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Gascon v.

G.R. No. 78389 October 16, 1989
Padilla, J.

Lopez family is the owner of two television stations: Channels 2 and 4,
which they have operated through ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. When martial law was
declared, Channel 4 was closed by the military and its facilities were taken by Kanlaon
Broadcasting System (KBS) which operated it as a commercial station. In 1978, the
KBS was taken over by the National Media Production Center (NPMC) which operated
under the Maharlika Broadcasting System TV 4. After the EDSA Revolution, PCGG
sequestered the TV stations and the Office Of Media Affairs took over the operation of
Ch. 4 On April 17, 1986, Lopez family requested Pres. Aquino to return to them Ch. 4
and 2. On Oct. 18, 1986,Ch 2 was returned to them. Upon the Lopez family’s request,
the respondent Executive Secretary, by the authority of the President, entered with
ABS-CBN, represented by its Pres. an “Agreement to Arbitrate”
Petitioners seek to annul and set aside the “Agreement to Arbitrate” entered
into by and between the Republic of the Philippines, represented by Executive
Secretary Joker T. Arroyo, and ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, represented by its
President, Eugenio Lopez, Jr., dated 6 January 1987, to settle the claims of ABS-CBN
for the return of radio and television stations (TV Station Channel 4), and to enjoin the
Arbitration Committee created under the aforesaid agreement from adjudicating the
claims of ABS-CBN.
Whether the Executive Secretary had the power and authority to enter into the
“Agreement to Arbitrate” with the ABS- CBN Broadcasting Corporation
Yes. Under the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines also
known as the Freedom Constitution), which was in force and effect when the
“Agreement to Arbitrate” was signed by the parties thereto on 6 January 1987, the
President exercised both the legislative and executive powers of the Government. As
Chief Executive, the President was (and even now) “assisted by a Cabinet” composed
of Ministers (now Secretaries), who were appointed by and accountable to the
President. In other words, the Members of the cabinet, as heads of the various
departments, are the assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases
where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or the law to act in person, or
where the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious
executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and
through the executive departments, and the acts of the heads of such departments
performed in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by
the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.

Respondent Executive Secretary had, therefore, the power and authority to enter
into the “Agreement to Arbitrate” with the ABS- CBN Broadcasting Corporation, as he
acted for and in behalf of the President when he signed it; hence, the aforesaid
agreement is valid and binding upon the Republic of the Philippines, as a party thereto.

Del Monte- USA vs. CA
Note: The agreement to arbitrate may be affected by subsequent events that may
prevent the non application of the AAif other parties who are not privy to or bound by the
AA wh must be included in the suit so that a complete resolution of the dispute is
possible. The court futher ruled that the case cannot be speedily and efficiently resolved
in its entirety if both arbitration and trial were to be simultaneously conducted or if trial
were to be suspended pending arbitration.
Facts: On 1 July 1994, in a Distributorship Agreement, petitioner Del Monte
Corporation-USA (DMC-USA) appointed private respondent Montebueno Marketing,
Inc. (MMI) as the sole and exclusive distributor of its Del Monte products in the
Philippines for a period of five (5) years, renewable for two (2) consecutive five (5) year
periods with the consent of the parties. The Agreement provided, among others, for an
arbitration clause which states 12. GOVERNING LAW AND ARBITRATION
This Agreement shall be governed by the laws of the State of California and/or, if
applicable, the United States of America. All disputes arising out of or relating to this
Agreement or the parties’ relationship, including the termination thereof, shall be
resolved by arbitration in the City of San Francisco, State of California, under the Rules
of the American Arbitration Association. The arbitration panel shall consist of three
members, one of whom shall be selected by DMC-USA, one of whom shall be selected
by MMI, and third of whom shall be selected by the other two members and shall have
relevant experience in the industry x x x x
In October 1994 the appointment of private respondent MMI as the sole and
exclusive distributor of Del Monte products in the Philippines was published in several
newspapers in the country. Immediately after its appointment, private respondent MMI
appointed Sabrosa Foods, Inc. (SFI), with the approval of petitioner DMC-USA, as
MMI’s marketing arm to concentrate on its marketing and selling function as well as to
manage its critical relationship with the trade.
On 3 October 1996 private respondents MMI, SFI and MMI’s Managing Director
LILY SY filed a Complaint against petitioners DMC-USA, Paul E. Derby, Jr., Daniel
Collins and Luis Hidalgo, and Dewey Ltd. before the Regional Trial Court of Malabon,

Metro Manila.. Private respondents predicated their complaint on the alleged violations
by petitioners of Arts. 20, 21 and 23of the Civil Code. According to private respondents,
DMC-USA products continued to be brought into the country by parallel importers
despite the appointment of private respondent MMI as the sole and exclusive distributor
of Del Monte products thereby causing them great embarrassment and substantial
damage. They alleged that the products brought into the country by these importers
were aged, damaged, fake or counterfeit.
Consequently, private respondents claimed, among other reliefs, the payment of
actual damages, exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.
On 21 October 1996 petitioners filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings [13] invoking
the arbitration clause in their Agreement with private respondents.
The trial court deferred consideration of petitioners’ Motion to Suspend
Proceedings as the grounds alleged therein did not constitute the suspension of the
proceedings considering that the action was for damages with prayer for the issuance of
Writ of Preliminary Attachment and not on the Distributorship Agreement.
Petitioners contend that the subject matter of private respondents’ causes of action
arises out of or relates to the Agreement between petitioners and private
respondents. Thus, considering that the arbitration clause of the Agreement provides
that all disputes arising out of or relating to the Agreement or the parties’ relationship,
including the termination thereof, shall be resolved by arbitration, they insist on the
suspension of the proceedings in Civil Case No. 2637-MN as mandated by Sec. 7 of RA
876 Sec. 7. Stay of Civil Action. If any suit or proceeding be brought upon an issue arising
out of an agreement providing for arbitration thereof, the court in which such suit or
proceeding is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or
proceeding is referable to arbitration, shall stay the action or proceeding until an
arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the
agreement. Provided, That the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with
such arbitration.
Private respondents claim, on the other hand, that their causes of action are rooted
in Arts. 20, 21 and 23 of the Civil Code, the determination of which demands a full blown
trial, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals.
Private respondents further contend that the arbitration clause centers more on
venue rather than on arbitration. They finally allege that petitioners filed their motion for
extension of time to file this petition on the same date petitioner DMC-USA filed a

petition to compel private respondent MMI to arbitrate before the United States District
Court in Northern California, docketed as Case No. C-98-4446. They insist that the
filing of the petition to compel arbitration in the United States made the petition filed
before this Court an alternative remedy and, in a way, an abandonment of the cause
they are fighting for here in the Philippines, thus warranting the dismissal of the present
petition before this Court.
Issue: whether the dispute between the parties warrants an order compelling them
to submit to arbitration.
A careful examination of the instant case shows that the arbitration clause in the
Distributorship Agreement between petitioner DMC-USA and private respondent MMI is
valid and the dispute between the parties is arbitrable. However, this Court must deny
the petition.
The Agreement between petitioner DMC-USA and private respondent MMI is a
contract. The provision to submit to arbitration any dispute arising therefrom and the
relationship of the parties is part of that contract and is itself a contract. As a rule,
contracts are respected as the law between the contracting parties and produce effect
as between them, their assigns and heirs. Clearly, only parties to the Agreement, i.e.,
petitioners DMC-USA and its Managing Director for Export Sales Paul E. Derby, Jr., and
private respondents MMI and its Managing Director LILY SY are bound by the
Agreement and its arbitration clause as they are the only signatories
thereto. Petitioners Daniel Collins and Luis Hidalgo, and private respondent SFI, not
parties to the Agreement and cannot even be considered assigns or heirs of the parties,
are not bound by the Agreement and the arbitration clause therein. Consequently,
referral to arbitration in the State of California pursuant to the arbitration clause and the
suspension of the proceedings in Civil Case No. 2637-MN pending the return of the
arbitral award could be called for [25] but only as to petitioners DMC-USA and Paul E.
Derby, Jr., and private respondents MMI and LILY SY, and not as to the other parties in
this case, in accordance with the recent case of Heirs of Augusto L. Salas, Jr. v. Laperal
Realty Corporation,[26] which superseded that of Toyota Motor Philippines Corp. v. Court
of Appeals.[27]
In Toyota, the Court ruled that "[t]he contention that the arbitration clause has
become dysfunctional because of the presence of third parties is untenable ratiocinating
that "[c]ontracts are respected as the law between the contracting parties" [28] and that
"[a]s such, the parties are thereby expected to abide with good faith in their contractual
commitments."[29] However, in Salas, Jr., only parties to the Agreement, their assigns or
heirs have the right to arbitrate or could be compelled to arbitrate. The Court went
further by declaring that in recognizing the right of the contracting parties to arbitrate or

all parties claiming an interest in the land or any part thereof purportedly conveyed by the instrument sought to be . Sun Valley was impleaded considering that it purchased the adjoining land whose title allegedly included the 723 square meters property. On October 30. Toyota filed a case against APT and Sun Valley docketed as Civil Case No. however. Third persons who are not parties to the contract cannot and should not be involved. Toyota was made to understand that included in its perimeter fence is the disputed strip of land. should not be allowed as it would. Toyota alleges that the discrepancy came about because of the serious flaw in the classification/cataloguing of properties bidded out for sale by APT. result in multiplicity of suits. Sun Valley contends that it should not have been impleaded as a defendant. the interest of justice would only be served if the trial court hears and adjudicates the case in a single and complete proceeding. 1991. Issue: W/N Sun Valley was properly impleaded as party defendant in its action for reformation? As a general rule. the issue before us could not be speedily and efficiently resolved in its entirety if we allow simultaneous arbitration proceedings and trial. therefore. as evidenced by the failure of the title to include the 723 square meters strip of compel arbitration. Branch 146 presided by Judge Salvador Tensuan. in effect. [31] Toyota Motor Philippines vs. Thus. 1991. or suspension of trial pending arbitration. or the suspension of trial pending arbitration between some of the parties. The complaint was for the reformation of the Deed of Sale executed between Toyota and APT. Toyota sought the resurvey of the property to correct this error in the title. Sun Valley. CA Facts:On September 11. Thus. duplicitous procedure and unnecessary delay. Toyota alleges that the instrument failed to reflect the true intention of the parties. Accordingly. In an action to reform a deed. the splitting of the proceedings to arbitration as to some of the parties on one hand and trial for the others on the other hand. argues that the complaint for reformation states no cause of action against it since an action for reformation is basically one strictly between the parties to the contract itself. Clearly. APT filed its answer with affirmative defenses alleging that the complaint must be dismissed on the ground that Toyota and APT should first have resorted to arbitration as provided in Toyota's deed of sale with APT. all persons to be affected by the proposed reformation must be made parties.[30] The object of arbitration is to allow the expeditious determination of a dispute. 91-2504 with the Regional Trial Court of Makati.

