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Karl Eschbach Jacqueline Hagan Nestor Rodríguez
Presented at the 26th Annual National Legal Conference on Immigration and Refugee Policy
Published in In Defense of the Alien, Vol. 26, pp. 37-52.
Washington, DC April 2003
Border Death Project The Center for Immigration Research at the University of Houston has been conducting an ongoing study of deaths of undocumented migrants along the Southwest border since 1995 through fieldwork and quantitative research (Eschbach, Hagan, Rodriguez, Hernandez and Bailey, 1999; Eschbach, Hagan and Rodriguez 2001). The fieldwork has involved interviews with Border Patrol agents, medical examiners, funeral directors, local law enforcement agents, undocumented migrants and human rights advocates. Through these interviews we have sought to understand both the number and reasons for migrant deaths in each area along the border. The quantitative component involves the systematic study of trends in undocumented deaths along the full border using a standardized data source. We believe that together these two approaches provide a comprehensive understanding of migrant deaths in recent decades. In this presentation we discuss our findings in relation to the themes of the conference session, border enforcement policy after September 11. Failure of IRCA and continued undocumented immigration To understand the emergence of concern about the deaths of undocumented migrants in the middle 1990s, it is important to place the problem in the context of immigration policy during this period. The dominant policy strategy during the 1990s was a substantial increase in the effort expended by the United States to prevent illegal entry through increased and targeted patrol of the Southwest border.
This border enforcement policy emerged in the wake of the failure of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) to control undocumented migration. Recall, IRCA attacked undocumented migration through a three-pronged strategy: a legalization program, an employer sanction program, and a border enforcement program. In the short run of a few years, IRCA did reduce the flow of undocumented migrants by legalizing several million migrants engaged in circular flow between the United States and Latin America, moving them into legal border crossing channels. However, while IRCA temporarily changed the stock of undocumented migrants through the legalization program, in the long run it did not change the basic dynamic of undocumented migration to the United States. By the 1990s, migration flows had returned to their pre-IRCA levels.
The Gatekeeper Complex The response to the failure of IRCA has been a progressive increase in the resources devoted to border control. Some of these increases were mandated under the terms of IRCA, and began in the late 1980’s. Most were ushered in the 1990s. Resources devoted to border enforcement were dramatically increased. The annual budget for enforcement operations increased sevenfold between 1980 and 1995, and then tripled between 1995 and 2001. It currently exceeds $2.5 billion (Reyes, Johnson, and Swearingen, 2002), The number of Border Patrol agents along the southwest border more than doubled between FY 1993 to FY 1999, from roughly 3,400 to 7,200 (Andreas 2001). The new policy initiative also included a huge influx of new technological resources such
as night vision cameras and ground sensors, along with the construction of new physical barriers along the border. In the San Diego sector alone, for example, the length of border fencing has more than doubled since 1994 (Andreas, 2000). Indeed, the Congressional Research Service reported that roughly $3.3 billion has been invested on the Border Patrol since 1994 (cited in Suro, 1998:3). The Border Patrol deployed these additional resources in the most popular urban crossing locations in a series of highly publicized border control operations. Operation Blockade (later renamed Hold-the-Line) was implemented in El Paso in 1993, followed the next year by Operation Gatekeeper in San Diego. Subsequent years saw the extension of intensive border control to other stretches of the border. We call the border control efforts of this period the “Gatekeeper Complex,” named for the largest and most visible of the border control operations. The Gatekeeper Complex had the intended purpose of raising the cost of migration by closing off the easy and well established crossing channels. Since El Paso and San Diego were adjacent to the largest border cities in northern Mexico (Juarez and Tijuana), transportation services to these locations within Mexico were plentiful. When they got to the border, migrants were implicitly aided by the large number of other persons trying to cross at the same places, which tended to overwhelm Border Patrol resources (Espenshade, Baraka and Huber, 1997). The proximity to urban areas meant that migrants could receive assistance from and blend to these cities to plan the next leg of their northbound journey. Networks of alien smugglers were well established in these cities. In the stretch from San Diego to Los Angeles, attempts by the Border Patrol to
