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Torts and Damages Case Digests Set 5

(Strict Liability Tort and Special Torts)

exc: Johnson ug Sea Commercial
On July 29, 1915, Theness was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a child of
the petitioners in the house of the late Vicente Miranda, the father of Purita Vestil, at
F. Ramos Street in Cebu City. She was rushed to the Cebu General Hospital, where
she was treated for "multiple lacerated wounds on the forehead" 1 and administered
an anti-rabies vaccine by Dr. Antonio Tautjo. She was discharged after nine days but
was readmitted one week later due to "vomiting of saliva." 2 The following day, on
August 15, 1975, the child died. The cause of death was certified as bronchopneumonia. 3
Seven months later, the Uys sued for damages, alleging that the Vestils were liable
to them as the possessors of "Andoy," the dog that bit and eventually killed their
daughter. The Vestils rejected the charge, insisting that the dog belonged to the
deceased Vicente Miranda, that it was a tame animal, and that in any case no one
had witnessed it bite Theness. After trial, Judge Jose R. Ramolete of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu sustained the defendants and dismissed the complaint. 4
In the proceedings now before us, Purita Vestil insists that she is not the owner of
the house or of the dog left by her father as his estate has not yet been partitioned
and there are other heirs to the property.
Pursuing the logic of the Uys, she claims, even her sister living in Canada would be
held responsible for the acts of the dog simply because she is one of Miranda's
heirs. However, that is hardly the point. What must be determined is the possession
of the dog that admittedly was staying in the house in question, regardless of the
ownership of the dog or of the house.
Article 2183 reads as follows:
The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for
the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. 'This
responsibility shall cease only in case the damages should come from force
majeure from the fault of the person who has suffered damage.
Thus, in Afialda v. Hisole, 6 a person hired as caretaker of a carabao gored him to
death and his heirs thereupon sued the owner of the animal for damages. The
complaint was dismissed on the ground that it was the caretaker's duty to prevent
the carabao from causing injury to any one, including himself.
While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house, which was still part of
Vicente Miranda's estate, there is no doubt that she and her husband were its
possessors at the time of the incident in question. She was the only heir residing in
Cebu City and the most logical person to take care of the property, which was only
six kilometers from her own house. 13 Moreover, there is evidence showing that she

and her family regularly went to the house, once or twice weekly, according to at
least one witness, 14 and used it virtually as a second house. Interestingly, her own
daughter was playing in the house with Theness when the little girl was bitten by
the dog. 15 The dog itself remained in the house even after the death of Vicente
Miranda in 1973 and until 1975, when the incident in question occurred. It is also
noteworthy that the petitioners offered to assist the Uys with their hospitalization
expenses although Purita said she knew them only casually. 16
The petitioners also argue that even assuming that they were the possessors of the
dog that bit Theness there was no clear showing that she died as a result thereof.
On the contrary, the death certificate 17 declared that she died of bronchopneumonia, which had nothing to do with the dog bites for which she had been
previously hospitalized. The Court need not involve itself in an extended scientific
discussion of the causal connection between the dog bites and the certified cause of
death except to note that, first, Theness developed hydrophobia, a symptom of
rabies, as a result of the dog bites, and second, that asphyxia broncho-pneumonia,
which ultimately caused her death, was a complication of rabies. That Theness
became afraid of water after she was bitten by the dog is established by the
testimony of Dr. Tautjo.
On the strength of the testimony, the Court finds that the link between the dog bites
and the certified cause of death has beep satisfactorily established. We also
reiterate our ruling in Sison v. Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, 20 that the
death certificate is not conclusive proof of the cause of death but only of the fact of
death. Indeed, the evidence of the child's hydrophobia is sufficient to convince us
that she died because she was bitten by the dog even if the death certificate stated
a different cause of death. The petitioner's contention that they could not be
expected to exercise remote control of the dog is not acceptable. In fact, Article
2183 of the Civil Code holds the possessor liable even if the animal should "escape
or be lost" and so be removed from his control. And it does not matter either that,
as the petitioners also contend, the dog was tame and was merely provoked by the
child into biting her. The law does not speak only of vicious animals but covers even
tame ones as long as they cause injury. As for the alleged provocation, the
petitioners forget that Theness was only three years old at the time she was
attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever she might have done to the animal.
According to Manresa the obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is
not based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the
possessor or user of the animal causing the damage. It is based on natural
equity and on the principle of social interest that he who possesses animals for his
utility, pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such animal may
cause. 21
We sustain the findings of the Court of Appeals and approve the monetary awards
except only as to the medical and hospitalization expenses, which are reduced to
P2,026.69, as prayed for in the complaint. While there is no recompense that can
bring back to the private respondents the child they have lost, their pain should at
least be assuaged by the civil damages to which they are entitled.

