Classic models for cell system opwhich allows the insurgents to use both legal and ilerations
legal methods to accomplish their goals. Eective
government resistance may convert this to a criticalDierent kinds of cell organizations have been used for
cell model.
dierent purposes. This section focuses on clandestine
3. Critical-cell: Critical cell is useful when the po- cells, as would be used for espionage, sabotage, or the
litical climate becomes less permissive than one organization for unconventional warfare. When unconthat allowed shadow cells. While other cell types ventional warfare starts using overt units, the cell systry to form intelligence cells within the govern- tem tends to be used only for sensitive leadership and
ment, this type sets up "shadow government" cells intelligence roles.[7] The examples here will use CIA
that can seize power once the system is destroyed cryptonyms as a naming convention used to identify
both by external means and the internal subversion. members of the cell system. Cryptonyms begin with a
This model ts the classic coup d'etat,[10] and of- two-letter country or subject name (e.g., AL), followed
ten tries to minimize violence. Variants include with an arbitrary word. It is considered elegant to have the
the Sandinista takeover of an existing government code merge with the other letters to form a pronounceable
weakened by external popular revolution. Insur- word.
gents also seek to inltrate the governments institutions, but their object is to destroy the system from
within. Clandestine cells form inside the govern- 5.1 Operations under ocial cover
ment. The use of violence remains covert until
the government is so weakened that the insurgencys Station BERRY operates, for country B, in target counsuperior organization seizes power, supported by try BE. It has three case ocers and several support ofthe armed force. One variation of this pattern is cers. Espionage operation run by case ocers under
when the insurgent leadership permits the popu- diplomatic cover, they would have to with the basic relar revolution to destroy the existing government, cruiting methods described in this article. Case ocer
then emerges to direct the formation of a new gov- BETTY runs the local agents BEN and BEATLE. Case
ernment. Another variation is seen in the Cuban ocer BESSIE runs BENSON and BEAGLE.
revolution[11] and is referred to as the foco (or Cuban
Some recruits, due to the sensitivity of their position or
model) insurgency. This model involves a single,
their personalities not being appropriate for cell leaderarmed cell which emerges in the midst of degeneratship, might not enter cells but be run as singletons, pering government legitimacy and becomes the nucleus
haps by other than the recruiting case ocer. Asset
around which mass popular support rallies. The inBARD is a dierent sort of highly sensitive singleton,
surgents use this support to establish control and
who is a joint asset of the country B, and the country idenerect new institutions.
tied by prex AR. ARNOLD is a case ocer from the
4. Mass-oriented: where the subversive and covert- country AR embassy, who knows only the case ocer

5 CLASSIC MODELS FOR CELL SYSTEM OPERATIONS

Representative diplomatic-cover station and networks

BERTRAM and the security ocer BEST. ARNOLD


does not know the station chief of BERRY or any of its
other personnel. Other than BELL and BEST, the Station
personnel only know BERTRAM as someone authorized
to be in the Station, and who is known for his piano playing at embassy parties. He is covered as Cultural Attache,
in a country that has very few pianos. Only the personnel
involved with BARD know that ARNOLD is other than
another friendly diplomat.
In contrast, BESSIE and BETTY know one another, and
procedures exist for their taking over each others assets
in the event one of the two is disabled.
Some recruits, however, would be qualied to recruit
their own subcell, as BEATLE has done. BESSIE knows
the identity of BEATLE-1 and BEATLE-2, since he had
them checked by headquarters counterintelligence before
they were recruited. Note that a cryptonym does not imply anything about its designee, such as gender.

5.2

Initial team presence by 2 separate clandestine teams with no ofcial cover

be shared. ALPINE and ALTITUDE, however, do not


know one another. They do not know any of the members of team ALICE.
The legitimacy of the subcell structure came from the recruitment process, originally by the case ocer and then
by the cell leaders. Sometimes, the cell leader would propose subcell member names to the case ocer, so the
case ocer could have a headquarters name check run
before bringing the individual into the subcell. In principle, however, the subcell members would know ALPINE,
and sometimes the other members of the ALPINE cell
if they needed to work together; if ALPINE-1 and
ALPINE-2 had independent assignments, they might not
know each other. ALPINE-1 and ALPINE-2 certainly
would not know ALISTAIR or anyone in the ALTITUDE
or ALLOVER cells.

