Professional Documents
Culture Documents
governmental technique:
managing gendered Islam
in Germany
Schirin Amir-Moazami
abstract
Throughout the last decades, state and civil society actors in Germany have
undertaken a number of initiatives in order to enter into a structured conversation
with Muslim communities, and to find spokespersons who serve as partners for
political authorities. This process has commonly been analysed in terms of its
empowering effects for Muslims via the emerging institutionalisation of Islam. The
modes and techniques of power at stake in this process have yet often been
undermined. Through the lens of Foucaults concept of governmentality, the starting
point of my article is one particular dialogue forum, initiated by the German state in
2006 the Deutsche Islam Konferenz (DIK) whose primary goal is to institutionalise
and regulate the communication between Muslims and state actors and thereby to
regulate the conduct of Muslims. Focusing mainly on the way in which gender and
Islam have been coupled and played out in this initiative, I argue that the DIK is less
a dialogical encounter than a tool of a broader civilising liberal project. Through the
inquiry into the modes of power operating in this state led dialogue initiative the
article shows that while aiming to secure Muslims integration into German society
and to liberate Muslim women from restrictive gender norms, the DIK operates as an
enactment of a particular notion of freedom with normative and normalising
implications.
keywords
dialogue; Muslims; Germany; governmentality
introduction
Looking at the ways in which Muslims have been dealt with in European public
spheres throughout the last decades, one can observe significant shifts in nearly all
parts of Western Europe with sizeable minority Muslim populations. Along with
enhanced security measures, state and civil society actors have increasingly placed
their focus on the institutionalization and integration of Islam. As a number of
scholars have observed, these politics are based on diverse and partly divergent
rationalities (Tezcan, 2007; Peter, 2008), and are obviously not detached from
techniques of power. This also makes the common juxtaposition of integration
versus exclusion questionable, at least if understood as mutually exclusive.
In this article, I will look at such interventionist practices through the
conceptual lens of Foucaults notion of governmentality (Foucault, 2006).
Governmentality provides a suitable tool because it is primarily concerned with
the power involved in the regulation of freedom (see Rose, 1999). Instead of
conceptualising power merely in terms of repression or hierarchy or, in turn,
as a counter-category to freedom, governmentality is anchored in liberal
politics and therefore allows us to think of power in a multi-leveled way. Being
concerned with the maintenance and control of bodies, persons and
populations, and the circulation of goods, governmentality operates at various
levels and is not exclusively tied to state power meant as a unique centre of
sovereignty. At the same time the technologies of power that Foucault was
interested in, especially in his essays on governmentality, are nonetheless
related to specific policy aims and attempts to enact social, political, religious
or cultural norms. The most interesting aspect for me in this multi-layered
notion of power is that it allows us to look at power as constituted by intertwined
rationalities of discipline, sovereignty and the dispositive of security (see in
particular Foucault, 1978, lecture 1).
This conceptual focus can help us to look at politics vis-a`-vis Muslims in Europe
beyond the common focus on historically shaped relationships between church
and state, or as specific post-war immigration policies (Fetzer and Soper, 2004;
Koenig, 2005). Instead, the idea of governmentality can further an understanding
of these politics as being part of a more general conception of freedom,
which does not only attempt to liberate subjects deemed unfree (Hindess, 2001),
but which also aims at producing free subjects (Rose, 1999: 87). Thus, the
broader question that interests me in this article is not immediately or not
exclusively related to the field of Islam in Europe, and is the question of how
freedom is governed, regulated and, by means of regulation, necessarily
restricted but also produced in liberal democratic societies.
Recent scholarship on Muslims in Europe has started to pay particular attention
to the techniques of power involved in this domain.1 One central feature in these
investigations are processes of securitisation. Security and the prevention of
10
1 Fruitful paths
have been traced by
2 The following
analysis is based on
reports, press notes
and interviews with
members, initiators
or commentators of
the DIK, channelled
through the German
media and also on
personal interviews
with both organised
and non-organised
Muslims involved in
the DIK. I am
referring here mainly
to the first round of
the DIK between
2006 and 2009,
under the aegis of
the then Minister of
the Interior Wolfgang
Scha
uble.