The Arbitration Committee shall convene not later than three (3) weeks after all its members have been appointed and proceed with the arbitration of the dispute within three (3) calendar months counted therefrom. b) One member to be appointed by the VENDEE. the parties are thereby expected to abide with good faith in their contractual commitments (Quillan v. Jr. However. Inc. In case of disagreement or conflict arising out of this Contract. .. The members of the Arbitration Committee shall be appointed not later than three (3) working days from receipt of a written notice from either or both parties. the parties hereby undertake to submit the matter for determination by a committee of experts. Attention must first be brought to the fact that the contract of sale executed between APT and Toyota provides an arbitration clause which states that: xxx xxx xxx 5. Contracts are respected as the law between the contracting parties (Mercantile Ins. & Co.. As such. under the facts of the present case. 169 SCRA 279 [1989]). to be appointed by both of the aforesaid parties. such time limit for the arbitration may be extended for another calendar month.reformed. The contention that the arbitration clause has become disfunctional because of the presence of third parties is untenable. Inc. By written mutual agreement by the parties hereto. The decision of the Arbitration Committee by majority vote of at least two (2) members shall be final and binding upon both the VENDOR and the VENDEE. acting as arbitrators. who shall be a lawyer. Co. v. 169 SCRA 66 [1989]). Toyota's action for reformation is dismissible as against Sun Valley. c) One member. and whose interests will be affected by the reformation of the instrument are necessary parties to the action. CA. Toyota is therefore bound to respect the provisions of the contract it entered into with APT. Felipe Ysmael. the composition of which shall be as follows: a) One member to be appointed by the VENDOR.

BIENVENIDO C. Chan. in his capacity as Head of the Department of Transportation and Communications. Facts: In August 1989.petitioners. BOÑE. Inasmuch as this concerns more importantly the parties APT and Toyota themselves. The Agreement provided that the concession period shall be for twenty-five (25) years commencing from the in-service date. No. JR. Judge Tensuan should have at least suspended the proceedings and directed the parties to settle their dispute by arbitration (Bengson v. G. Such questions can only be answered by the parties to the contract themselves. . DIMAANO. INC. MENDOZA. The Government granted PIATCO the franchise to operate and maintain the said terminal during the concession period and to collect the fees. Go. Sec. 155001 May 5. JOSE MARI B. and PHILIPPINE AIRLINES EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PALEA). the purpose of which is to look into the real intentions/agreement of the parties to the contract and to determine if there was really a mistake in the designation of the boundaries of the property as alleged by Toyota. MAMERTO S. DIMALANTA. This is a controversy which clearly arose from the contract entered into by APT and Toyota.NATIONAL LABOR UNION (MWU-NLU).R. MIASCOR WORKERS UNION . and PIATCO. CONRADO G. PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL AIR TERMINALS CO. rentals and other charges in accordance with the rates or schedules stipulated in the 1997 Concession Agreement. Henry T. AGAN. HILARIO. 78 SCRA 113 [1977]. signed the "Concession Agreement for the Build-Operateand-Transfer Arrangement of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal III" (1997 Concession Agreement). CATAHAN. HIZON. respondents. through its President.. and may be renewed at the option of the Government for a period not exceeding twenty-five (25) years. JOSEPH B. LOLITA R. the arbitration committee is therefore the proper and convenient forum to settle the matter as clearly provided in the deed of sale.Toyota filed an action for reformation of its contract with APT. REUEL E. Having been apprised of the presence of the arbitration clause in the motion to dismiss filed by APT. Enrile.. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS and SECRETARY LEANDRO M. MANUEL ANTONIO B. RA 876). CLARA. REMEDIOS P. 7. DOMALAON. 2003 DEMOSTHENES P. vs. the DOTC engaged the services of Aeroport de Paris (ADP) to conduct a comprehensive study of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) and determine whether the present airport can cope with the traffic development up to the year 2010 the Government.. Judge Tensuan should have not taken cognizance of the case. REUNILLA. ADOLFO. MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY. MORY V. through then DOTC Secretary Arturo T.

Sec. demolition or disposal of subterranean structures uncovered or discovered at the site of the construction of the terminal by the Concessionaire. claiming that they stand to lose their employment upon the implementation of the questioned agreements. Miascor. together with Philippine Airlines (PAL).The First Supplement to the ARCA amended Sec. cannot be made before an arbitral tribunal. . the MIAA which is charged with the maintenance and operation of the NAIA Terminals I and II. repair and/or replacement of all airport facilities and equipment which are owned or operated by MIAA. 1. The First Supplement also provided a stipulation as regards the construction of a surface road to connect NAIA Terminal II and Terminal III in lieu of the proposed access tunnel crossing Runway 13/31 The Second Supplement to the ARCA contained provisions concerning the clearing.05 (d) of the ARCA referring to the obligation of MIAA to provide sufficient funds for the upkeep. ADR: Where petitioners are not parties to a contract with an arbitration clause. and the MacroAsia Group.05 of the ARCA. workers of the international airline service providers. they cannot be compelled to submit to arbitration proceedings. Issue: WON petitioner can be subject themselves to the arbitration proceedings Actions. Finally. filed before this Court a petition for prohibition to enjoin the enforcement of said agreements. 2. the Third Supplement provided for the obligations of the Concessionaire as regards the Meanwhile. joining the cause of the petitioning workers. filed a motion for intervention and a petition-in-intervention. had existing concession contracts with various service providers to offer international airline airport services. After the oral argument. such as in-flight catering. passenger handling. and further providing additional special obligations on the part of GRP aside from those already enumerated in Sec. a speedy and decisive resolution of all the critical issues in the present controversy including those raised by petitioners. the Court heard the case on oral argument. to several international airlines at the NAIA.. aircraft maintenance and provisions. the Court then resolved in open court to require the parties to file simultaneously their respective Memoranda in amplification of the issues heard in the oral arguments within 30 days and to explore the possibility of arbitration or mediation as provided in the challenged of the surface road connecting Terminals II and III. cargo handling and warehousing. ramp and ground support. are the dominant players in the industry with an aggregate market share of 70%. maintenance. DNATA-Wings Aviation Systems Corp. 2. and other services. DNATA and MacroAsia. Some of these service providers are the Miascor Group.36 of the ARCA defining "Revenues" or "Gross Revenues". the service providers. removal.

JESUS F. ESCANO. Accordingly. PILAR VICTORIA E. PILAR ESCANOBERNAD. NOEL and GABRIEL NOEL. L-47207 September 25. the Mactan Airport commenced its operation and the Philippine Airlines stopped using the Lahug Airport.977 . Inc.977 by Mamerto Escano. Principle: Courts cannot create contracts. ILANO. G. petitioners-appellants. MARIA LOURDES E. In 1966. NOEL. ten lots were sold for P31. COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. the petitioners. by means of two deeds of assignment and other documents. The object of arbitration is precisely to allow an expeditious determination of a dispute. No. to the Republic for use by the CAA. This objective would not be met if this court were to allow the parties to settle the case by arbitration as there are certain issues involving non parties to the piatco contracts which the arbitral tribunal will not be equipped to resolve. they cannot be bound by the arbitration clause provided for in the ARCA and hence. ESCANO. cannot be compelled to submit to arbitration proceedings. the petitioners became the successors of Mamerto Escano. vs. cannot be made before an arbitral tribunal. ESCANO. The sale was subject to the resolutory condition that when the CAA would no longer use the lots as part of the airport. including those raised by petitioners. Inc.It is established that petitioners in the present cases who have presented legitimate interests in the resolution o f the controversy are not parties to PIATCO contracts. made a written tender to the CAA of the repurchase price of P31.R.' In 1964. SAMUEL F. respondentsappellees. then the title thereto would revert to the seller upon reimbursement of the price without interest. VICENTA F. N. A speedy and decisive resolution of all the critical issues in the present controversy. for himself and the minor heirs of his deceased wife LOURDES ESCANO. That condition was annotated on the title issued to the Republic of the Philippines. to the reversionary right or the right to repurchase the lots from the Republic of the Philippines. ANA MA. 1980 JOSE F. Filipinas Airways and Air Manila ceased to use the Lahug Airport at the end of 1966 and thereafter used the Mactan Airport On the premise that the above-mentioned resolutory condition had already been fulfilled. ESCANO. through counsel. meaning that the ten lots were no longer being used as part of the Lahug Airport because of the operation of the Mactan Airport.

INC. After hearing. made a new contract for them. until such time as the airport operation is finally transferred to Mactan Airport" nullifies the reversion or resolutory condition and negatives the trial court's findings that the Lahug Aiport had ceased to be operational and that it had been replaced by the Mactan Airport. petitioners. The 1964 contract of sale between the petitioners' predecessors-in-interest and the Government is the law between them. The Appellate Court ruled that the repurchase should be subject to the same five conditions which were imposed in 1961 on the resale made by the CAA to General Isagani Campo of his two lots which are in proximity to petitioners' ten lots. The Court of Appeals. No costs. WHEREFORE. In fact. 1974. .R. The Government appealed because it believed that the resolutory condition for the repurchase had not yet materialized. G. The fact that the contract of sale does not mention those conditions means that they were never within the contemplation of the parties. ordering the CAA to reconvey to the petitioners the ten lots after payment of the repurchase price of P31. vs. the vendee a retro. The court cannot impose conditions not agreed upon in the deed of sale with repurchase rights after Lahug Airport is no longer in use by the government. Issue: WON the lots could be reverted back to petitioners Ruling: Eminent Domain Cotnracts.The Director of Civil Aviation rejected the tender. the contract is the law betweent he parties thereto. No. the decision of the Court of Appeals is modified by deleting therefrom the five conditions for the reconveyance of the ten lots to the petitioners. they could have easily made a stipulation to that effect in the 1964 deed of sale. Had they intended that the conditions imposed in the resale of General Campo's lots in 1961should likewise be imposed in the resale to the reversionary owners of the ten lots. the second condition "that the repurchases allow the CAA to continue using the property repurchased for airfield purposes. Sale. the trial court rendered a decision on October 30. 1989 SIME DARBY PILIPINAS. the ten lots could not yet be released and returned to the reversionary owners the petitioners sued the Republic of the Philippines (CAA) in the Court of First Instance of Cebu for the reconveyance of the ten lots. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment allowing the repurchase but it went farther.. in gratuitously imposing those conditions.977. The trial court's judgment is affirmed. He reasoned out that because the Lahug Airport was still being utilized for general aviation. 90426 December 15.