Clandestine presence

The diagram of initial team presence shows that two


teams, ALAN and ALICE, have successfully entered an
area of operation, the country coded AL, but are only
aware of a pool of potential recruits, and have not yet actually recruited anyone. They communicate with one another only through headquarters, so compromise of one
team will not aect the other.
Assume that in team ALAN, ALISTAIR is one of the ofcers with local contacts, might recruit two cell leaders,
ALPINE and ALTITUDE. The other local ocer in the
team, ALBERT, recruits ALLOVER. When ALPINE
recruited two subcell members, they would be referred
to as ALPINE-1 and ALPINE-2.
Clandestine teams have built initial subcells
ALPINE and ALTITUDE only know how to reach ALISTAIR, but they are aware of at least some of other team
members identity should ALISTAIR be unavailable, and As the networks grow, a subcell leader might create his
they would accept a message from ALBERT. Most often, own cell, so ALPINE-2 might become the leader of the
the identity (and location) of the radio operator may not ALIMONY cell.

5.3

Fault-tolerant cellular structures

leadership core. Supercially, this might be likened to a


Western cell structure that emanates from a headquarters,
but the Western centrality is bureaucratic, while structures in other non-western cultures builds on close personal relationships, often built over years, perhaps involving family or other in-group linkages. Such in-groups are
thus extremely hard to inltrate; inltration has a serious
chance only outside the in-group. Still, it may be possible
for an in-group to be compromised through COMINT or,
in rare cases, by compromising a member.

Modern communications theory has introduced methods


to increase fault tolerance in cell organizations. In the
past, if cell members only knew the cell leader, and the
leader was neutralized, the cell was cut o from the rest
of the organization. Game theory and graph theory have
been applied to the study of optimal covert network design (see Lindelauf, R.H.A. et al. 2009. The inuence
of secrecy on the communication structure of covert networks. Social Networks 31: 126-137).
The core group is logically a ring, but is superimposed
If a traditional cell had independent communications with on an inner hub-and-spoke structure of ideological authe foreign support organization, headquarters might be thority. Each member of the core forms another hub and
able to arrange its reconnection. Another method is to spoke system (see infrastructure cells), the spokes leading
have impersonal communications side links between to infrastructure cells under the supervision of the core
cells, such as a pair of dead drops, one for Team ALAN group member, and possibly to operational groups which
to leave lost contact messages to be retrieved by Team the headquarters support. Note that in this organization,
ALICE, and another dead drop for Team ALICE to leave there is a point at which the operational cell becomes autonomous of the core. Members surviving the operation
messages for Team ALAN.
may rejoin at various points.
These links, to be used only on losing contact, do not
guarantee a contact. When a team nds a message in
its emergency drop, it might do no more than send an
alert message to headquarters. Headquarters might determine, through SIGINT or other sources, that the enemy
had captured the leadership and the entire team, and order the other team not to attempt contact. If headquarters
can have reasonable condence that there is a communications failure or partial compromise, it might send a new
contact to the survivors.
When the cut-o team has electronic communications,
such as the Internet, it has a much better chance of eluding
surveillance and getting emergency instructions than by
using a dead drop that can be under physical surveillance.
Core group, with contact ring and ideological hierarchy

Non-traditional models, exemplied by al-Qaeda

Due to cultural dierences, assuming the al-Qaeda


Training Manual[12] is authentic, eastern cell structures
may dier from the Western mode. Al-Qaidas minimal
core group, only accounting for the leadership, can also
be viewed topologically as a ring or chain network, with
each leader/node heading their own particular hierarchy.
Such networks function by having their sub-networks
provide information and other forms of support (the
many-to-one model), while the core group supplies truth and decisions/directions (the one-to-many
model). Trust and personal relationships are an essential part of the Al-Qaida network (a limiting factor, even
while it provides enhanced security). Even while cell
members are trained as replaceable units, vetting of
members occurs during the invited training period under
the observation of the core group.[13]