Islamic extremism has indeed become one of the most important driving forces of
governmental practices towards Muslims. However, one domain that has triggered
similar concerns is the Muslims quest for recognition and the challenge to the
normative foundations and basic principles of liberal nation-states that this
quest has brought about. My main concern here are those governmental
practices, which can be interpreted as a response to this quest for recognition as
well as to the growing institutionalisation of Islam in European public spheres,
which it has provoked. I will argue that these governmental practices are, in the
first place, concerned with the regulation of sensibilities, life conduct and
personal attitudes of Muslims and work at the intersections between law and
pedagogy, and between discipline and normalisation.
In the intertwined processes of securitisation and integration, dialogue with
Muslims has become salient, and has recently also been discovered by
governments as a tool for integration and social cohesion. Focusing on the case
of Germany I will look here at one specific example of such state-managed
dialogues. My point of departure is the Deutsche Islam Konferenz (hereafter DIK),
which the German government initiated in the autumn of 2006 in order to enter
into a structured conversation with Muslims.2 Based on the intertwined attempt
to improve the conditions for Muslims to practice their religion and to ensure that
this improvement will take the right form, the DIK is an interesting case of micropolitics, which reveals the ambivalences at stake in the regulation of freedom
of and from religion.
Although the DIK tackles a wide range of issues, one of the most central domains
in this and other related initiatives is the effort to shape Muslims social and
religious conduct in the domain of gender norms and sexuality. This is namely the
sphere which is supposedly based on Islamic normativity and thus regarded
as contradicting principles of gender equality and individual autonomy. I will
place the main focus of my analysis on the question of how sexual politics work
in this initiative as a technique of regulation, discipline and normalisation of
subjects. I argue that the disciplinary impetus here does not consist of
sanctioning deviations from the norm but rather in reshaping the Muslim body
with a conditional affirmation of its difference through modes of guidance and
control.
I will proceed in two major steps. First, I will look at the role of secular Muslim
feminists, who have become key figures in informing and moulding discourses on
gendered Islam in Germany and who have also become involved in the DIK as
female spokespersons. I will argue that the DIK has contributed to the widening
circulation and reification of the very category of the secular Muslim feminist.
I further suggest that their large impact is symptomatic of a broader phenomenon that is coupled with the production of knowledge and subjectivities in
liberal-secular contexts.
Schirin Amir-Moazami
11
Focusing on the procedures in the DIK, I will analyse in a second step how the
recurrent coupling of rights and values vis-a`-vis Muslims can be read as a
normalising practice. Here the aim is to mould the Muslims life conduct in the
domain of gender relations and sexuality according to liberal scripts. I will argue
that although based on and backed up by the liberal legal order, the techniques
at stake here exceed juridical power.
3 On the
ambivalence
involved in the
gesture to welcome
people who have
settled in Germany
for almost three
generations, see
in particular Peter
(2009) and
Amir-Moazami
(2009).
While being approached as forming a part of German society, Muslims thus still
have to be fashioned in a way which faces their problems and ensures their
integration.
What I find interesting here is the position of state agents who turn into pilots of
integration of one particular population (Muslims), by endorsing and assisting
them in the process of becoming German Muslims. This reveals at the same time
a transformation in the states self-understanding as the newly emerging
caretaker of problems faced by Muslims and exclusively by them. The
acknowledgement of the durable and sustainable presence of Muslims is thus
coupled with the assumption of their inherent deficiencies, which the state has
to help solve. There is thus an inherent tension involved in the DIK between
recognition and suspicion, which characterises policies vis-a`-vis Muslims in
Germany more generally (see Schiffauer, 2008).
This logic of integrating through dialogue resonates with a more general trend in
other flourishing programmes designed for Muslims, for example, by church-based
interfaith groups, or intercultural dialogue initiatives of political foundations.