US vs Pineda
G.R. No. L-12858
January 22, 1918
Lessons Applicable: Experts and Professionals (Torts and Damages)

Feliciano Santos, having some sick horses, presented a copy of a prescription
obtained from Dr. Richardson, and which on other occasions Santos had given to
his horses with good results, at Pineda's drug store for filling. (Santiago Pineda,
the defendant, is a registeredpharmacist)

Under the supervision of Pineda, the prescription was prepared and returned
to Santos in the form of 6 papers marked Botica Pineda

Santos, under the belief that he had purchased the potassium chlorate
which he had asked for, put two of the packages in water the doses to two of his
sick horses.

Another package was mixed with water for another horse, but was not
used. The twohorses, to which had been given the preparation, died shortly

Santos, thereupon, took the three remaining packages to the Bureau of

Science for examination. Drs. Pea and Darjuan, of the Bureau of Science, on
analysis found that the packages contained not potassium chlorate
but barium chlorate.

At the instance of Santos, the two chemists also went to the drug store
of the defendant and bought potassium chlorate, which when analyzed was
found to be barium chlorate. (Barium chlorate, it should be noted, is a poison;
potassium chlorate is not.)

Dr. Buencamino, a veterinarian, performed an autopsy on the horses,

and found that death was the result of poisoning

RTC: held Pineda liable

ISSUE: W/N Pineda should be liable for negligence

HELD: YES. The judgment of the lower court, sentencing the defendant to pay a fine
of P100, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs, is
affirmed with the cost of this instance against the appellant, without prejudice to
any civil action which may be instituted

Every pharmacist shall be responsible for the quality of all drugs, chemicals,
medicines, and poisons he may sell or keep for sale; and it shall be unlawful for
any person whomsoever to manufacture, prepare, sell, or administer any
prescription, drug, chemical, medicine, or poison under any fraudulent name,
direction, or pretense, or to adulterate any drug, chemical, medicine, or poison
so used, sold or offered for sale. Any drug, chemical, medicine, or poison shall be

held to be adulterated or deteriorated within the meaning ofthis section if it

differs from the standard of quality or purity given in the United States
The same section of the Pharmacy Law also contains the following
penal provision: "Any person violating the provisions of this Act shall, upon
conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than five hundred dollar." The
Administrative Code, section 2676, changes the penalty somewhat by providing
that: Any person engaging in the practice of pharmacy in the Philippine Islands
contrary to any provision of the Pharmacy Law or violating any provisions of said
law for which no specific penalty s provided shall, for each offense, be punished
by a fine not to exceed two hundred pesos, or by imprisonment for not more
than ninety days, or both, in the discretion of the court.
As a pharmacist, he is made responsible for the quality of all drugs and
poisons which he sells. And finally it is provided that it shall be unlawful for him
to sell any drug or poison under any "fraudulent name." It is the one word
"fraudulent" which has given the court trouble. What did the Legislature intend
to convey by this restrictive adjective?
Were we to adhere to the technical definition of fraud, which the appellant
vigorously insists upon, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to convict any
druggist of a violation of the law. The prosecution would have to prove to a
reasonable degree of certainty that the druggist made a material representation;
that it was false; that when he made it he knew that it was false or made it
recklessly without any knowledge of its truth and as positive assertion; that he
made it with the intention that it should be acted upon by the purchaser; that
the purchaser acted in reliance upon it, and that the purchased thereby suffered
Under one conception, and it should not be forgotten that the case we
consider are civil in nature, the question of negligence or ignorance is irrelevant.
The druggist is responsible as an absolute guarantor of what he sells. Instead
of caveat emptor, it should be caveat venditor.


