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On October 7, 1989, Rafael M. Salas was appointed by the PAGCOR Chairman as Internal
Security Staff Member (ISS) and assigned to the Casino at the Manila Pavilion Hotel. ISS
members do not directly report to the Office of the Chairman, and are subject to the control and
supervision of an Area Supervisor who only implements the directives of the Branch Chief
Security Officer.
The BOD of PAGCOR terminated him on Dec. 3, 1991 on the ground of loss of confidence.
Salas was allegedly engaged in proxy betting in affidavits of 2 customers, claiming to have
been used as gunners.CA reversed finding that Salas is not a confidential employee and cannot
be dismissed on that ground, applying the proximity rule enunciated in Case 63: Grino V. CSC
& Case 60: De los Santos V. Mallare. CA also held that PD 1869 Section 16 has been repealed
by Section 2 (1),Article IX-B of the Constitution.
Whether Salas is a confidential employee?
Whether the Pinero doctrine is still applicable?
Every appointment implies confidence, but more more than ordinary confidence is reposed in the
occupant of a position that is primarily confidential. The latter phrase denotes not only
confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office, but primarily close
intimacy which insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from
misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of the State.
In Pinero, et. al. V. Hechanova, et. al. since the enactment of RA 2260: the 1959 Civil Service
Act, it is the nature of the position which finally determines whether a position is: a.)primarily
confidential, b.)policy determining or c.)highly technical. Senator Tanada: in the 1st instance, it
is the appointing power that determines the nature of the position. In case of conflict, then it is
the Court that determines whether the position is primarily confidential or not.-Employees
occupying various positions in the Port Patrol Division of the Bureau of Customs, which is part
of the Customs police force, is not in itself sufficient indication that there positions are
primarily confidential.
1. No. Salas position is the lowest in the chain of command. His job description is ordinary,
routinary and quotidian in character. His pay is only P2,200 per month. He does not enjoy that
primarily close intimacy which characterizes a confidential employee. Where the position
occupied is remote from that of the appointing authority, the element of trust between them is no

longer predominant. Citing the case of Tria V. Sto. Tomas, the fact that sometimes, private
respondent may handle ordinarily confidential matters or papers which are somewhat
confidential in nature does not suffice to characterize his position as primarily confidential.
2. Yes. PD 1869 can be no more than initial determinations that are not conclusive in cases of
conflict.1986 Constitutional Commission Records The primary purpose of the framers of the
1987 Constitution in providing for the declaration of a position as a.) primarily confidential, b.)
policy determining or c.) highly technical is to exempt these categories from competitive
examinations as a means for determining merit and fitness. It must be stressed further that these
positions are covered by the security of tenure, although they are considered non-competitive
only in the sense that appointees thereto do not have to undergo competitive examinations for
purposes of determining merit and fitness.CSC Resolution 91-830 does not make PAGCOR
employees confidential, merely reiterates exemption from civil service eligibility requirement .In
reversing the decision of the CSC, the CA opined that the provisions of Section 16, PD 1869
may no longer be applied in the case at bar because the same is deemed to have been repealed in
its entirety by Section 2 (1), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution. This is not completely
correct. On this point, we approve the more logical interpretation advanced by the CSC to the
effect that Section 16 of PD 1869insofar as it exempts PAGCOR positions from the provisions
of the Civil Service Law & Rules has been amended, modified or deemed repealed by the 1987
Constitution & EO 292: Administrative Code of 1987.
However, the same cannot be said with respect to the last portion of Section16 which provides
that All employees of the casinos and related services shall be classified as confidential
appointees. While such executive declaration emanated merely from the provisions of
Implementing Rules of the Civil Service Act of 1959 Rule XX Section 2 The power to declare a
position as: a.) primarily confidential, b.) policy determining or c.) highly technical, as defined
therein has subsequently been codified and incorporated in EO 292: Administrative Code of
1987 Book V. Civil Service Commission Section 12. The Commission shall have the ff powers
and functions: (9) Declare positions in the Civil Service as may properly be primarily
confidential, highly technical or policy determining. This later enactment only serves to bolster
the validity of the categorization made under Section 16 PD 1869.Be that as it may, such
classification is not absolute and all-encompassing. Prior to the passage of the Civil Service Act
of 1959, there were 2 recognized instances when a position may be declared primarily
confidential: 1:when the President, upon recommendation of the Commissioner of Civil Service,
has declared the position to be primarily confidential;2:in the absence of such declaration, when
by the nature of the functions of the office, there exists close intimacy between the appointing
power which ensures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment of freedom from misgivings
of betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of the State.
RA 2260: Civil Service Act (June 19, 1959) Section 5.
The non-competitive or unclassified service shall be composed of positions expressly declared

by law to be in the non-competitive or unclassified service or those which are policy

determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature.
General Rules Implementing PD 807: Civil Service Rules Section 1.
appointments to the Civil Service, except as to those which are policy determining, primarily
confidential, or highly technical in nature, shall be made only according to merit and fitness to be
determined as far as practicable by competitive examinations.

De los Santos vs Mallare

Eduardo de los Santos, the petitioner, was appointed City Engineer of Baguio on July 16, 1946,
by the President, appointment which was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments on
August 6, and on the 23rd of that month, he qualified for and began to exercise the duties and
functions of the position. On June 1, 1950, Gil R. Mallare was extended an ad
interimappointment by the President to the same position, after which, on June 3, the
Undersecretary of the Department of Public Works and Communications directed Santos to
report to the Bureau of Public Works for another assignment. Santos refused to vacate the office,
and when the City Mayor and the other officials named as Mallare's co-defendants ignored him
and paid Mallare the salary corresponding to the position, he commenced these proceedings. The
petitioner rests his case on Article XII of the Constitution, section 4 of which reads: "No officer
or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by
law." It is admitted in respondents' answer that the City Engineer of Baguio "belongs to the
unclassified service."
WON legality of the petitioner's removal from the same office which would be the effect of
Mallare's appointment if the same be allowed to stand.
No. The removal by Santos was rightfully made in accordance with the law.
Citing the case of Lacson vs Romero, it is contended that only officers and employees in the
classified service should be brought within the purview of Article XII of the Constitution.
Section 1 of this article ordains: "A Civil Service embracing all branches and subdivisions of the
Government shall be provided by law. Appointments in the Civil Service, except as those which
are policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature, shall be made only
according to merit and fitness, to be determined as far as practicable by competitive

examination." The adoption of the "merit system" in government service has secured efficiency
and social justice. It eliminates the political factor in the selection of civil employees which is the
first essential to an efficient personnel system. It insures equality of opportunity to all deserving
applicants desirous of a career in the public service. It advocates a new concept of the public
office as a career open to all and not the exclusive patrimony of any party or faction to be doled
out as a reward for party service.
As has been seen, three specified classes of positions policy-determining, primarily
confidential and highly technical are excluded from the merit system and dismissal at pleasure
of officers and employees appointed therein is allowed by the Constitution. These positions
involved the highest degree of confidence, or are closely bound out with and dependent on other
positions to which they are subordinate, or are temporary in nature. It may truly be said that the
good of the service itself demands that appointments coming under this category determinable at
the will of the officer that makes them. The office of city engineer is neither primarily
confidential, policy-determining, nor highly technical. Every appointment implies confidence,
but much more than ordinary confidence is reposed in the occupant of a position that is primarily
confidential. The latter phrase denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for
the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which insures freedom of intercourse without
embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters
of state. Nor is the position of city engineer policy-determining. A city engineer does not
formulate a method of action for the government or any its subdivisions. His job is to execute
policy, not to make it.

Espanol v CSC
1. The position of Regional Manager of the National Irrigation Administration, Regional Office
No. 2, Cauayan, Isabela, became vacant. Petitioner Perfecto Espaol was Chief of the
Engineering Division, and private respondent Orlando L. Bulseco was Chief Design Engineer.
2. In the organizational chart of the National Irrigation Administration (NIA), the position of
Chief Design Engineer is below the Chief of the Engineering Division, and the latter is
considered next-in-rank to the position of Regional Manager.
3. Bulseco was the one appointed to the vacant position pursuant to Resolution No. 5302-86
passed by the Board of Directors of NIA prompting petitioner Espaol to file a protest with the
Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) which subsequently referred the protest to the NIA
Administrator for appropriate action. However, the protest was dismissed on the ground that "in
the evaluation conducted, Mr. Bulseco has advantage over Mr. Espaol on the factors of
performance and potential.

4. Espanol alleges that he is the employee next-in-rank to the position of Regional Manager and,
as such, he has promotional priority over Bulseco.
5. Espanol appealed, MPSB then ordered that he be appointed as Regional Manager ruling that
the individual qualifications of the contestants exceed the qualification requirements, especially
those of respondent Bulseco. This prompted Bulseco to appeal to the Civil Service Commission
which then reversed the ruling of the MPSB and held Bulsecos appointment.
Issue: Who is entitled to the promotion? Espanol or Bulseco?
Ruling: Bulseco. Bulseco was previously designated and performed his duties and functions to
rank of equal and next-in-rank positions as to that of Espanols as certified by the Civil Service
Ratio: Even if the vacancy here had been filled by promotion rather than by lateral transfer, the
concept of "next-in-rank" does not import any mandatory or peremptory requirement that the
person next in rank must be appointed to the vacancy. What Section 19(3) of P.D. No. 807, the
Civil Service Law, provides is that if a vacancy is filled by a promotion, the person holding the
position next in rank thereto "shall be considered for promotion.
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in whom
it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee shall possess
the qualifications required by law. This is a political question involving considerations of
wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide.
The determination of who among several candidates for a vacant position has the best
qualifications is vested in the sound discretion of the department head or appointing authority
and not in the Civil Service Commission
Section 19, paragraph 6, Article VIII of Presidential Decree No. 807 defines a qualified next-inrank as an employee appointed on a permanent basis to a position previously determined to be
next-in-rank to the vacancy proposed to be filled and who meets the requisites for appointment
thereto as previously determined by the appointing authority and approved by the respondent