control transit up Interstate 5 corridor from San Diego to Los Angeles had to contend with the fact that this Interstate is among the most heavily traveled in the country. By initially concentrating enforcement on the most used crossing points, the Border Patrol intended to deny these relatively easy corridors to the migrants, redirecting those who would still try to smaller secondary cities. The extension of increased enforcement to secondary cities was intended to increasingly redirect undocumented migration flows out of urban areas into the surrounding countryside. Because there were relatively few roads leading away from the border in many of these rural areas, the Border Patrol could in these areas control flow on the highways using a combination of fixed checkpoints and mobile patrols. The Border Patrol could then deploy additional agents and technological aids to “cut for sign” of northbound intruders. The length of these cross country journeys--sometimes taking more than 50 miles on the United States side of the border alone—gave the Border Patrol more time to apprehend migrants than in urban settings. It was the expressed hope of the INS officials who designed the new enforcement policies of the 1990s that the intensified and targeted control would discourage many would-be migrants from even attempting the journey because of the additional physical difficulty, and the increased financial and psychological costs of the northbound journey. New technologies and laws that increased the penalties faced by migrants who were apprehended during an unauthorized entry accompanied these increases in resources devoted to border control. The penalty that had long been paid by the person apprehended while attempting an unauthorized entry had been voluntary return to the country of
origin. The implementation of new "IDENT" technology created and maintained a database of biometric identifiers that allowed the Border Patrol to identify repeat entrants and increase the penalty to prison time for some. Increasing dangers to migrants? Almost as soon as the plans for the Gatekeeper Complex became public, migrant advocates expressed their fear that the collateral damage from this enforcement initiative would be increased dangers and risk of death for the migrants. The rural terrain to which migrants were being redirected exposed them to increased risk. As the probability of apprehension and the legal penalties associated with undocumented migration went up, the impulse to take dangerous risks through more dangerous concealment strategies to avoid capture also went up. So too did the incentive to engage in either high-speed flight or violence in response to an imminent apprehension. For its part, the INS did not contest the idea that there were dangers associated with the redirection of undocumented migration to rural areas. INS officials made several responses to these allegations. First, they observed that the migrants themselves were responsible for these increased risk since undocumented entry is a crime in the United States. Second, they pointed to professional alien smugglers—the so-called coyotes-- as the principal villains, by encouraging and sometimes misleading migrants to take unnecessary risks. Third, they observed that the border was already dangerous before the implementation of the concentrated enforcement campaign, especially in the out-ofcontrol San Diego crossing corridor.
When some of the predictions about the dangers to migrants in the restructured border environment proved true, the Border Patrol implemented the Border Safety Initiative Program in 1998, in cooperation with the Mexican government. This initiative included increased deployment of emergency medical service (EMS) units, increased EMS training for agents, increased supply if life-saving equipment in Border Patrol vehicles, an emphasis on patrolling-for-rescue as well as patrolling for apprehension, particularly during dangerously hot weather. Another part of this initiative was an advertising campaign in Mexico and Central America warning potential migrants of border dangers. What did the Gatekeeper Complex accomplish? There is little evidence that the Gatekeeper Complex has reduced undocumented migration and the unauthorized labor supply (Hanson and Spilimbergo 1999; Reyes et al 2002; GAO 1997; 1999; 2001). Many critics of border enforcement policies in this period suggest that the primary result of increased danger and expense of illegal border crossing has been to decrease cross-border circulation by lengthening the time spent in the United States by undocumented persons. (Kossoudji, 1992; Espenshade et al, 1997; Massey, Durand, and Malone, 2002; Reyes et al, 2002). The 1990s saw large increases in the stock of undocumented immigrants living in the United States. These increases are estimated to be about half a million per year. The undocumented population in the United States has been estimated at about 8.5 million in 2000 (Passel and Fix, 2001).