Albenson Ent. delivered mild steel plates to Guaranteed Industries Inc. A
Pacifi c BankingCorporation Check was paid and drawn against the account
of EL Woodworks. Check waslater dishonored for the reason Account Closed.
Company traced source of check and
laterd i s c o v e r e d t h a t t h e s i g n a t u r e b e l o n g e d t o o n e E u g e n i o B a l
t a o . A l b e n s o n m a d e a n extrajudical demand upon Baltao but latter
denied that he issued the check or that thesignature was his. Company
fi led a complaint against Baltao for violation of BP 22. It
waslater discovered that private respondent had son: Eugene Baltao III,
who manages thebusiness establishment, EL Woodworks. No effort from the father

to inform Albenson of suchinformation. Rather the father filed complaint

for damages against Albenson.
Whether there is indeed cause for the damages against Albenson Enterprise.
Based on Art 19, 20, 21 of the civil code, petitioners didnt have the intent to cause
damageto the respondent or enrich themselves but just to collect what was due to
them. There wasno abuse of right on the part of Albenson on accusing Baltao of BP
22.Albenson Corp. honestly believed that it was private respondent who issued
check based onff inquiries:
SEC records showed that president to Guaranteed was Eugene Baltao
Bank said signature belonged to EB
EB did not do his part in clarifying that there were in fact 3 Ebs, Jr., Sr. and theIII.
There was no malicious prosecution on the part of Albenson: there must be proof
t h e p ro s e c u t i o n w a s p ro m p t e d b y a s i n i s t e r d e s i g n t o v e x
a n d h u m i l i a t e a person and that damages was initiated deliberately by
defendant knowing that his chargeswere false and groundless
Elements of abuse of right under Article 19:
1.there is a legal right or duty
2.exe rcised in bad faith
3.for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another
Elements under Article 21: contra bonus mores:
1 . t h e re i s a n a c t w h i c h i s l e g a l
2.but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order or public
3 . i t i s d o n e w i t h i n t e n t t o i n j u re
A person who has not been paid an obligation owed to him will
n a t u r a l l y s e e k w a y s t o compel the debtor to pay him. It was normal for
petitioners to find means to make the issuerof the check pay the amount
thereof. In the absence of a wrongful act or omission or of fraud or bad
faith, moral damages cannot be awarded and that the adverse result of
anaction does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to
the payment of damages, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty
on the right to litigate.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in
C.A. G.R.C.V. No. 14948 dated May 13, 1989, is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Costs against respondent Baltao.
University of the East vs. Jader G.R. No. 132344
UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST, petitioner vs. ROMEO A. JADER, respondent.