In sum, petitioner would want the Court to hold that since at the time of the appointment in
dispute, he was Chief Deputy Assessor exercising, according to his allegation, immediate
administrative control and supervision over respondent Maliwanag, who was Senior Deputy
Assessor, and inasmuch as he has superior educational and appropriate civil service eligibilities

to those of said respondent, the appointment aforementioned extended to the latter by respondent
City Mayor is illegal and contrary to law being violative of the rule of next-in-rank. Petitioner
maintains that upon the promotion of the Assistant City Assessor to the position of City
Assessor, he, petitioner, instead of respondent Maliwanag should have been appointed thereto.
Maliwanag's appointment was recommended by the City Assessor and his reasons therefor,
stated in said official's indorsement to the Mayor recommending dismissal of petitioner's protest
thereto and quoted in the record, are substantial and well taken, as, in fact, they have been
reviewed by respondent Commissioner and found to be sustainable, as he did sustain them.
The appointment in controversy was made on November 23, 1973 and respondent Maliwanag
assumed office on the strength thereof, albeit she claims she has not been paid her salary. On the
other hand, the petition herein was filed only on March 13, 1975, clearly more than one year
after the pretended right of petitioner to hold the office in question arose. This single
circumstance has closed the door for any judicial remedy in his favor.
WON the petitioner instead of respondent Maliwanag should have been appointed thereto.
No. Petitioner contends in regard to this point that Section 16 of Rule 66 invoked by private
respondent refers to actions of quo warranto and since his petition is also
for certiorari and mandamus, said rule is inapplicable. Such contention is not correct. As earlier
noted in this decision, the allegations supporting petitioner's cause or causes of action boil down
to no more than the removal of respondent Maliwanag from the position to which she has been
appointed in order to be replaced by him, with a new appointment in his favor.
Necessarily, the ouster of Maliwanag by quo warranto has to be based on a nullification o her
appointment, which petitioner seeks, albeit unnecessarily, by certiorari. His ultimate remedy,
therefore, is quo warranto. Besides, even if it could be also viewed as mandamus, it is already
settled that his latter remedy prescribes also after one year. (Cornejo vs. Sec. of Justice, L-32818,
June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 663.)
And it is of no avail to petitioner that during the intervening period of more than one year, he
was seeking relief from the corresponding administrative outhorities. The resort to such
administrative remedy does not abate the period for the judicial action. (Torres vs. Quintos, 88
Phil. 436; Galano vs. Roxas, G.R. L-31241, Sept. 12, 1975, 67 SCRA 8.)

AQUINO, J., dissenting.
Petitioner Abraham C. Sison, as the incumbent chief deputy assessor, is the qualified and
competent next-in-rank employee who should be promoted to the contested position of assistant
city assessor of Olongapo City, as contemplated in section 23 of the Civil Service Law. He is
qualified for that position because he is a provincial Assessor eligible and he holds a bachelor's
degree in commerce. Those qualifications are required for the position of assistant city assessor.
Respondent Eureka F. Maliwanag, who was appointed by the mayor to that position, is not
qualified because she is not a provincial assessor eligible and she is not a holder of a bachelor's
degree. Her appointment to the contested position is in violation of section 23. Hence, the
Commissioner of Civil Service revoked that appointment in his decision of May 3, 1974.
However, upon motion for reconsideration, the Commissioner approved that appointment in his
decision of June 24, 1974.
It is incontestable that Sison is senior to Mrs. Maliwanag. He was appointed senior deputy
assessor of Olongapo City effective September 25, 1967. Then, he was promoted to the position
of chief deputy assessor of that city on September 1, 1969. On that date, Mrs. Maliwanag was
appointed to the position of senior deputy assessor, the position vacated by Sison (pp. 62-63,
Thus, Sison (not Mrs. Maliwanag) was next in line for the position of assistant city assessor
when that position became vacant on November 23, 1973. There is no reason why Mrs.
Maliwanag should jump over Sison. The mayor should have apprised Sison as to why he was
being bypassed and why Mrs. Maliwanag was being appointed to that position. That legal
requirement was not observed.
Although Sison's petition in this Court is for certiorari, mandamus and quo warranto, he has no
cause of action for quo warranto because Mrs. Maliwanag holds an appointment to the contested
position of assistant city assessor. She cannot be regarded as a usurper of that position. Sison's
petition should be treated as one for certiorari and mandamus only. Those special civil actions
are adequate for assailing the decisions of the Commissioner of Civil Service. The quo warranto
aspect of Sisons's petition should be disregarded.
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court does not fix any period for the filing of a petition
for certiorari and mandamus. The one-year period within which the petition for quo warranto
should be filled does not apply to Sison. His petition was delayed because, as he explained, he is
a poor man who cannot afford to embark on an expensive and protracted litigation.


Respondent Torrijos was appointed to the position of Assistant Chief of the Scientific Library
and Documentation Division of the National Science Development Board. The legality of the
appointment was contested by petitioner who claimed that she had preferential right to the
disputed position. Her protest was denied by the NSDB Chairman. Her appeal to the Civil
Service Commission did not prosper as it was found that she is not an employee next in rank;
that the contested position as well as the division where it belongs are newly created offices as a
result of the implementation of the Integrated Reorganization Plan; that the appointee is qualified
and eligible; and that there is absence of a showing that her selection has been the result of grave
abuse or discretion of fraud. The Commissions decision dismissing the appeal was elevated to
the Presidential Assistant, Office of the President, but the decision and resolution appealed from
was affirmed in toto.
Whether or not the appointing authority (NATIONAL SCIENCE DEVELOPMENT BOARD)
can choose Torrijos for the said position
On certiorari, the Supreme Court ruled that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
public respondents as the appointing authority has discretion in the choice of who is entitled
to promotion considering as the basic factor, the needs of the public service, especially
where no question may be raised as to who is the employer next in rank.
Petition dismissed.
An employee cannot be promoted, even if merely as a result of a transfer, without his consent. A
transfer that results in promotion or demotion, advancement or reduction or a transfer that aims
to lure the employee away from his permanent position cannot be done without the employees
There is no law that compels an employee to accept a promotion for the reason that a promotion
is in the nature of a gift or reward, which a person has a right to refuse.

1. PT&T, engaged in the business of providing telegraph and communication employed
various employees, herein private respondents.
2. After conducting a series of studies regarding profitability of its retail operations, PT&T
came up with a Relocation Restructuring Program designed to
a. Sustain its retail operations
b. Decongest surplus workforce, to promote efficiency and productivity
c. Avid retrenchment of employees occupying redundant productivity
3. Herein private respondents receive letters from PT&T giving them the option to choose
the branch to which they could be transferred. PT&T offered benefits/allowances to those
employees who would agree to be transferred under its new program. Likewise, the
employees would agree top be transferred would be considered promoted.
4. Private respondents rejected petitioners offer.
5. PT&T asked an explanation for such refusal and to justify why disciplinary action should
not be taken against them.
6. Private respondents explained that it would case difficulties because they would be
assigned to distant places, which would require separations from their respective families.
That some of them would need to ride a boat overnight in going to their new assignment
7. Dissatisfied with this explanation, PT&T considered the refusal as an insubordination and
willful disobedience to a lawful order thus they were dismissed from work.
8. Private respondents claim that their refusal to transfer could not possibly give rise to a
valid dismissal on the ground of willful disobedience, as their transfer was prejudicial and
inconvenient; thus unreasonable.
Private respondents and their new assignments:
1. Jesus Paracale, from General Santos Branch to Butuan City Branch;
2. Romeo Tee, from Zamboanga Branch to Jolo Branch;
3. Benjamin Lakandula, from Iligan City to Butuan City;
4. Avelino Acha, from Legaspi City Branch t Odiongan Branch;
5. Ignacio Dela Cerna, from Pagadian City Branch to Butuan Branch;
6. Guillermo Demigillo, from Midsayap to Lebak Cotabato Branch
9. PT&T contends that the transfers were made in the lawful exercise of its management
prerogative and were done in good faith.
10. Respondents however claims that since their respective transfers resulted in their
promotion, they had the right to refuse or decline the positions being offered to
them. Thus, the refusal to accept the transfer could not have amounted to insubordination
or willful disobedience to the lawful orders of the employer.
11. NLRC declared PT&T guilty of illegal dismissal and ordering to reinstate individual
complainants-appellants to their former positions without loss of seniority rights and other

privileges and to pay them full backwages from the date of their dismissal up to the date of their
actual reinstatement.
ISSUE: Whether or not the refusals of private respondents constitute willful disobedience and
insubordination which will justify their dismissal?
RULING: NO, refusal did not constitute willful disobedience. Private respondents were illegally
[P]romotion, as we defined in Millares v, Subido, is the advancement from one
position to another with an increase in duties and responsibilities as authorized by law, and
usually accompanied by an increase in salary.
Apparently, the indispensable element for there to be a promotion is that there must be
an advancement from one position to another or an upward vertical movement of the
employees rank or position. Any increase in salary should only be considered incidental but
never determinative of whether or not a promotion is bestowed upon an employee. This can be
likened to the upgrading of salaries of government employees without conferring upon the, the
concomitant elevation to the higher positions.
The admissions of the petitioner are conclusive on it. An employee cannot be promoted,
even if merely as a result of a transfer, without his consent. A transfer that results in promotion
or demotion, advancement or reduction or a transfer that aims to lure the employee away from
his permanent position cannot be done without the employees consent.]
There is no law that compels an employee to accept a promotion for the reason that a
promotion is in the nature of a gift or reward, which a person has a right to refuse. Hence, the
exercise by the private respondents of their right cannot be considered in law as insubordination,
or willful disobedience of a lawful order of the employer. As such, there was no valid cause for
the private respondents dismissal.
As the questioned dismissal is not based on any of the just or valid grounds under Article
282 of the Labor Code, the NLRC correctly ordered the private respondents reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights and the payment of backwages from the time of their dismissal up
to their actual reinstateme
DISPOSITIVE: Private respondents won.