ALU (SDSEA-ALU) wrote petitioner demanding the implementation of a provision Identical to the above contained in their own CBA with petitioner. In this petition for Certiorari. parties were called to a conciliation meeting and in such meeting. both parties agreed to submit their dispute to voluntary arbitration. Their agreement to arbitrate stated. before petitioner could submit its Reply to the union's Position Paper. that they were "submitting the issue of performance bonus to voluntary arbitration" and that "the decision/award of the voluntary arbitrator shall be respected and implemented by the parties as final and executory. MAGSALIN as Voluntary Arbitrator and the SIME DARBY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION. the same is not justified when the company's performance has been poor. had automatically lost jurisdiction over the arbitration case upon the issuance of the award. petitioner filed its position paper which aimed to show that the performance of the members of respondent union during the year. among other things. the Voluntary Arbitrator held that a reading of the CBA provision on the performance bonus would show that said provision was mandatory hence the only issue to be resolved was the amount of performance bonus Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which motion was not entertained by the Voluntary Arbitrator upon the ground that the Voluntary Arbitrator. petitioner mainly argues that respondent Voluntary Arbitrator gravely abused his discretion in holding that the grant of performance bonus was mandatory and that the only issue before him was the amount of the bonus. in accordance with the law. respondents. Subsequently. the Voluntary Arbitrator gravely abused his discretion in giving an award of 75% of the monthly basic rate without any evidence of the basis used in arriving at such an award. Petitioner also argues that even if a performance bonus were justified. In that award. . petitioner called both respondent SDEA and SDEA-ALU to a meeting wherein the former explained that it was unable to grant the performance bonus corresponding to the fiscal year 1988-1989 on the ground that the workers' performance during said period did not justify the award of such bonus. the Voluntary Arbitrator issued an award which declared respondent union entitled to a performance bonus equivalent to 75% of the monthly basic pay of its members. It is contended that since a performance bonus is a "gift" based on the company's performance. However. petitioner Sime Darby and private respondent SDEA executed a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) providing for a performance bonus the Sime Darby Salaried Employees Association. private respondent SDEA filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) an urgent request for preventive conciliation between private respondent and petitioner.DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR BUENAVENTURA C.

the matter of the amount thereof. The Arbitrator. petitioner Sime Darby urges that the Arbitrator gravely abused his discretion in passing upon not only the question of whether or not a performance bonus is to be granted but also. Sime Darby's counsel considered that issue as having dual aspects and intended in his own mind to submit only one of those aspects to the Arbitrator. the parties submitted to the Voluntary Arbitrator "the issue of performance bonus. We noted earlier that in their agreement to arbitrate. the voluntary arbitrator had plenary jurisdiction and authority to interpret the agreement. 1962 . the amount thereof. G. he failed to reflect his thinking and intent in the arbitration agreement. in a proper case. the company determines the amount of the bonus if the same be justified. to arbitrate and to determine the scope of his own authority. in a proper case. viewed his authority as embracing not merely the determination of the abstract question of whether or not a performance bonus was to be granted but also. the second question being reserved for determination by the employer Sime Darby. The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 8 November 1989 is hereby LIFTED. Issue: Won the award of the arbitrator is justified Ruling: 1. In respect of the first issue. in the affirmative case.It is insisted that under the relevant CBA provision. the amount thereof. the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit. if he did." The language of the agreement to arbitrate may be seen to be quite cryptic. in the affirmative case. WHEREFORE. only one tier of which was being submitted to arbitration. is that the Arbitrator was authorized to determine only the question of whether or not a performance bonus was to be granted. Possibly. viewed his authority as embracing not merely the determination of the abstract question of whether or not a performance bonus was to be granted but also. The Arbitrator. It is thus essential to stress that the Voluntary Arbitrator had plenary jurisdiction and authority to interpret the agreement to arbitrate and to determine the scope of his own authority subject only. as already indicated. It is thus essential to stress that the Voluntary Arbitrator had plenary jurisdiction and authority to interpret the agreement to arbitrate and to determine the scope of his own authority subject only. L-13525 November 30. to the extent we can understand it. No. Performance bonus. as already indicated. in the affirmative case. to thecertiorari jurisdiction of this Court. There is no indication at all that the parties to the arbitration agreement regarded "the issue of performance bonus" as a two-tiered issue. to the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court. Same Jurisdiction. This Decision is immediately executory.R. however. The position of petitioner. Costs against petitioner.

the other two at Poro Point. Philippines. Japan. and Tacloban. La Union.135. for the latter and/or his agents refused to extend the license. fires. Leyte.6 metric tons. phone and cable expenses .. 13.00 Four (4) days before the expiration of the Far East licence. The pertinent provisions of the agreement are represented below — 1. and the Seller shall not be responsible for delay in or failure of shipment or delivery or delays in transportation due to force majeure. the untimely death of President Magsaysay and the taking over by President Garcia changed the picture. the third (SS Mina) only 1. plaintiffappellee.058. vs. regulations and restrictions or to any conditions beyond thecontrol of the SELLER whether the nature herein stated or not. LTD. LTD. Japan. defendant-appellant. three (3) boats sent by Nankai arrived in the Philippines. Force Majeure: The execution of this agrrement is subject to any and allGovernment restrictions prohibiting or penalizing in whole or in part theexport of Iron & Steel Scrap from the Philippines. riots.. The two boats sailed to Japan without any cargo.FAR EAST INTERNATIONAL IMPORT and EXPORT CORPORATION. Because of the expiration of the export license. foreign wars. Quantity: Approximately 5. revolutions. damages. defendants.. An agreement was reached wherby the Far East would seek an extension of the license. accidents. Ltd. However. in the amount of $312. wars.NANKAI KOGYO CO.6 metric tons of steel scrap.058. only 1. but asked for damages amounting to $148. The buyer sign in Japan and the seller in Manila. dfferences with workmen.000 (five thousand) metric tons 10% more or less. a foreign corporation organized under Japanese Laws with address at Osaka. 1957. mobilizations.00 consisting of dead freight charges.6 metric tons of scrap steel was loaded on the SS Mina (loading in Manila).058. Upon perfection of the contract and after having been informed of the readiness to ship and that the Export License was to expire on March 18. ET AL. respectively. bank charges. flood. San Fernando. Nankai confirmed and acknowleged delivery of the 1. strikes. issued by the Nippon Kangyo.500. The loading was accordingly stopped The boat at Poro Point was also unloaded of the 200 metric tons. one to load in Manila.. Tokyo. NANKAI KOGYO CO. for the same reason. Far Eastentered into a Contract of Sale of Steel Scrap with the Nankai..Nankai opened a letter for credit with the China Banking Corporation.

for the issuance of the of Bill Lading were ignored. in order that payment thereof be effected against the Letter of Credit Everett informed Far East that they were not in a position to comply because the Bill of Lading was issued and signed in Tokyo by the Master of the boat. a complete set of negotiable of Lading for the 1. both against the shipping agent and the buyers (Nankai). it reiterated the grounds contained in the Motion to Dismiss Complaint and Dissolve the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and the arguments invoked in the oppositions. defendant filed its Answer to the original complaint containing the customary admissions and denials. Before resolution on the reconsideration could be issued.Far East wrote the Everett Steamship Corporation. since defendants have not yet filed a responsive pleading An opposition was registered by defendant. plaintiff filed a Motion to file amended complaint The motions to dismiss the complaint and to dissolve the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction were denied. a writ of preliminiry mandatory injunction directed against Nankai and the shipping company. a semblance of jurisdiction of the Court over the person of the defendant Nankai and the subject matter. replies . As Special Defenses. The defendant Nankai presented an opposition to the motion to admit amended complaint.6 metric tons of scrap and a writ of preliminary injunction against the China Banking Corporation and the Nankai to maintain the Letter Credit. By Special Apperance. stating that the same is belated and an unfair and unjust attempt to establish by allegation. upon request of the Charterer. A motion for reconsideration of the order was presented plaintiff alleging that the amended complaint contained facts which are necessary and indispensable for the complete resolution of the issues between the parties and that the amendment is a matter of right. Far East filed the present complaint for Specific Performance. the motion to file an amended complaint was denied. defendant Nankai filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint and dissolve the preliminary mandatory injunction on the following grounds: lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant and the subject matter: and failure to state a cause of action against the said defendant Before the Special Appearance. As repeated requests. requesting the issuance of a complete set of the Bill of Lading for the shipment. to issue and deliver to the plaintiff. damages. the Court holding that the grounds therefor "do not appear to be indubitable". defendant herein.058. Motions to Dismiss and Dissolve Preliminary Mandatory Injunction could be ruled upon by the court a quo.

however. found that the question of jurisdiction over the person of defendant and the subject matter has become moot Defendant assigned six (6) errors allegedly committed by the lower court. Messrs. established a temporary office at Room 517 Luneta Hotel That in spite of the repeated demands and actual receipt of the delivery of the 1. wherein it contested the jurisdiction of the Philippines Courts to take cognizance of the case on grounds contained in the various pleadings presented by it. showed that its representatives.056. Defendant Nankai presented Francisco Santos. accountant of the Luneta Hotel. The motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction had been overruled because it did not appear indubitable. Defendant Everett Steamship Company and the China Banking Corporation also presented evidence. both actual and moral. The lower court rendered judgment absolving. Decision of the Board of Arbitration shall be final and binding on both BUYER and SELLER".At the trial. Ishida and Tominaga. if it is followed by a motion to dismiss or to quash the motion invokes the jurisdiction of Court . however. of the parties. thru the testimony of its Secretary Pablo Ocampo. same. both oral and documentary. if at thesame time he alleges any non-jurisdictional ground for dismissing the action. 12 & 13 of Answer to Amended Complaint). plaintiff Far East. and that while it has entered into the transaction in question. which circumstance vested upon the Court jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case. defendants Everett Steamship Company and China Banking Corporation from liability and denied the claim for damages. Subsequently. so as to make it amenable to summons and subject it to the Court's jurisdiction.8 metric tons of scrap steel. which acts prevented plaintiff from collecting the price of the scrap from theChina Banking Corporation against the Letter of Credit. (1) Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the person of the defendant-appellant Issue: W/N Arbitration Agreement waived. Board of Arbitration may be formed in Japan. It is true that the defendant entered a Special Appearance. Even though the defendant objects to the jurisdiction of the court. does not constitute "doing business". Nankai and the steamship company failed and consistently refused to issue the Bill of Lading. the defendant filed its Answer and invoked defenses and grounds for dismissal of complaint other than lack of jurisdiction (See pars. the Court acquires jurisdiction over him Thus though a Special appearance to object to the jurisdiction is not a submission. It bolstered this claim by a provision in the contract which provides that "In case of disputes. Defendant contends that Philippine Courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case because the Nankai is not doing business in the islands.

