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STO.TOMASvs.REY SALAC G.R. No.

152642
November 13, 2012
Facts
On June 7, 1995 Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) 8042 or
the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 that, for
among other purposes, sets the Governments policies on
overseas employment and establishes a higher standard of
protection and promotion of the welfare of migrant workers, their
families, and overseas Filipinos in distress.
G.R. 152642 and G.R. 152710
(Constitutionality of Sections 29 and 30, R.A. 8042)
Sections 29 and 30 of the Act1 commanded the Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE) to begin deregulating within one
year of its passage the business of handling the recruitment and
migration of overseas Filipino workers and phase out within five
years the regulatory functions of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA).
On January 8, 2002 respondents filed a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with application for temporary
restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction against
petitioners, the DOLE Secretary, the POEA Administrator, and the
Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA)
Secretary-General before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, Branch 96.2
Salac, et al. sought to: 1) nullify DOLE Department Order 10
(DOLE DO 10) and POEA Memorandum Circular 15 (POEA MC
15); 2) prohibit the DOLE, POEA, and TESDA from implementing
the same and from further issuing rules and regulations that would
regulate the recruitment and placement of overseas Filipino
workers (OFWs); and 3) also enjoin them to comply with the policy
of deregulation mandated under Sections 29 and 30 of Republic
Act 8042.
On March 20, 2002 the Quezon City RTC granted Salac, et al.s
petition and ordered the government agencies mentioned to
deregulate the recruitment and placement of OFWs. 3 The RTC
also annulled DOLE DO 10, POEA MC 15, and all other orders,

circulars and issuances that are inconsistent with the policy of


deregulation under R.A. 8042.
Petitioners appealed.
On April 17, 2002 the Philippine Association of Service Exporters,
Inc. intervened in the case before the Court, claiming that the RTC
March 20, 2002 Decision gravely affected them since it paralyzed
the deployment abroad of OFWs and performing artists. The
Confederated Association of Licensed Entertainment Agencies,
Incorporated (CALEA) intervened for the same purpose. 4
On May 23, 2002 the Court5 issued a TRO in the case, enjoining
the Quezon City RTC, Branch 96, from enforcing its decision.
In a parallel case, on February 12, 2002 respondents Asian
Recruitment Council Philippine Chapter, Inc. and others (Arcophil,
et al.) filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with application
for TRO and preliminary injunction against the DOLE Secretary,
the POEA Administrator, and the TESDA Director-General, 6 before
the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 220, to enjoin the latter from
implementing the 2002 Rules and Regulations Governing the
Recruitment and Employment of Overseas Workers and to cease
and desist from issuing other orders, circulars, and policies that
tend to regulate the recruitment and placement of OFWs in
violation of the policy of deregulation provided in Sections 29 and
30 of R.A. 8042.
On March 12, 2002 the Quezon City RTC rendered an Order,
granting the petition and enjoining the government agencies
involved from exercising regulatory functions over the recruitment
and placement of OFWs. This prompted the DOLE Secretary, the
POEA Administrator, and the TESDA Director-General to file the
present action in G.R. 152710. As in G.R. 152642, the Court
issued on May 23, 2002 a TRO enjoining the Quezon City RTC,
Branch 220 from enforcing its decision.
On December 4, 2008, however, the Republic informed 7 the Court
that on April 10, 2007 former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
signed into law R.A. 94228 which expressly repealed Sections 29
and 30 of R.A. 8042 and adopted the policy of close government
regulation of the recruitment and deployment of OFWs. R.A. 9422
pertinently provides:

xxxx
SEC. 1. Section 23, paragraph (b.1) of Republic Act No. 8042,
otherwise known as the "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos
Act of 1995" is hereby amended to read as follows:
(b.1) Philippine Overseas Employment Administration The
Administration shall regulate private sector participation in the
recruitment and overseas placement of workers by setting up a
licensing and registration system. It shall also formulate and
implement, in coordination with appropriate entities concerned,
when necessary, a system for promoting and monitoring the
overseas employment of Filipino workers taking into consideration
their welfare and the domestic manpower requirements.
In addition to its powers and functions, the administration shall
inform migrant workers not only of their rights as workers but also
of their rights as human beings, instruct and guide the workers
how to assert their rights and provide the available mechanism to
redress violation of their rights.
In the recruitment and placement of workers to service the
requirements for trained and competent Filipino workers of foreign
governments and their instrumentalities, and such other employers
as public interests may require, the administration shall deploy
only to countries where the Philippines has concluded bilateral
labor agreements or arrangements: Provided, That such countries
shall guarantee to protect the rights of Filipino migrant workers;
and: Provided, further, That such countries shall observe and/or
comply with the international laws and standards for migrant
workers.
SEC. 2. Section 29 of the same law is hereby repealed.
SEC. 3. Section 30 of the same law is also hereby repealed.
xxxx
On August 20, 2009 respondents Salac, et al. told the Court in
G.R. 152642 that they agree9 with the Republics view that the
repeal of Sections 29 and 30 of R.A. 8042 renders the issues they
raised by their action moot and academic. The Court has no
reason to disagree. Consequently, the two cases, G.R. 152642
and 152710, should be dismissed for being moot and academic.

