Afectivitate Negativa Si Luarea Deciziilor in Grup

British Journal of Management, Vol.
21, 375392 (2010)

DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8551.2009.00675.x
Good Eects of Bad Feelings: Negative

Aectivity and Group Decision-making
Hanneke J. M. Kooij-de Bode, Daan van Knippenberg1 and
Wendy P. van Ginkel1
TNO Kwaliteit van Leven, PO Box 718, 2130 AS Hoofddorp, The Netherlands, and 1Rotterdam School
of Management, Erasmus University Rotterdam, PO Box 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands
Corresponding author email: dvanknippenberg@rsm.nl
Extending the growing interest in the relationship between aect and workgroup processes,
we propose that groups make better use of their distributed information and therefore make better decisions when group members are higher in negative aectivity. In an
experiment, we studied the inuence of negative aectivity when information was
distributed among group members and when group members had fully shared information.
Results indicated that negative aectivity indeed stimulates group information processing
and decision quality when information is distributed among group members.
Introduction
Organizations often rely on groups for decisionmaking based on the assumption that groups
possess a broader range of informational resources
and more diversity of insights than individuals
(Ilgen et al., 2005; Jackson, 1991; Tindale, Kameda
and Hinsz, 2001). This is expected to enhance
decision quality when groups exchange and integrate the task-relevant information and perspectives that may be distributed over their members
(De Dreu, Nijstad and van Knippenberg, 2008;
Hinsz, Tindale and Vollrath, 1997; van Knippenberg, De Dreu and Homan, 2004). However,
group decision-making studies show that groups
typically are poor users of their distributed
informational resources. Groups with distributed
information often fail to discuss individual group
members unique information and focus more on
information known to all members before group
discussion (Stasser and Titus, 1985; Wittenbaum
and Stasser, 1996). Even when unique information and perspectives are entered into group
This research was nancially supported by Grant 40201-043 of the Netherlands Foundations for Scientic
Research (NWO) to Daan van Knippenberg.
discussion, groups often fail to recognize the

relevance of unique information and base decisions
on information that was already known to all
members before discussion (Gigone and Hastie,
1993; Scholten et al., 2007; Winquist and Larson,
1998). A core issue for research in groups eective
use of distributed information therefore is to
identify factors that are conducive to the elaboration the exchange, discussion and integration of
task-relevant information and perspectives (van
Knippenberg, De Dreu and Homan, 2004).
Over the course of more than 20 years, research
in group decision-making with distributed information has made substantial progress in uncovering factors that aect a groups use of distributed
information (e.g. Kerr and Tindale, 2004). Consistent with the conclusion that research in
organizational behaviour has a longer tradition
in the study of cognitive processes than in the
study of aective processes (Brief and Weiss,
2002), research in group decision-making has so
far neglected the inuence of group member
aective dispositions. There is a consistent body
of evidence, however, suggesting that negative
aect is associated with more careful and extensive
information processing. Building on this work we
develop and test the hypothesis that when group
r 2009 British Academy of Management. Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford
OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA, 02148, USA.
376
H. J. M. Kooij-de Bode, D. van Knippenberg and W. P. van Ginkel
members are more strongly disposed to experience

negative aect (i.e. are higher on negative aectivity; Watson and Clark, 1984), the group engages in
a more careful and extensive process of information elaboration and reaches higher-quality decisions. This focus on group member negative
aectivity is in line with a more general trend in
research in organizational behaviour to become
increasingly attuned to the role that aect moods
and emotions and aective dispositions play in
organizational behaviour (e.g. Brief and Weiss,
2002; Elfenbein, 2007; van Knippenberg et al.,
2008; Staw and Barsade, 1993; Weiss and Cropanzano, 1996), including in groups and teams
(Barsade et al., 2000; George, 1990).
The problem of distributed information in group

decision-making: hidden proles
A key rationale for the team-based organization
of work and for making groups rather than
individuals responsible for decisions is the proverbial notion that two heads know more than one.
Dierent group members may know dierent
things and have dierent perspectives on the task
at hand. Combining this distributed information
(i.e. information that is only known to one group
member or a subset of group members) should thus
allow groups to reach high-quality decisions (Ilgen
et al., 2005). Research in distributed information
has described this as the hidden prole to be
uncovered by the group (e.g. Wittenbaum and
Stasser, 1996). While the information available to
individual group members before group interaction
may suggest one decision alternative, full use of the
information available to the group i.e. integrating
the information distributed over group members
would suggest another, superior, decision alternative. Viewed in this way, the core task of
decision-making groups with distributed information (cf. informational diversity; van Knippenberg
and Schippers, 2007) is to exchange, discuss and
integrate their distributed information to come to a
high-quality decision (van Ginkel and van Knippenberg, 2008) a process called group information elaboration (van Knippenberg, De Dreu and
Homan, 2004). Recent research in group decisionmaking has consistently supported this proposition
regarding the core role of group information
elaboration (van Ginkel and van Knippenberg,
2008, 2009; van Ginkel, Tindale and van Knippen-
berg, in press; Homan et al., 2007, 2008; Kooij-de

Bode, van Knippenberg and van Ginkel, 2008).
Research in distributed information, however,
shows that groups are poor users of their distributed
information (Stasser and Titus, 1985; Wittenbaum
and Stasser, 1996). Group members tend to focus
on discussion of the information that is already
available to all before group discussion, and to the
extent that distributed information does enter group
discussion its impact on the nal group decision
tends to be much smaller than that of information
available to all. One reason for this is hard to
change: information that is known to all has a
higher chance of entering group discussion because
it can be brought up by all individuals in the group
(Stasser, 1999). Other reasons are directly related to
the cognitive-motivational processes involved in
group information elaboration and are therefore
more interesting from an applied perspective.
As a somewhat obvious consequence of the
need to reach agreement, group members are
often primarily focused on a search for common
ground in an attempt to reach consensus about a
decision (van Ginkel and van Knippenberg,
2008). Such common ground is often found in
the information available to all group members
before discussion, which will typically argue in
favour of a certain decision preference. Because
group members have a tendency to discuss information in a preference-driven way (i.e. focusing
on information that supports a certain preference) rather than in an evidence-driven way (i.e.
focusing on all decision-relevant information;
Hastie and Pennington, 1991), such preferences
tend to bias discussion away from distributed
information and render it more likely that group
members zoom in on an emerging group consensus. Faced with such emerging consensus,
group members may take this consensus as a sign
of the validity of the groups preferred decision
option, and move to nalize the decision without
further exploring the information available to the
group (van Ginkel and van Knippenberg, 2008).
Factors that render group members more open to
new information, less easily satised with an emerging consensus, and less hesitant to move against this
emerging consensus, may thus motivate more
extensive information elaboration and result in
higher-quality decisions (cf. Scholten et al., 2007).
Interestingly and importantly, research in individual judgement and decision-making suggests that
negative aectivity may accomplish just that.
r 2009 British Academy of Management.
Negative Aectivity and Group Decision-making