Although clearly diverse in scope and plural in the approaches, one common
feature in these initiatives is their rising inscription into a teleological rationality
that aims at solving societal, political and partly even economic problems and
conflicts. Levent Tezcan (2006) observes, for example, that hitherto locally
and loosely structured interfaith groups since the late 1990s have increasingly
linked their activities with normative goals. Parallel to the state attempts to
institutionalise a structured conversation with Muslims in order to organise the
conduct of conduct, local grassroots and pluralistically structured interfaith
Schirin Amir-Moazami
13
dialogue initiatives have begun to resettle their agendas, acting more and more
as assistants for processes of integration.
As already indicated in Schaubles quotation above, the core of the problem is
seen in the fact that Muslims find it hard to adjust to existing gender norms and
should therefore be guided. The reason for this is the assumed coercion that
Muslim women are subjected to through specific bodily practices and religious
life conduct. I will be focusing on the DIKs politics of invitation, and, more
specifically, on the role of the secular Muslim feminists.
4 The most
prominent is probably
the sociologist Necla
Kelek (2007), who
gained wide public
attention and
recognition through
her book on forced
and arranged
marriages among
Turkish migrants.
Seyran Ates (2003), a
lawyer specialising in
divorce cases,
became a public
figure after having
various publications
with a highly
autobiographical
focus. Ezhar Cezairli
works as a dentist in
Frankfurt/Main and
initiated the
association of
Secular Muslim
Germans in the
federal state of
Hessen.
orders, which have made this subject position possible and salient. Liberal
secular Muslims, and here more specifically liberal-secular feminists, comprise a
growing number of academics, activists and also politicians who challenge a
conception of Islam as a normative form of life conduct from within or who
sometimes retreat from Islam as a discursive tradition altogether. The main
reference point for these secular Muslim feminists is their commitment to Western
liberal notions of justice, autonomy, tolerance and individual rights. These
concepts, however, gain meaning primarily in terms of counter-concepts to the
underlying understanding of Islamic normativity as a closed set of rules and
restrictions. What is also significant for the success of these secular Muslim
feminists is their strong focus on autobiographical experiences, which leads them
to a tendentious condemnation of the condition of the Muslim woman in Islam.
Their goal is to struggle against the subordinate status of women in Muslim
communities in Europe as a sign of Islams backwardness. What they propose
alternatively is a model of religion based on the ideal of secular Europe,
understood as the product of a progressive retreat from religion in the public
sphere. I do not want to deny here that their claims derive from serious
experiences with oppressive patriarchal practices. However, these claims often
result in a problematic goal to obsessively liberate the oppressed by constructing
and imposing one single gender model.
Necla Kelek, who is the best-known among these activists in Germany, claimed,
for example, before the first meeting of the DIK that her aim was to reach a
general prohibition of students to abstain from mixed swimming classes in state
schools and a nationwide headscarf ban in primary schools (Welt online,
http://www.welt.de/politik/article155551/Islam_Kritikerin_Kelek_Wir_brauchen_
ein_Kopftuchverbot_an_Grundschulen.html, last accessed May 2011, translation
my own). In another related interview she explained more precisely: Covered
women do not participate anymore in the achievements of humanity. They are not
allowed to experience their body, to swim, to do physical exercise, to participate
in the biology lessons, and they are deprived of their sexuality (SpiegelOnline, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,424999,00.html, last
accessed May 2011, translation my own).
Such assumptions reveal a significant paradox of a missionary struggle of liberalsecular feminism, and even of liberalism more generally. The requirement to
adjust to liberal gender norms of equality and autonomy clearly goes beyond the
regulation of the public life and targets a very intimate sphere, rhetorically
constructed as private and personal, in this case dress codes and physical
exercise. This contributes to the blurring of sacredly defined and defended
boundaries between the public and the private in liberal thought and to the
construction of a normative standard of how to act and behave as a liberal
subject. As Talal Asad (2006) argues in his recent interventions on the antiheadscarf rulings in France, such politics go largely beyond the rhetorically and
Schirin Amir-Moazami
15
of dividing different cultures or spaces into different time frames, Butler argues
that hegemonic conceptions of progress define themselves over and against
a pre-modern temporality that they produce for the purposes of their own selflegitimation (ibid.). In this understanding of freedom as related to a specific
notion of temporality, Europe is imagined as having reached modernity, while
immigrants are associated with orthodoxies and traditions, in need of being
refashioned. Thus what is crucial in Butlers analysis, and also for my argument,
is the linkage that she denotes between freedom and progress on the one
hand, and their functional relatedness to other notions of temporality, which
are responsible for the production of conceptions of both modernity and
backwardness, on the other.