vs. to wit: for the construction of a dormitory and support facilities and for the installation of electrical. ROCK A. HUANG. forged a construction agreement whereby respondent contractor committed to construct petitioner corporation's industrial/factory complex in Tanawan. Inc. INC. WHEREFORE. JAMES J. 1992 CHUNG FU INDUSTRIES (PHILIPPINES) decide the issue raised by the motion. VELEZ (Presiding Judge. Tanza. CHEN. HUANG. AMADOR. JEM S. However. respondent Roblecor failed to complete the work despite the extension of time allowed it by Chung Fu. water and hydrant systems at the plant site. Regional Trail Court of Makati [Branch 57]) and ROBLECOR PHILIPPINES. COURT OF APPEALS. he cannot thereafter claim that the court had no jurisdiction over him. seems to have been waived with appellant's voluntary submission. Consequently. Apart from the fact that the clause employs the word "may". VICENTE B. its Directors and Officers namely: HUANG KUO-CHANG. HON. a defendant files a cross complaint demanding affirmative relief. MARIA TERESA SOLIVEN and VIRGILIO M. Petitioner Chung Fu Industries and private respondent Roblecor Philippines. the latter had to take over the construction when it had become evident that Roblecor was not in a position to fulfill its obligation. No. TRISTAN A. pursuant to the arbitration clause in the construction . Not only did appellant allege non-jurisdictional grounds in its pleadings to have the complaint dismissed. HUANG AN-CHUNG. Chung Fu and Roblecor entered into two (2) other ancillary contracts. and a decision of that issue binds the defendant. Apart from the aforesaid construction agreement.R. the provision of the contract wherein it was agreed that disputes should be submitted to a Board of Arbitration which may be formed in Japan (in the supposition that it can apply to the matter in dispute payment of the scrap). respondents. 96283 February 25.C..R. petitioners. DEL ROSARIO. Cavite. Claiming an unsatisfied account and unpaid progress billings Roblecor filed a petition for Compulsory Arbitration with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order before respondent Regional Trial Court. G. FRANCISCO X. there could not be a better situation of acquired jurisdiction based on consent. Therefore if the decision of the motion is based upon a finding of facts Undoubtedly if after his objection to the jurisdiction is wrongly overruled. the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed. CATINDIG.. but it also went into trial on the merits and presented evidence destined to resist appellee's claim.C. Verily. Subsequently. with costs against defendant-appellant Nankai Kogyo.

agreement. Subsequent negotiations between the parties eventually led to the formulation of an arbitration agreement Respondent Regional Trial Court approved the arbitration agreement Engr. entered judgment in conformity therewith Chung Fu elevated the case via a petition for certiorari to respondent Court of Appeals. Hence. as well as denied due process and substantial justice to petitioners. The trial court granted Roblecor's Motion for Confirmation of Award and accordingly. Consequently. as signatories to the Arbitration Agreement are bound to observe the stipulations thereof providing for the finality of the award and precluding any appeal therefrom. — (a) by refusing to exercise their judicial authority and legal duty to review the arbitration award. Willardo Asuncion was appointed as the sole arbitrator. the stipulation to refer all future disputes to an arbitrator or to submit an ongoing dispute to one is valid. Going a step further. and (b) by declaring that petitioners are estopped from questioning the arbitration award allegedly in view of the stipulations in the parties' arbitration agreement that "the decision of the arbitrator shall be final and unappealable" and that "there shall be no further judicial recourse if either party disagrees with the whole or any part of the arbitrator's award." Issue: W/N award reviewable But certainly. Being part of a contract between the parties. pursuant to the Arbitration Agreement precluding judicial review of the award. Arbitrator Asuncion ordered petitioners to immediately pay respondent contractor He further declared the award as final and unappealable. Roblecor moved for the confirmation of said award. this constitutes a condition . the instant petition anchored on the following grounds: Respondents Court of Appeals and trial Judge gravely abused their discretion and/or exceeded their jurisdiction. in the event that they declare their intention to refer their differences to arbitration first before taking court action. it is binding and enforceable in court in case one of them neglects. Chung Fu moved to remand the case for further hearing and asked for a reconsideration of the judgment award claiming that Arbitrator Asuncion committed twelve (12) instances of grave error by disregarding the provisions of the parties' contract. fails or refuses to arbitrate. The respondent appellate court concurred with the findings and conclusions of respondent trial court resolving that Chung Fu and its officers. On the other hand. Chung Fu moved to dismiss the petition and further prayed for the quashing of the restraining order.

It is to be borne in mind. We rule in the negative. Similarly. the arbitrators' award may be annulled or rescinded. It is stated explicitly under Art. Furthermore. judicial review of the award is properly warranted. without prejudice to Articles 2038. thus: Any stipulation that the arbitrators' award or decision shall be final is valid.precedent. as well as petitioners' discussion of the same in their Motion to Remand Case For Further Hearing and Reconsideration and Opposition to Motion for Confirmation of Award. 2039 and 2040. A court action may likewise be proven where the arbitrator has not been selected by the parties. What if courts refuse or neglect to inquire into the factual milieu of an arbitrator's award to determine whether it is in accordance with law or within the scope of his authority? How may the power of judicial review be invoked? This is where the proper remedy is certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. the pivotal inquiry is whether subject arbitration award is indeed beyond the ambit of the court's power of judicial review. 2044 of the Civil Code that the finality of the arbitrators' award is not absolute and without exceptions. the Construction Industry Arbitration Law provides that the arbitral award "shall be final and inappealable except on questions of law which shall be appealable to the Supreme Court. 20 Thus. if and when the factual circumstances referred to in the above-cited provisions are present. the court shall suspend the same and the parties shall be directed forthwith to proceed to arbitration. in granting unjustified extra . however. that this action will lie only where a grave abuse of discretion or an act without or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of the voluntary arbitrator is clearly shown After closely studying the list of errors. may the parties who agree to submit their disputes to arbitration further provide that the arbitrators' award shall be final. Where the parties agree that the decision of the arbitrator shall be final and unappealable as in the instant case. unappealable and executory? Article 2044 of the Civil Code recognizes the validity of such stipulation. such that where a suit has been instituted prematurely. 2039 and 2040 applicable to both compromises and arbitrations are obtaining. thus committing a grave abuse of discretion. 15 Under present law. under Sections 24 and 25 of the Arbitration Law. 19 Additionally. modifying or rescinding an arbitrator's award. there are grounds for vacating. we find that petitioners have amply made out a case where the voluntary arbitrator failed to apply the terms and provisions of the Construction Agreement which forms part of the law applicable as between the parties. Where the conditions described in Articles 2038.

One of the stipulations in the contracts (a) declared certain particular disputes to be subject to arbitration and (b) specified the manner of enforcement by court action of the resulting arbitration awards. Bernardino F.compensation to respondent for several items. The stipulation reads as follows: It is made quite clear that these two (2) classes of disputes are to be "referred to a board of arbitration. the trial court itself committed grave abuse of discretion. the appellate court. . As it happened. and had been superimposed on its own claims.R. respondents. Gregorian Mining Company consequently brought suit against Western Minolco Corporation in the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet. " In the event of such an action." and (2) only if the action "be based upon the award as obtained. Regala & Cruz for petitioner. for the rescission of their agreements and damages . in not giving due course to the petition. for respondent Gregorian Mining Company. Catbagan. the petition is GRANTED Asset Privatization Trust Vs CA see digest by Ate Knorr G. vacating or modifying said award under the laws on arbitration. Abello. Likewise. committed grave abuse of discretion. No. Respondent courts should not shirk from exercising their power to review. Jr. he exceeded his powers — all of which would have constituted ground for vacating the award under Section 24 (d) of the Arbitration Law. petitioner. the venue thereof "shall be in the City of Manila." Western Minolco Corporation subsequently executed another agreement with another firm. for the validation of 36 mineral lode claims in the latter's favor. A series of contracts was entered into between Western Minolco Corporation and Gregorian Mining Company for the operation by the former of the latter's mining claims. such power may be rightfully exercised. Concepcion. 1988 WESTERN MINOLCO CORPORATION. those 36 claims were believed by Gregorian Mining Company to be in conflict with." It is made equally clear that no action concerning them may be instituted in any court by either party (1) unless the controversy be "first submitted to and received by said board of arbitrators. vs. L-51996 November 23. Angara. where under the applicable laws and jurisprudence. the Dreamers Mining Association. WHEREFORE. which it had earlier located and which were in fact subject of the series of agreements signed by it and Western Minolco Corporation. more so where the objections raised against an arbitration award may properly constitute grounds for annulling.COURT OF APPEALS and GREGORIAN MINING COMPANY.

deduction. unambiguous. only two (2) kinds of "disputes. consisting of its entering into a contract with a third party for the validation of mining claims which it knew had already been located by Gregorian. for rescission and damages. such a controversy does not fall within either of the two categories of disputes which must first be submitted for arbitration. . Gregorian sought to take an appeal to the Court of Appeals. Issue:W/N Western Minolco is barred in filing the case in the court The terms of the applicable provision of the parties' agreements are indeed "clear. and while it was seeking reconsideration of the Baguio Court's adverse order. differences or disagreements" have been made subject of arbitration: 1) those "regarding the meaning. b) the action could not be instituted until and unless the dispute subject thereof had first been resolved by arbitration. was improperly laid. as covenanted by the parties. application or effect of the agreement(s) or any clause thereof. in line with its agreement with Gregorian. The stipulation in question (for arbitration to be first had) did not therefore constitute an impediment or a bar to the institution of the action commenced by Gregorian against Western Minolco." As pointed out in the opening paragraphs of this opinion.Western Minolco moved to dismiss the complaint In the meantime. or other item of expense" provided in the agreement. was the breach of faith. and for recovery of damages against the latter. or the double dealing of Western Minolco in undertaking to validate in favor of a third party the self—same claims which it had earlier undertaken to operate for Gregorian. the petition was granted. Western Minolco filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Manila to compel arbitration. Clearly. but the Manila Court ruled that the appeal should more properly be taken to this Court. The controversy involved in the action brought by Gregorian against Western Minolco was the alleged violation by the latter of its agreements with the former. and unequivocal. After an exchange of pleadings." and 2) those "in regard to the amount and computation of the royalties. and to await instead the decision of the Court of Appeals on the petition for certiorari and prohibition which Western Minolco had in the meantime filed to assail the Orders of the CFI of Baguio and Benguet It is Western Minolco's thesis that it was reversible error for the Court of Appeals to find and declare that— a) the venue of the action instituted against it by Gregorian Mining Co. What was involved. Gregorian decided to forego the appeal. in other words.

e. ZOSA and HON. and since there is here no such award because no controversy subject to arbitration existed and was ever submitted to arbitration. but should be construed merely as an agreement on an additional forum. the term of respondent Zosa's employment shall be co-terminous with the management agreement. MCHC. Zosa entered into an "Employment Agreement" designating Zosa as President and Chief Executive Officer of MCHC.. BUENA. unless sooner terminated pursuant to the provisions of the Employment Agreement. supersede the general rules on the matter set out in Rule 4 of the Rules of Court. In any event. Under the "Employment Agreement". petitioners. an order to arbitrate should be granted since any doubt should be resolved in favor of arbitration. as a rule. it is not entirely amiss to restate the doctrine that stipulations in a contract. which specify a definite place for the institution of an action arising in connection therewith. and private respondent Rolando M.R. MCMC. or until March 1996. 2001 MAGELLAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT CORPORATION and MAGELLAN CAPITAL HOLDINGS CORPORATION. no error can possibly be imputed to the Trial Court in not applying the stipulation to the action a quo.Since the stipulation as to venue becomes relevant only when an action has to be instituted "based upon the award as obtained" (from the board of arbitrators) (i. SOBERANO. not as limiting venue to the specified place LM Engineering Case See digest by Ate Knorr The rule of liberality: so long as a clause is susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. as the mode of enforcement of the award).ROLANDO M. in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 58 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. on the same month. do not.3 The grounds for termination of employment are also provided in the Employment Agreement. JR..1 Pursuant thereto. 129916 March 26. JOSE P. 7th Judicial Region. J. vs. No. Home Bankers Case See CBR king digest by Camille Remoroza G.: Under a management agreement entered into Magellan Capital Holdings Corporation [MCHC] appointed Magellan Capital Management Corporation [MCMC] as manager for the operation of its business and affairs. respondents. the majority of MCHC's Board of Directors decided not to re-elect respondent Zosa as President and Chief Executive Officer of MCHC on account of loss of trust and .