Although there is no evidence to show that the Gatekeeper Complex accomplished its policy goals, there is no doubt it dramatically restructured the geography of border crossing. In particular, the massing of enforcement resources and construction of effective fencing in the extreme western part of San Diego County west of Otay Mountain and close to the San Ysidro port of entry substantially reduced illegal migration through this formerly popular migration corridor. Figure 1 shows the magnitude of this restructuring by showing the changing distribution of apprehensions to different Border Patrol operational sectors along the Southwest border from 1985 to 2002. Apprehensions are an imperfect measure of the location of migration flows, because the probability of apprehension (and hence the relationship between apprehension totals and successful migration attempts) varies at different places on the border. However, the patterns in apprehensions are so striking that they give a clear indication of what happened. The percentage of apprehensions in the El Paso and San Diego border sectors peaked at 70 in 1992. By 1998, this figure had dropped to less than 25 percent. At the same time, the percentage of apprehensions increased in the area from Imperial County California through Arizona. Insert Figure 1 Here By the summer of 1998, the western San Diego area had become so well controlled that middle class housing was under development in areas on the United States side of the border that had formerly been overrun by undocumented border crossing. In the same year, however, Border Patrol officials in Calexico estimated that the ratio of "got-aways" to apprehensions in that area may have been as high as ten-to-one, because
tens of thousands of undocumented migrants had shifted to this area, while the Border Patrol did not markedly increase resources. By 2000, increased resources devoted to border enforcement in the Calexico area had shifted flows further eastward yet, making the Arizona desert the primary terrain where unauthorized entries are attempted Within the border areas, unauthorized migration increasingly shifted to the open countryside surrounding the relatively well-controlled border cities. In any case, border cities in Arizona are relatively small. Even if an undocumented migrant successfully entered an Arizona border city such as Nogales, Douglas, or Naco, he or she would still need to traverse the parched landscape northward to Tucson or Phoenix. These open areas have become the new playing field for the sometimes deadly game of cat-and-mouse played by the undocumented migrants and United States border control personnel.
How did the Gatekeeper Complex change the deaths of undocumented migrants along the border? The Gatekeeper Complex has had limited success from the point of view of its policy goals, but what has been the effect on death and danger to migrants? The question is not as straightforward as at first appears. Government officials did not keep border wide records of the deaths of undocumented migrants until 1998, when the Border Patrol began to record deaths occurring in furtherance of an illegal entry in border areas in the United States. The Mexican government also began to tabulate deaths of its own citizens attempting undocumented entry in the 1990s. The Mexican series includes deaths in nearborder areas in northern Mexico, as well as deaths in the United States. The series is
aggregated from reports assembled from the network of Mexican consulates in the border region. It is marred in its early years, by inconsistent coverage of different border areas. Coverage of the San Diego border region is complete dating from the early 1990s, but was incomplete through most of the decade in other areas, and especially in Texas. The vital registration database for the United States is a useful alternative source of data about longer term trends in deaths during undocumented migration. This source is intended to be a complete registry of all deaths occurring within the United States. Death records do not contain any information about the immigration status of decedents, or activity at time of death. Thus these data cannot be used to generate a definitive count of deaths during undocumented migration. Vital registration death data do contain information about decedents’ place of residence and citizenship, as well as information about underlying cause of deaths. Using this information we can construct a data series for accidental deaths of foreign transients (foreign-born, non-U.S. residents) and for unidentified bodies in near-border counties. Comparison of the Border Patrol counts of undocumented migrant deaths with the death data supplied by the San Diego medical examiner and Imperial County coroner show that the large majority of the accidental deaths of foreign transients identified in the vital registration data for near border counties do in fact occur to undocumented migrants attempting to enter without inspection. Thus the shaded area of overlap in figure 2 is large, and the vital registration data provide a useful data source to learn about longer term trends in the numbers and causes of deaths occurring in the course of undocumented migration (Eschbach, Hagan, Rodriguez 2001). Insert Figure 2 Here 10