PD 807, Section 24. Personnel Actions. All appointments in the career service shall be
made only according to merit and fitness, to be determined as far as practicable by competitive
examinations. A non-eligible shall not be appointed to any position in the civil service whenever
there is a civil service eligible actually available for and ready to accept appointment.
As used in this Decree, any action denoting the movement or progress of personnel in the
civil service shall be known as personnel action. Such action shall include appointment through
certification, promotion, transfer, reinstatement, re-employment, detail, reassignment, demotion,
and separation. All personnel actions shall be in accordance with such rules, standards, and
regulations as may be promulgated by the Commission.
(a) Appointment through certification. An appointment through certification to a position
in the civil service, except as herein otherwise provided, shall be issued to a person who
has been selected from a list of qualified persons certified by the Commission from an
appropriate register of eligibles, and who meets all the other requirements of the position.
All such persons must serve a probationary period of six months following their original
appointment and shall undergo a thorough character investigation in order to acquire
permanent civil service status. A probationer may be dropped from the service for
unsatisfactory conduct or want of capacity any time before the expiration of the
probationary period: Provided, That such action is appealable to the Commission.
(c) Transfer. A transfer is a movement from one position to another which is of
equivalent rank, level, or salary without break in service involving the issuance of an
It shall be considered disciplinary when made in the interest of public service, in which
case, the employee concerned shall be informed of the reasons therefore. If the employee
believes that there is no justification for the transfer, he may appeal his case to the
The transfer may be from one department or agency to another or from one
organizational unit to another in the same department or agency: Provided, however, That
any movement from the non-career service to the career service shall not be considered a
(g) Reassignment. An employee may be reassigned from one organizational unit to
another in the same agency: Provided, That such reassignment shall not involve a
reduction in rank, status or salary.

Abaya received an Assignment Order transferring him to the Philippine Embassy in Beijing
as Minister-Counsellor and Consul General. On March 18, 1988, he requested deferment of his
transfer to his new assignment in Beijing, to give him ample time to wind up official and

pending family matters. On April 15, 1988, the Office of Personnel and Management Services
(OPMS) recommended to the Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs:
The appointment (in place of Abaya) of Ariel Abadilla to the Embassy at Beijing,
Abayas suitability having been questioned by Ambassador Rodolfo Severino.
Abayas recall to the Home Office in line with the Departments program of recalling
overstaying officers and employees assigned abroad.
Chairman Ramon Diaz of the PCGG requested that Abaya be allowed to testify before a
grand jury then investigating the Marcoses ill-gotten wealth in the U.S. OPMS addressed a
memo to Secretary of DFA Raul Manglapus (petitioner) reiterating its recommendation to recall
Abaya from New York had been extended on request of the PCGG. Abaya sent a telex message
to the home office requesting reconsideration of the recall order and a deferment of its
effectivity, for the reason that in the case of 8 members of the UN Mission, their recalls were
allegedly made effective some 16 to 23 months from receipt of recall orders, this being in
consonance with Foreign Service Circular No. 11-89 providing that recall orders are served
one year in advance to cushion those concerned against harsh tradition.
Abaya sent a telex communication to Secretary Manglapus duly noting the latter's
instructions to report at Manila on June 1, 1989, and stating that: (1) the period of his initial tour
of duty at the UN Mission at New York was not 13 years but 11 years and some 7 months, and
he served in the home office for 14 months before being reassigned to New York in June, 1984;
(2) that these assignments involved no violation of rules but had been "lawfully made by the then
Minister of Foreign Affairs in the exercise of his legal prerogative to redeploy DFA staff in (the)
interest of (the) service a prerogative of any secretary of foreign affairs, past or incumbent . .
.;" (3) that said prerogative was not being disputed, the issue being his right to "one-year advance
notice of recall orders," a right unconditionally conferred by FS Circular 11-89; and (4) that his
request for one-year notice should thus be granted.
Secretary Manglapus directed that if Abaya was unable to return to the home office, he
should file leave application with salaries computed at home office rate and payable in pesos.
Abaya went to court. He filed a petition for Certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against Sec.
Manglapus with the RTC of Manila. Secretary Manglapus moved to dismiss the action OTG that
(1) Abayas recall is an exercise of Secs prerogative and discretion which may not be interfered
with by the Court; and (2) petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies.
The RTC denied the motion and granted the application for preliminary injunction. It ruled
that Manglapus had no authority to disregard Foreign Service Circular No. 11-89; he had not
shown with convincing evidence that the exigencies of the service require the immediate and
peremptory recall of Abaya; Abayas case was substantially identical to those of eight other
members of the Philippine mission who had been accorded advance notice of their recall of more
than a year.
W/N the Secretary of Foreign officers has the authority under the law to recall and reassign
officers as the interests of the service may in his discretion require? Corollary to this, W/N
Abaya may be reassigned to another post

YES. Where an officer has served in a foreign post for at least four years, as in Abaya's case,
it would appear that the Secretary's power of assignment and transfer rests entirely in his
discretion, guided chiefly by his perception of what is necessary for the good of the service.
There is no need in that event that some "emergency or extraordinary circumstances" exist, this
being required only where the officer has served less than four years in a foreign post.
Abaya's reassignment to Beijing in January, 1988, and his recall to the Home Office
reiterated in December, 1988, were thus well within the authority granted to the Foreign Affairs
Secretary by law (RA No. 708). Those acts were based on reasoned conclusions of the OPMS
and the head of the Beijing Embassy including the fact that Abaya is really an "overstaying"
officer in the UN Mission, having served in that post for much more than the maximum term of
four (4) years prescribed by Section 6 of the Foreign Service Law, as amended and hence,
could not in truth be said to be in any sense capricious or whimsical, no matter how debatable
Abaya might think the validity of those conclusions is.
No grave abuse of discretion, or lack or excess of authority, may rightfully be ascribed to the
respondent Secretary. It is the RTC which the facts disclose to have gravely abused its discretion
in having so utterly misread the facts and the applicable law and overruling the Secretarys
plainly valid and legally authorized actions.

Sec. Ricardo T. Gloria vs Judge Salvador P. De Guzman, Jr

Private respondents were employees of the Philippine Air Force College of Aeronautics
(PAFCA) by virtue of temporary appointments because at the time of their appointment, they
lacked appropriate civil service eligibilities or otherwise failed to meet the necessary
qualification standards for their respective positions. One of them was Rosario Cerillo who was
appointed as Board Secretary II of PAFCA. However she was relieved from the position by
reason of loss of confidence. Subsequently, she was designated as "Coordinator for Extension
Services". Said appointments expired when the PAFCA was dissolved and replaced by the PSCA
(Philippine State College of Aeronautics) Aggrieved, private respondents filed a Petition for
Mandamus and Reinstatement before the RTC of Pasay. Petitioners filed an answer upon the
ground that mandamus will not lie to compel reinstatement because their appointment prayed for
is discretionary on the part of the appointing power (Board of Trustees). Respondent Judge de
Guzman rendered a decision ordering the reinstatement of Cerillo as coordinator for extension
services. Thus, Sec. Gloria filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to the SC.
Whether or not private respondent Rosario V. Cerillo is entitled to reinstatement to the
position of "Coordinator for Extension Services"?

The judgment of respondent Judge de Guzman which orders the reinstatement of Ms.
Rosario V. Cerillo to the position of "Coordinator for Extension Services" is patently improper
because it finds no support as to facts and the law. The fact is that private respondent's
assignment to the said position was a mere designation. Not being a permanent appointment, the
designation to the position cannot be the subject of a case for reinstatement. The fact that private
respondent Cerillo passed the requisite Civil Service Examination after the termination of her
temporary appointment is no reason to compel petitioners to reappoint her. Acquisition of civil
service eligibility is not the sole factor for reappointment. Still to be considered by the appointing
authority are: performance, degree of education, work experience, training, seniority, and, more
importantly, as in this case, whether or not the applicant enjoys the confidence and trust of the
appointing power, considering that the position of Board Secretary II, by its nature, is primarily
confidential. Reappointment to such position is an act which is discretionary on the part of the
appointing power hence it cannot be the subject of an application for a writ of mandamus.
Reinstatement is technically issuance of a new appointment which is essentially discretionary, to
be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition
being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. Such exercise of the
discretionary power of appointment cannot be controlled, not even by the Court as long as it is
exercised properly by the appointing authority. Thus the order of the lower court for the
reinstatement of the private respondent amounts to an undue interference by the court in the
exercise of a discretionary power vested in the PSCA Board of Trustees. To the question as to
the legality of the termination of the services of the petitioners, the only answer is there was no
termination to speak of. Termination presupposes an overt act committed by a superior officer.
There was none whatsoever in the case at bar. At most, PSCA Chairman of the Board of Trustees
Col. Julian gave notice to the petitioners of the expiration of their respective contracts.
Petitioners appointment or employment simply expired either by its very own terms, or because
it may not exceed one year, but most importantly because the PAFCA was dissolved and
replaced by the PSCA.