Enrique I.confidence4 arising from alleged violation of the resolution issued by MCHC's board of directors and of the non-competition clause of the Employment Agreement. respondent Zosa was elected to a new position as MCHC's ViceChairman/Chairman for New Ventures Development Respondent Zosa communicated his resignation for good reason from the position of Vice-Chairman under paragraph 7 of the Employment Agreement on the ground that said position had less responsibility and scope than President and Chief Executive Officer. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the RTC in compliance with the earlier order of the court directing petitioners to file responsive pleading to the amended complaint. Francis Zosa. Inigo S. filed an action for damages against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu 12 to enforce his benefits under the Employment Agreement. . Fojas10 and MCMC nominated Atty. respondent Zosa designated his brother. but instead informed him that the Employment Agreement is terminated for cause in accordance with Section 7 (a) (v) of the said agreement. He demanded that he be given termination benefits as provided for in Section 8 (c) (i) (ii) and (iii) of the Employment Agreement. Atty. However. respondent Zosa invoked the Arbitration Clause of the Employment Agreement. MCHC communicated its non-acceptance of respondent Zosa's resignation for good reason. petitioners filed their Answer Ad Cautelam with counterclaim reiterating their position that the dispute should be settled through arbitration and the court had no jurisdiction over the nature of the action the trial court issued its pre-trial order declaring the pre-trial stage terminated and setting the case for hearing. as his representative in the arbitration panel9 while MCHC designated Atty. instead of submitting the dispute to arbitration. respondent Zosa. Quiason11 as their respective representatives in the arbitration panel. 5 Nevertheless. Respondent Zosa was further advised that he shall have no further rights under the said Agreement or any claims against the Manager or the Corporation except the right to receive within thirty (30) days the amounts stated in Section 8 (a) (i) (ii) of the Agreement Disagreeing with the position taken by petitioners. on account of his breach of Section 12 thereof. petitioners filed a motion to dismiss13 arguing that (1) the trial court has no jurisdiction over the instant case since respondent Zosa's claims should be resolved through arbitration pursuant to Section 23 of the Employment Agreement with petitioners the RTC Branch 58 of Cebu City issued an Order denying petitioners motion to dismiss upon the findings that (1) the validity and legality of the arbitration provision can only be determined after trial on the merits.

Issue: W/N Arbitration clause is valid We rule against the petitioners. as claimed by petitioners in their assignment of errors. and (2) that the parties be directed to submit their dispute to arbitration In compliance with the CA decision. . on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. and the third to be chosen by both the plaintiff and defendants. one for the plaintiff. one for the defendants. under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. And under Republic Act No. the trial court. In view of the trial court's decision. 876. and directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the Employment Agreement under the panel of three (3) arbitrators.petitioners filed their Motion Ad Cautelam for the Correction. petitioners MCMC and MCHC filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals. Addition and Clarification of the Pre-trial Order which was denied by the court petitioners MCMC and MCHC filed a Motion Ad Cautelam for the parties to file their Memoranda to support their respective stand on the issue of the validity of the "arbitration clause" contained in the Employment Agreement. It is error for the petitioners to claim that the case should fall under the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission The controversy does not in anyway involve the election/appointment of officers of petitioner MCHC. premises considered. judgment is hereby rendered partially declaring the arbitration clause of the Employment Agreement void and of no effect. petitioners filed this petition for review on certiorari." it is the regional trial court which exercises jurisdiction over questions relating to arbitration. Petitioners filed a motions for partial reconsideration of the CA decision praying (1) for the dismissal of the case in the trial court. Respondent Zosa's amended complaint focuses heavily on the illegality of the Employment Agreement's "Arbitration Clause" initially invoked by him in seeking his termination benefits under Section 8 of the employment contract. In an order the trial court denied the motion of petitioners MCMC and MCHC. the Court of Appeals rendered a decision (ordering the lower court to resolve validity of arbitration). only insofar as it concerns the composition of the panel of arbitrators. WHEREFORE. otherwise known as the "Arbitration Law. rendered a decision declaring the "arbitration clause" in the Employment Agreement partially void and of no effect.

" Petitioners. not of fact. unless the factual findings complained of are devoid of support by the evidence on record. But as the defendants [herein petitioner] represent the same interest. and do not fall within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the SEC. Equally unavailing for the petitioners is the review by this Court. the Court is of the view that the defendants [petitioner] MCMC and MCHC represent the same interest. that they would not protect and preserve their own interest. of the factual findings made by the trial court that the composition of the panel of arbitrators would. incisively correct so as to merit our approval. in all probability.Although the controversy which spawned the action concerns the validity of the termination of the service of a corporate officer. 29 Even if procedural rules are disregarded. the question there settled becomes the law of the case upon subsequent appeal. as all other laws.R. through another remedial measure and in any other forum. which is the arbitration clause but only as regards the composition of the panel of arbitrators. the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. in the arbitration proceedings. are barred from challenging anew. via the instant petition. SP No. the authority of the regional trial court to resolve the validity of the arbitration clause. would both or either favor the interest of the plaintiff. . it could never be expected. this Court finds the trial court's observations on why the composition of the panel of arbitrators should be voided. "From the memoranda of both sides. Furthermore. Thus. much less. There is no quarrel that both defendants are entirely two different corporations with personalities distinct and separate from each other and that a corporation has a personality distinct and separate from those persons composing the corporation as well as from that of any other legal entity to which it may be related. We have repeatedly stressed that the jurisdiction of this Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law. 43059 affirming the trial court's assumption of jurisdiction over the case has become the "law of the case" which now binds the petitioners. or the assailed judgment is based on misapprehension of facts. the issue on the validity and effectivity of the arbitration clause is determinable by the regular courts. The arbitration law. and a scrutiny of the merits of the case is undertaken. is intended for the good and welfare of everybody. In fact. The "law of the case" doctrine has been defined as "a term applied to an established rule that when an appellate court passes on a question and remands the cause to the lower court for further proceedings. what is being challenged by the plaintiff herein is not the law itself but the provision of the Employment Agreement based on the said law. therefore. work injustice to respondent Zosa. lest they be truly guilty of forum-shopping which the courts consistently consider as a contumacious practice that derails the orderly administration of justice.

From a submission agreement of the Luzon Development Bank (LDB) and the Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees (ALDBE) arose an arbitration case to resolve the following issue: Whether or not the company has violated the Collective Bargaining Agreement provision and the Memorandum of Agreement dated April 1994. ESTER S. petitioner. No. insofar as the composition of the panel of arbitrators is concerned should be declared void and of no effect. "Any clause giving one of the parties power to choose more arbitrators than the other is void and of no effect" In this connection. Any ambiguity in its provisions is generally resolved against the party who drafted the document. As the defendant MCMC is the Manager of defendant MCHC.31 Secondly. petitioners' attempt to put respondent in estoppel in assailing the arbitration clause must be struck down. Any arrangement or scheme that would give undue advantage to a party in the negotiating table is anathema to the very purpose of arbitration and should.ASSOCIATION OF LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK EMPLOYEES and ATTY. vs. its decision or vote in the arbitration proceeding would naturally and certainly be in favor of its employer and the defendant MCHC would have to protect and preserve its own interest. because the law says. We need only to emphasize in closing that arbitration proceedings are designed to level the playing field among the parties in pursuit of a mutually acceptable solution to their conflicting claims. Accordingly. respondents. the parties agreed on the submission of their respective Position Papers Atty. this issue of estoppel. as likewise noted by the Court of Appeals. employment agreements such as the one at bar are usually contracts of adhesion. 120319 October 6. hence. on promotion. Garcia. found its way for the first time only on appeal.From the foregoing arbitration clause. be resisted. At a conference. For one. Ester S. 1995 LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK. received ALDBE's Position Paper . the arbitration clause. therefore. it appears that the two (2) defendants [petitioners] (MCMC and MCHC) have one (1) arbitrator each to compose the panel of three (3) arbitrators. in her capacity as Voluntary Arbitrator.R. G. Wellsettled is the rule that issues not raised below cannot be resolved on review in higher courts. the two (2) votes of both defendants (MCMC and MCHC) would certainly be against the lone arbitrator for the plaintiff [herein defendant]. GARCIA in her capacity as VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR.

preferably from those accredited . arbitration is the reference of a labor dispute to an impartial third person for determination on the basis of evidence and arguments presented by such parties who have bound themselves to accept the decision of the arbitrator as final and binding. such that once an award has been rendered by an arbitrator. or include a procedure for their selection. such a third party is normally appointed by the government. on the other hand. Without LDB's Position Paper. but in compulsory arbitration. on the other hand. on the basis of the obligation on which it is based. Compulsory arbitration is a system whereby the parties to a dispute are compelled by the government to forego their right to strike and are compelled to accept the resolution of their dispute through arbitration by a third party. parties to a CBA shall name and designate therein a voluntary arbitrator or a panel of arbitrators. Pursuant thereto. Hence. as either compulsory or voluntary. they are presumed to have freely chosen arbitration as the mode of settlement for that particular dispute. to an impartial third person for a final and binding resolution. Ideally. finding is hereby made that the Bank has not adhered to the Collective Bargaining Agreement provision nor the Memorandum of Agreement on promotion.LDB. voluntary arbitration. referral of a dispute by the parties is made. Issue: W/N decisions of a voluntary arbiter can be appealed to the Court of Appeals In labor law context. this petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to set aside the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator and to prohibit her from enforcing the same. In the Philippine context. arbitration awards are supposed to be complied with by both parties without delay. Arbitration may be classified. they have chosen a mutually acceptable arbitrator who shall hear and decide their case. they have mutually agreed to de bound by said arbitrator's decision. pursuant to a voluntary arbitration clause in their collective agreement. failed to submit its Position Paper despite a letter from the Voluntary Arbitrator reminding them to do so. 1 The essence of arbitration remains since a resolution of a dispute is arrived at by resort to a disinterested third party whose decision is final and binding on the parties. After all. the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a decision disposing as follows: WHEREFORE. the parties to a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) are required to include therein provisions for a machinery for the resolution of grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the CBA or company personnel policies. Above all. nothing is left to be done by both parties but to comply with the same.