G.R. 167590
(Constitutionality of Sections 6, 7, and 9 of R.A. 8042)
On August 21, 1995 respondent Philippine Association of Service
Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) filed a petition for declaratory relief and
prohibition with prayer for issuance of TRO and writ of preliminary
injunction before the RTC of Manila, seeking to annul Sections 6,
7, and 9 of R.A. 8042 for being unconstitutional. (PASEI also
sought to annul a portion of Section 10 but the Court will take up
this point later together with a related case.)
Section 6 defines the crime of "illegal recruitment" and enumerates
the acts constituting the same. Section 7 provides the penalties for
prohibited acts. Thus:
SEC. 6. Definition. For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment
shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring, procuring workers and includes
referring, contract services, promising or advertising for
employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by
a non-license or non-holder of authority contemplated under Article
13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise
known as the Labor Code of the Philippines: Provided, That such
non-license or non-holder, who, in any manner, offers or promises
for a fee employment abroad to two or more persons shall be
deemed so engaged. It shall likewise include the following acts,
whether committed by any person, whether a non-licensee, nonholder, licensee or holder of authority:
xxxx
SEC. 7. Penalties.
(a) Any person found guilty of illegal recruitment shall suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1)
day but not more than twelve (12) years and a fine not less than
two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) nor more than five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).
(b) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) nor more than one million
pesos (P1,000,000.00) shall be imposed if illegal recruitment
constitutes economic sabotage as defined herein.

Provided, however, That the maximum penalty shall be imposed if


the person illegally recruited is less than eighteen (18) years of
age or committed by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority.10
Finally, Section 9 of R.A. 8042 allowed the filing of criminal actions
arising from "illegal recruitment" before the RTC of the province or
city where the offense was committed or where the offended party
actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense.
The RTC of Manila declared Section 6 unconstitutional after
hearing on the ground that its definition of "illegal recruitment" is
vague as it fails to distinguish between licensed and non-licensed
recruiters11 and for that reason gives undue advantage to the nonlicensed recruiters in violation of the right to equal protection of
those that operate with government licenses or authorities.
But "illegal recruitment" as defined in Section 6 is clear and
unambiguous and, contrary to the RTCs finding, actually makes a
distinction between licensed and non-licensed recruiters. By its
terms, persons who engage in "canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers" without the
appropriate government license or authority are guilty of illegal
recruitment whether or not they commit the wrongful acts
enumerated in that section. On the other hand, recruiters who
engage in the canvassing, enlisting, etc. of OFWs, although with
the appropriate government license or authority, are guilty of illegal
recruitment only if they commit any of the wrongful acts
enumerated in Section 6.
The Manila RTC also declared Section 7 unconstitutional on the
ground that its sweeping application of the penalties failed to make
any distinction as to the seriousness of the act committed for the
application of the penalty imposed on such violation. As an
example, said the trial court, the mere failure to render a report
under Section 6(h) or obstructing the inspection by the Labor
Department under Section 6(g) are penalized by imprisonment for
six years and one day and a minimum fine of P200,000.00 but
which could unreasonably go even as high as life imprisonment if
committed by at least three persons.
Apparently, the Manila RTC did not agree that the law can impose
such grave penalties upon what it believed were specific acts that
were not as condemnable as the others in the lists. But, in fixing
uniform penalties for each of the enumerated acts under Section 6,

Congress was within its prerogative to determine what individual


acts are equally reprehensible, consistent with the State policy of
according full protection to labor, and deserving of the same
penalties. It is not within the power of the Court to question the
wisdom of this kind of choice. Notably, this legislative policy has
been further stressed in July 2010 with the enactment of R.A.
1002212 which increased even more the duration of the penalties of
imprisonment and the amounts of fine for the commission of the
acts listed under Section 7.
Obviously, in fixing such tough penalties, the law considered the
unsettling fact that OFWs must work outside the countrys borders
and beyond its immediate protection. The law must, therefore,
make an effort to somehow protect them from conscienceless
individuals within its jurisdiction who, fueled by greed, are willing to
ship them out without clear assurance that their contracted
principals would treat such OFWs fairly and humanely.
As the Court held in People v. Ventura, 13 the State under its police
power "may prescribe such regulations as in its judgment will
secure or tend to secure the general welfare of the people, to
protect them against the consequence of ignorance and incapacity
as well as of deception and fraud." Police power is "that inherent
and plenary power of the State which enables it to prohibit all
things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society." 14
The Manila RTC also invalidated Section 9 of R.A. 8042 on the
ground that allowing the offended parties to file the criminal case in
their place of residence would negate the general rule on venue of
criminal cases which is the place where the crime or any of its
essential elements were committed. Venue, said the RTC, is
jurisdictional in penal laws and, allowing the filing of criminal
actions at the place of residence of the offended parties violates
their right to due process. Section 9 provides:
SEC. 9. Venue. A criminal action arising from illegal recruitment
as defined herein shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court of the
province or city where the offense was committed or where the
offended party actually resides at the time of the commission of the
offense: Provided, That the court where the criminal action is first
filed shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts:
Provided, however, That the aforestated provisions shall also apply
to those criminal actions that have already been filed in court at the

time of the effectivity of this Act.