Petitioner Reynoso B. Floreza joined the government service in May, 1955 as a clerk
(action attorney) in the Administrative Division of the Department of Finance.
December, 1959-he transferred to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) where he was
appointed Senior Revenue Examiner.
While based in Davao City as Regional Director of Revenue, he was informed by then
Acting BIR Commissioner Ruben B. Ancheta of the latter's intention to designate him to
the position of Revenue Service Chief (Legal). Floreza accepted the designation.
April 4, 1986 Pursuant to reorganization program, BIR Commissioner, Bienvenido Tan,
Jr. issued a memorandum asking the all Service Chiefs and assistants to tender their

resignation. Floreza refused to do this. Commissioner Tan then issued Travel Assignment
Order assigning Floreza to the Office of the Commissioner as Consultant due to "the
exigencies of the service." The same order directed Jaime M. Maza to report to the Legal
Office as its acting chief.
The President issued EO 127 reorganizing the Ministry of Finance. Three days later, Feb.
2, 1987, the new Constitution was ratified. Section 3 of the transitory provisions provides
that all existing executive orders and issuances not inconsistent with the constitution
"shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked.
Thereafter, the committee constituted to effect the reorganization of the Bureau submitted
a staffing pattern and structure to the Commissioner and the Secretary of Finance.
Feeling that he had been placed in a "freezer" 11 and having been confidentially advised
that he would be removed from the position of Revenue Service Chief (Legal) as he was
not among those recommended for reappointment, Floreza filed in the Court of Appeals
on June 4, 1987 a petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction.
He alleged that this violated his right to security of tenure.
CA: Dismissed the petition. CA ruled that Executive Order No. 127 was issued pursuant
to Section 2, Article III of the Freedom Constitution mandating that "(a)ll elective and
appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office
until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or
appointment and qualification of their successors, if such appointment is made within a
period of one year from February 25, 1986.; that Floreza's non-reappointment as Revenue
Service Chief (Legal) did not violate his constitutional right to security of tenure for it
merely confirmed his earlier separation from the post.; Section 59 of Executive Order No.
127 which took effect on January 30, 1987 or within the one-year period prescribed by
the Freedom Constitution, personnel of the Ministry of Finance, including Floreza, were
considered removed on said date. Hence, the present petition.
March 7, 1988 - President Aquino issued appointment for Jaime M. Maza and Rizalina
Magalona to the positions of Assistant Commissioners for Legal Service and Planning
and Research Service, respectively. It is not shown why Commissioner Tan had to secure
Presidential appointments for these two items since persons appointed to these positions
are not and have never been presidential appointees at least, not under the law.
Floreza appealed on March 12, 1988 to both the Department of Finance and the Civil
Service Commission his non-reappointment as Revenue Service Chief and the
appointment of Maza and Magalona to said position.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION DECISION: Directed the BIR to appoint Floreza "to a
position in the new staffing pattern equivalent or comparable to the rank of Revenue
Service Chief, There is however no showing that the post of Assistant Commissioner is
equivalent to the post of Revenue Service Chief Assuming however that such is the case,
there is no showing either that Floreza is more qualified than either Maza or Magalona to
move up to the contested Assistant Commissioner post.
Floreza then filed the other petition herein. He prays that said decision be modified by
"restoring" him to the position of Revenue Service Chief (Legal) 'retitled Assistant
Commissioner (Legal)."

1. WON Florezas assignment as Consultant in the Office of the Commissioner through a travel
assignment order, is considered a transfer under Sec.24(c) of PD 807, hence his position as
Legal Revenue Service Chief was considered discontinued?
2. WON Floreza was invalidly terminated?

No. Florezas assignment as Consultant is considered a Detail under Sec. 24(f) of PD
807. Under such provision,
Detail. A detail is the movement on an employee from one agency to another without the
issuance of an appointment and shall be allowed, only for a limited period in the case of
employees occupying professional, technical and scientific positions. If the employee
believes that there is no justification for the detail, he may appeal his case to the
Commission. Pending appeal, the decision to detail the employee shall be executory
unless otherwise ordered by the Commission.

Under Sec. 24(c),

Transfer. A transfer is a movement from one position to another which is of equivalent
rank, level, or salary without break in service involving the issuance of an appointment.

Therefore, Floreza continued holding the position of Revenue Service Chief until
Commissioner Tan went to the President for the appointments of Jaime M. Masa as
Assistant Commissioner for the Legal Service and Rizalina S. Magalona as Assistant
Commissioner for the Planning and Research Service on March 7, 1988.
Since both the Planning and Policy (or Research) Service and the Legal Service were
given new Chiefs, Floreza was in effect terminated in his employment even as he was
offered a demotion in rank to replace it.

As to the second issue, Yes, Floreza was invalidly terminated. The Court ruled that
government reorganization may continue under the 1987 Constitution. However, no
employee shall be terminated without just cause and due notice.
In this case, the Court held that Floreza was deprived of his right to security of tenure by
his non-reappointment to the position of Revenue Service Chief or its new title under the
reorganized Bureau of Internal Revenue.
When Floreza was not reappointed as Revenue Service Chief or as Assistant
Commissioner either in the Legal Service or in the Planning and Research Service, and
other persons were appointed to the positions, he was, in effect, dismissed from the
service in violation not only of his right to security of tenure but to due process as well.
There was no vacancy in the office to which Jaime M. Maza was appointed and,
therefore, the latters promotion was invalid.



Atty. Inocencio Dumalao, then Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 134, was charged by the petitioner for allegedly engaging in usurious activities,
immorality and violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. First, Atty. Dumalao has
been collecting commissioners fee from party litigants and lawyers in exchange for favourable
action on their cases. Second, He is neglectful of his duty. He was often absent during court
hearings. Third, He withheld the salary checks of all RTC Makati employees and compelled
them to borrow money from him at usurious rates. He charged them 10% per month. Failure on
the part of the employees to pay would lead to his filing of criminal charges against the
Whether or not Atty. Dumlao must be dismissed from office given the findings of guilt against
him by the lower court.
YES. Dismissal of respondent is based on grave misconduct and dishonesty prejudicial to the
interest of the service and acts unbecoming of a court officer.
Public service requires utmost integrity and strictest discipline. The administration of justice is a
sacred task. The conduct of all officers charged with the dispensation of justice must not only be
characterized by propriety and decorum but, above all else, must be above suspicion.
First, it is expressly provided in the Manual for Clerks of Court that No branch clerk of court
shall demand and/or receive commissioners fees for reception of evidence ex-parte. Defense of
unfamiliarity with the manual is not considered by the Court. Ignorance of the existence of the
Manual clearly demonstrates how grossly remiss he has been in the performance of his duty.
Second, Atty. Dumalao, although he cannot be charged civilly and criminally because of the
suspension of the Usury law, can be held administratively liable under the Civil Service law
where lending money at usurious rates of interests is specifically listed as grounds for
disciplinary actions. The court is not a lending institution, by engaging in the lending activities,
respondent has caused dishonour to the courts of justice.
Lastly, respondents failure to prepare proper or correct monthly reports of cases was found by
the court to be a serious breach of duty. His reliance on the reports prepared by the Clerks-incharge was insufficient and is a lazy and sloppy manner of performing his duty.



Aquino v. Fernandez
Judge Manuel R. Aquino of the Municipal Trial Court of Caba, La Union submitted to
the Office of the Court Administrator his Report/Findings dated November 16, 1998
recommending that an appropriate disciplinary action be imposed upon Jocelyn Fernandez who
holds the position of Stenographer I in his sala. It appears that respondent committed several
transgressions, among which are:

Her failure to comply with the instruction to type the drafted order in Criminal
Case No. 41978 entitled, People of the Philippines vs. Jose Runas on November
4, 1998;


For absenting herself from office for the period November 4,5,6, 1998 without
prior leave of absence as required by law;

And for these transgressions the investigating judge recommended her suspension for 1 month
without pay together with a stern warning.
Whether or not the recommendation of the investigating judge was appropriate
No. Although the first transgression is considered a less grave offense under Sec. 23 of the
Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations Implementing Book V of Executive Order No.
292 for which a penalty of suspension for one month and one day to six months shall be imposed
for the first offense and dismissal for the second offense, The Court considered her admission
and plea for compassion with a promise not to commit the same acts in the future, thus deemed a
lighter penalty than suspension for one month and one day on respondent would suffice in this
As for the second offense, sections 50-51 of the Rule XVI of the Omnibus Civil Service
Rules and Regulations state that it is not mandatory to submit an application for vacation leave of
absence and in the case that these were not approved by the department or agency head, the

employee will not receive his salary to the corresponding date of absences and but does not ipso
facto render an employee administratively liable. These set of facts were found by the Court as
insufficient to discipline the respondent.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Jocelyn C. Fernandez, Stenographer I, Municipal Trial
Court, Caba, La Union GUILTY of simple neglect of duty. She is FINED the amount of Two
Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
offenses in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

FACTS: Guevarra and Cezar were the Officer-in-Charge/President and the Vice President for
Administration, respectively of the PUP.
Cueva, then PUP Chief Legal Counsel, filed an administrative case against Guevarra and Cezar
for gross dishonesty, grave misconduct, and falsification of official documents among other
charges. In Guevarras application, he denied the existence of his pending criminal and
administrative cases..rll In his Application, he answered Question No. 11 in this wise:
11. Do you have any criminal or administrative records? NO. If so, state briefly the
nature thereof NO.rll
This was despite the undisputed fact that, at that time, both Guevarra and Cezar admittedly had
17 pending cases before the Sandiganbayan. Cezar, knowing fully well that both he and
Guevarra had existing cases before the Sandiganbayan, endorsed and recommended the approval
of the application.rll
They explained that they believed "criminal or administrative records" to mean final conviction
in a criminal or administrative case.Thus, because their cases had not yet been decided by the
Sandiganbayan, they asserted that Guevarra responded in good faith.
Meanwhile, the CSC formally charged Guevarra with Dishonesty and Cezar with Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.
Aggrieved, Guevarra and Cezar filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA
essentially questioning the jurisdiction of the CSC. The CA granted the petition, nullifying and
setting aside the questioned resolutions of the CSC for having been rendered without jurisdiction.
The CA noted that the CSC erred in recognizing the complaint filed by Cueva, reasoning out that
the latter should have exhausted all administrative remedies by first bringing his grievances to
the attention of the PUP Board of Regents.

Hence, these petitions.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Civil Service Commission has original concurrent jurisdiction over
administrative cases falling under the jurisdiction of heads of agencies.
RULING: Yes, the CSC has jurisdiction over cases filed directly with it, regardless of who
initiated the complaint.
The CSC, as the central personnel agency of the government, has the power to appoint and
discipline its officials and employees and to hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or
brought before it directly or on appeal.rll
By virtue of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1341,PUP became a chartered state university,
thereby making it a government-owned or controlled corporation with an original charter whose
employees are part of the Civil Service and are subject to the CSCs original jurisdiction.

Villaluz vs Zaldivar
Ruben Villaluz was appointed as the Administrator of the Motor Vehicles Office in 1958.
In 1960, Congressman Joaquin Roces alleged that Villaluz was an ineffective leader and had
caused losses to the government. He indorsed the removal of Villaluz. Consequently, Executive
Secretary Calixto Zaldivar suspended Villaluz and ordered a committee to investigate the matter.
After investigation, it was recommended that Villaluz be removed. The president then issued an
Administrative Order removing Villaluz from his post. Villaluz averred that the president has no
jurisdiction to remove him.
Whether or not Villaluz is under the jurisdiction of the President
considering that he is an appointee of the president.

to be removed

Yes. The president has jurisdiction and not the Civil Service. The President of the
Philippines has jurisdiction to investigate and remove him since he is a presidential appointee
who belongs to the non-competitive or unclassified service under Sec 5 of Republic Act No.
2260; being a presidential appointee, Villaluz belongs to the non-competitive or unclassified
service of the government and as such he can only be investigated and removed from office after
due hearing by the President of the Philippines under the principle that the power to remove is
inherent in the power to appoint .