Negative aect and information processing
The concept of aect captures the disposition to
experience positive and negative feelings (also
known as positive aectivity and negative aectivity) as well as positive and negative transient mood
states (Elfenbein, 2007; Forgas, 1995; Russell
and Barrett, 1999; Watson and Tellegen 1985).
Whether as disposition or as transient mood,
research in aect supports the conclusion that
negative aect has important consequences for
information processing that are directly relevant to
a groups use of distributed information.
To capture the inuence of negative aect on
group information elaboration and decisionmaking in the present study, we focus on group
member dispositional (trait) negative aectivity.
The interest value of this focus on negative
aectivity lies in the fact that while state negative
aect (i.e. negative mood) may be relatively
unpredictable unless it is specically tied to
circumstances that would directly feed into the
group decision-making context (an interesting
but dierent issue altogether), negative aectivity
may be seen as a group composition variable that
exerts a predictable inuence (Barsade et al., 2000;
Kelly and Barsade, 2001). In that sense, ndings
for negative aectivity may have important
implications for team stang and design. Even
so, given that negative aective states are a core
reason why negative aectivity inuences group
information processing, we build on theory and
research in both negative aectivity and negative
moods to outline how group member negative
aectivity inuences group information elaboration and decision quality.
Negative aectivity is the disposition to experience subjective distress (Watson and Clark,
1984). People score higher on negative aectivity
the more they are disposed to experience negative
feelings like sadness, guilt, nervousness and so
on, while they score lower on negative aectivity
the less they are disposed to experience such
feelings (Watson, Clark and Tellegen, 1988). While
clearly the core of negative aectivity is the disposition to experience negative aect, this disposition is
associated with a specic pattern of cognitions, and
these cognitions and aect mutually inuence each
other to create and maintain the disposition of
negative aectivity (Watson and Clark, 1984).
Note that in healthy populations high negative
aectivity refers to relatively mild levels of negative
377
aectivity and not to the higher levels of negative
aectivity that may be observed in clinical samples
(Watson and Clark, 1984; Watson, Clark and
Tellegen, 1988), just as moods reect low-intensity
aective states that do not have the intensity of
emotions (Forgas, 1995). It is these mild levels of
negative aect that are associated with more
extensive information processing rather than with
some of the dysfunctional consequences of clinical
levels of negative aectivity.
Key to understanding the inuence of negative
aectivity on information processing is the proposition that aect has an important signalling function
aective states are informative to the individual.
Aect signals whether the state of things requires
attention and potentially action or is satisfactory
and does not require vigilant monitoring. Negative
aect signals that the state of things is problematic
and therefore requires attention and potential
action. As a consequence, negative aect is associated with more extensive information processing
and greater openness and attention to new information (Bless and Schwarz, 1999; Clore, Schwarz and
Conway, 1994; Forgas, 1995; Forgas and Bower,
1987; Forgas and George, 2001; Frijda, 1988;
Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz and Bless, 1991). Negative
aect does not simply inuence cognitive eort or
processing capacity, but rather induces a particular
style of processing (Bless and Fiedler, 2006). Negative aect supports a bottom-up processing style (i.e.
evidence-driven rather than preference-driven) focused on external/situational information relevant
to the issue (e.g. task) at hand. Negative aect thus
may motivate adapting the internal state (e.g. attitudes, beliefs, preferences) to new information (e.g.
the requirements of a problematic external state)
(Bless, 2001; Bless and Fiedler, 2006; Fiedler, 2001;
Forgas, 1995, 2002; Forgas and George, 2001).
At the individual level of analysis, these information processing benets of negative aect/
aectivity (i.e. of mild levels of negative aect/
aectivity compared with lower levels) have been
demonstrated for a variety of issues. Research in
persuasive communication for instance shows
that negative mood compared with positive mood
results in more careful information processing
(Bohner et al., 1992; Mackie and Worth, 1989)
and work by Forgas suggests that negative compared with neutral moods lead to more accurate
perceptions and attributions of external stimuli
(Forgas, 1998; Forgas, Laham and Vargas, 2005).
Negative aectivity is likewise associated with
378
more vigilant attention to new and potentially

worrisome information and with less closing of
the mind based on decision preferences and greater
openness to decision-disconrming information
(Olsen and Zanna, 1979; Watson and Clark,
1984). Also of relevance to the benets of negative
aectivity for group processing of distributed
information, Tong et al. (2008) show that individuals conformed less to others opinions when in a
negative mood compared with a neutral or positive
mood, and Watson and Clark (1984) conclude in
similar vein that negative aectivity is associated
with lower conformity to others opinions.
The group information elaboration process is
not identical to individual-level information
processing, but there are obvious linkages between
the conclusions of these conceptual and empirical
analyses and the proposition that a groups use of
distributed information is critically contingent on
openness to and elaborate processing of new
decision-relevant information and perspectives.
Accordingly, based on the evidence that negative
aectivity is associated with greater attention and
openness to new information, we propose that
group member negative aectivity is associated
with more elaboration of distributed information
and therefore with higher-quality decisions in
groups with distributed information.
Negative aectivity and distributed information:
the present study
Research in group decision-making with distributed information has identied insucient information elaboration inspired by a focus on common
ground and emerging group consensus as the key
problem standing in the way of high-quality group
decisions. Negative aectivity may be an important
factor in this respect, because it inspires greater
attention and openness to new decision-relevant
information and motivates more evidence-driven
and less preference-driven information processing.
It is exactly this bottom-up processing style focused on new information associated with negative
aectivity that may help decision-making groups
break away from their tendency to limit group
discussion largely to information that is already
known to all group members before discussion.
The lower tendency to conform to others opinions
associated with negative aectivity further contributes to the processing benets of negative
aectivity by making group members less likely
to zoom in on emerging consensus without