But there is nothing arbitrary or unconstitutional in Congress fixing
an alternative venue for violations of Section 6 of R.A. 8042 that
differs from the venue established by the Rules on Criminal
Procedure. Indeed, Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the latter Rules
allows exceptions provided by laws. Thus:
SEC. 15. Place where action is to be instituted. (a) Subject to
existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the
court of the municipality or territory where the offense was
committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred.
(Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Section 9 of R.A. 8042, as an exception to the rule on venue of
criminal actions is, consistent with that laws declared policy 15 of
providing a criminal justice system that protects and serves the
best interests of the victims of illegal recruitment.
G.R. 167590, G.R. 182978-79,16 and G.R. 184298-9917
(Constitutionality of Section 10, last sentence of 2nd paragraph)
G.R. 182978-79 and G.R. 184298-99 are consolidated cases.
Respondent spouses Simplicio and Mila Cuaresma (the
Cuaresmas) filed a claim for death and insurance benefits and
damages against petitioners Becmen Service Exporter and
Promotion, Inc. (Becmen) and White Falcon Services, Inc. (White
Falcon) for the death of their daughter Jasmin Cuaresma while
working as staff nurse in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed the claim on the ground that the
Cuaresmas had already received insurance benefits arising from
their daughters death from the Overseas Workers Welfare
Administration (OWWA). The LA also gave due credence to the
findings of the Saudi Arabian authorities that Jasmin committed
suicide.
On appeal, however, the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) found Becmen and White Falcon jointly and severally
liable for Jasmins death and ordered them to pay the Cuaresmas
the amount of US$113,000.00 as actual damages. The NLRC

relied on the Cabanatuan City Health Offices autopsy finding that


Jasmin died of criminal violence and rape.
Becmen and White Falcon appealed the NLRC Decision to the
Court of Appeals (CA).18 On June 28, 2006 the CA held Becmen
and White Falcon jointly and severally liable with their Saudi
Arabian employer for actual damages, with Becmen having a right
of reimbursement from White Falcon. Becmen and White Falcon
appealed the CA Decision to this Court.
On April 7, 2009 the Court found Jasmins death not work-related
or work-connected since her rape and death did not occur while
she was on duty at the hospital or doing acts incidental to her
employment. The Court deleted the award of actual damages but
ruled that Becmens corporate directors and officers are solidarily
liable with their company for its failure to investigate the true nature
of her death. Becmen and White Falcon abandoned their legal,
moral, and social duty to assist the Cuaresmas in obtaining justice
for their daughter. Consequently, the Court held the foreign
employer Rajab and Silsilah, White Falcon, Becmen, and the
latters corporate directors and officers jointly and severally liable
to the Cuaresmas for: 1) P2,500,000.00 as moral damages; 2)
P2,500,000.00 as exemplary damages; 3) attorneys fees of 10%
of the total monetary award; and 4) cost of suit.
On July 16, 2009 the corporate directors and officers of Becmen,
namely, Eufrocina Gumabay, Elvira Taguiam, Lourdes Bonifacio
and Eddie De Guzman (Gumabay, et al.) filed a motion for leave to
Intervene. They questioned the constitutionality of the last
sentence of the second paragraph of Section 10, R.A. 8042 which
holds the corporate directors, officers and partners jointly and
solidarily liable with their company for money claims filed by OFWs
against their employers and the recruitment firms. On September
9, 2009 the Court allowed the intervention and admitted Gumabay,
et al.s motion for reconsideration.
The key issue that Gumabay, et al. present is whether or not the
2nd paragraph of Section 10, R.A. 8042, which holds the corporate
directors, officers, and partners of recruitment and placement
agencies jointly and solidarily liable for money claims and
damages that may be adjudged against the latter agencies, is
unconstitutional.
In G.R. 167590 (the PASEI case), the Quezon City RTC held as

unconstitutional the last sentence of the 2nd paragraph of Section


10 of R.A. 8042. It pointed out that, absent sufficient proof that the
corporate officers and directors of the erring company had
knowledge of and allowed the illegal recruitment, making them
automatically liable would violate their right to due process of law.
The pertinent portion of Section 10 provides:
SEC. 10. Money Claims. x x x
The
liability
of
the
principal/employer
and
the
recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims under this
section shall be joint and several. This provision shall be
incorporated in the contract for overseas employment and shall be
a condition precedent for its approval. The performance bond to be
filed by the recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law,
shall be answerable for all money claims or damages that may be
awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placement agency is a
juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and partners as
the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable
with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and
damages. (Emphasis supplied)
But the Court has already held, pending adjudication of this case,
that the liability of corporate directors and officers is not automatic.
To make them jointly and solidarily liable with their company, there
must be a finding that they were remiss in directing the affairs of
that company, such as sponsoring or tolerating the conduct of
illegal activities.19 In the case of Becmen and White Falcon, 20 while
there is evidence that these companies were at fault in not
investigating the cause of Jasmins death, there is no mention of
any evidence in the case against them that intervenors Gumabay,
et al., Becmens corporate officers and directors, were personally
involved in their companys particular actions or omissions in
Jasmins case.
As a final note, R.A. 8042 is a police power measure intended to
regulate the recruitment and deployment of OFWs. It aims to curb,
if not eliminate, the injustices and abuses suffered by numerous
OFWs seeking to work abroad. The rule is settled that every
statute has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. The
Court cannot inquire into the wisdom or expediency of the laws
enacted by the Legislative Department. Hence, in the absence of a
clear and unmistakable case that the statute is unconstitutional,