The Commissioner of Civil Service is without jurisdiction to hear and decide the
administrative charges filed against said official, because his authority to pass upon questions of
suspension, separation or removal can only be exercised with reference to permanent officials
and employees in the classified service to which classification the administrator does not belong.
There is some point in the argument that the power of control of the President may extend
to the power to investigate, suspend or remove officers and employees who belong to the
executive department if they are presidential appointees or do not belong to the classified service
for such can be justified under the principle that the power to remove is inherent in the power to
appoint but not with regard to those officers or employees who belong to the classified service
for as to them that inherent power cannot be exercised. This is in line with the provision of our
Constitution which says that the Congress may by law vest the appointment of the inferior
officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in heads of department.

Quimbo v Gervacio
FACTS: Petitioner Prudencio C. Quimbo, Provincial Engineer of Samar, was administratively
charged for harassment and oppression by Elmo V. Padaon, a general foreman. During the
pendency of the case, he was placed under preventive suspension without pay. The Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman found Quimbo guilty of oppression and recommended that he be suspended
from office for a period of 8 months without pay. This was approved by the Ombudsman.
The CA found Quimbo guilty of simple misconduct only and penalized him with suspension
from office for a period of 2 months without pay. Quimbo filed a Motion for
Modification/Reconsideration calling attention to the fact that he had been on preventive
suspension from March 18, 1998 to June 1, 1998 and praying that the order under
reconsideration be modified to take into account the period of his PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION
of 2 MONTHS and 17 DAYS WITHOUT PAY as part of the final penalty
imposed. The Ombudsman clarified that preventive suspension is not a penalty but
a preliminary step in an investigation; and that if after such investigation, the charge is
established and the person investigated upon is found guilty warranting the imposition of
penalty, then he shall accordingly be penalized. Such was affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE: WON the preventive suspension pending the investigation is a penalty.

HELD: Jurisprudential law establishes a clear-cut distinction between suspension as

preventive measure and suspension as penalty. The distinction, by considering the purpose aspect
of the suspensions, is readily cognizable as they have different ends sought to be achieved.
Preventive suspension is merely a preventive measure, a preliminary step in an administrative

investigation. The purpose of the suspension order is to prevent the accused from using his
position and the powers and prerogatives of his office to influence potential witnesses or tamper
with records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case against him. If after such
investigation, the charge is established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts
warranting his suspension or removal, then he is suspended, removed or dismissed. This is the
penalty. That preventive suspension is not a penalty is in fact explicitly provided by Section 24
of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987
(Executive Order No. 292) and other Pertinent Civil Service Laws. As stated in Sec. 24,
preventive suspension is not a punishment or penalty for misconduct in office but is considered
to be a preventive measure. Not being a penalty, the period within which one is under preventive
suspension is not considered part of the actual penalty of suspension. So Section 25 of the same
Rule XIV provides that the period within which a public officer or employee charged is placed
under preventive suspension shall not be considered part of the actual penalty of suspension
imposed upon the employee found guilty. Clearly, service of the preventive suspension cannot be
credited as service of penalty. To rule otherwise is to disregard above-quoted Sections 24 and 25
of the Administrative Code of 1987 and render nugatory the substantial distinction between, and
purposes of imposing preventive suspension and suspension as penalty.


DOCTRINE: Administrative Law; Public Officers; Preventive Suspensions. Although civil
service employees who are preventively suspended pending investigation are not entitled to the
payment of their salaries even if they are exonerated, there are, however, entitled to
compensation for the period of their suspension pending appeal if eventually they are found
There are two kinds of preventive suspension of civil service employees who are charged
with offenses punishable by removal or suspension: (1) preventive suspension pending
investigation (51) and (2) preventive suspension pending appeal if the penalty imposed by the
disciplining authority is suspension or dismissal and, after review, the respondent is exonerated
1. Petitioners are public school teachers at the Juan Sumulong High School in Quezon City.
For being absent on September 20 and 21, 1990, they were charged by Secretary Cario,
then Secretary of DECS, with alleged participation in the mass actions/strikes on said
2. Petitioners were placed under preventive suspension on September 21, 1990. In the
decisions of Secretary Cario on May 28, 1991 and July 9, 1992, the petitioners were
guilty as charged and dismissed them from the service effective immediately.

MERIT SYSTEM PROTECTION BOARD: Set aside. Found the petitioners guilty
only of Gross Violation of Existing Civil Service Law and Rules and suspended them
for three (3) months without pay.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION: Modified. Found the petitioners were only guilty of
being absent without necessary leave of absence. They were only meted out the penalty
of reprimand. They are automatically reinstated in the service but without payment of
back salaries. MR was denied.
CA: Affirmed. MR denied.
CA RATIO: Cited City Mayor of Zamboanga v. CA, where the SC held that back
salaries may be ordered paid to an officer or employee if he is exonerated of the charge
against him and his suspension or dismissal is found and declared to be illegal. In Sales v.
Mathay, Sr., the SC held that a postal clerk suspended for six months for gross neglect of
duty is not entitled to back salary if he cannot show that his suspension was unjustified or
the he is innocent of charge.
Are the petitioners, who were earlier dismissed for allegedly participating in mass
actions/strikes, are entitled to their back salaries upon their reinstatement after they were
found guilty only of violating reasonable office rules and regulations and penalized only
with reprimand?
YES! The petitioners, who were earlier dismissed for allegedly participating in
mass actions/strikes, are entitled to their back salaries upon their reinstatement after they
were found guilty only of violating reasonable office rules and regulations and penalized
only with reprimand. Petition granted, judgment reversed and set aside. DECS ordered
to pay petitioners their salaries.
The Supreme Court use the doctrine of stare decisis. As correctly pointed out
by the petitioners, the ruling in Gloria v. CA is squarely applicable in this case as the facts are
substantially the same. In Gloria, the public school teachers therein were either suspended or
dismissed for allegedly participating in strikes sometime in September and October 1990. They
were eventually exonerated of said charge and found guilty only of violation of reasonable office
rules and regulation by failing ti file applications for leave of absence. Thus, the penalty of
dismissal earlier imposed on them was reduced to reprimand and their reinstatement was orders.
Moreover, the Supreme Court affirmed the payment of back salaries to said teachers explain that
although employees who are preventively suspended pending investigation are not entitled
to the payment of their salaries even if they are exonerated, the Supreme Court do not
agree with the government that they are not entitled to compensation for the period of their
suspension pending appeal if eventually they are found innocent.
There are two kinds of preventive suspension of civil service employees who are charged
with offenses punishable by removal or suspension:
(1) Preventive suspension pending investigation (51) and
(2) Preventive suspension pending appeal if the penalty imposed by the disciplining
authority is suspension or dismissal and, after review, the respondent is exonerated

Apuyan vs Sta. Isabel

-Complaint for Gross Misconduct, Conduct Unbecoming of a Public Official and Graft and
-Apuyan is one of the plaintiffs in a civil case. In that civil case, a writ of attachment was
issued by the RTC against the monies and properties of defendants.
-Apuyan fetched Sheriff Sta Isabel and other policemen for the execution of the writ of
attachment against the defendant.
-Sta Isabel told Apuyan that the Sheriffs rate is 5% of the total amount attached, but he was
willing to settle for a 0.5% share. The total amount subject to attachment was
P10,000,000.00, or a share of P50,000.00.
-After levying the properties, Apuyan handed Sta Isabel an envelope containing P2,000.
When the latter saw the money, he threw the envelope and cursed him, saying that the amount
of P2,000.00 is a big insult to his person. He grabbed Apuyans collar, uttering, O, ano ang
gusto mong mangyari ngayon? Sta Isabels officemates intervened to avoid further harm and
embarrassment to complainant Apuyan.
-For his defense, Sta Isabel denied that he threw the envelope and grabbed Apuyans collar.
Accordiing to him, Apuyan was angered when he refused to accept the offer of P2,000.00
goodwill money.
-The Office of the Court Administrator found Sta Isabel guilty of the charges and
recommended the suspension of Sta Isabel. Case was submitted to the Supreme Court for
Issue: Is Sta Isabel guilty?
1. Yes. Section 9, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court requires the sheriff to estimate his expenses in
the execution of the decision. The prevailing party will then deposit the said amount to the
Clerk of Court who will disburse the amount to the sheriff, subject to liquidation. Any
unspent amount will have to be returned to the prevailing party.
In this case, no estimate of sheriffs expenses was submitted to the court by Sta Isabel. In fact,
the money which he had demanded and had received from Apuyan was not among those
prescribed and authorized by the Rules of Court.
The SC has ruled that any amount received by the sheriff in excess of the lawful fees allowed by
the Rules of Court is an unlawful exaction and renders him liable for grave misconduct and
gross dishonesty.
2. However, this is the first time that Sta Isabel has ever been charged administratively. Thus,
instead of imposing the penalty of dismissal which is the imposable penalty for commission of
the first offense of grave misconduct and dishonesty, Sta Isabel, as appropriately recommended
by the OCA, should be suspended for a period of one year without pay with a stern warning
that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.

Nilo Malanyaon v Hon.Lising

Mayor Pontanal was charged with violation of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).
He was suspended from office but he died during his incumbency, and while the case was
pending. The case was dismissed due to his death. Petitioner sought the payment of the Mayor's
salary during his period of suspension pursuant to Section 13 of RA 3019 which provides should a public officer be convicted by final judgement he shall lose all retirement or gravity
benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the
salaries and benefits to which he failed to receive during his suspension. Malanyaon was a
member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Bula, Camarines Sur.
He filed an action to declare illegal the disbursement made by Goleta as Municipal Treasurer to
the widow of Mayor Pontanal a portion of the salary of the late Mayor as such Mayor of such
municipality during the period of his suspension from August 16, 1977 up to November 28,
1979. However, Judge Lising dismissed the action on the ground that the criminal case against
Mayor Pontanal due to his death amounted to acquittal.
Whether or not the dismissal of the case due to the death of the accused constitutes acquittal?
No. It is obvious that the statute speaks of the suspended officer being "acquitted". It means that
after due hearing and consideration of the evidence against him the court is of the opinion that
his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt thus it is decided based on the merits of
the case. BUT Dismissal is not decided based on the merits of the case against the suspended
officer but due to other considerations such as, lack of jurisdiction of the court to decide the case.
THEREFORE, dismissal does not amount to acquittal.

