Absorption - Human Nature and Buddhist Liberation

Buddhism Series
ABSORPTION
HUMAN NATURE AND BUDDHIST LIBERATION
Johannes Bronkhorst
UNIVERSITyMEDIA
20 1 2
Copyright 20 1 2 Johannes Bronkhorst

Published by UniversityMedia, Wi! / Paris
www. universitymedia.org
All rights reserved.
Printed on acid-free and lignin-free paper
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Bronkhorst, Johannes, 1946Absorption. Human Nature and Buddhist Liberation. / Johannes
Bronkhorst.
p. cm. - (UniversityMedia, Buddhism Series)
Includes bibliographical references and index
ISBN 978-3-906000-24-4 (acid-free paper)
1 . Buddhism -Psychology-Meditation.
2. Psychology-Psychotherapy-Sigmund Freud.
3. Language-Semantics-Symbolism-Origin.
4. Mind-Body-Brain-Sexuality.
5. Religion-Mythology-Mysticism-Ritual.
I. Title.
ISBN 978-3-906000-24-4
For Joy
whose encouragement has been unflinching
Contents
PREFACE.................................................................................................................................... 3
PART I: THE SYMBOLIC MIND

INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................. 9
I. Symbolic representation..........................................................................................9
2. Mysticism ..................................................................................................................... 25
3. Ritual ............................................................................................................................... 31
. .
. . . . . . .. 41
4. Mythology and Religion
.
.. ..
. .
. . . . . .. .. .. . 43
5. Culture
..................... ...... .............. ..... ...... ....... .....
................ . ......... ......................
......
ApPENDIX I: Semantic etymologies
.......... ... .......... .... .... . . ..
. .
................. ......... .... ........
..
..
. ..
. ..
. ... . .
.......
. ..
. . . .. . . .... .. . . 48
... .
. .
.. .
. ..
. .
ApPENDIX 2: Symbolic rderence and the origin of languagc. . .... . . . 55

. .. .
.. .
. ..
PART II: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE BUDDHA

INTRODUCTION
................................... .................................... ........... ..........................
73
OUTLINE OF A PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY

I. Fundamentals
.
.
.. . .
95
. . . . . . . . . 109
2. Comparison with neurological findings .
.. .
. . ... . . 117
3. Psychotherapy and its obstacles
4. A "complete cure"
. . ..
..
. . ... . . . . . . . .. 125
5. The theory adapted .
.
. .
. .. . . . . .
... 135
.
.. . . .. .
... .
142
6. The theory refined .
... .
.
. . . . 149
7. Sexuality and sublimation
. :....................................................... 157
8. The result of a "complete cure"
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS .
. 163
. . ...................... ....................................... . .. .............. . ..... ...... .........
.. .......... ..... .... .... .. ..
... . .. .. . .
............ . ....... .... .................. .... .
................... .. ......
.......... .. ........ .. .... ..
... .......... .................. ........ ..... .........
.... ........... ............ . .... ..
..
. .... ..... .
. . .. ..
...
... .. .....
....
... . . .
.. . .. ........
. .... ........ .. .. .... .. . .................... ..
................ ........................
. ........ ............
... ... ..
......... ....
... ................................. ..
ApPENDIX I: The main texts, with a psychological commentar y

I. The path of liberation as a whole
.. ... . . 176
2. Guiding one's thoughts
.
. . . . 183
.. . . . . . . . .
. .. . .. 187
3. Avoiding hunger .
4. Awareness .
. .
..
. .. . . 189
.
. .
. .. . ..
190
5. Mindfulness .
6. Fear of being alone
. . . . . . . .... .. . .
.
194
.. .. .
.. .
.. . .
. .. . 197
7. Who succeeds?
. .
. ... .. . . .
... 200
8. The liberated person .
ApPENDIX 2: Absorption & Pleasure in Mysticism & Meditation. 202
ApPENDIX 3: Psychology and Free WilL. .. . . ..
. . . . . . 208
................................................
.. .
........................... .................... . .................. .. . .... ..
... .......................
. . .. .. .. ... ..... .... ...
.. ........ ...
. ... .
....
.. .................................... ... ........................... .. ......... .. . ......... . .

.... .............................. .............................. ... ......... .......
.............
............
..
. ......
.. . ..... . .. .......
..........
..... .......... ....
..
.... ......................... . ..
..
.. ....................
...... ... ...
......
.. .
... ... .. ... ............
.. .......
. . ..
... .
.......
...... .. .
.......
. ...
...... ...
..
...
. . ...
...... . ....
.. .... . .........
. . . . ..
Technical Terms and their Sanskrit and Pali Equivalents . .. .
. . . .. 216
. . .. . . . . . .. . 216
.
.
217
245
.
Abbreviations
Bibliography
Index
. . ..
.................................. ....... .... ....
..
..................
. ........ ...
... . ..
...... ...... .... .. .
......
. ..
.. . .
..
....... ..
.. ... ..
..................................... .............................. ........... .................. .
.......................................................................................................................................
My most fundamental objective is to urge a change

in the perception and e valuation offamiliar data.'
Preface
The two studies announced in the subtitle overlap only mini
mally. They find expression in Part I and Part II of this book
respectively. These two parts can be read and evaluated inde
pendently. The one point they have in common is the impor
tant role they attribute to attention, or rather absorption, in
the functioning of the mind.
Apart from this common point, the two parts present two
theories - one in Part I, another in Part II - meant to provide
answers to a set of questions. Several of these questions ( espe
cially those discussed in Part I ) have been asked before, and an
swers have been proposed. It is not the aim of this book to dis
cuss those answers. This would be impractical: those answers
belong to widely different fields of enquiry, and are not always
relevant to the answers proposed in this book. This book will
rather focus on its own intended contribution, which does not
wholly fit in any existing field in particular. It offers two new
theories, and concentrates on issues that have a direct bearing
on those theories. To the best of my knowledge, the two theo
ries do not contradict but rather complement each other.
Matters not directly required for a presentation ( and un
derstanding ) of the two theories are mostly relegated to the
notes, which readers who merely wish to acquaint themselves
with the theories are free to ignore. The notes are for those
who wish to be informed about sources of information ( and
1
Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (p. viii-ix) .
ABSORPTION
of ideas) , concurring views of others, possible objections, and

further issues to be explored. There are references to neuro
logical findings, yet the theories presented do not amount to
interpreted neuroscience. Indeed, it is a fundamental claim of
this book, argued especially in the Introduction to Part II and
in Appendix 3 of Part II, that there is a need for genuine psy
chological theory beside an understanding of underlying and
accompanying neurological processes.
Part I, to put it brieRy, deals with the human faculty of
speech, and shows that this faculty is inseparable from some
other human particulars, most notably religion and culture. It
argues that, largely as a result of language acquisition, humans
have two levels of cognition, which in normal circumstances
are simultaneously active. Absorption is a ( or the) means to cir
cumvent some, perhaps all, of the associations that characterize
one of these two levels of cognition, the symbolic one (sym
bolic in a sense to be specified) , thus leaving the non-symbolic
level of cognition. The result is what is sometimes referred to
as a mystical experience, but which is not confined to mysti
cism. It plays a role in ritual, mythology and other "religious"
phenomena, and elsewhere.
Part II takes as point of departure what John Brockman
would call a "dangerous idea" (What Is Your Dangerous Idea?),
whose consequences it explores (but on whose correctness it
does not insist). In doing so, it has to develop a rudimentary
psychological theory centered on motivation. Absorption has
its place in this theory, too, in that it reveals itself as an im
portant source of pleasure. Since the human mind is at least
in part guided by pleasure, which it seeks to repeat, states of
absorption leave memory traces that subsequently direct the
mind. However, these memory traces do not "recall" the states
of absorption, but rather the objects or circumstances that ac
companied them. The resulting activity of the mind differs in
Preface
this way from person to person, and can pursue wildly diverg
ing goals. The theory in Part II also accounts for an important
characteristic of absorption : it cannot normally be evoked at
will. Without this characteristic, absorption could not play the
roles it does in the two theories of Part I and Part II.
The theories here presented do not easily fit into usual aca
demic categories. If pressed, I would propose "human science":
the scientific study of the way humans function which, while
using material from all relevant domains, refuses to be boxed
into any of them.
Inevitably, I am no specialist in all the domains that are
being touched upon in this enquiry. Yet I believe that some
thing important is missing in any and all of them. I am aware
of the risks of venturing into foreign territory, and cannot but
request readers to bear with me and concentrate on the posi
tive that this enquiry may contribute. In spite of helpful com
ments from anonymous referees, insufficiencies will no doubt
remain, perhaps even plain errors. StilL I do hope and believe
that it may help to make progress toward a fuller understand
ing of human nature.
An earlier version of Part I has appeared under the tide
"Ritual, holophrastic utterances, and the symbolic mind" in
the Proceedings of the International Conference "Ritual Dy
namics and the Science of Ritual" that was held at Heidelberg
University, 29 September to 2 October 2008 ( Bronkhorst,
20 10). A preliminary PDF version of the whole book was
available on the internet from 2009 onward; 2 it has now been
removed. The present book contains the definitive text and
incorporates substantial improvements on the earlier versions.
2 It has evoked at least one published response: "Re-introducing philo
sophical soteriology: Bronkhorst on absorption" by Eddy Van Laer

hoven (20 1 0).
PART ONE
The Symbolic Mind
INTRODUCTION
The evolutionary proximity of human beings to other primates

is sufficiently established for studies of "the naked ape" or "the
third chimpanzee" to be possible and justified.! Nevertheless,
many of those working in the human sciences insist that there
are fundamental differences between humans and the other
primates. Something happened in our evolutionary past which
led to the rise of a number of features that we do not share
with our evolutionary cousins. The most notable of these are
language, culture and religion. 2 What happened that had these
momentous consequences ? The following pages will propose
an answer. Given the nature of the question, it is appropriate
to begin with primates different from us.
1 SYMBOLIC REP RESENTATION
In research carried out during the seventies at Georgia State

University, two chimpanzees-called Sherman and Austin
participated in an experiment meant to investigate whether
chimpanzees could be taught to uselanguage, and to what extent
they would do SO.3 Since the vocal tract of chimpanzees does
not allow them to pronounce the sounds of human language,
a different method was employed: The apes were taught to use
a special computer keyboard made up of so-called lexigrams.
! These are the titles of two popular books on human behavior by Des
mond Morris ( 1967) and Jared Diamond ( 1 992) respectively.
2 Perhaps one should add (certain forms of) madness, which some
(Crow, 1 99 1 ; 1 995; 1 998; Bentall, 2003: 203) consider inextricably
linked to language.
3 See Savage-Rumbaugh & Rumbaugh, 1 978, esp. p. 279 ff.
ABSORPTION, PART I: T H E SYMBOLIC MIND
The more specific aim of the experiment was to find out

whether they would be able to use lexigrams in combinations.
These combinations might then be looked upon as elementary
syntactical relationships. The chimps were trained to chain
lexigram pairs in simple verb-noun relationships. For example,
the lexigram GIVE followed by the lexigram BANANA would
result in the giving of a banana. GIVE followed by ORANGE
would be similarly successful, but other combinations would
not. The following scheme, where + means "successful", and.
means "unsuccessful': illustrates this:
GIVE + BANANA +
GIVE + ORANGE +
BANANA + ORANGE
ORANGE + GIVE
etc.
Initially our chimps would have just two "verb" lexigrams and
four food or drink lexigrams to choose from. But the mere
learning of a number of lexigram pairs was not sufficient for
the chimps to understand the general system (viz., "verb" fol
lowed by "noun" leads to the appropriate result). They could
learn individual associations between specific pairs and their
result, but for a long time they failed to grasp the system of re
lationships of which these correlations were a part. In the end
they did grasp the system, but at the cost of thousands of trials
in which they had to find out what combinations oflexigrams
led to no result whatsoever. Once they had grasped the system,
they had crossed the symbolic threshold. They had succeeded in
using "words" as symbols in the special sense used here : as signs
that do not only refer to "their" objects, but also to each other.
For a correct appreciation of what follows it is essential to
understand that the word symbol is not used here in its usual
sense and that it should on no account be confused with it. I
10
1 Symbolic Representation
borrow the word in this specific sense - i.e., signs that do not
only refer to "their" objects, but also to each other - from Ter
rence Deacon, who in turn has borrowed it from the philoso
pher Charles Sanders Peirce. Symbols of this kind play a role in
what we will call symbolic reference.
Even the highly condensed presentation oflong and elabo
rate experiments given above shows how much is required to
acquire symbolic reference. To cite Deacon ( 1 997: 86) :
What the animals had learned was not only a set of
specific associations between lexigrams and objects or
events. They had also learned a set oflogical relationships
between the lexigrams, relationships of exclusion and in
clusion. More importantly, these lexigram-Iexigram re
lationships formed a complete system in which each al
lowable or forbidden co-occurrence of lexigrams in the
same string (and therefore each allowable or forbidden
substitution of one lexigram for another) was defined.
They had discovered that the relationship that a lexigram
has to an object is a function of the relationship it has to
other lexigrams, not just a function of the correlated ap
pearance of both lexigram and object. This is the essence
of a symbolic relationship.
What Sherman and Austin learned with enormous and pro
longed exertion, we humans learn in our childhood, apparently
with much less effort. 4 Where the two chimpanzees took a
long time to learn to pay attention, not just to the desired ob4 Only in extremely unfavorable external circumstances, such as those
experienced by so-called feral children, may human infants not succeed

in acquiring language. On feral children, see Candland, 1 993; Newton,
2002; Strivay, 2006. The story of Helen Keller who, though blind and
deaf from an early age, succeeded in acquiring language is interesting in
this context; see Donald, 200 1 : 232-25 1 (note esp. p. 249: "The notion
oflabeling events and objects simply doesn't occur to an isolated mind.")
11
ABSORPTION, PART I: THE SYMBOLIC MIND
ject of their activity but also to the signs and to their relation
ships with each other, we learn to do so almost automatically.
Indeed, all normal human children learn the language of their
care-takers. Yet the complexities of those languages are much
greater than those of the simple sets of "words", two in each
set, which Sherman and Austin managed to master. All human
children cross the symbolic threshold at an early age, without
realizing it. They are able do so because evolution has equipped
us for this task, primarily by giving us a much enlarged prefron
tal cortex.s
Let us stay somewhat longer with our two chimpanzees. In
itially, they had learned the combination GIVE + BANANA as a
indivisible whole, which gave rise to a pleasant result, viz., that
a banana was given to them. After thousands of trials and er
rors they had mastered the system behind it. They had learned,
for example, that the lexigram GIVE could be used with a fol
lowing ORANGE so as to lead to a different result, viz., that an
orange was given to them. Meanwhile they had learned that
these two outcomes had something in common, and that this
common element was somehow represented by the lexigram
GIVE. Similarly, other combinations had taught them that the
lexigram BANANA was associated with the element banana in
various activities. In other words, Sherman and Austin were
in the process of creating representations corresponding to ele
ments of objective reality. These representations were the re
sult of the overlap of events: the representation "give" resulted
from the overlap of "give banana" and "give orange". Human
beings appear to arrive at their representations in a similar,
though much more complex manner.
These few reflections show that the learning of language
facilitates the formation of representations. These representa
tions correspond initially to the shared parts of different linS
See Deacon, 1 997, Part Two : Brain (pp. 1 45-3 1 8 ).
12
guistic utterances, i.e., primarily words. However, these same

reflections show that this process, once begun, does not neces
sarily stop here. We can easily imagine a situation where our
chimpanzees wish to receive an object for which there is no
lexigram on their keyboard, say a piece of chocolate. In that
case they might create a symbolic representation, chocolate,
which they would know how to deal with syntaxically if only
there were a lexigram CHO C O LAT E, for example in GIV E +
CHO C O LAT E. In other words, once the learning of language
has initiated the capacity of creating symbolic representations,
the animal may be in a position to create new symbolic repre
sentations for which there are no words. This accounts for the
human capacity not only to create new words but also to have
symbolic representations for which there are no words.6
Consider in this connection another ape, a bonobo called
Kanzi. Kanzi, for reasons that will not be discussed at present,
acquired language to a degree far superior to Sherman and
Austin. Strikingly, his linguistic skills subsequently facilitated
other kinds oflearning even in domains not directly associated
with language. Indeed,
his understanding encompassed all manner of novel
events and even of metaphor. His understanding of lan
guage informed his interpretation of real world events
and his broadened capacity to interpret and appropri
ately classify real world events informed his linguistic
comprehension in a boot strapping effect. An example of
6 Symbolic representations must be distinguished from concepts (even
though some authors use the word concept for what we call representa
tion, and category for what we call concept; so Bickerton, 2009: 1 92 ff.).
An animal of prey may have a concept of the animals that it hunts, in
the sense that it will know and recognize them. Without symbolic rep
resentation, however, it cannot think about those animals the way those
endowed with symbolic representation can.
13
this was the ease with which Kanzi learned to flake stone
tools given a modicum of both visual and verbal instruc
tion. Similar attempts by other apes required long and
arduous conditioning and shaping regiments?
Crossing the symbolic threshold, it appears, involves more
than being able to learn to use language. It opens up a world of
representations which, by the boot strapping effect mentioned in
this passage, extends well beyond the representations covered
by the words of one's language. 8
It is tempting to connect these reflections with what neu
robiologists tell us about human consciousness. Consider the
following passages from a recent book by Gerald M. Edelman,
a neuroscientist (2004: lOS ):
By its very nature, the conscious process embeds repre
sentation in a degenerate, 9 context-dependent web: there
are many ways in which individual neural circuits, synap
tic populations, varying environmental signals, and previ
ous history can lead to the same meaning.
[ J
.
There is no single circuit activity or code that corresponds

to a given conscious "representation". A neuron may con
tribute to that "representation" at one moment, and in
the next have no contribution to make. The same is true
of context-dependent interactions with the environment.
7 Savage-Rumbaugh, Fields & Taglialatela, 2000: 9 1 6.
8 It is for this reason hardly surprising that Kanzi is reported to have
made, all on his own, four new "words", standing for 'banana ,' 'juice',
'grapes ' and 'yes ' (New Scientist, 2 January 2003) . Everett (20 1 2: 258)
shows that Pirah as can describe colors they have no word for, and con
cludes: "People can think beyond their language."
9 On p. 43 Edelman explains : "Degeneracy is the ability of structurally
different elements of a system to perform the same function or yield the
same output."
14
A shift of context can change the qualia that are parts of

a representation, or even recompose some qualia and still
keep that representation.
[ ... ]
[D] epending on input, environment, body state, and oth
er contexts, different core states can underlie a particular
representation. The interactions are relational and have
the properties of polymorphous sets. These are sets, like
Ludwig Wittgenstein's "games", that are defined neither
by singly necessary nor by jointly sufficient conditions.
Elsewhere (p. 99), Edelman draws attention to the hippocam
pus, a neural structure in the brain which is "necessary for epi
sodic memory, the long-time memory of sequential events, the
brain's 'narrative"'. He comments: "Higher-order conscious
ness rests in part on episodic memory, and in the absence of
such memory coherent semantic activity would not be likely
to develop."
It seems probable, then, that the overlap of episodic memo
ries and other mental events plays an important role in the cre
ation of representations in the mind, just as for Sherman and
Austin the intersection of the useful units of communication
GIVE + BANANA and GIVE + ORANGE led to the representa
tion give. Symbolic reference greatly increases the number of
representations thus created. It seems that Sherman and Austin
had not extracted the representation give out of the numerous
situations in which they had been given things. Only the ex
ercises with the lexigrams taught them to do so. We may as
sume that the same happens to human children when learning
to speak.
In this way, symbolic reference makes possible an almost
limitless multiplication of representations as well as their com
bination in countless ways. Indeed, worlds of imagination can
IS
now be created that take us away from our immediate impulses

and experience. The results are multiple. Symbolic representa
tion, to begin with, permits us to think, and speculate, about
our own past and future and, what is more, to think about our
selves as characters in numerous scenarios. Hence we can think
about ourselves the way we think about others. This is what
Deacon refers to in the following passage ( 1 997: 452) :
Consciousness of self in this way implicitly includes con
sciousness of other selves, and other consciousnesses can
only be represented through the virtual reference created
by symbols. The self that is the source of one's experience
of intentionality, the self that is judged by itself as well as
by others for its moral choices, the self that worries about
its impending departure from the world, this selfis a sym
bolic self It is a final irony that it is the virtual, not actual,
reference that symbols provide, which gives rise to this
experience of self This most undeniably real experience
is a virtual reality.lo
Symbolic representation influences our experienceY We will
return to this below. It also allows us to be objective with regard
to ourselves, which in its turn is behind our tendency to judge
ourselves the way we judge others ( at least to some extent ) Y
This in its turn allows for empathy on a wider scale than might
otherwise be possible. Without symbolic representation there
1 0 This self is what Dennett ( 1 99 1 : 418) calls the narrative self; see be
low.
II
George Van Driem, private communication : "The idea that language
exerts an unfavorable effect on perception itself and blinds us to real
ity is an old idea already espoused by Bertus Brouwer and Frederik van
Eeden."
1 2 Symbolic reference, and the acquisition oflanguage that underlies it,
are also a necessary prerequisite for the understanding of others' false
beliefs; Pyers & Senghas, 2009.
16
would be no detachment from immediate arousal and compul

sion, no possibility to judge oneself the way we judge others,
no place for moral choices, no developed forms of empathy, no
ordinary sense of sel and much else.
Symbolic representation does not stop at self-representa
tion. The immediate arousal and compulsion mentioned ear
lier, too, are objectified and find a place in the "outside world"
in the form of values and institutions. The result is as described
by Roy A. Rappaport ( 1 999: 8), who uses the word symbol ap
proximately in the same way we do : 1 3
The epochal significance of the symbol for the world
beyond the species in which it appeared did not become
apparent for many millennia - perhaps hundreds of
millennia - after it had emerged. But earlier effects of
language and even proto-language upon the lifeways of
the hominids in its possession must soon have become
enormous. [ ... ] [L] anguage permits thought and
communication to escape from the solid actualities ofhere
and now to discover other realms, for instance, those of
the possible, the plausible, the desirable, [ ... ] [However,]
[l] anguage does not merelyp ermit such thought but both
requires it and makes it inevitable. Humanity is a species
that lives and can only live in terms of meanings it itself
must invent. These meanings and understandings not
only reflect or approximate an independently existing
world but participate in its very construction. The
worlds in which humans live are not fully constituted
1 3 Cpo Rappaport, 1999: 4: "only humans, so far as we know, are pos
sessed of languages composed, first, oflexicons made up of symbols in

Peirce s' sense of the word [ ... ] or Buchler s' [ . . . ] : tha t is, signs related only
'by law: i.e. convention, to that which they signify, and second, of gram
mars, sets of rules for combining symbols into semantically unbounded
discourse."
17
by tectonic, meteorological and organic processes. They

are not only made of rocks and trees and oceans, but
are also constructed out of symbolically conceived and
performatively established [ ... ] cosmologies, institutions,
rules, and values. With language the world comes to be
furnished with qualities like good and evil [ ... ]
Once again, this description concerns the world experienced
with the help of symbolic representation. The world experi
enced without it, if such a thing is possible, lacks these features.
The effects of symbolic representation go even further than
this. Objective reality is in part social reality. This is what John
R. Searle set out to show in his book The Construction of Social
Reality ( 1 995). 1 4 And indeed, it cannot be denied that there
is "an objective world of money, property, marriage, govern
ments, elections, football games, cocktail parties and law courts
in a world that consists entirely of physical particles in fields of
force, and in which some of these particles are organized into
systems that are conscious biological beasts, such as ourselves"
(p. xi-xii). In other words, "there are portions of the real world,
objective facts in the world, that are only facts by human agree
ment" (p. 1 ) . This social reality, which is real, is yet language
dependent (chapter 3). In institutional reality, language is not
used merely to describe the facts but, in an odd way, is pardy
constitutive of the facts.ls And being language-dependent, it
depends on symbolic representation.
Largely as a result of symbolic representation, human
thought is, at least to some extent, narrative in nature. 1 6 To cite
the philosopher Daniel Dennett ( 1 99 1 : 4 1 7- 1 8) :
14 See further Searle,.20 10.
IS
Searle, 1 999: llS.
1 6 See, e.g., Turner, 1 99 6; Deacon & Cashman, 2009: 49 6 ff.; Boyd,

2009.
18
Our human environment contains not just food and

shelter, enemies to fight or flee, and conspecifics with
whom to mate, but words, words, words. These words
are potent elements of our environment that we read
ily incorporate, ingesting and extruding them, weaving
them like spiderwebs into self-protective strings of
rative. Indeed, [ ..]

.
when we let in these words
nar
[ . .] they
.
tend to take over, creating us out of the raw materials

they find in our brains.
Our fundamental tactic of self-protection, self-control,

and self-definition is not spinn in g webs or building dams,
but telling stories, and more particularly concocting and
controlling the story we tell others - and ourselves about who we are.
of the characteristics of narrative is its so-called 'chunk
ing' of experience. As a matter of fact, " [i] t is easier to organ
ize knowledge and behavior if the vast realms of experience
are subdivided; indeed, the world would quickly become un
manageable if! had to sort through every possible concept and
potential course of action at every given moment." (Herman,
2003: 1 72). To avoid the threatening chaos, the narrative-i.e.
symbolic-mind sifts through the data of perception and ap
portions different parts to different narratives. I? Depending on
the "stories" in which "I" figure, certain objects receive extra at
tention while others are neglected. This sifting process is, once
again, at least in part the result of symbolic representation.
One
I? Cpo Hirstein, 2005: 239: "The creative process of confabulation, its

character and persistence, is emblematic of what it is to be human . . . . [I]
t places actions and events in a particular human context we find easy to
understand. ... It is capable of providing the peace of mind an explana
tion brings, whether or not that explanation is a good one . ... [W] e find
stories ... easy to understand and convenient to use ...
"
19
We may sum up what precedes by citing once more Deacon

( 1 997: 423):
Because of our symbolic abilities, we humans have access
to a novel higher-order representation system that not
only recodes experiences and guides the formation of
skills and habits, but also provides a means of represent
ing features of a world that no other creature experiences,
the world of the abstract. We do not just live our lives in
the physical world and our immediate social group, but
also in a world of rules of conduct, beliefs about our his
tories, and hopes and fears about imagined futures.
Here two points have to be emphasized. First, symbolic repre
sentation not only affects the way we think or communicate, it
also affects our cognition and the way we experience the world.
Second, the way we experience the world with the help of sym
bolic representation - in short, symbolic experience is based
on, and cannot exist without, non-symbolic experience. In
other words, we have two levels of cognition,18 one of which (the
symbolic one) cannot exist without the other, but not vice
versa. Let us look at these two points:
-
1 . Symbolic representation affects the way we experience the

world. As symbolic beings we live in a constructed world which
contains many things that the objective world (which is "out
side" and independent of us) does not contain, or which it
only contains by human agreement. Among these construct
ed things, as we have seen, we must count our objectified self
("self", "soul") , our objectified urges ("values", "morality"),
18 One might speak of "dual processing", a notion that attracts the at
tention of researchers, but which does not so far appear to have led to a
study of the phenomena which our two levels of cognition will bring u p
below; see Evans, 2008.
20
objects to which a function has been attributed (bank-notes

where there are only pieces of paper), and much else.
2. Symbolic experience is rooted in non-symbolic experience
and would become seriously dysfunctional without it. Without
non-symbolic experience, we might lose contact with objec
tive reality altogether, being locked, without possibility of
escape, into a world of imagination that symbolic representa
tion creates for US. 1 9 The young child has pure non-symbolic
experience, which allows it to subsequently "cross the symbolic
threshold" and make the quantum leap into the world of sym
bolic experience. But even after this leap it needs non-symbolic
experience to mold the world it constructs into objective fact.
The conclusion we are led to draw is that we, normal human
adults, experience the world in a double manner: a construct
ed world of symbolic representation is added onto a world of
"raw" experience that underlies and accompanies it.
What would non-symbolic experience be like, if it could
free itself from symbolic representation? Consider first the fol
lowing passage from Searle's book ( 1 995: 1 2) :
From a God's-eye view, from outside the world, all the fea
tures of the world would be intrinsic, including intrinsic
relational features such as the feature that people in our
culture regard such and such objects as screwdrivers. God
could not see screwdrivers, cars, bathtubs, etc., because
intrinsically speaking there are no such things. Rather,
God would see us treating certain objects as screwdrivers,
cars, bathtubs, etc. But from our standpoint, the stand
point of beings who are not gods but are inside the world
1 9 According to certain sleep researchers, this is what happens in
dreams. See Llin as & Pare, 1 99 1 ; Jouvet, 1 999: 106 ; Hirstein, 2005:
242; Warren, 2007: 1 37 f.
21
that includes us as active agents, we need to distinguish

those true statements we make that attribute features to
the world that exist quite independently of any attitude
or stance we take, and those statements that attribute
features that exist only relative to our interests, attitudes,
stances, purposes, etc.
We may not be gods, but our experience of the world without
symbolic representation would be close to the one attributed
to God in this passage: we would see no screwdrivers, cars,
bathtubs, etc., but only the objects that people who do use sym
bolic representation treat as screwdrivers, cars, bathtubs, etc.
On the basis of our earlier reflections, we may add further fea
tures. If we could free ourselves from symbolic representation,
we would have no "objective" notion of self, we would inhabit
a world without values, and our expectations of the future and
many of our memories of the past would not affect our present
experience. And finally, we would not filter out many of the
features of the world that have been neglected because they do
not fit into any of our present narratives.
Once again it will be interesting to cite the observations of a
neurologist. Antonio Damasio deals with the question of con
sciousness in his book The Feeling of What Happens ( 1 999). He
distinguishes between two kinds of consciousness that he calls
core consciousness and extended consciousness. Core conscious
ness, he argues, is of a nonverbal nature. Extended conscious
ness is based on core consciousness and cannot exist without
it. The reverse is not true: core consciousness can exist with
out extended consciousness, and this is indeed what happens
in certain neurological disorders. Extended consciousness, in
the words ofDamasio (p. 1 9 5- 1 96) , "goes beyond the here and
now of core consciousness, both backward and forward. The
here and now is still there, but it is flanked by the past, as much
past as you may need to illuminate the now effectively, and,
22
just as importantly, it is flanked by the anticipated future. The

scope of extended consciousness, at its zenith, may span the
entire life of an individual, from the cradle to the future, and
it can place the world beside it. On any given day, if only you
let it fly, extended consciousness can make you a character in
an epic novel, and, if only you use it well, it can open wide the
doors of creation About the experience of core consciousness
he says (p. 202) :
In a neurologically normal state, we are never completely
deprived of extended consciousness. Yet it is not difficult
to imagine what a possessor of only core consciousness
probably experiences. Just consider what it may be like
inside the mind of a one-year-old infant. I suspect objects
come to the mind's stage, are attributed to a core self, and
exit as quickly as they enter. Each object is known by a
simple self and clear on its own, but there is no large-scale
relation among objects in space or time and no sensible
connection between the object and either past or antici
pated experience.
For our present purposes it is important to remember that
extended consciousness cannot exist without core conscious
ness, so that core consciousness is present in some way in
every normal conscious human being. To this may be added
that extended consciousness, whatever its neurological basis, is
largely shaped by symbolic representation. Damasio's extended
consciousness may therefore be considered as coinciding for a
large part with the consciousness that results from symbolic
representation. Damasio's observations confirm in this manner
that symbolic experience is based on, and cannot do without,
non-symbolic experience.
Edelman, whom we mentioned before, distinguishes be
tween what he calls primary consciousness and higher-order
23
consciousness. Even though he thinks that "it is likely that

[such primates as chimpanzees] have a form of higher-order
consciousness", he recognizes that the acquisition of language
makes a major difference. About this he says (2004: 1 03 ) :
Clearly, one o f the largest steps toward the acquisition
of true language is the realization that an arbitrary to
ken - a gesture or a word - stands for a thing or an
event. When a sufficiently large lexicon of such tokens is
subsequently accumulated, higher-order consciousness
can greatly expand in range. Associations can be made by
metaphor, and with ongoing activity, early metaphor can
be transformed into more precise categories or intraper
sonal and interpersonal experience. The gift of narrative
and an expanded sense of temporal succession then fol
low. While the remembered present is in fact a reflection
of true physical time, higher-order consciousness makes
it possible to relate a socially constructed self to past re
collections and future imaginations. The Heraclitean illu
sion of a point in the present moving from the past into
the future is constructed by these means. This illusion,
mixed with the sense of a narrative and metaphorical abil
ity, elevates higher-order consciousness to new heights.
Note that more is needed than just a "sufficiently large lexi
con" of arbitrary tokens that stand for things or events. These
tokens - as has become clear from the experiments involving
Sherman and Austin - should be recognized and employed
as symbols in the sense used here, i.e. as referring not just to
"their" things or events, but also to each other, and as consti
tuting a system oflogical relationships with each other.
In view ofwhat precedes we can use the image of a web that
symbolic representation weaves between us and the objects of
our perception, a web that separates us from the outside world.
24
2 Mysticism
This is of course only an image: there is no real web, and there

is no real separation from the outside world. In reality, incom
ing signals are interpreted in the light of the numerous associa
tions which they evoke. In the case of those who master sym
bolic reference, these associations are richer and more intricate
than for those who don't. 2o
2 MYSTICIS M
In spite of its obvious insufficiencies, I will continue to use the

image of a web woven by symbolic representation that situates
itself between us and the outside world. Is it possible to push
the web aside and experience the world in a more direct man
ner ? Are we condemned to remain separated from the objects
of our perception by this artificial construction that has inter
posed itself between us and the world ? Some of the testimo
nies of people variously referred to as mystics, madmen and
meditators suggest that the web sometimes tears, or is torn,
whether on purpose or by accident. 2 1
20 It is of course conceivable that incoming signals will be interpreted in
the light of other associations than the usual ones, in which case we may
be entitled to speak of hallucinations. Cf Benta U, 2003: 3 64 ff.
21 C Pyysiainen, 1993: 3 6 (cp. 200 1 : 1 1 4 ): "mystical experiences
may count as an exception to the linguistic quality of man's being-in
the-world"; Staal, 1990: 139: "mysticism is characterized by the absence
of language. It points to a pre-linguistic state which can be induced
by ritual, by recitation, by silent meditation on mantras, or by other
means". On the link of epileptic seizures with "deeply moving spiritual
experiences, including a feeling of divine presence and the sense [of be
ing] in direct communion with God", see Ramachandran & Blakeslee,
1998: 179 f. Deacon & Cashman (2009) propose a somewhat different
explanation of mysticism and religion.
25
Since William James, mystical experience is often charac

terized as being ineffa ble and as possessing a noetic quality.22
Literal-minded philosophers find the idea that it is ineffable,
and therefore beyond the realm of language, puzzling. 23 Less
caviling readers may find this a particularly appropriate man
ner of describing experience that is no longer co-determined
by symbolic representation, and therefore by language. Mysti
cal and related experience is also said to give access to a differ
ent, higher, reality, or to allow its subject to perceive things as
they really are (this is James's noetic quality). Indeed, a univer
sal effect of mystical experience is said to be "an understand
ing that what was experienced was more real/important than
any prior experience." 24 The second of these two claims cor
responds to what we would expect to hear from someone who
has succeeded in discarding symbolic representation, if only
for a short while and perhaps only in part. Such a person may
be expected to experience the world differently, and in a more
direct and immediate fashion, since ordinary human experi
ence is always separated from its objects by the web of symbolic
representation. The claim that mystical experience gives access
to a different and higher reality is, though not strictly true, al
most correct. Experience through symbolic representation is
indirect, mediate. Experience without it, or with less of it, is
direct, immediate. Strictly speaking it is the same "objective"
22 Wul ff, 2000: 400. For a collection o f passages from Western litera
ture on what cannot be said, see Franke, 2007.
23 See Gellman, 2005: 3 . 1 ; Proudfoot, 1985: 124 Nelson (20 1 1 :
254) thinks that the mystical is not beyond language in a neurologi
cal sense. "It is before language, residing in ancient brain structures con
cerned with our Darwinian survival. My strong hunch is that mystical
experiences existed long before language came to our species." Inevita
bly, Nelson is obliged to conclude that "other animals aside from human
beings may have mystical feelings." This is not the position here taken.
24 Paper, 2004: 4.
26
2 Mysticism
reality that is experienced, but it is experienced so differently

that the experiencer may have difficulty recognizing it. Indeed,
recognition itself involves connecting the present cognition
with earlier ones. In non-symbolic experience the link with
constructed former and anticipated later experiences is weak
ened, or absent. The subject is, as a result, easily convinced that
he or she is confronted with a different reality, where in actual
fact it is the same reality that is experienced differently. Let me
add that, if our mystic has to answer the question which of the
two realities he or she has experienced is more real, the answer
can easily be predicted. The mystical experience is so much
more direct and immediate, and so undoubtedly real, that the
choice is obvious: the reality presumably experienced in the
mystical state is more real than that of ordinary experience.
Other features commonly ascribed to mystical experience
are easily explained by the weakening or disappearance of the
web of symbolic representation. The ordinary self, for exam
ple, will tend to disappear. This does not surprise, given the
fact that the ordinary self was a construction of symbolic rep
resentation to begin with. The unitary and undifferentiated
nature of mystical consciousness emphasized by Stace ( 1 960)
and others is another feature that fits in well with the absence
of symbolic representation. Recall that the symbolic level of
cognition divides the world into representations. Without
symbolic representation reality presents itself as undivided,
and therefore unitary.
It seems safe to conclude from all this that there are ways to
liberate experience, if only temporarily and perhaps partially,
from the web woven by symbolic reference. 2 5 This extraordi
nary experience will subsequently be interpreted in ways prop25 It will be argued below ( 5) that culture, too, weaves a web of sym
bolic reference which is added on to, or integrated with, the "linguistic"
web.
27
er to the culture of the person concerned. Such interpretations

are, of course, of the greatest significance both to those who
have these experiences and those who study them on the basis
ofwitness reports. However, they do not interest us in the con
text of the present investigation.
We note in passing that this non-symbolic experience (the
"mystical" experience) is highly valued and sometimes sought
after by many of those who have had it. There is a notable ten
dency to ascribe deep significance to it. We will have more to
say about this below.
Having established that there appear to be ways of discard
ing the web of symbolic representation, we may give some
thought to the question of how this result is obtained. The
aim is not to enumerate techniques and methods that are de
facto used by mystics and others who succeed in having mysti
cal experiences. Rather, we wish to consider what mechanism
we would expect, in the light of our reflections so far, to lead
to that result.
In order to make progress, we have to abandon the image
of a web woven by symbolic reference, and try to understand
in a more factual way what happens when a person crosses the
symbolic threshold. The case of Sherman and Austin will once
again be helpful. Whereas these two chimpanzees had initially
learned the connection between the pair oflexigrams GIV E +
BANAN A and the giving of a banana that followed, they had,
after extensive supplementary learning, come to associate the
single lexigram GIVE with a variety of situations and elements,
among them other lexigrams. These numerous associations with other lexigrams, with the order oflexigrams to be respect
ed, with situations in which different things were given - al
lowed them to use this particular lexigram in a simple system
of symbolic reference.
28
2 Mysticism
Essentially the same applies to human language users. A

vast number of associations allows them to use words the way
they do. Many, perhaps most, of these associations are not con
scious. But they are there, below the surface. 26 Without them,
language use would not be possible.
What should one do to remove the web woven by symbolic
representation? The obvious answer is: Stop the extra associa
tions that constitute symbolic reference. How does one stop in
numerable associations, most ofwhich are not even conscious ?
Focusing the mind presents itself as a plausible method.
Focusing the mind is a faculty which humans and many
animals possess. Situations that are particularly threatening,
to take an example, make us forget almost everything elseY
This faculty is to some extent subject to ordinary conscious
control. We then speak of concentration. It can take more ex
treme forms, in which case the expression absorption is to be
preferred. 2s Absorption typically accompanies mystical experi
ences. Absorption, we must assume, reduces the number and
perhaps the intensity of associations, including unconscious
associations. 29 What remains is an experience in which the
26 Cpo Deacon, 1 997: 265-66: "The symbolic reference emerges from
a pattern of virtual links between [neurological] tokens, which consti
tute a sort of parallel realm of associations to those that link those to
kens to real sensorimotor experiences and possibilities."
27 The filtering of irrelevant information is preceded by activity in the
prefrontal cortex and basal ganglia, particularly in the globus pallidus;
McNab & Klingberg, 2007.
2 8 "Absorption is the tendency to alter our perceptions and surround
ings while in a state of highly focused attention with complete immer
sion in a central experience at the expense of contextual orientation"
(Maldonado & Spiegel, 1998: 59). On the exclusion of irrelevant infor
mation, see Rees et ai., 1 997.
29 For references to literature dealing with the neurological correlates
of focused attention, in particular the reduced activity of certain brain
parts, see notes 150 and 1 5 1 below.
29
associations that are responsible for symbolic representations

have been reduced or suppressed: a non-symbolic, mystical ex
perience.3o
This explanation of mystical experience has an additional
advantage. If focusing the mind can reduce the number and/or
intensity of associations, there is no reason to insist that in its
strongest forms it affects only those associations that partici
pate in symbolic representation. No symbolic representation
is required to associate present with past experience: animals
that have not crossed the symbolic threshold can yet learn ftom
past experience, and therefore interpret the present in the light
of the pastY Mystical experiences that are completely time
less and therefore without any associative connection with the
past, can be understood as resulting from a state of absorption
in which all associations with the past, including those that do
not contribute to symbolic representation ( if such exist ) , are
30
Compare these reflections with the following passage from

Pyysiainen's book Beliif and Beyond ( 1 996): "If we now define the so
called external mystical experience [ ... ] as an experience with sensory
input but with no thoughts, it corresponds rather well to [the]
description of the receptive mode in which [ ... ] logical thinking and
categorization are reduced to a minimum [ ... ] [S]uch experience would
mean that syntax and the linguistic aspects of consciousness [ ... ] as
well as off-line thinking are turned off. Moreover, also consciousness
of one's own conscious nature [ ... ], on which (together with language)
the experience of self is based, supposedly disappears. What remains, is
[ ... ] on-line thinking, and an awareness of one's sensations. The external
world does not disappear from one's consciousness, but is experienced
as a here and now continuity with which oneself is coextensive."
31 See Rose, 2003 : ISS ff. There is a debate about the question whether
and to what extent different animals (bonobos, orangutans, scrub-jays,
squirrel monkeys, rats) can anticipate the future; see New Scientist of 1
November 2008 p. 32-3S ("Chrono-creatures: do animals ponder the
past and contemplate the future ?" by Henry Nicholls) with references
to Mulcahy et al., 2006; Naqshbandi et al., 2006; Raby et al., 2007;
Correia et al., 2007; Clayton et aI., 2008.
30
3 Ritual
interrupted. In other words, focusing the mind can serve as an

explanation for mystical experiences that are free from symbol
ic representation, but also for aspects of such experiences that
cannot be fully understood by the mere absence of symbolic
representation.
The explanation of mystical experience by means of absorp
tion has a further consequence. There can be degrees of absorp
tion, with as upper limit the total interruption of all associa
tions. This upper limit is not necessarily reached by all those
who have mystical or semi-mystical experiences. It follows that
there is a sliding scale connecting "ordinary" and "mystical" ex
perience. 32 A slight reduction of the number and intensity of
associative mental connections may be part of everyone's daily
experience, yet may not strike those who undergo it as particu
larly remarkable; they may not even take notice.
3 RITUAL
Ritual is often accompanied by formulas, strings of speech

sounds. In India the term used is mantra, and I shall occasion
ally speak of mantras when referring to these kinds of formu3 2 Damasio (20 1 0: 1 68- 169) makes a similar comparison in connec
tion with his core consciousness and extended consciousness: "Today 1 see
the changes in consciousness scope as far more mercurial than 1 first
envisioned them; that scope constantly shifts up or down a scale as
if it moved on a gliding cursor." Further, "the levels of consciousness
fluctuate with the situation" (p. 169). "I have always envisioned many
grades between the core and autobiographical endpoints of the scale"
(p. 1 7 1 ) . Lewis-Williams & Pearce (2005: 56 etc.; also Lewis-Williams.
20 10: 140 ff) speak of a "spectrum of consciousness" and mention in
tense concentration as one of the factors that intensify its introverted
end; "religious experience is. in the first instance. a result of taking the
introverted end of the spectrum at face value - within a given cultural
context" (p. 5 5 ) .
31
las. Frits Staal, in several publications ( e.g. 1 984; 1 985; 2006),

has drawn attention to the fact that mantras, when used as
mantras, do not express meaning, at least not in the ordinary
way. He does not deny that many, though not all, mantras have
a form that resembles or is identical with linguistic utterances.
He emphasizes, however, that mantras, even those that consist
of language, are not used as language. Formulas used in ritual
settings are not analyzed.33 Indeed, often they cannot be ana
lyzed. They may be in a language that is no longer used and
that is unknown to those who hear or even pronounce the for
mulas. This is as true of the Latin of the Catholic mass34 as it
is of the Vedic Sanskrit used in Brahmanical ritual. Sometimes
the formulas are in no known language. This applies to many
of the mantras used in Tantric forms of Hinduism and Bud
dhism. A more familiar example may be abracadabra. Whether
or not this formula has a historical etymology, it is and has
been unanalyzable and "meaningless" for most if not all of its
users.
Why should ritual formulas be unintelligible, "meaning
less" ? This question may find its answer in the observation that
ritual formulas are, or perhaps have to be, holophrastic. Ordi33 Cpo Rappaport, 1 999: 1 5 1 : "It is virtually definitive of ritual speech
that it is stereotyped and stylized, composed of specified sequences of

words that are often archaic, is repeated under particular, usually well
established circumstances, and great stress is often laid upon its precise
enunciation. As Maurice Bloch [ ... ) has emphasized, in contrast to or
dinary discourse in which considerable choice is open to speakers at a
number of points in any utterance, in ritual formulae the 'features of
juncture: those components of speech indicating relations among the
referents, are immutable. In M. C. Bateson's [ ... ) terms, ritual utterances
are 'fused: This is to say that meaning is derived from them as unseg
mented wholes, or as wholes only segmented into minimal meaning
ful units of considerable length, usually much greater length than is the
case in ordinary speech."
34 For an ethnographic description of the Latin mass, see Jucker, 2007.
32
3 Ritual
nary holistic phrases - i.e., the formulas we use in daily life