extensive consideration of the available information. Applying these individual-level insights to the
group decision-making context, we may therefore
expect that decision-making groups dealing with
distributed information engage in more information elaboration and reach higher-quality decisions
the higher their members are in negative aectivity
(i.e. again noting that this implies a comparison of
moderate levels of negative aectivity with lower
levels of negative aectivity).
Clearly, group information elaboration is a
group process shaped by the interaction and
exchange between group members and not an
individual-level process, and when applying insights from the individual study of negative aect
and information processing to group processes an
important question is what the most appropriate
model is to relate group composition in terms of
individual negative aectivity to group process
(elaboration) and performance (decision quality).
Indeed, when studying the inuence of dispositional factors in groups and teams, it is good to
realize that dierent composition models are
possible: mean trait, variance in trait, and minimum or maximum level of the trait probably are
the more obvious ones (Barrick et al., 1998). While
all these models may be legitimately studied,
conceptual analysis should typically be able to
identify the more appropriate model. To determine
the most appropriate composition model a sensible
strategy is to follow the notion that the composition model used should match the nature of the
task, and to use Steiners (1972) taxonomy, which
distinguishes disjunctive, conjunctive and additive
tasks, to classify the type of task used in the study
(Beersma et al., 2003; Homan et al., 2008; Neuman
and Wright, 1999). If the task is essentially additive
in nature, a mean (average) model is for instance
the more appropriate model: because group members contributions additively combine to create
the group product, the underlying dispositional
inuences that inuence group members behaviour are most appropriately modelled as additive
(Beersma et al., 2003; Homan et al., 2008). Following this reasoning, in the present study we focused
on a mean negative aectivity (i.e. disposition
averaged over group members) model to test our
predictions (cf. Barsade et al., 2000; Kelly and
Barsade, 2001), because the task of exchanging,
discussing and integrating information to reach a
group decision is primarily an additive task. The
379

group relies equally on all members to contribute
their unique knowledge, and the discussion of this
information is also an additive process that suers
if not all members contribute.
Individual-level research in the role of aect
suggests that negative aectivity is not related to
cognitive eort per se but rather expresses its
inuence through dierences in processing style,
specically in greater openness to new information
and less preference-driven information processing,
as well as in a lower tendency to conform to the
opinion of others. Accordingly, we expect that the
inuence of negative aectivity is contingent on the
distribution of information in the group. From the
perspective of the distributed information problem,
distribution of information can range from a
situation in which all information is available to
all group members before discussion (fully shared
information) to a situation in which certain pieces
of information are available to only one of the
members (distributed information; Gruenfeld et al.,
1996; Stasser and Titus, 1985). In view of its
inuence on processing style, the inuence of
negative aectivity should be especially apparent
in the treatment of distributed information (which
should come up as new information in group
discussion) and not necessarily evident in the
treatment of information that is already known to
all (which could also reect dierences in prediscussion information processing). To substantiate
this point, in the present study we include a
comparison of a situation in which groups deal
with distributed information with a situation in
which all information is already fully shared (i.e.
known to all members) before group discussion (cf.
Kooij-de Bode, van Knippenberg and van Ginkel,
2008). Based on the notion that negative aectivity
is particularly relevant to the elaboration of new
information that may run counter to pre-discussion
preferences and emerging group consensus, we
predict that negative aectivity only shows a
positive relationship with information elaboration
and decision quality in groups with distributed
information. This leads to the following hypotheses.
H1: Group member negative aectivity is
positively related to group information elaboration in groups with distributed information, but
not in groups with fully shared information.
H2: Group member negative aectivity is
positively related to group decision quality in
groups with distributed information, but not in

groups with fully shared information.
Based on analyses of decision-making with distributed information that put information elaboration
centre-stage in mobilizing the groups informational
resources and reaching high-quality decisions (van
Ginkel and van Knippenberg, 2008; van Knippenberg, De Dreu and Homan, 2004), we expected that
information elaboration mediates the predicted
relationship with decision quality. That is, negative
aectivity is expected to inuence decision quality
through its relationship with group information
elaboration.
H3: Elaboration of task-relevant information mediates the interaction of negative aectivity and
distribution of information on decision quality.
We tested these hypotheses in an experimental
study of decision-making groups. This allowed us
to manipulate the distribution of information and
reach conclusions about causality in this respect,
and enabled us to assess the group processes
leading to the nal decision through behavioural
coding of group interaction, which is a more
objective and more valid way of assessing group
process than the team self-reports typical of eld
research (Weingart, 1997; Wittenbaum, Hollingshead and Botero, 2004). This experimental set-up
also allowed us to dene a relatively objective
measure of group decision quality. Moreover, tests
of interactions in survey research often suer from
low power because same-source biases and correlations between independent variables lead to the
underestimation of interaction eects (Evans, 1985;
McClelland and Judd, 1993), and an additional
advantage of our experimental set-up was that we
could partly address these problems and thus
increase the statistical power of our interaction tests.
Method
Sample and design
Two hundred and seventy students (175 male and
95 female) from a university in The Netherlands
participated in the study for monetary compensation (10 euro, approximately 13 US dollars or
9 pounds sterling). The majority of the participants were management students (70%). Their
mean age was 20 (SD 5 1.89). The experimental
design included distribution of information as an
experimental manipulation (distributed versus
380
fully shared) and negative aectivity as a quasiexperimental factor. Participants were randomly
assigned to 90 groups of three, and groups were
randomly assigned to the experimental conditions. Dependent variables were group information elaboration and decision quality.
Data of some groups could not be included because of missing values. For one group the decisions
were not available, ve groups were not videotaped
due to technical problems, in one group a participant did not ll out the questionnaire that measured
negative aectivity, and in two groups participants
did not ll out the items that measured the manipulation check for distributed information.1 Finally,
residual analysis identied two groups as outliers on
the information elaboration measures. When reexamining these groups using the audio-video data,
one of the groups seemed to have incorrectly
understood the instructions, while no irregularities
were found in the other group. Subsequently, this
one group as well as the nine other groups described
above were excluded from further analyses.
As discussed in the introduction, the average of

group members scores was used to represent
negative aectivity at the group level (M 5 1.77,
SD 5 0.28, Md 5 1.73, range 5 1.13). Note that
the observed levels of negative aectivity were
indeed quite low as would be expected from a
mentally healthy population, and that as outlined
in the introduction our analysis pertains to the
range of very low to moderate levels of negative
aectivity.
Also note that because negative aectivity is an
individual dierences measure and individuals
are randomly assigned to groups, there is no
reason to expect agreement between group
members levels of negative aectivity nor is such
agreement a precondition for computing group
members mean level of negative aect (cf.
Beersma et al., 2003; Homan et al., 2008). (In
contrast, such agreement would be required when
individual ratings refer to a shared group experience such as group conict or group cohesion,
but this is not the issue we are dealing with here;
cf. Klein and Kozlowski, 2000).3
Measurement of negative aectivity