the Court must uphold its validity.


WHEREFORE, in G.R. 152642 and 152710, the Court
DISMISSES the petitions for having become moot and academic.
1wphi1

In G.R. 167590, the Court SETS ASIDE the Decision of the


Regional Trial Court ofManila dated December 8, 2004 and
DECLARES Sections 6, 7, and 9 of Republic Act 8042 valid and
constitutional.
In G.R. 182978-79 and G.R. 184298-99 as well as in G.R. 167590,
the Court HOLDS the last sentence of the second paragraph of
Section 10 of Republic Act 8042 valid and constitutional. The
Court, however, RECONSIDERS and SETS ASIDE the portion of
its Decision in G.R. 182978-79 and G.R. 184298-99 that held
intervenors Eufrocina Gumabay, Elvira Taguiam, Lourdes
Bonifacio, and Eddie De Guzman jointly and solidarily liable with
respondent Becmen Services Exporter and Promotion, Inc. to
spouses Simplicia and Mila Cuaresma for lack of a finding in those
cases that such intervenors had a part in the act or omission
imputed to their corporation.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE v PANIS G.R. Nos. L-58674-77 July 11, 1990
The basic issue in this case is the correct interpretation of Article
13(b) of P.D. 442, otherwise known as the Labor Code, reading as
follows:
(b) Recruitment and placement' refers to any act of canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, hiring, or procuring workers,
and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising
for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not:
Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or
promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be
deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.
Four informations were filed, in the CFI of Zambales and Olongapo
City alleging that Serapio Abug, private respondent herein, "without
first securing a license from the Ministry of Labor as a holder of
authority to operate a fee-charging employment agency, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally operate a private fee
charging employment agency by charging fees and expenses

(from) and promising employment in Saudi Arabia" to four separate


individuals named therein, in violation of Article 16 in relation to
Article 39 of the Labor Code. 1
Abug filed a motion to quash on the ground that the informations
did not charge an offense because he was accused of illegally
recruiting only one person in each of the four informations. Under
the proviso in Article 13(b), he claimed, there would be illegal
recruitment only "whenever two or more persons are in any
manner promised or offered any employment for a fee. " 2
As we see it, the proviso was intended neither to impose a
condition on the basic rule nor to provide an exception thereto but
merely to create a presumption. The presumption is that the
individual or entity is engaged in recruitment and placement
whenever he or it is dealing with two or more persons to whom, in
consideration of a fee, an offer or promise of employment is made
in the course of the "canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring (of) workers. "
The number of persons dealt with is not an essential ingredient of
the act of recruitment and placement of workers. Any of the acts
mentioned in the basic rule in Article 13(b) win constitute
recruitment and placement even if only one prospective worker is
involved. The proviso merely lays down a rule of evidence that
where a fee is collected in consideration of a promise or offer of
employment to two or more prospective workers, the individual or
entity dealing with them shall be deemed to be engaged in the act
of recruitment and placement. The words "shall be deemed" create
that presumption.
PEOPLE vs. GALLO G.R. No. 187730

June 29, 2010

The Facts
Originally, accused-appellant Gallo and 12 others, were charged
with syndicated illegal recruitment and eighteen (18) counts of
estafa.
That on or about May 28, 2001, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
the said accused conspiring and confederating together and
helping with [sic] one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud EDGARDO V. DELA CAZA, in
the following manner, to wit: the said accused by means of false