- do have functions. They may have a literal meaning as well,
but this literal meaning plays a reduced role in the formula
when used as formula. Sometimes the literal meaning may even
be misleading. The phrase "how do you do ?" is not a question
about the way the person addressed does something. But even
though the constituent words are misleading, the phrase is not
without function, as anyone who refuses to use it in appropri
ate circumstances will soon discover.
Ritual formulas, then, are like ordinary formulas, but more
so. Ritual formulas often do not even pretend to have a literal
meaning. Indeed, it seems to be a plus for ritual formulas to be
unintelligible. Let us therefore forget about their literal mean
ings. What remains ? Recall that ritual formulas, being holis
tic utterances like formulaic phrases in ordinary language, can
still have a function. Ordinary holistic utterances, as recent re
search has shown, often "seem to be geared towards manipulat
ing the situation in which the speaker finds him- or herself".3s
Nothing prevents us from assuming that ritual formulas do
the same. And indeed, it would be easy to provide illustrations
of the frequently manipulative intent of the use of ritual for
mulas. In India, "mantras are understood by the tradition as
polyvalent instruments of power";36 "their function [ ... J is a di
rect action, generally a ritual one, or a psychological or mysti
cal one".37 It seems natural to conclude that ritual formulas do
have a function, but unlike ordinary formulas they no longer
pretend to have a linguistic meaning as well. Ritual formulas,
seen this way, are the perfect holistic utterances. Compared to
ritual formulas, formulaic expressions in ordinary life are ho
listic only in the sense that we do not bother to analyze them.
35 Wray, 2002b : 87.
36 Alper, 1 989a: 6.
37 Padoux, 1989: 302
33
ABSORPTION, P ART I: THE SYMBOLIC MIND
Ritual formulas are different: they are unanalyzable. Like or

dinary formulaic expressions they have a function, otten a
manipulative one. Unlike ordinary formulaic expressions, they
perform this function directly, without the intervention of the
elements that are designated by the words that occur in ordi
nary formulas.
Recall now the experiments in which the two chimpan
zees Sherman and Austin learned, with great effort, to master
symbolic reference. They started with what we might call ho
listic phrases like GIV E + BANANA. Once they had crossed the
symbolic threshold, they could use the constituents of these
phrases independently. They could, for example, use the lexi
gram BANANA in a new context created by themselves. Our
ordinary language use is of that type, though infinitely more
complex. We can use words in a virtually limitless number of
contexts of our own choosing. However, ritual utterances are
different. They are holistic. They correspond to the combined
lexigrams GIVE + BANANA before Sherman and Austin had
learned to segment this sequence. This suggests that people
who opt for the use of holistic phrases - which is what we all
do in specific, "ritual", circumstances - attempt, by so doing,
to step back out of the realm of symbolic representation into
the immediacy of non-symbolic experience.3 8
38 The question of the relationship between mantras and music presents
itself here, rather than that of the relationship between language and
music ( see on this, e.g., Mithen, 2005: Part One ) . In this connection it is
of interest that an often and exactly repeated phrase, as the psychologist
Diana Deutsch discovered, begins to sound like song. ( Verify this by
listening to www.tinyurl.com/65tcer. and see further New Scientist 0[ 8
November 2008 p. 17 ( "Fine line between speech and song revealed" ) . )
Deutsch "suspects our brains normally suppress musical cues when we
hear speech, so that we focus on interpreting the words. But repetition
of the words, which we've already processed, can sometimes override
this." If a phrase has already been processed and is not processed anew,
it becomes a holistic utterance, like the formulas used in ritual. This
34
3 Ritual
To avoid confusion, let me add that not all formulaic ex

pressions are, for that reason, ritual formulas. te on the
contrary, it seems clear that formulaic expressions are also used
in ordinary language, in play, and perhaps elsewhere. The ques
tion why certain formulaic expressions are accepted as ritual
formulas whereas others are not, is interesting and deserves at
tention in its own right. It cannot be dealt with in this study.
Let us turn to ritual action. Is it possible to maintain that ritual
activity relates to ordinary activity in the same way as ritual
utterances relate to linguistic utterances ?39 Recall that ritual
utterances are holistic, unlike most utterances used in ordinary
language. What is more, normal linguistic utterances exem
plify symbolic reference, whereas holistic utterances don't. Is
it possible to say the same, or approximately the same, about
ritual and ordinary activity? Is it true that ritual activity is ho
listic in some sense whereas ordinary activity is guided by sym
bolic representation ?
I suggest that this last question can be answered with a dou
ble yes. Yes, ritual activity is holistic and therefore not guided
by symbolic representation as understood here, and yes, ordi
nary activity is gUided by symbolic representation.
The holistic nature of ritual activity can be established with
relative ease.40 Scholars have often observed that ritual actions
suggests not only that repeated phrases are likely to do good service as
mantras, but also that certain forms of music fit well into ritual. Note
in this connection that "the most prominent and perhaps the only uni
versal context [ of music] is that of religion : music is used everywhere to
communicate with, glorify and/or serve the divinities identified within
any particular culture." (Mithen, 2005: 13)
39 This was Rappaport's ( 1 999: 1 5 1 ) position: ''As far as form is con
cerned, ritual formulae are to ordinary language as ritual postures and
gestures are to ordinary instrumental activity."
40 Cpo Rappaport, 1 999: 253: "to perform a ritual is not to analyze it.
35
are divorced from their usual goals. Some emphasize that they
have no meaning, or that they are not communicativeY This
does not mean that rituals never have a specific overall pur
pose; they often do. But "the set of sequences that compose
the ritual are not connected to this goal in the same way as
sub-actions connect to sub-goals in ordinary behavior".42 Re
call in this context what was said above about the frequently
manipulative intent of the use of ritual formulas. Both ritual
acts and ritual formulas can be used to reach some end, but
Indeed, the import of performance is exactly the converse of that of an
analytic operation." The correctness of this observation is not necessari
ly affected by the fact that many rituals consist of a concatenation of"el
ements of ritual" (Ritualelemente; Michaels, 2007: 242). See Michaels,
2007: 246: "Das Problem aller Morphologie des Rituals ist: Wenn
Handlungseinheiten als kleinste Bausteine des Rituals genommen wer
den, dann entspricht dies nicht den Morphemen einer Sprache, son
dern allenfalls den Satzen [ ... j ': Similarly Lawson & McCauley, 1 990:
84 (cited Michaels, 2007: 246): "Returning, then, to the analogy with
linguistics, it is the action that is the analogue of the sentence (which is
the fundamental unit oflinguistic analysis)." Levi-Strauss ( 1 97 1 : 603)
contrasts the holistic nature of ritual with the analysis that find expres
sion in myths : "Cette tentative eperdue, toujours vouee a I' echec, pour
retablir la continuite d'un vecu demantele sous l'eff"et du schematisme
que lui a substitue la speculation mythique constitue l' essence du rituel".
It is of particular interest, and very intriguing (c Appendix 1 of Part I,
below), that some people resort to semantic etymologizing when trying
to explain the elements of ritual: " [ A] n important part of the Ndembu
explanation of symbols rests upon folk etymologizing. The meaning
of a given symbol is often, though by no means invariably, derived by
Ndembu from the name assigned to it, the sense ofwhich is traced from
some primary word, or etymon, often a verb. S cholars have shown that
in other Bandu societies this is often a process of fictitious etymologiz
ing, dependent on similarity of sound rather than upon derivation from
a common source. Nevertheless, for the people themselves it constitutes
part of the 'explanation' of a ritual symbol" (Turner, 1 969: 1 1 ) .
41 Staal, 1 990; Humphrey & Laidlaw, 1 994.
42 Boyer & Lienard, 2006: 3; similarly Pyysiainen, 200 1 : 89.
36
3 Ritual
both seek to do so in a holistic manner, forgoing the functions

which their constituent actions and words (if there are any)
would normally accomplish.43
What about ordinary activity ? Must we accept that it is
guided by symbolic representation ? Yes, and the distinction
between two levels of cognition introduced above explains
why. Our dominant level of cognition is the one determined
by symbolic representation. 44 It is the level of cognition that
allows us to plan our lives and carry out projects of some com
plexity. It is this cognitive level that gave our ancestors, and us,
an edge over competitors. It is the level of cognition on which
our well-being, even our life, depends.
Ritual activities, seen this way, are, like ritual formulas, a
denial of symbolic representation. Like ritual formulas, they
are an attempt to step back out of the realm of symbolic rep
resentation into the immediacy of non-symbolic experience.
Neither ritual activities nor ritual formulas are symbolic in the
sense used here. Both concern a "different", "higher reality, a
reality not touched by symbolic representation. Rituals and
ritual formulas have their role to play, but in the "higher" real
ity that is concealed by symbolic representation rather than in
our ordinary world.
43 Cpo Rappaport, 1 999: 390: "It may be suggested [ .. J that ritual
.
recaptures a state having its ontogenetic origin in the relationship of

pre-verbal infants to their mothers. If this is the case the ground of the
numinous precedes the development of any awareness of the sacred or
the sanctified for, being discursive, that awareness can come only with
language."
44 Cpo Deacon, 1997: 257: "In general terms, human information pro
cessing should be biased by an excessive reliance on and guidance by the
kinds of manipulation that prefrontal circuits impose upon the infor
mation they process. We humans should therefore exhibit a 'cognitive
style' that sets us apart from other species - a pattern of organizing
perceptions, actions, and learning that is peculiarly 'front-heavy', so to
speak:'
37
Does this mean that ritual activities are carried out, and
ritual formulas uttered, with the intention of reaching mysti
cal states ? Scholars have pointed out that altered states of con
sciousness do often accompany ritual.45 It is also known that
ritual formulas are used in a number of traditions to evoke al
tered states of consciousness: the use of mantras in Indian yoga
and the so-called dhikr in Islam come to mind. Nor is it surpris
ing that these activities or recitations might bring about such
results. We have seen that mental absorption can be a means to
reach such states, perhaps the only one. Ritual activities and ut
terances may be conducive to mental absorption. The fact that
the difference between ordinary and mystical experience is not
abrupt, so that people can have "weak" or "partial" mystical
states, supports the claim that altered states of consciousness
may accompany many if not all rites.
In spite of this, I hesitate to look upon the search for altered
states of consciousness as the only explanation for ritual in all
of its manifestations. I rather assume that most if not all human
beings, including those who are unfamiliar with altered states
of consciousness, are implicitly aware of the fact that the world
created by symbolic representation is not the only world there
is. This assumption gains in credibility if we recall that even
"ordinary", i.e. symbolic, experience is not always to the same
extent accompanied by associative mental connections: con
centration and absorption reduce them, if ever so little. Even
the person least susceptible to mystical experience is likely to
undergo the resulting fluctuations in the thickness of the web
woven by symbolic reference.
45 C Rappaport, 1 999: 227: "ritually altered consciousness is wide
spread if not, indeed, culturally universal." Staal, 1 990: 1 39 : "mysticism
[ ... ] points to a pre-linguistic state which can be induced by ritual [ ... J"
(cited above). According to Michaels (2006: 261 ), rituals "often create
an auratic sphere or arena of timelessness and immortality". See further
Goodman, 1988: 34
38
3 Ritual
In a way we are obliged to make this assumption of an im

plicit awareness. The use of holistic utterances and holistic
activities in ritual in widely separate cultures indicates that
there must be such an awareness of the process that leads to
ordinary, symbolic cognition, viz., through the division of an
originally undivided cognition. Without the assumption of
implicit awareness we might have to postulate that ritual ut
terances and ritual activities have been discovered by chance,
presumably because these utterances and these activities gave
rise to altered states of consciousness. This postulate does not,
it seems to me, deserve serious consideration. We therefore
hold on to the view that implicit awareness of the two levels
of cognition common to all normal human beings is behind
ritual in its various manifestations.
Why should anyone wish to act-as indeed almost everyone
does-in or on the reality thought to be hidden below the sur
face of our ordinary experience ? One reason is no doubt that
virtually everyone, not only mystics, is convinced that such a
different reality exists and that it is more real than ordinary
reality. We have already seen that this conviction is almost cor
rect. All humans are in the possession of an alternative level of
cognition giving them more direct access to reality than sym
bolic representation. All of them "know", in some way, that
their ordinary experience of the world is incomplete. There is
another, "higher': reality, which has to be manipulated to se
cure one's well-being. It cannot be manipulated with the help
of symbolic reference. As a result, the manipulative tools pro
vided by tradition - rituals and ritual formulas - are and
have to be free from symbolic reference: they are, and have to
be, holistic.
However, the implicit knowledge that people appear to
possess about the nature of ordinary experience and its relation
39
to a "different", "higher", reality goes further than this. Sym

bolic representation is grounded in non-symbolic experience.
Symbolic representation allows for deception and dishonesty,
because it can create and communicate imaginary worlds and
situations. Escape from symbolic representation through ritual
is, in a number of cases, an attempt to re-establish reference
by grounding it in the real world. Deacon ( 1 997: 403 ) gives
in this context the example of the Yanomamo Indians from
Venezuela, notorious for their almost constant warfare among
themselves. Occasionally peace is assured by means of an elab
orate ritual known as a "Feast': Deacon describes it as follows
(p. 404) : 46
First, the hosts who wish to make peace prepare a meal.
When their guests are due to arrive, dressed as for war
and carrying their weapons, the hosts put their weapons
away and the men recline on their hammocks waiting for
the guests to enter their village. The guests enter, danc
ing and chanting, and circle around the camp stopping in
front of each host. There they ritually threaten them, rais
ing an axe or drawing a bow and arrow. The hosts must
remain unmoved, trying to show no fear and no offense
at provocative remarks. After this has been repeated for
a while (and latent hostilities have not erupted in vio
lence), the roles are reversed. The guests recline in ham
mocks, their weapons hidden away, while the hosts circle
around the camp dancing and ritually threatening their
guests. Finally, when it is clear that nothing untoward is
likely to happen, they break off and the guests are offered
food. Later they may chant together, barter and exchange
goods, or even arrange a marriage.
46 Cpo Chagnon, 1968: 97 ff. For a brief presentation and discussion of
the recent allegation of mistreatment of the Yanomamo by this anthro

pologist, see Benson & Stangroom, 2006: 1 S4 ff.
40
4 Mythology and Religion
It is ritual which protects hosts and guests from the surprise

attacks that are otherwise common among this tribe.
Grounding in the real world and the accompanying escape
from symbolic representation with its possibilities of lies and
deceit47 may explain the use of ritual at other occasions, too. A
wedding ritual goes beyond the promises that are exchanged.
These promises are, by means of ritual, grounded in a reality in
which no deception is possible. 4 8 Similar considerations may
be applicable to other rituals, but this topic cannot be further
explored here.
4 MYTHOLOGY AND RELIG I ON
Many of the points discussed above are relevant to the realm

commonly thought of as religion. Symbolic reference accounts
for more than just language. It also creates a barrier separat
ing human beings from a more immediate experience of real
ity. What is more, human beings are in some way aware of this
fact. Some succeed in breaking through this barrier and attain
a more direct experience of the world; we have called them
mystics. Others search by various means for the hidden reality
which they believe must exist. We have considered ritual, but
there are no doubt others, among them philosophico-religious
speculation. The implicit awareness of a more direct access to
47 This theme is taken very seriously by Rappaport in his study of ritual;
see Rappaport, 1999; 1 1 and passim.
48 This observation is at variance with Deacon's view according to
which marriage is essentially a symbolic relationship the need for which

explains the acquisition oflanguage by early humans; "Symbolic culture
was a response to a reproductive problem that only symbols could solve ;
the imperative of representing a social contract." ( 1 997; 40 1 ) . Bickerton
(2009) provides an interesting alternative proposal as to the initial cir
cumstances that may have set offlanguage in early humans.
41
the world in which we live often takes the form of a deep con
viction that there is a higher reality, different from the ordinary
world. What is more, there appears to be an implicit awareness
that the world of our ordinary experience has emerged from
that higher reality. This notion may find expression in "crea
tion myths", stories that speak of the transition from an initial
undivided whole subsequently divided. A primordial formless
substance takes form, often under the influence of the spoken
word. Rappaport ( 1 999: 1 62 ff) gives a number of examples
from a variety of cultures. The idea that the highest reality is
also an encompassing whole is known to religious thought. The
present study will not enter into an analysis of these beliefs.
It can, however, be suggested that they contain an element of
truth. Our world has indeed arisen out of an earlier one that
was not yet divided. And this undivided whole is really still
there and underlies all our cognition. But the transition from
an undivided to a multiple world did not happen at the begin
ning of cosmic time. It took place in our childhood when we,
each of us individually, crossed the symbolic threshold.
The preceding reflections, if correct, show that symbolic
reference, and symbolic representation which results from it,
have a profound effect on the way we experience the world.
Symbolic representation is, in an important sense, that which
makes us human, that which distinguishes us even from our
nearest cousins in the animal realm. It does not just allow us to
learn and use language but instills in us the implicit or explicit
conviction that there is a "deeper" or "higher" reality behind
the "ordinary" reality experienced in our everyday lives. This in
its turn impels us to carry out certain forms of activity ("ritu
als") and induces us to think certain kinds of thoughts. In view
of all this, it is hard to overestimate the importance of symbolic
reference. This in its turn raises the question whether symbolic
reference makes itself also felt in other domains of human ac-
42
5 Culture
tivity. The next section will argue that it does, and that culture
may be one such domain.
5 CULTURE
We have so far considered symbolic representation in connec

tion with language and, in particular, with vocal utterances.
But there is no reason to believe that the faculty that allows us
to create symbolic representation is only active in the presence
of vocal utterances. This same faculty allows the deaf to use
sign language which uses gestures rather than vocal utterances.
Sign language has syntax like ordinary language and shares
many features with it. It is indeed possible that gestures pre
ceded vocal signs in the historical development of language.49
However, we may go one step further and consider that the
faculty which makes symbolic representation possible is not
confined to language in any of its forms, whether vocal, ges
tural, or other (including lexigrams) .
A s pointed out above, the crucial faculty that enables the
human infant to learn language is the capacity to pay attention
not just to the objects in its environment but also to features whether vocal, gestural, or other - that it interprets as signs
of those objects. This capacity allows, even obliges, the child
to pay attention to further signs that are somehow related to
these initial signs, and to the relationships between them. We
have seen that the child uses this capacity when learning the
language of its caretakers. However, this capacity is not con
fined to the signs that make up this language. It also covers
everything else that the infant associates, for whatever reason,
with the objects of its experience and which it therefore in49 See Rowan Hooper in New Scientist of 5 May 2007, p. 6 f
43
terprets as signs. 5 0 The very capacity that allows the child to

learn its language will also make it pay attention to other, non
linguistic, "signs" and look for the ways in which these signs
are interrelated. In the case oflanguage, the ultimately adopted
system of relationships between linguistic signs is the structure
that governs the language of the child's caretakers. In the case
of other, non-linguistic "signs", too, the child is likely to adopt
the system of relationships that its caretakers adhere to.
These somewhat abstract reflections suggest that the child,
at the appropriate age, is not only busy acquiring its language.
Alongside language, it explores the relationships that may ex
ist between other potential signs. As in the case of language,
it will in the end settle on the web of relationships accepted
by those in its surroundings, or one close to it. It follows that
the faculty underlying symbolic representation weaves not just
one, but two webs that separate us from the outside world.
One is the web woven by language that was discussed at some
length. The other is the web woven by the non-linguistic signs
that have come to be recognized as such in the culture of the
individual concerned.
This web of non-linguistic signs can vary from culture to
culture. Examples will therefore be culture-specific. As a wide
ly understood yet simple (and no doubt simplifying) example
from the western world, we may consider the Christmas tree.5 1
50 Cpo Deacon, 1 997: 264: "The contributions of prefrontal areas to
learning all involve, in one way or another, the analysis of higher-order
associative relationships. More specifically, [ ... ] they are necessary for
learning associative relationships where one associative learning process
must be subordinated to another."
51 The first four notes of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony constitute an
other example. Marvin Minsky said the following about them : "no one
could remember Beethoven's Fifth Symphony entire, from a single hear
ing. But neither could one ever hear again those first four notes as just
four notes ! Once but a tiny scrap of sound, it is now a Known Thing -
44
5 Culture
The Christmas tree is not just a sign that designates something

(Christmas, the birth of Christ, or something else again) . It is
also, perhaps even primarily, an element in a wide web of asso
ciations, at least for those who have grown up in cultures where
Christmas was celebrated. Though people grown up in other
cultures may learn what the Christmas tree stands for, they will
not yet share this wide associative web. A Christmas tree may
not "mean" anything to them. In the case of those for whom
it "means" something, we may assume that the Christmas tree
is treated in a way not dissimilar to the way in which symbols
(i.e., Peircean symbols, primarily the words of language) are
treated. Like words, the Christmas tree is used to construct a
system, a web of associations. (Unlike words, it may here be
added, the Christmas tree and other cultural "symbols" are not
likely to give rise to the precise representations that the use of
words obliges their users to create.)
It may be justified to say that this web, or rather the ac
cumulation of webs of which the Christmas-tree-web may be
one, is the culture into which the child grows up.5 2 As in the
case of language, the web of culture may affect cognition. In
terestingly, there is some evidence to suggest that cultures do
indeed affect cognition differentially, that is to say, members of
different cultures cognize the world differently.53
a locus in the web of all the other things we know, whose meanings and
significances depend on each other." (cited in Sacks, 2007: 2 1 1 )
5 2 For a recent discussion of culture, see Plotkin, 2007a.
5 3 See Plotkin, 2007: 236 fE, with references to various publications
(Lillard, 1998; Nisbett et al., 200 1 ; 2003; 2005 ; Siok et al., 2004; Atran,
1998; Medin & Atran, 2004; Greenfield et al., 2003; Cole, 2006; for
a review of some recent research critical of this conclusion, see "East
meets West" by Ed Yong in New Scientist of7 March 2009, pp. 3 2-3 5 ) ;
further Lloyd, 2007. This suggestion i s parallel t o the hypothesis ac
cording to which individual languages are responsible for the way their
users understand the world and act in it, the so-called S apir-Whorf
45
The web of culture, like the web of language, can be torn,

presumably by the same method, viz., when the person con
cerned enters into a state of absorption. This suggests that the
world experienced by so-called mystics is not only free from all
that language had superimposed on it, but also from numer
ous other superimpositions that may be globally referred to as
cultural superimpositions.
It follows from what precedes that the very capacity ena
bling us to learn and use language and underlying certain be
haviors and experiences commonly referred to as religious,
may also be responsible for human culture. 5 4 This capacity
identifies certain objects and sensory inputs as signs of others
and looks for the system of their mutual relationships. A sub
set of these signs along with their mutual relationships con
stitute language. Others constitute networks of connections,
systematized and rationalized in ways that may differ from one
culture to the next (just as languages vary). These networks of
connections may incorporate background assumptions about
the nature of the world around us. They may also, as in the case
of the Christmas tree, have a primarily emotional character and
give "meaning" to our world. As in the case of language, these
networks of associative connections are likely to be deeply anhypothesis; see, e.g., Gleitman & Papafragou, 2005; further Boroditsky,
200 1 ; Deutscher, 20 10; Everett, 20 1 2: 255 ff. Indeed, some maintain
that the two theories cannot be separated: "a language is shaped by its
culture, and a culture is given expression in its language, to such an ex
tent that it is impossible to say where one ends and the other begins, i.e.
what belongs to language and what to culture" ( Grace, 1 987: 1 0).
54 It goes without saying that the term "religion" as commonly used also
covers certain behaviors and experiences that are "cultural" in the sense
here employed. In terms of the theory here presented, what is ordinarily
understood as religion combines elements that require different expla
nations: some are "cultural" features, others fall in the category of "at
tempts to step back out of the realm of symbolic representation".
46
5 Culture
chored in each person. And, as in the case of a first language,

considerable effort may be required for alternative networks to
find a place beside the original ones.
47
ApPENDIX 1 : SE MANTIC ETY MOLOGIES55
Symbolic reference is essential for language learning. It allows

us to "extract" words from larger utterances, just as Sherman
and Austin had "extracted" GIVE from GIVE + BANANA.
However, there is no obvious reason why this analytical pro
cess should stop at words. We might expect that human be
ings are inclined to push the analysis further, so that symbolic
reference then goes beyond the level at which it is useful in
daily life, and "overshoots the mark". This is what happens in
the phenomenon to be considered in this Appendix.
Recall that human beings, more than chimpanzees, have the
capacity to analyze acoustic and other inputs so as to discover
symbols that may be hidden in them. Sherman and Austin had
a hard time segmenting the unit GIVE out of the combinations
GIVE + BANANA and GIVE + ORANG E . Human children seg
ment countless words out of a linguistic input that contains no
clear indications as to where one word ends and the next one
begins, even less where one morpheme ends and the next one
begins. Yet these same children succeed in attributing mean
ings to the results of their segmentations. The question is: do
children, and adult speakers for that matter, stop at the com
monly recognized words of language or do they advance be
yond words, perhaps even beyond the morphemes that make
up words ?
This question is of some importance. If one thinks that
words correspond to pre-existing representations, language us
ers will then divide the linguistic input they receive into words
that fit those pre-existing representations and no further, be
cause there are no representations further down the line. 5 6 In
55 Many of the examples given in this Appendix have been taken from
Bronkhorst, 200 1 .
5 6 See Pinker, 2007: 8 9 for a discussion o f different points o f view
48
Appendix 1 : Semantic Etymologies
this book we take a different position: many representations

are created, often (but not always) on the basis of the words
of language. This position leads to the reasonable expectation
that the segmentation that humans apply to their linguistic
input is not halted once they arrive at some purportedly natu
ral representations. Rather, we would expect that human seg
menting extends also beyond the words of language into the
realm of parts of words and perhaps even individual sounds. 57
This is indeed what we find. Human segmenting of this kind
finds expression in the phenomenon that I will call semantic
etymologizing. This phenomenon is wide-spread.
A semantic etymology is to be distinguished from a histori
cal etymology. A historical etymology presents the origin or
early history of a word; it tells us, for example, that a word in
a modern language is derived from another word belonging to
an earlier language, or to an earlier stage of the same language.
The English word militant, for example, is derived from Latin
militans through the intermediary of French militant. And the
Hindi pronoun maim ('1') is derived from Sanskrit maya ('by
me') through Prakrit mae (Oberlies, 1 998: 1 7). Semantic ety
mologies do something different. They connect one word with
one or more others that are believed to elucidate its meaning.
According to the Vedic Satapatha Brahmana (6. 1.3. 1 0) the god
regarding representations (there called "concepts") in language and
thought. Note further that also Bickerton (2009) takes the position
that representations (which he, too, calls "concepts") result from lan
guage, rather than vice-versa. He also records a change of mind (p.
226): "I eventually came to agree with Terrence Deacon that it was sym
bolism rather than syntax that marked the boundary between humans
and nonhumans."
S7 The question ofindividual speech sounds is tricky, for the notion that
speech can be analyzed into a sequence of phonemes, and their percep
tion, has been argued to be inseparable from alphabetical writing; War
ren, 1 999: 169
49
Rudra, for example, has that name because he cried (rud-) in a

story about him. Semantic etymologies tell us nothing about
the history of a word, but something about its meaning.
Semantic etymologies have largely gone out of fashion
these days. Most sensible people have serious doubts about the
possibility of finding the meaning of one word by comparing it
with other, more or less similar words. We tolerate such seman
tic etymologizing from children who indulge in it quite freely,
as Jean Piaget ( 1 925) and others after him have shown. We
are less tolerant with respect to adults who do so ; the person
who interprets the word contentment as "being content with
men" or with tea (content-men-t) , is perhaps rightly diagnosed
as schizophrenic by modern investigators. 5 8
And yet semantic etymologies are wide-spread in all pre
modern cultures. Here are some examples:
In the Sumerian myth of Enki and Ninhursag the former is
cured when Ninhursag causes deities to be born corresponding
to Enki's sick members: "The correspondence between the sick
member and the healing deity rests on the [ ... ] etymologizing
of the ancient scribes; the Sumerian word for the sick organ
contains at least one syllable in common with the name of the
deity. Thus e.g. one of the organs that pained Enki was the
'mouth', the Sumerian word for which is ka, and the deity cre
ated to alleviate this pain is called Ninkasi; similarly, the god
dess born to alleviate the pain of the rib, the Sumerian word for
which ti, is named Ninti, etc." (Kramer, 1 969: 37 n. 1 3).
An ancient Egyptian text carved inside two pyramids dat
ing from the 24th century B eE "is full of plays on words"
such as: "0 Atum-Kheprer, [ ... ] thou didst arise (weben) as
the ben-bird of the ben-stone in the Ben-House in Heliopolis."
(Wilson, 1 969: 3). Sauneton ( 1 957: 1 23 f) adds further ex5 8 So Werner & Kaplan ( 1 963 : 259), citing a patient of Maria Lorenz
( 1 96 1 : 604).
50
Appendix 1 : Semantic Etymologies
amples and points out that 'plays on words' were considered to

give an 'explanation' of the world.5 9
In the Hebrew Bible etymologies are common, especially
in connection with names: Adam is linked with adama 'earth'
(Gen. 2.7) ; woman, ish a, is derived from man, ish (Gen. 2.23 ) ;
Cain from qaniti ' I have gotten' (Gen. 4. 1 ) ; etc. (Boh!, 1 99 1 :
1 63 f).
Kirk ( 1 974: 57 ) emphasizes the use of etymologies in
Greek myths and states (p. 58): "The poets of the Homeric tra
dition were already intrigued by the resemblance of the name
'Odysseus' to the verb odussomai 'I am angry'. [ ... ] Pytho, the
old name for Delphi, is derived [in the Hymn to Apollo, prob
ably late seventh century B CE] from the serpent destroyed
there by Apollo and allowed to rot, puthein. [ ... ] Heraclitus the
Presocratic philosopher found it significant that one word for
a bow resembled the word for 'life' (bios and bios), and Aeschy
lus related the name of Helen to the idea that she 'took the
ships' (hele-naus), that of Apollo to apollunai, 'destroy: and that
of Zeus to zen, 'live'." Similar efforts at etymologizing charac
terize later Greek antiquity.60
An example from medieval Europe is provided by the secret
spiritual organization of the Fedeli dore, whose representa
tives were active in France, Italy, and Belgium from the 1 2th
century onward. They used a hidden language in order to keep
their mystery of love secret. Love for them is a soteriological
means, and accordingly the word amor 'love' is interpreted as
a-mor 'without death':
59 See further Morenz, 1957; Sander-Hansen, 1 946, esp. p. 1 9

60 For a study of the etymologies in Homer, see Rank, 195 1 ; also Kraus,
1987: 3 1 For an ( incomplete) list of etymologies in Plutarch, see Stro

bach, 1 997: 1 86
51
ABSORPTION, PART I : THE SYMBOLIC MIND
A senefie en sa partie
Sans, et mor senefie mort;
Or l'assemblons, s'aurons sans mort.61
Caesarius of Heisterbach (ca. 1 1 70-ca. 1 240) gives an expla

nation of the word mors 'death' in his Dialogue on Miracles:62
Though the transgression of the first created, death en
tered into the world. Hence death (mors) received its
name from 'biting' (morsus) . As soon as man bit (momor
dit) the apple of the forbidden tree, he incurred death and
subjected himself as well as his whole posterity to its ne
cessity. Death is also said to have come from 'bitterness'
(amaritudine), because, as it is said, no pain in this life is
more bitter than the separation of body and soul.
Elsewhere he explains the word puer 'boy': "Puer ('boy:) signi
fies purus ('pure') ". 63
An example from ethnographic records is the following:
Among the inhabitants ofthe Trobriand islands the word vatuvi
occurs in a magical formula. 64 This word has no gram atical
form; it is neither noun nor verb. Malinowski ( 1 935: II: 249,
c p. 260-6 1 ) observed : "the real etymological identity of this
word will define it as connected with vitawo, or the prefix vitu-,
and the word vituvatu, 'to institute: 'to set up', 'to direct', 'to
show'. [It has] also [ ... ] fortuitous, but magically significant
associations with vatu, 'coral boulder', 'coral reef', and the more
or less real word va-tuvi, 'to foment', 'to make heal'."65
61 See Eliade, 198 6: 1 1 2. (A signifies, for its part, without, and mor
signifies death; combining them we have without death).
6 2 Cited in Zaleski. 1988: 50.
6 3 Cited in Zaleski, 1 988: 52.
64 Malinowski ( 1 935: I: 9 6, II: 257) describes it as the most important
formula in all Omarakana garden magic.
6S
Regarding the last association, va-tuvi, Malinowski observes (p. 2 60-
52
Appendix 1: Semantic Etymologies
All these semantic etymologies illustrate one and the same

phenomenon: the search for expressive units beyond the level
recognized in the speech community concerned. They remind
us that the capacity for symbolic reference was not created
for language learning (even though its usefulness in language
learning no doubt explains the selective advantage it offered).
The Chinese language, with its monosyllabic words, lends
itself less easily to an analysis beyond the level recognized in
the speech community. However, its many homonyms invite
its users to connect unrelated things that have the same name.
Indeed, "Han commentators applied a form of correlative
thought in their philological studies, frequendy explaining
the meaning of obscure characters by sound analogy on the as
sumption that a phonetic correspondence indicated a seman
tic relation".66 "Sometimes highly complex circular shou em
blems [symbols of long life or immortality] had incorporated
into their design a swastika (pronounced wan), to express by
a pun the concept of wan shou, meaning 'ten thousand years
of long life'." Similarly: "The endless knot [was] interpreted
[ ... ] as symbolizing Buddha's intestines (ch'ang) . [ ... ] [S]ince
its name, chang, made a pun on the word for long, the whole
figure [ ... ] symbolized [to the later Chinese] a long life [ ... ] :'67
etc. An example closer to our time is found in the weekly jour
nal Newsweek oOuly 6, 1 9 87, p. 1 8 : "Hong Kong's new Brit
ish governor, Sir David Wilson, bowed to local tradition by
changing his Cantonese name, Ngai Tak-ngai, shordy before
assuming office last ApriL Its characters were homophones
for the phrase 'so hypocritical it's dangerous'; his new moni6 1 ) : "As a matter of fact, one or two natives [ . . ] gave me this expla
nation of the word when commenting upon the spell." It is not clear
whether any native made the association with vatu explicit.
66 Henderson, 1984: 1 9-20.
67 Cammann, 1 962: 98, 99- 1 00.
.
53
ker, Wai Yik-shun, means 'guardianship' and 'trust', conjuring

up more soothing images to colony residents [ ... J ". These ex
amples do not illustrate the search for expressive units beyond
the level commonly recognized, but something different. They
illustrate the search for a shared semantic interpretation of
minimal units, even where the speech community assigns dif
ferent interpretations to them. This search is, of course, similar
to the search that allowed Sherman and Austin to arrive at one
representation for GIVE, starting from GIVE + BANANA and
GIVE + ORANGE.
54
ApPENDIX 2: SYMBOLIC REFERENCE AND THE O RIGIN OF

LANGUAGE
The origin of language is increasingly debated. To get an im

pression of some current opinions, we turn to a recent issue of
the journal Lingua (vol. 1 1 7 no. 3, 2007, pp. 503-604) dedi
cated to language evolution. One of the contributors, Derek
Bickerton, points out that this is "an interdisciplinary game,
played by biologists, neurologists, anthropologists, archaeolo
gists, computer scientists, philosophers, and more - as well
as [ . . J by linguists" (2007: 5 1 0) . On the following page he
emphasizes the distinction between language evolution and
changes in languages. Whereas the former is part of the bio
logical evolution of humans, the latter belongs to the realm of
cultural change.
An essential concept in the study of language evolution is
pro to language. Says Bickerton (2007: 5 1 5) : "The notion that
the earliest stages of language evolution involved a largely if
not entirely structureless protolanguage [ .. J is now so widely
accepted that the term seems to have passed into the general
vocabulary of language evolutionists." This protolanguage is,
as indicated, largely if not entirely structureless. What were
its constituents ? According to Bickerton "there does not, as
yet, exist any compelling reason for rejecting the original con
cept of a protolanguage as containing a categorially complete,
if severely limited vocabulary of items roughly equivalent to
modern words, but lacking a sophisticated phonology and any
consistent structure" (2007: 5 1 7) .
Not everyone accepts this position. A competitor i s the
theory according to which protolanguage was holophrastic.
Bickerton describes it as follows (2007: 5 1 6-5 17):
.
55
[ T ] he most radical proposal with regard to the con

stituents of protolanguage is that these were holophras
tic rather than synthetic. This proposal has been most
thoroughly developed by [Alison ] Wray [ ... J . Wray's
proposals support genre continuism, since [ ... ] animal
calls are roughly equivalent to holophrases, rather than
words. Wray claims that protolanguage simply increased
the number of such units to a point where they began
to impose an excessive memory load, at which point the
holophrases were decomposed on the basis of phonetic
similarities. Here we can do no better than quote Wray's
own example : "So if, besides tebima meaning give that to
her, kumapi meant share this with her, then it might be
concluded that ma had the meaningfemale person + ben
eficiary." ( [ Wray, ] 2000 : 297 )
Bickerton does not agree with this proposal, as is clear from his
comments (200 7: 5 1 7 ): 68
68
In a more recent publication (2009), Bickerton still rejects the no

tion of a holistic protolanguage (pp. 65 f.) but presents a picture of the
simultaneous appearance of words and representations that is not all
that different; see e.g. p. 2 1 9 : "Gradually the sound is getting divorced
from the situation that gave rise to it. Put something into enough dif
ferent contexts and its particular details become blurred; it gets closer
to becoming an arbitrary symboL At the same time, a representation
is formed in the brain ..." Even more recently (20 10) his change of
mind seems to be complete : "Initial displacement signals might well
have been holistic; a signal, rather than meaning simply 'elephant' like a
modern word, might have been interpreted as something equivalent to
'There's dead elephant out there and we can eat it ifwe all move quickly'
(there is no need to suppose that the underlying semantics of such a
modern-language message would have been represented
a mental
picture of a dead elephant plus the thought of all that meat would have
been enough) . While such a usage of 'elephant' might qualify techni
cally as displacement ( insofar as it conveyed information that might be
already several hours old about a sight perhaps several miles distant) ,
its meaning, unlike that of words, would be tied to one kind of situ-
56
Appendix 2: Symbolic Reference and the Origin of Language
This leaves out of account the possibility that, although

the syllable rna might occur as Wray suggests, it would
also occur in a number of holophrases lacking any ref
erences to either females or beneficiaries. Not only is
this extremely likely, but the only possible alternative is,
if anything, even more damaging to Wray's case. For if
rna occurred always and only where female beneficiaries
were involved, the holophrastic protolanguage would be
a hollow charade, a mere disguise for a medium already
fully synthetic. But if rna also occurred where a female +
beneficiary was impossible - contexts perhaps as numer
ous as, or more numerous than, those that can bear such
a reading - why would the hearer assume that it referred
to a female beneficiary in just those cases where such a
reading was possible, and how would that hearer account
for the other cases ?
For further arguments against the holophrastic model, Bick
erton refers to one of his own earlier publications (Bickerton,
2003) and to the contribution of Maggie Tallerman in the
same issue of Lingua (Tallerman, 2007).
Alison Wray, the main target of Bickerton's criticism, also
contributed an article co-signed by George W. Grace to this
issue of Lingua. These two authors describe their understand-
ation involving elephants. However, once this degree of displacement

was available (that is, once the 'elephant' signal was freed from its de
pendence on a physically-present, sensorily-accessible elephant), the
road was opened to further developments : use of the same signal on
seeing elephant footprints or dung, or imitations of elephants in chil
dren's play, for example. Use of a constantly widening range of contexts
would move the signal closer to becoming a true symbol - closer to the
kind of meaning exemplified by the modem word 'elephant'." (p. 1 7 1 )
See further note 56, above.
57
ing of the first language users in the following words (Wray &
Grace, 2007: 570-57 1 ) : 69
[W]e must understand that what made the very first
language users different from their parents was that they
possessed the capacity to identify patterns inside their
existing message units and extract (apparently) recurrent
material for recombination. [ ... ] The first 'segmenters'
need not have stood out all that much from those around
them, for theirs would have been a marginal activity rela
tive to the general use of holistic forms with agreed func
tions. Those who could segment out sections from holistic
utterances for recombination could do so [ ... ] , while the
others carried on using what they already knew. The anal
ysis, operating in direct response to interactional need,
could thus be naturally very slow, and indeed would need
to be, both because the analyticity of the modern speaker
would be little challenged by the holistic usages of his
pre-modern companions, and because, in the short term,
his novel expressions, while meaningful to him, would be
impenetrable to the rest, unless they learned them whole.
But little by little, under the influence of even one ana
lytic operator and his/her descendants over a number of
generations, an initially immutable proto language could
progressively transform into something more flexible, un
til a command of the flexibility became advantageous to
survival and/or reproduction.
This passage is slightly puzzling in that it calls those with the
capacity to segment existing units "the first language users".
69 The idea of a holistic protolanguage is not new. As Van Driem
(2004) points out, Hugo Schuchardt argued already in 1 9 1 9 that the
first utterance arose from the splitting of a holistic primeval utterance
("Sprachursprung" I & II, Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen Akademie
der Wissensch aften 52, 7 1 6-720 & 863-869) .
58
One would rather have expected that these segmenters be

called "the first word users": through their segmenting they
would have arrived where Bickerton's protolanguage users were
all along, viz., in the possession of "a categorially complete, if
severely limited vocabulary of items roughly equivalent to
modern words, but lacking [ ... ] any consistent structure" (see
above). This is no doubt what Bickerton had in mind when he
wrote (2003: 87) : ''All the substantive problems in language
evolution - how symbolism got started and fixed, how, when,
and why structure emerged, where and to what extent any of
this got instantiated in neural tissue - remain to be solved,
whether one accepts a holistic account or not" (my emphasis) .
Bickerton concludes from this that "it i s more parsimonious to
assume that language began as it was to go on - that discrete
symbols, whether oral or manual, were there from the begin
ning" (ibid.)?O I am not sure whether parsimony settles this
issue, even if we were to follow Bickerton in other respects. It
is at least conceivable that language evolution passed through
various phases, starting from a holophrastic phase, which was
then (partly) succeeded by a synthetic phase?l Alternatively,
70 Interestingly, Wray (2000: 287) invokes Occam's razor to argue for
the continuity between the holistic communication used by primates

and the holistic language we use today.
7l This is Mithen's position (2005 : 260): "This 'words before grammar'
is the type oflanguage evolution that Bickerton proposed - so we can
see that his views are not necessarily wrong, but are simply chronologi
cally misplaced and require a pre-existing history of holistic proto-lan
guage to be feasible." Wray (2002a) speaks of "the holistic system that I
propose pre-existed and provided the context for the emergence of the
analytic system" (p. 1 1 6) and of "the holistic protolanguage that I pro
pose coexisted with - and preceded - the simple analytic system from
which our modern grammatical capability developed" (p. 1 1 8); see also
the following: "there is a place for a simple analytic protolanguage of
the kind that Bickerton proposes, but not as the sole medium of com
munication" (p. 1 1 8). Arbib (2003 : 1 83; cpo 2005 : 1 08, 1 1 8 ) intro-
59
ABSORPTION, PART I: THE SYMBOLIC M I ND
one might think that the very process whereby segmenting be

came possible was also responsible for at least some structure.
We will return to this issue below.
Let us assume, for argument's sake, that there was once an
exclusively holophrastic protolanguage. The first segmenters
differed from their parents on account of a new capacity, the
capacity to segment holophrastic phrases. This new capacity
may have had a biological basis. This, at any rate, is what Wray
and Grace assume. Only in this way "even one analytic opera
tor and his/her descendants over a number of generations" can
exert the influence referred to in the above passage: if this ca
pacity were cultural, there would be no need to wait a number
of generations, and the novel expressions of the first language
users would not necessarily be "impenetrable to the rest". We
will see below that this is not the only possible point of view.72
For the time being we will, however, follow Wray and Grace in
assuming that the new capacity must be thought of as based on
a genetic mutation, and therefore as part of biological evolu
tion.
duces the notion of a prelanguage which, he suggests, was composed of
'unitary utterances' and which preceded the discovery of words: "On
this view, words in the modern sense co-evolved with syntax through
fractionation, a process of discovery and diffusion quite distinct from
the formation of a genetic module for grammar." Consider, finally, Sear
le, 20 1 0 : 77: "We are not assuming that reference and predication, the
speech acts corresponding to noun phrases and verb phrases, are in any
way simple independent elements, but rather that once we have the to
tal speech act we can abstract these as component elements. Following
Frege, we think of the noun phrases and verb phrases as derived from
the total sentence and not of the total sentence as arrived at by combin
ing noun phrases and verb phrases:'
72 Citing Dennett (2003 : 1 84-85), but replacing religion by language
one might say: "If there are any genes for [language] , this is, in fact, one
of the least interesting and least informative of the Darwinian possibili
ties."
60
Appendix 2; Symbolic Riference and the Origin of Language
The above passage from Wray and Grace's article also pre
supposes that all members of the group, including those who
do not yet possess the capacity to identify segments, are ca
pable of learning new utterances. Only in this way can they
"learn whole" expressions that are impenetrable to them. These
expressions are not therefore genetically transmitted. This pre
supposition is not spelled out in Wray and Grace's article, but
seems to be important in view of the fact that it takes for grant
ed an important difference between human protolanguage and
primate calls, which are genetically transmitted.
The specification that the protolanguage out of which
modern language eventually arose was different from primate
calls, and that it consisted of learned utterances that could be
distinguished from each other, answers a number of the objec
tions voiced by Tallerman in her contribution to the Lingua
issue, notably those that deal with the presumed proximity of
the proto language to animal calls73 and with its presumed pho
nological insufficiency.74 We cannot deal with them in detail.
Some of her other criticisms are summed up and responded to
by Mithen (2005: 254) in the following terms:
73 Elsewhere in her article Tallerman accepts that "protolanguages (like
languages) are culturally transmitted" (2007: 599).

74 See in this connection Wray, 2002a : 1 1 5 : "I have suggested that
the holistic cries and gestures of our pre-human ancestors were trans
formed, over a long period of time, into a phonetically expressed set of
holistic message strings [ J " (emphasis mine, ]B). Also Arbib, 2003:
1 96: " [T]he lowering of the larynx in humans or pre-human hominids
might have served a similar purpose (as in the red deer, viz., deepening
the animal's roar, ]B) - without denying that further selection could
have exploited the resultant increase in degrees of freedom to increase
the flexibility of speech production. [ ] [T]his selective advantage would
hold even for a species that employed holophrastic utterances devoid of syn
tax." (emphasis mine, ]B)
...
...
61
Although linguists unsympathetic to Wray's approach,

such as Derek Bickerton and Maggie Tallerman, have
questioned the feasibility of segmentation, their criti
cisms have been unsubstantial. Tallerman claims, for in
stance, that the likelihood of any chance associations aris
ing is remote, but computer simulations have shown that
they could easily have happened [ . . J while Wray herself
has explained how the process of segmentation may have
been supported by 'near matches'. Tallerman also claims
that holistic utterances are unlikely to have contained
multiple phonetic strings with the potential for seg
mentation because they would have been too short. But
one need do no more than consider the lengthy holistic
phrases of monkeys, apes, birds, and so forth, to appreci
ate that those of our human ancestors may have been of
considerable length,75 having evolved over millennia and
proliferated in number to provide ever greater semantic
specificity. Similarly, an argument that Wray's theory of
segmentation has to assume the prior existence of dis
crete segments, which then invalidates her conception of
holistic utterances, also has no foundation. Holistic ut
terances may have been multi-syllabic but they were by definition - holistic, with none of the individual or
.
75 Consider in this connection the following: "In a paper with

Nobuyuki Kawai, [Tetsuro] Matsuzawa showed that Ai, a young
chimpanzee, could remember a sequence of at least five numbers, more
than a preschool child; and at a recent symposium in Chicago on 'The
Mind of the Chimpanzee', he showed how Ai, with further training,
had developed powers ofworking memory beyond that of most human
adults. He suggested that 'our common ancestors might have had
immediate memory, but in the course of evolution, they lost this and
acquired languagelike skills:" (Sacks, 2007: 1 S9 n. 8; see further Kawai
& Matsuzawa, 2000, and Cohen, 2007)
62
groups of syllables mapping onto a discrete aspect of the

utterance's complex meaning.
It is not the aim of this Appendix to enter into an exhaustive
discussion of all the arguments for and against the holophrastic
model (whether in the form of the assumption that all human
protolanguage was holophrastic, or rather that a holophrastic
protolanguage gave rise to an analytic protolanguage which
in its turn gave rise to language). What counts at this point is
that this model is not dead; far from it, it is alive and kicking.
This allows us to consider some of its consequences. Wray and
Grace observe (2007: 56 1 ) : "For reasons that may be partly
biological, the older the individual becomes, the more likely
he or she is to dissect language more than is strictly necessary
for effective general communication." Since the capacity of dis
secting language does not respond to a specific need, the result
may be surprising (Wray & Grace, 2007: 56 1 - 562) :
Any biological influences on the balance between for
mulaicity and compositionality may be limited to the
peripheral capacity to open up a form before there is a
specific need to do so, thus maintaining a creative edge
to one's engagement with language. Since such a capac
ity would simply need to exist, rather than achieve any
specific goal (such as a complete analysis of the language
into atomic particles and rules), we might anticipate find
ing that its effects are haphazard and idiosyncratic - and
indeed we do.
One individual might suddenly wonder what it is that is
'done' in how do you do?, while another notices that bark
ing seems to contain the morphemes bar and king. Such
inappropriate analyses will capture attention whereas
others, that turn out to be rational in terms of the shared
perceptions of compositional structure in the language,
are simply absorbed.
63
The "peripheral capacity" referred to in this passage is cen

tral to the holophrastic model (in either of its two forms) .
The model predicts this capacity, and would indeed be empty
without it. The existence of this capacity in modern humans,
on the other hand, does not suffice to prove the correctness
of the holophrastic model. The fact that one sometimes won
ders what is 'done' in how do you do? does not, by itself, prove
that human language arose out of a protolanguage (or proto
protolanguage) which was holistic. However, if it could be
demonstrated that the capacity to open up forms before there
is a specific need to do so is more than a capacity-that it is
a proclivity manifestimg itself in various ways across human
cultures and stages of development-then this would consti
tute an argument in support of the holophrastic model. Such
a proclivity would be harder to account for in the synthetic
model, for here words are extracted to correspond to pre-ex
isting concepts. The widely attested use of semantic etymolo
gies (discussed in Appendix 1 of Part 1, above) provides such a
demonstration.
Let us, to begin with, restate some of the objections that have
been voiced against the holophrastic model. Bickerton, in a
passage already cited, found fault with Wray's hypothetical
example in which, besides tebima meaning give that to her, ku
mapi meaning share this with her, early language users might
conclude that ma had the meaningfemale person + beneficiary.
Bickerton's criticism took the following form. He pointed
out that the syllable ma might also occur in holophrases that
lack references to either females or beneficiaries. Indeed, if ma
only and exclusively occurred where female beneficiaries were
involved, the holophrastic protolanguage would be a hollow
charade, a mere disguise for a medium already synthetic. If, on
the other hand, ma occurred both in contexts where reference
64
to a female beneficiary is impossible and in contexts where this

is possible, how would the hearer know where and when it
does indeed refer to a female beneficiary, and how would that
hearer account for the other cases ? Tallerman (2007: 597) dis
cusses the same hypothetical example and comments:
A major problem in this regard is that logically, similar
substrings must often occur in two (or more) utterances
which do not share any common elements of meaning at
least as many times as they occur in two utterances which
do share semantic elements. For instance, suppose that a
string mabali also contains the ma sequence, but means
'put that rock down !'. What ensures that ma gets associ
ated with 'her' ?
Bickerton and Tallerman are probably not aware of the fact
that reflections similar to theirs occur already in one of Plato's
Dialogues, the Cratylus. This Dialogue presents Socrates in
discussion with Cratylus, an etymologist. Socrates subjects the
procedure of (semantic) etymologizing to a thorough analysis.
This procedure is not dissimilar, in Socrates' analysis, to the
extraction of ma in the above hypothetical examples. Socrates
would call ma a "primary name"; he further maintains that pri
mary names are by their very nature like the things they denote
(p. 1 69). In the course of his analysis he comes to assign certain
meanings to some letters of the Greek alphabet: the letter rho
is expressive of speed, motion, and hardness; the letter lambda
conveys smoothness, softness, and other qualities. However,
this leads to difficulties in words like skler6tes which, though
containing the letter lambda, means "hardness" (p. 1 73). Like
Bickerton and Tallerman, Socrates considers these difficulties
insurmountable: "I myself prefer the theory that names are, so
far as possible, like the things named; but really this attractive
force of likeness is [ ... ] a poor thing, and we are compelled to
6S
ABSORPTION, PART I: THE SYMBOLIC M I ND
employ in addition this commonplace expedient, convention,

to establish the correctness of names" (p. 175).
Socrates was not, of course, discussing the transition from
protolanguage to language. He was concerned with semantic
etymologies. Just as Bickerton and Tallerman try to undermine
the hypothesis of a holistic protolanguage, Socrates' arguments
should have discouraged semantic etymologizing. They did no
such thing. Consider the reflections by Isidore of Seville, the
sixth century author of a monumental work called, precisely,
Etymologies. About etymologies he says, among other things:76
Etymologies of words are furnished either from their ra
tionale (causa), as 'kings' (rex, gen. regis) from [ ... J 'acting
correctly' (recte agendum) ; or from their origin, as 'man'
(homo) because he is from 'earth' (humus), or from the
contrary, as 'mud' (lutum) from 'washing' (lavare, ppl. lu
tus), since mud is not clean, and 'grove' (lucus), because,
darkened by its shade, it is scarcely 'lit' (lucere).
Isidore should perhaps have followed Socrates' example and
pondered upon the question whether there is some mean
ing that can be ascribed to the sound sequence hom/hum and
that recurs in all formations ofwhich this sequence is part. He
might have offered similar reflections with regard to lu and luc.
He did not. Difficult cases and counterexamples clearly did
not discourage him.
Examples of etymologies like these can be cited from widely
different cultures and literatures; further examples are provid
ed by children and psychiatric patients. This has been shown
in Appendix 1 of Part I. Strictly speaking they do not extract
meaningful segments, at least not explicitly. It is however clear
that they are based on the similarity or identity of parts of the
words compared. In many cases there is no linguistic justifica76 Barney et al., 2006: 55 (Etymologies I.xxix).
66
tion whatsoever for these semantic etymologies. This is stated

in so many words in a text from ancient India that deals with
etymologizing, Yaska's Nirukta. Ancient India had also a so
phisticated tradition of grammar, which obliged scholars to
distinguish between the two activities. Yaska's position in this
matter is clear: etymologizing is the complement of grammar,
it treads where grammar cannot gO.77
Consider now Sverker Johansson's (2005: 234) criticism of
the idea of a holistic protolanguage:7 8
It is not obvious to me [ ... ] why the segmentation process
envisaged by Wray [ ... ] would be expected ro work. A sim
ilar process is certainly present in modern-day language
acquisition - children first acquire some stock phrases
as unanalyzed wholes, and later figure out their inter
nal structure - but that only works because these stock
phrases have an internal structure, given by the grammar
of the adults from whom the child acquires them.
Johansson assumes (as do Bickerton and Tallerman) that the
segmentation process can only work where the material al
ready contains, in a consistent and organized manner, the seg
ments that are being extracted. Socrates would agree, for he
refers repeatedly to the name-givers who gave names to things
in a long distant past. But not all semantic etymologies are
based on this belief. Most semantic etymologizing takes place
quite independently ofit. Semantic etymologizing "works", i.e.
it is practiced, in spite of the fact the words and phrases they
deal with do not have any relevant internal structure. We must
conclude that there is a widely attested proclivity to extract
segments and assign meanings to them even in cases where
the material is inconsistent and resists such segmentation. This
77 Bronkhorst, 1 984.
78 Cited by Tallerman (2007: 594).
67
proclivity coincides in all essentials with the capacity to seg

ment postulated by the upholders of the theory of a holophras
tic ptotolanguage. It is not limited to situations in which the
prior existence of discrete segments has to be assumed. This,
then, does away with some of the most serious criticism of the
idea of a holophrastic protolanguage.
Having come this far, let us consider in some detail what the
transition from holistic protolanguage users to segmenters
implies. It has been suggested that a genetic mutation may be
responsible, but this remains vague. Indeed, it amounts to lit
tle more than giving a name ( "genetic mutation") to a process
which one does not understand. And yet, the process con
cerned may not escape understanding, and what is more, it is
open to question whether a genetic mutation has to be postu
lated to explain it.
The event which turns holophrasts into segmenters may be
nothing else than crossing the symbolic threshold. Our homi
nid ancestors have crossed this threshold ( phylogenetic ally)
many thousands of years ago, and all human beings who learn
to use language do the same (ontogenetically) during their
early years.
Symbolic reference even seems able to explain at least
some of the syntactic rules of language. Deaco ( 2003a: 90,
with a reference to 1 997) argues, to begin with, "that the
structure of [ Universal Grammar ] would not yield to it bio
logical evolutionary solution, nor would it have a neurological
explanation".?9 According to him, many structural features of
language may derive from semiotic constraints, inherent in the
79 See also Van Driem, 200 1 : 66 f. ("The splitting of the symbol and
the birth of syntax") . Note that Deacon, in a more recent publication