Negative aectivity was measured before the actual
experiment by the full ten-item measure developed
as part of the Positive and Negative Aect Schedule
(PANAS) to measure negative aectivity (Watson,
Clark and Tellegen, 1988). For this measure,
individuals, following the instruction Indicate to
what extent you generally feel this way, rate the
extent to which they tend to experience such
negative aective states as distressed, nervous
and jittery. Responses were assessed on ve-point
scales (1 5 disagree and 5 5 agree; a 5 0.83). This
PANAS measure has been shown to be internally
consistent and exhibit trait-like stability.2
1
Preliminary analyses including these two groups

showed that conclusions were unaected by whether or
not these groups were included. However, because we
considered the most appropriate test of our hypotheses
to be one in which all analyses were based on data from
the exact same groups, we decided to leave these two
groups out of the analyses.
2
Our analysis links information processing benets to
negative aectivity and not to the absence of positive
aectivity, which as a trait is independent of negative
aectivity (Watson, Clark and Tellegen, 1988). Even so,
in anticipation of questions from interested readers, we
also assessed positive aectivity (with the full ten-item
PANAS measure) and analysed its relationship with
information elaboration and decision quality. As anticipated, no signicant relationships were obtained.
Decision task
The experimental task was a three-person decision
task that was an altered version of Architectural
Design Firm (Palmer and Thompson, 1998).
Although the original task was a negotiation task,
the task was changed to make it a purely cooperative decision task. Participants received a case in
which they had to design a house, and in which a
client specied required features and a limited
budget. Participants were told that they were a
team of experts who had to work together to (a)
make a design that met the requirements and
budget of the client and (b) earn maximum prot
for the architectural rm. All participants were
given information about pricing for various
options they could include in the design plan, a
prot schedule (indicating the amount of prot for
the rm if an option would be included in the
3
To further validate our conclusion that the mean model

is the more appropriate model to predict group
information elaboration and group decision quality,
we also explored other models focusing on variance in
negative aectivity, minimum level of negative aectivity and maximum level of negative aectivity. Corroborating our conceptual analysis, these analyses showed
that the mean model was the only model able to predict
groups use of distributed information.
381

design, with some options being more protable
than others) and special extra prot information
involving certain (combined) options.
The highest possible joint prot was h73,250.
While in theory the lowest possible prot was
zero, this would in fact only be achieved if groups
did not spend any of the clients budget in eect
when they did not execute the task. As soon as
groups start investing the budget, they make a
prot. Because groups are not required to spend
the entire budget of the client, and indeed not all
groups did, it is not possible to put a concrete
number to the lowest possible score for groups
following task instructions, as any value we
would quote would be arbitrary. Note that this
also means that dierences between conditions
should not be interpreted with reference to the
theoretical scale low of zero, but rather with
reference to this more realistic but impossible to
specify low. We therefore suggest relying more on
indicators of eect size to assess the magnitude of
dierences between conditions than on reference
to theoretical scale range.
Manipulation of distribution of information
All groups received the same information, but the
way in which the information was distributed
among group members diered between the two
conditions (Gruenfeld et al., 1996; Kooij-de
Bode, van Knippenberg and van Ginkel, 2008;
Stasser and Titus, 1985). General information
(e.g. information about the purpose of the task)
and task-irrelevant information (e.g. the children
of the customers love the zoo) were shared in
both conditions. In addition, part of the information about the prot associated with dierent
decision options was also shared in both conditions. In the fully shared condition, the full set of
decision-relevant information was given to all
members. However, in the distributed information condition, several items of information that
were necessary to reach an optimal decision were
distributed over group members in such a way
that each group member received some information that no other member had. Because of this,
group members individual information argued
for a lower-quality decision than the information
of all group members combined (i.e. a hidden
prole was created; Stasser and Titus, 1985).
Specically, in addition to the prot associated
with each design option, certain combinations of
design options yielded a higher prot than could

be expected on the basis of the associated prots
of the options in isolation. There were six such
combinations of options that would yield extra
prot. In the distributed information condition,
information about the extra prot associated
with these combinations was distributed among
members i.e. available to only one of the
members, with each member receiving information about two dierent combinations (i.e. no
member was favoured in terms of receiving
unique information). In addition, information
about the availability and associated prot of
some of the design options was distributed
among group members.
Importantly, at the group level groups in both
conditions possessed the exact same pool of
information (as they should; otherwise we would
experimentally confound distribution of information and amount of information available to the
group). Yet, group members in the distributed
information condition possessed some information not known to their fellow group members,
whereas all group members possessed the same
(full) set of information in the fully shared
condition. Following standard procedures for
research in distributed information (e.g. Gruenfeld et al., 1996; Stasser and Titus, 1985), in the
distributed information condition group members were informed that the information they
received might slightly dier between members,
but they were not informed about the exact
nature of the dierences.
Procedure
Groups were seated in a small room, where
participants were asked for permission to record
the group interaction on audio-video tapes.
Participants rst lled out the negative aectivity
questionnaire. After completion, they received
a folder containing general information about
the decision task and specic decision-relevant
information that varied as a function of the
distribution of information manipulation (see
above). Groups were then given 20 minutes to
complete the decision task and to write down
which options they had chosen with the associated prices and prots. After that, they lled
out a questionnaire to check the experimental
manipulation and assess demographics. Finally,
participants were debriefed and paid.
382
Dependent measures
Manipulation check. To assess the success of the
distribution of information manipulation we used
four items (responses on ve-point scales: 1 5 disagree, 5 5 agree). Examples of items are The other
two group members had partly other information
than I and The other two group members had
exactly the same information as I (reverse coded).
To assess interrater agreement we used the awg(1)
value (instead of the more frequently used rwg(1)
index), following the recommendations of R. D.
Brown and Hauenstein (2005). We did not rely on
ICC(1) because indices of agreement in this context
seem more important than indices of consistency in
scores over group members (cf. Kozlowski and
Hattrup, 1992). The awg(1) value for the manipulation check was 0.79, indicating strong agreement,
so this variable was aggregated to the group level
(a 5 0.98).
Information elaboration. Group information elaboration was assessed through behavioural observation using audio-video recordings of the group
discussions. Coding followed the logic of the coding scheme developed by van Ginkel and van
Knippenberg (2008), which is rooted in van
Knippenberg, De Dreu and Homans (2004) analysis and denition of group information elaboration
(also see van Ginkel and van Knippenberg, 2009;
van Ginkel, Tindale and van Knippenberg, in press;
Homan et al., 2007; Kooij-de Bode, van Knippenberg and van Ginkel, 2008). The rating scheme used
in the present study resulted in scores on a ve-point
scale, where each scale point is operationalized in
terms of specic behavioural standards observable
from the audio-video recordings. In line with earlier
research in distributed information these standards
include such behaviour as the exchange and repetition of information (e.g. Larson, Foster-Fishman
and Keys, 1994; Stasser, Taylor and Hanna, 1989).
Based on the conceptualization of information
elaboration these standards also include behavioural indicators of the actual use and integration of
distributed information such as asking questions
about information introduced in group discussion
or drawing conclusions from the combination of
dierent pieces of information (note that these
behaviours cannot exist independently from the
exchange of information).
A score of 5 was given when the group elaborated
thoroughly on the information, i.e. when the three
group members actively discussed all task-relevant