manifestations and fraudulent representations which they made to


the latter, prior to and even simultaneous with the commission of
the fraud, to the effect that they had the power and capacity to
recruit and employ said EDGARDO V. DELA CAZA in Korea as
factory worker and could facilitate the processing of the pertinent
papers if given the necessary amount to meet the requirements
thereof; induced and succeeded in inducing said EDGARDO V.
DELA CAZA to give and deliver, as in fact, he gave and delivered
to said accused the amount of P45,000.00 on the strength of said
manifestations and representations, said accused well knowing
that the same were false and untrue and were made [solely] for the
purpose of obtaining, as in fact they did obtain the said amount of
P45,000.00 which amount once in their possession, with intent to
defraud said [EDGARDO] V. DELA CAZA, they willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted the
said amount of P45,000.00 to their own personal use and benefit,
to the damage and prejudice of the said EDGARDO V. DELA
CAZA in the aforesaid amount of P45,000.00, Philippine currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
When arraigned on January 19, 2004, accused-appellant Gallo
entered a plea of not guilty to all charges.
On March 3, 2004, the pre-trial was terminated and trial ensued,
thereafter.
During the trial, the prosecution presented as their witnesses,
Armando Albines Roa, the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) representative and private complainants
Dela Caza, Guanteno and Sare. On the other hand, the defense
presented as its witnesses, accused-appellant Gallo, Pacardo and
Manta.
Version of the Prosecution
On May 22, 2001, Dela Caza was introduced by Eleanor Panuncio
to accused-appellant Gallo, Pacardo, Manta, Mardeolyn, Lulu
Mendanes, Yeo Sin Ung and another Korean national at the office
of MPM International Recruitment and Promotion Agency ("MPM
Agency") located in Malate, Manila.
Dela Caza was told that Mardeolyn was the President of MPM
Agency, while Nelmar Martir was one of the incorporators. Also,

that Marcelino Martir, Norman Martir, Nelson Martir and Ma. Cecilia
Ramos were its board members. Lulu Mendanes acted as the
cashier and accountant, while Pacardo acted as the agencys
employee who was in charge of the records of the applicants.
Manta, on the other hand, was also an employee who was tasked
to deliver documents to the Korean embassy.
Accused-appellant Gallo then introduced himself as a relative of
Mardeolyn and informed Dela Caza that the agency was able to
send many workers abroad. Together with Pacardo and Manta, he
also told Dela Caza about the placement fee of One Hundred Fifty
Thousand Pesos (PhP 150,000) with a down payment of FortyFive Thousand Pesos (PhP 45,000) and the balance to be paid
through salary deduction.
Dela Caza, together with the other applicants, were briefed by
Mardeolyn about the processing of their application papers for job
placement in Korea as a factory worker and their possible salary.
Accused Yeo Sin Ung also gave a briefing about the business and
what to expect from the company and the salary.
With accused-appellants assurance that many workers have been
sent abroad, as well as the presence of the two (2) Korean
nationals and upon being shown the visas procured for the
deployed workers, Dela Caza was convinced to part with his
money. Thus, on May 29, 2001, he paid Forty-Five Thousand
Pesos (PhP 45,000) to MPM Agency through accused-appellant
Gallo who, while in the presence of Pacardo, Manta and
Mardeolyn, issued and signed Official Receipt No. 401.
Two (2) weeks after paying MPM Agency, Dela Caza went back to
the agencys office in Malate, Manila only to discover that the office
had moved to a new location at Batangas Street, Brgy. San Isidro,
Makati. He proceeded to the new address and found out that the
agency was renamed to New Filipino Manpower Development &
Services, Inc. ("New Filipino"). At the new office, he talked to
Pacardo, Manta, Mardeolyn, Lulu Mendanes and accusedappellant Gallo. He was informed that the transfer was done for
easy accessibility to clients and for the purpose of changing the
name of the agency.
Dela Caza decided to withdraw his application and recover the
amount he paid but Mardeolyn, Pacardo, Manta and Lulu
Mendanes talked him out from pursuing his decision. On the other

hand, accused-appellant Gallo even denied any knowledge about


the money.
After two (2) more months of waiting in vain to be deployed, Dela
Caza and the other applicants decided to take action. The first
attempt was unsuccessful because the agency again moved to
another place. However, with the help of the Office of Ambassador
Seeres and the Western Police District, they were able to locate
the new address at 500 Prudential Building, Carriedo, Manila. The
agency explained that it had to move in order to separate those
who are applying as entertainers from those applying as factory
workers. Accused-appellant Gallo, together with Pacardo and
Manta, were then arrested.
The testimony of prosecution witness Armando Albines Roa, a
POEA employee, was dispensed with after the prosecution and
defense stipulated and admitted to the existence of the following
documents:
1. Certification issued by Felicitas Q. Bay, Director II, Licensing
Branch of the POEA to the effect that "New Filipino Manpower
Development & Services, Inc., with office address at 1256
Batangas St., Brgy. San Isidro, Makati City, was a licensed
landbased agency whose license expired on December 10, 2001
and was delisted from the roster of licensed agencies on
December 14, 2001." It further certified that "Fides J. Pacardo was
the agencys Recruitment Officer";
2. Certification issued by Felicitas Q. Bay of the POEA to the effect
that MPM International Recruitment and Promotion is not licensed
by the POEA to recruit workers for overseas employment;
3. Certified copy of POEA Memorandum Circular No. 14, Series of
1999 regarding placement fee ceiling for landbased workers.
4. Certified copy of POEA Memorandum Circular No. 09, Series of
1998 on the placement fee ceiling for Taiwan and Korean markets,
and
5. Certified copy of POEA Governing Board Resolution No. 02,
series of 1998.
Version of the Defense