Secular Muslim feminists involved to the DIK as representatives of Muslim women
in Germany confirm Butlers assumptions and can at the same time be seen as
embodiments of the productive force of the particular conception of temporality Butler describes. Deriving from a different pre-modern, traditional,
patriarchal time frame these secular Muslim feminists have become icons of a
conception of secular time anchored in freedom and/as progress. They have
incorporated a temporally and spatially specific understanding of secularity as a
gradual detachment from religious normativity and therefore have reached what
others still have to reach.
Their role at the DIK and other events, in which Muslim informants are
requested, should thus be analysed precisely in this light. As critics from within
they contribute to a further legitimisation of the states interventions into Muslim
gender norms and sexuality. In other words, the state manages its pedagogic
mission to enact freedom, putting itself into the position of the instance that
tames and mediates between orthodox, that is Islamically committed Muslim
men of Islamic federations, and female secular Muslim feminists. This practice
suggests that not only the state should be in charge of transmitting a particular
notion of freedom and emancipation, but also Muslim women themselves should
be involved in circulating their ideals of the right conduct and thereby act as role
models.
The states mandate attributed to secular Muslims to shape Muslim gender
norms from within is closely linked to the idea of the formation of expert
knowledge in the field of Islam in Germany and Europe. Apart from being
present at the DIK as spokeswomen for gender concerns, most of these women
gained significant positions as political advisors and experts on Muslim gender
questions long before the practice of state-managed dialogue. The lawyer
Seyran Ates, for example, was invited as an adviser to the hearings before
the adoption of new laws prohibiting teachers from wearing headscarves in
state schools in the federal state of Baden-Wurttemberg. Necla Kelek was
significantly responsible for the questionnaire of the so-called attitude test,
introduced in 2006 in the same federal state. This test was explicitly designed
Schirin Amir-Moazami
17
19
is pointed out that these problems should be solved together with Muslims. Hence
Muslims, and only they, are still targeted as the bearers of problems related
to gender inequality, and at the same time envisaged and promoted as their
solution.
Unlike other recent measures, such as legally codified headscarf bans in
several federal states (Amir-Moazami, 2007), or attempts to prevent what have
come to be called forced marriages through the restricted criteria of
immigration,5 the DIK has an outspoken pedagogic incentive. It is not about
sanctioning practices or gender norms, which are deemed to deviate from the
norm. It is much more about normalising such practices through dialogue and
education, and the attempt to smoothly but authoritatively transform Muslims
into liberal democratic subjects. This becomes most explicit in the recurrent
coupling of rights and values, which I will turn to in the following section.
It is important to note that all participating agents at the DIK were committed to
ideals of gender equality and more generally to Germanys constitutional order.
The working groups, however, comprise issues, which are extended into a domain
that interrogates the intimate sphere of individuals and looks at the inner logics
of personal behaviour and life conduct of a particular group of people, that is
Muslims. What is interesting in this specific kind of engagement with Muslims
is the subtext, which presumes Muslim gender norms and sexuality as somewhat
disturbing, yet as not necessarily transgressing legality.
Moreover, most of the sub-themes discussed at the DIK had already been
touched upon on the legal arena. A number of claims by Muslims with regard to
practicing religion publicly have, at least partially, been accommodated by local,
federal or national courts, mostly with recourse to the principles of equal rights
and religious freedom.6 The attempt to re-address these topics in the form of a
state-initiated dialogue can be interpreted as an interesting example of how
state agents have started to identify their responsibility and to engage in a
broader discussion about issues of the good that are deemed to impede the
cultural integration of Muslims ideally detached from the domain of rights in
liberal thought.