options and information, considered these facts at
length, asked each other for task-relevant information, and discussed it in detail. A score of 1 was
given when a group hardly elaborated on the
information, i.e. when group members mainly gave
their opinion about certain options, discussed their
opinions instead of task-relevant information, and
agreed with each other without much discussion
(M 5 2.59, SD 5 1.20). Information elaboration
was coded on the group level by two judges
(k 5 0.75, indicating good interrater reliability).
Decision quality. Decision quality was operationalized as the amount of prot the groups
earned. Groups had to write down their chosen
design options on a form, with corresponding
prices and prots and (by summing up) their total
joint prot. For simplicity, we divided this joint
prot associated with the group decision by 1000
before analysing (M 5 69.48, SD 5 3.14).
Results
Treatment of the data
Regression analyses were conducted for the manipulation check for informational diversity and the
three hypotheses. We dummy-coded distribution
of information ( 0.5 for distributed information
and 0.5 for fully shared information). We centred
negative aectivity and computed the cross-product of negative aectivity and the dummy for
distribution of information following the recommendations of Aiken and West (1991).
Manipulation check
Hierarchical regression of the manipulation
check on negative aectivity, distribution of information and their cross-product only showed a
main eect of distribution of information,
b 5 0.93, po0.001. Groups with fully shared
information indicated less diversity of information (M 5 1.81, SD 5 0.70) than groups in
which information was distributed among group
members (M 5 4.58, SD 5 0.29). No inuence of
negative aectivity was observed, b 5 0.02, ns,
nor was there an interaction eect of distribution of information and negative aectivity,
b 5 0.01, ns. We concluded that the manir 2009 British Academy of Management.
383

pulation of distribution of information was
successful.
results for the interaction shows, however, these

ndings were qualied by the interaction.
Information elaboration
Decision quality
To test whether negative aectivity was more

strongly related to elaboration in groups with
distributed information than in groups with fully
shared information, as predicted in Hypothesis 1,
we entered negative aectivity and distribution
of information in the regression equation in step 1
and added their cross-product in step 2. As
expected, the interaction between negative aectivity and distribution of information was signicant, DR2 5 0.05, po0.05, b 5 0.22, po0.05. In
line with Hypothesis 1, groups with distributed
information engaged in more information elaboration when they were higher on negative aectivity.
Simple slope analysis to determine the relationship
between negative aectivity and information elaboration in the fully shared and distributed
information conditions showed that this relationship was signicant in the distributed information
condition, b 5 0.52, po0.001. Information elaboration in groups with fully shared information
was not aected by negative aectivity, b 5 0.07,
ns (see Figure 1).
Main eects of negative aectivity and distribution of information on information elaboration were also found. Groups higher in negative
aectivity elaborated more on information, DR2 5
0.09, po0.01, b 5 0.29, po0.01. Groups with distributed information elaborated less on information
than groups with fully shared information, DR2 5
0.11, po0.01, b 5 0.34, po0.01. As the pattern of
To test Hypothesis 2 we entered negative aectivity

and distribution of information into the regression
equation in step 1 and added their cross-product in
step 2. The predicted interaction between negative
aectivity and distribution of information
was signicant, DR2 5 0.06, po0.05, b 5 0.24,
po0.05. As expected, groups with distributed
information reached higher-quality decisions when
they were higher in negative aectivity, as was
evident in a signicant simple slope, b 5 0.39,
po0.01. Decision quality in groups with fully
shared information was not related to negative
aectivity, b 5 0.09, ns (see Figure 2).
A main eect of distribution of information on
decision quality was also found. Groups with
distributed information reached lower-quality
decisions than groups with fully shared information, DR2 5 0.22, po0.01, b 5 0.47, po0.01.
As the pattern of ndings for the interaction shows,
however, this eect was qualied by the interaction.
Information elaboration and decision quality:
mediation analysis
Information elaboration was positively correlated with decision quality (r 5 0.65, po0.01).
To test whether elaboration mediated the interaction of negative aectivity and distribution of
information on decision quality (Hypothesis 3),
we relied on a method recently proposed to test
72
71
Distribution of information
Distributed
Fully Shared
Decision Quality
Information Elaboration
70
69
68
67
Distributed
Fully Shared
66
65
1SD
+1SD
Negative Affectivity
Figure 1. Interaction eect of negative aectivity and distribution

of information on information elaboration.
1SD
+1SD
Figure 2. Interaction eect of negative aectivity and distribution

of information on decision quality.
384
mediated moderation (Preacher, Rucker and

Hayes, 2007). This method is often seen as
superior to models relying solely on hierarchical
regression analyses (e.g. Baron and Kenny, 1986;
Yzerbyt, Muller and Judd, 2004), because it
provides more information about the nature of
mediated moderation (cf. Edwards and Lambert,
2007) and because a bootstrapping procedure is
applied which makes the method more robust.
An SPSS macro provided by Preacher, Rucker
and Hayes (2007) was used to test the model.
For the present study, this involved three steps.
In the rst step, regression analysis is used to test
the extent to which the mediator (information
elaboration) is predicted by both independent
variables (negative aectivity and distribution of
information) and their interaction. In the second
step, the dependent variable (group decision
quality) is regressed on both independent variables, the interaction between the independent
variables, and the mediator. In the third step, a
bootstrapping procedure is used to verify the
conditional indirect eects in groups with distributed information versus groups with fully
shared information. As can be seen in Table 1,
the interaction between negative aectivity and
distribution of information predicted information
elaboration (as also reported above). Furthermore, when performance was regressed on negative aectivity, distribution of information, their
interaction, and information elaboration, the
eect of information elaboration was signicant,

while the interaction was not. Step 3 shows that
the conditional indirect eect of negative aectivity on group decision quality through information elaboration is only signicant for groups
with distributed information and not for groups
in which information is fully shared. In sum, the
analysis provides support for Hypothesis 3 that
predicts that information elaboration mediates
the interaction of negative aectivity and distribution of information on decision quality (see
Figure 3).
Discussion
Groups often make suboptimal use of their
distributed information (Wittenbaum and Stasser, 1996). Research has identied group members tendency to search for common ground and
to process information in a preference-driven way
(as opposed to a bottom-up, evidence-driven
way) as key inuences in this respect. This leads
group members to follow emerging group consensus based on the information already available
to all prior to group discussion, while ignoring
distributed information that may argue against
emerging group consensus. The current analysis
points to group member negative aectivity as an
important inuence to the good here, because
negative aectivity is associated with a processing
Table 1. Test of the conditional indirect eects