FACTS: Romeo Jader took his law proper at UE from 1984-88. During the first
semester of his last year in law school, he failed to take the examination for Practice
Court I in which he obtained an incomplete grade. He filed an application for
removal of the incomplete grade given by Prof. Carlos Ortega on February 1, 1988
which was approved by Dean Celedonio Tiongson after the payment of required
fees. He took the exam on March 28 and on May 30, the professor gave him a
grade of 5.
His name was still on the tentative list of candidates for graduation.
Likewise, his named appeared in the invitation for the commencement exercises
which was held on April 16, 1988. When he learnt of his deficiency, he dropped from
his Bar Review classes thereby made him ineligible to take the bar exam.
He filed a civil suit against UE for damages because he suffered moral
shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
and sleepless nights due to UEs negligence. The petitioner denied liability arguing
that it never led respondent to believe that he completed the requirements for an
LlB degree when his name was included in the tentative list of graduating students.
The court ruled in favor of the respondent.
ISSUE: Whether or not UE be held liable for damages to the respondent.
HELD: The petition lacks merit.
The court ruled that the petitioners liability arose from its failure to promptly
inform the result of the examination and in misleading respondent into believing
that the latter had satisfied all the requirements for graduation. However, while
petitioner was guilty of negligence and thus liable to respondent for the latters
actual damages, we hold that respondent should not have been awarded moral
damages. As a senior law student respondent should have been responsible enough
to ensure that all his affairs, specifically those pertaining to his academic
achievement, are in order.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of CA is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Petitioner is ordered to pay the sum of Php 35, 470 with legal interest of 6% per
annum computed from the date of filing of the complaint until fully paid; the
amount of Php 5000 as attorneys fees and the cost of the suit. The award of moral
damages is deleted. SO ORDERED.
University of the East vs Jader
Petitioner was enrolled in the defendants College of Law. He failed to take the
regular examination in Practice Court 1 for which he was given an incomplete grade.
He enrolled for the second semester as a fourth year student, and filed an
application for the removal of the incomplete grade which was approved by the
Dean. In the meantime, the faculty members and the Dean met to deliberate who
among the fourth year students should be allowed to graduate. The plaintiffs name
appeared on the tentative list, he also attended the investiture ceremonies to which
he tendered blowout afterwards. He thereafter prepared himself for the bar
examination and took review classes. However, he was not able to take the bar
examination because his academic requirements is not complete. Consequently,
respondent sued petitioner for damages alleging that he suffered moral shock

besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, sleepless nights, when he was not able to
take the 1988 bar examinations arising from the latters negligence. He prayed for
an award of moral damages, unrealized income, attorneys fees and cost of suit.
ISSUE: Whether or not an educational institution be held liable for damages for
misleading a student into believing that the latter had satisfied all the requirements
for graduation when such is not the case.
HELD: The Supreme Court held that UE is liable for damages. It is the contractual
obligation of the school to timely inform and furnish sufficient notice and
information to each and every student as to where he or she had already complied
with the entire requirement for the conferment of a degree or whether they should
be included among those who will graduate. The school cannot be said to have
acted in good faith. Absence of good faith must be sufficiently established for a
successful prosecution by the aggrieved party in suit for abuse of right under Article
19 of the Civil Code.

MVRS vs Islamic DaWah Council of the Phils. (2003)

Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc., a local federation of more than seventy(70)
Muslim religious organizations, and individual Muslims (Linzag, Arcilla, de Guzman,da Silva,
Junio) filed in the RTC a complaint for damages in their own behalf and as aclass suit in behalf of
the Muslim members nationwide against MVRS Publications, Inc.,arising from an article
published in the 1 August 1992 issue of Bulgar, a daily tabloid. The article reads:"
Na ang mga baboy at kahit anong uri ng hayop sa Mindanao ay hindi kinakain ng mga Muslim?
Para sa kanila ang mga ito ay isang sagradong bagay. Hindi nila ito kailangang kainin kahit
nasila pa ay magutom at mawalan ng ulam sa tuwing sila ay kakain. Ginagawa nila itong
Diyosat sinasamba pa nila ito sa tuwing araw ng kanilang pangingilin lalung-lalo na sa araw
natinatawag nilang 'Ramadan'."
Islamic DaWah: the libelous statement was insulting and damaging to the Muslims; notonly
published out of sheer ignorance but with intent to hurt the feelings, cast insultand disparage
the Muslims and Islam,; that on account of these libelous words Bulgar insulted not only the
Muslims in the Philippines but the entire Muslim world
MVRS Publications, Inc.,: the article did not mention respondents as the object of thearticle and
therefore were not entitled to damages; and, that the article was merely anexpression of belief
or opinion and was published without malice nor intention to causedamage