For his defense, accused-appellant denied having any part in the


recruitment of Dela Caza. In fact, he testified that he also applied
with MPM Agency for deployment to Korea as a factory worker.
According to him, he gave his application directly with Mardeolyn
because she was his town mate and he was allowed to pay only
Ten Thousand Pesos (PhP 10,000) as processing fee. Further, in
order to facilitate the processing of his papers, he agreed to
perform some tasks for the agency, such as taking photographs of
the visa and passport of applicants, running errands and
performing such other tasks assigned to him, without salary except
for some allowance. He said that he only saw Dela Caza one or
twice at the agencys office when he applied for work abroad.
Lastly, that he was also promised deployment abroad but it never
materialized.
Ruling of the Trial Court
On March 15, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision convicting the
accused of syndicated illegal recruitment and estafa. The
dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
I. Accused FIDES PACARDO y JUNGO and PILAR MANTA y
DUNGO are hereby ACQUITTED of the crimes charged in
Criminal Cases Nos. 02-206293, 02-206297, 02-206300 and 02206308;
II. Accused RODOLFO GALLO y GADOT is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. 02-206293 of the crime of
Illegal Recruitment committed by a syndicate and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a
fine of ONE MILLION (Php1,000,000.00) PESOS. He is also
ordered to indemnify EDGARDO DELA CAZA of the sum of
FORTY-FIVE THOUSAND (Php45,000.00) PESOS with legal
interest from the filing of the information on September 18, 2002
until fully paid.
III. Accused RODOLFO GALLO y GADOT in Criminal Case No.
02-206297 is likewise found guilty and is hereby sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of FOUR (4) years of prision
correccional as minimum to NINE (9) years of prision mayor as
maximum.

IV. Accused RODOLFO GALLO y GADOT is hereby ACQUITTED


of the crime charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 02-206300 and 02206308.
Let alias warrants for the arrest of the other accused be issued
anew in all the criminal cases. Pending their arrest, the cases are
sent to the archives.
The immediate release of accused Fides Pacardo and Pilar Manta
is hereby ordered unless detained for other lawful cause or charge.
SO ORDERED.5
Ruling of the Appellate Court
On appeal, the CA, in its Decision dated December 24, 2008,
disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 30, in Criminal Cases Nos. 02-206293 and 02206297, dated March 15, 2007, is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that in Criminal Case No. 02-206297, for estafa,
appellant is sentenced to four (4) years of prision correccional to
ten (10) years of prision mayor.
SO ORDERED.6
The CA held the totality of the prosecutions evidence showed that
the accused-appellant, together with others, engaged in the
recruitment of Dela Caza. His actions and representations to Dela
Caza can hardly be construed as the actions of a mere errand boy.
As determined by the appellate court, the offense is considered
economic sabotage having been committed by more than three (3)
persons, namely, accused-appellant Gallo, Mardeolyn, Eleonor
Panuncio and Yeo Sin Ung. More importantly, a personal found
guilty of illegal recruitment may also be convicted of estafa. 7 The
same evidence proving accused-appellants commission of the
crime of illegal recruitment in large scale also establishes his
liability for estafa under paragragh 2(a) of Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC).
On January 15, 2009, the accused-appellant filed a timely appeal
before this Court.

The Issues
Accused-appellant interposes in the present appeal the following
assignment of errors:
I
The court a quo gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant
guilty of illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate despite the
failure of the prosecution to prove the same beyond reasonable
doubt.
II
The court a quo gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant
guilty of estafa despite the failure of the prosecution to prove the
same beyond reasonable doubt.
Our Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
Evidence supports conviction of the crime of Syndicated Illegal
Recruitment
Accused-appellant avers that he cannot be held criminally liable for
illegal recruitment because he was neither an officer nor an
employee of the recruitment agency. He alleges that the trial court
erred in adopting the asseveration of the private complainant that
he was indeed an employee because such was not duly supported
by competent evidence. According to him, even assuming that he
was an employee, such cannot warrant his outright conviction sans
evidence that he acted in conspiracy with the officers of the
agency.
We disagree.
To commit syndicated illegal recruitment, three elements must be
established: (1) the offender undertakes either any activity within
the meaning of "recruitment and placement" defined under Article
13(b), or any of the prohibited practices enumerated under Art. 34
of the Labor Code; (2) he has no valid license or authority required
by law to enable one to lawfully engage in recruitment and
placement of workers;8 and (3) the illegal recruitment is committed

by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or


confederating with one another.9 When illegal recruitment is
committed by a syndicate or in large scale, i.e., if it is committed
against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group, it is
considered an offense involving economic sabotage. 10
Under Art. 13(b) of the Labor Code, "recruitment and placement"
refers to "any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes
referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for
employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not".
After a thorough review of the records, we believe that the
prosecution was able to establish the elements of the offense
sufficiently. The evidence readily reveals that MPM Agency was
never licensed by the POEA to recruit workers for overseas
employment.
Even with a license, however, illegal recruitment could still be
committed under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 ("R.A. 8042"),
otherwise known as the Migrants and Overseas Filipinos Act of
1995, viz:
Sec. 6. Definition. For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment
shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes
referring, contract services, promising or advertising for
employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by
a non-licensee or non-holder of authority contemplated under
Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended,
otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines: Provided,
That any such non-licensee or non-holder who, in any manner,
offers or promises for a fee employment abroad to two or more
persons shall be deemed so engaged. It shall, likewise, include the
following act, whether committed by any person, whether a nonlicensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of authority:
(a) To charge or accept directly or indirectly any amount greater
than that specified in the schedule of allowable fees prescribed by
the Secretary of Labor and Employment, or to make a worker pay
any amount greater than that actually received by him as a loan or
advance;
xxxx

