MUNICIPALITY OF CAVITE V. ROJAS – G.R. NO.

9069

Facts:
The municipal council of Cavite by Resolution No. 10, leased to Rojas some 70 or 80 square meters of
Plaza Soledad, on condition that she pay rent quarterly in advance according to the schedule fixed in
Ordinance No. 43, series of 1903 and that she obligate herself to vacate said land within 60 days
subsequent to notification to that effect. Upon such notification, however, she refused to vacate the
land, forcing the municipality to file a complaint before the CFI to order her to vacate the land. After a
hearing of the case, the CFI dismissed the complaint.
Issues:
(1) Is the contract valid?
(2) If in the negative, what are the obligations of the parties?
Held: (1) No. Article 1271 of the Old Civil Code, prescribes that everything which is not outside the
commerce of man may be the object of a contract, and plazas and streets are outside of this
commerce. Communal things that cannot be sold because they are by their very nature outside of
commerce are those for public use, such as the plazas, streets, common lands, rivers, fountains, etc.
(2) Rojas must restore and deliver possession of the land described in the complaint to the municipality
of Cavite, which in its turn must restore to her all the sums it may have received from her in the nature
of rentals just as soon as she restores the land improperly leased.

and remained in such a state until 1912 when the Government undertook the dredging of Vitas Estuary in order to facilitate navigation.Government of the Phil Islands vs Cabangis Government of the Phil Islands vs Cabangis 53 Phil 112 Facts: Certain lots were formerly a part of a large parcel of land belonging to the predecessor of the herein claimants and appellees. For their occupancy. 2 . again without plaintiff's knowledge and consent. Held: The Supreme Court held that the lots in question having disappeared on account of the gradual erosion due to the ebb and flow of the tide. pursuant to theMayor's directive to clear squatters' houses on city property. This was followed by the City Treasurer's demand on each defendant. plaintiff's City Engineer. the judgment appealed from the lower court is reversed. From the year 1896 said land began to wear away. and withoutthe necessary building permits from the city. 37082 and 37558. they are public land in the sense that neither the here in claimants-appellees nor their predecessors did anything to prevent their destruction. were given by Mayor Valeriano E. Hence.defendants entered upon these premises without plaintiff's knowledge and consent. by fillings made by the Bureau of Public Works and by the construction of the break-water. surrounding that belonging to the Philippine Manufacturing Company. They builthouses of second-class materials. thereby slowly and gradually forming the lots. the presence of defendants having previously been discovered. defendantswere charged nominal rentals. for the payment of the amount d ue by reason of the occupancy and to vacate in fifteen (15) days. covered byTorrens Titles Nos.In November. By virtue whereof. this suit to recover possession. 49763. forming one compact area.were in need of expansion. due to the action of the waves of Manila Bay. City of Manila vs Garcia Facts: Plaintiff City of Manila is owner of parcels of land. until the year 1901 when the said lots became completely submerged in water in ordinary tides.Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School which is close. the subject matter of this proceeding. On September 14. 1947. 1962. to the property. Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred in not holding that the lots in question are of the public domain the same having been gained from the sea by accession. made in February and March.Defendants refused. gave each of defendants thirty (30)days to vacate and remove his construction or improvement on the premises. Fugoso written permits — each labeled "lease contract" — to occupyspecific areas in the property upon conditions therein set forth. and having remained in such a state until they were reclaimed from the sea by the filling in done by the Government. depositing all the sand and silt taken from the bed of the estuary on the low lands which were completely covered with water. Shortly after liberation from 1945 to 1947. 1961. though not contiguous.