Article 262 authorizes them. it follows that the voluntary arbitrator. orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies. board or commission. and apart from. as amended." Under these rulings. or orders. the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. resolutions. their decisions have the same legal effect as judgments of a court. a labor arbiter under Article 217 of the Labor Code has jurisdiction over the following enumerated cases (provided enumeration) The state of our present law relating to voluntary arbitration provides that "(t)he award or decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator . boards or commissions. a voluntary arbitrator by the nature of her functions acts in a quasi-judicial capacity. but only upon agreement of the parties. Section 9 of B. 129.P. still both he and the panel are comprehended within the concept of a "quasi-judicial . as amended by Republic Act No. past practice shows that a decision or award of a voluntary arbitrator is. elevated to the Supreme Court itself on a petition for certiorari. Yet. hence. . whether acting solely or in a panel. to exercise jurisdiction over other labor disputes. the provisions of this Act. including the Securities and Exchange Commission. . On the other hand. Republic Act No. the NLRC since his decisions are not appealable to the latter. and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). more often than not. awards. awards." 5 while the "(d)ecision. 442. 7 in effect equating the voluntary arbitrator with the NLRC or the Court of Appeals awards of voluntary arbitrators determine the rights of parties. 6715 is silent with respect to an appeal from the decision of a voluntary arbitrator. decisions. Article 261 of the Labor Code accordingly provides for exclusive original jurisdiction of such voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators over (1) the interpretation or implementation of the CBA and (2) the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies. 7902. instrumentalities. the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission. shall be final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the parties." 6 Hence. or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions. Assuming arguendo that the voluntary arbitrator or the panel of voluntary arbitrators may not strictly be considered as a quasi-judicial agency. enjoys in law the status of a quasi-judicial agency but independent of. except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution. while there is an express mode of appeal from the decision of a labor arbiter. provides that the Court of Appeals shall exercise: Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments.

The fact that his functions and powers are provided for in the Labor Code does not place him within the exceptions to said Sec. in line with the procedure outlined in Revised Administrative Circular No. This would be in furtherance of. A party to the controversy may. the decision or award of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators should likewise be appealable to the Court of Appeals. An "instrumentality" is anything used as a means or agency. 876. as well as the subsequent arbitrator/arbitral tribunal operating under the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission. Nor will it run counter to the legislative intendment that decisions of the NLRC be reviewable directly by the Supreme Court since. apply to the court having jurisdiction for an order confirming the award and the court must grant such order unless the award is vacated. shall have jurisdiction.P. at any time within one (1) month after an award is made. or if none be specified. 19 . 11 that the broader term "instrumentalities" was purposely included in the above-quoted provision. 12 Thus. 1-95. In the same vein." with respect to a state. the original purpose of Circular No. arbitration is deemed a special proceeding of which the court specified in the contract or submission. the Regional Trial Court for the province or city in which one of the parties resides or is doing business. also known as the Arbitration Law. within the contemplation of the term "instrumentality" in the aforequoted Sec. or in which the arbitration is held. contemplates an authority to which the state delegates governmental power for the performance of a state function The voluntary arbitrator no less performs a state function pursuant to a governmental power delegated to him under the provisions therefor in the Labor Code and he falls. or by which a certain government act or function is performed The word "instrumentality. 9 of B." It may even be stated that it was to meet the very situation presented by the quasi-judicial functions of the voluntary arbitrators here. 1-91 to provide a uniform procedure for the appellate review of adjudications of all quasi-judicial entities 18 not expressly excepted from the coverage of Sec. 129. modified or corrected. 9 of B. the terms governmental "agency" or "instrumentality" are synonymous in the sense that either of them is a means by which a government acts. and consistent with. it is worth mentioning that under Section 22 of Republic Act No. just like those of the quasi-judicial agencies. precisely. therefore. 129 by either the Constitution or another statute. 9 since he is a quasi-judicial instrumentality as contemplated therein A fortiori.P. boards and commissions enumerated therein. the cases within the adjudicative competence of the voluntary arbitrator are excluded from the jurisdiction of the NLRC or the labor arbiter.instrumentality.

. 6713 the Office of the Ombudsman endorsed5 the case to the Office of the Court Administrator It was pointed out in said Evaluation Report "that respondent is primarily accused of Knowingly Rendering Unjust Judgment.JUDGE PERFECTO A. ROBERT Z. filed against respondent judge in connection with his acquittal of the accused LAWRENCE WANG y CHEN complainants ROBERT Z. section 3(e) of Republic Act No. Wang denied that illegal drugs or unlicensed firearms were found in his possession. 6713. DILG. this equates the award or decision of the voluntary arbitrator with that of the regional trial court.S. vs. BARBERS. J. section 3(e) of Republic Act No.S. in Malate. 2 and section 4. Secretary of the Interior and Local Government.In effect. Manila (for posession of shabu and firearms and possession of firearms on COMELEC ban) Prior to his arraignment. subsections (b) and (c) of Republic Act No. BARBERS. 3019. a Hong Kong national who was apprehended by elements of the Public Assistance and Reaction Against Crime or PARAC. LAGUIO. petitioners. JUANITO DE GUZMAN and LUCIO MARGALLO IV. Cua submitted a Resolution . Chapter 4 The Arbitration Proceedings A.1 JUANITO DE GUZMAN and LUCIO MARGALLO IV filed a joint complaint-affidavit with the Office of the Ombudsman charging respondent Judge PERFECTO A.: Before us is an administrative complaint for alleged violation of Article 204 (Knowingly Rendering Unjust Judgment) of the Revised Penal Code.M. LAGUIO. JR. 3019 and sections 4(b) and (c) of Republic Act No. RTJ-00-1568 February 15. The cases were later remanded to the trial court after Assistant City Prosecutor Michaela M... of allegedly violating Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code. respondent. JR. DE LEON. No. in a petition for certiorari from that award or decision." The administrative complaint stemmed from the acquittal by respondent judge of Lawrence Wang. this Court shall henceforth remand to the Court of Appeals petitions of this nature for proper disposition. Wang filed a motion for preliminary investigation which was granted by the trial court in an Order During the preliminary investigation before the prosecutor. Consequently. 2001 HON. As a matter of policy. the Court of Appeals must be deemed to have concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court. JR.

In turn. Under Section 5. in his presence. . Wang. and (c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while being transferred from one confinement to another. The accused was merely walking from the Maria Orosa apartment and was about to enter the parked BMW car when the police officers arrested and frisked him and searched his car. Wang through counsel filed a Manifestation making of record his continuing objection to his warrantless arrest and praying that the trial court enter a plea of "not guilty" on his behalf. Assistant City Prosecutor Winnie M. 380 9mm Automatic Back-up Pistol [sic] that the accused had in his possession was concealed inside the right front pocket of his pants. or is attempting to commit an offense. the defense filed a motion for leave of court to file a Demurrer to Evidence. Rule 113 of the New Rules of Court. (b) when an offense has in fact just been committed. the person to be arrested has committed. wherein the prosecution claimed it has not yet rested the trial court set further hearings on the two (2) remaining cases respondent judge issued a Resolution granting Wang's Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting Wang in the said three (3) closely related cases. And the handgun was bantam and slim in size that it would not give an outward indication of a concealed gun if placed inside the pants' side pocket as was done by the accused. or unlawful as asserted by the defense.finding probable cause against Wang. None of these circumstances were present when the accused was arrested. The trial court granted the defense's motion in an Order of the same date and gave Wang a period of twenty-five (25) days from receipt thereof within which to file a Demurrer to Evidence. During the hearing the prosecution formally rested its case. is actually committing. Edad filed a "Manifestation with Motion" stating that the prosecution is resting its case against the accused. The threshold issue raised by accused in his Demurrer to Evidence is whether his warrantless arrest and search were lawful as argued by the prosecution. and the prosecution a similar period to file its opposition thereto. insofar as Criminal Case No. 96-149990 only was concerned but excluding the two (2) remaining cases for illegal possession of firearms and violation of the COMELEC gun ban. and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. The accused was not committing any visible offense at the time of his arrest. Neither was there an indication that he was about to commit a crime or that he had just committed an offense. An undated Demurrer to Evidence was then filed by Wang Subsequently. Fearing that his objection to his warrantless arrest and search would be waived by his entering a plea. a peace officer may arrest a person without a warrant: (a) when. The unlicensed AMT Cal.

Branch 18. Oliver Lozano. Lozano to accomplish a receipt written on the special power-of-attorney itself. Her findings were adopted by the Office of the Court Administrator. After its receipt of the respondent's comment strongly denying and disputing the administrative charges against him and upon the recommendation of OCA. or knowledge that the banned articles were inside the car. Ditto on the 32 bags of shabu and the other unlicensed Daewoo Cal. . They also filed an administrative complaint against the trial prosecutor. The police officers searched the car on mere suspicion that there was shabu therein. The caller. and the Daewoo handgun was underneath the driver's seat of the car. the Department of Justice issued its Resolution dismissing the administrative complaint against Edad for lack of merit. Cristobal complied. according to Cristobal. Oliver Lozano. this Court required the respondent to comment thereon. Atty. Respondent judge then issued on the same day setting the promulgation of his aforequoted Resolution On the day before the scheduled promulgation. for alleged gross neglect of duty in his handling of the Wang cases. However. Not satisfied with Wang's acquittal. instructed him to bring to court the next day the money confiscated from Wang. al. The police officers had no information. but he first required Atty. 9mm Pistol with magazine that were found and seized from the car. The 32 bags of shabu were in the trunk compartment. petitioners Barbers et. filed the said Joint Complaint-Affidavit against respondent judge before the Office of the Ombudsman. nor did they see him in possession thereof immediately prior to his arrest. Cristobal was presented with a special power-of-attorney executed by Wang authorizing his counsel. to receive the confiscated money. Cristobal handed over the money to Atty.The arresting officers had no information and knowledge that the accused was carrying an unlicensed handgun. or that the accused had placed them there. she submitted her Report recommending that respondent judge be reprimanded and meted a fine equivalent to six (6) months salary. After the Resolution was promulgated by the trial court. this Court referred the matter to the then Court of Appeals Associate Justice (now Supreme Court Associate Justice) Consuelo YnaresSantiago for investigation and report. The contraband items in the car were not in plain view.. After the said Joint Complaint-Affidavit of the complainants against respondent judge was endorsed by the Ombudsman to the Office of the Court Administrator. SPO3 Cristobal claimed that he received a telephone call from a person claiming to be the branch clerk of court of RTC Manila. Assistant City Prosecutor Edad.