Trends in deaths Figure 3 shows the trends in deaths that we compiled at the University of Houston from vital registration sources (1985 to 2000). We extend this series from to 2002 using Border Patrol counts. The number of deaths reported follows a u-shaped curve. In the late 1980s, the number of foreign transient deaths usually exceeded 300, and peaked in 1988 at 355. Thereafter, the number of deaths fell to 180 in 1993 and 1994. After 1994 the number of deaths started to increase again, peaking in 2000 at 370. Border Patrol counts for 2001 and 2002 show a small decrease in the number of deaths in those years compared to 2000. Insert Figure 3 Here As Figure 4 shows, the leading causes of deaths of foreign transients in the border region across the period were drowning, motor vehicle accidents, auto-pedestrian accidents, deaths from exposure to environmental heat and cold, and deaths from unknown causes. (Unknown cause deaths pertain primarily to bodies found as skeletal remains in open areas.) In considering these distributions, it is important to keep in mind that not all deaths occur during an undocumented entry. For example, deaths from homicides likely include a large number of undocumented aliens, but a substantial portion could pertain to persons who were engaged in drug trafficking or other illegal activities (Eschbach, Hagan, Rodriguez 2001). Insert Figure 4 Here Figure 5 shows that there were several important changes in the causes of deaths of foreign transients in the border region. Two causes, homicide deaths and auto11
pedestrian accidents, peaked in 1988 and declined thereafter. Since 1994, both causes together have contributed about 50 deaths a year. Deaths from exposure to environmental heat, cold and dehydration declined from the middle 1980s to the middle 1990s before increasing sharply. Insert Figure 5 Here . The large majority of auto-pedestrian deaths occurred in the San Diego area. This
cause of death was substantially reduced before the implementation of Operation Gatekeeper in 1994. Auto-pedestrian deaths had occurred primarily in the vicinity of the Border Patrol’s checkpoint on Interstate 5 at San Clemente. These deaths declined after the fencing of the Interstate median in the early 1990s made it difficult for northbound migrants to cross the southbound lanes on foot south of the checkpoint. Like auto-pedestrian deaths, homicide deaths occurred primarily in San Diego County. The number of deaths began to drop rapidly in the early 1990s. Investigation of these deaths in the archives of the San Diego Union-Tribune shows that a few of the deaths involved the victimization of a migrant worker crossing the San Diego border. Many more were related to disputes among drug-traffickers. The number of homicides declined markedly and has remained low in the San Diego border areas after it was brought under control by Operation Gatekeeper. The shifting of undocumented migration to other border areas did not result in an increase in homicides to the areas were undocumented migration was shifting. The final noteworthy change in cause-specific death totals was a sharp increase after 1993 in deaths from environmental heat, cold, exposure and dehydration. There
were 33 such deaths reported in 1985, declining to just 6 deaths border wide from these causes in 1992 and 1993. This cause of death has skyrocketed since 1995, to 99 in 2000. Data from the Border Patrol and the Mexican Consulates show that this cause of death has remained high since 2000. This figure understates the number of deaths from environmental causes, because many bodies may remain undiscovered in open areas throughout the region. Motor vehicle accidents and drowning are both leading causes of deaths. Both causes of death fluctuate in number throughout this period, with no overall pattern related to changes in enforcement and crossing patterns. Our studies have shown that that the majority of drowning deaths occur in the Rio Grande, and that water levels along that river are more strongly associated with the number of drowning deaths than is the changing location of border crossing. The migrants have been fortunate that extended drought conditions in the Rio Grande basin through most of the 1990s have kept water levels in the river at historic lows (Eschbach, Hagan and Rodriguez 2001). In summary, the data partially confirm the fears of the human rights advocates that the redirection of flows from urban to rural crossing points is increasing the danger to migrants. It is now unambiguous that the redirection of migrant flows to the Sonoran deserts of Arizona and eastern California, and to the ranchlands of South Texas, takes the lives of perhaps 100 persons per year that we can document through vital registration data, and an uncounted number of additional persons whose bodies have yet to be - and perhaps may never be – discovered.