Paredes v. CSC

This is a consolidated case of G.R. 88177 and 89530 wherein the former case, Paredes
assails the resolution sustaining the Merit System Protection Board (MSPB) directing the
revocation of her appointment as HS Project Coordinator in the HLURB and declaring the said
position vacant while, the latter case, Paredes assails another resolution affirming the decision of

the MSPB dismissing all charges against Atty.

Amor was reprimanded and warned.
G.R. 88177
Peredes entered in government services
as a public school teacher in 1950 and later
transferred to the General Auditing Office as
Auditing Clerk at the Phil/ Tobacco
Administration. Subsequently, she joined the
Human Settlements Regulatory Commission
(HSRC) as Project Officer (PO) II and was
promoted to PO III and afterwards, as the HS
Project Supervisor (PS). Respondent Atty.
Amor, HS PO IV, assailed the promotion of
Paredes; the case was docketed in the HSRC.
HSRC Commission and CEO Mendiola
dismissed Amors protest because: (1) as it was
filed beyond the prescribed period provided in
Sec 10 Rule IV of the Civil Service Rules and
Regulations; (2) Amor is not among the top
next-in-rank candidates; and even though
Paredes is only a holder of a 2 year Elementary
Teachers Certificate her educational deficiency
can be substituted with her 31 years of service
in the government. Amor appealed to the
Office of the President but it was forwarded to
the MSPB. The appeal was favored to Amor.
MSPBs ground was opined that (1) the
position requires a lawyer, architect, engineer
or a holder of a masteral degree for
appointment thereto; (2) Paredes length in
service cannot be used; (3) even if the 2 year
educational requirement can be substituted,
Paredes is only a holder of a 2 year elementary
teacher certificate not meeting the standards as
provided in the HSRC Qualification Standards;
(4) in the exercise of appointing authority
should be guided by the Civil Service Law and
Paredes files her motion for
reconsideration alleging that there is no
Qualification Standards; that the CSC
Resolution No. 84-215 approved only the
HSRCs Merit Promotion Plan (MPP) and the
System of Ranking Positions (SRP) ; that the
Qualification standards is separate from the
MPP and SRP; that the promotional

Amor except habitual tardiness for which Atty.

G.R. 89530
Peredes filed a complaint against Amor for
falsification of documents, dishonesty,
violation of the Civil Service Law and
reasonable office Rules and Regulations,
habitual tardiness, conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service and for being
notoriously undesirable.
Amor denies all allegations against her and
alleges that shes being harassed.
Finding prima facie evidence against Amor,
Legal Officer Aquino of HSRC recommended
to resolve the issue at the CSC pursuant to
CSC Memorandum Circular No. 6, Series of
1978, implementing PD No. 1409, then
Commissioner Mendiola requested in his letter
dated June 25, 1986 that the said
administrative case be taken cognizance of by
the MSBP. MSPB favoured Amor of all
Not satisfied with MSPB, Paredes appealed to
CSC however it was dismissed on the grounds
that she is not the party affected by the

appointments of petitioner are legal. However,

it was denied by the MSPB. On appeal, the
CSC ruled that although the HLURB
Qualification Standards has not been approved
it can be used as basis for recruitment and
whether or not the public respondent Whether or not petitioner Paredes has the legal
committed a grave abuse of discretion when it personality to appeal the decision of the MSPB
sustained the revocation of petitioner Paredes' absolving private respondent Amor of all
appointment as HS Project Coordinator and in charges except for habitual tardiness for which
declaring the said position vacant.
the latter was reprimanded.
No. In declaring the Position of HS Project No. Paredes the complainant is not the party
Coordinator vacant; the public respondent has adversely affected by the decision so that she
therefore not abused its discretion as the has no legal personality to interpose an appeal
Qualification Standards of the HSRC which to the Civil Service Commission. In an
should be the basis and guide for appointment administrative case, the complainant is a mere
has not been approved by the Civil Service witness (Gonzalo v. D. Roda, 64 SCRA 120)
Section 37 & 39 allows appeal to the Civil
Section 20 of Article III on Personnel Policies Service Commission in an administrative case
and Standards under Presidential Decree No. is extended to the party adversely affected by
807 dated October 6, 1975, expressly mandates the decision, that is, the person or the
them to do so. Also, it prescribes for the respondent employee who has been meted out
minimum qualification requirement in terms of the penalty of suspension for more than thirty
education, Civil Service eligibility, training, days; or fine in an amount exceeding thirty
experience, physical fitness and other qualities days salary demotion in rank or salary or
for appointment to a particular position as transfer, removal or dismissal from office. The
determined by the appointing authority. A decision of the disciplining authority is even
Qualification Standard is to be established or final and not appealable to the Civil Service
formulated by the Department or agency Commission in cases where the penalty
concerned but must be approved by the Civil imposed is suspension for not more than thirty
Service Commission. Approval is required by days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty
law because the Civil Service Commission is days salary. Appeal in cases allowed by law
the central personnel agency of the government must be filed within fifteen days from receipt
entrusted with the enforcement of laws relative of the decision.
to the selection, promotion and discipline of Here, The penalty was only a reprimand so that
the even private respondent Amor, the party
Qualification Standards shall be used as guides adversely affected by the decision, cannot even
in appointment and in the adjudication of interpose an appeal to the Civil Service
contested appointments.
For an act of a court or tribunal to be Appeal in judicial proceedings is a statutory
considered as committed in grave abuse of right that must be exercised only in the
discretion the same must be performed in a manner and in accordance with the

capricious and whimsical manner as

tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined by law or to act in
contemplation and within the bounds of law
(Carson et al. v. Judge Pantamosos, Jr., G.R.
No. 75934, December 13, 1989; Intestate
Estate of Carmen de Luna v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, G.R. 72424, February 13,
1989; People v. Manuel, 11 SCRA 618)
Failure on the part of the petitioner to show
grave abuse of discretion will result in the
dismissal of the petition (Del Rosario v.
Subido, 31 SCRA 382).

provisions of law (Ozaeta v. Court of

Appeals, G.R. 83281, December 4, 1989;
Velasco v. Court of Appeals, 51 SCRA 439).
This doctrine is also applicable in quasijudicial proceedings so that one must first
ascertain the law applicable to determine
whether or not the party can appeal the
order or decision


An administrative complaint was filed with the Office of the Regional Director of the then
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), NCR, by Dr. Carolina C. Dizon, the
principal of the Bacood Elementary School in Sta. Mesa, against Angelito M. Huertas, a school
teacher in the same school, for grave misconduct, disrespect of authority and violation of the
provision of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers.
The school conducted a regular election of the officers of the faculty club. Huertas was reelected president, besting for the second time around his co-teacher, Mrs. Catalina Lorenzo. This
notwithstanding, a group of teachers circulated a manifesto denouncing Huertas. As a
countermove, Huertas launched his own signature campaign to show his clear mandate.
Huertas received information that Dizon was preventing the teachers from signing in his
favor. He rushed to the office of Dizon and angrily confronted the latter. After the heated
exchange of words, Huertas decided to leave, but before doing so, warned Dizon that if she
doesnt stop, he will sue her. Dizon preempted Huertas and filed an administrative complaint
against him.
An Investigating Committee (Grievance Committee) was constituted for the purpose. The
Investigating Committee conducted a preliminary hearing. The formal investigation was set on
September 10, 1996, during which Huertas appeared without the assistance of counsel. The

parties agreed to submit the case for resolution without any formal investigation on the basis of
the affidavits on record.
In time, the Grievance Committee submitted its investigation report, finding Huertas guilty of
gross discourtesy in the course of official duties. In a Resolution dated October 16, 1996,
Regional Director Nilo Rosas modified the findings and recommendation of the Grievance
Committee. He found Huertas guilty of gross disrespect and imposed on him the penalty of one
(1) month suspension from service without pay.
Huertas moved for a reconsideration of the resolution on the alleged ground of lack of due
process, both substantive and procedural. He claimed that he was not represented by counsel
during the investigation and that the Grievance Committee failed to conduct a formal
investigation of the case. Director Rosas denied the motion, prompting Huertas to appeal the
resolution to the DECS Secretary via a petition for review.
Then DECS Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria issued a Resolution reversing the resolutions of the
Regional Director and dismissing the administrative complaint for want of a formal hearing. The
Secretary ruled that Huertas was deprived of his right to due process when the Grievance
Committee dispensed with a formal investigation and based its report-recommendation merely
on the affidavits of the parties and those of the witnesses of the complainant.
Dissatisfied, Dizon herself filed a motion for the reconsideration of the resolution. Then Acting
Secretary Erlinda C. Pefianco reconsidered the ruling of her predecessor and reinstated the
resolution of the Regional Director.
Huertas filed a petition for review which was treated as a motion for reconsideration by then
DECS Secretary Andrew Gonzalez, FSC. Secretary Gonzalez reconsidered and set-aside
Secretary Pefiancos Resolution and reinstated Secretary Glorias Resolution. In reinstating
Secretary Glorias Resolution, Secretary Gonzalez tersely and succinctly ratiocinated:
It is evident that then Secretary Pefianco acted on the motion for Reconsideration of the
[complaint] contrary to the rule that only the respondent can file a motion for reconsideration
(CSC Resolution No. 94-0512, Sec. 7).
The CA ruled that Dizon herself had the right to appeal or move for a reconsideration of the
Resolution of Secretary Gloria as held by the Court in Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy. It
rejected the argument of the OSG that a decision in administrative cases penalized by one month
suspension or less shall be final under Section 47(2), Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of
E.O. No. 292. According to the CA, the petitioners case does not fall within the ambit of E.O.
No. 292 because the root of the penalty is an illegally constituted investigating committee. As
the old adage tells us it is a fruit of a poisonous tree.
Petitioner avers that respondent Dizon was barred from filing a motion for the reconsideration
of the Resolution of Secretary Gloria. This resolution reversed that of Regional Director Rosas
and ordered the dismissal of the said complaint, on the ground that the petitioner was deprived of
his right to due process when the committee dispensed with a formal investigation and because
its report was based merely on the affidavits on record. The petitioner cites Section 39(a) of