b
Step 1 Regressing information elaboration on
Negative aectivity
Negative aectivity distribution of information
Step 2 Regressing decision quality on
Negative aectivity
Negative aectivity distribution of information
Information elaboration
Step 3 Conditional indirect eects
Distributed information
Fully shared information
SE b
1.26
0.88
1.92
0.02
1.90
2.85
1.30
Boot con. ind. eects
2.91
0.45
0.42
0.23
0.80
0.97
0.56
1.90
0.26
Boot SE
0.92
0.94
p
3.14
3.89
2.39
0.002
o0.001
0.019
0.02
3.37
1.50
4.95
Boot z
3.17
0.48
0.98
0.001
0.14
o0.001
Boot p
0.002
0.63
Note. Step 1 consists of regressing information elaboration on negative aectivity, distribution of information and their interaction.
Step 2 consists of regressing group decision quality on negative aectivity, distribution of information, their interaction, and
information elaboration. Step 3 consists of testing the conditional indirect eects of negative aectivity on group decision quality
through information elaboration for groups with distributed information and groups with fully shared information using
bootstrapping.
Distribution of
Information
Information
Elaboration
Decision Quality
Figure 3. Interaction eect of negative aectivity and distribution of information on decision quality: mediation by information
elaboration.
style that is less bound by preferences and particularly attuned to new information. In support of
this analysis, groups with distributed information
engaged in more information elaboration (Hypothesis 1) and reached higher-quality decisions
(Hypothesis 2) the higher their members were in
negative aectivity. Further corroborating our
proposition that this inuence of negative aectivity is tied in particular to the processing of
new (i.e. distributed) information, group member
negative aectivity did not aect information
elaboration or decision quality in groups with
fully shared information. Supporting our proposition regarding the key role of information
elaboration in mobilizing distributed information, the interactive eect of negative aectivity
and distribution of information was mediated by
information elaboration (Hypothesis 3).
Implications for theory and practice
Perhaps somewhat counter-intuitively, the present study thus suggests that negative aectivity
the moderate as compared with lower levels
studied here may have positive eects. For group
tasks requiring the careful elaboration of new
information it may pay o to compose teams with
members with moderately high negative aectivity.
While we emphasize that the current ndings
concern trait aect and not state aect and that
conclusions regarding the role of state negative
aect require future research, the implication of
these ndings for negative mood states is interesting and potentially important. Our ndings
would suggest that just as negative aectivity
may have good eects, a negative aective state
is not necessarily a bad thing. Indeed, it may be
very functional that situational inuences that are
typically associated with negative aect and
distress such as crisis and uncertainty elicit negative
aect (cf. Frijda, 1988). Negative aect may
motivate appropriate responses to the situation if
it leads group members to be more vigilant and to
385
better process new information that is potentially
relevant to resolving the problems at hand. Rather
than only focusing on alleviating negative aect
states in times of crisis and uncertainty, it may
therefore be valuable to try to mobilize these states
in situation-appropriate responses. This, however,
is a hypothesis to be tested in future research and
not a conclusion that can be based on the current
ndings. In that sense, the present ndings invite
future research to extend the current research to
the inuence of negative mood states to more
comprehensively cover the inuence of negative
aect in groups.
An interesting implication of the nding that
negative aectivity is especially benecial in groups
with distributed information lies in the clear link
between distributed information and diversity
(van Knippenberg and van Ginkel, in press; van
Knippenberg and Schippers, 2007; Williams and
OReilly, 1998). As van Knippenberg, De Dreu
and Homan (2004) argue, the potential benets of
work group diversity for group performance lie in
diversity as an informational resource in the pool
of task-relevant knowledge, expertise and perspectives available to the group. Viewed from this
perspective, diversity is a distributed informational
resource, and it requires group information elaboration to mobilize this informational resource.
Integrating these observations with the present
analysis, we may thus propose that group member
negative aectivity may be instrumental in harvesting the benets in diversity.
An important point to note here is that negative
aectivity does not imply negative relationships
between group members. Good relationships may
be conducive to the eective use of distributed
information (Gruenfeld et al., 1996; Kooijde Bode, van Knippenberg and van Ginkel, 2008;
Phillips, Northcraft and Neale, 2006) and to group
performance more generally (De Dreu and Weingart, 2003; Mullen and Copper, 1994). If group
member negative aectivity were to disrupt relationships between group members, we would not
expect to obtain the current ndings. Negative
aectivity need not lead to dysfunctional social
behaviour, however, nor does negative aect in
a group necessarily lead to problematic outcomes.
Sy, Cote and Saavedra (2005) for instance
observed that groups in a negative mood were
more persistent in task performance than groups in
a positive or in a neutral mood. In a related
vein, both Damen, van Knippenberg and van
386
Knippenberg (2008) and Van Kleef et al. (2009)

observed that under some circumstances team
leader negative aect can lead to higher performance than team leader positive aect. While
clearly poor relationships between group members may be associated with negative aect,
negative aect is more likely to be consequence
than cause here, and the current ndings are not in
opposition with ndings of better team performance in groups with better social relationships
among their membership.
We should be careful not to over-generalize the
implications of the present ndings, however.
Negative aectivity should not always be benecial to group performance. Research in aect in
groups is limited, but it has also documented
instances in which positive aect is associated
with desirable outcomes and negative aect is
not. Barsade et al. (2000) and Sy, Cote and
Saavedra (2005) found that group member positive aect predicted cooperation and coordination within the group, whereas negative aect
was unrelated to cooperation and coordination.
In addition, individual-level research suggests
that positive aect may be more conducive to
creativity than negative aect (Baas, De Dreu
and Nijstad, 2008; but see George and Zhou,
2002), and evidence suggests that negative aect
may render individuals more risk-avoidant in
decision-making (Williams, Zainuba and Jackson, 2003). Both these inuences suggest that
negative aect may be less conducive to the
performance of for instance research and development teams that rely heavily on creativity and
a willingness to take risks in trying out new
avenues in product development (cf. Hirst, van
Knippenberg and Zhou, 2009). The conclusion
thus seems warranted that negative aect
and positive aect each have their own benecial
inuence, though each on dierent processes
and depending on contextual factors (George
and Zhou, 2002; Isen and Baron, 1991). While
negative aect may not inuence social processes
like cooperation and coordination (cf. McIntyre
et al., 1991; Watson et al., 1992), it may exert
more inuence on task persistence and information processing.
Consistent with the general trend in research in
aect (Watson and Clark, 1997) and with the
analyses linking negative aect to information
processing on which our analysis builds (Bless,
2001; Forgas, 1995), we focused on general
negative aectivity. Negative aect/aectivity is