I would like to make my point more explicit by taking up the example of
co-educative sports and swimming classes in state schools, which have recently
become a frequently discussed topic in the German public sphere. Back in 1992
the Supreme Administrative Courts in Munster and Luneburg had decided in
favour of Muslim girls abstaining from co-educational sports lessons. The topic,
however, has started to preoccupy public opinion, and also state agents more
recently. The more recent decisions in Hamburg in 2007 and Munster in 2008,
which prohibit students right to abstain from swimming classes indicate,
furthermore, how much the interpretation and application of the law itself is all
but immune from specific social climates and discourses.
20
5 See article in
Su
ddeutsche
Zeitung,
Symbolischer Kampf,
27 October 2010,
http://www
.sueddeutsche.de/
politik/
bundesregierungzwangsheiratwird-einestraftat-1.1016679.
6 The most
prominent examples
are: the decision of
the Constitutional
Court (BVG) on the
legitimacy of
covered teachers in
state schools, which
was primarily based
on the principle of
religious freedom
and which argued
that headscarves as
such did not provide
a legal reason to
ban teachers from
classes (see http://
www.bundesver
fassungsgericht.de/
entscheidungen/
rs20030924_
2bvr143602.html):
and the decision by
the BVG that allows
Muslims to slaughter
animals according to
We can interpret the fact that the DIK brought this topic onto its dialogue
platform with Muslims in various ways. The more innocent interpretation would
suggest that it was an attempt to discuss bodily practices and issues of sexuality
with those Muslims who might for religious reasons have a problem with
participating in mixed sports and swimming classes. In the best practice of
dialogue, the aim could then consist of trying to self-reflexively understand
their perspectives (see Gadamer, 1988). A more critical reading would argue that
to bring this topic onto the agenda of a state-initiated dialogue platform in the
first place contributes to the production of co-education as the norm and an
ideal of gender equality considers deviations from this norm as illegitimate and
in need of being reshaped through dialogue instead of through legal sanctions.
There is some evidence for this latter interpretation, one being the fact that only
secular Muslim feminists, whose positions on the issue I already discussed above,
were invited to represent female Muslims. Another one is a controversy that the
head of the Muslim council (Koordinierungsrates der Muslime in Deutschland),
Axel Ayyub Kohler, elicited before the second plenary session. Kohler claimed that
for him the question of co-educative sports classes was a matter of discussion.
More controversially, he argued that the role of Islamic federations was to
support Muslim parents and students in their initiatives to further possibilities for
gender segregated sports classes. This statement triggered a lot of discussion
(Cantzen, 2007: 273), and also motivated the commissioner for integration Maria
Bohmer to react fiercely with the following statement:
Cultural diversity is something very nice and enriching. But I want to clarify one thing: it ends
at a point, where our basic values and rights are questioned. The equality of sexes is one of
these nonnegotiable basic rights. It is expressed, among other things, in common sports and
swimming classes of boys and girls or in common school trips. We will not allow that a small
minority of backward-oriented people tries to introduce the rules of their grandfathers.
(http://www.welt.de/politik/article842814/Muslime_kritisieren_Innenminister.html, last accessed
May 2011. Quote taken from Welt Online, translation my own)
21
7 Most
constitutional
lawyers would
probably contradict
the assumption that
constitutional norms
should be connected
to an ethical
substance, immune
from societal
changes and cultural
pluralisation.
However, some have
recently argued
along such lines and
repeated a wellknown argument
that the liberal
state should not be
abused by illiberal
practices (see
Langenfeld, 2008).
8 This is
undocumented
information, which
I gathered in
personal interviews
with representatives
of Islamic
organisations,
conducted between
2008 and 2009. See
also Schiffauer,
Werner in Berliner
Zeitung, 26 March
2009.
23
Muslims into legalism because they tend to consider the law as the only available
ground to communicate their aims and quest for recognition.9
The demand to extend the identification with legal principles to an identification
with values (constituting these principles) definitely reflects an expression of
puzzlement resulting from the Muslims capacity to use the law by basing their
claims on the existing constitutional order. However, in my view, such an
interpretation simultaneously confirms much of the liberal thought. Although
admitting that constitutional law was founded in a particular time and space
and on particular ethical grounds (Habermas, 1993: 183), most committed liberal
theorists nonetheless conceive of constitutionalism as a neutral and universal set
of principles, available to everybody in the same way. What the requirement of
identification with a value substance associated with legal principles uncovers is
precisely the non-neutral, that is ethical, character of their constitutional
principles themselves. The demand to also subscribe to an ethical substance of
constitutional principles indeed reveals itself as the particularity of allegedly
universal constitutional norms (see Brown and Halley, 2002).