RTC: dismissed the complaint; persons allegedly defamed by the article were notspecifically
CA: reversed RTC decision. The defamation was directed to all adherents of the Islamicfaith. The
suit for damages was a "class suit" and that ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC.'s religious status as a Muslim umbrella organization gave it therequisite personality to sue
and protect the interests of all Muslims.
1. WON Islamic DaWah has a cause of action for libel.
2. WON in the alternative, the action can be considered as one is for intentional tort and notlibel.
3. WON this is a valid class suit.
1. NO, there is no cause of action for libel.
Defamation - which includes libel and slander, means the offense of injuring a
person'scharacter, fame or reputation through false and malicious statements.
It is that which tends toinjure reputation or to diminish the esteem, respect, good will or
confidence in the plaintiff orto excite derogatory feelings or opinions about the plaintiff.
It is the publication of anythingwhich is injurious to the good name or reputation of another or
tends to bring him intodisrepute.
Defamation is an invasion of a relational interest since it involves the opinion whichothers in the
community may have, or tend to have, of the plaintiff.
Words which are merely insulting are not actionable as libel or slander per se, and merewords of
general abuse however ill-natured, whether written or spoken, do not constitute abasis for an
action for defamation in the absence of an allegation for special damages.
Thefact that the language is offensive to the plaintiff does not make it actionable by itself.
Declarations made about a large class of people cannot be interpreted to advert to anidentified
or identifiable individual. Absent circumstances specifically pointing or alluding to aparticular
member of a class, no member of such class has a right of action without at allimpairing the
equally demanding right of free speech and expression, as well as of the press.
there was no fairly identifiable person who was allegedly injured by the Bulgar
article. Since the persons allegedly defamed could not be identifiable, private respondentshave
no individual causes of action; hence, they cannot sue for a class allegedly disparaged.An
individual Muslim has a reputation that is personal, separate and distinct in the community.A

Muslim may find the article dishonorable, even blasphemous; others may find it as
anopportunity to strengthen their faith and educate the non-believers and the "infidels." There
isno injury to the reputation of the individual Muslims who constitute this community that
cangive rise to an action for group libel. Each reputation is personal in character to every
person. Together, the Muslims do not have a single common reputation that will give them a
commonor general interest in the subject matter of the controversy.
If the group is a very large one, then the alleged libelous statement is consideredto have no
application to anyone in particular, since one might as well defame all mankind. Asthe size of
these groups increases, the chances for members of such groups to recoverdamages on
tortious libel become elusive. This principle is said to embrace two (2) important public policies:
, where the group referred to is large, the courts presume that no reasonable reader wouldtake
the statements as so literally applying to each individual member.
, the limitation on liability would satisfactorily safeguard freedom of speech andexpression, as
well as of the press, effecting a sound compromise between the conflictingfundamental
interests involved in libel cases.
The Muslim community is too vast as to readily ascertain who among theMuslims were
particularly defamed.
Newsweek, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court
: associations of sugarcane plantersin Negros Occidental filed against Newsweek over an article
"Island of Fear"allegedly depicting Negros Province as a place dominated by exploitative
wealthylandowners and sugar planters who also brutalized and killed underpaid planters.SC
dismissed complaint on the ground that no allegation in the complaint that thearticle
complained of specifically referred to any of them. Where the defamation isalleged to have
been directed at a group or class, it is essential that the statementmust be so sweeping or allembracing as to apply to every individual in that groupor class, or sufficiently specific so that
each individual in the class or group canprove that the defamatory statement specifically
pointed to him, so that he canbring the action separately, if need be.
Arcand v. The Evening Call Publishing Company
: US CA held that the one guidingprinciple of group libel is that
defamation of a large group does not give rise to acause of action on the part of an individual
unless it can be shown that he is thetarget of the defamatory matter
Mr. Justice Reynato S. Punos opinion :

Defamation is made up of the twin torts of libel (written) and slander (oral). In either
form,defamation is an invasion of the interest in reputation and good name. This is a
"relationalinterest" since it involves the opinion others in the community may have, or tend to
have of the plaintiff.

The law of defamation protects the interest in reputation the interest in acquiring,retaining
and enjoying one's reputation as good as one's character and conduct warrant.Defamation
requires that something be communicated to a third person that may affect theopinion others
may have of the plaintiff. It must be shown that this communication wouldtend to hurt plaintiff's
reputation, to impair plaintiff's standing in the community.