(20 1 2 : 69 f.), argues that Universal Grammar must be considered a
"homuncular theory".
68
requirements for producing symbolic reference. Indeed, "some

major universals of grammar may come for free, so to speak,
required by the nature of symbolic communication itself"
(2003: 1 38). Deacon is of the view that "it may turn out that
many core features of [Universal Grammar] - recursive oper
ations, the minimally diadic structure of sentences, and many
subjacency, ordering, and dependency constraints of grammar
- trace their origin to [ ... ] indexical [ ... ] requirements [which]
apply to all symbolic linguistic relationships" (2003: 1 33). As
a result, "theoretical efforts now directed toward showing how
innate [Universal Grammar] could have evolved and how it
might be instantiated in brains could well turn out to be mere
intellectual exercises" (2003: 1 39).
It would seem, then, that the crossing of the symbolic
threshold had a double effect on the forms of communication
of our remote ancestors. Symbolic reference enabled them to
segment the holophrastic utterances (or other forms of com
munication, e.g. gestures) they had hitherto employed. On top
of that, symbolic reference imposed certain constraints on the
combined use of the resulting segments. 80
8 0 For an interesting and plausible account of the way in which minimal

early language has given rise to modern languages, see Deutscher, 2005.
69
PART II
The Psychology of the Buddha
INTRODUCTION
This study is an experiment, or rather, it takes you on a voy

age of discovery. It begins with a map that shows the way to a
treasure. It follows the map faithfully, and exhibits the treasure
that it finds.
This study is not about a real map, nor is it about a physi
cal treasure. It starts with the working hypothesis that certain
central claims of the early Buddhist texts are true and tries to
determine what implications this has for psychological theory.
The working hypothesis is the map; its implications for psy
chological theory are the treasure. You, the reader, are invited
to judge the process by its outcome. You are not asked to judge
the working hypothesis. In the comparison with the treasure
hunter, you are not asked to pronounce on the reliability of the
map. You are merely asked to judge the value of the treasure.
You may think that this treasure is valuable, and yet be con
vinced that the map used to find it was unreliable, or indeed
was no map at all. You are asked to suspend your disbelief, fol
low the reasoning and evaluate the outcome.
There are, to be sure, some a priori arguments in support of
our working hypothesis. The relevant claims in the early Bud
dhist texts (which we will consider in detail below) concern
psychological states and processes that are unusual from a com
monsensical point of view. They are not, however, in conflict
with any established rules of natural science or psychology.
Moreover, historians have to take the evidence of their sources
seriously, even about psychological states and processes, until
and unless they have reasons to do otherwise. 81 They often do
81 By not observing this rule, even a field like Buddhist studies may run
the risk of "degenerating into a 'de-bunking enterprise', based more on
73
ABSORPTION, PART II: THE PSYCHOLO GY OF THE BUD D H A
have such reasons. Sources may be in conflict with each other,

or report on facts that are in conflict with what established sci
ence tells us about the world. Sometimes we have grounds for
thinking that texts lie on purpose. 82 No compelling reasons of
this kind present themselves in this case. The claims made in
the early Buddhist texts may not agree with the way we think
about ourselves and other human beings, but that may mere
ly mean that we have to revise our thoughts about ourselves.
This is the reason why I propose to accept the veracity of these
claims as a working hypothesis, and to explore whether they
can add to our understanding of the human psyche. 83
One might object that historia'1s are not the kind of peo
ple to provide data, or ideas, fit to be used in the sciences, in
cluding psychology. This is not always necessarily correct. To
show that historical data can sometimes provide data that help
a scientific discipline to make progress, consider the followideology than evidence"; Csikszentmihalyi, 1996: 17, with a reference
to Hannah Arendt.
The history of India offers many examples of the general requirement
that historians have to take seriously the evidence of their sources until
and unless they have reasons to do otherwise. Particularly important
among these are the testimonies of foreign visitors - such as the Hel
lenistic ambassador Megasthenes around 300 BCE, a number of Chi
nese Buddhist monks during the first millennium, and the Persian
Moslem Al-Biruni around the year 1000. Isolated observations of these
visitors - i.e., observations that are neither confirmed nor contradicted
by other evidence - are taken very seriously by historians, and rightly
so. For a discussion of the determining influence of the accounts of the
Chinese pilgrims Faxian and Xuanzang on nineteenth century Indian
archaeology, see Leoshko, 2003: 30 ff.
8 2 Beckman, 2005.
8 3 Cpo Turner, 1 996: 1 14: "In the hard sciences, which attract so much
emulation and envy, unusual events are not dismissed as peripheral. On
the contrary, unusual events often command the most attention, on the
principle that they are the most likely to reveal general processes."
74
Introduction
ing. The records of so-called historical supernovae, i.e., super

novae whose first appearance has been recorded in historical
documents, have been described as "among the most valuable
legacies which the ancient world has bequeathed to modern
science". They made a significant impact on modern astrophys
ics. 84 The claims of the early Buddhist texts are admittedly very
different from the recordings of supernovae by early observers.
Nevertheless, both are entitled to respect from scientists, and
both may conceivably contribute to modern science, each in
their own way.
Others may object that no conclusions can be drawn from a
single case, such as from what presumably happened to the his
torical Buddha and perhaps some of his early followers. Those
who feel this way are invited to recall the complaint voiced by
the neuroscientist V. S. Ramachandran: "Imagine that I cart
a pig into your living room and tell you that it can talk. You
might say, 'Oh, really ? Show me'. I then wave my wand and the
pig starts talking. You might respond, 'My God! That's amaz
ing!' You are not likely to say, 'Ah, but that's just one pig. Show
me a few more and then I might believe you: Yet this is pre
cisely the attitude of many people in my field." 8 5
Others again may fear that the working hypothesis pro
posed is no more than a covert way to introduce a hidden
religiOUS agenda into a scientific debate. They may think that
one might as well adopt as "working hypothesis" the Christian
84 Clark and Stephenson, 1977; this book offers a general presentation
of historical supernovae, as well as observations about the interpreta
tion of celestial data in China. The most famous of these historical su
pernovae is the one that was to give rise to the Crab Nebula well known
to astronomers; it was observed in 1 054 CE by Chinese astronomers.
For a translation of the Chinese and Japanese sources related to the
Crab Nebula, see Clark and Stephenson, 1 977: 140 f, and Duyvendak,
1942.
8 5 Ramachandran & Blakeslee, 1 998: xiii.
75
ABSORPTION, PART I I : THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE BUD D H A
belief that "Jesus is the son of God". This fear, though under
standable, would be misplaced. The working hypothesis here
proposed has nothing to do with religious beliefs, and involves
no metaphysical assumptions of any kind. If a comparison with
early Christianity has to be made at all (which does not seem
to me a particularly good idea), then rather with some such
statement as "Jesus was a historical person who ended his life
being crucified". Research may or may not be able to confirm
or falsify this statement, which is yet of the kind that could
interest also non-religious researchers.
Reruming now to the Buddhist sources, it is true that stud
ies that try to reconstruct facts about the life of the histori
cal Buddha are confronted with innumerable difficulties and
rarely, if ever, produce reliable results. 8 6 Legendary accounts
of episodes in the Buddha's life have come into existence for
numerous reasons. Popular imagination, in particular, dwelt
upon the person of the Buddha, and played an important role
in the creation of many of the stories told about him. From
among these, it is virtually impossible to separate the wheat
from the chafE
The present study is not interested in the details of the
historical Buddha's life. Rather, it concentrates on the central
claims of his teaching. 8 7 Here we are on safer ground, for a tra
dition of monastic recitation was set up precisely for the pur
pose of preserving this teaching. Unlike the stories of the Bud
dha legend, which are largely absent from the oldest texts, the
main teachings are repeated over and over again in these texts.
86
For attempts, see, e.g., Bareau, 1963; 1970-7 1 ; Nakamura, 20002005. Even the tradition as to the final days, death and incineration of
the Buddha may be no more than pious fiction; see Bronkhorst, 20 1 1 :
206-224.
87
For a presentation and analysis of the teaching of the historical Bud
dha, see Bronkhorst, 2009.
76
Introduction
This is also not a study of the Buddhist religion. It is rather

a study based on certain claims which the Buddhist commu
nity has preserved in its oldest texts. These claims concern,
primarily if not exclusively, the person who referred to him
self as the Buddha, "the awakened one': and whom subsequent
generations came to accept as the founder (or most recent fully
enlightened teacher) of Buddhism. These claims should not be
confused with claims regarding psychological attainments that
may be found among members of the Buddhist community. In
this study we are not interested in the Buddhist community
and its attainments, but only in the old texts which it has pre
served. These texts go back to a time before the community
existed in anything resembling its present form.
There are good reasons to think that it took a considerable
time before monks and nuns settled down in monasteries. The
Buddha and his early disciples did not live in monasteries: they
were mendicants who begged for their food and had no perma
nent place of residence. 88 The method which the Buddha had
followed in order to achieve his goal, and which he subsequent
ly taught to his followers, had to be practiced in isolated places
in the jungle and not in monasteries. 89 Indeed, for a hundred
years or so following the disappearance of the Buddha, monas
teries and the accompanying communal style of living may still
not have existed. When the emperor Asoka wanted to bestow
a gift in memory of the Buddha's birth, he was not able to do
nate it to the community of monks and nuns, as would become
customary in a later age. Instead he freed the viflage in which
the Buddha was born from all taxes, and had this recorded in
one of his famous inscriptions. 9o In other words, he presented
88 An old rule enjoins monks to eat scraps of food, wear rags, and lodge
under trees; Hiniiber, 2006: 1 6.
8 9 Appendix 1 ofpart II 1 (8), 6, below.
90 Bloch, 1 950: 1 57. Cpo Schopen, 2006: 3 1 6.
77
ABSORPTION, PART II: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE BUD D H A
a gift to the inhabitants of this village rather than to the com

munity of monks and nuns. Undoubtedly the reason for this
was that the Buddhist community could still not receive gifts
at that time. This changed after Asoka, but the development of
monastic Buddhism in subsequent centuries tends to obscure
the fact that the Buddha and his earliest followers pursued
their path in isolation from the world.
The claims dealt with in this study belong to texts that have
been handed down by the Buddhist monastic community. The
ideas, practices and beliefs of members of this community are
not necessarily useful for a correct understanding of the origi
nal claims. From the point of view of this study, its main virtue
is to have preserved these texts with great care.9 1
Which are these claims ? There are several of them. We will
study them in detail as we proceed. The most important one
in the present context is that a certain practice specified in
the texts can lead to both the end of desire and the end of suf
fering.9 2 The claim concerning the end of suffering occurs fre
quently. We find it in its most condensed form in the so-called
Four Noble Truths. These concern (i) suffering, ( ii) the origin
of suffering, ( iii) the cessation of suffering, ( iv) the way lead
ing to the cessation of suffering. In other words, the Buddha is
supposed to have claimed that ordinary life is suffering; to have
identified the causes responsible for this; to have, in his own
case, removed those causes; and to have taught the way that has
to be followed (and that he claimed to have followed) in order
to bring about that result.
91 Wynne, 2004.
92 This practice is also claimed to lead to the end of rebirth. Since this
claim is based on a belief that is hard to reconcile with modern science,
it does not constitute a challenge to science. C Flanagan, 20 1 1 : 72 If.
78
Introduction
Some qualifications are called for. The early Buddhist tradi

tion has preserved an account of the Buddha's last days which
records the fatigue and discomfort due to disease and old age
that he was experiencing. 93 The early Buddhist tradition, and
the Buddha himself, apparently saw no contradiction between
this account and the destruction of suffering which he had
presumably accomplished.94 Indications like these allow us to
conclude that the destruction of suffering taught here must be
understood primarily as the destruction of psychological suf
fering. The extent to which this affects bodily suffering will be
discussed later.95
No such qualifications are required with regard to desire.
Desire, which is frequently referred to as thirstO,96 is regularly
mentioned as the root cause of suffering. Desire must therefore
be eradicated. The traditional explanation of the second Noble
Truth is: "This is the Noble Truth of the origin of suffering:
the thirst for repeated existence which, associated with delight
and greed, delights in this and that, namely the thirst for the
objects of sense desire, the thirst for existence, and the thirst
for non-existence." It comes as no surprise that the claim of the
third Noble Truth is that suffering can be made to cease by get
ting rid of the thirst that underlies it.
Our working hypothesis, as explained above, is that these
claims are true: desire and psychological suffering can be
93 Appendix 1 of Part II 8, below.
94 Subsequent Buddhism made lists of the afRictions of the Buddha.
and attempted to explain them. a topic dealt with by John Strong in
a paper ("Explaining the Buddha's afRictions : karmic strands, good
means. or just aches and pains") presented at the XVIth Congress of the
International Association of Buddhist Studies. Taiwan 20 1 1 .
95 Part II 8 and Appendix 1 of Part II 8, below.
96 Words followed by are included among the Technical terms and
their Sanskrit and Pali equivalents on p. 2 1 6.
"0"
79
brought to an end. Desire and suffering are familiar to all of

us. This may make us distrustful with regard to the claim that a
person could exist without them. Distrust, however, is no dis
proo so let us proceed.
How can we proceed ? The early Buddhist claims confront us
with the following questions: What are human beings like i
in appropriate circumstances, they can attain a conscious and
enduring state of being without suffering and without desire ?
What psychological theory would account for such a state ?97
And what further theoretical assumptions are necessary in or
der that the process described in the ancient texts9 8 should lead
to this state ?
In order to answer these questions, we need to reflect on
the kind ofpsychological theory we require. It seems clear from
97 The choice of existing global psychological theories is extremely lim
ited, and may not have progressed much beyond the state referred to by
William James in a letter to his brother Henry: "It is indeed strange to
hear people talk triumphantly of 'the New Psychology' and write 'His
tories of Psychology' when into the real elements and forces which the
word covers not the first glimpse of clear insight exists. A string of raw
facts, a little gossip and wrangle about opinions; a little classification
and generalization on the mere descriptive level . . . but not a single law
in the sense in which physics shows us laws, not a single proposition
from which any consequence can be casually deduced." (cited in Slater,
2004: 2S I ) .
Scholars o f Buddhism who confront these and similar questions tend
to believe that they call for a philosophical rather than a psychological
answer; one example among many is David Burton's book Buddhism,
Knowledge and Liberation: A Philosophical Study (2004). I think these
scholars are mistaken. Burton observes (p. 170) : "Whether human na
ture is such that the complete eradication of craving and hence suffer
ing is attainable by one's own efforts is a debatable point." He is right,
but the debate concerned would be a psychological debate, not a philo
sophical one.
98 For this process, see primarily Appendix 1 of Part II 1 , below.
80
Introduction
the beginning that neither neuroscience nor evolutionary psy

chology can provide full answers. 99 Let us consider neurosci
ence first.
Neuroscience might conceivably discover what processes or
states ofthe human brain correspond to a conscious state that is
free from suffering and free from desire. It might even discover
which neurological interventions would bring about that state.
Even if such information existed, it would be of only limited
use for understanding the early Buddhist texts. These texts pre
sent an enduring and conscious state free from suffering and
free from desire as the final outcome of a process described in
experiential terms. In order to understand these texts, we need
an answer formulated in terms of a theory which has a place
for experiential elements; the theory has to show how these are
functionally interrelated.loo Only such a theory might conceiv99 This means that we must disagree with Watson (2000: 760) where
he states with regard to psychology: "Darwin provides the only hope at
the moment, together with the latest advances being made in neurosci
ence."
100 William James' emphasis on the "elementary ingredients of the
mind" ( 1 890: I: 28: "A science of the mind must reduce [ . . . ] complex
manifestations [ . . . ] to their elements. [ . . ] A science of the relations of
mind and brain must show how the elementary ingredients of the for
mer correspond to the elementary functions of the latter.") omits the
need to understand the functional interrelationship between the "ele
mentary ingredients of the mind Similarly, Rose's (2003: 5 ) "Rosetta
stone" that may help to translate between the two languages of mind
and brain, if it can exist at all, requires not just a "language of the brain"
that supposedly may be provided by neuroscience, but also a "language
of the mind with a "syntax" of its own, i.e. a theoretical structure that
brings to light the interrelationship between mental entities. As long as
this Rosetta stone contains mere isolated words in the part written in
the language of the mind, no such thing as a translation is ever likely to
be possible. It is certain that " [the] Rosetta Stone metaphor of transla
tion remains a longway from realisation" (Rose, 2005 : 2 1 ) . In the After
word added in the reprint, Rose abandons this metaphor ("Older and
.
81
ably answer our questions. Neuroscience will certainly have

to be taken into consideration. Both the process described in
the ancient texts and the personal state that presumably results
from it must, if they are at all possible, have counterparts in
processes in and states of the human brain. However, mere
knowledge of the neuro-physiological correlates of the process
and its result will not provide us with the understanding we
are looking for. 101 Even a detailed understanding of what hap
pened in the Buddha's brain - if we could obtain it - would
not help us understand why and how it occurred. 10 2 Nor would
hopefully wiser, I now see that the Rosetta Stone, much as I love it, is an
inadequate analogy" (2005: 308), and "I ... consign my Rosetta Stone
to the dustbin of discarded metaphors" (p. 3 1 0) ) .
101 Komisaruk, Beyer-Flores & Whipple (2006: 265) draw atte h tion to
the danger of creating "just so" stories on the basis of mere research find
ings regarding brain activity. For a discussion of neuroscience's "explan
atory gap see Horgan, 1 999: 1 5 ff. Flanagan (20 1 1 : 88) observes: "One
reason to hope that the explanatory gap can be closed [by means of a
theory that bridges it] is that ifit is not, we are left (unless science comes
up with radically new laws) with no way to explain mental causation
and thus to keep consciousness from, in fact, being epiphenomenal."
102 Recall that, to borrow a phrase from Boden (2006: II: 1 1 10), "a
theory of the brain needs a theory of what it is that the brain is doing
and that "the original conceptual problem of defining what the brain
actually does psychologically speaking, what its psychological functions
are, remains as elusive as ever" (Richards, 2002: 1 19). Similarly, "it is
one thing to look at the brain and see where neurons 'light up', it is quite
another to have a sophisticated sense of what one is looking for, and
looking at" (Lear, 2005: 6). And again: "When it comes to studying
mental function, biologists are badly in need of guidance." (Kandel,
2005: 38; Kandel then adds that, in his opinion, psychiatry and
cognitive psychology can make a particularly valuable contribution to
brain science "as guide and tutor") . Neuropsychologist Seth Horowitz
of Brown University, as cited in Scientific American (Biello, 2007),
states : "You list a bunch of places in the brain as if naming something
lets you understand it': "Vincent Paquette . . . goes further, likening
neuroimaging to phrenology, the practice in which Victorian-era
82
Introduction
it explain how he was able to plan the process which led to the
intended result, viz., the end of desire and the end of suffering.
Evolutionary psychology can at best be only ofmarginal use
in our investigation. There can be no doubt that in the study
of the human mind it is essential to keep an eye on what is,
or might be, humanity's genetic heritage. It is evident that the
elimination of desire, including sexual desire, brings no evolu
tionary advantage. Natural selection cannot, therefore, be in
voked as a factor that has worked in favor of the development
of the faculty to do so, at least not in a simplistic and direct
manner. 103 The question remains how humanity's evolutionary
past has led to a situation in which, ex hypothesi, desire can be
eliminated. This is a question that can only be meaningfully
addressed once we know exactly what happens, in terms of
mental functioning, in such a situation.
Having argued that no satisfactory answers to the specific
questions raised in this study can be expected either from neu
roscience or evolutionary psychology, let me now address the
scientists tried - and ultimately failed - to intuit clues about brain
function and character traits from irregularities in the shape of the
skull" ( ibid.) . Pribram's ( 1 998: 1 2) following critical remarks sum it
all up : "Today's establishment, in the role of eliminative materialists
such Francis Crick, the Churchlands (Paul and Patricia), and Steven
Stitch, want to get rid of what they call 'folk psychology: They claim
that if you know all about neurons you don't need to have a science of
consciousness; once we know what each neuron does, we have it all. They
are, of course, making a 'category error', but Crick passes that objection
off as just philosophical nonsense. No turn of the century Viennese was
that unsophisticated. Nor do we need to be now." According to Edelman
(2006: 89), "no adequate reduction of human sciences to the brain's
so-called epigenetic rules is realizable". See further Looren de long &
Schouten, 2005; Looren de long, 2006; Van Eck, Looren de long &
Schouten, 2006; and Appendix 3 of Part II.
103 This does not, of course, exclude the possibility that celibacy may
in certain circumstances be an adaptive strategy; see e.g. Deady et al.,
2006.
83
question what kind of theory offers the best hope for making
psychological sense of the claims of the early Buddhist texts.
I think the answer is obvious. We need a theory in which ex
periential terms - and most particularly desire - figure as
functional elements. Only such a theory may do justice to our
working hypothesis, viz., the reliability of certain claims in the
early Buddhist texts.
Let it be clear that I do not claim that experiences such as
desire are in principle irreducible to more elementary processes
in the brain (or brain and body). In the present context it is not
necessary to pronounce on this issue. All that counts is that
the theory which allows us to discuss the claim that desire can
be eradicated should have a place for desire. 'There may or may
not be deeper - perhaps neurophysiological - levels/of ex
planation, but this is without immediate importance for our
project. Moreover, the decision to conduct our discussion on
a level where desire and other experiences figure as functional
elements brings an unexpected advantage: it allows us to cir
cumvent the much-debated issue of free will. 104
Few psychological theories that I am aware of have a place
for experiential terms. 'The most serious attempt, in spite of all
its flaws, is still Freud's psychoanalytic theory (including what
he came to call metapsychology) . We will therefore have to take
this theory as point of departure, whether we like it or not. We
are of course free to depart from it wherever this appears use
ful or necessary. Freudian psychoanalysis, like the theory we
are looking for, was meant to be a coherent theory in which
experiential terms play an essential role. In Freudian theory, as
104 See Appendix 3 of Part II. This procedure will also allow us to cir
cumvent the problems - discussed by Roger Penrose, esp. 1994, Part I
- connected with the reduction of certain mental functions to compu
tational mechanisms (supposing such a reduction is even theoretically
possible).
84
Introduction
in our ideal theory, experiential elements are embedded in a

larger theoretical context in which other elements that are not
directly related to experiences also have their place. Repression
and the various drives, or instincts, which Freud postulated are
examples of elements that do not directly correspond to expe
riences but which do play essential roles in his theory. Freudian
theory as it stands would lend itself to a confrontation with the
claims of the early Buddhist texts, most notably because desire
plays a central role both here and in those texts. In particu
lar Freud's sexual instinct might be profitably confronted with
the claims of our texts according to which all desire, including
sexual desire, can be extinguished.
We will see below that Freudian psychoanalysis, as it stands,
is not our ideal theory. It will be useful to consider some of the
criticisms that have been directed against it. Freudian theory
has been accused of being unfalsifiable. Our Buddhist sources
show that this criticism is not justified: Freudian theory can
be falsified. Indeed, it is falsified if we accept the testimony
of these sources. A theory that postulates the biological, and
therefore inborn nature of the sexual instinct as we know it, is
in conflict with the claim that sexual desire (along with all oth
er forms of desire) can be eliminated. l O S Freudian theory could
however be improved upon, for example, by an appropriate re
formulation of the sexual instinct. This could then give rise to
a theory which no longer stands refuted.
This first, and as yet extremely superficial confrontation of
Freudian theory with the testimony of the early Buddhist texts
105 Don't forget that we are speaking of the elimination of sexual desire,
not about sexual restraint or sexual abstinence. Freud later in life elabo
rated and expanded his ideas about the sexual instinct so as to arrive,
for example, at "erotic instincts [that 1 strive to bring about a synthesis
ofliving things into greater unities" (New Introductory Lectures on Psy
choanalysis, 1933; SE XXII p. 108). Yet he never abandoned the convic
tion that sexuality is rooted in biology.
85
shows promise. This testimony takes us directly to the remot

est and least accessible parts of the theory. Freud always spoke
about the instincts - including the sexual instinct - in a most
circumspect manner. I 0 6 This is understandable, because infor
mation about these instincts had to be extracted, or rather ex
cavated, from underneath a jungle of more accessible data. The
promise of the early Buddhist texts is that there may be a direct
way to the roots of this jungle which avoids the luxuriant over
growth. More than forty years ago Kurt Eissler, the New York
psychoanalyst who founded and directed the Sigmund Freud
Archives, stated that "the psychoanalytic situation has already
given forth everything it contains. It is depleted with regard
to research possibilities:'lo7 If so, alternative ways to get at the
\
"roots" of Freudian theory merit serious attention.
The sexual instinct as conceived of by Freud is not only in
conflict with the testimony of the early Buddhist texts, but
also with a vital element in psychoanalytic theory and practice
itself, viz., sublimation. Sublimation is supposed to be a devia
tion, a redirection, of sexual energy to higher aims. If, however,
sexual energy is indeed rooted in biology, it cannot be redi
rected: sexual energy should not find satisfaction in different
106 Freud's ideas about the instincts are for this reason open to serious
criticism. C Panhuysen, 1998: 4 1 : "There are [ ... J some serious objec

tions to Freud's approach. In the first place there is the concrete shape of
his drive theory. His drives are too little elaborated (and are capable of
being elaborated too much): Not only are Eros and Thanatos mythical
beings, but also all drives remain vague shadows, principally because the
transition from somatic upwelling to drive represented in a psychic way
remains too indeterminate:'
107 Kurt Eissler ( 1 969: 469) as cited in Kandel, 2005: 66. Others close
to the psychoanalytic movement have been critical. An example is Wil
helm Reich, who wrote in 1954: "I left behind me an age which had
finally got hold of a little corner of the Freudian thought system, but
had completely thrown overboard Freud's courage to stand alone [ J "
(Reich, 1 967: 5).
...
86
Introduction
aims than those which are naturally its own. Sublimation is

therefore problematic in Freudian theory as it stands. 108 Once
again, a reformulation of this and other aspects of the theory
could result in a better, more viable theory.
As well as being criticized for being unfalsifiable, Freudian
theory is also criticized for being "positivist" and "empiricist".
This, it is claimed, is inappropriate for a psychological theory:
human sciences supposedly do not fit such a model. This criti
cism (for being "positivist" and "empiricist") is the opposite of
the earlier one (for being unfalsifiable) . Indeed, it objects to
the very notion that Freudian theory might be, or might want
to be, falsifiable. 109 The very notion of a "mechanistic" theory
of the mind is reprehensible to those who uphold this view.
Cognitive scientists, nevertheless, have no difficulty compar
ing the mind with a machine - although not quite in the way
Freud didYo
The position taken here is that falsifiability of a theory is a
virtue rather than a vice. An unfalsifiable theory is hardly bet
ter than no theory at all, for it is untestable. Such a theory is in
danger of becoming merely a manner of speaking about phe
nomena, or perhaps only a way to feel one's way into them. A
108 See, e.g., Vergote, 1 997.
109 E.g. Frosh, 2006: 40: " [T]he kind of approach to scientific testing
advocated in the positivist, empiricist tradition is inappropriate to the
human sciences. This is, first, because it cannot account for 'reflexivity'
[ ... ] . Secondly, the empiricist approach is geared to highly controlled
situations that are not representative of the actualities of human cir
cumstances."
1 10 Note the title Mind as Machine. A history of cognitive science of a re
cent publication ; its author (Boden, 2006: 9) presents, "broadly speak
ing", the study of mind as machine as a definition of cognitive science.
Note further that " [0] ne of Freud's earliest British supporters [ T. N.
Mitchell, JB] saw him as 'dominated by the [ ... ] prevailing urge to find
mechanistic explanations for everything in the cosmos'" (Cioffi, 1 998:
85).
87
ABSORPTI ON, PART I I : THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE BUD D H A
satisfactory psychological theory should be more than this. It

should allow us to discuss psychological events or experiences
in terms that "stick their neck out". Such a theory could, if
necessary, be replaced by a better one for other than subjective
reasons.
Two noteworthy thinkers - Thomas Nagel and Eric R.
Kandel - have contrasting views about this issue. Let us con
sider these.
In a review that appeared in the New York Review of Books,
the philosopher Nagel argues that theories like the one we are
looking for cannot be expected to go beyond a generalized
"feeling into". He writes: 1 1 I
As Wollheim [the author of the book reviewed, JB] ob
serves, commonsense explanations are a form oi under
standing "from within"; even when they provide insights
into the mind of another, they depend, in part, on self
understanding, since they interpret the other person as
another self To understand someone else's thought, feel
ings, or behavior requires that we make sense - even if
only irrational sense - of his point of view, by using our
own point of view as an imaginative resource. Imagina
tion enables us to make internal sense of beliefs, emo
tions, and aims that we do not share - to see how they
hang together so as to render the other's conduct intel
ligible. But Freud's extension of this form of insight to
unconscious thoughts, motives, and fantasies, and into
the minds of infants, threatens to deprive ordinary psy
chological concepts, like belief, wish, and desire, of their
familiar empirical support in the common experience
and understanding of everyday life. [ . ]
.
III
New York Review of Books of May 12 1994. I cite from the reprint
in Gomez, 2005: 1 38- 1 50. The quoted passages occur on pages 1 39,
140 and 142.
88
Introduction
Freud extended the range of such explanation to unheard

oflengths, to cover not only memory lapses and slips, but
jokes, dreams, neurotic symptoms, and the substructure
of erotic life and family ties - with forays into morality,
politics, art, and religion. [ ... ]
Yet the entire system remained psychological in the sense
Wollheim has specified. It sought to provide an under
standing ofhuman beings "from within", so that we could
put ourselves in their-shoes and make sense of their symp
toms and responses by attributing to them beliefs, desires,
feelings, and perceptions - with the difference that these
were aspects of their point of view of which they were not
consciously aware.
Not surprisingly, Nagel comes to the conclusion that uncon
scious mental processes - i.e. processes that are described in
the terminology of ordinary experience, but which are yet not
part of it - must be evaluated by the same standard as ordi
nary experience, and not "by the methods appropriate in parti
cle physics, cancer research, or the study of reflexes". According
to him, "we may not be able to run controlled experiments, but
we can still try to make internal sense" of them.
Nobel laureate Kandel holds a different opinion. He states
(2005 : 66) : 1 1 2 "although psychoanalysis has historically been
scientific in its aims, it has rarely been scientific in its methods;
it has failed over the years to submit its assumptions to test
able experimentation. Indeed, psychoanalysis has tradition112 See also Kandel, 2006: ch. 27 ( "Biology and the renaissance of
psychoanalytic thought" ) . Further Kandel, 2005: 1 27: "I .. . think that
the emergence of an empirical neuropsychology of cognition based
on cellular neurobiology can produce a renascence of scientific psy
choanalysis. This form of psychoanalysis may be founded on theoretical
hypotheses that are more modest than those applied previously but that
are more testable because they will be closer to experimental inquiry."
89
ally been far better at generating ideas than at testing them.

As a result of this failure, it has not been able to progress as
have other areas of psychology and medicine." ll3 Kandel (p.
68) opts in this way for the scientific view ofpsychoanalysis and
rejects the hermeneutic one, which Nagel represents. In Kan
del's opinion, the hermeneutic view of psychoanalysis "reflects
a position that has hindered psychoanalysis from continuing
to grow intellectually".
In this debate we take sides with Kandel against Nagel. 1 l4
Indeed, Nagel's remarks might be applied to any theory that
uses terms related to ordinary experience and then extends
their use beyond their habitual field of application. We do not
wish our theory to play (merely) the role that Nagel would as
cribe to it. We are not looking for a theory in order to lunder
stand the processes and results described in the early Buddhist
texts "from within", i.e. "to try to make internal sense" of them.
1 1 3 Similarly Kandel, 2005 : 54: "With the perspective of time, we
can readily see what has hindered the full intellectual development of
psychoanalysis during the last century. To begin with, psychoanalysis
has lacked any semblance of a scientific foundation. Even more, it has
lacked a scientific tradition, a questioning tradition based not only on
imaginative insights but on creative and critical experiments designed
to explore, support, or, as is often the case, falsify those insights."
1 1 4 Steven Rose, though not mentioning psychoanalysis, argues in favor
of some form of "mind-language" in the following passage (200 5 : 220) :
"Some years ago at a symposium on reductionism in the biological sci
ences I clashed with the distinguished philosopher Thomas Nagel on
this matter of levels of explanation. Arguing for the primacy of reduc
tionist explanations, Nagel suggested that whilst higher level accounts,
such as mentalistic ones, could describe a phenomenon, only the 'lower
level' reductionist could explain it. I disagree. In many cases, lower-level
accounts are descriptive whilst the higher-level ones are explanatory. . . .
For sure, explaining the brain i s helping u s describe and understand our
minds, but it is not going to succeed in eliminating mind-language by
relocating it into some limbo dismissable by the cognitive illuminati as
mere 'folk psychology:" C note 1 02, above.
90
Introduction
This is exactly the procedure that we fear might lead us astray

by drawing these processes and results back into the realm of
our experience, where we may be dealing with processes and re
sults that are not part ofitYs We need a theory that is both for
mulated in the terms of ordinary experience and broad enough
to cover areas that are not part of it and go, in a sense, beyond
our common imagination. I 1 6
Kandel suggests that "one way that psychoanalysis might
re-energize itself . . . is by developing a closer relationship with
biology in general and with cognitive neuroscience in par
ticular" (2005 : 64). He continues: "From a conceptual point
of view, cognitive neuroscience could provide a new founda
tion for the future growth of psychoanalysis, a foundation that
l IS
This attitude of "trying to make internal sense" of the texts explains
no doubt the remarkable fact that academic scholarship has so far failed
to even notice or comment upon the extraordinary nature of the claims
contained in the early Buddhist texts.
1 16
It should not cover the type of unconscious mental state that is "very
commonly discussed in the cognitive science literature [ ... J where the
agent not only cannot bring the mental state to consciousness in fact,
but could not bring it to consciousness even in principle, because it is
not the sort of thing that can form the content of a conscious inten
tional state." Searle (2004: 1 67- 1 68) illustrates this type with the fol
lowing example : "in cognitive science it is commonly said that a child
learns a language by 'unconsciously' applying many computational rules
of universal grammar, or that the child is able to perceive visually by
performing 'unconscious' computational operations over the input that
comes into the child's retina." About this type of unconscious mental
state, which he calls deep unconscious mental state, Searle rightly says (p.
1 7 1 ) : "There are no such cases. There is no such thing as a deep uncon
scious mental state." See further Searle, 2007: 1 l 3 : "there are all sorts
of subpersonal processes going on in the brain, in the lateral geniculate
nucleus, for example, which can be described as if they were cases of
thinking about information, but of course there is literally no informa
tion there. There are just neuron firings, which result in information
of a conscious kind at the end of the process but themselves have no
semantic content."
91
ABSORPTION, PART II: THE PSYC H OLOGY OF THE BUDD H A
i s perhaps more satisfactory than metapsychology." Kandel's

suggestion is no doubt valuable and promising, yet one re
grets that he considers discarding metapsychology altogether,
rather than improving it in a manner that it will lend itself to
a confrontation "with biology in general and with cognitive
neuroscience in particular." It is the latter aim that inspires the
following pages.
It is difficult to create a theory that shares elements with Freud
ian psychoanalysis but avoids its weaknesses because, as it
stands, Freudian theory is not one single theory. Freud's ideas
developed over his lifetime, and he revised his theory regularly,
sometimes radically.l l 7 A number of his fundamental notions
are anthropomorphic and must be avoided in a theory that
aims at being scientific. It is not possible at present to deal with
all the criticisms that have been raised against the theory, some
of which are valid.l l 8 It is however clear that the theory as it
stands cannot be used in the investigation we wish to conduct.
What we need is a new theory that will derive inspiration from
Freudian psychoanalytic theory where it appears to be useful,
but which is otherwise free to deviate from it.
1 1 7 This leads Borch-Jacobsen and Shamdasani (20 1 2: 303) to charac
terize psychoanalysis as being "an empty theory in which one can cram
whatever one likes". They explain: "To take an example, Freud's unilat
eral insistence on the pre-eminence of sexuality was objected to from
all sides. No matter, he then developed his theory of narcissism and the
analysis of the ego, silently borrowing from some of his critics, Adler
and Jung. The traumatic neuroses of the First World War appeared to
have conclusively demonstrated that one could suffer from hysterical
symptoms for non-sexual reasons. Freud then came up with the theories
of the repetition compulsion and the death drive from the ever ready
unconscious."
1 18 See, e.g., Cioffi, 1998; Crews, 1 998; Dufresne, 2003; 2007; Meyer,
2005. Most of these criticisms do not concern the theoretical elements
that will be drawn upon in the following pages.
92
Introduction
This new theory can be less elaborate than psychoanalysis.

Many important elements can be omitted, because they play no
useful role in the present investigation. For example, the new
theory does not have to deal with transference, a key concept
in psychoanalytic theory and practice. Transference plays no
role in a process which is brought about by a single individual
unaccompanied by a therapist. The Buddha, according to the
early Buddhist texts, reached his goal on his own, far away from
society and the company of other human beings. Dreams, too,
play no role in the path described in the Buddhist texts. There
is no need to deal with their place in the new theory, in spite
of the fact that for Freud they constituted the royal road to the
unconscious. Other key concepts in Freudian theory, such as
the Oedipus complex, do not need to be considered. The early
Buddhist texts do not mention the specific personal difficulties
which individuals are to overcome on their way to the goal. For
our investigation the hypothesis that that goal can be reached
is more important than the specific difficulties encountered.
The aim of this study, moreover, is not to show that the path
depicted in the Buddhist texts represents some form of psy
choanalytic therapy, but rather that, though perhaps unique as
a path, it can be described and perhaps understood in terms of
a theory that has points in common with Freudian theory. All
that is required is the skeleton of a theory (which may one day
be elaborated into a "full" theory). However, without a prop
erly coristructed skeleton no body can stand up. This applies
to bodies of theory as much as to bodies of flesh and blood.
Much ofthe Freudian superstructure, its "flesh and blood will
therefore remain outside our immediate area of concern. What
remains corresponds more or less closely to Freud's metapsy
chology.
The same observations can be expressed through the com
parison of the human mind with wild growth in a tropical
93
AB SORPTION, PART II: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE B U D D H A
jungle which I used above. Psychotherapists have, by necessity,

approached this luxuriant growth from above, trying to disen
tangle the multitudes of forms that present themselves to the
eye. Their ideas about what hides in the soil, beneath this rich
cover, have had to remain tentative because no direct access to
it was possible. The approach which we are exploring offers di
rect access to the roots, but tells us relatively little abour the
overgrowth. This study will therefore confine itself to the in
vestigation of those "roots': without denying that a complete
theory should take into consideration the whole "plant", both
the parts that are hidden in the soil and those that protrude
from it.
In the following pages a new theory will be constructed
along these lines. Though new, it does not deny itsl obvious
indebtedness to Freudian theory. Footnotes will from time to
time (though not systematically or exhaustively) cite passages
from Freud's collected works which express ideas that are simi
lar to the ones presented here. These footnotes are not meant to
suggest that the theory presented is in these respects identical
with Freudian theory. Nor are they to be read as justifications
of the positions put forward.
94
OUTLINE OF A PSYCHOLOGI CAL THEORY

l FUNDA MENTALS
The observation that human behavior is influenced by earlier

experiences must be our point of departure. A pleasurable ex
perience, in particular, will leave a trace in the human mind
which can be activated ("remembered") by a renewed en
counter with the object or event that was originally associated
with it, or with objects or events that are sufficiently similar
to these. 1 19 The activated memory trace may evoke the bodily
state (e.g., an activity) which had accompanied the pleasurable
experience on the previous occasion.
We can think of the mind (or an important part of the
mind) as a large collection of memory traces, each more or
less deeply entrenched. Many of these will bring about specific
bodily states when activated. A memory trace together with
the bodily arousal that belongs to it incorporate a partial map
of the world, however primitive. 1 20 This combination can be
1 1 9 Not all memories preserved in memory traces are episodic or explicit,
or more generally declarative memories; many are procedural or implicit

memories. See below. Rose (2003 : 378) observes that " [pJ rocedural
memories, unlike declarative, do not seem to become forgotten in the
same way, suggesting that they are both learned and re-membered by a
very different mechanism from declarative one." He then suggests the
following explanation : "Perhaps this is because memories that involve
procedural rather than declarative modes - such as riding a bicycle are not confined simply to the brain but involve whole sets of other
bodily memories, encoded in muscles and sinews ?"
120 This is not the opinion of Antonio Damasio (20 1 0 : 1 30 ff), who
distinguishes between dispositions (the brain's "true and tried device")
and maps and their images ("a new invention") ; the two are said to work
in synergy. Others, however, maintain that already at the most elemen-
95
seen as an embodiment of the "belief" that the obj ect or event

tary level we have to think of physicomental maps rather than of mere
sequences of stimulus-response. Cpo Rose, 2003: 1 77- 178: "despite its
popularity with psychological theorists, modellers and neurobiological
experimenters, association cannot be the only way in which memory
occurs . . . For instance, on Skinner's theory, rats ought to learn to run a
maze correctly by learning each correct turn (first left, second right and
so on) individually and sequentially as a chain of stimuli and responses.
But it was quite straightforward to show, by rearranging the maze or
altering the cues within it, that the animals are not so inefficient; in
stead they seem after a few trials to be able to form some sort of a global
image of the maze, a map if you like, in their brains, so that wherever
they are placed in it they can deduce where the goal may be and adopt
the most efficient route towards it without being excessively confused
by the rearrangement of the maze. Animals use strategies when they
learn; they can create concepts. To understand such mechanisms it is
not adequate to reduce them to linear sequences of stimulus-response,
positive and negative reinforcement." (my emphasis, ]B) . Also p. 269:
"Cognitive behaviour is not reducible to simple sequences of contin
gencies of reinforcement but instead reflects goal-seeking activities,
hypothesis making and many other features which had hitherto been
dismissed from consideration within the Anglo-American tradition in
psychology." Rose, 2005: 22: " [A] free-living cell ... needs to be able to
respond appropriately to ... changes. One way of conceiving of this ca
pacity to vary a program is as an action plan, an 'internal representation'
of the desired goal - at its minimum, that of survival at least until rep
lication is achieved." Intelligence in cells is also defended in Ford, 2009.
See further Kandel, 2005 : 1 1 8: "investigation/which fail to 'consider
internal representations of mental events are in adequate to account for
behavior, not only in humans but - perhaps more surprisingly - also
in simple experimental animals." The question how such cognitive maps
and goal-seeking are to be explained on the level of the memory traces
is beyond the scope of this publication ; see however Freeman, 1 999:
1 20- 1 2 1 : "the ingredients received by brains from their sensory corti
ces with which to make meanings are produced by the cortices. They
are not direct transcriptions or impressions from the environment in
side or outside the body. All that brains can know has been synthesized
within themselves, in the form of hypotheses about the world and the
outcomes of their own tests of the hypotheses, success or failure, and
the manner of failure." The fear of introducing homunculi here cannot
96
1 Outline of a Psychological Theory: Fundamentals
concerned, if reacted to with that specific bodily state, will lead

to a pleasurable experience. In the simplest case this "belief" is
based on one single experience, and may very well be wrong: a
repeated confrontation with the same or a closely similar object
or event, followed by the same bodily arousal, may not bring
about a pleasurable experience on this subsequent occasion. In
many cases new experiences can correct wrong "beliefs". They
can do so because a number of memory traces can mutually
INT E G RAT E and form a T RACE UNIT or S E C O NDARY T RAC E .
A trace unit will incorporate a better map, i.e. a better reality
assessment, and will evoke the bodily arousal which its better
reality assessment "believes" will give rise to pleasurable expebe fully removed in the manner suggested by Dennett (2005: 1 37, also
1 6 1 ) : "As long as your homunculi are more stupid and ignorant than
the intelligent agent they compose, the nesting of homunculi within
homunculi can be finite, bottoming out, eventually, with agents so
unimpressive that they can be replaced by machines". Deacon (20 1 2:
83-84) comments: "everything depends on mental processes being a cu
mulative effect of the interactions of tiny mindless robots. Though the
homunculus problem is in this way subdivided and distributed, it is not
clear that the reduction of complex intentionality to many tiny inten
tions has done any more than give the impression that it can be simpli
fied and simplified until it just disappears. But it is not clear where this
vanishing point will occur. Though intuitively one can imagine simpler
and simpler agents with stupider and stupider intentional capacities, at
what point does it stop being intentional and just become mechanism ?"
And again (p. 1 39) : "No fractionation ... into modules of even smaller
scope and proportion allows the apparent arrow of causality to reverse."
Deacon dedicates much of the remainder of his book trying to show
how this arrow of causality can actually reverse.
About remembering, Rose states (p. 3 8 1 ) : "Truth to tell, . . . we still
haven't the slightest idea of just how re-membering occurs, how a sim
ple clue can evoke the sequential memory of an entire scene." Note fi
nally that at the human level memory traces tend to be integrated in
such a manner that some kind of essence is attributed to the objects of
memory; see Bloom, 20 10.
97
riences. 1 2 1 Integrated traces may even change in the process of

integration - i.e., they may no longer remember the "same"
memory.
By way of example we may think of the hunger of a baby
that is appeased when it is suckled at the mother's breast. The
initial memory trace of this pleasurable event may contain lit
tle understanding of the way in which that event came about,
and how it could be brought about again when the need
arises. Combined with other memory traces, a trace unit may
arise that incorporates a better map of the situation, includ
ing knowledge of the kind of activity that might bring about a
repetition of that experience. Continued experience may make
this map ever more sophisticated. The baby may start to realize,
for example, that an effective method to repeat the experience
passes through ways of attracting the attention of the mother.
This understanding is not attached to one single memory trace
but to a number of them that have mutually integrated, thus
forming a trace unit.
The process described can be visualized in more detail in
the following manner. The primary traces that together make
up a trace unit will ( if they have not changed in the process;
see above ) still bring about the states of bodily arousal that
they brought about before their integration. At that time this
bodily arousal took the direction dictated by its primary trace.
After integration, the direction of bodily arousal will no long
er be determined by the reality assessment of its original trace
but by that of the trace unit as a whole. In this way, the baby's
search for appeasement of its hunger will pass through various
phases from, say, undirected crying to focused attempts to at
tract the attention of the mother.
1 2 1 The mechanism by which integration takes place and can give rise to
a better reality assessment is in need of elucidation (without the help of
anthropomorphic homunculi), which cannot be provided here.
98
It will be useful to reformulate the above in terms of (bod

ily) urges and their satisfaction. An urge is linked to a memory
trace which determines its direction. It does so because the
memory trace incorporates the "belief" that satisfaction will
be obtained in that specific way. After integration of the mem
ory trace into a trace unit, the urge will still be there ( it will
be put in a state of excitation when the memory trace is acti
vated). However, its direction will no longer be determined by
"its" memory trace but by the trace unit as a whole. Part of the
excitation associated with the original memory trace, however,
will remain free floating and contribute to a general degree of
bodily tension in an individual.
The example of hunger shows that at least certain urges
can push for satisfaction without the preliminary activation
of associated memory traces. (One may feel hunger without
being confronted with or thinking of food.) In such cases the
excitation of the urge may activate the memory trace rather
than vice-versa. We will call such urges independent. We must
keep in mind that there may be other urges which do not "an
nounce" themselves on their own. These can only be known,
and excited, through the activation of their memory traces.
Such urges are dependent, for they depend for their manifes
tation on the activation of their memory traces or on chance
occurrences of satisfaction. More will be said about this below.
As a first approximation we posit an underlying principle
ofhotrieostatic equilibrium in all of these cases. The organism
"searches" for this state. Excited urges disturb this equilibrium,
their satisfaction reestablishes it. Events that reestablish ho
meostasis are experienced as pleasurable, those that disturb it
as unpleasurable.
The principle
of homeostatic equilibrium will have to be
'
expanded in order to account for certain pleasurable experi
ences that will be dealt with later. The expression "homeostatic
99
ABSORPTION, PART II: T H E PSYC HOLOGY OF T H E BUDD H A
equilibrium" wrongly suggests that there is a stable state that

can be reestablished and that corresponds to a constant level
of bodily tension. In reality this level can vary, so that it will be
better to speak of heterostasis rather than homeostasis. 1 22 This
topic, too, will be further elaborated below.
If all the memory traces of an individual were to be inte
grated in the way described above, the result would be one sin
gle all-embracing trace unit whose reality assessment would be
founded upon all the experiences that person had ever had. An
individual's urges would aim at satisfaction in the most "realis
tic" manner possible for him or her.
We will see below that the mind does not consist of one
single all-embracing trace unit. It is however true that the ma
jority of memory traces do integrate so as to form <bne large
trace unit. We will call this particular trace unit, the largest of
them all, the main unit. The main unit incorporates the reality
assessment of the person as a whole. It directs, and often redi
rects, the majority of that person's urges. 123
The following can be stated about the inner functioning
of the main unit. Since it unites innumerable memory traces,
almost any situation encountered will activate a number of
these. Many different courses of action would lead to satisfac
tion of some of the associated urges, yet all of these courses of
action cannot be undertaken simultaneously. It is at this point
that attention has a role to play. Attention allows the main unit
to "choose" between different courses of action.
1 22 Cpo Panksepp, 1 998: 164.
12 3 This does not necessarily deny that the main unit may be divided
into partly overlapping subunits, responsible for a multiplicity of per

sonalities in one and the same person ; see Carter, 2008. For a critical
presentation and discussion of multiple personality, see Hacking, 1995;
further Nathan, 20 1 1 ; Reinders et al., 20 12.
1 00
Scientists have pointed out that attention is vital to the life

and survival of many animals, not only humans. "An animal
that is hungry or being threatened has to select an obj ect or
an action from many possible ones. It is obvious that the abil
ity to choose quickly one action pattern to be carried out to
the exclusion of others confers considerable selective advan
tage. Possessing such an ability makes it possible to achieve a
goal that would otherwise be interfered with by the attempt to
undertake two incompatible actions simultaneously. Survival
may depend critically on this ability." 1 24 The question that in
terests us at present is: What is attention in terms of our theo
ry ? What happens when attention "chooses" between different
courses of action ? The answer to these questions must take the
following reflections into consideration.
In the theory so far presented, memory traces belong to the
mind, urges (being bodily states) belong to the body. Mind and
body interact closely, yet they must be clearly distinguished.
In trying to specify the nature of attention, this distinction is
important.
Attention may determine that in a given situation one par
ticular trace (or a small number of traces) will be activated (and
the corresponding urge put in a state of excitation) at the ex
pense of others : attention can imply selective activation. The
other traces that might be activated in the situation are side
lined, if only temporarily. However, attention is not only the
selective activation of memory traces. Attention can also be
directed at certain aspects of the sensory input. Perhaps this is
indeed its primary function. Animals that observe their prey
and music lovers who listen to their favorite composer direct
their attention to the relevant aspects of their sensory input.
This happens once again at the expense of other potential ob
jects. Through the selected aspects of the sensory input, certain
1 24 Edelman, 1992: 141- 142.
101
memory traces will also be activated, but this is secondary in

these cases, not primary as above.
Whether attention is primarily directed at aspects of sen
sory input or at selected memory traces - either way, this hap
pens at the expense of other aspects of the sensory input and
of other memory traces. It will therefore be useful to think of
attention as a limited power supply: the more attention is di
rected at certain parts of the sensory input or at certain mem
ory traces, the less will be available for others. 1 2 5 Depending on
the amount of attention that is directed at a specific memory
trace, this memory trace will be activated to a greater or lesser
degree. A more strongly activated memory trace will excite
the accompanying urge to a higher degree than one that is less
strongly activated. Here, as before, the memory trace is mental,
the urge physical.
The exclusion of non-selected memory traces is relative in
most cases: Typically a selected memory trace will be activat
ed to a higher degree than non-selected ones. As a result, the
urge associated with a selected memory trace will be put into a
higher degree of excitation than the ones associated with non
selected memory traces. The greater strength of the chosen
urge may in certain cases be called upon to counteract those
other urges. It follows that the higher the level of attention, the
more easily the main unit will be able to carry orit its chosen
course of action.
If we now return to the functioning of the main unit, the
following picture emerges. Selective activation of memory
1 25 Cpo Eysenck, 1 982: 28: "attention is regarded as a limited power
supply. The basic idea is that attention represents a general purpose lim
ited capacity that can be flexibly allocated in many different ways in
response to task demands." Spiegel & Spiegel, 2004: 1 9 : "Any intensi
fication of focal attention necessitates the elimination of distracting or
irrelevant stimuli. . . . We not only pay attention to our given task but
also ward off distractions."
1 02
traces (by means of the faculty called attention) will excite dif
ferent urges to different degrees. This differential excitation
of urges gives the selected urges (i.e., urges that are associated
with selected memory traces) the extra (bodily) tension that
can be used to counterbalance other excited urges (should
these exist) . 1 26
It must be emphasized that the activity of the main unit is
not exclusively reactive. Memory traces are not only activated
by the confrontation with outer objects or events through sen
sory input, but also by memories (whether real or otherwise)
and fantasies. The main unit, in its attempts to anticipate fu
ture conceivable events, can construe an almost limitless num
ber of these latter. It is helped in this by its capacity of symbolic
representation, which we discussed in Part I (I 1 ) . Attention,
when directed at any of these memories or fantasies, will acti
vate the traces in a similar manner to that of unmediated con
frontation with the external object or event concerned, though
as a rule to a lesser degree.
1 26
It is not impossible, though perhaps hard to prove, that the opposi

tion between main unit and other trace units finds expression in the
different characters that can figure in dreams. Cpo Deacon, 20 1 2: 478:
" [T]he unity of consciousness may be more mercurial than commonly
imagined. Different loci of teleodynamic activity at the same level may
develop in parallel and come into competition as they differentiate and
propagate to recruit additional neurological resources. Thus the differ
entiation of self may also involve a Darwinian component . . . The otten
quite sophisticated alter egos that we find ourselves interacting with
in dreams, and who can otten act in unexpected ways, suggests that in
this state of consciousness, there may be no winner-take-all exigency. In
dreams, all action is virtual and thus need never be finally differentiated;
but when awake and enjoined to behave by real-world circumstances,
action depends on a winner-take-all iogic to produce a single integrated
action. So the unity ofwaking conscious experience may in this respect
be a special case of a more pluralistic self-differentiation process."
103
Sometimes, traces are definitely rather than provisionally dis

carded by the main unit. This kind of trace is linked to urges
whose manifestation is so completely opposed to all other
goals of the main unit, and so strong, that it has to be coun
tered. This takes place through a forceful mobilization of free
tension. Attention plays a key role in this. As long as it is di
rected at the dangerous trace, it will raise the level of excita
tion of the threatening urge. 1 27 To avoid this, attention must
be withdrawn from that trace. In order to do so, and in order
to recruit the free tension required to oppose the threatening
urge, attention has to be directed to other traces or external
objects. (These other traces or external objects may become
associatively connected with the threatening urge, in which
case the displacement can become a symptom.) 1 28 TJ;l e result
is avoidance, or denial, of everything that might activate the
dangerous trace. 1 2 9
This whole process, including the increase in bodily tension
and the diversion of attention, takes place with great urgency.
As a result the full content of the dangerous trace remains "un
known". This is a way of saying that this trace will not be inte
grated into the main unit. By not being integrated, the content
of this trace will remain unchanged. Since an urge takes its
1 27 Attention may not be the exclusive property of the main unit. It is
perhaps a feature of the organism as a whole, attaching itself to activated
memory traces, whether or not "approved of" by the main unit, or to
sensory inputs that activate memory traces. See note 132, below.
1 28 Cpo Freud in Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety ( 1 926; SE XX p.
9 1 ) : ''A symptom is a sign o and a substitute for, an instinctual satisfac
tion which has remained in abeyance; it is a consequence of the process
of repression." Ibid. p. 1 03: "It is this displacement, then, which has a
claim to be called a symptom."
129 In Freudian terms, this description accounts for both primal repres
sion and the repression proper of associated ideas (for details, see Freud,
"Repression" [ 1 9 1 5] ; SE XIV pp. 1 4 1 - 1 58).
1 04
1 Outline of a Psychological Theory; Fundamentals
direction from the trace to which it is attached, the urge will

keep its threatening nature, even if the trace to which it is at
tached aims it where no satisfaction can be obtained. The mis
directed urge will remain misdirected, for it does not "know"
better. It cannot "know" better, for it cannot profit from other
experiences. In order to profit from other experiences, its trace
would have to be integrated into the main unit from which it
is excluded.
This fate is not only reserved for primary memory traces. It
also concerns trace units of various sizes whose reality assess
ments, i.e. "beliefs" in the possibility of obtaining satisfaction
for the accompanying urges, are so much in conflict with the
procedures for satisfaction adopted in the main unit that they
threaten it. One might think that even dangerous memory
traces will, in due time, lose their threat and end up being in
tegrated in the main unit. However, this does not usually hap
pen. The reason is that the main unit has "taken note" of the
danger from which it has so narrowly escaped. The confron
tation with the threatening urge and accompanying memory
content, which has only been averted in extremis, has left a
sign-post in the form of a memory trace that contributes to the
reality assessment of the main unit. The negative experience
associated with this memory trace and its accompanying urge
will henceforth be avoided, just as negative experiences in the
outer world are avoided.
Why should confrontations with "unacceptable" traces
and urges be a source of unpleasure ? We have seen that the or
ganism as a whole "strives" after a state of homeostasis (more
precisely, heterostasis). Urges are states of excitation that seek
discharge. The discharge of an urge ( its satisfaction) gives rise
to an experience of pleasure. The appeasement of hunger is an
example. The confrontation with "unacceptable" traces and
urges does the opposite: it gives rise to high levels of bodily
105
tension, for a strongly excited urge has to be countered by ten

sion brought about by means of diverted attention. Given that
discharge is pleasurable, the charged situation that accompa
nies this confrontation, which does not lead to discharge, is
experienced as unpleasurable. 1 3 0
At this point the notion of consciousness has to be introduced.
Attention and consciousness often go together, even though
this is not always the case.l 3 l Mental contents at which at
tention is directed are usually conscious; many other mental
contents are not. Certain non-conscious mental contents may
become conscious once attention is directed towards them. It
follows from the exposition above that there are also mental
I
1 30 Note that the satisfaction of the "unacceptable" urge is not itself the
source of unpleasure in these cases. Its source is rather the reaction of

the organism as a whole, mobilized to prevent this satisfaction from
taking place. Cpo Freud, Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety ( 1926; SE
XX p. 92-93) : "Repression is an equivalent of [an] attempt at flight.
The ego withdraws its (preconscious) cathexis from the instinctual rep
resentative that is to be repressed and uses that cathexis for the purpose
of releasing unpleasure (anxiety). The problem of how anxiety arises in
connection with repression may be no simple one; but we may legiti
mately hold firmly to the idea that the ego is the actual seat of anxiety
and give up our earlier view that the cathectic energy of the repressed
impulse is automatically turned into anxiety. IfI expressed yself earlier
in the latter sense, I was giving a phenomenological description and not
a metapsychological account of what was occurring." Ibid. p. 1 08-09:
"It [ is] anxiety which produce r s] repression and not, as I formerly be
lieved, repression which produce [s] anxiety."
1 3 1 Moors & De Houwer, 2007: 39 f.; Koch & Tsuchiya, 2007. An ex
ception may further have ro be made for certain forms of brain damage ;
cf. Kentridge et aI., 1999. Note also that "the activation of a memory
trace is not at all synonymous with conscious remembering" ( Turnbull
and Solms, 2003: 60). Donald (200 1 ) is critical towards attempts to
explain human mental activity without realizing the central role con
sciousness plays in it.
1 06
contents to which attention cannot or will not be directed. 1 32