(l) Failure to actually deploy without valid reason as determined by


the Department of Labor and Employment; and
(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in
connection with his documentation and processing for purposes of
deployment and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases
where the deployment does not actually take place without the
workers fault. Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate
or in large scale shall be considered an offense involving economic
sabotage.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried
out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or
confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large
scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or
as a group.
The persons criminally liable for the above offenses are the
principals, accomplices and accessories. In case of juridical
persons, the officers having control, management or direction of
their business shall be liable.
In the instant case, accused-appellant committed the acts
enumerated in Sec. 6 of R.A. 8042. Testimonial evidence
presented by the prosecution clearly shows that, in consideration
of a promise of foreign employment, accused-appellant received
the amount of Php 45,000.00 from Dela Caza. When accusedappellant made misrepresentations concerning the agencys
purported power and authority to recruit for overseas employment,
and in the process, collected money in the guise of placement
fees, the former clearly committed acts constitutive of illegal
recruitment.11 Such acts were accurately described in the testimony
of prosecution witness, Dela Caza, to wit:
PROS. MAGABLIN
Q: How about this Rodolfo Gallo?
A: He was the one who received my money.
Q: Aside from receiving your money, was there any other
representations or acts made by Rodolfo Gallo?
A: He introduced himself to me as relative of Mardeolyn Martir and

he even intimated to me that their agency has sent so many


workers abroad.
xxxx
PROS. MAGABLIN
Q: Mr. Witness, as you claimed you tried to withdraw your
application at the agency. Was there any instance that you were
able to talk to Fides Pacardo, Rodolfo Gallo and Pilar Manta?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: What was the conversation that transpired among you before
you demanded the return of your money and documents?
A: When I tried to withdraw my application as well as my money,
Mr. Gallo told me "I know nothing about your money" while Pilar
Manta and Fides Pacardo told me, why should I withdraw my
application and my money when I was about to be [deployed] or I
was about to leave.
xxxx
Q: And what transpired at that office after this Panuncio introduced
you to those persons whom you just mentioned?
A: The three of them including Rodolfo Gallo told me that the
placement fee in that agency is Php 150,000.00 and then I should
deposit the amount of Php 45,000.00. After I have deposited said
amount, I would just wait for few days
xxxx
Q: They were the one (sic) who told you that you have to pay Php
45,000.00 for deposit only?
A: Yes, maam, I was told by them to deposit Php 45,000.00 and
then I would pay the remaining balance of Php105,000.00,
payment of it would be through salary deduction.
Q: That is for what Mr. Witness again?
A: For placement fee.

Q: Now did you believe to (sic) them?


A: Yes, maam.
Q: Why, why did you believe?
A: Because of the presence of the two Korean nationals and they
keep on telling me that they have sent abroad several workers and
they even showed visas of the records that they have already
deployed abroad.
Q: Aside from that, was there any other representations which
have been made upon you or make you believe that they can
deploy you?
A: At first I was adamant but they told me "If you do not want to
believe us, then we could do nothing." But once they showed me
the [visas] of the people whom they have deployed abroad, that
was the time I believe them.
Q: So after believing on the representations, what did you do next
Mr. Witness?
A: That was the time that I decided to give the money.
xxxx
PROS. MAGABLIN
Q: Do you have proof that you gave the money?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: Where is your proof that you gave the money?
A: I have it here.
PROS. MAGABLIN:
Witness is producing to this court a Receipt dated May 28, 2001 in
the amount of Php45,000.00 which for purposes of record Your
Honor, may I request that the same be marked in the evidence as
our Exhibit "F".
xxxx

PROS. MAGABLIN
Q: There appears a signature appearing at the left bottom portion
of this receipt. Do you know whose signature is this?
A: Yes, maam, signature of Rodolfo Gallo.
PROS. MAGABLIN
Q: Why do you say that that is his signature?
A: Rodolfo Gallos signature Your Honor because he was the one
who received the money and he was the one who filled up this
O.R. and while he was doing it, he was flanked by Fides Pacardo,
Pilar Manta and Mardeolyn Martir.
xxxx
Q: So it was Gallo who received your money?
A: Yes, maam.
PROS. MAGABLIN
Q: And after that, what did this Gallo do after he received your
money?
A: They told me maam just to call up and make a follow up with
our agency.
xxxx
Q: Now Mr. Witness, after you gave your money to the accused,
what happened with the application, with the promise of
employment that he promised?
A: Two (2) weeks after giving them the money, they moved to a
new office in Makati, Brgy. San Isidro.
xxxx
Q: And were they able to deploy you as promised by them?
A: No, maam, they were not able to send us abroad. 12