9 In an interview
I conducted with the
general secretary
cu
Oguz U
ncu
of the
Turkish-Muslim
organisation in
Germany (Islamische
Gemeinschaft Mill
Gorus) in April 2008
he claimed that the
only viable path for
practicing Muslims
to gain any
recognition in
Germany was to
meticulously rely on
the legal order. He
claimed that he lost
trust in the DIK
mainly because
committed and
organised Muslims
were not listened to.
conclusion
The DIKs conception of dialogue as recasting alludes to some of the
ambivalences involved in the very notion of dialogue as a liberal practice,
which in this case quite consistently unfolds its anchorage in intersecting power
techniques. The encounter is not open to interpretations of criteria and new
suggestions of what the criteria could be, but closed around a fixed set of
finalised foundations. The initiative does not start from an open encounter
between two unknown subjects and their confrontation through openness towards
both understanding and misunderstanding.10 Being coupled with the pronunciation of specific goals and related to an examining logic, this kind of dialogue
starts from the presumption of an unintelligible difference which has to be
reshaped. The dialogue therefore turns out to be governmental practice, through
which the Other is subsumed into ones own voice, and where the strange is simply
rendered into something familiar. Governmental power here operates in a way
that enacts particular norms as normalcy, while considering and constructing
24
10 This is what
philosophical
approaches to
dialogue of thinkers
from Martin Buber,
Emanuel Levinas to
Hans-Georg
Gadamer suggest.
Although embedded
in different
traditions of thought
these thinkers share
a conception of
dialoguing as
something that must
be detached from
aims at conversion,
cohesion or
conviction, but that
is rather based on
the ethical principle
of recognising the
difference of the
Other through the
readiness to revise
ones own
presuppositions in
and through the
encounter (see in
particular Gadamer,
1988).
25
author biography
Schirin Amir-Moazami holds a PhD from the Department of Social and Political
Sciences of the European University Institute in Florence. Since 2009 she has been
assistant professor of Islam in Europe in the Department of Islamic Studies at
Freie Universitat Berlin. She published a book on the headscarf controversies in
France and Germany (Politisierte Religion. Der Kopftuchstreit in Deutschland
und Frankreich, Bielefeld, transcript, 2007) and numerous articles related to
questions of secular orders and Muslims in both countries. Her research interests
include Islamic movements in Europe, Political Theory, Feminist Theory and the
Sociology of Religion.
references
Amir-Moazami, S. (2007) Euro-Islam, Islam in Europe, or Europe revised through Islam? Versions of
Muslim solidarity within European borders in Karagiannis, N. (2007) editor, European Solidarity
and Solidarity Beyond Europe, Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 186213.
Amir-Moazami, S. (2009) Die Produktion des Tolerierbaren: Toleranz und seine Grenzen im Kontext
der Regulierung von Islam und Geschlecht in Deutschland in Dietze, G., Brunner, C. and Wenzel,
E. (2009) editors, Kritik des Okzidentalismus. Transdisziplinare Beitrage u (Neo-)Orientalismus
und Geschlecht, Bielefeld: transcript, 151167.
Asad, T. (2006) Trying to understand French secularism in De Vries, H. and Sullivan, L.E. (2006)
editors, Political Theologies: Public Religions in a Post-Secular World, New York: Fordham
University Press, 494526.
Ates, S. (2003) Gro e Reise ins Feuer. Die Geschichte einer deutschen Turkin, Berlin.
Brown, W. (2006) Regulating Aversion. Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire, Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Brown, W. and Halley, J. (2002) Editors, Left Legalism/Left Critique, Durham and London: Duke
University Press.
Butler, J. (2008) Sexual politics, torture, and secular time, The British Journal of Sociology, Vol.
59, No. 1: 123.