Attention is withdrawn from these because their accompany
ing urges represent (or represented) a danger to the main unit.
In this way, mental contents fall into two main categories: those
that are or can become conscious without the help of a special
stratagem, and those that resist becoming conscious. The dif
ference between these two is not confined to the presence or
absence of consciousness. The contents that are (potentially)
conscious are part of a system : the main unit, whose reality as
sessment is determined by the majority of the person's experi
ences. The reality assessments of contents that have no access
to consciousness have been stunted in their development and
are based on a relatively limited number of experiences. 1 33
The theory presented so far shares various features with the
psychological ideas of Sigmund Freud. It contains elements
1 32 The attention talked about here is, of course, the attention of the
main unit. One could imagine that the faculty of attention is also availa
ble to repressed trace units, but this possibility cannot be explored here.
1 33 Our theory does not exclude the possibility of a main unit that is
divided into several mutually opposing parts. This might account, for
example, for the conscious decision in certain people to hold on to
patterns of behavior that they know go against their interest and well
being. Such internal divisions of the main unit should be expected to
be accompanied by permanent (relatively) high levels of bodily tension.
We will not discuss posttraumatic dissociation. Repression as under
stood in our theory should be distinguished from it, even though re
pression may well be a special instance of dissociation. Dissociation is
the selective "f?rgetting" that may result from trauma. Repression, too,
is traumatic, but not because of the content of the repressed urge itself,
but because of the reaction of the organism; see note 1 30, above. On
dissociation, see Bremner & Marmar, 1 998 (various contributions);
Gerschuny & Thayer, 1 999. Recent developments in the theory of dis
sociation are discussed in Spitzer et al., 2006. On Freud's initial confu
sion between repression and dissociation, see Nemiah, 1 998.
107
that correspond more or less closely to the Freudian conscious

and unconscious (later, Ego and Id) and something that corre
sponds to Freud's repression.134 Our theory, however, omits nu
merous areas included in Freudian psychology and is therefore
much more limited in its scope. Moreover, even where the two
overlap, they are not identical. A major difference is that Freud
had very little to say about attention, which plays virtually no
role in his thought. 1 3 5 In our account of repression (or what
corresponds to it), attention plays a crucial role, so that our
account of repression, too, is different from the Freudian one.
These differences illustrate that our theory is not meant to be a
faithful copy of Freud's theory, or of some of its parts. It should
not therefore be judged by its degree of compliance with psy
choanalytic doctrine. Rather, it should be looked uR on as an
independent attempt to create sufficient theoretical structure
to support the discussion that follows. Note further that our
theory, at least in the presentation given so far, neglects the un
deniable fact that the mind does not start off as a tabula rasa.
We will come back to this.
\ 324) as
1 34 It is possible to state - with V. S. Ramachandran ( 1994:
cited in Solms, 2006 - that "the repression phenomena [ .. ] form the

cornerstone of classical psychoanalytical theory"; cpo Freud, "On the
history of the psycho-analytic movement" ( 1 9 14; SE XIV p. 1 6) : "The
theory of repression is the corner-stone on which the whole structure
of psycho-analysis rests."
1 3 5 See, however, Freud's remark in The Interpretation of Dreams ( 1 900;
SE V p. 6 1 5 ) : "The system Pes. [ ... ] has at its disposal for distribution
a mobile cathectic energy, a part of which is familiar to us in the form
of attention." Freud's use of cathexis is sometimes close to our attention.
The "system Pes." corresponds, by and large, to our "main unit':
.
1 08
2 Comparison with Neurological Findings
2 CO MPARISON WITH NEUROLOGICAL FINDINGS
It will be interesting to see to what extent our theory agrees

with what is known about the functioning of the human brain.
In this field enormous progress has been made in recent years.
The psychological interpretation of its findings, however, is
confronted with many difficulties. We are most interested in
findings and interpretations that seem compatible with our
theory. These exist. There is a tendency among certain re
searchers to interpret the findings of neuroscience in terms of
Freudian theory. 1 36 But researchers who do not look to Freud
for inspiration, too, come up with findings and interpretations
that are of interest.
Consider recent ideas about the neurological analogue of
consciousness. Watt and Pincus (2004: 8 1 ) refer to a number
of publications and summarize current thought on this matter
in the following words: "many theories support the assump
tion that consciousness reflects globally integrative processes
derivative of neurodynamical interactions between multiple
contributing brain systems, particularly communication be
tween the critical triad of thalamus, brainstem, and cortex."
As an example we consider the ideas of Gerald M. Edel
man 1 37 and Giulio Tononi. These authors discuss the theme of
integration and consciousness from a neurobiological point of
view in their A Universe of Consciousness (the European edition
is called Consciousness; 2000). They point out that neuronal
circuits only give rise to consciousness if they are integrated
with each other through a process they call reentry ("a process
1 36 For a discussion, see Solms, 2004.
1 37 Horgan's characterization of Edelman as a "high-profile Freudo
phile" ( 1 999: 39) is not based, to my knowledge, on any parti pris on

Edelman's part in favor of Freudian theory. See Edelman, 2006: 1 08
for his response to psychoanalytic theory.
1 09
of signaling back and forth along reciprocal connections", p.

44) . Consider the first two of their three conclusions (p. 36) :
First, conscious experience appears to be associated with
neural activity that is distributed simultaneously across
neuronal groups in many different regions of the brain.
Consciousness is therefore not the prerogative of any one
brain area; instead, its neural substrates are widely dis
persed throughout the so-called thalamocortical system
and associated regions. Second, to support conscious ex
perience, a large number of groups of neurons must in
teract rapidly and reciprocally through the process called
reentry. If these reentrant interactions are blocked, entire
sectors of consciousness disappear, and consciousness it
self may shrink or split.
These conclusions, especially the second one, suggest that
mental maps that are embodied in neuronal groups integrate
with other maps if the neuronal groups concerned interact
through reentry; and they give rise to consciousness if large
numbers of such groups are involved. On the other hand, they
stay isolated and remain unconscious if the reentrant interac
tions are blocked. The integrated neuronal groups constitute a
dynamic core, defined as "a cluster of neuronal groups that are
strongly interacting among themselves and that have distinct
functional borders with the rest of the brain at the time scale
of fractions of a second" (p. 144). 1 3 8 This dynamic core corre
sponds to our main unit, in that it is responsible for conscious
1 3 8 It would seem that the dynamic core is similar to what other re
searchers call global neuronal workspace ( Dehaene & Naccache, 200 1 ;
Dehaene e t aI., 2006; Dehaene, 20 1 1 ; see further Dennett, 2005: 1 3 1
f ) . This, too, is characterized by "long-distance connections" and forms
"a reverberating neuronal assembly with distant perceptual areas". Den
nett (2005: 1 36 , 1 60 ) speaks of "fame in the brain" or "cerebral
celebrity."
1 10
experience. Edelman and Tononi take care to point out that

the term dynamic core does not refer to a unique, invariant set
of areas of the brain (whether prefrontal, extrastriate, or striate
cortex). The core, moreover, may change in composition over
time. 1 39
Edelman and Tononi further observe that "there is reason
to believe that a substantial portion of neural activity, even in
the cerebral cortex, does not correlate with what a person is
aware of" (p. 140). It is here that we may hope to find the iso
lated trace units of our theory. Edelman and Tononi do indeed
go so far as to introduce the notion of splinter cores that exist
beside and independendy of the dynamic core; 1 40 they do not,
however, formulate explanatory hypotheses about these. They
merely ask a number of questions. The following two are of
particular interest in the present context (p. 1 90) :
Is it possible that such active but functionally insulated
thalamocortical circuits may underlie certain aspects of
the psychological unconscious - aspects that, as Sig
mund Freud pointed out, share many of the hallmarks of
the "mental" - except that they do not make it into con
sciousness ? Can such circuits be created by mechanisms
of repression?
Having raised these and other questions, our two authors limit
themselves to observing that "clearly, much work needs to be
done to clarify these issues': 1 4 1 The questions are however in1 39 This may be looked upon as an example of the "dynamic localiza
tion" in the brain of mental functions and processes, advocated by
Kaplan-Solms & Solms (2002: 26 fT.), following Luria (and ultimately
Freud) .
1 40 Edelman (2006: 1 1 2) emits the hypothesis that certain people such as those who suffer from the symptoms resulting from disruption
of the corpus callosum - may have two dynamic cores.
1 4 1 Cpo Edelman, 2004: 95: "I have not dealt with the Freudian un-
III
ABSORPTION, PART II : THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE BUD D H A
triguing, and we may be comforted in thinking that the psy

chological theory presented so far is not contradicted by the
ideas of Edelman and Tononi. The idea of multiple splinter
conscious and the notion of repression, which remains to some extent
a vexed subject." According to Edelman, 2006: 1 55-56, "nonconscious
brain systems [ ... ] have structures and dynamics that interact with and
influence the dynamic core. In this respect, Freud's views of uncon
scious sources of behavior were premonitory." Naccache (2006) is of
the view that Freudian repression and neuroscience are incompatible,
as are the Freudian and neuroscientific notions of the unconscious: "Ie
coeur meme de la psychanalyse freudienne de l'inconscient, c'est-it-dire
Ie concept de refoulement, et certaines proprietes des representations
mentales inconscientes postulees par Freud sont en absolue contra
diction avec ce que nous connaissons aujourd'hui du fonctionnement
mental et de sa physiologie" (p. 36 1 ) . However, it is far frdm obvious
that the unconscious functions explored in his book can or should be
identified with the unconscious that figures in Freudian theory. Buser
(2005) is less absolute; indeed, one of his ambitions is to "explorer, con
fronter, et tenter d'associer les deux domaines inconscients" (p. 7), i.e.,
the "cognitive" unconscious and the "thymic" or affective unconscious.
His conclusion (p. 1 9 1 ) : "nonobstant toutes les inevitables reserves, les
incontournables sorties de route de la theorisation psychanalytique, on
ne peut nier tout en bloc et ignorer ce pan de l'analyse du psychisme,
avec ses trois volets que sont l'inconscient, Ie preconscient et Ie consci
ent, alors que l'on reserverait par ailleurs maintenant Ie droit de vie au
couple inconscient-conscient du domaine cognitif et que l'on recon
naitrait it ce dernier seul la valeur d'un systeme scientifiqueri;Jent prou
ve." Magistretti & Ansermet (20 10: 9) speak of"les confusions actuelles
dans les neurosciences it propos de l'inconscient, et notamment autour
de la distinction entre l'inconscient cognitif et l'inconscient freudien."
See further Ansermet & Magistretti, 20 lOa. Ansermet & Magistretti
(2004) associate the (Freudian) unconscious with the amygdala: "il
n'est pas impossible [ . ] que les traces inscrites dans l'amygdale soient Ie
substrat, ou l'un des substrats, des scenarios fantasmatiques et des etats
somatiques associes qui constituent ce que no us avons appele la realite
interne inconsciente" (p. 198). Elsewhere (20 1 0 : 172) they contrast
l"'inconscient au sens freudien" with "ce que l'on appelle l'inconscient
cognitif."
..
1 12
cores, if it were to be confirmed, is of course closer to our trace

units than to the Freudian system of the unconscious.1 42
Solms and Turnbull (2002) draw attention to what they
call the seeking system in the brain, whose source cells are lo
cated in the ventral tegmental area. 1 43 This system "does not
appear to know what it is seeking" (p. 1 1 8- 1 1 9). Its mode of
operation "is therefore incomprehensible without reference
to the memory systems with which it is intimately connected."
The clear distinction in our theory between memory traces
and associated urges seems in this way to find a confirmation
in the physical structure of the brain.
This distinction is further confirmed by some important
ideas presented by Antonio Damasio in a number of publica
tions. 1 44 Recall that the brain is not isolated from the body; it
is in constant interaction with it. Experiences, which as a rule
affect the brain first, subsequently evoke reactions in the body.
These reactions can be of various kinds: muscular, hormonal,
and so on. Following Damasio, I will reserve the term emotion
to designate certain bodily states; emotions are to be distin
guished from feelings, which are the perceptions of those bod-
1 42 The "system Ucs" ( The Interpretation of Dreams, 1 900; SE V p. 541 ) .

Note, however, that "the ego i s an organization and the i d i s not" (In
hibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety, 1 926; SE XX p. 97), and (ibid.) "As a
rule the instinctual impulse which is to be repressed remains isolated."
Similarly Lear, 2005: 53: "it is a mistake to think of [the unconscious] as
a second mind with beliefs, intentions and desires all of its own".
1 43 Cpo Panksepp, 1998: 144 ff.
1 44 These ideas are a weakened version of ideas first published by Wil
liam James in 1 8 84, and independently by Carl Georg Lange in 1 885.
See James, 1890: II: 449 ff.; further LeDoux, 1996: 29 1 if.; Rolls, 1 999:
70 ff.; 2005: 26 if.; Klein, 200212006: 16 ff.; Ansermet & Magistretti,
20 1 0 : 39 ff. Lehrer (2007: 1 ff.) draws attention to the influence in this
respect of Walt Whitman on James (p. 1 8: "This psychological theory,
first described in the 1 884 article 'What is an emotion?' is Whitman,
pure and simple"), and of Ralph Waldo Emerson on both of them.
1 13
ABSORPTION, PART II: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE BUDDH A
ily states. 1 4 5 For Damasio, "emotions are actions or movements,

many of them public, visible to others as they occur in the face,
in the voice, in specific behaviors. To be sure, some compo
nents of the emotion process are not visible to the naked eye
but can be made 'visible' with current scientific probes such
as hormonal assays and electrophysiological wave patterns.
Feelings, on the other hand, are always hidden, like all men
tal images necessarily are, unseen to anyone other than their
rightful owner, the most private property of the organism in
whose brain they occur." 1 46 About feelings it can be said that
"the essential content of feelings is the mapping of a particular
body state; the substrate of feelings is the set of neural patterns
that map the body state and from which a mental image of the
body state can emerge. A feeling in essence is an ,de a - an
idea of the body and, even more particularly, an idea of a cer
tain aspect of the body, its interior, in certain circumstances. A
feeling of emotion is an idea of the body when it is perturbed
by the emoting process." 1 47 These ideas allow and even oblige
us to distinguish strictly between memory traces and the emo
tional charges that accompany them. 1 48 The former correspond
to neural patterns in the brain, the latter to body states (which
are subsequently "perceived" by other neural patterns). This
distinction is strictly observed in our theory.
Experiments show that long-term memory, if activated,
can be "unbound" and "reconsolidated", i.e., updated and
1 45 It goes without saying that this terminology is to some extent ar
bitrary, and that other ways of using these terms are possible; see, e.g.,
Scherer, 2005.
146 Damasio, 2003: 28; see further Damasio, 20 1 0 : 1 08- 1 29 ( "Emo
tions and feelings" ) .
1 47 Damasio, 2003: 88.
148 It also obliges us, of course, to distinguish between feelings and
pleasure, defined above.
1 14
changed. 1 49 These findings can be read as a confirmation of the

observation that the integration of memory traces may involve
the modification of their reality assessments.
The effects of focused attention on brain functioning are
clear from studies of its "default mode". It appears that certain
brain areas are active when the person is at rest, but quieten
down when the subject starts concentrating. Indeed, "the pos
terior cingulate cortex and adjacent precuneus can be posited
as a ronically active region of the brain ... It would appear to
be a default activity of the brain ... Only when successful task
performance demands focused attention should such a broad
information gathering activity be curtailed." 1 5 0 Indeed, medi
tating Zen Buddhists are found to deliberately switch off their
default network.l 5l This appears ro be the neural correlate of
the selective activation of memory traces at the expense of oth
ers which we had postulated as a characteristic feature of at
tention.
I conclude with some passages from an article about "Re
cent advances in understanding attention" which will be of use
in the further elaboration of our theory (Taylor, 2003a) :
[V] arious experiments have shown that moving the focus

of attention is achieved by a different brain network from
that involved in processing the input being attended to.
The regions exercising control of attention movement are
1 49 Nader, 2003; Doyere et aI., 2007; Ansermet & Magistretti, 20 1 0 :
147 ff.; Garner e t aI., 20 1 2. Th e extent t o which this phenomenon may

be obstructed by the "indelibility of emotional memory" (LeDoux
1996: 250 ff.) is not known to me. Recent experiments suggest that
memories can be dissociated from their emotional charge; this effect
was brought about by administering propranolol (Brunet et aI., 2008).
I SO
Raichle et aI., 200 1 : 68 1 . See further New Scientist of 8 November
2008, pp. 28-3 1 ("Private life of the brain" by Douglas Fox).
lSI
Pagnoni e t aI., 2008.
1 15
in parietal and prefrontal sites, while attended sites are in

primary and secondary unimodal cortices in the various
senses (and also in motor cortex for response). [ .. . ]
Attention control has been found to arise by two mecha
nisms, one by bottom-up signals from the occurrence
of unexpected and strong inputs (such as a brief flash of
light) , the other by top-down control from some required
goal (such as by the face of a friend being searched for in a
crowd). It has been thought that bottom-up signals nor
mally achieved attention capture ; it is now appreciated
that top-down control is usually in charge. Involuntary
attention capture by distracting inputs occurs only if they
have a property that a person is using to find a target.
Thus there is a single control network deciding between
the importance of desired (top-down) and unexpected
(bottom-up) sites for attention.
These lines suggest that attention is essentially independent
of the input and may therefore exist without being directed
at any specific object. By emphasizing the "top-down" mecha
nism, they further suggest that attention can be used "at will",
and is not an automatic reaction to certain inputs in every situ
ation. We will make grateful use of these suggestions later on. 1 S 2
15 2 The possibility of "pure", i.e. essentially contentless, consciousness
and attention without object has been argued for in various ways by
a number of researchers. See, e.g., Forman, 1 990; 1 999; Taylor, 2002;
2003b; Lutz, Dunne & Davidson, 2007: 538; also Lachaux, 20 1 1 : 10l.
The article "Mysticism" in the online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philoso
phy (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mysticism/; latest revision Feb
9, 20 10) provides a number of arguments for and against PCE (Pure
Consciousness Events) ( 5-6) . Forman's own contribution to the vol
ume edited by him, which concentrates on Meister Eckhart, emphasizes
the rapture, and therefore the pleasurable nature, of the state of "pure
consciousness" presumably experienced by this mystic. More on this in
Appendix 2 ofpart II, below.
1 16
3 Psychotherapy and its Obstacles
It appears, then, that at least certain aspects of our psycho

logical theory are compatible with recent findings in brain
functioning. These findings do not prove that our theory is
correct. It requires further elaboration in order to be testable.
We also need to expand the theory to be able to use it in our
present investigation. It would be unrealistic to assume that we
can be guided in this by neuroscience alone. This does not im
ply that our theory and neuroscience now have to part ways.
te on the contrary. We may hope that the elaborated theo
ry will make predictions that can be tested by neuroscience, or
at least raise issues that may suggest experimental inquiry. We
will return to this topic at the end of this study.
3 PSYCHOTHERAPY AND ITS OBSTACLES
Repressed trace units can interfere with the activity and well
being of the organism in the following way: Various forces
affect the behavior of the organism simultaneously. The inte
grated reality assessment of the main unit guides its principal
activity. The main unit has a certain quantity of bodily tension
at its disposition. Outside the main unit, a number of isolated
urges ",ill seek expression guided by the undeveloped reality
assessments of their trace units. These isolated urges may in
terfere with the proposed course of action of the main unit.
In order to carry out the activities determined by its reality
assessment, the main unit will have to counteract these urges.
For this task, it uses the available tension. In most cases it may
succeed, but occasionally an isolated urge will find expression,
usually in a round-about manner. 153 The avoidance of repressed
153 The resulting "slips" are the ones that occupied Freud in The Psycho
pathology of Everyday Life ( 190 1 ; SE VI), and elsewhere.
1 17
memory traces and their accompanying urges will also affect

behavior; the resulting behavior is not direcdy due to the re
pressed urge but to the memory, recorded in the main unit,
of an earlier catastrophe that was barely avoided. The constant
interplay of the activity of the main unit and the interference
(direct or indirect) by repressed memory traces will, in many
cases, lead to some kind of equilibrium. This equilibrium cor
responds to what we call character. IS4 In certain cases the inter
ference by repressed urges is experienced as a source of discom
fort. When the discomfort is severe, psychotherapeutic "cures"
may be sought.
Psychotherapy, in some of its forms, tries to reduce the in
terference by methods that aim at integrating isolated units
into the main unit. At first sight this looks like an almost im\
possible task. How can it be achieved ?
Recall that repressed memory traces do not themselves
affect the behavior of a person. Interference results from the
emotional charges they "carry" in the form of associated urges.
In order to integrate a repressed memory trace, it has to be ac
tivated ("remembered") . This is not possible without exciting
the associated urge. This means that a therapy that aims at the
integration of repressed memory traces has to gain access to
their emotional charges. lss However, an excited urge that is as
sociated with a repressed memory trace will pvoke a reaction
from the main unit. To prevent expression o f the repressed
urge, the main unit will divert attention and in this way moI S4
More about this below.

Th is has been accepted by psychoanalysis from its beginning; see
Breuer and Freud, "Preliminary communication" ( 1 893; SE II p. 6):
" [ J we found, to our great surprise at first, that each individual hys
terical symptom immediately and permanently disappeared when we
had succeeded in bringing clearly to light the memory of the event by
which it was provoked and in arousing its accomp anying affect .[ . . ] " (my
emphasis, ]B)
I SS
...
1 18
bilize the tension it needs to counter that urge. Attention is

diverted from the repressed memory trace, and the repression
is likely to stay in place. Thus the therapeutic effort is unlikely
to succeed. In spite of this, psychoanalysis and related forms
of therapy claim certain successes. How can this be explained ?
What is missing in our depiction of the therapeutic process
that might account for this ?
What stands in the way of therapeutic success is both the
strength of the repressed urge and the level of tension raised by
the main unit to counter it. Ifboth are strong, the therapeutic
result is likely to be nil. However, in ideal therapeutic situa
tions both are reduced. This can be seen as follows.
The main unit derives most of its (bodily) tension from
its activated traces. These traces are activated by experiences
(confrontation with objects or situations corresponding to the
traces concerned) or by what we may call anticipating the fu
ture. An ideal therapeutic environment (the "couch" and other
elements in Freudian therapy) IS 6 is a safe place that provides
few stimuli that might activate memory traces. The absence
of immediate danger combined with other factors allow the
mind to lower its level of preparedness for possible future
events. An important contributing factor to this "absence of
immediate danger" is the tolerant and non-judgmental atti
tude of the therapist, the only person with whom the thera15 6 Freud was aware of the importance of the therapeutic environment;
see "On beginning the treatment" ( 19 1 3; SE XII p. 1 33-34). Whether
he succeeded in creating a safe place is another question; Weissweiler
(2008: 264) speaks of a "Tradition der Couch und der schweren
Eichenmabel, der verstaubten Perserteppiche und mit Nippeskram
iiberladenen Vitrinen" and of "Mabel ... die Angst machen". Physical
and emotional relaxation and calmness are also essential in hypnotic
techniques that can facilitate the process of recovery of traumatic
memories while still allowing patients to feel in control; Maldonado &
Spiegel, 1 998: 78
1 19
peutic experiences are shared. As a result, the standby level of

(bodily) tension will be low. The degree of activation of the
recovered traces will be low, too, because these traces are not
activated by a renewed experience of the object or event that
hold the promise of satisfaction. te on the contrary. In the
therapeutic situation the traces are recovered in a round-about
way (through slips, free associations, and so forth) ; they are
not confronted head-on with the objects or events which con
stitute the more usual occasion for their activation. It is this
relatively low-intensity situation which, in the best of circum
stances, allows the integration of repressed traces into the main
unit: The degree of excitation of the "dangerous" urges is so
low that no threatening activity can result from them. The cor
responding traces can therefore be made the object of aware\
ness and hence integrated into the main unit.
Circumstances are not always ideal. The frequency of re
lapses (or simply failed therapies) indicates that our theory is
in need of further refinement. One complication is that the
contents of certain repressed memory traces can be known
"intellectually", i.e., without putting the associated urge in a
state of excitation. 1 57 Strictly speaking this description is not
15 7 Freud repeatedly warned against the presentation of repressed fan
tasies to a patient not yet ready for it; see ibid. ( 1 9 1 3 ; SE XII p. 1 40) :
"It is not difficult for a skilled analyst to read the patients secret wishes
plainly between the lines of his complaints and the story of his illness;
but what a measure of self-complacency and thoughtlessness must be
possessed by anyone who can, on the shortest acquaintance, inform a
stranger who is entirely ignorant of all the tenets of analysis that he is
attached to his mother by incestuous ties, that he harbours wishes for
the death of his wife whom he appears to love, that he conceals an in
tention of betraying his superior, and so on! I have heard that there are
analysts who plume themselves upon these kinds oflightning diagnoses
and 'express' treatments, but I must warn everyone against following
such examples. Behaviour of this sort will completely discredit oneself
and the treatment in the patient's eyes and will arouse the most violent
1 20
correct. We know that the main unit has an almost limitless

capacity for producing fantasies. It can also produce a fantasy
that is identical with, or similar to, the images embodied in re
pressed traces. The main unit may resist producing such a fan
tasy to some extent, because this takes it dangerously close to
repressed material (and may therefore activate it) ; yet with the
help of some prodding by the therapist or by some other means
it can produce it. i S S Patient and therapist may in this case be
lieve that they have recovered a repressed image where in real
ity they have created a new one, one which is not and has never
been repressed and carries no emotional charge. Such a "recov
ered" image will not and cannot have a therapeutic effect.
Recovering new fantasies rather than real memories is the
opposite of a successful therapy. In both cases a repressed imopposition in him, whether one's guess has been true or not; indeed, the
truer the guess the more violent will be the resistance. As a rule the ther
apeutic effect will be nil; but the deterring of the patient from analysis
will be final." In 1 906, he told Jung that the transference "provides the
impulsion for comprehending and translating the unconscious; where
it refuses to act, the patient does not take this trouble, or does not listen
when we present the translation we have found." (Gay, 1 988: 30 1 )
i 5 8 Cpo Freud, "The Unconscious" ( 1 9 1 5; SE XIV pp. 175- 176) : "If we
communicate to a patient some idea which he has at one time repressed
but which we have discovered in him, our telling him makes at first no
change in his mental condition. Above all, it does not remove the re
pression nor undo its effects, as might perhaps be expected from the
fact that the previously unconscious idea has now become conscious.
On the contrary, all that we shall achieve at first will be a fresh rejection
of the repressed idea. But now the patient has in actual fact the same idea
in two forms in different places in his mental apparatus; first, he has the
conscious memory of the auditory trace of the idea, conveyed in what
we told him ; and secondly, he also has - as we know for certain - the
unconscious memory of his experience as it was in its earlier form. Ac
tually there is no lifting of the repression until the conscious idea, after
the resistances have been overcome, has entered into connection with
the unconscious memory-trace."
121
ABSORPTION, PART II: THE PSYCHOL O G Y OF THE BUD D H A
age has been "recovered": in the case of a successful therapy by

making repressed material available to the main unit; in the
case of fantasies by reconstructing (ex hypothesi correctly) the
contents of the repressed traces. In this last case the repressed
traces will remain as repressed as they were, and the associated
urges will not become integrated into the general-purpose ten
sion of the main unit.
There may be possibilities intermediate between these two
extremes. The newly constructed fantasy may absorb some ele
ments of the repressed memory trace and in this way take on a
part of the associated emotional charge. Here the therapeutic
cure will be only partial, a result which may appropriately de
scribe the outcome of many psychotherapies.
There is a possible variant of the "intermediate" result of a
psychotherapeutic cure. The memory that is believed to have
been recovered, but which has in reality been ne'Yly created,
may not correspond in its main points to the repressed mate
rial and yet incorporate some of its elements. In consequence
it carries part of its emotional charge. We may assume that this
variant is most often found in cases where the new fantasy has
been created under the influence of theoretical a priori convic
tions of the therapist.
The situations so far considered start from the assumption
that repressed memories can be recovered, at least in theory.
This may be in need of clarification. As Solms and Turnbull
point out, "On present knowledge, it seems reasonable to as
sume that episodic early infantile memories can never be recov
ered in any veridical sense. Our earliest experiences can only
be reconstructed, through inferences derived from implicit (un
conscious) semantic and procedural evidence. The same ap
plies, to a lesser extent, to traumatic memories." 1 59 Even later
1 59 Solms and Turnbull, 2002: 1 69. See also Turnbull and Solms, 2003.
Note however Doidge, 2007: 3 8 1 (with references to Rovee-Collier,
1 22
in life, episodic memory appears to be the result of reconstruc

tion: "We remember bits and pieces of our experiences and
then reconstruct them to create plausible, but not necessarily
accurate, accounts of what happened." 1 60 The constructed na
ture of episodic memory may constitute an additional obstacle
to the attempt at diffusing repressed urges by bringing to light
the associated memory traces. It does not, however, affect our
theory, which does not require that the memory traces that
guide human activity have to embody episodic memories.
Finally, let us consider the following hypothetical situation :
A repressed memory has been truly recovered and the associ
ated urge been diverted. However, the disappearance of this
"threat" disrupts a delicately structured equilibrium. Recall
that the whole psyche consists of a large number of memory
traces, many of which are united in the main unit, while the
others constitute a number of smaller units. The main unit and
the other units keep each other in a delicate equilibrium in
which the main unit uses free tension to counter the urges as
sociated with those other units. Recall further that the reality
assessment of the main unit is co-determined by the memory
traces of the unpleasant experiences that accompanied the re
pression of various urges. A similar situation may prevail be
tween the various trace units, especially those which can be
activated by similar stimuli and yet seek expression in mutually
incompatible ways. We may then assume that urges excited by
"stronger" trace units reserve part of their tension for block1 997; 1 999) : "We have underestimated the development of the explicit
memory system for facts and events in infants because we usually test
the explicit memory system by asking people questions, which are an
swered with words. Obviously preverbal infants cannot tell us whether
they consciously recollect a particular event. But recently researchers
have found ways to test infants by getting them to kick when they re
cognize the repetition of events, and they can remember them."
1 60 Marshall, 2007: 39; see further Addis, Wong & S chacter, 2007.
1 23
ing urges excited by their "weaker" competitors, only to be

blocked themselves by the tension at the disposal of the main
unit. The resulting equilibrium between numetous units con
stitutes character, i.e., the configuration of stable traits which
might be defined as the organization of inner conflicts. 1 6 1 This
organization is in danger of collapsing when one of its con
stituent elements is removed. In concrete terms, a repressed
trace unit which has so far been held in check by a neighbor
ing trace unit that is now being integrated into the main unit
may constitute a new threat to the equilibrium of the whole.
These various factors are most easily and efficiently dealt with
by renewed repression of the trace that comes up for integra
tion, or rather: by interrupting and, as far as possible, undoing
the integration that is taking place. This is possible because the
recovered memory trace does not disappear thr01.gh being in
tegrated in the main unit. The memory trace is still there, ready
to take on once again the emotional charge from which it was
believed to have been freed. In such cases a successful psycho
therapy can be undone by the tendency of the whole to resist
disturbances to the equilibrium in place. 1 62
1 6 1 Cpo Freud, "Character and anal erotism" ( 1 908; SE IX p. 175): "the
permanent character-traits are either unchanged prolongations of the
original instincts, or sublimations of those instincts, or reaction-forma
tions against them."
1 62 See in this connection what Freud said about the mechanisms of de
fence ( "Analysis terminable and interminable", 1 937; SE XXIII p. 23738): " [They] become fixated in his ego. They become regular modes of
reaction of his character, which are repeated throughout his life when
ever a situation occurs that is similar to the original one. This turns
them into infantilisms, and they share the fate of so many institutions
which attempt to keep themselves in existence after the time of their
usefulness has passed. [ .. . ] the defensive mechanisms directed against
former danger recur in the treatment as resistances against recovery." In
1 9 1 4 Freud stated ( "Remembering, repeating and working-through";
SE XII p. 1 5 5 ) : "I have often been asked to advise upon cases in which
1 24
.A
"Complete Cure"
4 A " C O MPLETE CURE"
Our investigation so far has yielded a provisional outline of

how the human mind functions. This outline is sketchy: it
omits far more than it includes. 1 63 Nevertheless, it is precise
enough to be useful for our present purposes. We will use it in
discussing the claims of the early Buddhist texts which consti
tute our point of departure. For this purpose, we will address
the question: What conditions will have to be fulfilled for a
"complete psychotherapeutic cure" to be possible ? This ques
tion does not so much concern the practical limits of psycho
therapy as the limits imposed by our theory.
A complete psychotherapeutic cure would comprise the
full integration of all repressed memory traces into the main
unit. In ordinary circumstances such integration is prevented
by the repression of certain memory traces, which involves the
recruitment of tension by the main unit to counteract the dis
charge of the connected urges. These urges can sometimes be
identified in a therapeutic context by discovering the memories
to which they are attached. We have, however, seen that this
method is hindered by the virtually limitless capacity of the
main unit to construct fantasies, including those which cor
respond to repressed contents. Moreover, many urges are not
associated with episodic memories. In these cases the search
for memories cannot lead to the intended result. These diffithe doctor complained that he had pointed out his resistance to the pa
tient and that nevertheless no change had set in; indeed, the resistance
had become all the stronger, and the whole situation was more obscure
than ever. [ ... J One must allow the patient time to become more con
versant with this resistance with which he has now become acquainted,
to work through it, to overcome it, by continuing, in defian:ce of it, the
analytic work [ .. .]"
1 63 Some of its most serious shortcomings will be remedied below.
1 25
cuities could be avoided if there were a more direct method to

identify and confront urges, i.e. one which does not exclusively
depend upon the reconstruction of repressed memories. We
will come back to this issue below.
To reach a complete psychotherapeutic cure (supposing for
the time being that such a thing can exist), at least three re
quirements will have to be fulfilled:
(i) To begin with, the level of (bodily) tension of the pa
tient will have to be reduced to an absolute minimum. We
have seen that psychotherapies often create therapeutic envi
ronments free from disturbing elements. A peaceful consulting
room and a non-judgmental therapist are factors that contrib
ute to the right "atmosphere" (not to speak of the transfer/
ence, considered indispensable in psychoanalytic treatments) .
This environment is of necessity temporary, and will soon be
replaced by the habitual environment of the patients. In be
tween therapeutic sessions, they will have to go back to work,
look after their family, or be involved in ordinary life in other
ways. As a consequence, the level of tension which the main
unit reserves for "anticipating the future" will not drop below
a certain threshold. For our patients, too, life goes on.
There are, then, obvious limits to the degree to which the
therapeutic environment can be optimized for patic::nts who
wish to continue their life in society. However, we are at pre
sent not bound by practical considerations of this kind. We
are exploring the question what environment would be ideal
for therapy to have optimal effect. The answer should now be
clear. For optimal effect patients should not return to "ordi
nary life" in between therapeutic sessions; they should abstain
from "anticipating the future" and avoid all situations which
might in any way raise the standby level of bodily tension. This
last requirement has a surprising but important consequence:
1 26
4 A "Complete Cure"
for optimal ffe c t the patient should be alone, even without a ther
apist. The presence of all other human beings, including that
of a therapist, will inevitably raise the level of tension kept in
reserve by the patient's main unit (which will in that case have
to anticipate social interaction with those human beings). 1 64
(ii) A second requirement is a method of directly identify

ing urges without having to know beforehand the repressed
memories with which they are associated. It is true that such
a method will also bring up repressed memories, for the spe
cific manifestation of an urge is determined by the associated
memory trace. However, since the identification concerns urg
es rather than memories, the creation of imitation memories
by the main unit can no longer stand in the way of therapeutic
success. The absence of episodic memories will also no longer
constitute a problem.
Existing psychotherapies otten identify repressed thought
contents on the basis of partially successful attempts of the as
sociated urges to express themselves. Freud's famous example
of the President of the Lower House of Austrian Parliament
can illustrate this. 1 6 5 This gentleman, being faced with the
prospect of a particularly turbulent session, mistakenly pro
nounced it closed rather than opened. His mistake revealed his
hidden wish to avoid the session that was about to take place.
An outside observer depends on such slips and other commu
nicable features to gain access to the repressed material of the
1 64 Being alone, too, can produce anxiety in certain people. The Bud
dhist texts are aware of this; see Appendix 1 of Part II 6.
1 6 5 Freud, The Psychopathology of Everyday Life ( 1 90 1 ; SE VI p. 59).
One might object that this example does not concern the expression
of repressed thought contents, since we may assume that the President
was well aware of his wish to avoid the session. The example may not,
therefore, be perfect, but it must do for expository purposes.
127
patient. In the special case we are considering, the patient is

alone with himself and is his own observer. He does not there
fore depend on communicable features alone and may use sig
nals that are accessible only to himself He does not have to
analyze the defenses that have let him down, but may look for
direct, ifprivate, manifestations of the repressed urges. For this
to succeed, he may prevent them from finding any outlet, not
by mustering supplementary tension to keep them repressed,
but in an altogether different way. The following considera
tions will show how this can be done.
Consciousness does not accompany all the activities initi
ated by the main unit. Many routine activities take place with
out conscious awareness. These activities are not repressed (i.e.,
linked to repressed memories or images). We rather remain
unaware of them because consciousness can "follo'w" only a
limited number of activities at a time and leaves routine ac
tivities to an "automatic pilot". 1 66 This is the selective role of
attention, which we discussed above. The "automatic pilot;'
which is responsible for activity carried out without awareness
normally accomplishes its task satisfactorily. People can ride
a bicycle without being aware of all the movements this in
volves; they can speak their language without consciously con
structing each sentence; and so on. However, it is during these
non-consciously performed (but non-repressed) activities that
repressed urges are most likefy to succeed in findi g expres
sion. To take the example of the President of the Lower House
of Austrian Parliament, referred to above, his slip (a "Freud
ian slip") gave expression to the secret and unavowed wish to
avoid this session. It occurred in the middle of his opening re
marks, a speech activity which is normally left at least in part
to the "automatic pilot': This illustration shows how repressed
1 66 Automaticity is particularly prominent in social interaction. For a
survey of this phenomenon, see Bargh, 2007.
1 28
4 A "Complete Cure"
urges use non-conscious but unrepressed activities to push for

discharge. It also suggests that, had the President of the Lower
House of Parliament decided to pronounce his words slowly
and consciously, paying full attention to each and every one of
them, he would not then have made his slip. This may reflect
a general rule. Even routine activities, if and when carried out
with full awareness, do not provide opportunities for repressed
urges to express themselves. 1 67
Repressed urges, then, find outlets in the middle of au
tomated activities, i.e., activities that are not conscious even
though they are not connected with repressed material. Au
tomated activities can be reduced to a minimum or even com
pletely avoided by someone who applies awareness to all of his
actions. It requires that all activity be reduced to a minimum,
and that what remains be slowed down to the extent possi
ble. 1 6 8 This can be achieved, for example, by sitting down and
directing one's attention at the few activities that remain, such
as breathing. This may not be a very practical course of action
for patients who have jobs and other responsibilities in soci
ety, but the hypothetical patient we are considering has already
done away with all this. Nothing therefore prevents us from
pursuing our reflections.
1 67 Ont; is reminded of the surgeon with Tourette's syndrome described
by Oliver Sacks ( 1 995: 73 ), whose tics and iterations are only inter
rupted by periods of intense attention, which include operating upon
patients and flying an airplane; and of Nick Van Bloss, a pianist with
severe Tourette's syndrome, whose tics stop the moment he begins to
play ( The Observer, 12 April 2009). Equally interesting is the case of
patients with obsessive compulsive disorder described by S chwartz &
Begley (2002, chapter two); Buddhism-inspired mindful awareness al
lowed these patients to avoid being overwhelmed by their obsessions,
and in due course to refocus their attention on other things. The same
technique appears to be effective against Tourette's syndrome and de
pression ( chapter seven) .
1 68 On the "sluggishness of consciousness", see Wegner, 2002: 56
1 29
ABSOR PTION, P ART I I : THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE BUDD H A
Our hypothetical patient, having completely given up all

forms of anticipating the future and having parted ways with
all human beings including his therapist, has now reduced his
activities to the few he can be fully aware of What happens to
his repressed urges ? In an ideal environment, one that provides
no stimuli whatsoever (and in which our patient somehow
succeeds in directing his fantasy life away from "dangerous"
thoughts) , we must assume that these urges will not be excited.
But they will not disappear either. In new situations where
stimuli are again present the repressed urges will reappear, and
little or no therapeutic progress will have been made. Urges,
however, are not only excited by external stimuli. Traces can
be activated by consciously directed fantasies; the associated
urges will then be put in a state of excitation. We had occasion
to point out that the states of excited urges ate bodily states,
emotions in the terminology of Damasio. These bodily states
will be mapped and the result of this mapping will be feelings.
Feelings are the unmistakable signs that allow our patient to
identify his urges, including repressed urges. Our patient may
experiment upon himself by exploring which fantasies evoke
which feelings. The resulting knowledge will be useful at a later
stage. For the time being he has no instrument to overcome the
repression. He does, however, have a way to 'nd out the "location" of repressed urges.
I will argue below, on the basis of the evidence of our early
Buddhist texts, that there is an instrument to overcome repres
sion. At this point it is sufficient to assume its existence, if only
for argument's sake. Granting this, we have to address the ques
tion: What further requirement may there be to accomplish
a complete psychotherapeutic cure ? There is one indeed: the
third item on our list.
1 30
4 A "Complete Cure"
(iii) As was explained above, incomplete psychotherapeu

tic cures are in danger of being of short duration. They disturb
the equilibrium that exists between the different entities that
make up the mind, i.e., the main unit and other (repressed)
trace units. This danger threatens our hypothetical patient,
and the extraordinary measures he has taken so far do not im
munize him from it. Relapse is possible, or even likely, until
the mind in its entirety has been dealt with. Any remaining
repressed trace units may push the mind back into its former
equilibrium. Unmodified warning signals in the main unit
against "dangerous" (i.e., repressed) thought contents may do
the same. 1 69 As a result, a complete psychotherapeutic cure will
have to be brought about in as short a time as possible, prefer
ably in one single therapeutic session. In this way a new equilib
rium will be established which is more stable than the earlier
one. In this new equilibrium no forces remain which could
push the mind back into an earlier state.
The above speculations about a complete psychotherapeutic
cure have called into existence a hypothetical patient capable
of bringing it about. This patient differs in numerous ways
from the average patient undergoing psychotherapy. He aban
dons his therapist and all other living company. He discards
all projects for the future definitively. He reduces his activity
to only such deeds as he can carry out with full awareness.
And then, with all these preliminaries successfully in place, he
brings about his complete psychotherapeutic cure in one single
session.
1 69 In view of the fact that formerly charged trace units have a tendency
to take on those emotional charges once again, it is conceivable that it

will be necessary, not just to allow repressed memories access to con
sciousness, but also to use this consciousness to "reconsolidate" them,
i.e., change them.
131
Needless to say, this description does not fit any patients

known to psychotherapists. It does, however, fit the ideal Bud
dhist practitioner depicted in the early texts. 1 70 These texts also
suggest that the instrument which can overcome repression is
absorption,171 We will see below that absorption is a particu
larly intensive form of concentration which is combined with
optimally reduced bodily tension. 1 72 Absorption plays a role at
levels two, three and four of the four levels of meditation that
are usually distinguished in the Buddhist texts. At the most ad
vanced level, the fourth, the ideal Buddhist practitioner brings
about the transformation which, as will be argued below, cor
responds to our complete psychotherapeutic cure.
How does absorption fit into the theory of the human mind
constructed above ? Absorption is intense concentration. This,
in its turn, is a form of attention. Attention can b directed at,
or away from sensory input and memory traces. It is imp or1 70 See Appendix 1 of Part II 1 , 2, 4, 5. The early Buddhist tradi
tion is unanimous in its claim that the Buddha reached his goal at the
end of one single session, which lasted one night.
1 7 1 See Appendix 1 of Part II 1, with my commentary.
1 72 Absorption is a form of "effortless attention" (Bruya, 20 10); see esp.
Dormashev, 20 1 0: 3 1 0 Cpo Austin, 1 998: 7 1 : "during rare moments,
[ ... J meditators may [ ... J make a major shift into an e:Jtraordinarily dif
ferent mode. It is a shift that carries the properties of clrity, persistence,
and concentration far beyond their ordinary limits. Now, as attention
transforms itself. [ ... J it reaches that state called absorption. [ ... J Absorp
tions convey the sense of being held, transfixed, and riveted. It is a pro
cess during which extra, concentrated energy involuntarily infuses the
act of attention." See further Austin, 2006: 3 1 3 ff. It is legitimate to ask
whether the combination of intense concentration (conceivably result
ing from terror) with drop of blood pressure and reduced bodily ten
sion explains the so-called "near-death experiences" frequently record
ed in the literature, which in that case may have to be explained in terms
of deep absorption. Indeed, Blanke & Dieguez (2009: 3 1 4, with refer
ences to further literature) point out that " [pJeople with [near-death
experience J . . . score higher than control subjects on absorption ...".
132
4 A "Complete Cure"
tant to note that for attention to be directed at some things it

will be withdrawn from others. 1 73 Attention withdrawn from
memory traces ensures that these will not be activated (or will
be less activated). When attention is withdrawn from sensory
input, it prevents this input from activating memory traces. Ei
ther way no urges will be excited.
This leaves the question: What is the absorption referred
to in the Buddhist texts directed at? The answer is that absorp
tion can but is not obliged to have an object. Like attention, of
which it is a more intense variant, absorption can occur with
out being directed at anything in particular. The concentration
of a fearful person who finds him- or herself in a dark and iso
lated place is not initially directed at anything in particular. 1 74
A suspect sound or a moving shadow may give it a focus. This
shows that it did not have one before. It appears indeed that
the faculty of attention in humans can be used without being
wholly directed at any specific object. Some of the neurologi
cal literature reviewed above supports this. 1 7 5
How does absorption overcome repression? Imagine that
our patient has successfully entered into a state of absorption.
As long as it lasts, no memory traces will be activated and no
urges will be excited. (An exception may have to be made for
the memory traces and associated urges to which our patient
decides to direct his attention (or part of it) .) 1 76 Assuming
1 73 C Part I 2, above.
1 74 This is at the same time an example of a conscious state that is not
intentional in the philosophical sense : 'n example of a conscious state

that is not intentional is the sense of anxiety that one sometimes gets
when one is not anxious about anything in particular but just has a feel
ing of anxiousness" (Searle, 2004: 97).
1 75 See note 1 5 2, above.
1 76 A further exception may have to be made for "independent" urges
such as hunger. The Buddhist texts insist that these urges must be ap
peased as far as possible before a successful "treatment" can be under-
133
that our patient has reduced the standby level of his bodily
tension to an absolute minimum, he now finds himself in an
ideal situation to explore his urges and the memories to which
they are attached. Urges will announce themselves as feelings
if and when the mind, in this concentrated state, imagines an
object or event related to them and thus activates the relevant
trace unit. The urges will announce themselves in the usual
manner (though weakly) by bringing about the appropriate
bodily states (the emotions). These in their turn will be per
ceived as feelings in the mind. The low degree of excitation
of the urge, resulting from the low degree of activation of the
corresponding memory trace, deprives it of all danger. It can
not manifest itsel for example in bodily activity. The minimal
level of standby bodily tension ensures that the conditions for
repression are not fulfilled. As a result, the trace nit can be
integrated into the main unit, and the associated urge diffused.
The situation so far described may be compared to a suc
cessful therapeutic session. But where the psychotherapy stops
(at least for that day), our ideal patient continues. He repeats
the process with respect to all of his urges, one after the other.
He discovers his urges with the help of his feelings, because
feelings are indicators of bodily emotions. Once all of the re
maining urges have been dealt with, the result wii be the com
plete psychotherapeutic cure which we set out to explore.
taken. See Appendix 1 of Part II 3.
1 34
5 The Theory Adapted
S THE THE O RY ADAPTED
At this point we must turn to the question: What must human

psychology be like for a complete psychotherapeutic cure to
be possible ?
Freud held that conflict is inherent in the human mind. 1 77
If this were true, no amount of therapy would ever be able to
resolve all conflicts. Our reading of the Buddhist texts leads to
a different view. If we assume with those texts that a complete
therapeutic cure is possible, conflict cannot be inherent in the
human mind. Let us consider the consequences of this posi
tion.
Freud postulated the existence of some mutually opposed
drives or instincts which he thought are behind the activities
1 77 In his "The psycho-analytic view of psychogenic disturbance of vi
sion" ( 19 10; SE XI p. 2 14), for example, Freud speaks of "the unde
niable opposition between the instincts which subserve sexuality, the
attainment of sexual pleasure, and those other instincts, which have as
their aim the self-preservation of the individual - the egO-instincts."
Later on, in Beyond the Pleasure Principle ( 1 920; SE XVIII pp. 3-64),
the Death instinct is posited as being in fundamental and irreducible
opposition to the Life instinct; in Civilization and its Discontents ( 1 930;
SE XXI pp. 59- 145) it is in conflict with Eros. A curious passage in this
last book ( SE XXI pp. 78-79) plays with the idea that suffering may be
reduced or even eliminated by "killing off the instincts": "Just as a satis
faction of instinct spells happiness for us, so severe suffering is caused us
if the external world lets us starve, if it refuses to state our needs. One
may therefore hope to be freed from a part of one's sufferings by influ
encing the instinctual impulses. This type of defence against suffering is
no longer brought to bear on the sensory apparatus; it seeks to master
the internal sources of our needs. The extreme form of this is brought
about by killing off the instincts, as is prescribed by the worldly wisdom
of the East and practised by Yoga. If it succeeds, then the subject has, it
is true, given up all other activities as well - he has sacrificed his life;
and, by another path, he has once more only achieved the happiness of
quietness."
135
ABSORPTION, PART II: THE PSYCHOLO G Y OF THE BUD D H A
of the mind. Leaving his ideas aside, it will be useful to recall

that our theory distinguishes two kinds of urges. 1 78
There are, on the one hand, the "independent" urges, ex
emplified by hunger. These urges can "announce" their excita
tion on their own by activating the associated memory traces.
Hunger will make itself felt whether or not we see, smell or
think about food. On the other hand, there are urges that can
not by themselves activate memory traces and are therefore
only "known" when some extraneous factor activates their
memory traces. These are the "dependent" urges, for their na
ture depends on the memory traces with which they are associ
ated. They are excited when the organism is confronted with
an object or event which on an earlier occasion accompanied
discharge. This confrontation can be external (through per
ception) or internal (through thought or imagination) . If no
such confrontation takes place, urges of this kind will remain
"dormant". Unlike independent urges, the nature of depend
ent urges is entirely determined by the past experiences of the
individual concerned.
This distinction between two kinds of urges is significant.
In the case of hunger and other independent urges, one may
assume that we have some idea as to their real nature. The urge
of hunger requires food to find its discharge, no matter the
I
memory traces with which it may be associated in any particular individual. We assume that we know the nature of hunger,
and we may be right in this. 1 79 However, no such assumption
1 78 Panksepp ( 1998 : 1 68) pleads for an even more drastic reduction:
"In the old psychological terminology, the bodily need detection sys
tems of the brain were thought to generate 'drives', but the use of that
concept has diminished as we have come to realize that such a broad
abstract intervening variable cannot be credibly linked to unitary brain
processes." About pleasure the same author states (p. 1 84) : "Perhaps
many stimuli can converge on a single pleasure system."
1 79 Note that hunger in itself does not "aim" at food, unless memory
1 36
is justified in the case of urges that are only known through

their associated memory traces. These memory traces provide
the urges with an "aim", but this aim is entirely dependent
upon earlier experiences of satisfaction. It would therefore be
a mistake to depict these urges anthropomorphically as drives
that pursue their own specific aims irrespective of the memory
traces with which they have become associated. We are thus
confronted with the question : What are the conditions for dis
charge of dependent urges ? What is their real nature ?
This question inevitably lead us to the topic of sexuality.
Sexuality presents itself in many different forms and pursues
many different objects and aims. Therefore it is difficult to de
termine its nature. The form it takes in an adult is largely deter
mined by earlier experiences, many of them belonging to child
hood. It is tempting to think of the development of sexuality
in an individual in "Darwinian" terms: Out of the innumerable
ways in which this urge can be satisfied, those which have met
with early experiences of satisfaction are selected. The adult is
no longer able to choose out of the innumerable possibilities
that were open in childhood, for the urge is now indissociably
connected with a relatively limited number of memory traces.
Sexuality is entitled to special attention in this study since
getting rid of thirst, which is dealt with in the third Noble Truth
of the early Buddhist texts, includes getting rid ofsexual desire.
Given, that the form which sexuality takes is (co-) determined
by the specific memory traces of satisfaction in each individual,
we wish to know what all these experiences of satisfaction have
in common.
We find ourselves face to face with the question in what the
sexual urge consists (supposing for the time being that there
is such a thing). In contradistinction to hunger, it would be a
mistake to assume that this urge really looks for satisfaction in
traces have provided it with that aim.
1 37
one specific way, say, in "normal" adult heterosexual activity.