a higher-order factor that groups together more
specic instances of negative aect such as
distress, hostility and sadness, and one may raise
the question of whether our ndings hold equally
for more specic conceptualizations of negative
aect. As Watson and Clark (1997) point out, the
empirical evidence consistently shows that the
intercorrelations of dierent subsets of negative
aect are very high too high in fact to empirically distinguish them and that the dierent
subdimensions typically do not dier in their
relationship with other variables, thus favouring
a focus on the higher-order factor of general
negative aect. The more appropriate question
may in that sense be whether specic negative
emotions would have similar eects as we
observed for negative aect in the present study.
Emotions in contrast to moods (i.e. which are
closer to the general notion of aective states,
and the disposition to experience certain aective
states) are more intense, more short-lived and in
contrast to diuse moods have a distinct cause.
From the perspective of the present analysis, this
greater intensity may be problematic as it might
be associated with impaired cognitive capacity
for information processing (cf. Ellis and Ashbrook, 1988). The current data cannot speak to
this, however, and it remains a question for
future research whether the benecial eects of
negative aect are indeed limited to mild levels of
negative aect (cf. Forgas, 1995).
While the present ndings clearly support the
conclusion that groups with distributed information benet from negative aectivity, a recent
study by Bramesfeld and Gasper (2008) warrants
discussion for yielding dierent results for mood
states. Although they also included an argument
leading to the prediction that negative aect is
more conducive to the use of distributed information as we do in the current study, Bramesfeld
and Gasper observed that groups with members
in a positive mood made better use of their
distributed information in group decision-making
than groups with members in a negative mood.
They attribute this nding to the greater cognitive exibility of happy as compared with sad
individuals (Lyubomirsky, King and Diener,
2005) a factor often associated with greater
creativity of people in a positive mood (Baas, De
Dreu and Nijstad, 2008). While both the current
study and the Bramesfeld and Gasper study focus
387

on decision-making with distributed information,
there are many dierences between the studies
that could potentially account for the dierences
in ndings (from dierences in the decisionmaking task to cross-national dierences), and
we can of course only speculate about the factors
underlying these dierential ndings.
One factor standing out as a theoretically
interesting lead in this respect is the dierence
between the structure of the decision options.
Whereas group members in our study had to
make a series of interrelated decisions to arrive at
an overall group decision, group members in the
Bramesfeld and Gasper study faced a far simpler
decision structure they had to pick one of three
decision options. The latter set-up may create
clear opposition between group member decision
preferences and thus potentially opposition between group members (De Dreu, Nijstad and van
Knippenberg, 2008) in which the more cooperative tendencies associated with positive aect as
opposed to the competitive tendencies associated
with negative aect (Forgas and George, 2001)
would help reach superior outcomes through
greater willingness to also consider the others
perspective (cf. De Dreu, Weingart and Kwon,
2000). In the current task, in contrast, the
decision structure is more complex with multiple
interrelated decision issues, and decision preferences are less easily construed as being in direct
opposition. This may make the development of
group discussion less contingent on cooperative
versus competitive tendencies than presumably in
the Bramesfeld and Gasper study, and thus allow
groups to benet from the information processing advantage of negative aectivity (i.e. rather
than from the cooperative advantage of positive
aect). Clearly, currently this can only be
speculation, but future research might fruitfully
investigate the role of cooperative versus competitive motives in the eects of aect on information elaboration.
One other factor that deserves mention in this
respect is that we focused on trait aect while
Bramesfeld and Gasper focused on state aect.
This may give rise to the question of whether
traitstate dierences might explain the dierences in ndings. Trait and state indeed should
not be equated. Trait aect captures the disposition (i.e. likelihood) to experience certain aective states, which should not be equated with
being in that state (i.e. state aect) at any given
moment in time. Moreover, trait aect is

characterized by the habitual interplay of cognitions and aect that presumably mutually inuence each other (Watson and Clark, 1984),
whereas state aect in principle refers to nothing
more than the experience of a certain aective
state. Accordingly, the inuence of trait and state
aect need not be identical (George, 1991). But
this is not to say that they would have the
opposite eect. Our analysis is rooted in a mix of
theory and research in trait and state negative
aect, and there is nothing in this literature to
suggest that trait negative aectivity and state
negative aect would have opposing inuences.
We therefore deem it highly unlikely that this
would explain the dierence between our ndings
and the Bramesfeld and Gasper ndings.
Limitations and future directions
Even though experiments are not conducted to
establish external validity (Brown, D. J., and
Lord, 1999; Dipboye, 1990; Mook, 1983), the
experimental nature of the current study may
raise questions about the generalizability of our
ndings to work groups and teams in organizations. In this respect, it is important to note that
evidence from research in organizational behaviour suggests that many ndings from laboratory experiments generalize to the eld (Dipboye,
1990; van Knippenberg and van Knippenberg,
2005; Locke, 1986) and recent research suggests
that this also holds for ndings concerning
information elaboration in groups (Kearney and
Gebert, 2009; Kearney, Gebert and Voelpel,
2009; cf. van Dick et al., 2008). Obviously,
however, the proof of the pudding is in the
eating, and it would be valuable if future research
established that the present relationships may
also be observed in work groups in organizations.
In reference to the experimental nature of the
task, we should also note that we should not
generalize conclusions regarding eect size from
experiments (cf. Locke, 1986; Mook, 1983). The
interaction between negative aectivity and distribution of information explained 6% of variance in decision quality, which is a decent-sized
eect in a test of an interaction relying on natural
variations in negative aectivity within the
sample (cf. Evans, 1985; McClelland and Judd,
1993), but we should not assume that similarsized eects would be observed in organizational
388
settings they could be larger as well as smaller. In