R. the accused may adduce evidence in his defense. 96-149991 and 96-149992 xxx. the pendency of the appeal is sufficient cause for the dismissal of the instant administrative complaint. 2 It has also been held that the filing of an administrative complaint is not the proper remedy for the correction of actions of a judge perceived to have gone beyond the norms of propriety. If the court denies the motion for dismissal. When the accused files such motion without the express leave of court. – After the prosecution has rested its case. there is an important aspect to this case which was heretofore not considered. Issue: W/N may issue dito? Hehehe. the court may dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence: (1) on its own initiate (sic) after giving the prosecution an opportunity to be heard. despite the statement in the resolution in question as well as respondent's claims to the contrary. No. It is well-settled that acquittal in a criminal case is immediately final and executory upon its promulgation. Following established doctrine.Section 15. The motion was granted by the First Division of this Court The said petition for review on certiorari (G. there is ample evidence on record that the prosecution had not yet rested its case in Criminal Cases Nos. is still pending in this Court. Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that: "Sec. or (2) on motion of the accused with prior leave of court. the State may not seek its review without placing the accused in double jeopardy. Particularly revealing on this point is the "Manifestation With Motion to Set Above-Entitled Cases for Further Hearing and For Issuance of Subpoena to Prosecution Witnesses However. accordingly. where a sufficient judicial remedy exists. W/N court can ask clarificatory questions? . It appeared that after the State received a copy of the said Resolution of respondent judge the Office of the Solicitor General filed a "Manifestation and Motion" with this Court praying for an extension of thirty (30) days (or until May 4. 128587) which was filed by the Solicitor General together with the Department of Justice. 1997 is one of acquittal.10 When the Investigating Justice submitted her Report the questioned Resolution of respondent judge acquitting Wang was already the subject of a pending petition for review on certiorari which was filed with this Court. 15. Demurrer to evidence. The respondent judge's Resolution in question dated March 13. 13 Differently expounded in another case. 1997. he waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecutio The rule is not applicable if the prosecution has not yet rested its case In this case. a Sunday) within which to file a petition for review on certiorari.

nor a substitute for. error in appreciation or admission of evidence. or a motion for inhibition. ordinarily. the State is relying on a recognized exception to the general rule in that where the assailed judgment is void.16 In view of the pendency of the said appeal. The administrative case at bar involves an acquittal on an accused by the respondent judge in three (3) closely related criminal cases which were earlier consolidated in the court presided by respondent judge. are pre-requisites for the taking of other measures against the persons of the judges concerned. or closed. no double jeopardy results from the re-filing of the criminal case. we should. in this administrative case. the established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions against Judges are not complementary or suppletory of. 96-149991 and 96-149992. as the case may be. 204 of the Revised Penal Code for allegedly knowingly rendering an unjust judgment. we may not. Now. as well as the entry of judgment in the corresponding action or proceeding. The ordinary remedies against errors or irregularities which may be regarded as normal in nature. it is indispensable that we consider the respondent Judge's subject Resolution granting accused Wang's Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting the latter in the closely related Criminal Cases Nos. However.. justice demands that we resolve the basic issue relative to the legality or illegality of Wang's warrantless arrest and search. 128587). civil or administrative liability may be said to have opened. capricious. that the door to an inquiry into his criminal. etc. and the issue on the admissibility of the bags of "shabu. ordinarily. 96-149990. Consequently.) are inter alia the special civil actions of certiorari. It is only after the available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken with finality. the law provides ample judicial remedies against errors or irregularities being committed by a Trial Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction. these judicial remedies. As a rule." scales and unlicensed firearms which were confiscated during the warrantless search. a petition for change of venue.R.1âwphi1. whether of civil.15 However. These are the very same issues being . be constrained from resolving the charge of violation of Art. review here the said judgment of acquittal in those three (3) criminal cases. whether ordinary or extraordinary. whimsical. a motion for new trial). administrative. and appeal. No. to resolve those charges in the administrative case.As everyone knows. or criminal nature. or in construction or application of procedural or substantive law or legal principle) include a motion for reconsideration (or after rendition of a judgment or final order. supra. despotic exercise of power or neglect of duty. Resort to and exhaustion of these judicial remedies.e. the inquiry in this administrative case being limited to the issue of whether the respondent judge is liable for the charges brought against him.nê In appealing Wang's acquittal. The extraordinary remedies against error or irregularities which may be deemed extraordinary in character (i. prohibition or mandamus. in view of the pendency in this Court (First Division) of the petition for review on certiorari (G. acquittal is immediately final and executory.

in an Order dated January 14. the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: e) Causing any undue injury to any party. 96-149991 and 96-149992) for further hearings. Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure During the hearing held on December 6. or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. 1996.17 Meanwhile. Respondent judge. 20 It was at this time that the defense asked for. 199722 granted that motion and set the two (2) remaining cases (Criminal Case Nos. evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. Perhaps belatedly realizing that it had rested prematurely. After reviewing the records. Respondent judge's alleged transgressions consist principally of: (a) resolving the Demurrer to Evidence when the prosecution had not yet allegedly rested in all three (3) criminal cases. the foregoing considerations do not prevent us from ruling upon the remaining charges brought against respondent judge. The jurisprudential rule is that pendency of an appeal from a questioned judgment renders the filing of administrative charges premature Nevertheless. we find scant evidence to support the charges as well as the adverse conclusions of the Honorable Investigator. The governing rule then.—In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law. the prosecution filed a "Manifestation with Motion to Set Above-Entitled Cases for Further Hearing and For the Issuance of Subpoenas to Prosecution Witnesses"21 on December 19. Significantly. there is as yet no definitive pronouncement by this Court whether respondent's Resolution of acquittal of Wang is patently erroneous. and was given. Section 15. advantage or preference in the discharge of his official. This fact belies the petitioners' claim that they were denied their day in court. The first involves an alleged violation of section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act Corrupt practices of public officers. including the Government. .litigated in the said appeal. and (c) propounding questions during the clarificatory hearing which revealed his alleged partiality in favor of the accused. 96-149990 relative to the drug charges. administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality. leave of court to file a Demurrer to Evidence. A close scrutiny of the record does not support the conclusion of the Investigator that respondent judge prematurely resolved the Demurrer to Evidence without giving the prosecution ample opportunity to prove its three (3) cases which were earlier consolidated. (b) dismissing all three (3) criminal cases when the Demurrer to Evidence allegedly referred only to Criminal Case No. Assistant City Prosecutor Winnie M. 1996. Edad stated that he was resting the People's case.

96-149990. namely. The record shows that the proceedings were astened when the defense filed a Manifestation on February 10. though numerous did not really create the impression that respondent judge was biased or that he has practically taken the cudgels for the defense. Pursuant to constitutional dictates. 96-149991 and 96-149992. clearly prayed for the dismissal of all the three (3) cases. "questions to clarify points and to elicit additional relevant evidence are not improper. and (2) the docket number stated on the first page of the Demurrer to Evidence referred only to Criminal Case No.during the hearing held on February 11. That claim is erroneous.24 Accordingly. Anent the charge that respondent judge displayed bias and partiality during the trial when he asked numerous clarificatory questions. the accompanying search and seizure which yielded the prohibited articles is also illegal and invalid. we note that the participation of respondent judge in the conduct of the trial was not by itself condemnable. 96-149990. Neither do we discern any impropriety when respondent judge resolved to dismiss all the three (3) criminal cases filed against Wang. under circumstances not falling within recognized exceptions. 96-149990 inasmuch as (1) the State has rested allegedly only in that case. . The prosecution was even able to file an opposition to the Demurrer to Evidence. Petitioners claim that the Demurrer to Evidence could apply only to Criminal Case No. 1997. as worded. 96-149990. a plain reading of the entire Demurrer to Evidence leaves no doubt that it also covered Criminal Case Nos.23 including Criminal Case Nos. 96-149991 and 96-149992. Differently stated. Hence. (Transcript provided in full text) The above-quoted questions propounded by respondent judge were necessary for the purpose of determining and clarifying the basis for resolving the all important issue of the legality or illegality of the warrantless arrest of Wang and the warrantless search of the latter's car. The judge being the arbiter may properly intervene in the presentation of evidence to expedite and prevent unnecessary waste of time The transcript of the clarificatory hearing reproduced below to show that the tenor of respondent judge's clarificatory questions. 1997 that it was admitting the existence of the firearms and the lack of license therefor. The principal argument of the defense in those three (3) criminal cases is that Wang was arrested illegally." That defense is unequivocally set forth in the Demurrer to Evidence. 25 said articles are inadmissible in evidence for being "fruits of a poisonous tree. without a warrant. 96-149991 and 96-149992. Herein respondent judge's aforequoted questions contrast favorably against instances in other cases wherein it was clearly shown that the judges therein displayed bias against a party litigant. Even if the caption of the Demurrer to Evidence stated only Criminal Case No. the prosecution rested in all the three (3) cases for the second time. there was not even a need to amend the Demurrer to Evidence inasmuch as the Demurrer to Evidence. Criminal Case Nos.

. petitioner. however adopted by ALA Industries Corporation were not workable. Laguna to GROGUN INC. September 18. if not baseless and hypothetical.Thus. National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) awarded the project of rehabilitating the Caliraya Glory Hole Service Spillway (CGHSS) at Caliraya Reservoir.R. The primary purpose of the Caliraya Reservoir was to keep the lake’s water level within the specified limit not only for the protection of the dam but also to prevent the flooding of the towns surrounding the dam. 156259. Chapter 5 The Arbitral Award [G. INCORPORATED. 2003] GROGUN.31 There is another case where the sheer volume of questions asked by the judge therein tended to be leading. probing and insinuation. there is a case where the questions asked of a witness by the judge therein were adversarial. NAPOCOR filed its Answer with Counterclaim [6] asserting that the poor quality of GROGUN’S workmanship led to numerous defects in the project. The design and method. finding no stipulation in the contract of the parties providing for arbitration as a mode of settling disputes. malicious and hostile in character. Leaks recurred in the vertical shaft of the CGHSS immediately after the project was accepted by NAPOCOR. misleading. Lumban. NAPOCOR failed to pay for the costs of the rehabilitation despite the completion of the project. respondent. which are characteristics of a cross-examination Where a sufficient judicial remedy exists. CIAC dismissed the case GROGUN filed an action for collection of sum of money and damages before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Numerous leaks. No.32 It has also been held that clarificatory questions asked by the trial court must not amount to confrontation. (GROGUN) Among several contractors. however occurred in the vertical shaft of CGHSS. GROGUN filed a request for adjudication before the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC). NAPOCOR engaged ALA Industries Corporation to repair the CGHSS. the filing of an administrative complaint is not the proper remedy to correct the actions of a judge. However. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION. GROGUN offered the most workable and viable design at the lowest price. vs.