The many ways in which this urge expresses itself in different
people suggests something quite different, viz., that there are
many ways in which this urge can find discharge. Children, to
use the Freudian expression, are "polymorphously perverse": "a
disposition to perversions is an original and universal disposi
tion of the human sexual instinct and [ ... ] normal sexual be
haviour is developed out of it as a result of organic changes and
psychical inhibitions occurring in the course of maturation". 180
What, then, is the sexual urge ? What do all the ways in
which it finds discharge, whether perverse or otherwise, have
in common ? Freud seemed to think that they have nothing in
common: "the sexual instinct itselfmust be something put to
gether from various factors, and [ ... ] in the perversions it falls
apart, as it were, into its components. [ ... ] [T]he iexual instinct
of adults arises from a combination of a number of impulses of
childhood into a unity, an impulsion with a single aim." 181
How does sexual satisfaction take place in children? Freud
proposed the following answer: 182
Satisfaction arises first and foremost from the appropriate
sensory excitation ofwhat we have described as erotogen
ic zones. It seems probable that any part of the skin and
any sense-organ - probably, indeed, any organ - can
function as an erotogenic zone, though there are some
particularly marked erotogenic zones whose excitation
would seem to be secured from the very first by certain
180 Freud, in the "Summary" of his Three Essays on the Theory of Sexual
ity ( 1 905; SE VII p. 23 1 ) .
181 Ibid. (SE VII p. 23 1 -232). On October 9, 1 9 1 8, Freud wrote to his
friend Oskar Pfister: "Aber mit der Sexualtheorie ? Was faUt Ihnen denn
ein, die Zerlegung des Sexualtriebes in Partialtriebe zu bestreiten, wozu
die Analyse uns jeden Tag notigt ?" (Freud & Meng, 1 963: 62)
18 2 Ibid. (SE VII p. 232-233).
1 38
organic contrivances. It further appears that sexual exci

tation arises as a byproduct, as it were, of a large number
of processes that occur in the organism, as soon as they
reach a certain degree of intensity, and most especially
of any relatively powerful emotion, even though it is of a
distressing nature.
One can forgive Freud for not finding much that these differ
ent sources of sexual satisfaction have in common. 18 3 He con
tinued saying: "The excitations from all these sources are not
yet combined; but each follows its own separate aim, which
is merely the attainment of a certain sort of pleasure:' And he
concluded his book on sexuality with the words : 184
The unsatisfactory conclusion [ ... ] that emerges from
these investigations of the disturbances of sexual life is
that we know far too little of the biological processes con
stituting the essence of sexuality to be able to construct
from our fragmentary information a theory adequate to
the understanding alike of normal and of pathological
conditions.
Freud used here the expression essence of sexuality, as if he still
believed that there should be something that unites these "bio
logical processes". 18 5 But clearly he did not know what it was.
And yet, the list of sources of infantile sexuality which he pro-
183 In "Instincts and their vicissitudes" ( 19 1 5; SE XIV pp. 1 09- 140)

Freud states, similarly, that "the sexual instincts [ ... J are numerous, ema
nate from a great variety of organic sources, act in the first instance in
dependently of one another and only achieve a more or less complete
synthesis at a late stage:'
184 SE VII p. 243.
185 He also refers to these as "various factors" and "components", as well
as "a number ofimpulses
1 39
vided in the same book contains one item that may contain a
key to the answer. Consider the following passage : 18 6
Finally, it is an unmistakable fact that concentration of the
attention upon an intellectual task and intellectual strain
in general produce a concomitant sexual excitation in
many young people as well as adults.
At first sight this is a very strange item in the list. What could
an intellectual task or an intellectual strain have in common
with more recognizable forms of sexual activity ? 1 8 7 A closer
look reveals that they do have something in common, namely,
concentration of the attention. This is arguably the only feature
which all sources of sexual satisfaction have in common. Note
in this connection that the passage quoted above contains the
phrase: "sexual excitation arises as a byproduct, a,$ it were, of a
large number of processes that occur in the organism, as soon
as they reach a certain degree of intensity" ( my emphasis). Con
centrated attention appears to be inseparable from sexual ex
citation.
Freud did not notice this, no doubt because concentration
and attention play no important role in his psychology. This is a
pity, for we have already discovered that these notions are vital
if we wish to make psychological sense of the early Buddhist
texts. We now see that these same notions may help us to arrive
at a deeper understanding of the nature of certain urges.
In brie the thesis presented here is as follows. Certain ex
periences are undergone in the specific states of concentration
1 86 Ibid. (SE VII p. 204) ; my emphasis.
1 8 7 Cpo Cioffi's ( 1 998: 48) scathing remarks aJ out the sexual nature of
abstract ideas: "it is difficult to imagine what associations to propor

tional representation, the single tax, states rights, or the axiom of exten
sionality could warrant their being recognised as disguised manifesta
tions of sexual impulses." In the thesis to be presented here there is no
need for such associations.
140
which we call absorption. Absorption is experienced as pleas

urable, for reasons that will be explained beloW. 188 Sexuality is
pleasurable because, and to the extent that, it is experienced in
a state of absorption. 18 9
It must here be observed that the memory trace produced
by absorption does not primarily record the state of absorp
tion but rather the object or event experienced in this state. 1 90
This object or event will activate the memory trace on future
occasions. The activated memory trace aims the accompanying
urge toward a renewed experience of this object or event rath
er than toward the more immediate cause of the initial pleas
ure, namely, the state of absorption. The search for pleasure
(whether sexual or other) will henceforth be guided by such
memory traces.
Our hypothetical patient, who has undergone a complete
psychotherapeutic cure, will have integrated all of his urges.
His reality assessment, moreover, will "know" that the state
of absorption rather than the renewed experience of objects
or events provides satisfaction. This cannot fail to affect his
behavior. We will discuss this below. First we have to answer
two questions: Why is absorption experienced as pleasurable ?
And how does our ideal patient gain satisfaction through ab
sorption, whereas most ordinary people do not succeed in do
ing so ? To answer these questions, we have to dedicate more
thought to absorption.
1 88 It is important to keep in mind that not all states of concentration
are experienced as pleasurable; see below.

1 8 9 The more specifically sexual aspect of sexual pleasure will be dis
cussed below.
1 90 Memory does more to distort the past experience: "What we learn
from the past is to maximize the qualities of our future memories, not
necessarily of our future experience." (Kahneman, 20 1 1 : 3 8 1 ) . The
memory of contextual details depends on the lateral prefrontal cortex;
its maturation does not occur until early adulthood (Ofen et al., 2007).
141
ABSORPTI ON, PART I I : THE PSYC HOLOGY OF THE BUDD H A
6 THE THEORY REFINED
The question why concentration may (but does not have to)
be experienced as pleasurable is easy to answer in terms of
our theory. We have postulated that the fundamental princi
ple of mental activity is the "search" for reduced bodily ten
sion. Events that bring this about are experienced as pleasur
able while those that raise bodily tension are experienced as
unpleasurable. There are various ways in which bodily tension
can be reduced. Concentration is one of them.
We know that attention implies relative deactivation of
certain memory traces. Deactivation of memory traces means
reduced excitation of the associated urges. If this leads to a re
duced overall level of bodily tension (which is/not always the
case), the resulting experience will be pleasurable. Absorption is
the term we reserve for intense concentration accompanied by
a reduced overall level of bodily tension.
Our theory also explains why all concentration is not ex
perienced as pleasurable. It is true that concentration may re
duce the level of bodily tension connected with deactivated
memory traces. However, it increases the level of excitation of
the urges associated with the memory traces at are being se
lected. These selected traces may excite their as ociated urges
so strongly that the result is an overall rise in the level of bod
ily tension. Moreover, the overall level of bodily tension must
often be increased to provide enough extra tension for concen
tration to be possible.
This last observation is in agreement with common expe
rience. There are tasks that require concentration yet are far
from pleasurable. In such cases it is likely that the task at hand
is not sufficiently inspiring to facilitate the withdrawal of at
tention from competing concerns. Additional bodily tension
1 42
6 The Theory Refined
is then recruited to make concentration possible. The overall

level of bodily tension will not be lower but rather higher than
before. The attention mustered in such situations is most com
monly due to an act of will.
Common experience also teaches us that the concentration
that accompanies dangerous and frightening situations is not
pleasurable. In such cases the state of concentration is not due
to an act of will but rather evoked by an involuntary assess
ment of the situation. These states of concentration, too, are
accompanied by a general mobilization of extra bodily tension.
The overall result is that the total amount of bodily tension
rises rather than falls - hence the displeasure. 1 9 1
Other experiences from daily life illustrate the agreeable ef
fects that certain states of concentration can have. Music lovers
experience pleasure when they listen to their favorite compos
er in an appropriate setting. The reasons why the music is ca
pable of absorbing a large part of their attention are no doubt
connected with their personal life history. The result of this
absorption is that the excitation of unconnected urges will be
reduced. In balance there will be an overall reduction of bodily
tension, so that the net result will be pleasure. 1 92 The pleasure
1 9 1 Practitioners of high-risk sports, amateurs of horror @ms, and oth
ers with similar inclinations fall in a separate category; see below.
1 9 2 Interestingly, for some of Oliver Sacks's patients, music-induced
pleasure culminates in epileptic seizures. So G. G.: "His seizures start
with or are preceded by a special state of intense. involuntary, almost
forced attention or listening. In this already altered state, the music
seems to grow more intense, to swell, to take possession of him, and at
this point he cannot stop the process, cannot turn off the music or walk
away from it. Beyond this point he retains no consciousness or memory,
though various epileptic automatisms, like gasping and lipsmacking, en
sue." Another patient, Silvia N., was freed from similar seizures through
surgical intervention. "Mrs. N. is delighted, of course, by her cure. But
she is occasionally nostalgic, too, for some of her epileptic experiences
- like the 'gates of heaven: which seemed to take her to a place unlike
143
will be most exquisite if the surroundings ask for minimal at

tention. Even the most beautiful music can become a source
of displeasure iflistened to, or rather heard, in demanding cir
cumstances. 1 93
In certain stressful occupations such as high-risk sports or
fairground joyrides, the net result may still be pleasure. In such
cases the amount of attention absorbed by the situation is so
great that little remains for other concerns. The release of ten
sion following the most threatening episodes accounts for the
resultant experience of pleasure. In these cases the concentra
tion of attention is not normally due to an act of will.
Recall now that the form of concentration referred to in
the early Buddhist texts is different from the one known from
daily experience. To begin with, it does not use bodily tension
specially generated for this purpose. Rather, it uses the (already
lowered) standby level of bodily tension. The result is the kind
of concentration we call absorption.
The absorption referred to in the Buddhist texts is not di
rected at an object. The texts use a special expression: "signless
absorption-of-mind"o. Our theory predicts that absorption
will always give rise to pleasure if it is not directed at an object,
for such absorption only reduces bodily tension and does not
excite any urges.
\
We turn to the next question: If absorption brings pleas
ure without effort (no bodily tension needs to be generated
to make it possible), why should anyone bother to search for
anything she had ever experienced before." (Sacks, 2007: 27, 29). On
the potentially religious dimension of music, see note 38, above. On the
sometimes orgasmic nature of epilectic seizures, see Komisaruk, Beyer
Flores & Whipple, 2008: 103. For the role of expectation in listening to
music, see Huron, 2006.
1 93 This analysis is not likely to be valid without adjustment for all the
different ways in which people listen to music, or for all types of music.
144
pleasure in any other way ? Why is this most efficient method

to obtain satisfaction systematically ignored ?
The two answers to this question complement each other.
The first one is straightforward: Absorption does not figure
prominently in memory traces. 1 94 Memory traces record pri
marily objects and events that are associated with experienc
es of satisfaction, not states of absorption. Since the kind of
absorption we are concerned with is not associated with any
objects or events, it has no "sign" by which it might be remem
bered. (This is no doubt the reason why it is called "signless-ab
sorption-of-mind"o in the early Buddhist texts). Certain events
- music, high-risk sports, etc. - induce states of intense at
tention; "signless" absorption differs from them in that it does
not come about on its own but is voluntarily evoked.
The second answer, the complement of the first, is as fol
lows. It is only after childhood that people may obtain enough
knowledge of their own mind to be able to explore its possi
bilities. 1 95 Meanwhile, the available bodily tension has been
taken up by numerous memory traces that have accumulated
over the years and by actual concerns ("anticipations of the fu
ture"). These factors resist attempts at withdrawal of attention
so that concentration becomes difficult. Only the concentra
tion that focuses on matters privileged by those memory traces
and actual concerns will not be resisted (or will be less resist
ed). Indeed, most forms of voluntary concentration depend on
a prior increase in bodily tension. They are therefore experi
enced as unpleasurable. The "royal road" to pleasure through
voluntary absorption, without prior increase in bodily tension,
1 94 See below for a more precise statement.
1 95 See note 1 90, above. Note that victims of traumatic experiences,
including children, may accidentally "find this place" (Le., a state of ab

sorption) as a way to escape from their torment; Maldonado & Spiegel,
1998, esp. p. 64.
145
is closed off. One can only gain access to it through a special

stratagem. The preparatory practices described in the Buddhist
texts are to be understood as such a stratagem. They make ac
cess to pleasure through "signless absorption" possible. 1 9G
We can reformulate the preceding paragraphs as follows.
Our point of departure is the presupposition that a diffuse, all
purpose bodily tension accompanies normal states of wakeful
ness. 1 97 The level of this diffuse tension may vary. Absorption
can reduce it. Most "normal" forms of concentration increase
it. Accepting the presence of such a diffuse, all-purpose bodily
tension is not problematic in terms of our theory. In an earlier
chapter we had to assume its existence in order to explain that
the main unit has tension available to resist repressed urges.
Much of this tension may result from the simultaneous acti
vation of numerous distinct memory traces. Its e111ployment
is guided by the main unit's reality assessment. It can thus be
used in the immediate service of a goal pursued at any particu
lar moment by the main unit. It can also be used to resist re
pressed urges. No matter what the details may be, this diffuse
general-purpose tension exists. Lowering its level will give rise
to pleasure. Certain states of concentration, most notably the
one we call absorption, can play a role in this. In the course
of an individual's growth and development, ever more bodily
1 96 Many so-called mystics have and had access to absorption, and left
testimonies as to the pleasure that accompanies it; see Appendix 2 of

Part II, below.
1 97 Cpo Freud in The Ego and the Id ( I 923; SE XIX p. 44) : "It will be
noticed [ ... J that [ ... J we have tacitly made [anJ assumption which de
serves to be stated explicitly. We have reckoned as though there existed
in the mind - whether in the ego or in the id - a displaceable energy,
which, indifferent in itself. can be added to a qualitatively differentiated
erotic or destructive impulse, and augment its total cathexis. Without
assuming the existence of a displace able energy of this kind we can make
no headway." Freud's energy corresponds to our tension.
146
tension is bound up with specific tasks. As a result, concentra

tion in a normal adult can draw upon a mere fraction of the
bodily tension that is present. Thus, concentration will usually
have to marshal additional bodily tension to be at all possible.
The pleasurable effect of voluntary concentration will thus be
much reduced. Indeed, it may disappear altogether, or become
unpleasure. The potential link between specific states of con
centration and pleasure remains therefore unknown to most
people. And yet, if concentration succeeds in reducing the
overall level of bodily tension, it will be experienced as pleas
ure.
Many situations, then, are pleasurable because we experi
ence them in a state of absorption ( more precisely: on account
of the drop in bodily tension that results from absorption) .
The source of pleasure in these cases is the state of absorption
and not those particular situations themselves. This means that
many of the aims we pursue in life, guided as we are by our
memory traces, are fundamentally mis-guided. 1 9 8 We strive to
repeat situations connected with earlier experiences of satisfac
tion where these situations were not the real cause of satisfac
tion. In extreme cases this may associate pleasure with other
wise painful or dangerous situations. This explains the fact ( a
fact which puzzled Freud) that sexuality can find expression in
many different ways, some of them painfuJ. 1 99
1 98 Cpo Schooler & Mauss, 20 10: 25 1 : " [W]hy, if flow states are so posi
tive, do people not seek them out more reliably. . . . the answer to this
question seems relatively straightforward. People fail to seek out flow
experiences because they lack meta-awareness about the fact that such
experiences are the most positive." For more on flow, see Appendix 2 of
Part II, below.
1 99 For Freud's own (more recent) attempt to solve the riddle of the
association of pleasure with pain, see his "The economic problem of
masochism" ( 1924; SE XIX pp. 1 55 - 1 70).
147
A B S ORPTION, PART I I : THE PS YCHOLOGY OF THE B UD D H A
The Buddhist texts present absorption as one of two sourc

es of pleasure, The first stage-of-meditation is described as
manifesting "rapture and pleasure born of seclusiono", while
the second has "rapture and pleasure born of absorption". 200
We know that reduction of bodily tension is the real source
of pleasure; it underlies all its manifestations. The Buddhist
"rapture and pleasure born of seclusiono" is due to a reduction
of tension unaccompanied by absorption : it is brought about
by avoiding situations that activate memory traces. The second
stage-of-meditation reduces bodily tension further through
absorption. In this way it adds to the "rapture and pleasure" of
the person concerned.
The Buddhist texts distinguish between "sensual pleasures"
and "pleasure that has nothing to do with sensual pleasures
and unwholesome states". 201 It is easy to understand this dif
ference in terms of our theory. "Sensual pleasureS" are pleas
ures obtained through the intermediary of activated memory
traces. "Pleasure that has nothing to do with sensual pleasures
and unwholesome states" is the pleasure derived directly from
seclusion and absorption.
The importance of the practices that precede absorption
in the Buddhist texts will now be clear. Mindfulnesso and se
clusion, in particular, bring down bodily tension (and in this
way lead to "rapture and pleasure born of seclusion",) . Without
them, concentration can only minimally deactivate the mem
ory traces from which attention is withdrawn and absorption
will not be possible. Once the field has been prepared by the
practice of mindfulness and seclusion, these traces can be de
activated. "Rapture and pleasure born of absorption" can then
be attained.
200 App endix 1 oEPart II 1 (lO- 1l) .
20 1 E. g. App endix 1 oE Part II 3 .
1 48
7 Sexuality and Sublimation
Let us return to our ideal patient. He has used his feelings

(which are signs of bodily states ) to identify the "location"
of his urges, including his repressed urges. Absorption is the
way to overcome repression. Overcoming repression normally
means: integrating the associated memory trace into the main
unit. To our ideal patient the process presents itself differ
ently. Memory traces retain features of situations that accom
panied satisfaction. They guide their associated urges toward
an attempted repetition of those situations. Our ideal patient
knows that these memory traces are fundamentally "mistaken".
However, recalled memories can be modified; they can be cor
rected. Our ideal patient can carry out the corrections by recall
ing these memories while in a state of absorption. In this state
his level of bodily tension will be extremely low. The memory
traces will now "recognize" that the remembered pleasure was
due to the lowering of bodily tension; even greater pleasure can
be obtained by lowering bodily tension further by means of
absorption. Integration of the modified memory trace meets
with no opposition : being modified, it will not be accompa
nied by the same urge.
7 SEXUALITY AND SUBLIMATION
The explanation proposed here of certain urges ( the "depend

ent" uges ) is meant to throw light on a variety of behaviors,
among these sexual behavior. The present theory explains how
and why sexual behavior can take many different forms. It is
less clear why it should cover sexual behavior in the narrow
sense. Why should sexual intercourse be the more or less regu
lar outcome of the search for reduced bodily tension?
149
The human mind is not a blank slate, nor was it one at

birth or conception. 20 2 Hereditary factors are involved in its
formation. These hereditary factors will push certain devel
opments in one direction rather than another, with the result
that specific individuals are programmed to have inclinations
of one kind rather than another. This much must be granted,
and we cannot but hope that further research will tell us more
about the mechanisms set in motion by these constitutional
factors. 203
202 See on this Pinker, 2002; Plotkin, 2007.
203 Many evolutionary psychologists adhere to the "massive modularity
thesis", in which "our cognitive architecture resembles a confederation

of hundreds or thousands of functionally dedicated computers (of
ten called modules)" (Tooby & Cosmides, 1995: xiii); these modules
"embody 'innate knowledge' about the problem-relevant 'parts of the
world" (Tooby & Cosmides, 1 992: 59). This thesis is inconsistent with
what we now know about the formation of the brain; Buller, 2005: 1 27
ff. See further Ramachandran, 20 1 2: 362: " ... MVF [mirror visual feed
back] ... radically changes our theoretical views on brain function. The
"old" view, based on the MIT model, postulates that the brain consists
of a number of hierarchically organised, largely isolated "modules" (e.g.,
for vision and touch). Each module performs some computation on the
input, makes some aspect of the information explicit, and passes it on to
the next and so on. The modules are hard-wired at birth and don't talk
much to each other. Our work with MVF (causing "paralyse' hands" to
move painlessly) and "remapping" of S I in amputees and the work of
Candy McCabe, Pat Wall, Peter Halligan, M. Sumitani, Alvaro Pascual
Leone, Mike Merzenich, John Kaas, and others in the last decade sug
gest a radical revision of our views on brain function; that it isn't a serial
hierarchical bucket brigade. Each module, far from being hardwired, is
in a constant state of dynamic equilibrium with the environment it is
immersed in (e.g., deafferentation leads to the rapid emergence of re
ferred sensations accompanying changes in brain topography) - chang
ing connections online in response to changing environmental needs.
And instead of being insulated, the modules interact profoundly with
each other (MVF psychophysics and brain imaging) ; interact back and
forth with the skin, muscles and bones (as demonstrated using MVF in
CRPS [complex regional pain syndrome] ) ; and indeed, interact with
1 50
It is possible to think of our present study as an investiga

tion into the limits of environmental conditioning. Ifwe regard
certain psychotherapies as attempts at partial deconditioning,
the Buddhist texts we are examining may then be taken as testi
monies with regard to how far deconditioning can go. It would
be premature and unhelpful to postulate in this study more
than a minimum of hereditary factors, i.e., factors that resist
deconditioning altogether. While granting the importance of
such factors, we have to continue to use a model that leaves
them as much as possible out of consideration. These factors
are bound to announce their presence at the point where our
theory reaches the limits of its explanatory power.
This takes us back to our question, "Why should the
search for reduction of bodily tension so often lead to sexual
behavior ?" 204 Most manifestations of sexuality - even in
Freud's broad understanding of this term - are connected
with the body, and with certain of its parts in particular: the
sexual organs and other erotogenic zones. These are all areas
that are well endowed with sensory nerves. 20 5 It is tempting to
other brains ( mirror neurons) ! Modules do exist of course, especially
for sensations ... and aspects of memory acquisition ( hippocampus),
but for most brain tissue current analogies - including the computer
metaphor - are grossly off the mark."
204 Shared features of orgasms and mystical experiences have been
pointd out by Newberg and D'Aquili (200 1 : 125), as reported in Hor
gan, 2003: 86-87. See also Parrinder, 1 976: 1 69- 1 74.
205 S ee, e.g., Komisaruk, Beyer-Flores & Whipple, 2006: 22; 228
These same authors further observe ( p. 223-24) : "it seems that while the
genital system is particularly well-organized to mediate the orgasmic
process, other body systems evidently manifest at least some of the same
properties and, consequently, under appropriate stimulus conditions
and sensitization may exhibit comparable activity." Klein, 2002/2006:
138: "If the size of the individual organs were commensurate with the
space given them in the brain, the penis and the vagina could easily out
weigh the entire upper body."
151
surmise that this relatively strong presence of sensory nerves,

along with the rather large surface of the brain associated with
them,z0 6 explains to at least some extent why these body areas
become so easily the object of intense attention. Besides that,
the genital organs in adults can produce pleasure of the high
est intensity accompanying the discharge of sexual substances
(as Freud put it). 207 1he genital organs present themselves in
this way as the primary focus of sexual satisfaction. "Pleasure
206 Interestingly, Ramachandran & Blakeslee ( 1 998: 3 5 f.) report a case
of a person who enjoyed sex more after the amputation of his foot. The
reason proposed is that the genitals are next to the foot in the body's
brain maps; the amputation resulted in an expansion of the brain sur
face related to the genitals, at the expense of the brain surface that used
to be connected with the foot and which served no purposany longer.
The amputee did indeed experience his orgasm in his "phantom foot".
207 The question why, in terms of our theory, the discharge of sexual
substances should be accompanied by pleasure, is intriguing, and the
fact that "it may well be that the larger part of the orgasm-correlated
secretion [ ... J is due to concurrent opioid release within the brain"
(Panksepp, 1 998: 243; cpo Komisaruk, Beyer-Flores & Whipple, 2006:
1 5 3 ) may give a clue to an answer; Georgiadis & Kortekaas (20 1 0 :
1 90) speak of "the recent idea that, neurochemically, pleasure, but not
motivation, may be subserved primarily by opioid mechanisms . . . Opi
ates presumably stimulate oxytocin release . . . , which, in tum, has been
shown to enhance orgasmic pleasure . . ." See further below. Note also
that during women's orgasms, according to the findings of Gert Hol
stege as reported in New Scientist (25 June 2005 p. 14), brain activ
ity decreases in the amygdala, the hippocampus, and many more areas
(similar findings for both men and women in Georgiadis et aI., 2009:
decreased activity in the medial temporal lobe, most notably in the
right amygdala and left fusiform gyrus) ; Georgiadis (2007) reports on
ejaculation-related deactivations throughout the pre-frontal cortex in
human males; can this be interpreted as highly selective attention, leav
ing out most other concerns ? The @tering of irrelevant information in
attention tests is preceded by activity in the prefrontal cortex and basal
ganglia, particularly in the globus pallidus; McNab & Klingberg, 2007.
1 52
of the highest intensity" means "greatest reduction of bodily

tension".
These thoughts about the development of sexual behavior
must be looked upon as hypothetical. They may nevertheless
help to explain why the pleasure generated by specific states
of attention will often give rise to a preoccupation with the
erotogenic zones as specific sources of pleasure, and with the
genitals in particular.
Another question, parallel to the preceding one but wid
er in its scope, is: "Why should the search for reduced bod
ily tension lead to any activities at all, whether of a sexual or
non-sexual nature ?" Using psychoanalytical terminology, such
activities include those covered by the expression sublimation.
Strictly speaking, this expression is less appropriate in the con
text of our theory, for it recognizes no primitive sexual instinct
that can be "lifted up" ( Latin sublimatus). Nevertheless we will
continue to use this expression.
In terms of our theory, activities are undertaken when ap
propriate memory traces are activated. A memory trace retains
the memory of an earlier experience of satisfaction, and the ac
tivity inspired by an activated memory trace aims at repeating
that experience. This activity is not always successful: it does
not always lead to renewed satisfaction. The (unrepressed )
memory traces of unsuccessful activities will, over time, be re
placed by traces of activities that do lead to renewed satisfac
tion.
This leaves us with the following. Initial experiences of sat
isfaction produce memory traces which induce the organism
to repeat the earlier activities. These memory traces weaken or
disappear if their activities do not lead to renewed satisfaction.
Satisfaction is therefore a precondition not only for the initial
registration of a memory trace, but also for its continued pres
ence in the mind. The question now is: what satisfaction do the
1 53
ABSORPT I ON, PART I I : THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE BUDDHA
repeated activities ( including "sublimated" ones) provide ? If

they are just misguided attempts to repeat an experience of sat
isfaction that belongs to the past and is henceforth definitely
out of reach, no renewed satisfaction should be expected from
them.
Our theory obliges us to look not only for the satisfaction
that created the memory trace in the first place, but also for the
satisfaction that the activity engendered by it produces later
on. As we have said, satisfaction (or pleasure) results from a re
duction of the level of bodily tension. We must conclude that
sublimated activity, too, lowers the level of bodily tension. But
why should sublimated activity give rise to pleasure at all ? In
terms of our earlier example : Why should music lovers who
listen to their favorite composer experience pleasure ?
A part of the answer to this question has already been given.
Music lovers listening to their favorite composer experience
pleasure because the music puts them in a state of absorption
now. This state of absorption takes attention away from other
memory traces and reduces the bodily tension connected with
them. Our music lovers will, of course, be well advised to listen
to their music in surroundings that deactivate other memory
traces as far as possible, e.g., in a concert hall or in the tranquil
ity of their home. Why does the music put them in a pleasure
providing state of absorption ? The question is not how our
music lovers acquired their specific taste to begin with. 20 8 We
start our present exploration from the assumption that appro
priate memory traces have been formed and are henceforth
present in their mind. These memory traces link the music to
earlier experiences of satisfaction. Why should this same music
lead to renewed satisfaction when it is heard again ?
These questions bring us to an aspect of the human mind
that we have not yet covered. An activated memory trace of an
20 8 See on this Levitin, 200 6: 223 If.
1 54
earlier experience of satisfaction attracts the attention of the

mind: the greater the satisfaction remembered (and therefore
promised) by the memory trace, the more attention it attracts.
More attention means deeper absorption. Absorption produc
es pleasure because it reduces the overall level of bodily ten
sion. Our music lovers now experience a new pleasure which
is due to their present absorption and not to some kind of hy
pothetical transfer of earlier pleasure. They may be tempted to
believe that this exquisite pleasure is due to some features of
the music they are listening to. From a psychological point of
view, our reflections suggest that this is not the case.
It is not necessary to postulate that the satisfaction of the
remembered event was as great as, or greater than the satisfac
tion accompanying its present memory. Certain memories
demonstrate the opposite. Marcel Proust's A la recherche du
temps perdu contains a famous example:
[My mother] sent for one to those squat, plump little
cakes called "petites madeleines", which look as though
they had been moulded in the fluted valve of a scallop
shell. And soon, mechanically, dispirited after a dreary
day with the prospect of a depressing morrow, I raised
to my lips a spoonful of the tea in which I had soaked a
morsel of the cake. No sooner had the warm liquid mixed
with the crumbs touched my palate than a shudder ran
through me and I stopped, intent upon the extraordinary
thing that was happening to me. An exquisite pleasure
had invaded my senses, something isolated, detached,
with no suggestion of its origin. And at once the vicis
situdes of life had become indifferent to me, its disasters
innocuous, its brevity illusory - this new sensation hav
ing had on me the effect which love has of filling me with
a precious essence ; or rather this essence was not in me,
it was me. I had ceased now to feel mediocre, contingent,
ISS
mortal. Whence could it have come to me, this all-pow

erful joy ? I sensed that it was connected with the taste
of the tea and the cake, but that it infinitely transcended
those savours, could not, indeed, be of the same nature.
[ ... ]
I began [ ... J to ask myself what it could have been, this
unremembered state which brought with it no logical
proof, but the indisputable evidence, of its felicity, its re
ality, and in whose presence other states of consciousness
melted and vanished.
[ ... ]
Undoubtedly what is thus palpitating in the depths of my
being must be the image, the visual memory which, being
linked to the taste, is trying to follow it into my
- conscious
mind.
[ ... ]
And suddenly the memory revealed itself The taste was
that of the little piece of madeleine which on Sunday
mornings [ . . J , when I went to say good morning to her in
her bedroom, my aunt Leonie used to give me, dipping it
first in her own cup of tea or tisane. 209
.
Jonah Lehrer (2007: 88) reminds us that the remembered

event was probably much less pleasurable than its recall: 'er
all, when Marcel was actually a child in Combray, eating ma
deleines to his heart's content, all he wanted was to escape his
small town. But once he escaped, Marcel incessantly dreamed
of recovering the precious childhood that he had so wantonly
squandered. This is the irony of Proust ian nostalgia: it remem
bers things as being far better than they actually were." It is
of course possible that we are confronted here with a screen
209 Proust, 1 9 1 3 / 1 98 1 : 48-50.
1 56
8 The Result of a "Complete Cure"
memory behind which deeper ( and presumably more satisfy

ing ) memories hide. There is no need to take a position in this
matter. It seems safer to restate that present pleasure is not the
result of a transfer of past pleasure. Proust's present pleasure
was determined, not by the pleasure that accompanied the re
membered event, but by the degree of absorption he experi
enced while remembering itYo
8
THE RESULT OF A "COMPLETE CURE"
Let us return to our ideal patient and see in what state the
transformations described so far have left him. If our thesis
regarding the true nature of "dependent" urges is correct, we
will be obliged to expand the notion of a "complete psycho
therapeutic cure". Such a cure will still integrate all repressed
memory traces into the main unit as well as redirecting the as
sociated urges. It will however do more than that. It will also
change the reality assessment of the individual memory traces
and of the main unit as a whole. Before the "complete cure': the
organism, guided by its memory traces, would aim to repeat
earlier experiences of satisfaction. After the "complete cure", it
will still aim to repeat earlier experiences of satisfaction, but
the memory traces will be changed: it will thus no longer be
210 Linden (20 1 1 : 135) speaks of a "minor miracle": "when pleasure
and associative learning are mixed . . . , a minor miracle . . . takes place.
Now behaviorally compelling stimuli don't have to be intrinsically
pleasurable, like sex of food, or artificially pleasurable, like drugs. Any
sound, smell, sight, or memory can become associated with pleasure
and can thereby become pleasurable in its own right." On p. 148 Lin
den mentions again the "ability to feel pleasure from arbitrary rewards"
and wonders whether "these rewards [are] really entirely arbitrary" or
if there is "some common theme or quality that runs through them?"
If the theory here presented is correct, the "common theme or quality"
that runs through "arbitrary rewards" is absorption.
1 57
guided by the same memory traces. Perhaps it would be better

to say that the same memory traces now survive in a reinter
preted, and therefore modified form. The memory traces now
"know" that they recall satisfaction only because the objects
and events remembered were accompanied by states of re
duced bodily tension often brought about by absorption, with
the result that the organism will now try to reestablish such
states directly and will abandon the pursuit of worldly aims. It
will be able to do so because the obstacles to absorption, i.e. all
those factors that demand the maintenance of a high level of
standby tension, will now have disappeared. 2 1 1
One consequence of the above must be emphasized. A per
son who has undergone a "complete cure" will no longer have
sexual desire of any kind. This conclusion becomes inevitable
once we accept that sexuality in its various manifestations is
among the urges that are not intrinsically directe d at specific
objects and activities. Objects and activities come to play a
role because the mind has the tendency of keeping a record
of objects and activities rather than of the states which are the
real causes of satisfaction. The idea that ideal patients might
achieve a complete therapeutic cure and find themselves with
out sexual interests and needs fully agrees, of course, with the
early Buddhist texts. Indeed, getting rid of desire 'l including
sexual desire, is presented as the key to all other aims'
The theory we constructed allows for an internal arrange
ment of the mind in which desire is absent (rather than be
ing suppressed, repressed, kept in check, or sublimated) . The
21 1 Th e question as t o why the historical Buddha bothered t o preach his
message after his enlightenment, rather than remaining in his newly ac
quired state ofpeace, occupied the early Buddhist tradition ; see Bareau,
1963: 1 3 5 ff. It also poses a challenge to the theory here presented. The
question whether the Buddha still had desires was also discussed in the
medieval Buddhist tradition, and has attracted the attention of modern
scholars; see Franco, 20 12.
158
Buddhist texts which are at the basis of this study, and whose
testimony we have accepted as our working hypothesis, state
in no uncertain terms that such an arrangement of the mind
can be brought about and that it was actually brought about
at least once.
The same applies to all desires in the broadest sense of the
term. Those who have successfully undergone the treatment
described in the preceding pages will no longer be attached to
the objects and events represented in their memory traces. As a
result, they will not be attached to any people, things or states
of affairs. A partial exception will have to be made for what
we have called "independent" urges, such as hunger and thirst,
and for bodily discomfort and disturbance, including illness.
These will still influence the persons concerned. However, pro
tection against these can be obtained by entering into a state of
absorption. This is what the historical Buddha is reported to
have done when suffering from physical ailments caused by old
age. 2 1 2 This is also what our theory predicts. 2 1 3
2 1 2 See Appendix 1 of Part II 8.
2 1 3 People may not feel pain in involuntary states of absorption, too :
"One has t o pay attention t o pain for i t to hurt" (Spiegel & Spiegel,
2004: 309). See, e.g., the testimony of 'A' as reproduced in Laski, 1 96 1 :
4 1 8- 1 9 : "Last night as I was walking home from the station I had one of
those strange experiences of 'rising upward within oneself', of 'coming
inwardly alive'. As it happens, I can remember the comparatively trivial
beginnings of it. A minute or so after I had left the station, I was at
tacked, though not severely, by the indigestion which is always liable to
recur when I have been working particularly hard. I thought to myself,
though I suppose not in so many words, 'I could separate myself from
this pain [ ... J' Even as I thought this the pain disappeared; that is, it was
in some way left behind [ ... ] and the sensation of 'rising up within' be
gan." There is, furthermore, considerable anecdotal evidence that even
severe pain can be "forgotten" when attention is deviated or otherwise
occupied: " [O]verwhelming and serious injury is sometimes accom
panied by a surprising absence of pain perception until hours after the
injury occurred. This traumatic dissociation has been observed in vic-
1 59
To conclude, I add a few specifications about pleasure. Pleas

ure is experienced when the level of bodily tension is reduced.
It is therefore associated with the transition from one state to
another. Once bodily tension has been reduced and a more or
less stable state of low tension has been reached, there should
be no experience of pleasure. This agrees with the description
of the fourth stage-of-meditation in the Buddhist texts as hav
ing "neither-pain-nor-pleasure and purity of mindfulness due
to equanimity". 2 1 4 The same characterization should apply to
any stable state oflow tension, including the more or less regu
lar states of those who have done a "complete therapy". If our
theory is correct, the outcome of a "complete therapy" will be
a state of permanent mental peace and not necessarily a state
of permanent bliss.
We have occasionally referred to neurological research in con
nection with our psychological theory. We return to it to ask
a very hypothetical question, which may be presented graphi
cally as follows. Suppose that, by some miracle, the brain of the
historical Buddha had been preserved and could be studied by
brain specialists. 2 1 5 Would they find anything noteworthy ?
If we base ourselves on the testimony of the earliest sources,
we can state with confidence that nothing like an "enlightentims of natural disasters, combat, and motor vehicle accidents." (Spiegel
& Spiegel, 2004: 309 ; see further Wall, 1 999: 4 ff.) Note further that
Grahek (2007: 40 & passim) argues that "pain, when stripped of [all its
affective, cognitive, and behavioral components] ' loses all its represen
tational and motivational force. It comes to nothing in the sense that
it is no longer a signal of threat or damage for the subject, and doesn't
move (emotio) his mind and body in any way." On persistent posttrau
matic dissociation, see note 1 33, above.
214
See Appendix 1 of Part II 1 ( 13).
215
One thinks, of course, of Einstein, the bizarre odyssey of whose
brain is described in Abraham, 200 l .
1 60
ment bump" would be found in this brain. 2 1 6 It is true that

brain plasticity, even in adults, is now a recognized phenom
enon. 2 l7 It is also true that meditation may bring about lasting
changes in the brain. 2 18 However, the early sources are categori
cal about the duration of the process responsible for the deci
sive modification in the mind of the historical Buddha: only
one night. 2 1 9 This is far too short a period to allow for extensive
modifications in the brain.
In spite of this, we may take it for granted that changes in
the mind are paralleled by changes in its neuronal substrate.
In other words, we may expect the brain of the Buddha to dis
tinguish itself in some respects from the brains of people who
have not effected the "complete cure". We may, however, feel
skeptical about the possibility of finding and identifying the
distinctive features during an autopsy with the tools presendy
available. 220
The situation might be different if the Buddha's functioning
brain could be observed. Recall that Edelman and Tononi put
forward the hypothesis that some of the splinter cores which
they found in the functioning brain beside and independent
ly of their dynamic core may correspond to the unconscious,
i.e. to our repressed trace units. Our theory, in combination
with their hypothesis, suggests that in the Buddha's brain these
splinter cores might have become integrated into the dynam2 1 6 The cranial bump on early statues of Bodhisattvas (= Buddhas-to
beO) may represent a head-cloth covering a hair-bun; the bump was sub
sequently added to statues of the Buddha, too. See Falk, 20 12.
2 1 7 Schwartz & Begley, 2002; Begley, 2007; Doidge, 2007.
2 1 8 See Begley, 2007: 2 1 2 If
2 1 9 It is almost superfluous to add that this decisive modification fol
lowed preliminary activities which took much longer.
220 For a discussion of the neurobiological consequences of psychother
apeutic interventions, see Etkin et aI., 2005.
161
ABSORPTION, PART II: THE PSYCHOLO G Y OF THE BUD D H A
ic core. In other words, no splinter cores might be found in

that brain. All this is, of course, pure speculation. Yet it can be
stated with confidence that the psychological changes brought
about by the process described in the early Buddhist texts must
leave traces in the brain.
1 62
SUMMARY AND CONC LUDING REFLECTIONS
The result of the preceding investigation can be summarized as

follows. The mind is motivated by the search for pleasure. It is
guided in this by memories of earlier experiences of pleasure.
However, the mind does not "know" why earlier experiences
were pleasurable; it is simply programmed to retain objects and
events that accompanied those earlier experiences. Its search
for pleasure becomes in this way a search to recreate situations
that accompanied earlier experiences ofpleasure. This does not
always lead to renewed pleasure.
Discharge of bodily tension is experienced as pleasure.
Since the mind does not "know" this, it can be led astray by its
memories. The activities it undertakes to recreate pleasurable
situations, however, may in themselves be pleasurable. These
activities, too, will then be remembered and added to the store
of memories on which the mind draws in determining future
behavior. This store of memories will become immense and
will be different for each individual, depending in important
measure on their different experiences.
All individuals have in common that their motivational
structure is not based on a correct evaluation of what consti
tutes pleasure. If discharge of bodily tension could be brought
about directly and, at the same time, if all memories could be
"convinced" that the features they retain are not the "right"
ones, the end result would be a human being with a radically
different motivational structure. Such a human being would
no longer have the same desires as others. Its principal remain
ing desire would be to bring about discharge of bodily tension
in this direct manner, which amounts to saying that it is free
from normal desire in any of its forms.
1 63
This hypothetical person has much in common with the

practitioner who has successfully followed the process de
scribed in the oldest Buddhist texts, instantiated in the histori
cal Buddha. Most notably, both are without desire.
The Buddhist texts enumerate two direct methods to bring
about discharge of bodily tension. 0ne is complete disengage
ment from human society. The other is mental absorption.
Once our hypothetical person has succeeded in "convincing"
his memories that the features he associates with pleasure are
not the "right" ones, he has also succeeded in disengaging him
self from human society. His only remaining "desire" will be to
enter into profound absorption.
"Convincing" all memory traces that they do not remember
the "right" things and that they promise pleasure where little
or none is to be had, is more easily said than done. In order
to understand how this goal can be attained, our "top-down"
presentation must now make place for a "bottom-up" summa
ry of the inner workings of the human mind.
The mind contains a large number of memory traces, usually
combined into trace units ( also called secondary traces) of vari
ous sizes. Trace units are associated with bodily urges, whose
direction is determined by "their" trace units. Trace units are
activated by a confrontation with the objects or evnts whose
memories they embody or by thoughts or fantasies about them.
Activated trace units put the associated urges into a state of ex
citation. The degree of activation of the trace units determines
the degree of excitation of the associated urges.
The memory traces that we are concerned with here record
earlier experiences of pleasure. Pleasure is experienced when
the overall level of bodily tension is reduced. The overall level
of bodily tension is largely the result of the simultaneous exci
tation of numerous urges to various degrees.
1 64
Summary and Concluding Reflections
The level of excitation of urges is directly related to the

degree of activation of the corresponding trace units. This de
gree of activation is not exclusively determined by the objects
and events that present themselves to the organism (whether
through sensory input, memory or imagination) . Attention
plays a major role. The more attention is directed at one ob
ject, event, or mental content, the less remains for others. At
tention aimed at one thing implies attention withdrawn from
another. Attention withdrawn means reduced activation of the
trace units concerned, and reduced excitation of the associated
utges. In favorable circumstances, appropriately directed at
tention generates a globally reduced level of bodily tension,
and therefore a pleasutable experience. This happens most sig
nificantly in the kind of attention called absorption.
Activated memory traces of earlier satisfaction tend to gen
erate attention and may in this way produce renewed satisfac
tion.
Trace units (or secondary traces) are the result of the inte
gration of (primary and/or secondary) memory traces. Mem
ory traces along with their associated urges embody reality
assessments. Through them the associated urges "know" how
to attain satisfaction. Larger trace units embody more encom
passing reality assessments than their constituent traces.
Distinct trace units may be activated simultaneously, thus
putting different utges in a state of simultaneous excitation.
This can result in conflict. Such a conflict is resolved if the trace
units concerned integrate into a larger trace unit. The reality
assessment of this larger trace unit will either choose between
the courses of action of the integrated traces or choose a new
one that provides optimal satisfaction to all the excited urges.
If there are obstacles to the mutual integration of trace
units, the strongest one may use part of its available bodily ten
sion to block the urges associated with the others. Mutual inte-
1 65
gration can then be prevented through withdrawing attention

from the weaker trace units and directing it elsewhere. Con
flicts like these normally oppose the largest trace unit of all,
the main unit, to other trace units which are then designated
repressed. Repression will leave a trace in the main unit which
blocks future access to the repressed trace unit.
The numerous trace units of the mind - i.e., one main unit
and many repressed trace units - keep each other in a more or
less delicate equilibrium. Attempts to integrate repressed trace
units into the main unit - strictly speaking these are renewed
attempts, subsequent to the initial one that failed and there
fore led to repression - meet in this way with resistance. In
order to succeed, they have to establish a new equilibrium be
tween the various forces that are active in the mind.
In spite of the many practical difficulties that oppose the in
tegration of repressed trace units and their urges, theoretically
there is no limit to this process: theoretically nothing stands in
the way of a main unit in which all trace units and their urges
are integrated.
In practice this goal may be attained by means of the overall
reduction of bodily tension. In the case of independent urges,
such as hunger, the reduction of tension is linked to specific
activities, such as eating. In the case of dependent urges, two
factors can bring it about:
(i) Reduced activation of the memory traces that are re

sponsible for the excitation of the associated bodily urges. This
happens typically when, and to the extent that, people can
separate themselves from their social surroundings and the as
sociated expectations.
(ii) Absorption. Absorption withdraws attention from
(many or all) memory traces and further reduces in this way
their activation and the excitation of the associated urges.
1 66
Because the mechanism of repression depends on the avail

ability of bodily tension, access to repressed memory traces
can be obtained once bodily tension is reduced to an absolute
minimum through these two means: social isolation and ab
sorption. Repressed memories can be localized through the
systematic exploration of feelings, which are the sign-posts of
bodily tension.
The theory presented does more than providing space for
the mental possibilities recorded in the early Buddhist texts.
It also presents a coherent picture, if ever so rudimentary, of
the nature of many "ordinary" mental events. The fact that it
proposes an explanation both for the initial motivation that
makes human beings tick and for the motivation that keeps
them ticking may count among its more specific virtues.
These are factors that plead in favor of the theory. However,
they do not prove that it is correct, i.e., true to reality. 22 1 To
make progress in that direction, we need to know whether, and
to what extent the theory can be tested. Can it be confronted
with experimental situations that might confirm, refute or
refine it, or that might call for other adaptations ? It does not
really matter whether the experiments concerned belong to
the realm of psychology, neurology, physiology, or perhaps to
some other domain, as long as they can test the theory or some
aspect of it.
Since I do not myselfhave the means and expertise required
to set up experiments of this kind, it may be useful to enumer
ate some of the assumptions underlying the theory, and some
of its consequences, so that a skilled experimenter may be able
to put them to the test. First of all, there is the assumption that
22 1 In striving to describe how the mind really works, we are elaborating
a theory rather than a model, which is a metaphor or analogy of what