Osama, in this model, has the main responsibility of commanding the organization and being the spokesman on
propaganda video and audio messages distributed by the
propaganda cell. The other members of the core each
command one or more infrastructure cells.
While the tight coupling enhances security, it can limit
exibility and the ability to scale the organization. This
in-group, while sharing tight cultural and ideological values, is not committed to a bureaucratic process.
Members of the core group are under what could be
termed 'positive control'long relationships and similar
mindsets make 'control' not so much of an issue, but there
are distinct roles, and position (structural, nancial, spiritual) determines authority, thus making the core group a
hierarchy topologically.[13]

In the rst example of the core, each member knows how


to reach two other members, and also knows the member(s) he considers his ideological superior. Solid lines
show basic communication, dotted red arrows show the
rst level of ideological respect, and dotted blue arrows
Cells of this structure are built outwards, from an internal show a second level of ideological respect.

6 NON-TRADITIONAL MODELS, EXEMPLIFIED BY AL-QAEDA

If Osama, the most respected, died, the core would reconstitute itself. While dierent members have an individual ideological guide, and these are not the same for all
members, the core would reconstitute itself with Richard
as most respected.
Assume there are no losses, and Osama can be reached
directly only by members of the core group. Members of
outer cells and support systems might know him only as
the Commander, or, as in the actual case of al-Qaeda,
Osama bin Ladens face is recognizable worldwide, but
only a very few people know where he is or even how to
contact it.
Core group and infrastructure cells; military cells in training

6.1

Infrastructure cells

Any clandestine or covert service, especially a non- These cells are socially embedded (less so than the
national one, needs a variety of technical and adminis- core group, however), structurally embedded, functionally embedded (they are specialized into a domain), and
trative functions. Some of these services include:[13]
knowledge base-specic (there does not seem to be a
great deal of cross-training, or lateral mobility in the orga1. Forged documents and counterfeit currency
nization). Such cells are probably subjected to a mixture
of positive and negative control (do this, do these sorts
2. Apartments and hiding places
of things, dont do that).[13]
3. Communication means
4. Transportation means
5. Information
6. Arms and ammunition
7. Transport

The leaders of military cells are responsible for training


them, and, when an operation is scheduled, selecting the
operational commander, giving him the basic objective
and arranging whatever support is needed, and then release him from tight control to execute the meeting. Depending on the specic case, the military leaders might
have direct, possibly one-way, communications with their
cells, or they might have to give Kim the messages to be
transmitted, by means that Anton and Hassan have no
need to know.

Other functions include psychological operations, trainNote that Anton does not have a direct connection to
ing, and nance.
Kim. Under normal circumstances, he sacrices eA national intelligence service[14] has a support organi- ciency for security, by passing communications requests
zation to deal with services such as nance, logistics, fa- through Hassan. The security structure also means that
cilities (e.g., safehouses), information technology, com- Hassan does not know the members of Antons cells, and
munications, training, weapons and explosives, medical Kim may know only ways to communicate with them but
services, etc. Transportation alone is a huge function, in- not their identity.
cluding the need to buy tickets without drawing suspicion,
Kim operates two systems of cells, one for secure comand, where appropriate, using private vehicles. Finance
includes the need to transfer money without coming un- munications and one for propaganda. To send out a propaganda message, Osama must pass it to Kim. If Kim
der the suspicion of nancial security organizations.
were compromised, the core group might have signicant
Some of these functions, such as nance, are far harder to problems with any sort of outside communications.
operate in remote areas, such as the FATA of Pakistan,
than in cities with large numbers of ocial and unocial Terrorist networks do not match cleanly to other cell sysnancial institutions, and the communications to support tems that regularly report to a headquarters. The apparent
them. If the nancial oce is distant from the remote al-Qaeda methodology of letting operational cells decide
headquarters, there is a need for couriers, who must be on their nal dates and means of attack exhibit an opertrusted to some extent, but they may not know the con- ational pattern, but not a periodicity that could easily be
tents of their messages or the actual identity of sender used for an indications checklist appropriate for a warnon seeing a local pattern to
and/or receiver. The couriers, depending on the balance ing center. Such lists depend
[15]
give
a
specic
warning.
among type and size of message, security, and technology
available, may memorize messages, carry audio or video Note that Hassan has two subordinates that have not yet
established operational cells. These subordinates can be
recordings, or hand-carry computer media.