Cantzen, R. (2007) Der deutsche Wertekonsens und die Religion der Anderen Kulturalisierung des
Islam: Die 2. Islamkonferenz in ausgewalten Printmedien, in pp. 267277.
Fetzer, J. and Soper, C.J. (2004) Muslims and the State in Britain, France and Germany, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Foucault, M. (2006) Sicherheit, Territorium, Bevolkerung Geschichte der Gouvernementalitat I:
Vorlesungen am Colle`ge de France, 19771978. Frankfurt/main: Suhrkamp.
Gadamer, H.-G. (1988) Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzuge einer Philosophischen Hermeneutik,
Frankfurt am Main: Campus.
Habermas, J. (1993) Anerkennungskampfe in einem demokratischen Rechtsstaat in Taylor, C.
(1993) editor, Multikuturalismus und die Politik der Anerkennung, Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp,
147196.
Habermas, J. (1995) Die Normalitat der Berliner Republik, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
Henkel, H. (2008) Turkish Islam in Germany. A problematic tradition or the fifth project of
constitutional patriotism? Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 28, No. 1: 113123.
Hindess, B. (2001) The liberal government of unfreedom Alternatives: Global, Local, Political,
Vol. 26, No. 2: 93111.
26
Joppke, C. (2007) State neutrality and Islamic headscarf laws in France and Germany Theory and
Society, Vol. 36, No. 4: 313343.
Kelek, N. (2007) Die fremde Braut, 3rd edition, Koln: Kiepenheuer und Witsch.
Koenig, M. (2005) Incorporating Muslim migrants in Western Nation States a comparison of
the United Kingdom, France, and Germany Journal of International Migration and Integration,
Vol. 6, No. 2: 219234.
Langenfeld, C. (2008) Religionsfreiheit als Hindernis fur die Integration? in Fussel, H.-P. and
Schuppert, G.F. (2008) editors, Bildung im Diskurs, Festschrift fur Ingo Richter, Berlin: Berliner
Wissenschaftsverlag, 183192.
MacIntyre, A. (1988) Whose Justice, Which Rationality? Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame.
Mas, R. (2006) Compelling the Muslim subject. Memory as post-colonial violence and the public
performativity of Secular and Cultural Islam The Muslim World, Vol. 96, No. 4: 585616.
Peter, F. (2008) Political rationalities, counter-terrorism and politics on Islam in the United
Kingdom and France in Eckert, J.M. (2008) editor, The Social Life of Anti-Terror Laws, Bielefeld:
transcript, 79108.
Peter, F. (2009) Welcoming Muslims into the nation. Tolerance politics and integration in
Germany in Cesari, J. (2009) editor, Muslims in Europe and in the US since 9/11, London:
Routledge, 119144.
Rose, N. (1999) Powers of Freedom. Reframing political thought, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Sayyid, S. and Vakil, A. (2011) Thinking Through Islamophobia: Global Perspectives, Colombia:
Colombia University Press.
Schiffauer, W. (2008) Zur Konstruktion von Sicherheitspartnerschaften in Bommes, M. and
Kruger-Potratz, M. (2008) editors, Migrationsreport 2008. Fakten, Analysen, Perspektiven,
Frankfurt/Main: Campus, 205238.
Schmolze, C. (2007) Koeduktion im Sportunterricht. Notwendigkeiten und Moglichkeiten der
Differenzierung, Saarbrucken: VDM Verlag Dr. Muller.
Terkessidis, M. (2002) Der lange Abschied von der Fremdheit. Kulturelle Globalisierung und
Migration Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, Misc: B 12.
Tezcan, L. (2006) Interreligioser Dialog und Politische Religion Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte,
APuZ 2829/2006, available at the website of Bundeszentrale fur Politische Bildung, http://
www.bpb.de/publikationen/J9E9O3,0,Interreligi%F6ser_Dialog_und_politische_Religionen.html.
Tezcan, L. (2007) Kultur, Gouvernementalitat der Religion und der Integrationsdiskurs Soziale
Welt, special issue, M. Wohlrab-Sahr and L. Tezcan, guest editors, No. 17, pp. 5176.
doi:10.1057/fr.2011.8
Schirin Amir-Moazami
27
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.