really happens.
1 67
attention behaves as ifit is of a more or less constant and finite

quantity: attention has to be withdrawn from one place in or
der to be directed elsewhere. Does attention really follow such
a rule, even approximately? Experimental research confirms
that directed attention has to compete with the general state
of arousal of the organism, but the issue may not be completely
settled. 222 Secondly, there is the further assumption that a bod
ily tension exists which follows a twofold rule: (i) fluctuations
in the total amount of tension determine the pleasure a per
son experiences, and (ii) the constituent urges of this tension
compete with each other. Does such a tension exist, and is it
measurable ? Is it perhaps possible to "translate" these levels
of tension into degrees of arousal that belong to the seeking
system discussed earlier ? 223 Thirdly, there are the claims about
222 Coull (2005 : 5 1 -52) states: "Electrophysiological recordings in
monkeys have shown that phasic LC ( i.e., locus coeruleus, JB) firing to
targets [ .. J actually varies according to the tonic LC activity (equivalent
to the state of arousal of the animal) and has corresponding effects on
attentional performance [ . . J This pattern of aftivity follows an inverted
U-shaped curve whereby too low or too high a state of tonic LC firing,
or arousal, alters phasic LC firing and, consequently, impairs perfor
mance. Optimal performance corresponds to an intermediate state of
tonic LC discharge or arousal." This would at first sight seem to agree
with our theory where higher and intermediate states of arousal are
concerned, but not in low states of arousal. However, thetaCt that outer
objects do not attract focused attention in monkeys (and perhaps hu
mans) when their overall state of arousal is low, does not need to imply
that no attention is available in that state.
223 Cpo Panksepp, 1 998: 1 67: "Existing evidence suggests that the seek
ing system is under the control of internal homeostatic receptor systems
that detect various bodily imbalances." On p. 1 68, this same author
makes a remark which suggests that bodily tension may be measur
able: 't a physiological level, increased arousal can be measured by
the intensification of reflexes as well as neural changes." Kaplan (2004:
550) goes further and introduces a comparison with an early notion of
Freud: "In his earliest efforts to formulate a psychology, Freud postu.
1 68
the relationship between absorption and pleasure, and the pos

sibility of attention without an object. At the time of writing,
I have not found many scientific studies that deal with these
claims, 224 but mystical literature and affirmations of practi
tioners of certain forms of meditation support them. 22 5 The
claimed existence of trace units different from the main unit
(and different from the Freudian system of the unconscious and
Id) might also permit experimental verification. 226 The claim,
furthermore, that much of human (and perhaps animal ?)
motivation does not depend on inbuilt instincts that pursue
their own goals, but rather on urges whose direction is fully or
largely determined by memory traces, gives rise to interesting
questions. What would happen if certain memory traces were
suppressed ? It appears possible to prevent memory traces from
reconsolidating by chemical means, at least in rats. 227 Our thelated a quantitative factor, which, in Project for a Scientific Psychology
[ ... ] he designated Q. This quantitative factor may be roughly translated
as a physical energic factor. It has been compared to the seeking system
theorized by Panksepp [ ... ] "
224 Note however the following: "It is possible the brain does not have
distinct neuronal signals related to attention and reward expectation."
(Maunsell, 2004: 264). In human beings, one of the physical character
istics of concentration called up "at will" (i.e., without reward expecta
tion) is increased pupil size; cpo Kahneman, 1973: 19, referring to Libby
et ai. 1973. Pupil dilation also accompanies other mental phenomena
such as decision-taking and excitation (see New Scientist of 6 March
20 10, p. 1 1 ; Bradley et aI., 2008), but this may find its explanation in
the fact that those other phenomena are themselves accompanied by
states of increased concentration.
22 5 On the relationship between absorption and pleasure, see Appendix
2 of Part II. On the possibility of attention without object, see above,
esp. note 1 52.
226 See the remarks made above in connection with the "splinter cores"
of Edelman and Tononi.
227 Miller & Marshall, 2005; Lee et aI., 2005.
169
ory suggests that such procedures might deeply interfere with

the motivational life of the organism concerned. Rigorous test
ing of the theory seems therefore possible in principle.
There are further questions of a more theoretical nature.
How do the rudimentary reality assessments of memory traces
give rise to the more sophisticated reality assessment of a trace
unit and ultimately of the main unit ? Is there a way to visualize
this process without introducing homunculi, i.e., anthropomor
phic elements which shift rather than solve the problem ? 228
And what is the exact relationship between feelings and "act
ing out" ? Is it true, as our theory suggests, that acting our emo
tions reduces or even annuls the corresponding feelings ? 229
Once again, we can only hope that future research will answer
these questions.
Recall that our theory distinguishes two different ways in
which pleasure can be attained: reduction of tension brought
about by the removal of sources of tension (the Buddhist " rap
ture and pleasure born of seclusion") and absorption ("rapture
and pleasure born of absorption"). There is only one ultimate
source of pleasure, to be sure, viz. the reduction of the overall
228 It may be useful here to refer back to note 1 20, above.
229 C f. James, 1 890: II: 466: "Manifesting an emotion, so far from in
creasing it, makes it cease. Rage evaporates after a good outburst [ ... J
During the manifestation the emotion is always felt." 1h is also an
obvious parallel in the alternative between repeating and remembering
to which Freud draws attention, for example in his "Remembering, re
peating and working-through" ( 1 9 14; SE XII p. 1 50: "the patient does
not remember anything ofwhat he has forgotten and repressed, but acts
it out. He reproduces it not as a memory but as an action; he repeats it,
without, of course, knowing that he is repeating it.") Note that Klein
(2002/2006: 42) warns against the "widely held psychological convic
tion" according to which people "will be free of their anger if they ex
press it, that theirs tears will release their pain"; referring to publications
by Mallick & McCandless ( 1 966) and Tavris ( 1 989), he considers this
belief "no truer than the flat earth".
170
level of bodily tension. The two ways to achieve this are never
theless quite different. This raises the question: Do these two
have their counterparts in the two chemical agents that are
often associated with pleasure, viz. opioids and dopamine (c
Panksepp, 1 998: 1 84) ? About opioid systems Panksepp states
( 1 998: 386 n. 94) : "The general pleasure produced by brain
opioid systems may be related to an interesting effect that can
be produced by high doses of externally administered opioids
- a quieting of the body that at its most extreme takes the
form of catalepsy: When animals are given high doses of opi
ates, their bodies become rigidly 'waxy', so that one can mold
them into almost any shape. Perhaps a mild form of this type
of immobility characterizes animals that have no regulatory
imbalances - ones that are completely satisfied." Dopamine
presents a puzzle to him ( 1 998: 385 n. 88) : " [ ... J it remains
unclear what type of neuropsychic reinforcing event is medi
ated by dopamine. Does the induced psychological process
resemble consummatory pleasure or some other form of desir
able psychic arousal ? The present position is that the psycho
logical state is akin to a generalized desire or reward-seeking
urge rather than any type of pleasure that typically accom
panies consummatory acts. Generally, this is in accord with
the most common subjective reports from human subj ects,
which indicate that what is being experienced are feelings of
positive energization, arousal, power, effectiveness, and being
on top of things." The crucial expressions in this passage are
"consummatory pleasure" and "some other form of desirable
psychic arousal." It is the latter which is to be associated with
dopamine. 23 0 A more recent study confirms this (Burgdorf &
230 LeDoux's following inference therefore would appear to be mistak
en (2002: 246) : "Dopamine was believed to be the chemical ofpleasure.
However, [ ... J dopamine is [ .. . J more involved in anticipatory behaviors
( looking for food or drink or a sexual partner) than in consummatory
171
Panksepp, 2006: 1 83-84) : "There appear to be at least two

distinct classes of PA [positive affect, JB] states represented
in the brain, with separate but overlapping neuroanatomical
substrates. An appetitive PA system, devoted [in rats, JB] to
foraging and reward-seeking, associated in part with the ef
fects of psycho stimulants such as cocaine and amphetamine is
dependent in part on the ventral striatal dopamine system. A
nearby PA system involved in processing sensory pleasure such
as pleasurable touch and hedonic tastes involves the opiate and
G AB A system in the ventral striatum and orbital frontal cor
tex." The link between dopamine and attention appears to be
well established. 23 1
Critics of our theory will justifiably ask how biological evo
lution could ever have produced this kind of mind. Human
beings are biological organisms and the product of biological
evolution. The mechanism governing this process is known in
principle and consists in the elimination, by natural selection,
responses (eating, drinking, having sex). But being hungry or thirsty
is unpleasant. Pleasure, to the extent it is experienced [ ... ] , would not
come during the anticipatory state but instead during consummation.
Since dopamine is involved only in the anticipatory phase, and not in
the consummatory phase, its effects (at least in the case of primary need
states) cannot be explained in terms of pleasure."
23 1 See, e.g., Rolls, 1999: 1 9 1 ff; here one finds a possible explanation
as to how dopamine could play an important role in setting the sensitiv
ity of the response selection function there specified (which presumably
corresponds to what we call attention). Austin ( 1 998: 200-0 1 ) refers to
experiments which suggest that dopamine helps sustain goal-directed
behaviors, and then suggests "that [dopamine] can normally enter in
to influence our several mechanisms of attention". See further LeDoux,
2002: 1 89-90; Rolls, 2005 : 3 1 2 ff; Leyton, 20 10. On the question of
the relation between pleasure on the one hand and dopamine and opi
oids on the other, see also Katz, 2006: 3.2 and 3.3, with references to
further literature.
172
of features that reduce fitness. An essential ingredient of fit

ness is procreation. In human beings as in many other organ
isms, this is inseparable from sexuality. A "sexual instinct" of
one sort or another would therefore seem to be a fundamental
necessity. 2 3 2 Without it, reproduction might be seriously com
promised. Organisms that are deficient in this respect should
soon be selected away. How then is it possible that human
beings have no sexual instinct in the strict sense ? And what
selection pressure could replace a clear, goal-oriented sexual in
stinct with the mechanism presented in our theory ? The need
for food is represented in the human mind by a clear, goal-ori
ented drive, 2 33 viz. hunger. Why then is sexuality not similarly
represented ?
This criticism is valid but can be answered without great
difficulty. If our theory is correct, human beings do indeed not
have a clear, goal-oriented sexual instinct. 234 However, for the
2 32 Rolls (2005 : 4 1 f.) argues "that emotions are states elicited by goals
(rewards and punishers), and that this is part of an adaptive process

by which genes can specify the behaviour of the animal by specifying
goals for behaviour rather than fixed responses." If our present theory
is correct, not even the goals for certain types of human behavior have
been specified by genes (or at any rate not fully), and yet this does not
endanger the survival of the species. About sexuality, Rolls states (p.
360) : "Sexual behaviour is an interesting type of motivated behaviour
to compare with feeding and drinking. For both feeding and drinking,
there are internal signals such as plasma glucose or cellular dehydration
related to homeostatic control that set the levels of food or water re
ward in order to produce the appropriate behaviour. In the case of sexual
behaviour, there are no similar short-term homeostatic controls." (my em
phasis, ]B)
233 Strictly speaking, hunger in our theory is not a "goal-oriented" drive,
but a drive that can only be satisfied in a small number ofways (primar
ily eating).
234 Even theoretically this is not necessarily a disadvantage, for pos
tulating an instinct does not explain much. Rose (2005: 1 14), having
enumerated nine different meanings of the word 'instinct', observes:
1 73
vast majority of mankind this does not make the slightest dif
ference. The number of people who have overcome their sex
ual urges through insight into their underlying motivational
structure and by bringing about the appropriate changes is
minuscule: there is indeed only one ex hypothesi "certain" ex
ample; further examples are uncertain. 23 5 The negative effect of
natural selection on the development from a straightforward
sexual instinct (that presumably once existed in evolutionary
history) to the mechanism expressed in our theory is therefore
negligible.
The positive effect, on the other hand, may have been con
siderable. The fact that sexual reproduction is only one of the
many possible outcomes of the motivational mechanism of the
human mind - however important it is - has opened up al
most limitless objects of human motivation. These include the
sexual "perversions" as well as all of those activities and inter
ests that are sometimes united under the banner of sublima
tion. Most if not all of human culture may in this way result
from the absence of an exclusively sexual instinct, i.e. one that
is programmed to serve only the purpose of reproduction. Re
production does take place, but the very fact that the motiva
tional energy underlying sexuality is not completely consumed
by this aim has allowed humanity to create an ever more fa
vorable environment for its offspring. The survival value of the
transition from pure sexual instinct to the more flexible mech
anism described in our theory is therefore not in question. The
"The problem with all of these ... senses of the word is that they lack
explanatory power. Rather, they assume what they set out to explain,
that is, an autonomous developmental sequence. They are thus as empty
as Moliere's famous burlesque explanation of sleep as being caused by a
'dormative principle'."
23 5 The case we are studying must be strictly distinguished from the
wide-spread human tendency toward asceticism, including sexual re
straint.
1 74
question by what trajectory through the fitness landscape (a

trajectory of the type "climbing Mount Improbable") 23 6 a pre
sumably earlier sexual instinct could make place for the situa
tion described in our theory, must for the time being remain
unanswered.
We have seen that the theory presented here is open to experi
mental tests, at least in principle. The treasure announced at
the beginning of this study can therefore be evaluated. Let us
hope that this will be done soon and that this value will turn
out to be sufficient to justify the effort made. If it is, readers are
free to form their own judgment about the value of the map,
i.e., the working hypothesis from which we started. They may
be reminded that there is no logically compelling reason to
accept the working hypothesis even if it has led to a valuable
result. Indeed, there can be no logical objection to using it like
Wittgenstein's ladder, which can be discarded once one has
reached a higher level.
236 Dawkins, 1996.
175
ApPENDIX 1: THE MAIN TEXTS

WIT H A PSYCHOLOGICAL COMMENTARY
This Appendix presents the most important passages from

the early Buddhist texts that specify the positions which we
have attributed to them. 237 They are taken from the version of
the Buddhist canon that has been preserved in the language
called Pali. Other old versions have been preserved in Chinese
translation, and fragments in other languages. The differences
between these versions are interesting for the philologist but
without significance for our investigation. Use has been made
of existing translations, which have been slightly adjusted so as
to avoid the employment of Indian expressions where this is
not absolutely necessary and to assure consistenc y in the trans
lation of key terms.
l THE PATH OF LIBERATION AS A' WHOLE
The most general presentation of the Buddhist method is con

tained in a long passage that occurs on numerous occasions in
the early texts (perhaps twenty or thirty times in the discourses
preserved in Pali) . lt describes in most general terms the effect
which the teaching of a Buddha (here called Tathagata) can
have on an ideal follower. The passage reads as follows: 23 8
237 For details about the philological work which underlies my under
standing of the early canonical texts, the reader is advised to refer to the
first part of my Buddhist Teaching in India (2009).
23 8 The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha: A new translation of the
Majjhima Nikaya, original translation by Bhikkhu Nanamoli, transla
tion edited and revised by Bhikkhu Bodhi, Wisdom Publications, Bos-
176
Appendix 1: The Main Texts, with a Psychological Commentary
1 . Here a Buddha appears in the world, accomplished,

fully enlightened, perfect in true knowledge and con
duct, sublime, knower of worlds, incomparable leader
of persons to be tamed, teacher of gods and humans, en
lightened, blessed. He teaches this world with its gods, its
Maras, and its Brahmas, this generation with its recluses
and brahmins, its princes and its people, what he has
himself realised with direct knowledge. He propounds
the Dhamma239 good in the beginning, good in the mid
dle, and good in the end, with the right meaning and
phrasing, and he reveals a holy life that is utterly perfect
and pure.
2. A householder or householder's son or one born in
some other clan hears that Dhamma. On hearing the
Dhamma he acquires faith in the Buddha. Possessing that
faith, he considers thus: 'Household life is crowded and
dusty; life gone forth is wide open. It is not easy, while
living in a home, to lead the holy life utterly perfect and
pure as a polished shell. Suppose I shave off my hair and
beard, put on the yellow robe, and go forth from the
home life into homelessness: On a later occasion, aban
doning a small or a large fortune, abandoning a small or
a large circle of relatives, he shaves offhis hair and beard,
puts on the yellow robe, and goes forth from the home
life into homelessness.
3. Having thus gone forth and possessing the monk's
training and way of life, abandoning the killing of liv
ing beings, he abstains from killing living beings; with
rod and weapon laid aside, gentle and kindly, he abides
ton, 1 995, pp. 272 f This translates Majjh ima Nikaya I p. 1 79 f I have
added my own numbering in order to facilitate cross-reference.
23 9 Dhamma the teaching of the Buddha.
=
1 77
ABSORPTION, PART I I : THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE B UD D H A
compassionate to all living beings. Abandoning the tak

ing of what is not given, he abstains from taking what is
not given ; taking only what is given, expecting only what
is given, by not stealing he abides in purity. Abandoning
incelibacy, he observes celibacy, living apart, abstaining
from the vulgar practice of sexual intercourse.
4. Abandoning false speech, he abstains from false
speech; he speaks truth, adheres to truth, is trustworthy
and reliable, one who is no deceiver of the world. Aban
doning malicious speech, he abstains from malicious
speech; he does not repeat elsewhere what he has heard
here in order to divide [those people] from these, nor
does he repeat to these people what he has heard else
where in order to divide [these people] from those; thus
he is one who reunites those who are divided, a promoter
of friendships, who enjoys concord, rejo ices in concord,
delights in concord, a speaker ofwords that promote con
cord. Abandoning harsh speech, he abstains from harsh
speech; he speaks such words as are gentle, pleasing to
the ear, and loveable, as go to the heart, are courteous,
desired by many and agreeable to many. Abandoning gos
sip, he abstains from gossip; he speaks at the right time,
speaks what is fact, speaks on what is good, speaks on the
Dhamma and the Discipline; at the right'tme he speaks
such words as are worth recording, reasonable, moderate,
and beneficial.
[ ... J
5. He becomes content with robes to protect his body and
with almsfood to maintain his stomach, and wherever he
goes, he sets out taking only these with him. Just as a bird,
wherever it goes, flies with its wings as its only burden,
so too the monk becomes content with robes to protect
his body and with almsfood to maintain his stomach, and
1 78
Appendix 1 : The Main Texts, with a Psychological Commentary
wherever he goes, he sets out taking only these with him.

Possessing this aggregate of noble virtue, he experiences
within himself a bliss that is blameless.
6. On seeing a form with the eye, he does not grasp at
its signs and features. Since, if he lett the eye faculty un
guarded, evil unwholesome states of covetousness and
grief might invade him, he practises the way of its re
straint, he guards the eye faculty, he undertakes the re
straint of the eye faculty. 0 n hearing a sound with the ear
[ ... ] On smelling an odour with the nose [ ... ] On tasting a
flavour with the tongue [ ... ] On touching a tangible with
the body [ ... ] On cognizing a mental property with the
mind, he does not grasp at its signs and features. Since,
if he lett the mind faculty unguarded, evil unwholesome
states of covetousness and grief might invade him, he
practises the way of its restraint, he guards the mind fac
ulty, he undertakes the restraint of the mind faculty. Pos
sessing this noble restraint of the faculties, he experiences
within himself a bliss that is unsullied.
7. He becomes one who acts in full awarenessO when go
ing forward and returning; who acts in full awareness
when looking ahead and looking away; who acts in full
awareness when flexing and extending his limbs; who acts
in full awareness when wearing his robes and carrying his
outer robe and bowl; who acts in full awareness when eat
ing, drinking, consuming food, and tasting; who acts in
full awareness when defecating and urinating; who acts
in full awareness when walking, standing, sitting, falling
asleep, waking up, talking, and keeping silent.
8. Possessing this aggregate of noble virtue, and this no
ble restraint of the faculties, and possessing this noble
mindfulnesso and full awareness, he resorts to a secluded
1 79
resting place: the forest, the root of a tree, a mountain, a

ravine, a hillside cave, a charnel ground, a jungle thicket,
an open space, a heap of straw.
9. On returning from his almsround, after his meal he sits
down, folding his legs crosswise, setting his body erect,
and establishing mindfulnesso before him. Abandoning
covetousness for the world, he abides with a mind free
from covetousness; he purifies his mind from covetous
ness. Abandoning ill will and hatred, he abides with a
mind free from ill will , compassionate for the welfare of
all living beings; he purifies his mind from ill will and ha
tred. Abandoning sloth and torpor, he abides free from
sloth and torpor, percipient of light, mindful and fully
aware; he purifies his mind from sloth and torpor. Aban
doning restlessness and remorse, he abides unagitated
with a mind inwardly peaceful; he purifies his mind from
restlessness and remorse. Abandoning doubt, he abides
having gone beyond doubt, unperplexed about whole
some states; he purifies his mind from doubt.
1 0. Having thus abandoned these five hindrances, im
perfections of the mind that weaken wisdom, quite se
cluded from sensual pleasures, secluded from unwhole
some states, he enters upon and abides in the first stage
of-meditation, which is accompanied by applied and
sustained thought, with raptureo and pleasureo born of
seclusion. [ ... ]
1 1 . Again, with the stilling of applied and sustained
thought, a monk enters upon and abides in the second
stage-of-meditation, which has self-confidence and sin
gleness of mind without applied and sustained thought,
with raptureO and pleasureo born of absorption. [ ... ]
1 80
1 2. Again, with the fading away as well of raptureo, a

monk abides in equanimity, and mindful and fully aware,
still feeling pleasureo with the body, he enters upon and
abides in the third stage-of-meditation, on account of
which the noble ones announce : 'He has a pleasant abid
ing who has equanimity and is mindful.' [ ... ]
1 3. Again, with the abandoning of pleasureo and pain,
and with the previous disappearance of joy and grief, a
monk enters upon and abides in the fourth stage-of-med
itation, which has neither-pain-nor-pleasure and purity
of mindfulness due to equanimity. [ ... J
[ ... ]
14. When his concentrated mind is thus purified, bright,
unblemished, rid of imperfection, malleable, wieldy,
steady, and attained to imperturbability, he directs it to
knowledge of the destruction of the taints. He under
stands as it actually is: 'This is suffering'; [ ... J 'This is the
origin of suffering'; [ ... J 'This is the cessation of suffering';
[ ... ] 'This is the way leading to the cessation of suffering';
[ ... J 'These are the taints'; [ ... J 'This is the origin of the
taints'; [ ... J 'This is the cessation of the taints'; [ ... J 'This is
the way leading to the cessation of the taints'.
[ ... ]
1 5. When he knows and sees thus, his mind is liberated
from the taint of sensual desire, from the taint of being,
and from the taint of ignorance. When it is liberated
there comes the knowledge: 'it is liberated'. He under
stands: 'Birth is destroyed, the holy life has been lived,
what had to be done has been done, so that I will not re
turn here.'
181
This passage presents in brief all the d'l1lents that the aspir
ant must practice. Buddhist candidates for liberation, like the
ideal patient described in the main text, withdraw from all hu
man company. By abandoning home and property, they are no
longer involved in social life. By abstaining from killing living
beings, giving up the possession of arms and renouncing all
forms of human interaction including sexual intercourse, they
minimalize the opportunities for social emotions. Instead they
practice a form of passive compassion, presumably an emotion
that facilitates the lowering of bodily arousal. Also the attempt
to promote friendship and concord rather than their opposites
where intercourse with other human beings is unavoidable is
to serve the goal of calming body and mind.
These practices do not promote "Buddhist morality", and
therefore a vision of society. Rather their aim is to calm body
and mind. The level of (bodily) tension is in this way reduced
as far as possible, as a precondition for the psychological work
that is to come. Once that stage is achieved, the practice of
awarenessO and mindfulnesso in all circumstances follows. This
practice is more than simply preliminary: it accompanies all
following stages up to and including the transformation that
will reward the candidate's efforts. The psychological signifi
cance of awareness and mindfulness is that the candidate will
only carry out activities of which he is fully aware, As a result,
repressed urges (which often slip through in the middle of au
tomated activities) cannot find expression. As a result, they
will attract attention as feelings whenever they are excited.
Mental peace is crucial to the final stages of the path, the
so-called four stages-of-meditation. The first of these may
come about of its own when total seclusion from outer forms
of stimulation has been achieved. This is confirmed by another
passage, which we will consider below (3).
1 82
From the second stage onward, absorption comes to play a

central role. The "rapture and pleasure" of the second stage are
"born of absorption". Absorption is not mentioned in connec
tion with the third stage, but a "concentrated mind" reappears
in the fourth. We must assume that absorption characterizes
all these stages.
We have discussed the role that absorption plays in the
economy of the mind in the main text. Absorption withdraws
attention from the tasks to which it is habitually assigned,
among them resisting repressed urges. This opens up the way
to dealing with those urges.
Beside this global presentation of the path to liberation, there
are presentations of its elements. Some of these elements are
explicitly mentioned in the above global presentation, others
are new. We will look at a selection of them.
2 GUIDING ONE'S THOUGHTS
Among the preparatory practices, training one's mind to focus

on certain thoughts rather than others plays an important role.
Some autobiographical remarks attributed to the Buddha deal
with the issue: 24o
Monks, before my enlightenment, while I was still only an
unenlightened Buddha-to-beO, it occurred to me: "Sup
pose that I divide my thoughts into two classes." Then I
set on one side thoughts of sensual desire, thoughts of ill
will, and thoughts of cruelty, and I set on the other side
thoughts of renunciation, thoughts of non-ill will, and
thoughts of non-cruelty.
240 The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha (as above) , pp. 207 if.
This translates Majjhima Nikaya I p. 1 14 if.
1 83
As I abided thus, diligent, ardent, and resolute, a thought

of sensual desire arose in me. I understood thus: "This
thought of sensual desire has arisen in me. This leads to
my own affiiction, to others' affiiction, and to the affiic
tion of both; it obstructs wisdom, causes difficulties, and
leads away from Nibbana." When I considered: "This
leads to my own affiiction;' it subsided in me; when I
considered: "This leads to others' affiiction;' it subsided
in me ; when I considered: "This leads to the affiiction of
both;' it subsided in me; when I considered: "This ob
structs wisdom, causes difficulties, and leads away from
Nibbana;' it subsided in me. Whenever a thought of sen
sual desire arose in me, I abandoned it, removed it, did
away with it.
of ill will arose in me [ ... ] a thought of cruelty arose in me.
I understood thus: "This thought of cruelty has arisen in
me. This leads to my own affiiction, to others' affiiction,
and to the affiiction of both; it obstru ts wisdom, causes
difficulties, and leads away from Nibbana." When I con
sidered thus [ ... ] it subsided in me. Whenever a thought
of cruelty arose in me, I abandoned it, removed it, did
away with it.
Monks, whatever a monk frequently thinks and ponders
upon, that will become the inclination of his mind. Ifhe
frequently thinks and ponders upon thoughts of sensual
desire, he has abandoned the thought of renunciation to
cultivate the thought of sensual desire, and then his mind
inclines to thoughts of sensual desire. If he frequently
thinks and ponders upon thoughts of ill will [ . ] upon
thoughts of cruelty, he has abandoned the thought of
.
1 84
non-cruelty to cultivate the thought of cruelty, and then

his mind inclines to thoughts of cruelty.
[. .J
.

of renunciation arose in me. I understood thus: "This
thought of renunciation has arisen in me. This does not
lead to my own affiiction, or to others' affiiction, or to the
affiiction of both; it aids wisdom, does not cause difficul
ties, and leads to Nibbana. If I think and ponder upon
this thought even for a night, even for a day, even for a
night and day, I see nothing to fear from it. But with ex
cessive thinking and pondering I might tire my body, and
when the body is tired, the mind becomes disturbed, and
when the mind is disturbed, it is far from absorption." So
I steadied my mind internally, quieted it, brought it to
singleness, and concentrated it. Why is that ? So that my
mind should not be disturbed.
of non-ill will arose in me [ ... J a thought of non-cruelty
arose in me. I understood thus: "This thought of non
cruelty has arisen in me. This does not lead to my own
affiiction, or to others' affiiction, or to the affiiction of
both; it aids wisdom, does not cause difficulties, and leads
to Nibbana. If I think and ponder upon this thought
even for a night, even for a day, even for a night and day,
I see nothing to fear from it. But with excessive thinking
and pondering I might tire my body, and when the body
is tired, the mind becomes disturbed, and when the mind
is disturbed, it is far from absorption." So I steadied my
mind internally, quieted it, brought it to singleness, and
1 85
concentrated it. Why is that ? So that my mind should

not be disturbed.
Monks, whatever a monk frequently thinks and pon
ders upon, that will become the inclination of his mind.
If he frequently thinks and ponders upon thoughts of
renunciation, he has abandoned the thought of sensual
desire to cultivate the thought of renunciation, and then
his mind inclines to thoughts of renunciation. If he fre
quently thinks and ponders upon thoughts of non-ill will
[ ... J upon thoughts of non-cruelty, he has abandoned the
thought of cruelty to cultivate the thought of non-cruel
ty, and then his mind inclines to thoughts of non-cruelty.
It is easy to see that one class of thoughts - thoughts of sen
sual desire, thoughts of ill will, and thoughts of cruelty - is
likely to activate memory traces that excite urges. The other
class - thoughts of renunciation, thoughts of non-ill will, and
thoughts of non-cruelty - will excite no urges. The preference
for the second class of thoughts has less to do with morality
than with the aim which is crucial for someone who is to make
progress on the path, namely reducing the level of tension. The
justification of this preference from the point of view of psy
chological theory is that when memory traces are reactivated,
they become more strongly entrenched and in this way gain
prominence in the mind. 24 1
24 1 On a neuro-physiological level this may be an example of Hebb's

law, according to which "cells that fire together, wire together': thus
transforming short-term memories into long-term ones which are then
further consolidated; see Solms & Turnbull, 2002: 145 Interestingly,
Hebb's law was already proposed, long before Hebb, by Freud in his
Projectfor a Scientific Psychology (SE I pp. 28 1 -397), written in 1 895 but
not published until 1950; see Pribram & Gill, 1 976: 65.
1 86
3 AVO IDING HUNGER
There are urges that do not go away when they are not thought
about. One example is hunger. However much we train our
selves to avoid thinking about food, sooner or later hunger will
manifest itselE This is why a distinction must be made between
urges that announce themselves only when the corresponding
memory traces are activated, and others that can present them
selves independently. In its manifestation, hunger is as depend
ent upon "its" memory traces as any other urge. Nevertheless,
there is a difference: hunger does not have to wait for the acti
vation ofits memory traces. An independent urge can itself ac
tivate its memory traces ( the memories of earlier satisfaction ) .
Practitioners who wish to bring down the level of excita
tion of all of their urges may not easily succeed in removing
hunger through mental means. Since they aim at eliminating
disturbing factors, we may expect them to appease hunger and
thirst by eating and drinking. While this may seem self-evident
to a modern reader, it was far from self-evident in the asceti
cally inclined period in which Buddhism arose. This will be
clear from the passage to be presented below.
The description of the path of liberation examined above
does not deal with hunger and thirst. The reason may well be
that facing hunger and thirst was not among the virtues cul
tivated in the early Buddhist tradition. However, the issue is
dealt with in certain autobiographic remarks attributed to the
Buddha. According to the passages concerned, the Buddha
to-bee had unsuccessfully tried various methods to reach his
goal before he found the correct one. These unsuccessful meth
ods included abstinence from food as well as various painful
practices. His discovery of the correct method is indissociably
linked to his decision to partake of food again and to end his
painful practices. The following passage describes how this
1 87
supposedly happened. The speaker is, once again, the Buddha,

who has just recounted his failed attempts to use those alterna
tive methods: 242
I considered: "I recall that when my father the Sakyan
was occupied, while I was sitting in the cool shade of a
rose-apple tree, quite secluded from sensual pleasures,
secluded from unwholesome states, I entered upon and
abided in the first stage-of-meditation, which is accom
panied by applied and sustained thought, with raptureo
and pleasureo born of seclusion. Could that be the path to
enlightenment ?" Then, following on that memory, came
the realisation: "That is the path to enlightenment."
I thought: "Why am I afraid of that pleasureo that has
nothing to do with sensual pleasures and unwholesome
states ?" I thought: "I am not afraid of that pleasureo since
it has nothing to do with sensual pleasures and unwhole
some states."
I considered: "It is not easy to attain that pleasureo with
a body so excessively emaciated. Suppose I ate some solid
food - some boiled rice and bread." And I ate some solid
food - some boiled rice and bread. [ ... J
Now when I had eaten solid food and regained my
strength, then quite secluded from sensual pleasures,
secluded from unwholesome states, I entered upon and
abided in the first stage-of-meditation, which is accom
panied by applied and sustained thought, with raptureo
and pleasureo born of seclusion.
242 The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha (as above) , p. 340. 1his
translates Majjhima Nikaya I p . 246
1 88
This passage confirms the importance of "silencing" hunger.

Judging by this passage, hunger and physical discomfort were
the final obstacles in the way of the future Buddha; he had pre
sumably met all other preconditions.
There is another reason why this passage is important. It
presents the first stage-of-meditation as something that may
occur naturally, at least in certain people. The Buddha's child
hood memory, whatever its historical value, suggests that cer
tain people may attain this stage while totally relaxed and on
their own. Its precondition is seclusion. This is not surprising,
for our ideal patient, too, realized this when he withdrew from
the world and from his therapist.
4 AWARENES S
Section 7 of the description of the path to liberation deals with

awareness. Practitioners must practice it both during their or
dinary daily occupations and when undertaking the sitting
practice that leads to profound meditation. This section occurs
several times in the old canon. Here is a different passage deal
ing with awareness: 243
Again, monks, when walking, a monk understands: "I am
walking"; when standing, he understands: "I am stand
ing"; when sitting, he understands: "I am sitting"; when
lying down, he understands: "I am lying down"; or he un
derstands accordingly however his body is disposed.
243 The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha (as above), pp. 146. This
translates Majjhima Nikaya I p. 56-57.
1 89
ABSORPTION, PART I I : THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE BUDDHA
5 MIND F ULNESS
A particularly important element of the path of liberation is

the mindfulnesso practiced once the practitioner has taken up
a seated position with the intention of traversing the last stages
of the path. A detailed account is found in the following selec
tion of passages, taken from the discourse called "The Founda
tions ofMindfulness": 244
Monks, this is the direct path for the purification of be
ings, for the surmounting of sorrow and lamentation, for
the disappearance of pain and grief, for the attainment
of the true way, for the realisation of Nibbana - namely,
the four foundations of mindfulness.
What are the four ? Here, monks, a monk abides contem
plating the body as a body, ardent, fully aware, and mind
ful, having put away covetousness and grief for the world.
He abides contemplating feelings as feelings, ardent, fully
aware, and mindful, having put away covetousness and
grief for the world. He abides contemplating mind as
mind, ardent, fully aware, and mindful, having put away
covetousness and grief for the world. He abides contem
plating mind-objects as mind-objects, ardent, fully aware,
and mindful, having put away covetotlsness and grief for
the world.
And how, monks, does a monk abide contemplating
the body as a body ? Here a monk, gone to the forest
or to the root of a tree or to an empty hut, sits down;
having folded his legs crosswise, set his body erect, and
244 The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha ( as above ) , pp. 145 if.
This translates Majjhima Nikaya I p. 5 5 if. The selection of passages

from this rather long discourse has been guided by considerations ex
plained in Bronkhorst, 1985, p. 309 fr.
1 90
established mindfulness in front of him, ever mindful he

breathes in, mindful he breathes out. Breathing in long,
he understands: "1 breathe in long"; or breathing out
long, he understands: "1 breathe out long." Breathing in
short, he understands: "1 breathe in short"; or breathing
out short, he understands: "1 breathe out short." He trains
thus: "I shall breathe in experiencing the whole body"; he
trains thus: "1 shall breathe out experiencing the whole
body." [ ... J
[ ... J
And how, monks, does a monk abide contemplating feel
ings as feelings ? Here, when feeling a pleasant feeling, a
monk understands: "1 feel a pleasant feeling"; when feel
ing a painful feeling, he understands: "1 feel a painful feel
ing"; when feeling a neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling,
he understands: "1 feel a neither-painful-nor-pleasant
feeling." When feeling a worldly pleasant feeling, he un
derstands: "1 feel a worldly pleasant feeling"; when feel
ing an unworldly pleasant feeling, he understands: "1 feel
an unworldly pleasant feeling"; when feeling a worldly
painful feeling, he understands: "1 feel a worldly painful
feeling"; when feeling an unworldly painful feeling, he
understands: "1 feel an unworldly painful feeling"; when
feeling a worldly neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling, he
understands: "1 feel a worldly neither-painful-nor-pleas
ant feeling"; when feeling an unworldly neither-painful
nor-pleasant feeling, he understands: "1 feel an unworldly
neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling."
[ ... J
And how, monks, does a monk abide contemplating mind
as mind ? Here a monk understands mind affected by lust
as mind affected by lust, and mind unaffected by lust as
191
mind unaffected by lust. He understands mind affected

by hate as mind affected by hate, and mind unaffected by
hate as mind unaffected by hate. He understands mind
affected by delusion as mind affected by delusion, and
mind unaffected by delusion as mind unaffected by de
lusion. He understands contracted mind as contracted
mind, and distracted mind as distracted mind. He un
derstands exalted mind as exalted mind, and unexalted
mind as unexalted mind. He understands surpassed mind
as surpassed mind, and unsurpassed mind as unsurpassed
mind. He understands concentrated mind as concentrat
ed mind, and unconcentrated mind as unconcentrated
mind. He understands liberated mind as liberated mind,
and unliberated mind as unliberated mind.
[ ... J
And how, monks, does a monk abide contemplating
mind-objects as mind-objects ? Here a monk abides con
templating mind-objects as mind-objects in terms of the
five hindrances. And how does a mo abide contemplat
ing mind-objects as mind-objects in terms of the five hin
drances ? Here, there being sensual desire in him, a monk
understands: "There is sensual desire in me"; or there be
ing no sensual desire in him, he underst38ds: "There is no
sensual desire in me"; and he also understands how there
comes to be the arising of unarisen sensual desire, and
how there comes to be the abandoning of arisen sensual
desire, and how there comes to be the future non-arising
of abandoned sensual desires."
There being ill will in him [ .. J There being sloth and tor
por in him [ ... J There being restlessness and remorse in
him [ ... J There being doubt in him, a monk understands:
"There is doubt in me"; or there being no doubt in him,
.
1 92
Appendix 1 : The Main Texts} with a Psychological Commentary
he understands: "There is no doubt in me"; and he un

derstands how there comes to be the arising of unarisen
doubt, and how there comes to the abandoning of arisen
doubt, and how there comes to be the future non-arising
of abandoned doubt.
[ ... J
Our psychological investigation shows that mindfulness serves
a double purpose. First of all, it limits all activity to conscious
activity (in so far as this is possible). This prevents repressed
urges from finding expression during these sessions even if the
associated memory traces are activated. As a result these urges
will give rise to feelings; this is the second function of mindful
ness. Feelings and the state of body and mind in general are the
object of attention during this exercise. Mindfulness, accord
ing to this understanding, permits practitioners to locate their
repressed urges.
The role which mindfulness plays in attaining absorption is
explained in the following passage, which also emphasizes the
need of "investigating and examining with wisdom" the state
of mindfulness. This is essential if practitioners are to locate
their repressed urges. 24 5
Monks, on whatever occasion a monk abides contemplat
ing the body as a body, ardent, fully aware, and mindful,
having put away covetousness and grief for the world on that occasion unremitting mindfulness is established
. h 1m.
246 [ . .. ]
In
245 The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha (as above), pp. 946 ff.
This translates Majjhima Nikaya III p. 8S ff.
246 The same is repeated with regard to feelings, mind, and mind-object.
1 93
Abiding thus mindful, he investigates and examines that

state with wisdom and embarks upon a full inquiry into
it. [ ... ]
In one who investigates and examines that state with wis
dom and embarks upon a full inquiry into it, tireless en
ergy is aroused. [ ... ]
In one who has aroused energy, unworldly rapture arises.
[ .. J
.
In one who is rapturous, the body and the mind become

tranquil. [ ... ]
In one whose body is tranquil and who feels pleasureo, the
mind becomes concentrated. [ ... ]
He closely looks on with equanimity at the mind thus
concentrated. [ ... ]
6
FEAR OF BEING ALONE
One of the difficulties which a person who leaves human com

pany has to face is fear, especially at night. Overcoming such
fear has to be a priority if the remainder of the training is to
succeed. The following passage, which is autobiographical in
character, depicts the Buddha-to-beo confronting fear: 247
On one occasion the Blessed One was living at Savatthi
in Jeta's Grove, Anathapindika's Park. Then the brahmin
Janussoni went to the Blessed One and exchanged greet
ings with him. When this courteous and amiable talk
was finished, he sat down at one side and said: "Master
247 The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha (as above), pp. 102- 1 04.
This translates Majjhima Nikaya I p. 16 ff.
1 94
Gotama, when clansmen have gone forth from the home

life into homelessness out of faith in Master Gotama, do
they have Master Gotama for their leader, their helper,
and their guide ? And do these people follow the example
of Master Gotama?"
"That is so, brahmin, that is so. When clansmen have
gone forth from the home life into homelessness out of
faith in me, they have me for their leader, their helper,
and their guide. And these people follow my example:'
"But, Master Gotama, remote jungle-thicket resting
places in the forest are hard to endure, seclusion is hard
to practise, and it is hard to enjoy solitude. One would
think the jungles must rob a monk of his mind, if he has
no concentration."
"That is so, brahmin, that is so. Remote jungle-thicket
resting places in the forest are hard to endure, seclusion
is hard to practise, and it is hard to enjoy solitude. One
would think the jungles must rob a monk of his mind,
if he has no concentration. Before my enlightenment,
while I was still only an unenlightened Buddha-to-beO,
I too considered thus: 'Remote jungle-thicket resting
places in the forest are hard to endure, seclusion is hard
to practise, and it is hard to enjoy solitude. One would
think the jungles must rob a monk of his mind, if he has
no concentration:
[ ]
...
"I considered thus: 'There are the specially auspicious

nights of the fourteenth, the fifteenth, 24 8 and the eighth
248
Fourteenth or fifteenth night
new moon night.
195
ABSORPTION, PART I I : THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE B U D D H A
of the fortnight. 249 Now what if, on such nights as these,

I were to dwell in such awe-inspiring, horrifying abodes
as orchard shrines, woodland shrines, and tree shrines ?
Perhaps I might encounter that fear and dread.' And
later on, such specially auspicious nights as the four
teenth, the fifteenth, and the eighth of the fortnight, I
dwelt in such awe-inspiring, horrifying abodes as orchard
shrines, woodland shrines, and tree shrines. And while
I dwelt there, a wild animal would come up to me, or a
peacock would knock off a branch, or the wind would
rustle the leaves. I thought: 'What now if this is the fear
and dread coming ?' I thought: 'Why do I dwell always
expecting fear and dread ? What if I subdue that fear and
dread while keeping the same posture that I am in when
it comes upon me ?' While I walked, the fear and dread
came upon me ; I neither stood nor sat nor lay down till I
had subdued that fear and dread. While I stood, the fear
and dread came upon me; I neither walked nor sat nor lay
down till I had subdued that fear and dread. While I sat,
the fear and dread came upon me; I neither walked nor
stood nor lay down till I had subdued that fear and dread.
While I lay down, the fear and dread came upon me; I
neither walked nor stood nor sat down till I had subdued
that fear and dread."
This passage deals with an authentic practical problem that
solitary practitioners had to deal with. Although it is not very
specific in explaining how they should deal with it, it is dear
that they were not to avoid situations in which fear and dread
might arise. If fear and dread did arise, the practitioner was not
to cede to panic. In such situations, the practitioners should
remain concentrated. The passage is especially instructive in
249 Eighth night half-moon night.
=
1 96
Appendix
1;
The Main Texts, with a Psychological Commentary
that it shows concern for certain practical difficulties that had

not been mentioned in the description of the path as a whole.
Since our outline of a psychological theory does not deal with
fear, we can draw no conclusions about this emotion in par
ticular. 25 0 What this passage does show is how practitioners are
advised to deal with strong emotions in general. Rather than
being affected by them, the practitioner observes them while
they come and go. Once again, concentration is a key element
in preventing that one be "robbed of one's mind".
This passage also illustrates how the practitioner, by not
avoiding objectively dangerous situations, abandons all forms
of "anticipating the future". Anticipating the futute is respon
sible for the raised level of bodily tension that stands in the
way of a "complete psychotherapeutic cure". Ideal practition
ers, we learn from this passage, do away with it in all situations,
including those that are potentially threatening to their well
being and survival.
7 WHO SUCCEED S ?
A discussion between the Buddha and a brahmin called Ga

naka Moggallana begins by presenting the instructions that
the Buddha gives to his disciples in similar terms to those
250 It is however tempting to recall that certain neuro-scientists recog
nize a fear system in the brain, beside the seeking system mentioned
earlier. And just as Buddhist meditational practice may make use of the
fact that the seeking system can be dissociated from its objects, i.e., from
what it is seeking, is it conceivable that the Buddhist practice here de
scribed uses the fact that "the representational (or 'object') aspect of the
[fearJ system is left largely a blank, to be filled in by early experience"
(Solms and Turnbull, 2002: 1 34; cpo Panksepp, 1998: 2 1 3 f., LeDoux,
1996: 1 6 1 f.)?
197
used for the path to liberation examined in 1, above. It then

continues: 2 5 1
When this was said, the brahmin Ganaka Moggallana
asked the Blessed One: "When Master Gotama's disci
ples are thus advised and instructed by him, do they all
attain Nibbana, the ultimate goal, or do some not attain
It. ."
"When, brahmin, they are thus advised and instructed
by me, some of my disciples attain Nibbana, the ultimate
goal, and some do not attain it:'
"Master Gotama, since Nibbana exists and the path lead
ing to Nibbana exists and Master Gotama is present as
the guide, what is the cause and reason why, when Mas
ter Gotama's disciples are thus advised and instructed by
him, some of them attain Nibbana, the ultimate goal, and
some do not attain it ?"
"As to that, brahmin, I will ask you a question in return.
Answer it as you choose. What do'you think, brahmin?
Are you familiar with the road leading to [the city] Ra
jagaha ?"
"Yes, Master Gotama, I am familiar with
the road leading
(
to Rajagaha."
"What do you think, brahmin? Suppose a man came who
wanted to go to Raj agaha, and he approached you and
said: 'Venerable sir, I want to go to Rajagaha. Show me
the road to Rajagaha: Then you told him: 'Now, good
man, this road goes to Rajagaha. Follow it for a while and
2 5 1 The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha (as above), pp. 877 ff.
This translates Majjhima Nikaya III p. 4 ff.
1 98
you will see a certain village, go a little furmer and you

will see a certain town, go a little further and you will
see Rajagaha with its lovely parks, groves, meadows, and
ponds.' Then, having been thus advised and instructed
by you, he would take a wrong road and would go to the
west. Then a second man came who wanted to go to Ra
jagaha, and he approached you and said: 'Venerable sir, I
want to go to Rajagaha.' Then you told him : 'Now, good
man, this road goes to Rajagaha. Follow it for a while [ ... ]
and you will see Rajagaha with its lovely parks, groves,
meadows, and ponds.' Then, having been thus advised
and instructed by you, he would arrive safely in Rajagaha.
Now, brahmin, since Rajagaha exists and the path lead
ing to Rajagaha exists and you are present as the guide,
what is the cause and reason why, when those men have
been thus advised and instructed by you, one man takes
a wrong road and goes to the west and one arrives safely
in Rajagaha ?"
"What can I do about that, Master Gotama ? I am one
who shows the way."
"So too, brahmin, Nibbana exists and the path leading to
Nibbana exists and I am present as the guide. Yet when
my disciples have been thus advised and instructed by
me, some of them attain Nibbana, the ultimate goal, and
some do not attain it. What can I do about that, brah
min ? The Buddha is one who shows the way."
It is dear from this passage that not all of the disciples of the
Buddha reached the highest goal, the "complete psychother
apeutic cure". It appears ramer that the Buddhist tradition
looked upon people who had reached the goal as being excep
tional. They were held to be so special, in fact, that the names
1 99
ABSORPTION, PART II: T H E PSYC HOLO GY OF THE BUD D H A
of the first disciples who succeeded in reaching the goal, and

that of the last to do so after receiving instruction from the
Buddha have been recorded. 25 2 Those who had not succeeded
are said to have included Ananda, the Buddha's favorite per
sonal attendant. A legend makes up for this embarrassing situ
ation by claiming that Ananda, very conveniently, did reach
the goal - just in time to participate in some important com
munal activities. 2S3 We can conclude from this that the tradi
tion was far from certain about the number of people who had
reached the goal and had the tendency to assign this attribute
to highly respected members of the community.
8
THE LIBERATED PERS ON
We pointed our in the main text that the Buddha was purport
edly free from psychological suffering but not free from physi
cal suffering. This observation is based on the assumption that
the distinction between these two kinds of suffering is clear
and free from ambiguity - an assumption that is far from ob
vious. It will be interesting to consider some passages that may
elucidate the relationship between the two. We first consider
the words in which the Buddha is believed to have announced
his approaching end to his favorite disciple, Ananda: 2 5 4
Ananda, I am now old, worn out, venerable, one who has
traversed life's path, I have reached the term oflife, which
is eighty. Just as an old cart is made to go by being held to
gether with straps, so the Buddha's body is kept going by
25 2 See Bareau, 1 963: 190 ff.; 1970-7 1 : II: 1 1 4 ff.
25 3 EncBuddh S.Y. Ananda (6) , Fasc. 1, 4 p. 532.
254 The Long Discourses of the Buddha: A translation of the Digha Ni
kaya, translated from the Pali by Maurice Walshe, Wisdom Publica
tions, Boston, 1987, p . 245. This translates Digha Nikaya II p . 1 00.
200
being strapped up. It is only when the Buddha withdraws

his attention from outward signs, and by the cessation of
certain feelings, enters into the signless-absorption-of
mindo, that his body knows comfort.
This passage presents the remedy against bodily pain which
our theory has led us to expect. Withdrawal of attention from
all sensory input, including pain, through objectless ( "sign
less") absorption of the mind is exactly what our theory would
have predicted as an appropriate method to avoid physical suf
fering. 2 ss To be sure, this method does not cure the body: the
Buddha is reported to have pronounced these words a short
time before his demise.
In numerous passages the Buddha is depicted as spending his
afternoons in seclusion. Some of these show that he spent this
time in absorption. One example is the visitor who wishes to
speak to him but is told by the attendant, who is a woman,
that the Buddha has withdrawn in seclusion. The visitor re
sponds: "Well, then, lady, when the Blessed Lord rises from
his absorption, please tell him what I have said." 2S6 Another
passage speaks of absorption as the state in which the Bud
dha constantly abides; it then continues by admitting that he
sometimes sleeps during the day. 2S7
2SS Not surprisingly, the absorption responsible for aesthetic enjoyment

affects pain thresholds; de Tommaso et aI., 2008.
25 6 The Long Discourses of the Buddha (as above), p. 324 (modified) .

This translates Digha Nikaya II p. 27 1 .
25 7 The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha (as above), p . 342. This
translates Majjhima Nikaya I p. 249.
20 1
ApPENDIX 2: AB S O RPTION AND PLEASURE IN MYS TICISM

AND MEDITATION
Expressions such as joy, rapture or ecstasy are frequent in de

scriptions of mystical and meditative experiences. So are words
like absorption, concentration and attention. This shows that ex
periences corresponding to the former set of words often ac
company states corresponding to the latter. The two sets are
not, however, always presented as being inherently connected.
This was to be expected, for we have seen that the mind associ
ates experiences primarily with objects and events. This is how
they are remembered, but this is also the way in which they are
experienced. It is not surprising, therefore, that states of deep
absorption, which are experienced as being different from "or
dinary" states of consciousness, are frequently said to give ac
cess to a different, higher reality. 25 8 The joy, rapture or ecstasy
that accompany them are variously interpreted, very often as
characteristics of the "real" self that perceives the "higher" re
ality. There is also a tendency to attribute less significance to
joy, rapture and ecstasy than to the knowledge that mystical
states presumably provide. This is illustrated by the following
citations.
In his The Varieties of Religious Experience ( 1 902) , William
James discusses "the deliciousness of some of [the] states [of
the 1 6th century mystic Saint Teresa, which] is spoken of as
too extreme to be borne, and as verging on bodily pain." James
adds the following commentary ( 1 902: 398) : "To the medical
mind these ecstasies signify nothing but suggested and imi
tated hypnoid states, on an intellectual basis of superstition,
and a corporeal one of degeneration and hysteria. Undoubt
edly these pathological conditions have existed in many and
possibly all the cases, but that fact tells us nothing about the
2 5 8 For more on this, see the first study in this book, Part I above.
202
Appendix 2: Absorption and Pleasure in Mysticism and Meditation
value for knowledge of the consciousness which they induce."