6.3

Indirect support networks

considered sleepers, but not necessarily with a sleeper


cell.

6.2

Operational cells

For each mission are created one or more operational


cells. If the al-Qaeda signature of multiple concurrent
attacks is used, there may be an operational cell for each
target location. It will depend on the operation if they
will need any support cells in the operational area. For
example, it may be more secure to have a local cell build
bombs, which will be delivered by cells coming from outCore group, with contact ring and ideological hierarchy
side the area.
Operational cells are not created, but instead 'seeded'
utilizing individuals spotted or that request assistance
(both groups are 'vetted' by being trained under the observation of the core group, which dramatically restricts
the opportunity for passing o walk-ins under false ag).
Categorization of operational cells appears to be by capabilities, region, and then task/operation. Operational cells
are composed of members whose worldview has been
rmly testednecessary to front-load, because such cells
are dispersed back to their own local control (or negative controlproscribed behaviorwith positive control
only coming in the form of contact for synchronization or
support).[13]
If operational cells routinely are released curved dotted
lines on link to military cells to select their nal operational
parameters, they use a dierent paradigm than governmental clandestine or covert operations. On a number of
cases, US special operations forces had to wait for Presidential authorization to make an attack, or even move to
staging areas. Admittedly, a country would have to face
the consequences of an inappropriate attack, so it may
tend to be overcautious, where a terror network would
merely shrug at the world being upset. Assuming that the
al-Qaeda operational technique is not to use positive control, their operations may be more random, but also more
unpredictable for counterterror forces. If their cells truly
need constant control, there are communications links
that might be detected by SIGINT, and if their command
can be disrupted, the eld units could not function. Since
there is fairly little downside for terrorists to attack out
of synchronization with other activities, the lack of positive control becomes a strength of their approach to cell
organization.

Cells are coordinated, not under command & controlthis autonomy and local control makes them exible, and enhances security
Trust and comcon internally to the cell
provide redundancy of potential command (a failure of Palestinian operations
in the past), and well as a shared knowledgebase (which may mean, over time,
that cross training emerges inside a cell,
providing redundancy of most critical
skills and knowledge).[13]

6.3 Indirect support networks


In the above graphic, note the indirect support network
controlled by Richards subcell.
While Al-Qaida has elements of the organization designed to support the structure, but such elements are insucient in meeting the needs of such an organization,
and for security reasons there would be redundant and
secondary-/tertiary-networks that are unaware of their
connection to Al-Qaida. These networks, primarily related to fundraising and nancial activities, as well as
technology providers, are in a use relationship with AlQaidamanaged through cut-outs or individuals that do
not inform them of the nature of activities, and that may
have a cover pretext sucient to deect questions or
inquiry.[13]

6.4 A possible countermeasure

The operational cells need to have continuous internal


communication; there is a commander, who may be in
In 2002, U.S. News & World Report said that American
touch with infrastructure cells or, less likely from a secuintelligence is beginning to acquire a suciently critirity standpoint with the core group.
cal mass of intelligence on al-Qaida indicating, Once
Al-Qaedas approach, which even diers from that of ear- thought nearly impossible to penetrate, al Qaeda is provlier terrorist organizations, may be very viable for their ing no tougher a target than the KGB or the Maa--closed
goals:
societies that took the U.S. government years to get inside. We're getting names, the dierent camps they
Cells are redundant and distributed, maktrained at, the hierarchy, the inghting, says an intelliing them dicult to roll up
gence ocial. Its very promising.[16] The report also