Presidential Decree No. 805, which provides that appeals where allowable, shall be made by the
party adversely affected by the decision. He also cites Del Castillo v. Civil Service
Commission, where the Court ruled that only the government employee against whom the
administrative case is filed is entitled to appeal from a decision adverse to him, and the ruling of
this Court in Mendez v. Civil Service Commission that the civil service law does not contemplate
a review of decisions exonerating officers or employees from administrative charges. The
petitioner insists that when Secretary Gloria ordered the dismissal of the complaint against him
for lack of due process, he was exonerated of the charge.
Whether or not private respondent Carolina Dizon has the locus standi to file a motion for
We do not agree with the petitioner. The Court overturned its ruling in Mendez v. Civil Service
Commission and in Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy, which latter holding, in turn, was
reiterated in Philippine National Bank v. Garcia, Jr. Thus:
In his Concurring Opinion, Justice Reynato S. Puno explained that the Civil Service Law did not
categorically sanction the old doctrine barring appeals by parties other than the respondent
employee. What the law declared as final were only those decisions of heads of agencies
involving suspensions of not more than thirty days or fines not exceeding thirty days salary.
These decisions, he said, involved minor and petty offenses, and to allow multiple appeals in
those instances would overburden the quasi-judicial machinery of our administrative systems.
Neither can the old doctrine barring appeal be justified by the provision limiting the jurisdiction
of the Civil Service Commission. According to that provision, the CSC was limited to the
review of decisions involving: (1) suspension for more than thirty (30) days; (2) fine in an
amount exceeding thirty (30) days salary; (3) demotion in rank or salary; and (4) transfer,
removal or dismissal from office. Nothing in the provision, however, indicates a legislative
intent to bar appeals from decisions exonerating a government official or an employee from an
administrative charge.
Indeed, the battles against corruption, malfeasance and misfeasance will be seriously undermined
if we bar appeals of exoneration. After all, administrative cases do not partake of the nature of
criminal actions, in which acquittals are final and unappealable based on the constitutional
proscription of double jeopardy.
Furthermore, our new Constitution expressly expanded the range and scope of judicial review.
Thus, to prevent appeals of administrative decisions except those initiated by employees will
effectively and pervertedly erode this constitutional grant.
It must be stressed that the petitioner was not exonerated of the charge against him in the
November 20, 1997 Resolution of Secretary Gloria; the DECS Secretary merely nullified the
proceedings before the committee as well as its report/recommendation. Hence, respondent
Dizon was moving for the reconsideration of the November 20, 1997 Resolution of the
Secretary, and was not, in effect, appealing from any resolution exonerating the petitioner.

FACTS: On December 14, 1994, then Mayor Jose Salcedo appointed Jocelyn Gentallan as local
civil registrar of the Municipality of Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. Commissioner Thelma Gaminde
of the CSC, when queried about Gentallans qualifications, confirmed that Gentallans work
experience was more than enough to meet the minimum requirement of 3 years experience for
the local civil registrar.
On January 5, 1995, the Cicvil Service Commission Regional Office No. 10 (CSCRO-10)
approved her appointment as permanent. However, Rosalina Asis, a researcher aide in the Office
of the Local Civil Registrar, filed a protest. It was dismissed by the CSC in CSC Resolution No.
95-5317, because the protestant was not a qualified next-in-rank. In the same resolution,
however, the CSC reviewed the appointment of respondent Gentallan. It held that Gentallan was
not qualified as she failed to fulfill the required 3-year experience relevant to the position of local
civil registrar. Her motion for reconsideration was denied in CSC Resolution No. 96-0582. She
then filed a motion for reconsideration
Mayor Paurom, pursuant to the CSC resolutions, ordered respondent to vacate her post as Local
Civil Registrar and directed her to assume the position s of Assistant Registration Officer. CA set
aside the questioned resolutions and found respondent qualified to the position. On December
21, 1998, the mayor issued a memorandum, directing respondent to assume office as the local
civil registrar, and a notice of respondents salary adjustment was issued. The court also held that
she was entitled to back wages as well as other bonuses. In contrary to the decision of the court
the CSC avers that Gentallan was not entitled to the back wages and other emoluments as she
was not illegally dismissed from office.
ISSUE/S: WON the CSC has the standing to appeal the decision which adversely affects the
civil service (entitlement to back wages and other emoluments).
HELD: YES. The CSC has the standing to appeal and/or file its motion for reconsideration.
RATIO: The CSC, as an institution whose primary concern is the effectiveness of the civil
service system, has the standing to appeal or to file a motion for reconsideration of a decision
which adversely affects civil service. At the outset, it should be noted that the Civil Service
Commission, under the Constitution, is the central personnel agency of the government charged
with the duty of determining questions of qualifications of merit and fitness of those appointed to
the civil service.
The Civil Service Commission is declared with legal standing to file its appeal and/or motion for
reconsideration in this case. But the Court sustained the decision of the CA insofar as it declares
that Gentallan should be reinstated to her position with back wages, RATA and bonuses to be
paid by the Municipality of Jasaan, Misamis Oriental.

NAB vs Mamauag
466 SCRA 624

Nancy Gaspar and Proclyn Pacay left the residence of Judge Angeles in Quezon City. Gaspar
and Pacay were both minors and were later classified as moderate or mild mental retardates
by the DSWD. Agnes Lucero found Gaspar and Pacay wandering around the vicinity of the
Philippine Rabbit bus terminal in Cubao. Gaspar and Pacay narrated to Lucero stories of
maltreatment and non-payment of salary by Judge Angeles.
Lucero brought Gaspar and Pacay to the Central Police District Command (CPDC). At the
police station, desk officer SPO1 Billedo recorded the girls complaint in the police blotter.
On Billedos instruction, SPO1Cario brought Gaspar and Pacay to the East Avenue Medical
Center for the requisite medical examination. The two girls were returned to the police
station where Cario interviewed them. Carios Initial Investigation Report was reviewed
and signed by SPO2 Almario and approved by P/Insp. Mamauag. SPO1 Felipe and SPO4
Garcia escorted Gaspar and Pacay to the DSWD. P/Insp. Ganias signed the Letter of
Turnover to the DSWD.
The incident drew the attention of the media and spawned several cases. One was a criminal
case for child abuse under Republic Act No. 7610 against Judge Angeles. Another was an
administrative complaint for Grave Misconduct filed by Judge Angeles against Ganias,
Mamauag, Almario, Cario, Felipe and Garcia. Judge Angeles later impleaded Billedo as
additional respondent.
Judge Angeles filed an administrative complaint, The Inspectorate and Legal Affairs
Division of the CPDC investigated the administrative complaint. After its investigation, the
ILAD recommended the dismissal of the charges. The CPDC District Director approved the
recommendation and dismissed the complaint. Not satisfied with the outcome, Judge Angeles
moved for re-investigation of the case before PNP Chief Sarmiento.
In a Decision dated 7 June 1996, PNP Chief Sarmiento ruled as follows:
WHEREFORE, this Headquarters finds: Respondents P/CINSP. Ganias, SPO1 Billedo,
and SPO1 Cario guilty of Serious Neglect of Duty and orders their dismissal from the
police service; P/INSP Mamauag and SPO2 Almario guilty of Less Serious Neglect of
Duty and orders that both of them be suspended from the police service for Ninety days
with forfeiture of pay; and SPO4 Erlinda Garcia and SPO1 Vivian Felipe exonerated of
the charge for insufficiency of evidence.
PNP Chief Sarmiento nmodified his previous ruling and ordered the dismissal from the
service of Mamauag, Almario, Garcia and Felipe.
Mamauag, et al. forthwith filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus against PNP Chief
Sarmiento, PNP Inspector General Sales and Judge Angeles before the RTC of Quezon City.

The Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition for failure of petitioners to exhaust
administrative remedies and for failure to show that respondents abused their discretion.
Mamauag, et al. then appealed the PNP Chiefs Resolution before the NAB.
The NAB dismissed the appeal for late filing and lack of merit. Mamauag, et al. filed a
motion for reconsideration of the Decision but the NAB denied it. Thus, Mamauag, et al.
sought relief from the Court of Appeals.

Whether the private complainant in an administrative case has the legal personality to move
for reconsideration, or appeal an adverse decision of the disciplining authority.
No. RA 6975 itself does not authorize a private complainant to appeal a decision of the
disciplining authority. Sections 43 and 45 of RA 6975 authorize either party to appeal in the
instances that the law allows appeal. One party is the PNP member-respondent when the
disciplining authority imposes the penalty of demotion or dismissal from the service. The other
party is the government when the disciplining authority imposes the penalty of demotion but the
government believes that dismissal from the service is the proper penalty.
However, the government party that can appeal is not the disciplining authority or tribunal which
previously heard the case and imposed the penalty of demotion or dismissal from the service.
The government party appealing must be one that is prosecuting the administrative case against
the respondent. Otherwise, an anomalous situation will result where the disciplining authority or
tribunal hearing the case, instead of being impartial and detached, becomes an active participant
in prosecuting the respondent.
A private complainant like Judge Angeles is not one of either party who can appeal under
Sections 43 and 45 of RA 6975. The private complainant is a mere witness of the government
which is the real party in interest. Private complainant Judge Angeles is not a party under
Sections 43 and 45 who can appeal the decision of the disciplining authority.
Judge Angeles has no legal personality to appeal the dismissal of the charges against Mamauag,
et al. by the CPDC District Director. The motion for re-investigation filed by Judge Angeles with
the PNP Chief is in substance an appeal from the decision of the CPDC District Director. The
PNP Chief had no jurisdiction to entertain Judge Angeles appeal in the guise of a motion for reinvestigation. Since the PNP Chief had no jurisdiction, all actions taken by the PNP Chief
pursuant to the appeal is void. Thus, the Decision of the CPDC District Director dismissing the
charges against Mamauag, et al. stands and is now final and executory.