the trial court revised his views. AL. The permits issued are null and void. AL. CRUZ. However. was beyond the commerce of man and therefore could not be the subject of private occupancy. VS CASTAÑEDA. the trial judge could well have taken — because he was duty bound to take — judicial notice of Ordinance 4566 . For. each labeled as ―lease contract‖ to occupy specific areas. plaintiff. ISSUE: WoN the trial court properly found that the city needs the premises for school purposes HELD: YES The trial court ruled out the admissibility of the documentary evidence presented by plaintiff – Certification of the Chairman. ET.The trial court ruled in favor of plaintiff taking judicial notice of Ordinance 4566 –appropriating P100k for the construction of additional building of Epifanio De Los Santos Elementary School. Defendants have absolutely no right to remain in the premises. It is in this factual background thatwe say that the city's need for the premises is unimportant.6.R. Without the knowledge and consent of plaintiff. The city mayor doesn’t have the authority to issue permits. JR. JR.Having discovered. The city's right to throw defendants City of Manila vs. Hence. Issue: Whether or not the squatters may be ejected Held: Yes . G.. VILLANUEVA. VILLANUEVA.Plaintiff is the owner of certain parcels of land. ET.Defendants appealed.: .00 was set aside for the ―construction of additional building‖ of the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School. But then the decision under review. The permits to occupy are recoverable on thirty days'notice. they refused to heed.4. Hence. He then declared that there was a need for defendants to vacate the premises for school expansion. the defendants’ appeal. 1987 (damnun absque injuria) Appeal from a decision of CFI Pampanga holding that the land in question.al FACTS: 1. Committee on Appropriations of the Municipal Board which recites the amount of P100k had been set aside in Ordinance 4566 for the construction of additional building of the said school. J. ET. Because of the court’s contradictory stance. in reversing his stand. Further defendants’ entry to the said property is illegal. And. being public in nature. The reason being that the city charter of Manila requires all courts sitting therein to take judicial notice of all ordinances passed by the municipal board of Manila.. defendants brought this case on appeal.3. AL.5. defendants refused to vacate the said property. through its treasurer. demanded payment of their rentals and vacate the premises for the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School’s expansion.. No. he cited the very document. VS CASTAÑEDA.. AL. The excuse that they have permits from the mayor is at best flimsy. defendants occupied the property and built their houses. They have been asked to leave.The lower court ruled in favor of the plaintiff. the elimination of the certification as evidence would not profit defendants. For their occupancy.000.2. Their constructions are as illegal. L-61311 September 2l. ET. Ordinance4566 itself confirms the certification aforesaid that an appropriation of P100. Gerardo Garcia et. this case was filed for recovery of possession.Despite the demand.After sometime. plaintiff through its mayor gave each defendant written permits. without permits. defendants were charged nominal rentals.

Ruling: Petition Dismissed. Villanueva vs castanueda There is in the vicinity of the public market of San Fernando. while this case was pending. issued a writ of preliminary injunction that prevented the defendants from constructing the said stalls until final resolution of the controversy. Judge Andres C. Pampanga. 1961. on November 2. for the promotion or protection of the general welfare. in the case at bar. or even abrogate it entirely. which declared the subject area as "the parking place and as the public plaza of the municipality. 1964. 29. The respondents deny this and justify the demolition of their stalls as illegal constructions on public property. 218.Facts: In the vicinity of the public market of San Fernando.” thereby impliedly revoking Resolution No. a conglomeration of vendors stalls together. This power can be activated at any time to change the provisions of the contract. No. The petitioners had no right in the first place to occupy the disputed premises and cannot insist in remaining there now on the strength of their alleged lease contracts. It is a well-settled doctrine that the town plaza cannot be used for the construction of market stalls. At the petitioners’ behest. every contract affecting the public interest suffers a congenital infirmity in that it contains an implied reservation of the police power as a postulate of the existing legal order. the loss or damage caused to petitioners. This is the subject of the herein petition. the resolution could have effectively terminated the agreement for it is settled that the police power cannot be surrendered or bargained away through the medium of a contract. there stands on a strip of land. when the municipal council of San Fernando adopted Resolution No. series of 1961. thereby impliedly revoking Resolution No. The petitioners claim they have a right to remain in and conduct business in this area by virtue of a previous authorization granted to them by the municipal government. Four years later. In fact. Such an . The respondents deny this and justify the demolition of their stalls as illegal constructions on public property per municipal council Resolution G. 29. The action was protested on November 10. we have issued a temporary restraining order to preserve the status quo between the parties pending our decision. 28) granted to them by the municipal government. which declared the subject area as “the parking place and as the public plaza of the municipality. The writ of preliminary injunction was made permanent. Aguilar decided the aforesaid case and held that the land occupied by the petitioners. Even assuming a valid lease of the property in dispute. 1961. The petitioners claim they have a right to remain in and conduct business in this area by virtue of a previous authorization (Resolution no. Issue: WON petitioners have the right to occupy the subject land. along Mercado Street. the municipal council of San Fernando adopted Resolution No. 1968. HELD Even assuming a valid lease of the property in dispute. 218 authorizing some 24 members of the Fernandino United Merchants and Traders Association to construct permanent stalls and sell in the above-mentioned place. being public in nature. in Civil Case No. Pampanga. a strip of land measuring 12 by 77 meters on which stands a conglomeration of vendors stalls together forming what is commonly known as a talipapa. This dispute goes back to November 7. the resolution could have effectively terminated the agreement for it is settled that the police power cannot be surrendered or bargained away through the medium of a contract.R. Hence. was beyond the commerce of man and therefore could not be the subject of private occupancy. Branch 2. does not constitute a violation of a legal right or amount to a legal wrong damnum absque injuria. On January 18. where the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. 218. and that such structures constitute a nuisance subject to abatement according to law. 2040.

act will not militate against the impairment clause. which is subject to and limited by the paramount police power. he acted correctly in sustaining the right and responsibility of the mayor to evict the petitioners from the disputed area and clear it of all the structures illegally constructed therein. On the contrary. . We hold that the respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the petition for prohibition.