GROGUN filed another Manifestation [12] asking the trial court to grant its Manifestation and Motion to Modify the Arbitral Award since NAPOCOR did not file a motion to vacate.06%. the Arbitration Tribunal rendered a decision: Defendant is directed to pay the Plaintiff GROGUN submitted a copy of the above decision to the trial court. the trial court issued an Order stating: the Arbitrators’ Fees of P420. GROGUN filed a Motion to Dismiss Court of Appeals rendered a decision. the parties filed a Joint Manifestation and Motion [7] submitting their dispute to arbitration under Republic Act No. NAPOCOR appealed to the Court of Appeals THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL DESPITE THE FACT THAT A COPY OF THE ARBITRAL DECISION DATED MAY 14.After the pre-trial conference. 876 [8] taking into consideration the highly technical nature of their contract.836. GROGUN filed before the trial court a Manifestation and Motion to Modify the Arbitral Decision.28 shall be shared by defendant NAPOCOR and plaintiff GROGUN in proportion to their respective claims. DESPITE: . alleging that the Arbitration Tribunal did not include in its Decision a provision on who should bear the costs of arbitration pursuant to the parties’ Agreement on Arbitration Expenses In its Comment.[18] reversing the Orders of the Regional Trial Court and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. pursuant to Section 23 of the Arbitration Law On September 15. NAPOCOR argued that the foregoing Motion is premature because the Arbitration Tribunal had not submitted its recommendation to the trial court and the same had not been approved or adopted by the trial court In the meantime.e. Instead of filing an Appellee’s Brief. respectively. 1998. NAPOCOR’s Motion for Reconsideration of the said Order was denied. 1998 SUBMITTED BY GROGUN WAS NOT VERIFIED. Thus.94 % and 30. modify or correct the same within one month from the time it was rendered. 69. i. this petition for review on the following assignment of errors: THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE APPEAL.. GROGUN filed a Motion for Reconsideration[20] of the said decision which was denied by the Court of Appeals Hence.

too. IT HAVING FAILED TO REPUDIATE THE ARBITRAL AWARD WITHIN THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD OF 30 DAYS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted and the doubt concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on the matter The issues raised by NAPOCOR in its appeal to the Court of Appeals are not purely questions of law. FAILING TO REPUDIATE THE SAME BEFORE THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL. which is based in a Resolution of the Court En Banc in UDK-9748 provides If an appeal under Rule 41 is taken from the regional trial court to the Court of Appeals and therein the appellant raises only questions of law. THE DEFECT OF NOT HAVING FILED A RECORD ON APPEAL WHICH IS REQUIRED IN SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS SUCH AS ARBITRATION UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. No record on appeal shall be . Issue: W/N action was converted to special proceeding. 876. issues purely of law not being reviewable by said court. Supreme Court Circular No. ITS CONFIRMATION BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BECAME MINISTERIAL. THUS THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT’S CONFIRMATION THEREOF IS NOT APPEALABLE. the appeal shall be dismissed. OR W/N arbitral award needs to be verified The petition lacks merit. AS SUCH IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN FIRST REPUDIATED BEFORE THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL. the mere filing of the notice of appeal is sufficient Rule 41.— The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. Section 2 of the 1997 Rule on Civil Procedure categorically states: (a) Ordinary appeal. An appeal under Rule 41 taken from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals raising only questions of law shall be dismissed. 876. Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. issues purely of law not being reviewable by said Court This was reproduced in Rule 50. Then. 2-90. THE ARBITRAL DECISION BY VIRTUE OF A JOINT SUBMISSION BY THE PARTIES WAS EFFECTIVELY ONE OF A “JUDGMENT BY CONSENT”. there is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of evidence presented.1.

The word verified. is not applicable. and it has been held that the word means “sworn to” and ordinarily imports a verity attested by the sanctity of an oath. On December 10. GROGUN argues that the Court of Appeals should have dismissed the appeal because NAPOCOR filed its Appellant’s Brief more than one year from the filing of the Notice of Appeal. In such cases. and consequently.required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require.[25] which is an ordinary civil action. Section 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the appellant shall file his brief within forty-five (45) days from receipt of notice from the Court of Appeals In the case at bar.[ In the case at bar. it argues that the lack of verification is a formal defect which is not fatal. within which to file its Brief. GROGUN admits that the copy of the arbitral award it submitted to the trial court was not verified. however. It cites cases which. The argument is tenuous. NAPOCOR received notice from the Court of Appeals to file its Brief within 45 days on October 26. Rule 44. This petition originated from an action for collection of a sum of money filed with the Regional Trial Court. which was granted. 2000. it filed a Motion for Extension of forty five days. in connection with statutory reports.[29] Hence. NAPOCOR’s Appellant’s Brief filed on January 24. within the personal knowledge of the affiant. and refers to an affidavit attached to the statement as to the truth of the matters therein set forth. 2000 was on time. However. therefore can not be the basis of the assailed Orders of the trial court. Neither did NAPOCOR repudiate the arbitral award before the Arbitration Tribunal and the trial court. refer to the effect of lack of verification in the pleadings. 1999. the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner. 1999. Section 22 of the Arbitration Law. the copy of the arbitral award did not meet the requirements of Section 20 of the Arbitration Law. has a settled or well known meaning.[26] The decision of the parties to submit their dispute to arbitration during the proceedings did not change the nature of the original action to one of special proceeding. under which an appeal shall be by record on appeal.[27] which provides that arbitration is in the nature of a special proceeding. . We come now to the issue of whether the copy of the arbitral award submitted by GROGUN to the trial court was valid. and may be waived or dispensed with. GROGUN argues that NAPOCOR did not raise as issue the lack of verification of the copy of the arbitral award in the trial court. or until January 25.

1993 IMPERIAL TEXTILE MILLS. The Union argued that the CBA increases should not be included in adjusting the wages to the base pay level. vs. NAPOCOR could not have raised the lack of verification of the copy of the arbitral award submitted by GROGUN since it was assailing the authenticity and due execution of the copy itself. Its resolution of the appeal on its merits meant that it found the Motion to Dismiss to be without merit. as it was separate and distinct from the increases resulting from the job classification and standardization scheme. VLADIMIR P. Inc. .R. 94960 March 8. theories. No. they executed another agreement on the job classification and wage standardization plan. On the other hand. INC. The Company maintained that the wage of a particular employee subject of possible adjustment on base pay should be the pay with the first year CBA increase already integrated therein. points of law. A dispute subsequently arose in the interpretation of the two agreements. petitioner Imperial Textile Mills. issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Ordinarily. It was only after the trial court upheld the said copy as a valid arbitral award that NAPOCOR was able to raise the issue. [34] provides that the appellee shall file his brief within forty-five days from receipt of the appellant’s brief. petitioner. Rule 44. The grant or denial of the Motion to Dismiss was within the sound discretion of the Court of Appeals. Section 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Hence.HON. 1986. respondents. The parties then submitted it to arbitration and designated public respondent Vladimir P. It also alleges that the Court of Appeals did not require it to file an Appellee’s Brief. which was during the filing of its appellant’s brief before the Court of Appeals. SAMPANG and IMPERIAL TEXTILE MILLS-MONTHLY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (ITM-MEA). there was no need for the Court of Appeals to require GROGUN to file its appellee’s brief. GROGUN also argues that the Court of Appeals should have first decided the Motion to Dismiss filed by the NAPOCOR before resolving the merits of the appeal. In the case at bar. 1986. however.The argument is not well-taken. G. This was also to take effect retroactively on November 1. Sampang as the Voluntary Arbitrator. The contention is without merit..L. and respondent Imperial Textile Mills-Monthly Employees Association entered into a collective bargaining agreement providing acrossthe-board salary increases and other benefits retroactive to November 1. executory and inappealable. The understanding was that his decision would be final.L.

Company appealed to the NLRC. The reason was that the original rule allowing appeal if the Voluntary Arbitrator's award was more than P100. they will do so in proper cases where the law ordains them.the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a decision upholding the formula used by the Company. Notwithstanding the natural reluctance of the courts to interfere with matters determined by the arbitrators. causing delay and expenses. The Company then came to this Court in this petition for certiorari Issue: W/N Arbitrator can change his decision after rendering his 1st The Union erred in filing a motion for reconsideration So did the respondent Voluntary Arbitrator in entertaining the motion and vacating his first decision. the first decision had already become so by virtue of Article 263 of the Labor Code making voluntary arbitration awards or decisions final and executory. a fact he was well aware of. he could no longer entertain a motion for reconsideration of the decision for its reversal or modification By modifying the original award. as shown by his previous Resolution of Inhibition wherein he refused to act on the Union's motion for reconsideration of the award or decision. so that all reasonable presumptions should be ascertained in its favor and none to overthrow it. awards or decisions of voluntary arbitrators become final and executory after calendar 10 days from notice thereof to the parties. the Voluntary Arbitrator lost jurisdiction over the case submitted to him the moment be rendered his decision. even without this stipulation. they expressly agreed that the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator would be final. would be merely an unnecessary step in the course of litigation. Otherwise. executory and inappealable. Moreover. as amended. arbitration proceedings. respondent arbitrator exceeded his authority as such. .00 had already been repealed by BP 130. The appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. It would be well to remind the Parties in this case that the arbitration law or jurisprudence on the matter is explicit in its stand against revocation and amendment of the submission agreement and the arbitration award once such has been made. but not finally settling anything. the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered another decision. Therefore.000. The rationale behind this is that: An award should be regarded as the judgment of a court of last resort. instead of being a quick and easy mode of obtaining justice. In fact. this time in favor of the Union. When the parties submitted their grievance to arbitration. The Union filed a motion for reconsideration which was opposed by the Company. under Article 262-A of the Labor Code.

and there is none shown here. as in the case at bar. that it would assume the attribute of finality upon its issuance. Corollarily his second decision dated December 14. The above-quoted provision did not expressly fix the time when the Voluntary Arbitrator's decision or award would become final. We have held. when the law in force was Article 263 of the Labor Code. the decision may still be reconsidered by the Voluntary Arbitrator on the basis of a motion for reconsideration duly filed during that period Such a provision. must be considered null and void and of no force and effect whatsoever . it cannot be applied to a case in which the decision had become final before the new provision took effect. which introduced amended Article 262-A of the Labor Code. may be applied retroactively to pending actions as we have held in a number of cases. The public respondent exceeded his authority when he acted on the Union's motion for reconsideration and reversed his original decision. however. 6715. being procedural. subject only to judicial review in appropriate cases.The power and authority of the Voluntary Arbitrator to act in the case commences from his appointment and acceptance to act as such under the submission agreement of the Parties and terminates upon his rendition of his decision or award which is accorded the benefits of the doctrine of res judicata as in judgments of our regular courts of law. The first decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator was rendered on July 12. R. became effective on March 21. order or resolution rest upon the continuing mutual consent of the parties. 1989. 1988. 1988. Voluntary arbitration awards or decisions shall be final. 5 However. and executory. the Voluntary Arbitrator has no choice but to decline to rule on the pleadings submitted by the parties. having been rendered in violation of law. inappealable. It is true that the present rule makes the voluntary arbitration award final and executory after ten calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the parties. 4 Presumably. Since the power and authority of the arbitrator to render a valid award.A.