SSS Employees Association v CA



Amnesty Does not Need Concurrence from Congress if the President Acts Pursuant to His Power
to Legislate
In 1982, after the lifting of Martial Law, Legaspi, then incumbent member of the interim
Batasang Pambansa, petitioned to declare Presidential Decree 1840 granting tax amnesty and
filing of statement of assets and liabilities and some other purposesunconstitutional. He argued
that said decree was promulgated despite the fact that under the Constitution (T)he Legislative
power shall be vested in a Batasang Pambansa (Sec. 1, Article VIII) and the President may grant
amnesty only with concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa. In this case, there was no
concurrence given by the IBP. Legaspi averred that since Martial Law is already lifted, the
president can no longer arbitrarily enact laws. At the same time, Legaspi averred that
Amendment No. 6, which provides legislative powers to Marcos, is invalid because that is no
longer allowed after the lifting of the ML.
ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos can validly grant tax amnesties w/o the concurrence of the
Batasan Pambansa.
HELD: SC ruled PD 1840 to be valid. Legaspi argued that PD 1840 is invalid for it did not
enjoy the concurrence of the Batasan. He relies on Article 7, Sec 11 of the Constitution which
provides that
The President may, except in cases of impeachment, grant reprieves, commutations and
pardons, remit fines and forfeitures and with the concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa, grant
The SC noted that Article 7, sec. 11, applies only when the President is exercising his power of
executive clemency. In the case at bar, PD 1840 was issued pursuant to his power to legislate
under Amendment No. 6. It ought to be indubitable that when the President acts as legislator as
in the case at bar, he does not need the concurrence of the Batasan. Rather, he exercises
concurrent authority vested by the Constitution.

Sevilla v. Gocon
Facts: Sevilla and Limbo was charged of falsification of official document, dishonesty and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Gocon, Guidance Counselor III, was
designated as Chairman of the Values Education Department in 1989. Limbo was a former Head
Teacher III in the Practical Arts Department of the Quezon National High School in Lucena City.

Respondent Sevilla requested for the reclassification of eight (8) items of Secondary Head
Teacher III to Secondary Head Teacher VI. Apparently, said request contains super
impositions/erasures, specifically item 7 wherein the Practical Arts Department was replaced to
Values Department with Limbo as the ALLEGED Secondary Head Teacher (Head Teacher III)
when in truth he was the Head Teacher of the Practical Arts Department which was later merged
with the Home Economics Department. Sevilla, in his capacity as Principal IV, requested the
Office of the Regional Director, DECS Region IV, for the upgrading of Gocons position of
Guidance Counselor III to Head Teacher VI for Values Education. DECS denied the request.
Gocon discovered that Limbo was appointed as Head Teacher VI for Values Education when he
asked about said appointment, Sevilla explained to Gocon that Limbo was temporarily
designated as Head Teacher for Values Education so that all Head Teacher items would be
reclassified by DECS Regional Office IV. Gocon filed a complaint and requested the
intercession of the then DECS Secretary regarding the matter. DECS claimed among others, as
follows: I strongly deny the allegation of Mr. Sevilla that I suggested to him to temporarily
designate Mr. Limbos appointment item as Values item I do not know personally Mr.
Sevilla, hence, I have no reason to make such suggestion to him knowing that such act is a clear
falsification of public documents. And I do not remember having met him. Limbo
acknowledged that he was the one who made alterations in the request for reclassification. He
stressed, however, that he initialed all the corrections he made to show that he was in good faith
in doing so and that he acted upon the suggestion of Monina Belen, as staff of Leovigildo
Arellano at the DECS Management Division.
In the CSC case, respondents Sevilla and Limbo were formally charged by the Civil Service
Commission Regional Office No. IV of falsification of official documents, dishonesty and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

WON the acts or omissions of petitioner Sevilla amounted to dishonesty

HELD: No, the omission of petitioner Sevilla was not equilvalent to dishonesty BUT he is
administratively liable for that omission. BASIS: The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of
Public Officials and Employees
RATIO: Dishonesty is intentionally making a false statement in any material fact, or practicing
or attempting to practice any deception or fraud in securing his examination, registration,
appointment or promotion. Dishonesty was understood to imply a disposition to lie, cheat,
deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity.
It was Limbo who had made the alterations in the letter of petitioner, who never represented him
to anyone as the head teacher of the Values Education Department. The records show that the
item of Limbo was reclassified from Head Teacher III (Practical Arts) to Head Teacher VI
(Values Education), without petitioner misrepresenting the former as the one performing
the functions of head teacher of the Values Education Department. Although Limbo was
appointed as Head Teacher VI (Values Education), after his previous item had been reclassified
as such, he continued performing the functions of head teacher of the Practical Arts Department.
Hence, there was no misrepresentation of him as the head teacher of Practical Arts (Boys). The
above circumstances, however do not totally absolve petitioner from liability. The meat of the

anguished Complaint of respondent was the concealment from her and the entire school of
Limbos appointment as Head Teacher VI for Values Education. Ordinarily, no one would
assume the heavy duties and responsibilities of a position without receiving, or at least expecting
to receive in the future, the corresponding compensation therefor. Good faith demanded that
petitioner should have revealed Limbos appointment to respondent. It was improper for him to
expect her to continue performing the functions of a values education head teacher, when
someone else had already been appointed to that position and was receiving the corresponding
salary. Thus, he is administratively liable for his omission which, however, did not amount to
dishonesty, as he had made no false statement. On his part, no deliberate intent to mislead,
deceive or defraud can be read from the circumstances of this case.
As a public school principal, petitioner is bound by a high standard of work ethic. The Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA 6713), enunciates inter
alia, the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the
public service. Section 4 of the Code commands that (p)ublic officials and employees at all
times respect the rights of others, and refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good
customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public interest.
By his omissions, petitioner failed to live up to such standard. His failure to inform respondent of
Limbos appointment and to promptly remedy the resulting prejudice against her may be
characterized as conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service, since such conduct
affected not only her but also all the other faculty members of QNHS.
The conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service is penalized under Section 22(t)
of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent
Civil Service Laws by suspension. The suspension is for six (6) months and one (1) day to one
(1) year for the first offense. HOWEVER, petitioner has already reached the compulsory age of
retirement during the pendency of this case. He is no longer in the government service. Thus, it
would be more appropriate to impose on him a fine equivalent to his salary for six (6) months,
instead of a suspension. This penalty is allowed under Section 19 of the same Rules.

Reyes v Anosa (1997)

Government service demands great sacrifice. One who cannot live with the modest salary of a
public office has no business staying in the service. Also, the public trust character of the office
proscribes him from employing its facilities or using official time for private business or

Respondent Anosa was a utility worker assigned in the court of Judge Reyes. However, said
judge recommended his dismissal for grave misconduct, dereliction of duty and conduct
unbecoming a public officer. First, the judge observed that there were times when
respondent would be absent from office, report late for work, and leave before the official
time. Second, said judge received a copy of an information, charging Anosa with the crime of
falsification of public document for delivering a falsified release order of a certain Sanchez who
was under detention at the National Bilibid Prisons. Third, Judge Reyes found that respondent
failed to deliver mail matters containing notices and subpoenas to parties and counsels for
hearings that were scheduled 1-3 years ago, which is his job to do.
In his reply, Anosa denied the second allegation. On the third allegation, he admitted that he
forgot to deliver the mail matters, and asked for apology. But with regards to the first allegation,
he explained that he reports for work but stays downstairs and sometimes helps, whether for a
fee or not, people who need to follow-up papers in court. He allegedly does so to augment his
income from the government, which, accdg. to him, is not adequate to support his family.
WON his explanation is sufficient not to dismiss him?
Held & Rationale
No. Government service demands great sacrifice. One who cannot live with the modest salary of
a public office has no business staying in the service. He is free to seek greener pastures. The
public trust character of the office proscribes him from employing its facilities or using official
time for private business or purposes." This ruling is aligned with the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees which demands that every public servant
shall at all times uphold public interest over his personal interest.
On the charge of falsification, respondent's guilt is yet to be determined pending a Criminal Case
resolution. Its pendency, however, is not a hindrance to his dismissal.

Baybay Water District v COA

Nitafan vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

FACTS: The Chief Justice has previously issued a directive to the Fiscal Management and

Budget Office to continue the deduction of withholding taxes from salaries of the Justices of the
Supreme Court and other members of the judiciary. This was affirmed by the Supreme Court en
banc on December 4, 1987.
Petitioners are the duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over Branches 52, 19 and 53,
respectively, of the RTC, National Capital Judicial Region, all with stations in Manila. They seek
to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial
Officer of the Supreme Court, from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their
salaries. They contend that this constitutes diminution of salary contrary to Section 10, Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that the salary of the members of the Supreme
Court and judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law and that during their continuance in
office, their salary shall not be decreased. With the filing of the petition, the Court deemed it
best to settle the issue through judicial pronouncement, even if it had dealt with the matter
administratively. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for prohibition.
Whether or not the salaries of judges are subject to tax.
HELD: Yes.
The salaries of members of the Judiciary are subject to the general income tax applied to all
taxpayers. Although such intent was somehow and inadvertently not clearly set forth in the final
text of the 1987 Constitution, the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission negate the
contention that the intent of the framers is to revert to the original concept of non-diminution
of salaries of judicial officers. Hence, the doctrine in Perfecto v. Meer and Endencia vs. David do
not apply anymore. Justices and judges are not only the citizens whose income has been reduced
in accepting service in government and yet subject to income tax. Such is true also of Cabinet
members and all other employees. on Act of 1935.
What is provided for by the constitution is that salaries of judges may not be decreased during
their continuance in office. They have a fix salary which may not be subject to the whims and
caprices of congress. But the salaries of the judges shall be subject to the general income tax as
well as other members of the judiciary.

San Luis v CA
Castro v Gloria