Although the gist of an action for defamation is an injury to reputation, the focus of adefamation
action is upon the allegedly defamatory statement itself and its predictableeffect upon third

The Restatement of Torts defines a defamatory statement as one that "tends to so harmthe
reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deterthird
persons from associating or dealing with him."

Consequently as a prerequisite to recovery, it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove: (1)published

a statement that was (2) defamatory (3) of and concerning the plaintiff. The rulein libel is that
the action must be brought by the person against whom the defamatorycharge has been
made. Plaintiff must be the person with reference to whom the statementwas made.

If the defamatory statements were directed at a small, restricted group of persons, theyapplied
to any member of the group, and an individual member could maintain an action
fordefamation. In contrast, if defamatory words are used broadly in respect to a large class or
group of persons, and there is nothing that points, or by proper colloquium or innuendo canbe
made to apply, to a particular member of the class or group, no member has a right of action
for libel or slander. A prime consideration, therefore, is the public perception of thesize of the
group and whether a statement will be interpreted to refer to every member.
Regarding the argument that the present case is an intentional tortious act causing
and not an action for libel. Invoking
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire
where the U.S. SCheld that profanity, intended merely to incite hostility, have no social value
and do not enjoyprotection; and Beauharnais v. Illinois where it was also ruled that hate speech
against agroup (based on religion, ethnicity, etc.) may validly be prohibited.
. "Emotional distress" tort action is personal in nature; it is a civil action filed byan
Individual to assuage the injuries to his emotional tranquility due to personal attacks on
no particular individual was identified in the disputed article of Bulgar . Here, itis
relational harm which includes harm to social relationships in the community in the formof
defamation; as distinguished from the principle of
reactive harm
which includes injuriesto individual emotional tranquility in the form of an
infliction of emotional distress.

Second Restatement of the Law

, to recover for the intentional infliction of emotional distressthe plaintiff must show that: (a) The
conduct of the defendant was intentional or in recklessdisregard of the plaintiff; (b) The conduct
was extreme and outrageous; (c) There was a causalconnection between the defendant's
conduct and the plaintiff's mental distress; and, (d) Theplaintiff's mental distress was extreme
and severe.

"Extreme and outrageous conduct" means conduct that is so outrageous in character, andso
extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded
asatrocious, and utterly intolerable in civilized society.

"Emotional distress" means any highly unpleasant mental reaction such as extreme
grief,shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, disappointment, worry, nausea, mental
sufferingand anguish, shock, fright, horror, and chagrin.

"Severe emotional distress," - he or she has suffered emotional distress so severe that
noreasonable person could be expected to endure it;
severity of the distress is an element of thecause of action, not simply a matter of damages

Hustler Magazine v. Falwell

A parody appeared in Hustler magazine featuring ReverendFalwell depicting him in an
inebriated state having an incestuous, sexual liaison with hismother. US Court held that it was
not libelous, because no reasonable reader would haveunderstood it as a factual assertion. But
still $200,000 awarded on a separate count of "intentional infliction of emotional distress," a
cause of action that did not require a falsestatement of fact to be made. Here, an intentional tort
causing emotional distress gives wayto the fundamental right to free speech
the conduct of petitioners was not extreme or outrageous. Neither was theemotional distress
allegedly suffered by respondents so severe that no reasonable personcould be expected to
endure it. There is no evidence on record that points to that result.
Professor William Prosser: Liability of course cannot be extended to every trivialindignity. One
must necessarily be expected and required to be hardened to a certainamount of rough
language, and to acts that are definitely inconsiderate and unkind.One cannot recover merely
because of hurt feelings.
Professor Calvert Magruder: There is no occasion for the law to intervene in every casewhere
someone's feelings are hurt. There must still be freedom to express anunflattering opinion.
had largely been superseded by