A full century later, John Horgan (2003: 7) still attributes cru
cial importance to knowledge : "Certain mystics describe their
experience as a form of ecstatic forgetfulness or self-dissolution
rather than of knowing. To my mind, however, a sense of abso
lute knowledge is the sine qua non of mystical experiences; this
noetic component transforms them into something more than
transient sensations."
In spite of the disinclination on the part of modern inves
tigators to attribute significance to the pleasure felt in mystical
and meditative states, reports about them abound. Careful re
searchers have taken note of this. The following examples must
suffice to illustrate this.
Abraham H. Maslow is famous for the "peak-experiences"
which he studied primarily in living subjects. He holds that
these peak-experiences are "the very beginning, the intrinsic
core, the essence, the universal nucleus of every known high
religion" (Maslow, 1 964: 1 9) ; there is no need to discuss this
claim here. Maslow provides a list of attributes of reality as per
ceived in peak-experiences (which may also be seen, he adds, as
a list of the irreducible, intrinsic values of this reality). This list
contains 14 items (truth, goodness, beauty, wholeness, etc.).
According to Maslow, it should be distinguished from another
list which enumerates the attitudes or emotions of the "peak
er" toward this cognized reality and its attributes. This second
list contains, among others, joy, rapture, bliss, and ecstasy. 2 59
Indeed, "the peak-experience is only good and desirable" (Ma
slow, 1 968 : 8 1 ) . Concentration comes up, too (Maslow, 1 964:
60) : "In the cognition that comes in peak-experiences, charac
teristically the percept is exclusively and fully attended to. That
is, there is tremendous concentration of a kind which does not
normally occur." This confirms both that a state of deep con25 9 Maslow, 1964: 9 1 -94.
203
centration accompanies these experiences and that these ex

periences tend to be directed at objects and events. Elsewhere
Maslow calls this state "total attention': and adds that it is "very
much akin to fascination or complete absorption" (Maslow,
1 968: 74). Elsewhere again he distinguishes two kinds ofpeak
experiences, in the second of which "fascination occurs, and in
which there is an extreme narrowing of consciousness down to
the particular percept [ ... ] and in which the rest of the world is
totally forgotten [ ... ] This is when there is so much absorption
and fascination with the percept, and everything else in the
world is so much forgotten that there is a felt transcenden[c] e
[ ... ] " (Maslow, 1 97 1 : 243). Maslow does not say that the excep
tional state of concentration is responsible for the experiences
and that it causes the joy that is experienced, but he provides all
the elements that allow us to consider this possibility.
Like Maslow, Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi has studied optimal
experience in ordinary life. "The optimal state of inner experi
ence:' he states (2002: 6), "happens when psychic energy - or
attention - is invested in realistic goals [ ... ] The pursuit of a
goal brings order in awareness because a person must concen
trate attention on the task at hand and momentarily forget
everything else:' He calls this flow experience. Flow experience
gives rise to enjoyment, because one is . a ble to concentrate on
what one is doing, and one acts with a deep Ipn: effortless in
volvement that removes from awareness the worries and frus
trations of everyday life (p. 49). Indeed, "one of the most fre
quently mentioned dimensions of the flow experience is that,
while it lasts, one is able to forget all the unpleasant aspects of
life. This feature of flow is an important by-product of the fact
that enjoyable activities require a complete focusing of atten
tion on the task at hand - thus leaving no-room in the mind
for irrelevant information." (p. 58) In optimal experience "con
centration is so intense that there is no attention left over to
204
think about anything irrelevant, or to worry about problems"

(p. 7 1 ) . 260
The title ofB. Alan Wallace's recent book The Attention
Revolution: Unlocking the power of the focused mind (2006)
leaves no doubt as to the importance of attention in the (Bud
dhist) meditative states he cultivates, teaches and studies. Just
before achieving the state called shamatha, Wallace tells us (p.
1 56) , there is "an extraordinary sense of physical bliss, which
then triggers an equally exceptional experience of mental bliss.
This rush of physical and mental rapture is transient, which
is a good thing, for it so captivates the attention that you can
do little else except enjoy it. Gradually it subsides and you are
freed from the turbulence caused by this intense joy. Your at
tention settles down in perfect stability and vividness." Else
where in the same book (p. 8 1 ) Wallace informs us that "the
'natural state' of the mind, according to Buddhist contempla
tives, is characterized by the three qualities of bliss, luminos
ity, and nonconceptuality." 26 1 Wallace believes this to be one
of the most remarkable discoveries ever made concerning the
nature of consciousness, but other interpretations are possible.
A possible causal link between attention (concentration, ab
sorption) and bliss (rapture, joy) receives no attention in Wal
lace's book, but it might provide an equally good if not better
explanation.
Evelyn Underhill's Mysticism ( 1 9 1 1 ) is a classic in the study
of "European mysticism from the beginning of the Christian
era to the death ofBlake" (its subtitle). In a chapter on "Ecstasy
and rapture" we read (p. 358): "Nearly all the great contempla-
260 Cpo Seligman. 2003: I l l : "It is the total absorption. the suspen
sion of consciousness, and the flow that the gratifications produce that
defin es liking these activities [ ... J Total immersion. in fact, blocks con
sciousness, and emotions are completely absent."
26 1 Similarly Wallace, 20 1 2: 68-69.
205
ABSORPTION, PART II: THE PSYCHOLO GY OF THE B U D D H A
tives [ ... ] describe as a distinct, and regard as a more advanced

phase of the spiritual consciousness, the group of definitely
ecstatic states in which the concentration of interest on the
Transcendent is so complete, the gathering up and pouring out
of life on this one point so intense, that the subject is more
or less entranced, and becomes, for the time of the ecstasy,
unconscious of the external world." Underhill is clearly of the
opinion that concentration and ecstasy go together. However,
true to the usual prejudice in most studies of mysticism and
related phenomena, she does not consider the one (concentra
tion) to be the cause of the other (ecstasy). The perception of
reality that accompanies such states is far more important, in
her opinion (p. 359) : "The induced ecstasies of the Dionysian
mysteries, the metaphysical raptures of the Neoplatonists, the
voluntary or involuntary trance of Indian mystics and Chris
tian saints - all these, however widely they may differ in
transcendental value, agree in claiming such value, in declar
ing that this change in the quality of consciousness brought
with it a valid and ineffable apprehension of the Real." She
does not perceive the importance of ecstasy: "The ecstasy is
merely the psycho-physical condition which accompanies it."
We have already seen that the emphasis on the object or event
experienced ("the Real" in this case) at the expense of the state
in which this experience takes place (absorption) is a predis
position of the human mind. In the present investigation the
emphasis lies elsewhere, namely, on the link between states of
deep concentration and joy. Underhill's studies confirm that
there is such a link.
Marghanita Laski's book Ecstasy ( 1 96 1 ) draws attention to
withdrawal ecstasies that frequently precede intensity ecstasies
(chapter IV). In her concluding chapter she describes the re
lationship between these two (p. 369): "Ecstatic experiences
may be divided into two kinds according to the manner in
206
which they are approached. One manner, which I have called

withdrawal and which involves a more or less gradual loss of
normal perceptions, I have noted only in passing. Withdrawal
experiences [ ... J may sometimes turn into the other kind of
experience which I have called intensity experience; indeed I
think it probable that all intensity experiences begin by being,
to no matter how slight a degree, withdrawal ones." Both bring
delight. Although Laski herself does not connect intensity ex
periences with the kind of concentration we call absorption,
her material is compatible with it. 262 Furthermore, her two
kinds of ecstasy - withdrawal ecstasy and intensity ecstasy
- naturally assimilate to the two kinds of pleasure we have
distinguished in the main text: pleasure resulting from the re
duction of tension brought about by the removal of its sources
(the Buddhist "rapture and pleasure born of seclusion") and
pleasure resulting from absorption ("rapture and pleasure born
of absorption").
Only the second of these two is referred to by Felicitas D.
Goodman ( 1 988a: 1 1 ) where she speaks about possession: "In
order for the switch from the ordinary perceptual state to the
ecstatic one to take place, people first of all have to prepare
physically. . . . But mainly, people need to concentrate. Trained
practitioners do that as a matter of course; others have to learn
it."
26 2 In the literary texts that are part of the material on which her study
is based, for example, we find statements like "I was absorbed; [ ... ] I was
exalted" (p. 402; from Richard Jefferies's The Story of My Heart); "It is
the strangest sensation for the mind to fix itself in the contemplation
of one single natural thing [ ... ] Fixed on one, all things become super
naturally distinct and detailed." (p. 402; from Margiad Evans' Autobiog
raphy); "my sharpened but converging senses" (p. 414; from Jacquetta
Hawkes' Man on Earth); "I was totally absorbed in prayer. [ ... ] the j oyful
ground shone with purple light." (p. 417; from Ovid).
207
ApPENDIX 3 : PSYCHOLOGY AND FREE WILL
For the investigation carried out in Part II we needed a psy

chological theory in which experiential terms had a place. This
was the only way to make sense of the claims which we had
accepted as working hypothesis. This appendix will argue that
the use of such a psychological theory brings an unexpected
advantage : while working within the framework of such a
theory we do not need to worry about questions relating to
determinism and free will.
The Oxford Handbook of Free Will observes that the prob
lem of free will and necessity ( or determinism) is "perhaps the
most voluminously debated of all philosophical problems." 263
This should not surprise us. This abstruse philosophical prob
lem is directly related to a conviction that most of us share, and
that was well formulated by William James: "the whole feeling
of reality, the whole sting and excitement of our voluntary life,
depends on our sense that in it things are really being decided
from one moment to another, and that it is not the dull rat
tling off of a chain that was forged innumerable ages ago:' 264
And yet, one of the tasks which science sets out to address is
precisely finding the rules governing "the rattling off of a chain
forged innumerable ages ago". Abandoning the idea that there
are such rules comes close to abandoning qe hope of studying
human beings scientifically.
This is not the place to review the different ways in which
scholars, scientists and philosophers try to solve the problem. 265
263
Kane, 2002: 3, citing Matson, 1 987: I: 1 5 8. Dennett ( 1 984: 2),

commenting on this claim, states: "Any philosopher ought to feel at
least a little embarrassed that with so much work so little progress has
been made."
264
James, 1 890: I: 453.
265
The Oxford Handbook ofFree Will (Kane, 2002), already mentioned,
208
Appendix 3: Psychology and Free Will
James himself was inclined to a spiritual solution. Others have

tried to capitalize on the presumed discovery that nature itself
in its fundamental functioning does not seem to be governed
deterministically. 266 Others again have argued that the almost
infinite complexity of processes in the human brain offer us
something as good as free will, even if it is not quite the real
thing. 267
Many psychologists do not waste time on this question.
They may be willing to grant that we have the feeling of free
will, and may try to explain why. They are not willing to assign
a causal role to this feeling in the mechanism that governs our
behavior. They present a variety of arguments and experimen
tal finding to prove The Illusion of Conscious Will.
This, incidentally, is the title of a book by the psycholo
gist Daniel M. Wegner (2002). It will be useful to consider
the position he puts forward. Conscious will, he points out
(p. 67), "is not a direct perception of [the] relation [between
thought and action] but rather a feeling based on the causal in
ference one makes about the data that do become available to
provides a useful presentation of the main positions. See also Fischer et
al., 2007.
266 This remains far from certain. Almost a century after its creation,
the indeterministic nature of quantum physics is regularly challenged.
See the review articles in New Scientist of 22 March 2008, 28 March
2009 and 2 August 20 1 2, and the cover story of 30 April 20 1 1 ("End
of uncertainty: Goodbye Heisenberg. Hello quantum certainty ?"). An
other difficulty with this approach is how undetermined, i.e. random,
processes can be supposed to account for free will.
267 See, e.g., Dennett, 2003: 225 : "I claim that the varieties of free will
1 am defending are worth wanting precisely because they play all the
valuable roles free will has been traditionally invoked to play. But 1 can
not deny that the tradition also assigns properties to free will that my
varieties lack. So much the worse for tradition, say I." The Varieties of
Free Will Worth Wanting is the subtitle of an earlier book by Dennett
( 1 984) .
209
ABSORPTION, PART II: THE PSYCHOL O GY OF THE BUD D H A
consciousness - the thought and the observed act." "The ex

perience of will . . . is the way our minds portray their operations
to us, not their actual operation. Because we have thoughts of
what we will do, we can develop causal theories relating those
thoughts to our actions on the basis of priority, consistency,
and exclusivity. We come to think of these prior thoughts as
intentions, and we develop the sense that the intentions have
causal force even though they are actually just previews of what
we may do:' (p. 96). It follows, Wegner thinks, that conscious
will is an epiphenomenon: "Just as compass readings do not
steer the boat, conscious experiences of will do not cause hu
man actions" (p. 3 1 8).
James's conviction that things are really being decided by us
from one moment to another will find little comfort in Weg
ner's position. He thought that this conviction is incompat
ible with the other one according to which reality is "the dull
rattling off of a chain that was forged innumerable ages ago."
Wegner, too, thinks that these two are incompatible. In real
ity they are not. For Wegner, the real action takes place in the
brain, or in the unconscious mind. There i there no place for
conscious will. Seen this way, this is a mere epiphenomenon
with no causal role to play. However, Wegner's conclusion is
the outcome of his prior decision as to what psychology is
all about. The decision that the real action is confined to the
brain, or to processes that remain belo the surface, cannot
but exclude conscious activities from the causal chain. It fol
lows from such an apriori decision that all the decisions we
take, including difficult ones which require much thought (as
opposed to the lifting of a finger which figures so prominently
in Wegner's experiments), are no real decisions at all .
Wegner's position has to face some serious difficulties. If, as
he claims, conscious will is an illusion, an epiphenomenon that
plays no role in determining our behavior, then the elements
2lO
Appendix 3: Psychology and Free Will
that go into the making of conscious will, ultimately pleasure

and pain, play no such role either. This raises the question why
evolution has provided us with those experiences to begin
with. The obvious answer - viz. that pursuing pleasure and
avoiding pain bring evolutionary rewards - is impossible to
maintain if those experiences cannot even in principle influ
ence behavior. 268
If, unlike Wegner and so many others, we opt for a psychol
ogy which includes experiential elements, James's incompat
ibility disappears. In that case, our decisions can have a causal
effect, for the simple reason that our decisions are part of the
causal chains which our psychology seeks to uncover. This
choice does not introduce indeterminism, to be sure. The caus
al chains of this new psychology are as deterministic as any.
"Free" choices are determined by prior events, whatever their
precise nature. Yet the main demand of those who insist on the
acceptance of free will, their conviction that their decisions are
"real" and have causal efficacy, is now fulfilled. As some recent
researchers have correcdy pointed out: "determinism does not
imply that our deliberations and conscious purposes are caus
ally irrelevant to what we do". 269 The difficult and painful deci
sions we sometimes have to make are not just the feelings that
accompany processes which are beyond our ken and control.
268 Compare the opening sentence of Jeremy Bentham's Introduction
to the Principles of Morals and Legislation: "Nature has placed mankind

under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is
for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to deter
mine what we shall do." (cited Kahneman, 20 1 1 : 377) Note further that
pleasure and pain are "multiply realizable" : "They can ... be embodied
in highly diverse kinds of physical-chemical processes and substrates."
(Deacon, 20 1 2: 29)
269 Nahmias, Coates & Kvaran, 2007: 220.
211
On the contrary, these decisions are the way in which a funda

mentally deterministic process unfolds. 2 70
Introducing experiential notions into psychology as func
tional elements (rather than as accompanying epiphenomena)
means abandoning (at least for the time being) the attempt
to explain human behavior in terms of ultimately physical and
chemical processes. This is a step other sciences have taken
before, so it should not count as an obstacle. 27 1 Evolutionary
biology, to take an example, does not and cannot provide the
insights we expect from it if it refuses to think of phenotypes
as opposed to genotypes. 27 2 A full account of the molecular
processes in organisms is unlikely to clarify why certain species
270 Similar remarks could be made about intellectual effort. To cite
Mary Midgley: "When Einstein has just solved a difficult problem, his
reasoning cannot be explained by giving even the most accurate account
of the actions of his neurons. To suggest that their actions were its real
cause would mean that they did the work on their own and told him
about it afterwards. Anyone who has tried leaving such work to their
neurons will agree that this story is improbable." (letter to New Scientist,
3 January 2009)
27 1 An extensive literature has developed around the question of differ
ent levels of explanation, and the related issue of reductionism ; see e.g.
McCauley, 2007; Looren de Jong, 2002; Hofstadter, 2007: 37 ff. An
important concept here is "emergence" - the notion that important
kinds of organization may emerge in systems qf many interacting parts,
but not follow in any way from the propertie of those parts. See the
various contributions in Clayton & Davies, 2006. For a sophisticated
attempt to explain mind from matter, see Deacon, 20 1 2.
272 "Because the genotype is _asymmetrically dependent on the pheno
type with respect to natural selection . . . it is the phenotype that offers
the best causal explanation of reproductive success . . . . The phenotypic
level has a causal efficacy and explanatory legitimacy of its own, even if
the phenotype is determined by the genotype (among other things).
Identifying phenotypic traits is not a merely heuristic, free-for-all,- es
sentially void kind of explanation, but rather, it taps real causal factors
in an organism's chances of survival." (Schouten & Looren de Jong,
2004: 3 1 2)
212
Appendix 3; Psychology and Free Will
survive and others don't. The biologist has to think simultane

ously on different levels if progress is to be made.
A different yet comparable situation may prevail in the study
of human psychology. If we wish to make headway, we have to
find place for conscious experiences, not as by-products, but as
functional elements of the theory to be constructed. 273 This is
not quite as radical as it may seem at first sight. Goal-directed
activity, requiring cognitive maps and goal-seeking, is known
from living organisms of all levels of complexity. 274
This is not the occasion to enter into the details of this fun
damental discussion. It should however be clear that much is
gained by including experiential notions as functional terms
into psychology. This is indeed the position here taken. One
of its immediate rewards, as we have seen, is that the so-called
problem of Free Will loses its fangs. More precisely put, once
the causal role that conscious will can play is acknowledged,
the so-called problem of free will is no more than an abstruse
philosophical problem that, even if it could be given a precise
273 Philosophers will be inclined to invoke the help of emergence; see
note 27 1, above. "Materialist theories of mind ... seek to do justice to

two compelling but apparently incompatible scruples. One is that ours
is a physical world, everything happening within it open to physical
explanation. The other is that mindedness is a matter of causal signifi
cance, that it makes a causal difference that there are minds. The more
we feel the pull of one of these scruples, the more mysterious becomes
the other. A robust commitment to physicalism leaves the mind looking
like an epiphenomenal by-product of natural processes, a causally in
ert shadow. But a view of the mind as possessing aetiological autonomy
threatens to re-enchant the physical world with supernatural causes and
effects. The attraction of emergentism is that it offers a way to escape the
dilemma. An emergentist tries to prise free the soundly motivated scru
ples about the dependence and autonomy of the mental from too-rigid
theory, to see the problems as symptoms of the fact that an insight has
been poorly ened in doctrine." (Ganeri, 20 1 1 : 696-697) .
274 See note 1 20, above.
213
ABSORPTI ON, P ART I I : THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE BUD D H A
formulation (which I doubt) , will no longer deserve the atten

tion it receives from specialists and non-specialists alike.
2 14
TECHNICAL TERMS AND THEIR SANSKRIT AND PALl

EQ.!!I VALENTS
English translation
Sanskrit
Pali
awareness
sarpprajanya
sampajafifia
Buddha-to-be
bodhisattva
bodhisatta
absorption
samadhi
samadhi
mindfulness
smrti
sati
pleasure
sukha
sukha
rapture
priti
piti
signless-absorption-of-mind
animitta
cetahsam idhi
animitta cetosamadhi
stage-ofmeoitation
dhyana
jhana
thirst
trQa
taQha
ABBREVIATIONS
EncBuddh
SE
Encyclopaedia of Buddhism, ed. G. P. Malalasekera, vol.

1 fE, Colombo 1961 fE
The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological
Works of Sigmund Freud, translated from the German
under the general editorship ofJames Strachey, 24
volumes, London : The Hogarth Press
216
BIBLI OGRAPHY
Abraham, Carolyn (200 1 ) : Possessing Genius. The Bizarre Odyssey of

Einstein's Brain. Cambridge: Icon Books. 2005.
Addis, Donna Rose; Wong, Alana T. & Schacter, Daniel L. (2007) :
"Remembering the past and imagining the future : Common
and distinct neural substrates during event construction and
elaboration." Neuropsychologia 45(7), 1 363- 1 377.
Alper, Harvey P. (ed.) ( 1989): Understanding Mantras. Albany: State
University of New York Press.
Alper, Harvey P. ( 1 989a) : "Introduction."
Alper, 1 989: 1- 14.
Ansermet, Fran'i=ois & Magistretti, Pierre (2004) : A chacun son cerveau.

Plasticite neuronale et inconscient. Paris: Odile Jacob.
Ansermet, Fran'i=ois & Magistretti, Pierre (20 10): Les enigmes du plaisir.
Paris : Odile Jacob.
Ansermet, Fran'i=ois & Magistretti, Pierre (20 10a): " (el inconscient ?"
Magistretti & Ansermet, 20 10: 195- 1 99.
=
Arbib, Michael A. (2003) : "The evolving mirror system: a neural basis

for language readiness." Christiansen & Kirby, 2003: 1 82-200.
=
Arbib, Michael A. (2005): "From monkey-like action recognition to

human language : An evolutionary framework for neuro-linguistics."
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28, 105- 1 67.
Arbib, Michael A. & Bickerton, Derek (ed.)(20 1 0 ) : The Emergence
of Proto language: Holophrasis vs compositionality. Amsterdam
Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Atran, Scott ( 1998): "Folk biology and the anthropology of science :
Cognitive universals and cultural particulars." Behavioral and Brain
Sciences 2 1 , 547-609.
Austin, James H. ( 1998) : Zen and the Brain. Toward an understanding
of meditatien and consciousness. Cambridge, Massachusetts &
London, England: MIT.
217
ABSORPTION
Austin, James H. (2006) : Zen-Brain Reflections. Reviewing recent

developments in meditation and states of consciousness. Cambridge,
Massachusetts & London, England: MIT.
Bareau, Andre ( 1 963) : Recherches sur la biographie du Buddha dans
les Sutrapitaka et les Vinayapitaka anciens. De la quete de /'e veil
a la conversion de Sariputra et de Maudgalyayana. Paris : Adrien
Maisonneuve.
Bareau, Andre ( 1 970-7 1 ) : Recherches sur la biographie du Buddha
dans les Sutrapitaka et les Vinayapitaka anciens. II. Les derniers
mois, Ie parinirvana et les funerailles. Two Volumes. Paris: Adrien
Maisonneuve.
Bargh, John A. (ed.)(2007) : Social Psychology and the Unconscious.
The automaticity of higher mental processes. New York and Hove:
Psychology Press.
Barney, Stephen A.; Lewis, W. ].; Beach, ]. A. & Berghof, Oliver (tr.)
(2006) : The Etymologies of Isidore of Seville. Cambridge University
Press.
Baron-Cohen, Simon ( 1 995): Mindblindness. An essay on autism and
theory of mind. Cambridge, Massachusetts - London, England:
MIT Press.
Beckman, Gary (2005 ) : "The limits of credulity." Journal of the
American Oriental Society 1 25, 343-352.
Begley, Sharon (2007) : Train your Mind, Change your Brain. How a
new science reveals our extraordinary potential to transform ourselves.
New York: Ballantine Books.
Bennett, Maxwell; Dennet, Daniel; Hacker, Peter & Searle, John
(2007) : Neuroscience and Philosophy. Brain, Mind, and Language.
New York: Columbia University Press.
Benson, Ophelia & Stangroom, Jeremy (2006) : Why Truth Matters.
London & New York: Continuum.
Bentall, Richard P. (2003) : Madness Explained. Psychosis and Human
Nature. Penguin.
Bickerton, Derek (2003) : "Symbol and structure : a comprehensive
framework for language evolution." Christiansen & Kirby, 2003:
77-93.
=
218
Bibliography
Bickerton, Derek (2007) : "Language evolution: a brief guide for
linguists:' Lingua 1 17(3), 5 10-526.
Bickerton, Derek (2009): Adams Tongue. How humans made language,
how language made humans. New York: Hill and Wang.
Bickerton, Derek (20 1 0) : "But how did protolanguage actually start?"
Arbib & Bickerton, 20 1 0 : 1 67- 1 74.
=
Biello, David (2007) : "Searching for God in the brain." Scientific

American October 3, 2007.
Blanke, Olaf & Dieguez, Sebastian (2009): "Leaving body and life
behind: Out-of-body and near-death experience." The Neurology
of Consciousness: Cognitive Neuroscience and Neuropathology. Ed.
Steven Laureys & Giulio Tononi. London: Academic Press. Pp.
303-325.
Bloch, Jules ( 1 950) : Les inscriptions d'Asoka. Traduites et commentees.
Paris: Les Belles Lettres.
Bloom, Paul (20 1 0 ) : How Pleasure Works. The new science of why we
like what we like. London: The Bodley Head.
Boden, Margaret A. (2006) : Mind as Machine. A history of cognitive
science. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 2 vol.
Bohl, Felix ( 199 1 ) : "Die etymologische Namensdeutung in der
rabbinischen Literatur." Discours etymologique. Actes du Colloque
international organise it l'occasion du centenaire de la naissance
de Walther von Wartburg. Edites par Jean-Pierre Chambon et
Georges Liidi, avec la collaboration de Hans-Martin Gauger, Frank
Lestringant, Georges Pinault (Max Niemeyer Verlag, Tiibingen
1 99 1 ) . Pp. 1 6 1 - 1 72.
Borch-Jacobsen, Mikkel & Shamdasani, Sonu (20 12): The Freud Files.
An inquiry into the history ofpsychoanalysis. Cambridge University
Press.
''\
Boroditsky, Lera (200 1 ) : "Does language shape thought ?: Mandarin
and English speakers' conceptions of time." Cognitive Psychology 43,
1 -22.
Boyd, Brian (2009) : On the Origin of Stories. Evolution, cognition,
and fiction. Cambridge, Massachusetts & London, England: The
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
219
ABSOR P TION
Boyer, Pascal & Lienard, Pierre (2006) : "Why ritualized behavior ?

Precaution systems and action parsing in developmental,
pathological and cultural rituals." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29,
1- 56.
Bradley, Margaret M.; Miccoli, Laura; Escrig, Miguel A. & Lang,
Peter ]. (2008): "The pupil as a measure of emotional arousal and
autonomic activation." Psychophysiology 45, 602-607.
Bremner, ]. Douglas & Marmar, Charles R. (ed.) ( l 998): Trauma,
Memory, and Dissociation. Washington, DC & London, England :
American Psychiatric Press.
Brockman, John (ed.) (2007) : What Is Your Dangerous Idea? Today's
Leading Thinkers on the Unthinkable. London : Harper Perennial.
Bronkhorst, Johannes ( 1 984) : "Nirukta, Unadi Sutra, and Astadhyayi."
Indo-Iranian Journal 27, 1 - 1 5 .
Bronkhorst, Johannes ( 1 985): "Dharma and Abhidharma." Bulletin of
the School of Oriental and African Studies 48 ( 1 98 5 ) , pp. 305-320.
Bronkhorst, Johannes (200 1 ) : "Etymology and magic: Yaska's Nirukta,
Plato's Cratylus, and the riddle of semantic etymologies." Numen
48, 200 1 , 1 47-203.
Bronkhorst, Johannes (2009): Buddhist Teaching in India. Boston :
Wisdom Publications.
Bronkhorst, Johannes (20 10): "Ritual, holophrastic utterances, and the
symbolic mind." Ritual Dynamics and the Science of Ritual. Volume
I: Grammar and morphologies of ritual practices in Asia. Ed. Axel
Michaels and Anand Mishra. Wiesbaden : Harrassowitz. Pp. 1 59202.
Bronkhorst, Johannes (20 1 1 ) : Buddhism in the Shadow of Brahmanism.
Leiden - Boston: Brill. ( Handbook of Oriental Studies 2/24.
Brugger, Peter (20 12): "The tell-tale brain: Unlocking the mystery of
human nature." Cognitive Neuropsychiatry 17(4) , 35 1-358.
Brunet, Alain ; Orr, Scott P.; Tremblay, Jacques; Robertson, Kate;
Nader, Karim & Pitman, Roger K. (2008) : "Effect of post-retrieval
propranolol on psychophysiologic responding during subsequent
script-driven traumatic imagery in post-traumatic stress disorder."
Journal of Psychiatric Research 42( 6), 503-506.
220
Bibliography
Bruya, Brian (ed.) (20 1O): Effortless Attention. A new perspective in the
cognitive science of attention and action. Cambridge, Massachusetts &
London, England: A Bradford Book, The MIT Press.
Buller, David J. (200 5 ) : Adapting Minds. Evolutionary Psychology and
the persistent quest for human nature. Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England: A Bradford Book, MIT Press.
Burgdorf, Jeffrey & Panksepp, Jaak (2006): "The neurobiology of
positive emotions." Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 30, 1731 87.
Burton, David (2004) : Buddhism, Knowledge and Liberation: A
Philosophical Study. Aldershot, England & Burlington, USA:
Ashgate.
Buser, Pierre (2005) : I.:inconscient aux mille visages. Paris : Odile Jacob.
Cammann, Schuyler ( 1 962) : Substance and Symbol in Chinese Toggles.
Chinese Belt Toggles from the C. F. Bieber Collection. Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press.
Candland, Douglas Keith ( 1 993) : Feral Children and Clever Animals.
Reflections on human nature. New York - Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Cardeiia, Etzel; Lyn, Stephen Jay & Krippner, Stanley (ed.) (2000) :
Varieties of Anomalous Experience: Examining the scientific evidence.
Washington, DC : American Psychological Association.
Carter, Rita (2008): Multiplicity. The New Science of Personality.
London : Little, Brown.
Chagnon, Napoleon A. ( 1 968 ) : Yanomamii: The fierce people. New
York etc.: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
Christiansen, Morton H. & Kirby, Simon (ed.) (2003) : Language
Evolution. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cioffi, Frank ( 1 998): Freud and the Question of Pseudoscience. Chicago

and La S 1le : Open Court.
Clark, David H. & Stephenson, F. Richard ( 1 977) : The Historical

Supernovae. Oxford etc.: Pergamon Press.
Clayton, N. S.; Correia, S. P. c.; Raby, C. R.; Alexis, D. M.; Emery, N.
J. & Dickinson, A. (2008): "Response to Suddendorf& Corballis
(2008): in defence of animal foresight." Animal Behaviour 76, e9-e l l .
221
ABSORPTION
Clayton. Philip & Davies. Paul (ed.) (2006): The Re-Emergence of

Emergence. The emergentist hypothesis from science to religion. Oxford
University Press.
Cohen. Jon (2007) : "The world through a chimp's eyes." Science 3 1 6.
44-45.
Cole. M. (2006) : "Culture and cognitive development in phylogenetic.
historical and ontogenetic perspective." Handbook of Child
Psychology, vol. 2: Cognition, Perception and Language. 6th edition.
Ed. W. Damon & D. Kuhn. Wiley. Chichester. (not seen)
Correia. Sergio P. c.; Dickinson. Anthony & Clayton. Nicola S .
(2007): "Western scrub-jays anticipate future needs independently
of their current motivational state." Current Biology 1 7. 8 56-861 .
Coull. Jennifer T. (2005) : "Psychopharmacology o f human attention."
Itti et al 2005: SO-56.
=
Crews. Frederick (ed.)( 1 998): Unauthorized Freud. Doubters confront a

legend. Harmondsworth : Penguin Books.
Crow. T. ]. ( 1 99 1 ) : "The origins of psychosis and 'The Descent of
Man'." BritishJournal of Psychiatry 1 59 (suppl. I4). 76-82.
Crow. T. ]. ( 1 995) : "A Darwinian approach to the origins of psychosis."
British Journal of Psychiatry 1 67. 1 2-25.
Crow. Tim J. ( 1998 ) : "Nuclear schizophrenc symptoms as the
key to the evolution of modern homo sapiens." From Brains to
Consciousness? Essays on the new sciences of the mind. Ed. Steven
Rose. Princeton. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Pp. 1 371 53.
Csikszentmihalyi. Mihaly ( 1 996) : Creativity.Flow and the psychology of
discovery and invention. New York: HarperPerennial.
Csikszentmihalyi. Mihaly (2002) : Flow. The Classic Work on How
to Achieve Happiness. Revised and updated edition. London etc.:
Rider.
Damasio. Antonio R. ( 1 994): Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason and
the Human Brain. New York: Grosset/Putnam.
Damasio. Antonio ( 1 999) : The Feeling of What Happens. Body,
Emotion and the Making of Consciousness. London: Vintage. 2000.
222
Bibliography
Damasio, Antonio (2003) : Lookingfor Spinoza. Joy, Sorrow and the
Feeling Brain. William Heinemann. Reprint: Vintage, London etc.
2004.
Damasio, Antonio (20 1 0) : Self Comes to Mind. New York: Pantheon
Books.
Dawkins, Richard ( 1 996) : Climbing Mount Improbable. Viking.
Reprint: Penguin Books, London etc., 1 997.
Deacon, Terrence ( 1 997) : The Symbolic Species. The co-evolution of
language and the human brain. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
Deacon, Terrence W. (2003) : "Universal Grammar and semiotic
constraints." Christiansen & Kirby, 2003: 1 1 1 - 1 39.
=
Deacon, Terrence W. (2003a) : "Multilevel selection in a complex

adaptive system : the problem oflanguage origins." Evolution and
Learning: The Baldwin Effect Reconsidered. Ed. Bruce H. Weber &
David ]. Depew. Cambridge, Massachusetts - London, England:
MIT Press. Pp. 8 1- 106.
Deacon, Terrence W. (20 1 2) : Incomplete Nature: How mind emerged
from matter. New York - London: W. W. Norton.
Deacon, Terrence & Cashman, Tyrone (2009): "The role of symbolic
capacity in the origins of religion." Journal for the Study of Religion,
Nature and Culture 3(4), 490- 5 1 7.
Deady, Denis K.; Law Smith, Miriam ].; Kent, ]. P. & Dunbar, R. I.
M. (2006): "Is priesthood an adaptive strategy ? Evidence from a
historical Irish population." Human Nature 17(4), 393-404.
Dehaene, Stanislas (20 1 1 ) : "Signatures of consciousness." The Mind.
Ed. John Brockman. New York etc. : Harper Perennial. Pp. 2 1 7-238.
Dehaene, Stanislas; Changeux, Jean-Pierre ; Naccache, Lionel; Sackur,
Jerome & Sergent, Claire (2006): "Conscious, preconscious, and
subliminal processing: a testable taxonomy." Trends in Cognitive
Scienc 10(5), 204-2 1 1 .
Dehaene, St slas & Naccache, Lionel (200 1 ) : "Towards a cognitive

neuroscience of consciousness : basic evidence and a workspace
framework." Cognition 79, 1 -37.
Dennett, Daniel C. ( 1984) : Elbow Room. The Varieties of Free Will
Worth Wanting. New York: Oxford University Press.
223
ABSORPTION
Dennett, Daniel C. ( 199 1 ) : Consciousness Explained. Boston etc.:

Little, Brown and Company.
Dennett, Daniel C. (2003) : Freedom Evolves. London : Allen Lane.
Dennett, Daniel C. (2005): Sweet Dreams. Philosophical Obstacles to
a Science of Consciousness. Cambridge, Massachusetts & London,
England: The MIT Press.
de Tommaso, Marina; Sardaro, Michele & Livrea, Paolo (2008) :
'esthetic value of paintings affects pain thresholds." Consciousness
and Cognition 17(4), 1 1 52- 1 162.
Deutscher, Guy (2005): The Unfolding of Language. The evolution of
mankind's greatest invention. London: Random House.
Deutscher, Guy (20 1 0) : Through the Language Glass. How words colour
your world. London: William Heinemann.
Diamond, ]ared ( 1 992): The Third Chimpanzee: The evolution and
future of the human animal. Toronto : HarperCollins.
Doidge, Norman (2007) : The Brain That Changes Itself. Stories of
personal triumph from the frontiers of brain science. London: Penguin.
Donald, Merlin (200 1 ) : A Mind So Rare. The evolution of human
consciousness. New York & London : W. W. Norton.
Dormashev, Yuri (20 1 0 ) : "Flow experience explained on the grounds
of an activity approach to attention." Bruya, 20 10: 287-333.
=
Doyere, Valerie; Debiec, ]acek; Monfils, Marie-H.; Schafe, Glenn E.

& LeDoux, ]oseph E. (2007) : "Synapse-specific reconsolidation of
distinct fear memories in the lateral amygdala." Nature Neuroscience
10(4), 414-416.
Dufresne, Todd (2003) : Killing Freud. Twentieth-century culture and the
death ofpsychoanalysis. London - New York: Continuum.
Dufresne, Todd (2007): Against Freud. Critics talk back. Stanford
University Press.
Duyvendak, ]. ]. L. ( 1 942) : "Further data bearing on the identification
of the Crab Nebula with the supernova of 1 054 A.D., part 1. The
ancient oriental chronicles." Publications of the Astronomical Society
of the Pacific 54, 9 1-94.
224
Bibliography
Edelman, Gerald M. ( 1 992) : Bright Air, Brilliant Fire. On the matter of
the mind. New York: Basic Books.
Edelman, Gerald M. (2004) : Wider than the Sky. The phenomenal gift
of consciousness. London: Penguin Books.
Edelman, Gerald M. (2006) : Second Nature. Brain science and human
knowledge. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
Edelman, Gerald M. & Tononi, Giulio (2000) : A Universe of
Consciousness. How matter becomes imagination. New York: Basic
Books. (The same book has been brought out by Penguin Books
under the title Consciousness.)
Eissler, K. R. ( 1 969) : "Irreverent remarks about the present and future
ofpsychoanalysis." International Journal of Psychoanalysis 50, 461 47 1 .
Eliade, Mircea ( 1 986) : Histoire des croyances e t des idees religieuses. 3.
De Mahomet Ii l'age des Riformes. Paris : Payot.
Etkin, Amit; Pittenger, Christopher; Polan, H. Jonathan & Kandel,
Eric R. (2005): "Toward a neurobiology of psychotherapy: basic
science and clinical applications." Journal of Neuropsychiatry and
Clinical Neuroscience 1 7, 145- 158.
Evans, Jonathan S t . B. T. (2008): "Dual-processing accounts of
reasoning, judgment, and social cognition." Annual Review of
Psychology 59, 255-278.
Everett, Daniel (20 1 2) : Language: The Cultural Tool. London: Profile
Books.
Eysenck, Michael W. ( 1 982) : Attention and Arousal. Cognition and
Performance. Berlin - Heidelberg - New York: Springer.
Falk, Harry (20 12): "Small-scale Buddhism."
49 1-5 17.
Voegeli et aI., 20 12:
Fischer, John Martin; Kane, Robert; Pereboom, Derk & Vargas,

Manuel (2007) : Four Views on Free Will. Malden, MA etc.:
Blackwell.
Flanagan, Owen (20 1 1 ) : The Bodhisattva's Brain. Buddhism naturalized.
Cambridge, Massachusetts & London, England: The M IT Press.
Ford, Brian J. (2009): "On intelligence in cells : the case for whole cell
biology." Interdisciplinary Science Review 34(4), 350-365.
225
ABSORPTION
Forman, Robert K. C. ( 1 990) : The Problem of Pure Consciousness.

Mysticism and philosophy. New York - Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Forman, Robert K. C. ( 1 999) : "What does mysticism have to teach us
about consciousness ?" Models of the Self. Ed. S. Gallagher & ]. Shear.
Thorverton, Devon: Imprint Academic. Pp. 361 -377.
Franco, Eli (20 1 2 ) : "Once again on the desires of the Buddha."
Voegeli et aI., 20 1 2: 229-245.
Franke, William (2007) : On What Cannot Be Said. Apophatic

discourses in philosophy, religion, literature, and the arts. Volume
1 : Classic formulations; volume 2: Modern and contemporary
transformations. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame
Press.
Freeman, Walter ]. ( 1 999) : How Brains Make up their Minds. London :
Phoenix. 2000.
Freud, Ernst L. & Meng, Heinrich (ed.) ( 1 963) : Sigmund Freud, Oskar
Pfister, Briefe 1 909-1 939. Frankfurt am Main : S. Fischer.
Frosh, Stephen (2006): For and Against Psychoanalysis. 2nd edition
(first edition 1 997) . London and New York: Routledge.
Ganeri, Jonardon (20 1 1 ) : "Emergentisms, ancient and modern." Mind
1 20 (479, July 20 1 1 ) , 67 1 -703.
Garner, Aleena R.; Rowland, David c . ; H\vang, Sang Youl;
Baumgaertel, Karsten ; Roth, Bryan L.; Kentros, Cliff & Mayford,
Mark (20 12): "Generation of a synthetic memory trace." Science
335, 1 5 1 3- 1 5 1 6.
Gay, Peter ( 1 988) : Freud. A life for our time. Anchor Books, New York,
1 989.
Gellman, Jerome (200 5 ) : "Mysticism." The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Spring 2005 Edition). Ed. Edward N. Zalta. URL
http : // plato.stanford.edul archivesl spr2005 1 entriesl mysticism I
=
Georgiadis, Janniko R. & Kortekaas, Rudie (20 1 0 ) : "The sweetest

taboo : functional neurobiology of human sexuality in relation to
pleasure." Kringelbach & Berridge, 20 1 0 : 1 78-20 1 .
=
226
Bibliography
Georgiadis, Janniko R.; Simone Reinders, A. A. T.; Van der Graaf,
H. C. E.; Paans, Anne M. J. & Kortekaar, Rudie (2007) : "Brain
activation during human male ejaculation revisited." NeuroReport
1 8 (6), 553-557.
Georgiadis, Janniko R.; Simone Reinders, A. A. T.; Paans, Anne M. J.;
Renken, Remco & Kortekaar, Rudie (2009): "Men versus women
on sexual brain function : prominent differences during tactile
genital stimulation, but not during orgasm." Human Brain Mapping
30, 3089-3 1 0 l .
Gershuny, Beth S. & Thayer, Julian F. ( 1 999) : "Relations among
psychological trauma, dissociative phenomena, and trauma-related
distress : a review and integration." Clinical Psychology Review 19(5),
63 1-657.
Gleitman, Lila & Papafragou, Anna (2005) : "Language and thought."
The Cambridge Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning. Ed. Keith J.
Holyoak & Robert G. Morrison. New York: Cambridge University
Press. Pp. 633-66l .
Gomez, Lavinia (2005): Th e Freud Wars. A n introduction t o the
philosophy ofpsychoanalysis. London and New York: Routledge.
Goodman, Felicitas D. ( 1 988): Ecstasy, Ritual, and Alternate Reality.
Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
Goodman, Felicitas D. ( 1 988a) : How about Demons? Possession and
Exorcism in the Modern World. Bloomington & Indianapolis:
Indiana University Press.
Grace, George W. ( 1 987) : The Linguistic Construction of Reality.
London etc. : Croom Helm.
Grahek, Nikola (2007) : Feeling Pain and Being in Pain. Second edition.
Cambridge, Massachusetts & London, England: A Bradford Book /
The MIT Press.
Greenfield, Patricia M.; Keller, Heidi; Fuligni, Andrew &
Maynard, Ashley (2003) : "Cultural pathways through universal
development." Annual Review of Psychology 54, 461 -490.
Hacking, Ian ( 1 995): Rewriting the Soul. Multiple personality and the
sciences of memory. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University
Press.
227
ABSORPTION
Henderson, John B. ( 1984) : The Development and Decline of Chinese

Cosmology. New York: Columbia University Press.
Herman, David (2003): "Stories as a tool for thinking." Narrative
Theory and the Cognitive Sciences. Ed. David Herman. Stanford :
CSLI Publications. Pp. 163- 1 92.
Hiniiber, Oskar von (2006): "Everyday life in an ancient Indian
Buddhist monastery." Annual Report of the International Research
Institute for Advanced Buddhology (Soka University, Tokyo) 9
(2005), 3-3 1 .
Hirstein, William (2005): Brain Fiction. Self-deception and the riddle of
confabulation. Cambridge, Massachusetts & London, England: A
Bradford Book.
Hofstadter, Douglas (2007) : I Am A Strange Loop. New York: Basic
Books.
Horgan, John ( 1 999) : The Undiscovered Mind. New York: The Free
Press.
Horgan, John (2003): Rational Mysticism. Dispatches from the border
between science and spirituality. Boston & New York: Houghton
Mifflin Company.
Humphrey, Caroline & Laidlaw, James ( 1994): The Archetypal Actions
of Ritual. A theory of ritual illustrated by theJain rite of worship.
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Huron, David (2006) : Sweet Anticipation. Music and the Psychology of
Expectation. Cambridge, Massachusetts & London, England: The
MIT Press.
Isidore of Seville : Etymologies. See Barney et al., 2006.
Itti, Laurent; Rees, Geraint; Tsotsos, John K. (ed.)(2005): Neurobiology
of Attention. Amsterdam etc.: Elsevier.
James, William ( 1 890) : The Principles of Psych 0 logy. 2 vols. Reprint:
Dover Publications, New York, 1950.
James, William ( 1 902) : The Varieties of Religious Experience. Reprint:
Fount Paperbacks, Glasgow, 1979.
Johansson, Sverker (2005) : Origins of Language: Constraints on
hypotheses. Amsterdam - Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
228
Bibliography
Jouvet, Michel ( 1 999) : The Paradox of Sleep: The story of dreaming.
Cambridge, Mass. : The MIT Press.
Jucker, Jean-Luc (2007): "Des marqueurs rituels. Ethnographie d'une
messe tridentine." Ethnographiques.org 1 3 (juin 2007). http :/ /www.
ethnographiques.org/2007/Jucker.html
Kahneman, Daniel ( 1 973) : Attention and Effort. Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.
Kahneman, Daniel (20 1 1 ) : Thinking, Past and Slow. New York: Farrar,
Straus and Giroux.
Kandel, Eric R. (200 5 ) : Psychiatry, Psychoanalysis, and the New
Biology of Mind. Washington, DC & London, England: American
Psychiatric Publishing.
Kandel, Eric R. (2006) : In Search of Memory. The emergence of a new
science of mind. New York - London: W. W. Norton.
Kane, Robert (ed.)(2002) : The Oxford Handbook ofPree Will. Oxford
University Press.
Kaplan, Marcia (2004) : "Psychoanalysis and psychopharmacology: art
and science of combining paradigms." Panksepp, 2004: 549-569.
=
Kaplan-Solms, Karen, & Solms, Mark (2002) : Clinical Studies in

Neuro-Psychoanalysis. Introduction to a Depth Neuropsychology.
Second Edition. New York - London : Karnac.
Katz, Leonard D. (2006) : "Pleasure." The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Summer 2006 Edition). Ed. Edward N. Zalta. URL
http ://plato.stanford.edu/ archives/ sum2006/ entries/ pleasure/
Kawai, Nobuyuki & Matsuzawa, Tetsuro (2000): "Numerical memory

span in a chimpanzee." Nature 403, 39-40.
Kentridge, R. W; Heywood, C. A. & Weiskrantz, L. ( 1 999) :
"Attention without awareness i n blindsight." Proceedings of the Royal
Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences 266, 1 805- 1 8 1 1 .
Kirk, G . S. ( 1 974) : Th e Nature of Greek Myths. Penguin Books.
Klein, Stefan (2002/2006) : The Science of Happiness. How our brains
make us happy - and what we can do to get happier. Translated by
Stephen Lehmann. Da Capo Press.
229
ABSORPTION
Knight, Chris; Studdert-Kennedy, Michael & Hurford, James R. (ed.)

(2000) : The Evolutionary Emergence of Language. Social function
and the origins oflinguistic form. Cambridge University Press.
Koch, Christof & Tsuchiya, Naotusugu (2007) : ''Attention and
consciousness: two distinct brain processes." Trends in Cognitive
Sciences 1 1 ( 1 ) , 1 6-22.
Komisaruk, Barry R.; Beyer-Flores, Carlos; Whipple, Beverly (2006) :
The Science of Orgasm. Baltimore : The Johns Hopkins University
Press.
Komisaruk, Barry R.; Beyer, Carlos; Whipple, Beverly (2008):
"Orgasm." The Psychologist 2 1 (2), February 2008, 100- 1 03.
Kramer, S.N. ( 1 969) : "Sumerian myths and epic tales."
1 969: 37-59.
Pritchard,
Kraus, Manfred ( 1 987): Name und Sache: Ein Problem im

fruhgriechischen Denken. Amsterdam : B.R. Gruner. (Studien zur
antiken Philosophie, 14.)
Kringelbach, Morten L. & Berridge, Kent C. (ed.) (20 10): Pleasures of
the Brain. Oxford University Press.
Kuhn, Thomas S. ( 1 970) : The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Second
edition, enlarged. Chicago and London: University of Chicago
Press.
Lachaux, Jean-Philippe (20 1 1 ) : Le cerveau attentif. Contrc3le, maftrise et
lacher-prise. Paris: Odile Jacob.
Laski, Marghanita ( 1961 ) : Ecstasy. A study of 50me secular and religious
experiences. Indiana University Press. Reprint: Greenwood Press,
New York, 1 968.
Lawson, E. Thomas & McCauley, Robert N. ( 1 990) : Rethinking
Religion. Connecting cognition and culture. Cambridge University
Press.
Lear, Jonathan (2005): Freud. New York and London: Routledge.
LeDoux, Joseph ( 1 996) : The Emotional Brain. The mysterious
underpinnings of emotional life. New York: Simon & Schuster.
LeDoux, Joseph (2002) : Synaptic Self. How our brains become who we
are. Harmondsworth : Viking Penguin.
230
Bibliography
Lee, Jonathan L. c., et al. (2005 ) : "Disrupting reconsolidation of
drug memories reduces cocaine-seeking behavior." Neuron 47(5),
September 1 5, 2005, pp. 795-80 1 .
Lehrer, Jonah (2007): Proust Was a Neuroscientist. Boston - New York:
Houghton Miffiin Company.
Leoshko, Janice (2003) : Sacred Traces. British Explorations of Buddhism
in South Asia. Hants, England & Burlington, USA: Ashgate.
Levi-Strauss, Claude ( 1971 ) : I.:homme nu. (Mythologiques, IV.) Paris :
PIon.
Levitin, Daniel ]. (2006) : This is Your Brain on Music. The science of a
human obsession. London: Penguin / Plume.
Lewis-Williams, David (20 10): Conceiving God. The cognitive origin
and evolution of religion. London: Thames & Hudson.
Lewis-Williams, David & Pearce, David (2005): Inside the Neolithic
Mind. Consciousness, cosmos and the realm of the gods. London:
Thames & Hudson.
Leyton, Marco (20 l O ) : "The neurobiology of desire: dopamine and
the regulation of mood and motivational states in humans."
Kringelbach & Berridge, 20 10: 222-243.
=
Libby, William L.; Lacey, Beatrice C. & Lacey, John I. ( 1 973) :

"Pupillary and cardiac activity during visual attention."
Psychophysiology 1 0(3), 270-294.
Lillard, Angeline ( 1998): "Ethnopsychologies : cultural variations in
theories of mind." Psychological Bulletin 1 23, 3-32.
Linden, David ]. (20 1 1 ) : The Compass of Pleasure. How our brains make
fatty foods, orgasm, exercise, marijuana, generosity, vodka, learning,
and gamblingfeel so good. New York etc.: Viking.
Llinas, R. R. & Pare, D. ( 1 99 1 ) : "Of dreaming and wakefulness."
Neuroscience 44(3), 521-535.
Lloyd, G. E. R. (2007) : Cognitive Variations. Reflections on the Unity
and Diversity of the Human Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Looren de Jong, Huib (2002): "Levels of explanation in biological
psychology." Philosophical Psychology 1 5 (4), 441-462.
23 1
ABSORPTION
Looren de Jong, Huib (2006) : "Explication pluralism : Where the

mind to molecule pathway gets off the track - Reply to Bickle."
Synthese 1 5 1 , 435-443.
Looren de Jong, Huib & Schouten, Maurice K. D. (200 5 ) : "Ruthless
reductionism : a review essay ofJohn Bickle's Philosophy and
neuroscience: A ruthlessly reductive account." Philosophical Psychology
1 8 (4), 473-486.
Lorenz, Maria ( 1 96 1 ) : "Problems posed by schizophrenic language."
Archives of General Psychiatry 4, 603- 10.
Lutz, Antoine ; Dunne, John D. & Davidson, Richard ]. (2007) :
"Meditation and the neuroscience of consciousness : an
introduction." The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Ed.
Philip David Zelazo, Morris Moscovitch & Evan Thompson.
Cambridge University Press. Pp. 499-5 5 l .
Magistretti, Pierre & Ansermet, Francrois (ed.) (20 1 O ) : Neurosciences
et psychanalyse. Une rencontre autour de la singularite. Paris : Odile
Jacob.
Maldonado, Jose R. & Spiegel, David ( 1 998 ) : "Trauma, dissociation,
and hypnotizability:' Bremner & Marmar, 1998: 57- 1 06.
=
Malinowski, Bronislaw ( 1 935 ) : Coral Gardens and Their Magic.