We should not overlook, however, that undocumented border crossing was dangerous before the Gatekeeper Complex. Returning to Figure 5, we can see that in the middle 1980s, drowning (mostly in the Rio Grande) was the leading cause of death for undocumented migrants. Deaths from environmental causes were reported even in this period. Moreover urban areas have their dangers, as shown by the chaos near the border and on the freeways in San Diego County in the late 1980s. Had the increases in flow associated with the peso devaluation in 1995 all been channeled through the San Diego and El Paso areas, we are not sure that the resulting death totals would have been markedly lower than what was observed, though the cause and location of death would have been different. While the Gatekeeper Complex probably did result in an increase in the number of migrant deaths, undocumented migration across the Southwestern border has always been dangerous. Resurrecting the status quo in the days before Operation Gatekeeper is not a solution to the dangers of undocumented border crossing. Enforcement after September 11. The terrorist attacks of September 11 had immediate ramifications for United States border policy. The most immediate effect was to slam shut the door that had been opened to the adjustment of the legal status of millions of undocumented Mexicans in the United States, and perhaps to the creation of a new guest worker program in the United States. To be sure, it was by no means clear what policy would have emerged from the discussions about a more liberal immigration policy that Presidents Fox and Bush had opened in the months before 9/11. It is clear that in the aftermath of the attacks, such a
liberalization was taken off of the table for the time being, and restrictionist voices gained strength in public debates. In the Gatekeeper era the mantra of the restrictionists was that we needed to control the borders against “alien and drug smuggling.” The new threat of foreign terrorists after September 11 added a third and very powerful justification for increased vigilance at our borders, despite the fact that none of the September 11 terrorists are known to have entered illegally across the Southwestern border. In a climate in which legal migrants faced suspicions and restrictions in the name of anti-terrorist counter measures, unauthorized migrants could expect little sympathy. The ineffectiveness of attempts to halt undocumented migration across the Southwest border stands in odd symbolic juxtaposition to the new claims that the United States will seal its border against terrorist entry. Conventional wisdom is that undocumented migrants always successfully run the gauntlet of border control or die trying. This fact sits uneasily next to the somewhat different challenge of control of the border against terrorism. In opening the new Department of Homeland Security, Secretary Ridge promised to “seal our borders from terrorists and their cargo.” Yet if a circular flow of more than a million undocumented migrants can make the journey each year, how well sealed can the border be against a threat that is potentially devastating in its consequences if just a single terrorist manages to enter? On the ground at the border itself, September 11 has not changed the basic dynamic of the cat-and-mouse game played out between undocumented migrants and United States border enforcement personnel. The number of apprehensions did fall
sharply after September 2001, continuing a downward trend that had begun the previous year. Increased border enforcement, immigrant fear of increased Border Control in the context of 9/11, changing Border Patrol strategies, and slow-downs in the United States economy likely all have contributed to the decline. In the face of declining apprehensions, the number of deaths of undocumented migrants along the border reported by the Border Patrol continues to exceed 300, which is substantially higher than the death totals from the middle 1990s. In 2003, the Arizona border continues to be the primary place where undocumented entry is attempted and contested. Migrant death from heat and dehydration remains a tragic concomitant of the border enforcement game in the arid deserts of the border region. After September 11, national security concerns are increasingly intertwined with border enforcement policy. It is unlikely that either Congress or the general public would agree to reduce border enforcement to the level seen before the Gatekeeper Complex was implemented. For this reason, calls to “Stop Operation Gatekeeper”—implicitly to return to the enforcement policies of the 1980s—increasingly fall on deaf ears. As mentioned above, simply rolling back enforcement policy to before Gatekeeper would not in any case have eliminated the deaths of undocumented migrants. Deaths will stop when undocumented flows are regulated through legal rather than illegal channels. Evidence for this is provided by the lull in deaths that we observed in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. The most plausible explanation for this decline was the temporary reduction in the circular flow of undocumented migrants because IRCA legalized more than two million immigrants. This took the migrants out of the rivers and
deserts of the border region, and put them onto commercial buses, eliminating most of the dangers associated with attempted unauthorized entry. The policy alternative confronting the United States today is not between a lax and a stringent effort to control the border, but rather between a policy that acknowledges the dependency of the American economy on foreign labor and a policy that continues to keep a large portion of this labor in undocumented status. It is likely that for the foreseeable future the quantity of border enforcement effort expended will exceed historical levels. But increased control of unauthorized entry is not inconsistent with increased authorization of legalized entry. The combination of increased authorized entry and increased border control may be the most effective policy for national security, to accomodate the labor demands of the United States economy, and to reduce the toll of migrant death at the Southwest border. September 11 may have created a new willingness of the American public to implement new technologies for the control of undocumented labor supply at the place of employment rather than at the border. These technologies include increased use of identification with non-duplicatable biometrics, together with the real time query of databases that report the legal status of the worker or job applicant. These technologies, if used, will probably make possible a more effective control of undocumented labor supply than is possible through the cat-and-mouse game currently played out between the Border Patrol and the undocumented migrants at the border. One implication of this effectiveness is that the United States may be forced to make its decisions about the use of unskilled foreign labor more transparent. If the best evidence is that more eight million illegal immigrants are a functioning part of the labor force of the United States, it is likely that 17
policies that would effectively deport this segment of the labor force could create significant dislocations in the American economy. Regulating foreign labor supply through legal channels has several advantages with respect to the imperative for national security. One of the advantages is that under a regulated system authorized migrants present themselves for inspection at the border, in contrast to the present system of clandestine entry. A second advantage to regulating the labor supply through legal channels is that this would put an end to the substantial financial costs associated with the current cat and mouse game along the border. Moreover, it would release resources for the Border Patrol and other agencies in the new Department of Homeland Security to concentrate their efforts on the interdiction of diseases, drugs and terrorists, rather than on ineffective efforts to disrupt labor flows. Among the most important benefit of regulating migration through legal channels is that such a policy would put an end to the tragic and needless deaths of undocumented migrants.