.American courts no longer accept the view that speech may be proscribed merelybecause it is
"lewd," "profane," "insulting" or otherwise vulgar or offensive.
Cohen v. California
: Cohen wore a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft". No onepresent in the courthouse
would have regarded Cohen's speech as a direct personalinsult, nor was there any danger of
reactive violence against him.
No specific individualwas targeted in the allegedly defamatory words printed on Cohen's jacket
. There wasno showing that Cohen's jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft" had threatened
toprovoke imminent violence.
Brandenburg v. Ohio:
a leader of the Ku Klux Klan was convicted for advocatingunlawful methods of terrorism as a
means of accomplishing reforms; U.S. SupremeCourt, held that the advocacy of illegal action
becomes punishable only
if suchadvocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely toincite
or produce such action
3. NO, it is not a valid class suit.DOCTRINE:
Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug: class suit elements: (a) whether the interest of thenamed party is
coextensive with the interest of the other members of the class; (b) theproportion of those
made parties as it so bears to the total membership of the class; and, (c)any other factor
bearing on the ability of the named party to speak for the rest of the class.
Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc., seeks in effect to assert theinterests not only of
the Muslims in the Philippines but of the whole Muslim world as well. Butthey obviously lack the
sufficiency of numbers to represent such a global group and were notable to demonstrate they
have the same interests with the rest of Muslims

So Ping Bun V. Court Of Appeals

G.R. No. 120554 September 21, 1999
Lessons Applicable: Interference with Contractual Relations (Torts and Damages)
Laws Applicable: Sec. 1314 of the Civil Code


1963: Tek Hua Trading Co, through its managing partner, So Pek Giok, entered
into lease agreements with lessor Dee C. Chuan & Sons Inc. (DCCSI)
Subjects of 4 lease contracts were premises located at Soler Street, Binondo,
Tek Hua used the areas to store its textiles.

The contracts each had a one-year term. They provided that should the
lessee continue to occupy the premises after the term, the lease shall be on a
month-to-month basis.

When the contracts expired, the parties did not renew the contracts, but Tek
Hua continued to occupy the premises

1976: Tek Hua Trading Co. was dissolved. Later, the original members of Tek
Hua TradingCo. including Manuel C. Tiong, formed Tek Hua Enterprising Corp.

1986: So Pek Giok died

So Ping Bun, occupied the warehouse for his own textile business, Trendsetter

August 1, 1989: lessor DCCSI sent letters addressed to Tek Hua Enterprises,
informing the latter of the 25% increase in rent effective September 1, 1989.

The rent increase was later on reduced to 20% effective January 1,

1990, upon other lessees' demand.

December 1, 1990: the lessor implemented a 30% rent increase.

Enclosed in their letters were new lease contracts for signing which So
Ping Bun did notanswer. Still, the lease contracts were not rescinded.

So Ping Bun refused to vacate

So Ping Bun requested formal contracts of lease with DCCSI in favor

Trendsetter Marketing

A suit for injunction was filed

RTC: Granted annulling the four Contracts of Lease without awarding


CA upheld RTC
ISSUE: W/N the injunction should be upheld and

HELD: AFFIRMED, with MODIFICATION that the award of attorney's fees is reduced
from two hundred thousand (P200,000.00) to one hundred thousand (P100,000.00)

Damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from injury, and damages are
the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. One
becomes liable in an action for damages for a nontrespassory invasion of
another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of asset if
(a) the other has property rights and privileges with respect to the use
or enjoyment interfered with,
(b) the invasion is substantial,
(c) the defendant's conduct is a legal cause of the invasion, and
(d) the invasion is either intentional and unreasonable or unintentional
and actionable under general negligence rules
elements of tort interference are:

(1) existence of a valid contract;

(2) knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of
contract; and
(3) interference of the third person is without legal justification or
Son Ping Bun asked DCCSI to execute lease contracts in its favor, and as a
result deprived DCCSI's property right
damage is NOT an essential element of tort interference
lower courts did not award damages, but this was only because the extent of
damages was not quantifiable
Lack of malice precludes damages. But it does not relieve petitioner of the
legal liability for entering into contracts and causing breach of existing ones.
The injunction saved the respondents from further damage or injury caused
by petitioner's interference.