Essentially, Dela Caza appeared very firm and consistent in


positively identifying accused-appellant as one of those who
induced him and the other applicants to part with their money. His
testimony showed
that
accused-appellant
made
false
misrepresentations and promises in assuring them that after they
paid the placement fee, jobs in Korea as factory workers were
waiting for them and that they would be deployed soon. In fact,
Dela Caza personally talked to accused-appellant and gave him
the money and saw him sign and issue an official receipt as proof
of his payment. Without a doubt, accused-appellants actions
constituted illegal recruitment.
Additionally, accused-appellant cannot argue that the trial court
erred in finding that he was indeed an employee of the recruitment
agency. On the contrary, his active participation in the illegal
recruitment is unmistakable. The fact that he was the one who
issued and signed the official receipt belies his profession of
innocence.
This Court likewise finds the existence of a conspiracy between
the accused-appellant and the other persons in the agency who
are currently at large, resulting in the commission of the crime of
syndicated illegal recruitment.
In this case, it cannot be denied that the accused-appellent
together with Mardeolyn and the rest of the officers and employees
of MPM Agency participated in a network of deception. Verily, the
active involvement of each in the recruitment scam was directed at
one single purpose to divest complainants with their money on
the pretext of guaranteed employment abroad. The prosecution
evidence shows that complainants were briefed by Mardeolyn
about the processing of their papers for a possible job opportunity
in Korea, as well as their possible salary. Likewise, Yeo Sin Ung, a
Korean national, gave a briefing about the business and what to
expect from the company. Then, here comes accused-appellant
who introduced himself as Mardeolyns relative and specifically told
Dela Caza of the fact that the agency was able to send many
workers abroad. Dela Caza was even showed several workers
visas who were already allegedly deployed abroad. Later on,
accused-appellant signed and issued an official receipt
acknowledging the down payment of Dela Caza. Without a doubt,
the nature and extent of the actions of accused-appellant, as well
as with the other persons in MPM Agency clearly show unity of

action towards a common undertaking. Hence, conspiracy is


evidently present.
In People v. Gamboa,13 this Court discussed the nature of
conspiracy in the context of illegal recruitment, viz:
Conspiracy to defraud aspiring overseas contract workers was
evident from the acts of the malefactors whose conduct before,
during and after the commission of the crime clearly indicated that
they were one in purpose and united in its execution. Direct proof
of previous agreement to commit a crime is not necessary as it
may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense
was perpetrated or inferred from the acts of the accused pointing
to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of
interest. As such, all the accused, including accused-appellant, are
equally guilty of the crime of illegal recruitment since in a
conspiracy the act of one is the act of all.
To reiterate, in establishing conspiracy, it is not essential that there
be actual proof that all the conspirators took a direct part in every
act. It is sufficient that they acted in concert pursuant to the same
objective.14
Estafa
The prosecution likewise established that accused-appellant is
guilty of the crime of estafa as defined under Article 315 paragraph
2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, viz:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud
another by any means mentioned hereinbelow
xxxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent
acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of
the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess
power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business
or imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar deceits.
The elements of estafa in general are: (1) that the accused
defrauded another (a) by abuse of confidence, or (b) by means of

deceit; and (2) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary


estimation is caused to the offended party or third person. 15 Deceit
is the false representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or
conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of
that which should have been disclosed; and which deceives or is
intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it, to his legal
injury.
All these elements are present in the instant case: the accusedappellant, together with the other accused at large, deceived the
complainants into believing that the agency had the power and
capability to send them abroad for employment; that there were
available jobs for them in Korea as factory workers; that by reason
or on the strength of such assurance, the complainants parted with
their money in payment of the placement fees; that after receiving
the money, accused-appellant and his co-accused went into hiding
by changing their office locations without informing complainants;
and that complainants were never deployed abroad. As all these
representations of the accused-appellant proved false, paragraph
2(a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code is thus applicable.
1avvphi1

Defense of Denial Cannot Prevail over Positive Identification


Indubitably, accused-appellants denial of the crimes charged
crumbles in the face of the positive identification made by Dela
Caza and his co-complainants as one of the perpetrators of the
crimes charged. As enunciated by this Court in People v. Abolidor,16
"[p]ositive identification where categorical and consistent and not
attended by any showing of ill motive on the part of the
eyewitnesses on the matter prevails over alibi and denial."
The defense has miserably failed to show any evidence of ill
motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses as to falsely testify
against him.
Therefore, between the categorical statements of the prosecution
witnesses, on the one hand, and bare denials of the accused, on
the other hand, the former must prevail.17
Moreover, this Court accords the trial courts findings with the
probative weight it deserves in the absence of any compelling
reason to discredit the same. It is a fundamental judicial dictum
that the findings of fact of the trial court are not disturbed on
appeal except when it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied

some facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would


have materially affected the outcome of the case. We find that the
trial court did not err in convicting the accused-appellant.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED for failure to sufficiently
show reversible error in the assailed decision. The Decision dated
December 24, 2008 of the CA in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02764 is
AFFIRMED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

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