References Andreas, P. 2000 Border Games: Policing the U.S.-Mexico Divide. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
Andreas, P. 2001 “The Transformation of Migrant Smuggling across the U.S. –Mexico Border.” In Global Human Smuggling: Comparative Perspectives. David Kyle and Rey Koslowski, eds. Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins University Press.
Eschbach, K., J. Hagan, N. Rodriguez, R. Hernandez and S. Bailey 1999 “Death at the Border,” International Migration Review 33(2): 430-454.
Eschbach, K., J. Hagan and N. Rodriguez 2001 “Causes and Trends in Migrant Deaths along the U.S.-Mexico Border, 1985-1998,” Center for Immigration Research, University of Houston. .
Espenshade,T.J., J.L. Baraka, and G.A. Huber 1997 “Implications of the 1996 Immigration Reforms,” Population and Development Review 23(4):769-801.
Hanson, G. and A. Spilimbergo 1999 “Illegal Immigration, Border Enforcement, and Relative Wages: Evidence from Apprehensions at the U.S.-Mexico Border.” American Economic Review 89:13371357.
Kossoudji, S. 19
1992 “Playing Cat and Mouse at the U.S.-Mexico Border,” Demography, 29(2):159-180.
Massey, D., S., J. Durand, and N.J. Malone 2002 Beyond Smoke and Mirrors: Mexican Immigration in an Era of Economic Integration. New York, New York: Russel Sage Foundation
Passel, J.S. and Fix, M. E 2001 “U.S. Immigration at the Beginning of the 21st Century,” Testimony before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims Hearing on “The U.S. Population and Immigration,” Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, Urban Institute, Washington, DC, 2001.
United States General Accounting Office 1997 Illegal Immigration: Southwest Border strategy Results Inconclusive; More Evaluation Needed. GAO/GAD-98-164, July 31. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
United States General Accounting Office 1999 Illegal Immigration: status for southwest border strategy Implementation, GAO/GGD-99-44, May 19. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
United States General Accounting Office 2001 INS’ Southwest border strategy: resource and Impact Issues Remain After Seven Years, Washington, D.C. U.S. Government Printing Office
Reyes, B., H.P. Johnson and R. Van Sweargen 2002 “Has Increased Border enforcement Reduced Unauthorized Migration?” Research
Brief, Public Policy Institute of California.
Suro, R. 1998 “Tightening controls and changing Flows: Evaluating the INS Border Enforcement Strategy,” Research Perspectives on Migration 2(1). Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Figure 1. Percentage of Apprehensions by Border Patrol Sector, 1985-2002
100.0% 90.0% 80.0% 70.0% 60.0% 50.0% 40.0% 30.0% 20.0% 10.0% 0.0% 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Yuma El Centro El Paso San Diego 2000 McAllen Laredo DelRio Marfa
Figure 2. Vital registration deaths of foreign transients and undocumented migrants
Figure 3. Total number of deaths, 1985-2002
400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0
U Houston Border Patrol
86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02
Figure 4. Deaths by Cause
Unknown 12% All Other 5% Homicide 16%
Environment 12% Train 4% Pedestrian 12%
Motor Vehicle 17%
Drowning Suffocation 0% 22%
Figure 5. Trends in death by cause and year
400 All Other 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 Suffocation Train Motor Vehicle Drowning Unknown
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