said that the collected data has allowed the recruiting of


informants.
Writing in the U.S. Army journal Military Review, David
W. Pendall suggested that a catch-and-release program
for suspected operatives might create reluctance or distrust in such suspects and prevent them from further acts
or, perhaps more important, create distrust in the cell
leaders of these individuals in the future. The author
noted the press release describing Ramzi Binalshibs cooperation with the United States are sure to prevent reentry into a terrorist cell as a trusted member and most likely
limits the further trust and assignments of close cell associates still at large. The captor would determine when to
name names and when to remain silent.[17] Indeed, once
intelligence learns the name and characteristics of an atlarge adversary, as well as some sensitive information that
would plausibly be known to him, a news release could be
issued to talk about his cooperation. Such a method could
not be used too often, but, used carefully, could disturb
the critical trust networks. The greatest uncertainty might
be associated with throwing doubt onto a key member of
an operational cell that has gone autonomous.

See also
Leaderless resistance
Lone wolf (terrorism)

References

[1] Leahy, Kevin C. (2005). The Impact of Technology on


the Command, Control, and Organizational Structure of
Insurgent Groups (PDF). Retrieved 2007-12-04.
[2] Irish Republican Army. The Green Book. Archived
from the original on 2007-06-16. Retrieved 2007-12-04.
[3] Hall, Roger (1964). You're Stepping on my Cloak and Dagger. Bantam Books.
[4] Hogan, David W. (1992). Chapter 3: Special Operations
in the European Theater. U.S. Army Special Operations
in World War II. Washington, D.C.: United States Army
Center of Military History. CMH Pub 70-42.
[5] Pike, Douglas (1970). Viet Cong: Organization and Technique of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam.
MIT Press.
[6] US Department of the Army (December 2006). FM 324: Counterinsurgency (PDF).
[7] Mao, Zedong (1967). On Protracted War. Foreign Language Press, Beijing.
[8] US Department of the Army (20 February 2003). FM 307 (formerly FM 100-20): Stability Operations and Support Operations.

EXTERNAL LINKS

[9] Nyberg, Eric N. (1991). Insurgency: The Unsolved Mystery. US Marine Corps University Command and Sta
College.
[10] Luttwak, Edward (1968). Coup d'etat: A Practical Handbook. Harvard University Press.
[11] Guevara, Ernesto Che (1961). On Guerilla Warfare.
Praeger.
[12] al-Qaeda training manual (PDF). US Southern District
Court, US New York City Attorneys Oce, entered as
evidence in Africa embassy bombings.
[13] Decision Support Systems, Inc. (2001-12-31). Hunting
the Sleepers: Tracking al-Qaidas Covert Operatives
(PDF). Retrieved 2007-11-17.
[14] US Central Intelligence Agency. Support to Mission:
Who We Are. Retrieved 2007-11-19.
[15] Fellman, Philip Vos; Wright, Roxana. Modeling Terrorist Networks - Complex Systems at the Mid-Range
(PDF). Retrieved 2007-11-02.
[16] Kaplan, David E. (22 September 2002). Run and Gun:
Al Qaeda arrests and intelligence hauls bring new energy
to the war on terrorism. U.S. News & World Report.
[17] Pendall, David W. (JanuaryFebruary 2004). EectsBased Operations and the Exercise of National Power.
Military Review (United States Army Combined Arms
Center). Find the article by going through the Military
Review directories

9 External links
An Introduction To Terrorist Organisational Structures

10
10.1

Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses


Text

Clandestine cell system Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clandestine%20cell%20system?oldid=625853879 Contributors: Edward,


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Jetpax and Anonymous: 32

10.2

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Derived from Image:Information icon.svg Original artist:
El T (original icon); David Levy (modied design); Penubag (modied color)
File:Edit-clear.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/f/f2/Edit-clear.svg License: Public domain Contributors: The
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File:T-Cell-0.png Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/97/T-Cell-0.png License: CC-BY-3.0 Contributors: Own
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10.3

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