this respect, it is important to note that, in line with
the experimental character of our study, participants were randomly assigned to groups and
conditions. As a result, variations in mean group
member negative aectivity between groups are
likely to be more modest than would be observed
in organizations where attraction, selection and
attrition processes may create a wider range of
group mean negative aectivity (George, 1991).
Accordingly, due to restriction of range our
ndings may underestimate the inuence of
negative aectivity as it might be observed in work
groups and teams in organizations.
A focus on trait negative aectivity may raise the
question of the relationship between negative
aectivity and other personality or individual
dierence variables. As Watson and Clark (1984)
argue, negative aectivity should be related to the
personality factor neuroticism as well as to other
individual dierence variables with clear aective
components. However, for the study of aective
experiences and inuences negative aectivity is the
more appropriate focus as it most directly and
purely captures the issue at stake: the disposition
to experience negative aect. Because our analysis
builds on research specically concerning negative
aect, we therefore focused on negative aectivity
rather than on other personality or individual
dierences indicators that may be more distal to
negative aect and more broadly dened. We do
note the interesting possibility, however, that other
individual dierence variables may have eects
similar to the ones observed in the present study
to the extent to which they are associated with
negative aect (e.g. neuroticism). Viewed from a
dierent perspective, we should acknowledge in this
respect that a limitation of our study is that we did
not include measures of other individual dierence
variables to determine whether negative aectivity
indeed is the key driver of the observed relationships
rather than another individual dierence variable
with which negative aectivity is correlated.
Key to our analysis is the notion that negative
aectivity motivates a more evidence-driven processing style that is more open to new decisionrelevant information. This prediction is rmly
rooted in individual-level research and our elaboration data suggest that at the group level it is
exactly this inuence that obtains. Even so, our
study does not contain measures of group member
motivations that could have further substantiated
our propositions regarding the inuence of negative aect. Future research that would also include
such motivational measures might in that sense be
valuable.
The outcome of interest in the present study
was group decision quality, a group level variable, and the group process predicting decision
quality, information elaboration, clearly is a
group-level variable too. Negative aectivity,
even though aggregated to the group level for
obvious reasons in the present study (i.e. we study
group-level process and outcome), is inherently an
individual-level factor and members within the
group may dier in their level of negative
aectivity. Individual performance at work is often
also enacted in the context of a work group or
team (e.g. Hirst, van Knippenberg and Zhou,
2009), and an interesting question for future
research would therefore be whether in a group
context there are individual-level outcomes that
would be contingent on group member negative
aectivity. The more elaborate information processing of group members higher in negative
aectivity could for instance mean that group
members with higher negative aectivity learn
more (e.g. acquire new knowledge) in the course
of group interaction, or alternatively that all group
members learn more as a consequence of more
extensive group information elaboration in a group
where the average level of negative aectivity is
higher. Exploring such multilevel issues (i.e. group
composition and group process as predictor of
individual-level outcomes) in future research would
further advance our understanding of the role of
negative aectivity in work groups and teams.
While groups with distributed information
higher in negative aectivity engaged in more
information elaboration, they did not outperform
groups with fully shared information. This
nding should be seen in the context of this
current study, where methodological considerations require that groups with distributed information and groups with fully shared information
have access to the exact same pool of information
at the group level (i.e. information distribution
and information available to the group should
not be confounded). In organizational practice,
however, groups with distributed information
(e.g. cross-functional teams) will typically have
access to a larger pool of information than
groups in which information is fully shared (cf.
van Knippenberg, De Dreu and Homans (2004)

discussion of informational diversity). Accordingly, in such situations negative aectivity may
actually help groups with distributed information
to outperform groups that are more homogeneous in terms of their information. An important next step would therefore be to study the
inuence of negative aectivity on team decisionmaking and performance in organizational contexts where groups may dier in the (distributed)
informational resources available to them.
In conclusion
There seems to be an implicit assumption in
research and practice in organizational behaviour
that positive aect(ivity) is preferable over
negative aect(ivity) when it comes to desirable
organizational outcomes. The present ndings
provide an important caveat in this respect,
suggesting that positive aect, while no doubt
more enjoyable than negative aect, is not always
preferable to negative aect when it comes to the
quality of group performance. The inuence of
negative aect in group performance may extend
beyond groups use of distributed information,
and our understanding of group decision-making
and group performance in general may stand
much to gain by the systematic investigation of
these potential inuences of negative aect on
group decision-making and performance. In that
sense, the present study also provides further
evidence for the importance of the growing
attention to aect and emotions in organizational
behaviour.
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Hanneke J. M. Kooij-de Bode received her PhD in business administration from the Rotterdam
School of Management, Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Netherlands. She currently works as
researcher/advisor at the Netherlands Organization for Applied Scientic Research (TNO). Her
main research interest focuses on organizational processes and labour productivity.
Daan van Knippenberg is Professor of Organizational Behaviour at the Rotterdam School of
Management, Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Netherlands. His research interests include
leadership, work group diversity, group decision-making, creativity and innovation, and social
identity processes in organizations. He is an associate editor of Organizational Behavior and Human
Decision Processes and Journal of Organizational Behavior, founding editor of Organizational
Psychology Review, and co-founder of the Erasmus Center for Leadership Studies.
Wendy P. van Ginkel is Assistant Professor of Organizational Behaviour at the Rotterdam School
of Management, Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Netherlands. She also received her PhD from
this school. Her current research interests include team decision-making, team diversity, team
leadership and shared cognition.
Copyright of British Journal of Management is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be
copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written
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British Journal of Management, Vol.

21, 375392 (2010)

Good Eects of Bad Feelings: Negative

discussion, groups often fail to recognize the

H. J. M. Kooij-de Bode, D. van Knippenberg and W. P. van Ginkel

members are more strongly disposed to experience

The problem of distributed information in group

berg, in press; Homan et al., 2007, 2008; Kooij-de

Negative Aectivity and Group Decision-making

H. J. M. Kooij-de Bode, D. van Knippenberg and W. P. van Ginkel

more vigilant attention to new and potentially

to zoom in on emerging consensus without

Negative Aectivity and Group Decision-making

groups with distributed information, but not in

H. J. M. Kooij-de Bode, D. van Knippenberg and W. P. van Ginkel

As discussed in the introduction, the average of

Measurement of negative aectivity

Preliminary analyses including these two groups

To further validate our conclusion that the mean model

Negative Aectivity and Group Decision-making

design options yielded a higher prot than could

H. J. M. Kooij-de Bode, D. van Knippenberg and W. P. van Ginkel

group members actively discussed all task-relevant

Negative Aectivity and Group Decision-making

results for the interaction shows, however, these

To test whether negative aectivity was more

To test Hypothesis 2 we entered negative aectivity

Figure 1. Interaction eect of negative aectivity and distribution

r 2009 British Academy of Management.

Figure 2. Interaction eect of negative aectivity and distribution

H. J. M. Kooij-de Bode, D. van Knippenberg and W. P. van Ginkel

mediated moderation (Preacher, Rucker and

eect of information elaboration was signicant,

Table 1. Test of the conditional indirect eects

r 2009 British Academy of Management.

Negative Aectivity and Group Decision-making

H. J. M. Kooij-de Bode, D. van Knippenberg and W. P. van Ginkel

Knippenberg (2008) and Van Kleef et al. (2009)

negative aectivity. Negative aect/aectivity is

Negative Aectivity and Group Decision-making

moment in time. Moreover, trait aect is

H. J. M. Kooij-de Bode, D. van Knippenberg and W. P. van Ginkel

settings they could be larger as well as smaller. In

Negative Aectivity and Group Decision-making

r 2009 British Academy of Management.

H. J. M. Kooij-de Bode, D. van Knippenberg and W. P. van Ginkel

Dipboye, R. L. (1990). Laboratory vs. eld research in

Hastie, R. and N. Pennington (1991). Cognitive and social

r 2009 British Academy of Management.

Negative Aectivity and Group Decision-making

r 2009 British Academy of Management.

H. J. M. Kooij-de Bode, D. van Knippenberg and W. P. van Ginkel

Watson, D. and L. A. Clark (1984). Negative aectivity: the

Williams, K. Y. and C. A. OReilly (1998). Demography and

r 2009 British Academy of Management.

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