Volume I: Soil-Tilling and Agricultural RiteS-in the Trobriand Islands.
Volume II: The Language of Magic and Gardening. London : George
Allen and Unwin. Second Edition 1 966. Indiana University
Press. (Indiana University Studies in the History and Theory of
Linguistics. )
Mallick, Shahbaz Khan & McCandless, Boyd R. ( 1966) : "A study of
Catharsis of aggression." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
4(6) , 59 1 -596.
Marshall, Jessica (2007): "Future recall." New Scientist, 24 March 2007,
pp. 36-40.
Maslow, Abraham H. ( 1 964) : Religions, Values, and Peak-Experiences.
Reprint: The Viking Press, New York, 1 970.
Maslow, Abraham H. ( 1 968): Toward a Psychology of Being. Second
edition. New York, Cincinnati etc.: D. van Nostrand.
232
Bibliography
Maslow, Abraham H. ( 1 97 1 ) : The Farther Reaches of Human Nature.
Harmondsworth etc.: Penguin Books.
Matson, Wallace ( 1 987) : A New History of Philosophy. Vol. 1. New
York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich. (not seen)
Maunsell, John H. R. (2004) : "Neuronal representations of cognitive
state : reward or attention?" Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8(6), June
2004, pp. 26 1 -265.
McCauley, Robert N. (2007): "Reduction : models of cross-scientific
relations and their implications for the psychology-neuroscience
interface." Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science. Ed. Paul
Thagard. Amsterdam etc.: Elsevier / North-Holland. Pp. 105- 1 5 8.
McNab, Fiona & Klingberg, Torkel (2007) : "Prefrontal cortex
and basal ganglia control access to working memory." Nature
Neuroscience 1 1, 1 03- 1 07.
Medin, Douglas L. & Atran, Scott (2004) : "The native mind:
biological categorization and reasoning in development and across
cultures." Psychological Review 1 1 1 , 960-983.
Meyer, Catherine (ed.)(2005 ) : Le livre noir de la psychanalyse. Paris :
Les Arenes.
Michaels, Axel (2006) : "Ritual and meaning." Theorizing Rituals:
Issues, Topics, Approaches, Concepts. Ed. Jens Kreinath, Jan Snoek
& Michael Stausberg. Leiden - Boston: Brill. (Numen Book Series,
Studies in the History of Religions, 1 14- 1 . ) Pp. 247-26 1 .
Michaels, Axel (2007) : '''How do you do ?' Voriiberlegungen z u einer
Grammatik der Rituale." Der Mensch - ein ''animal symbolicum"?
Sprache - Dialog - Ritual. Ed. Heinrich Schmidinger & Clemens
Sedmak. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchge5ellschaft. Pp. 239258.
Miller, Courtney A. & Marshall, John F. (2005): "Molecular substrates
for retrieval and reconsolidation of cocaine-associated contextual
memory." Neuron 47(5), September 1 5 , 2005, pp. 873-884.
Mithen, Steven (2005) : The Singing Neanderthals. The origin of music,
language, mind and body. London : Phoenix. 2006.
233
ABSORPTION
Moors, Agnes & De Houwer, Jan (2007) : "What is automaticity? An

analysis of its component features and their interrelations." Bargh,
2007: 1 1-50.
=
Morenz, Siegfried ( 1 957) : "Wortspiele in Agypten." Festschrift

Johannes Jahn zum 22. November 1 957, Leipzig 1957, pp. 23-32.
Reprint: Morenz, 1975 : 328-342.
Morenz, Siegfried ( 1975 ) : Religion und Geschichte des alten Agypten.
Gesammelte Aufsatze. Kaln - Wien: Bahlau.
Morris, Desmond ( 1 967): The Naked Ape. London : Cape.
Mulcahy, Nicholas J. & Call, Josep (2006) : "Apes save tools for future
use." Science 3 12, 1 038- 1 040.
Naccache, Lionel (2006) : Le nouvel inconscient. Freud, Christophe
Colomb des neurosciences. Paris: Odile Jacob.
Nader, Karim (2003) : "Memory traces unbound." Trends in
Neurosciences 26( 2), p. 65-72.
Nahmias, Eddy; Coates, D. Justin & Kvaran, Trevor (2007 ) : "Free
will, moral responsibility, and mechanism: experiments on folk
intuitions." Midwest Studies in Philosophy 3 1 , 214-242.
Nakamura, Hajime (2000-05): Gotama Buddha. A biography based
on the most reliable texts. Two Volumes. Translated by Gaynor
Sekimori. Tokyo : Kosei Publishing.
Naqshbandi, Mariam & Roberts, William A. (2006) : ''Anticipation of
future events in squirrel monkeys (saimiri sciureus) and rats (rattus
norvegicus) : tests of the Bischof-Kohler hypothesis." Journal of
Comparative Psychology 1 20(4), 345-357.
Nathan, Debbie (20 1 1 ) : Sybil Exposed. The extraordinary story behind
the famous multiple personality case. New York: Free Press.
Nelson, Kevin (20 1 1 ) : The God Impulse. Is religion hardwired into the
brain? London etc.: Simon & Schuster.
Nemiah, John C. ( 1 998): "Early concepts of trauma, dissociation, and
the unconscious: their history and current implications." Bremner
& Marmar, 1 998: 1-26.
=
Newberg, Andrew & dl\.quili, Eugene (200 1 ) : Why God Won't Go

Away. New York: Ballantine Books.
234
Bibliography
Newton, Michael (2002) : Savage Girls and Wild Boys. A history offeral
children. London: Faber and Faber.
Nisbett, Richard E. & Masuda, Takahiko (2003) : "Culture and point
of view." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America 1 00 ( 1 9) , 1 1 1 63- 1 1 1 70.
Nisbett, Richard E. & Miyamoto, Yuri (2005): "The influence of
culture : holistic versus analytic perception." Trends in Cognitive
Sciences 9 ( 1 0) , 467-473.
Nisbett, Richard E.; Peng, Kaiping; Choi, Incheol & Norenzayan, Ara
(200 1 ) : "Culture and systems of thought: holistic versus analytic
cognition." Psychological Review 108, 29 1 -3 1 0.
Oberlies, Thomas ( 1 998 ) : Historische Grammatik des Hindi. Die Genese
seines morphologischen Systems aus dem Mittel- und Altindischen.
Reinbek: Inge Wezler. (lndologische Lehrmaterialien, 3.)
Ofen, Noa; Kao, Yun-Ching; Sokol-Hessner, Peter; Kim, Heesoo ;
Whitfield-Gabrieli, Susan & Gabrieli, John D. E . (2007) :
"Development of the declarative memory system in the human
brain." Nature Neuroscience 1 0(9), September 2007, 1 1 98- 1 205.
Padoux, Andre ( 1 989): "Mantras - what are they ?"
295-3 1 8.
Alper, 1989:
Pagnoni, Giuseppe; Cekic, Milos & Guo, Ying (2008): "'Thinking

about not-thinking': neural correlates of conceptual processing
during Zen meditation." PLoS ONE 3(9), e3083.
Panhuysen, Geert ( 1 998) : "The relationship between somatic and
psychic processes." Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 843
(Neuroscience of the Mind on the Centennial of Freud's Project for a
Scientific Psychology, ed. Robert M. Bilder and F. Frank LeFever),
20-42.
Panksepp, Jaak ( 1 998): Affective Neuroscience. The foundations of
human and animal emotions. New York - Oxford : Oxford University
Press.
Panksepp, Jaak (ed.) (2004): Textbook of Biological Psychiatry. Hoboken,
New Jersey: Wiley-Liss.
235
ABSORPTION
Paper, Jordan (2004) : The Mystic Experience. A descriptive and

comparative analy sis. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Parrinder, Geoffrey ( 1 976) : Mysticism in the Worlds Religions. London :
Sheldon Press.
Penrose, Roger ( 1 994) : Shadows of the Mind. A search for the missing
science of consciousness. Reprint: Vintage Books, London, 2005.
Piaget, J. ( 1 925 ) : "Le realisme nominal chez l'enfant." Revue
Philosophique de la France et de l'etranger 99, 1 89-234.
Pinker, Steven (2002) : The Blank Slate. The modern denial of human
nature. London etc.: Allen Lane.
Pinker, Steven (2007): The Stuff of Thought. London etc.: Penguin.
Plato: Cratylus. With an English translation by H. N. Fowler. The
Loeb Classical Library 167 (Plato IV) . Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann. 1 977.
Plotkin, Henry (2007) : Necessary Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
Plotkin, Henry (2007a) : "The power of culture. Oxford Handbook
of Evolutionary Psychology. Ed. R. 1. M. Dunbar & Louise Barrett.
Oxford University Press. Pp. 1 1 - 1 9.
"
Pribram, Karl H. ( 1998): "A century of progress ?" Annals of the New
York Academy of Sciences 843 (Neuroscience of the Mind on the
Centennial of Freuds Project for a Scientific Psychology, ed. Robert M.
Bilder and F. Frank LeFever), 1 1 - 19.
Pribram, Karl H. & Gill, Merton M. ( 1 976) : Freuds 'Project' Re
assessed. New York: Basic Books.
Pritchard, James B. (ed.) ( 1 969) : Ancient Near Eastern Texts relating to
the Old Testament. Third Edition with Supplement. Princeton, New
Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Proudfoot, Wayne ( 1985): Religious Experience. Berkeley etc.:
University of California Press.
Proust, Marcel ( 19 1 3 / 1 98 1 ) : Remembrance of Things Past, Volume
One; Swann s Way; Within a Budding Grove. Translated by C. K.
Scott Moncrieff and Terence Kilmartin. New York: Vintage Books.
236
Bibliography
Pyers, Jennie E. & Senghas, Ann (2009): "Language promotes
false-belief understanding: evidence from learners of a new sign
language." Psychological Science 20(7), 805-8 12.
Pyysiainen, llkka ( 1 993) : Beyond Language and Reason. Mysticism in
Indian Buddhism. Helsinki: Suomalainen Tiedeakatemia. (Annales
Academiae S cientiarum Fennicae, Dissertationes Humanarum
Litterarum, 66.)
Pyysiainen, llkka ( 1 996) : Beliif and Beyond. Religious categorization of
reality. Abo : Abo Akademi. (Religionsvetenskapliga skrifter, 33.)
Pyysiainen, llkka (200 1 ) : How Religion Works. Towards a new cognitive
science of religion. Leiden etc.: Brill. (Cognition and Culture Book
Series, 1.)
Raby, R. c . ; Alexis, D. M.; Dickinson, A. & Clayton, N. S. (2007) :
"Planning for the future by western scrub-j ays." Nature 445, 9 1 9921 .
Raichle, Marcus E.; MacLeod, Ann Mary; Snyder, Abraham Z.;
Powers, William J.; Gusnard, Debra A. & Shulman, Gordon L.
(200 1 ) : "A default mode of brain function." Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences 98(2), 676-682.
Ramachandran, V. S. ( 1 994) : "Phantom limbs, neglect syndromes,
repressed memories, and Freudian psychology:' International Review
of Neurobiology 37, 291 -333.
Ramachandran, V. S. (20 1 2) : "Author response" to Brugger, 20 12.
Cognitive Neuropsychiatry 1 7(4), 359-366.
Ramachandran, V. S. & Blakeslee, Sandra (l 998) : Phantoms in the
Brain. Probing the mysteries of the human m ind. New York: William
Morrow.
Rank, Louis Philippe ( 1 95 1) : Etymologiseering en Verwante
Verschijnselen bij Homerus. Dissertation Utrecht.
Rappaport, Roy A. ( 1 999) : Ritual and Religion in the Making of
Humanity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rees, Geraint; Frith, Christopher D. & Lavie, Nilli ( 1 997) :
"Modulating irrelevant motion perception by varying attentional
load in an unrelated task." Science 278, 1 6 1 6- 1 6 1 9.
237
ABSORPTION
Reich, Wilhelm ( 1967) : Reich Speaks of Freud. Reprint: Pelican Books

1 975.
Reinders, A. A. T. Simone ; Willemsen, Antoon T. M.; Vos, Herry P.
J.; den Boer, Johan A. & Nijenhuis, Ellert R. S. (20 12): "Fact or
factitious ? A psychobiological study of authentic and simulated
dissociative identity states." PLoS One, DOl: 10. 1 37 1 1journal
pone.0039279.
Richards, Graham (2002): Putting Psychology in its Place. A Critical
Historical Overview. Second edition. Routledge.
Rolls, Edmund T. ( 1 999) : The Brain and Emotion. Oxford University
Press.
Rolls, Edmund T. (2005) : Emotion Explained. Oxford University Press.
Rolls, Edmund T. (2008): Memory, Attention, and Decision-Making.
A unifying computational neuroscience approach. Oxford University
Press.
Rose, Steven (2003) : The Making of Memory. From molecules to mind.
Revised edition. London: Vintage.
Rose, Steven (2005): The 21st-Century Brain. Explaining, Mending and
Manipulating the Mind. London : Vintage. 2006.
Rovee-Collier, Carolyn ( 1 997) : "Dissociations in infant memory:
rethinking the development of implicit and explicit memory."
Psychological Review 1 04(3) , 467-498.
Rovee- Collier, Carolyn ( 1 999) : "The development of infant memory."
Current Directions in Psychological Science 8(3), 80-85.
Sacks, Oliver ( 1 995) : An Anthropologist on Mars. Seven paradoxical
tales. London: Picador.
Sacks, Oliver (2007) : Mus icophilia. Tales of Music and the Brain.
London : Picador.
Sander-Hansen, C.E. ( 1 946) : "Die phonetischen Wortspiele des
altesten Agyptischen." Acta Orientalia 20, 1 -22.
Sauneron, Serge ( 1 957): Les praTeS de l'ancienne Egypte. Editions du
Seuil.
238
Bibliography
Savage-Rumbaugh, Sue; Fields, William Mintz & Taglialatela, Jared
(2000) : 'Ape consciousness - human consciousness: a perspective
informed by language and culture." American Zoologist 40, 9 1 0-92 1 .
Savage-Rumbaugh, E . Sue & Rumbaugh, Duane M . ( 1 978 ) :
"Symbolization, language, and chimpanzees: A theoretical
reevaluation based on initial language acquisition processes in four
young Pan troglodytes." Brain and Language 6, 265-300.
Scherer, Klaus R. (2005): "What are emotions ? And how can they be
measured." Social Science Information 44(4), 695-729.
Schooler, Jonathan W. & Mauss, Iris B. (20 10): "To be happy and
to know it: the experience and meta-awareness ofpleasure."
Kringelbach & Berridge, 20 10: 244-254.
=
Schopen, Gregory (2006): 'A well-sanitized shroud. Asceticism and

institutional values in the middle period of Buddhist monasticism."
Between the Empires. Society in India 300 BCE to 400 CEo Ed.
Patrick Olivelle. Oxford University Press. Pp. 3 1 5-347.
Schouten, Maurice K. D. & Looren de Jong, Huib (2004): "Could
the neural AB C explain the mind ?" Behavioral and Brain Sciences
27(2), 3 1 1-3 1 2.
Schwartz, Jeffrey M. & Begley, Sharon (2002) : The Mind and the
Brain. Neuroplasticity and the power of mental force. New York:
ReganBooks.
Searle, John R. ( 1 995 ) : The Construction of Social Reality. Penguin
Books.
Searle, John R. ( 1999): Mind, Language and Society. Doing philosophy
in the real world. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
Searle, John R. (2004) : Mind. A brief introduction. New York
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Searle, John (2007): "Putting consciousness back in the brain."
Bennett et aI., 2007: 97- 1 24.
Searle, John R. (20 10): Making the Social World. The structure of
human civilization. Oxford University Press.
Seligman, Martin E. P. (2003) : Authentic Happiness. London: Nicholas
Brealey.
239
ABSORPTION
Siok, Wai Ting; Perfetti, Charles A.; Jin, Zhen & Tan, Li Hai (2004):
"Biological abnormality of impaired reading is constrained by
culture:' Nature 43 1 , 7 1-76.
Slater, Lauren (2004) : Opening Skinner's Box. Great psychological
experiments of the 20th century. London: Bloomsbury.
Solms, Mark (2004) : "Freud returns." Scientific American 290(5), May
2004.
Solms, Mark (2006) : "Putting the psyche into neuropsychology." The
Psychologist 1 9(9), September 2006, 538-539.
Solms, Mark & Turnbull, Oliver (2002) : The Brain and the Inner
World. An introduction to the neuroscience of subjective experience.
London - New York: Karnac.
Spiegel, Herbert & Spiegel, David (2004) : Trance and Treatment.
Clinical uses of hypnosis. Second edition. Washington, DC &
London, England: American Psychiatric Publihing.
Spitzer, Carsten; Barnow, Sven; Freyberger, Harald ]. & Grabe,
Hans Joergen (2006) : "Recent developments in the theory of
dissociation." World Psychiatry 5 (2), 82-86.
Staal, Frits ( 1984): "Ritual, mantras and the origin oflanguage:'
Amrtadhara. Professor R. N. Dandekar Felicitation Volume. Delhi:
Ajanta Publications. Pp. 403-425.
Staal, Frits ( 1 985) : "Mantras and bird songs." Journal of the American
Oriental Society 105(3; Indological Studies Dedicated to Daniel H.
H. Ingalls), 549-558.
Staal, Frits ( 1 990) : Ritual and Mantras: Rules without meaning.
Reprint: Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1 996.
Staal, Frits (2006) : "Artificial languages across sciences and
civilizations ." Jo urn al of Indian Philosophy 34( 1 -2), 89- 1 4 l .
Stace, W. T. ( 1 960) : Mysticism and Philosophy. London: MacMillan &
Co.
Strivay, Lucienne (2006) : Enfants sauvages: Approches anthropologiques.
Gallimard.
240
Bibliography
Strobach, Anika ( 1 997) : Plutarch und die Sprachen. Ein Beitrag zur
Fremdsprachenproblematik in der Antike. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner.
(Palingenesia, 64.)
Tallerman, Maggie (2007) : "Did our ancestors speak a holistic
protolanguage ?" Lingua 1 1 7(3), 579-604.
Tavris, Carol ( 1 989): Anger: The misunderstood emotion. New York:
Touchstone.
Taylor, John G. (2002) : "Paying attention to consciousness." Trends in
Cognitive Sciences 6(5), 206-2 1 0.
Taylor, John G. (2003a) : "Recent advances in understanding
attention." Science & Consciousness Review. (http ://www. sci-con.
org/)
Taylor, John G. (2003b) : "An Attention-Based Control Model of
Consciousness (CODAM) ." Science & Consciousness Review.
(http ://www. sci-con.org/)
Tooby, John & Cosmides, Leda ( 1 992) : "The psychological
foundations of culture." The Adapted Mind. Evolutionary Psychology
and the generation of culture. Ed. Jerome H. Barkow, Leda Cosmides
& John Tooby. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pp.
19-1 36.
Tooby, John & Cosmides, Leda ( 1 995): "Foreword."
1995: xi-xviii.
Baron-Cohen,
Turnbull, Oliver & Solms, Mark (2003) : "Memory, amnesia and

intuition: a neuro-psychoanalytic perspective." Emotional
Development in Psychoanalysis, Attachment Theory and Neuroscience.
Ed. Viviane Green. Hove and New York: Brunner-Routledge. Pp.
55-85.
Turner, Mark ( 1 996) : The Literary Mind. The origins of thought and
language. Oxford etc.: Oxford University Press.
Turner, Victor W ( 1 969) : The Ritual Process. Structure and anti
structure. London : Routledge & Kegan Paul. ( The Lewis Henry
Morgan Lectures/ 1 966.)
241
ABSORPTION
Underhill, Evelyn ( 1 9 1 1 ) : Mysticism. A study in the nature and

development of man's spiritual consciousness. Reprint: Methuen &
Co., London, 1 949.
Van Driem, George (200 1 ) : Languages of the Himalayas. An
Ethnolinguistic Handbook of the Greater Himalayan Region. Volume
One. Leiden etc.: Brill. (Handbook of Oriental Studies, Section
Two : India, vol. 10/ 1 .)
Van Driem, George (2004) : "Language as organism : a brief
introduction to the Leiden theory oflanguage evolution." Studies
on Sino-Tibetan Languages. Papers in Honor of Professor Hwang
cheng Gong on his Seventieth Birthday. Ed. Ying-chin Lin,
Fang-min Hsu, Chun-chih Lee, Jackson T.-S. Sun, Hsiu-fang Yang
& Dah-ah Ho. Taipei: Institute of Linguistics, A-cademia Sinica.
(Language and Linguistics Monograph Series W-4.) Pp. 1 -9.
Van Eck, Dingmar; Looren de Jong, Huib & Schouten, Maurice K. D.
(2006) : "Evaluating New Wave Reductionism: The case of vision."
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57, 167- 1 96.
Van Laerhoven, Eddy (20 1 0 ) : "Re-introducing philosophical
soteriology: Bronkhorst on absorption (samadhi).";Acta
Comparanda 2 1 , 1 5 7- 1 70.
Vergote, A. ( 1 997) : Religion, Belief and Unbelief: A Psychological Study.
Amsterdam : Leuven University Press.
Voegeli, Fran\=ois; Eltschinger, Vincent; Feller, Danielle; Candotti,
Maria Piera; Diaconescu, Bogdan & Kulkarni, Malhar (ed.) (20 12):
Devadatttyam. Johannes Bronkhorst Felicitation Volume. Bern etc.:
Peter Lang. (Worlds of South and Inner Asia, Vol. 5.)
Wall, Patrick ( 1 999) : Pain: The Science of Suffering. London : Phoenix.
Wallace, B. Alan (2006): The Attention Revolution. Unlocking the power
of the focused mind. Boston: Wisdom Publications.
Wallace, B. Alan (20 1 2) : Meditations of a Buddhist Skeptic. A
manifesto for the mind sciences and contemplative practice. New York:
Columbia University Press.
Warren, Jeff (2007) : The Head Trip. Adventures on the Wheel of
Consciousness. Oxford: OneWorld Publications.
242
Bibliography
Warren, Richard M. ( 1 999) : Auditory Perception. A new analysis and
synthesis. Cambridge University Press.
Watson, Peter (2000) : A Terrible Beauty. The People and ideas that
Shaped the Modern Mind. London : Phoenix.
Watt, Douglas F. & Pincus, David I. (2004) : "Neural substrates of
consciousness: implications for clinical psychiatry." Panksepp,
2004: 75- 1 10.
=
Wegner, Daniel M. (2002) : The nlusion of Conscious Will. Cambridge,

Massachusetts - London, England: A Bradford Book, M IT Press.
Weissweiler, Eva (2008) : Die Freuds. Biographie einer Familie. Frankfurt
am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch.
Werner, Heinz & Kaplan, Bernard ( 1 963) : Symbol Formation. An
organismic-developmental approach to language and the expression of
thought. New York-London-Sydney: John Wiley & Sons.
Wilson, John A. ( 1 969) : "Egyptian myths, tales, and mortuary texts."
Pritchard, 1 969: 3-36.
=
Wray, Alison (2000) : "Holistic utterances in protolanguage : the

link from primates to humans." Knight, Studdert-Kennedy &
Hurford, 2000: 285-302.
==
Wray, Alison (2002) (ed. ) : The Transition to Language. Oxford: Oxford

University Press.
Wray, Alison (2002a) : "Dual processing in protolanguage:
performance without competence." Wray, 2002: 1 1 3- 1 37.
==
Wray, Alison (2002b) : Formulaic Language and the Lexicon.

Cambridge : Cambridge University Press.
Wray, Alison & Grace, George W. (2007) : "The consequences of
talking to strangers: evolutionary corollaries of socio-cultural
influences on linguistic form." Lingua 1 17(3), 543-578.
Wulff, David M. (2000) : "Mystical experience."
397-440.
==
Cardefia et aI., 2000:
Wynne, Alexander (2004) : "The oral transmission of early Buddhist

literature."Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies
27( 1 ) , 97- 1 27.
243
ABSORPTION
Yong, Ed (2009) : "East meets West." New Scientist of7 March 2009,
32-35.
Zaleski, Carol ( 1 988): Otherworld Journeys. Accounts of near-death
experience in medieval and modern times. Oxford University Press.
244
INDEX
Abraham, Carolyn 1 60
absorption 3-5, 29-3 1 , 38, 46, 1 32, 1 33, 1 4 1 - 1 49, 1 54, 1 5 5,
1 57- 1 59, 1 64- 1 67, 1 69, 1 70, 1 80, 1 83 , 1 85 , 1 93, 20 1 ,
202, 204-207, 2 1 6
activated 95, 99, 1 0 1 - 1 04, 1 1 4, 1 1 8 - 1 20, 1 23, 1 30 , 1 33 , 1 4 1 ,
1 48, 1 53, 1 54, 1 64, 1 65, 1 87, 1 93
activation 99, 1 0 1 , 1 02, 1 06, 1 1 5, 1 20, 1 34, 1 46, 1 64- 1 66, 1 87
Addis, Donna Rose 1 23
Aeschylus 5 1
Al-Biruni 74
Alper, Harvey P. 33
Ananda 200
Ansermet, Franois 1 1 2, 1 1 3, 1 1 5
anticipating the future 30, 1 1 9, 1 26, 1 30, 1 97
Arbib, Michael A. 59, 6 1
Arendt, Hannah 74
asceticism 1 74
Asoka 77, 78
associations 4, 1 0, 1 1 , 24, 25, 28-3 1 , 45, 52, 62, 1 20, 1 40
Atran, Scott 45
attention 3, 1 1 , 1 5, 1 9, 20, 29, 32, 3 5 , 43, 44, 63, 74, 82, 86, 98,
1 00- 1 04, 1 06- 1 08, 1 1 3, 1 1 5 , 1 1 6, 1 1 8 , 1 1 9, 1 28, 1 29,
1 32, 1 33, 1 37, 1 40, 1 42- 1 45, 1 48, 1 52- 1 5 5 , 1 5 8, 1 59,
1 65 , 1 66, 1 68- 1 70 , 1 72, 1 82, 1 8 3, 1 93, 20 1 , 202, 204206, 2 1 4
Austin 9, 1 1 - 1 3, 1 5, 24, 28, 34, 48, 54, 1 32, 1 72
automaticity 1 28
automatic pilot 1 28
awareness 30, 37, 39, 4 1 , 42, 1 20, 1 28 , 1 29, 1 3 1 , 1 47, 1 79, 1 82,
1 89, 204, 2 1 6
245
ABSORPTION
baby 9 8
Bareau, Andre 76, 1 58, 200
Bargh, John A. 1 28
Barney, Stephen A. 66
Bateson, M. C. 32
Beckman, Gary 74
Beethoven, Ludwig van 44
Begley, Sharon 1 29, 1 6 1
Benson, Ophelia 40
Bentall, Richard P. 9, 25
Bentham, Jeremy 2 1 1
Beyer-Flores, Carlos 82, 1 44, 1 5 1 , 1 52
Bickerton, Derek 1 3, 4 1 , 49, 5 5 - 57, 59, 62, 64-67
Biello, David 82
Blakeslee, Sandra 25, 75, 1 52
Blake, William 205
Blanke, Olaf 1 32
blank slate, see also tabula rasa 1 50
Bloch, Maurice 32, 77
Bloom, Paul 97
Boden, Margaret A. 82, 87
Bodhi, Bhikku 1 76
Bahl, Felix 5 1
Borch-Jacobsen, Mikkel 92
Boroditsky, Lera 46
Boyd, Brian 1 8
Boyer, Pascal 36
Bradley, Margaret M . 1 69
Brahmanical ritual 32
brain 1 2, 1 5, 26, 29, 56, 8 1 -84, 90, 9 1 , 95, 1 06, 1 09, 1 1 0- 1 1 5,
1 17, 1 36, 1 50- 1 5 2, 1 60- 1 62, 1 69, 1 7 1 , 1 72, 1 97, 209,
210
brain plasticity 1 6 1
Bremner, ]' Douglas 1 07
Breuer, Josef 1 1 8
246
Index
Brockman, John 4
Bronkhorst, Johannes 5, 48, 67, 76, 1 90
Brouwer, Berrus 1 6
Brunet, Alain 1 1 5
Bruya, Brian 1 32
Buddha 53, 7 1 , 75- 79, 82, 93, 1 32, 1 5 8- 1 6 1 , 1 64, 1 76, 1 77,
1 83, 1 87- 1 90, 1 93- 1 95, 1 97-20 1 , 2 1 6
Buddha-to-be 1 83, 1 87, 1 94, 1 9 5, 2 1 6
Buddhism 32, 77-80, 1 87, 2 1 6
Tantric 32
Buddhist 73-8 1 , 84-86, 90, 9 1 , 93, 1 25 , 1 27, 1 30, 1 32, 1 33 ,
1 35, 1 37, 1 40, 1 44- 1 46, 1 48, 1 5 1 , 1 5 8- 1 60, 1 62, 1 64,
1 67, 1 70, 1 76, 1 82, 1 87, 1 97, 1 99, 205, 207
Buddhist morality 1 82
Buddhist religion 77
Buller, David J. 1 50
Burton, David 80
Buser, Pierre 1 1 2
c
Cammann, Schuyler 5 3
Candland, Douglas Keith 1 1
Carter, Rita 1 00
Cashman, Tyrone 1 8, 25
cathexis 1 06, 1 08, 1 46
celibacy 83, 1 78
Chagnon, Napoleon A. 40
character 1 9, 23, 46, 83, 1 1 8, 1 24, 1 94
child 2 1 , 43-45, 62, 67, 9 1 , 1 56
children l l , 1 2, 1 5, 48, 50, 57, 66, 67, 1 38, 1 45
chimpanzee 9, 62
Christianity 76
Cioffi, Frank 87, 92, 1 40
Clark, David H. 75
Clayton, N.S. 30
Clayton, Philip 2 1 2
Coates, D. Justin 2 1 1
247
ABSORPTION
cognition 4, 20, 27, 37, 39, 42, 45, 89, 203

cognitive 37, 82, 87, 90, 9 1 , 92, 96, 1 1 2, 1 50, 1 60, 2 1 3
cognitive neuroscience 9 1 , 92
Cohen, Jon 62
Cole, M. 45
complete cure 1 25 , 1 57, 1 5 8, 1 6 1
complete psychotherapeutic cute 1 25, 1 26, 1 30 - 1 32, 1 34, 1 3 5,
1 4 1 , 1 57, 1 97, 1 99
concentration 29, 3 1 , 38, 1 32, 1 33, 1 40- 1 48, 1 69, 1 95, 1 97,
202-207
concept 1 3, 1 9, 53, 5 5 , 93, 1 1 2, 1 36, 2 1 2
conditioning 1 4, 1 5 1
conscious 1 4, 1 8, 23, 29, 30, 80, 8 1 , 9 1 , 1 03, 1 06- 108, 1 1 0, 1 2 1 ,
1 28 , 1 29, 1 33, 1 56, 1 93, 209-2 1 1 , 2 1 3
consciousness 1 4- 1 6, 22-24, 27, 30, 3 1 , 38, 39, 82, 83, 9 1 , 1 03,
1 06, 1 07, 1 09- 1 1 1 , 1 1 6, 1 28, 1 29, 1 3 1 , 1 43, 1 56, 202206, 2 1 0
core consciousness 22, 23, 3 1
Correia, Sergio P. c . 30
Cosmides, Leda 1 50
Coull, Jennifer T. 1 68
Cratylus 65
Crews, Frederick 92
Crick, Francis 83
Crow, Tim J. 9
Csikszentmihalyi, Mihaly 74, 204
culture 4, 9, 2 1 , 27, 28, 35, 4 1 , 43-46, 1 74
D
Damasio, Antonio 22, 23, 24, 3 1 , 95, 1 1 3, 1 1 4, 1 30

Dquili, Eugene 1 5 1
Darwin, Charles 8 1
Darwinian 26, 60, 1 03, 1 37
Davidson, Richard J. 1 1 6
Davies, Paul 2 1 2
Dawkins, Richard 1 7 5
Deacon, Terrence W. 1 1 , 1 2, 1 6, 1 8, 20, 25, 29, 37, 40, 4 1 , 44,
49, 68, 69, 97, 1 03, 2 1 1 , 2 1 2
248
Index
Deady, Denis K. 83
deconditioning 1 5 1
deep unconscious mental state 9 1
Dehaene, Stanislas 1 1 0
De Houwer, Jan 1 06
de Jong, Looren 83, 2 1 2
Dennett, Daniel C . 1 6, 1 8, 60, 97, 1 1 0, 208, 209
desire 78-8 1 , 83-85, 88, 1 37, 1 58, 1 63, 1 64, 1 7 1 , 1 8 1 , 1 83, 1 84,
1 86, 1 92
determinism 208, 2 1 1
de Tommaso, Marina 20 1
Deutsch, Diana 34
Deutscher, Guy 46, 69
Diamond, Jared 9
Dieguez, Sebastian 1 3 2
discharge 1 05, 1 06, 1 25 , 1 29, 1 36, 1 37, 1 38, 1 52, 1 63, 1 64, 1 68
dissociation 1 07, 1 59, 1 60
Doidge, Norman 1 22, 1 6 1
Donald, Merlin 1 1 , 1 06
dopamine 1 7 1 , 1 72
Dormashev, Yuri 1 32
Doyere, Valerie 1 1 5
drive, see also instinct 86, 92, 1 73
dual processing 20
Dufresne, Todd 92
Dunne, John D. 1 1 6
Duyvendak, J.J.L. 7 5
dynamic core 1 1 0- 1 1 2, 1 6 1
E
Eckhart, Meister 1 1 6
ecstasy 202, 203, 205, 206, 207
ecstatic 203, 206, 207
Edelman, Gerald M. 1 4, 1 5, 23, 83, 1 0 1 , 1 09, I l l , 1 1 2, 1 6 1 ,
1 69
Ego 92, 1 06, 1 08, 1 1 3, 1 24, 1 35 , 1 46
Einstein, Albert 1 60, 2 1 2
249
ABSORPTION
Eissler, Kurt 86
Eliade, Mircea 52
emergence 59, 89, 1 50, 2 1 2, 2 1 3
emergentism 2 1 3
Emerson, Ralph Waldo 1 1 3
emotion 1 1 3, 1 1 4, 1 39, 1 70, 1 82, 1 97
emotional charge 1 1 5, 1 2 1 , 1 22, 1 24
empiricist 87
energy 86, 1 06, 1 08, 1 32, 1 46, 1 74, 1 94, 204
enlightenment bump 1 60
epiphenomena 2 1 2
epiphenomenal 82, 2 1 3
epiphenomenon 2 1 0
episodic 1 5, 95, 1 22, 1 23, 1 25 , 1 27
episodic memory 1 5, 1 23
equilibrium 99, 1 00, 1 1 8, 1 23, 1 24, 1 3 1 , 1 50, 1 66
Etkin, Amit 1 6 1
etymologizing 36, 49, 50, 5 1 , 65, 66, 67
etymology 32, 49
Evans, Jonathan St. B. T. 20, 207
Everett, Daniel 1 4, 46
evolution 1 2, 5 5 , 59, 60, 62, 1 72, 2 1 1
evolutionary 9, 68, 8 1 , 83, 1 50, 1 74, 2 1 1 , 2 1 2
evolutionary psychology 8 1 , 83
excitation 99, 1 0 1 - 1 05 , 1 20, 1 30, 1 34, 1 36, 1 38- 1 40, 1 42, 1 43,
1 64- 1 66, 1 69, 1 87
excited 99, 1 03, 1 06, 1 1 8, 1 23, 1 24, 1 30, 1 33, 1 36, 1 65, 1 82
explanatory gap 82
extended consciousness 22, 23, 3 1
Eysenck, Michael W. 1 02
F
Falk, Harry 1 6 1
falsifiability 87
fantasy 1 2 1 , 1 22, 1 30
Faxian 74
fear 40, 75, 76, 9 1 , 96, 1 85, 1 94, 1 96, 1 97
250
Index
feeling 22, 25, 88, 1 1 4, 1 33, 1 8 1 , 1 9 1 , 208, 209
feral children 1 1
Fields, William Mintz 1 4
Flanagan, Owen 78, 82
flow 1 47, 204, 205
folk psychology 83, 90
Ford, Brian J. 96
Forman, Robert K.c. 1 1 6
formula 32, 33, 52
Four Noble Truths 78
Fox, Douglas 1 1 5
fractionation 60, 97
Franco, Eli 1 5 8
Franke, William 26
Freeman, Walter J. 96
free will 84, 208, 209, 2 1 1 , 2 1 3
Freud 84-89, 92-94, 1 04, 1 06- 1 09, 1 1 l , 1 1 2, 1 1 7- 1 2 1 , 1 24, 1 27,
1 35 , 1 38- 1 40, 1 46, 1 47, 1 5 1 , 1 52, 1 68, 1 70, 1 86, 2 1 6
Freud, Ernst L . 1 38
Freudian 84-87, 92-94, 1 04, 1 08- 1 1 3, 1 1 9, 1 28, 1 38, 1 69
Frosh, Stephen 87
G
Ganeri, ]onardon 2 1 3
Garner, Aleena 1 1 5
Gay, Peter 1 2 1
Gellman, ]erome 26
Georgiadis, ]anniko R. 1 52
Gerschuny, Beth S. 1 07
Gill, Merton M. 1 86
Gleitman, Lila 46
global neuronal workspace 1 1 0
Gomez, Lavinia 88
Goodman, Felicitas D. 38, 207
Grace, George W 46, 57, 58, 60, 6 1 , 63
Grahek, Nikola 1 60
Greenfield, Patricia M. 45
25 1
ABSORPTION
Hacking, Ian 1 00
Halligan, Peter 1 50
Hawkes, Jacquetta 207
Hebb's law 1 86
Heisenberg, Werner 209
Heisterbach, Caesarius of 52
Helen Keller 1 1
Henderson, John B. 5 3
Heraclitus 5 1
hermeneutic 90
heterostasis 1 00, 1 0 5
higher-order consciousness 1 5, 23, 24
Hinduism 32
Tantric 32
Hiniiber, Oskar 77
hippocampus 1 5, 1 5 1 , 1 52
Hirstein, William 1 9, 2 1
Hofstadter, Douglas 2 1 2
holistic 33-37, 39, 56, 58, 59, 6 1 , 62, 64, 66-68
holophrastic 5, 32, 5 5 , 56, 57, 59-64, 68, 69
Holstege, Gert 1 52
homeostasis 99, 1 00, 1 0 5
homeostatic 9 9 , 1 68, 173
homeostatic equilibrium 99
Homer 5 1
homuncular 68
homunculi 96, 97, 98, 1 70
homunculus 97
Hooper, Rowan 43
Horgan, John 82, 1 09, 1 5 1 , 203
Horowitz, Seth 82
human natute 5, 80
human science 5
Humphrey, Caroline 36
hunger 98, 99, 1 0 5 , 1 33, 1 36, 1 37, 1 59, 1 66, 173, 1 87, 1 89
Huton, David 144
252
Index
I
Id 1 08, 1 1 3, 1 46, 1 69
independent urge 1 87
ineffable 26, 206
instinct, see also drive 85, 86, 1 3 5, 1 38, 1 5 3, 1 73, 1 74, 1 7 5
integrate 97, 1 00, 1 1 0, 1 1 8, 1 57, 1 65, 1 66
integration 98, 99, 1 09, 1 1 5 , 1 1 8, 1 20, 1 24, 1 25, 1 49, 1 65, 1 66
intentionality 1 6, 97
Isidore of Seville 66
Islam 38
J
James, William 26, 80, 8 1 , 1 1 3, 1 70, 202, 208, 2 1 0
Jefferies, Richard 207
Johansson, Sverker 67
Jouvet, Michel 2 1
joy 1 56, 1 8 1 , 202,-206
Jucker, Jean-Luc 32
K
Kaas, John 1 50
Kahneman, Daniel 1 4 1 , 1 69, 2 1 1
Kandel, Eric R. 82, 86, 88-92, 96
Kane, Robert 208
Kanzi 1 3 , 1 4
Kaplan, Bernard 5 0 , l l l , 1 68
Katz, Leonard D. 172
Kawai, Nobuyuki 62
Keller, Helen 1 1
Kentridge, R.W 1 06
Kirk, G.S. 5 1
Kirkland, Patricia 83
Klein, Stefan l l 3, 1 5 1 , 1 70
Klingberg, Torkel 29, 1 52
Komisaruk, Barry R. 82, 1 44, 1 5 1 , 1 52
Kortekaas, Rudie 1 52
253
ABSORPTION
Kramer, S. N. 50
Kraus, Manfred 5 1
Kuhn, Thomas S. 3
Kvaran, Trevor 2 1 1
L
Lachaux, Jean-Philippe 1 1 6
Laidlaw, James 36
Lange, Carl Georg 1 1 3
language 4, 9, 1 1 - 1 4, 1 6- 1 8, 24-26, 29, 30, 32-35, 37, 4 1 -49, 5 1 ,
53, 5 5 , 56, 58-6 1 , 63, 64, 66-69, 8 1 , 90, 9 1 , 1 28, 1 76
Laski, Marghanita 1 59, 206, 207
Latin mass 32
Lear, Jonathan 82, 1 1 3
LeDoux, Joseph 1 1 3, 1 1 5 , 1 7 1 , 1 72, 1 97
Lee, Jonathan L.c. 1 69
Lehrer, Jonah 1 1 3, 1 56
Leoshko, Janice 74
level of cognition 4, 27, 37, 39
Levi-Strauss, Claude 36
Levitin, Daniel ]. 1 54
Lewis-Williams, David 3 1
lexigram 1 0- 1 3, 28, 34
Leyton, Marco 1 72
Libby, William 1. 1 69
liberated 1 8 1 , 1 92, 200
liberation 80, 1 76, 1 82, 1 83, 1 87, 1 89, 1 90, 1 98
Lienard, Pierre 36
Lillard, Angeline 45
Linden, David ]. 1 57
linguistic 1 2, 1 3, 25, 27, 30, 32, 33, 35, 36, 38, 44, 48, 49, 66, 69
Llinas, R. R. 2 1
Lloyd, G.E.R. 45
Lorenz, Maria 50
Luria, Alexander Romanovich 1 1 1
Lutz, Antoine 1 1 6
254
Index
Magistretti, Pierre 1 1 2, 1 1 3, 1 1 5
main unit 1 00, 1 02- 1 05 , 1 07, 1 08, 1 1 0, 1 1 7- 1 28, 1 3 1 , 1 34, 1 46,
1 49, 1 57, 1 66, 1 69, 1 70
Malalasekera, G.P. 2 1 6
Maldonado, Jose R . 29, 1 1 9, 1 45
Malinowski, Bronislaw 52
Mallick, Shahbaz Khan 1 70
mantra 3 1
Marmar, Charles R . 1 07
Marshall, Jessica 1 23, 1 69
Maslow, Abraham H. 203, 204
massive modularity thesis 1 50
Matson, Wallace 208
Matsuzawa, Tetsuro 62
Maunsell, John H.R. 1 69
Mauss, Iris B. 1 47
McCabe, Candy 1 50
McCandless, Boyd R. 1 70
McCauley, Robert N. 36, 2 1 2
McNab, Fiona 29, 1 52
Medin, Douglas 1. 45
meditation 25, 1 32, 1 48, 1 60, 1 6 1 , 1 69, 1 80, 1 8 1 , 1 82, 1 88,
1 89, 202, 2 1 6
Megasthenes 74
memory 4, 1 5, 5 6, 62, 77, 89, 9 5 - 1 06, 1 1 3, 1 1 4, 1 1 5, 1 1 8- 1 25 ,
1 27, 1 32- 1 34, 1 36, 1 37, 1 4 1 - 1 43, 1 45- 1 49, 1 5 1 , 1 53- 1 59,
1 64- 1 67, 1 69, 1 70, 1 86- 1 89, 1 93
memory trace 95, 98, 99, 1 02, 1 0 5 , 1 06, 1 1 8 , 1 1 9, 1 22, 1 24,
1 27, 1 34, 1 4 1 , 1 49, 1 53, 1 54, 1 5 5
Meng, Heinrich 1 38
Merzenich, Mike 1 50
metapsychology 84, 92, 93
Meyer, Catherine 92
Michaels, Axel 36, 38
Midgley, Mary 2 1 2
255
A B S ORPTION
Miller, Courtney A. 1 69
mindfulness 1 48, 1 60, 1 79, 1 80- 1 82, 1 90, 1 9 1 , 1 93, 2 1 6
Minsky, Marvin 44
Mitchell, T.N. 87
Mithen, Steven 34, 35, 59, 6 1
module 60, 1 50
Moggallana 1 97, 1 98
Moliere (Jean-Baptiste Poquelin) 1 74
Moors, Agnes 1 06
Morenz, Siegfried 5 1
Morris, Desmond 9
Mulcahy, Nicholas J. 30
multiple personality 1 00
music 34, 3 5 , 1 0 1 , 1 43, 1 44, 1 45, 1 54, 1 5 5
mystic 27, 1 1 6, 202
mystical 4, 25-3 1 , 33, 38, 1 5 1 , 1 69, 202, 203
mysticism 4, 25, 38, 1 1 6, 202, 205, 206
mythology 4, 4 1
N
Naccache, Lionel 1 1 0, 1 1 2
Nader, Karim 1 1 5
Nagel, Thomas 88, 89, 90
Nahmias, Eddy 2 1 1
Nakamura, Hajime 76
Nanamoli, Bikkhu 1 76
Naqshbandi, Mariam 30
narrative 1 5, 1 6, 1 8, 1 9, 24
Nathan, Debbie 1 00
Nelson, Kevin 26
Nemiah, John C. 1 07
neurobiological 96, 1 09, 1 6 1
neurological 4, 22, 23, 26, 29, 68, 8 1 , 1 03, 1 09, 1 33 , 1 60
neurologist 22
neuroscience 4, 8 1 , 82, 83, 9 1 , 92, 1 09, 1 1 2, 1 1 7
neuroscientist 1 4, 75
Newberg, Andrew 1 5 1
256
Index
Newton, Michael 1 1
Nibbana 1 84, 1 8 5, 1 90, 1 98, 1 99
Nicholls, Henry 30
Nirukta 67
Nisbett, Richard E. 45
noetic 26, 203
non-symbolic 4, 20, 2 1 , 23, 27, 28, 30, 34, 37, 40
o
Oberlies, Thomas 49
Ofen, Noa 1 4 1
opiates 1 52, 1 7 1
opioid 1 52, 1 7 1
orgasm 1 52
orgasmic 1 44, 1 5 1 , 1 52
origin oflanguage 5 5
Ovid (Publius Ovidius Naso) 207
p
Padoux, Andre 33
Pagnoni, Giuseppe 1 1 5
pain 50, 52, 1 47, 1 50, 1 59, 1 60, 1 70, 1 8 1 , 1 90, 20 1 , 202, 2 1 1
painful 1 47, 1 87, 1 9 1 , 2 1 1
Panhuysen, Geert 86
Panksepp, Jaak 1 00, 1 1 3, 1 36, 1 52, 1 68, 1 69, 1 7 1 , 1 72, 1 97
Papafragou, Anna 46
Paper, Jordan 26
Paquette, Vincent 82
Pare, D. 2 1
Parrinder, Geoffrey 1 5 1
Pascual-Leone, Alvaro 1 50
patient 50, 1 20, 1 2 1 , 1 25- 1 3 1 , 1 33, 1 34, 1 4 1 , 1 43, 1 49, 1 57,
1 70, 1 82, 1 89
peak-experience 203
Pearce, David 3 1
Peirce, Charles Sanders 1 1 , 1 7, 45
257
ABSORPTION
Penrose, Roger 84
Pfister, Oskar 1 38
Piaget, Jean 50
Pincus, David 1. 1 09
Pinker, Steven 48, 1 50
Plato 65, 1 1 6
pleasurable 95, 97-99, 1 06, 1 1 6, 1 4 1 - 1 43, 1 47, 1 56, 1 57, 1 63,
1 65, 1 72
pleasure 4, 1 05 , 1 1 4, 1 3 5, 1 36, 1 39, 1 4 1 , 1 43- 1 49, 1 52- 1 5 5 ,
1 57, 1 60, 1 63, 1 64, 1 68- 1 72, 1 80, 1 8 1 , 1 83, 1 88, 1 94,
202, 203, 207, 2 1 1 , 2 1 6
Plotkin, Henry 45, 1 50
Plutarch 5 1
positivist 87
prelanguage 60
Pribram, Karl H. 83, 1 86
primary consciousness 23
primary trace 98
primate 61
protolanguage 5 5 -6 1 , 63, 64, 66-68
Proudfoot, Wayne 26
Proust 1 5 5, 1 56, 1 57
psychoanalysis 84, 8 5 , 89, 90-93, 1 1 8, 1 1 9
psychoanalytic theory 84, 86, 89, 92, 93, 1 08, 1 09, 1 26, 1 53
psychological 4, 33, 73, 77, 79, 80, 82, 84, 87-89, 95, 96, 1 07,
1 09, 1 1 1 - 1 1 3, 1 1 7, 1 36, 1 40, 1 5 5 , 1 60, 1 62, 1 70, 1 7 1 ,
1 76, 1 82, 1 86, 1 93, 1 97, 200, 208, 2 1 6
psychological theory 4, 73, 80, 87, 88, 95, 1 1 2, 1 13 , 1 1 7, 1 60,
1 86, 1 97, 208
psychology 7 1 , 73, 74, 80-83, 90, 96, 1 08, 1 3 5, 1 40, 1 67, 1 68,
1 69, 1 86, 208, 2 1 0-2 1 3
psychotherapeutic 1 1 8, 1 22, 1 2 5 , 1 26, 1 30- 1 32, 1 34, 1 3 5, 1 4 1 ,
1 57, 1 6 1 , 1 97, 1 99
psychotherapy 1 17, 1 1 8, 1 24, 1 25, 1 3 1 , 1 34
pupil dilation 1 69
Pyers, Jennie E. 1 6
Pyysiainen, llkka 2 5 , 30, 36
258
Index
Q
quantum physics 209
R
Raby, R. C. 30
Raichle, Marcus E. 1 1 5
Ramachandran, V. S. 25, 75, 1 08, 1 50, 1 52
Rank, Louis Philippe 5 1
Rappaport, Roy A . 1 7, 32, 3 5 , 37, 38, 4 1 , 42
rapture 1 1 6, 148, 1 70, 1 80, 1 8 1 , 1 83, 1 88, 1 94, 202, 203, 205,
207, 2 1 6
reality assessment 97, 98, 1 00, 1 0 5 , 1 07, 1 1 7, 1 23, 1 4 1 , 1 46,
1 57, 1 65, 1 70
rebirth 78
recitation 25, 76
reductionism 90, 2 1 2
Rees, Geraint 29
Reich, Wilhelm 86
Reinders, A.A.T. Simone 1 00
religion 4, 9, 25, 3 5 , 4 1 , 46, 60, 77, 89, 203
religious 4, 3 1 , 4 1 , 42, 46, 75, 76, 1 44, 202
representation 9, 1 2-3 1 , 34, 35, 37-44, 46, 54, 56, 96, 1 03, 1 40
repressed 1 06, 1 07, 1 1 3, 1 1 7- 1 3 1 , 1 46, 1 49, 1 57, 1 5 8, 1 6 1 , 1 66,
1 67, 1 70, 1 82, 1 83, 1 93
repression 85, 1 04, 1 06, 1 07, 1 08, 1 1 1 , 1 1 2, 1 1 9, 1 2 1 , 1 23, 1 24,
1 25 , 1 30, 1 32, 1 33, 1 34, 1 49, 1 66, 1 67
resistance 1 2 1 , 1 25 , 1 66
Richards, Graham 82
ritual 4, 5 , 25, 3 1 -4 1
Rolls, Edmund 1 1 3, 1 72, 1 73
Rose, Steven 30, 8 1 , 90, 9 5 , 96, 97, 173
Rosetta stone 8 1 , 82
Rovee-Collier, Carolyn 1 22
Rumbaugh, Duane 9, 1 4
259
ABSORPTION
Sacks, Oliver 45, 62, 1 29, 1 43, 1 44

Sander-Hansen, C.E. 5 1
satisfaction 86, 99, 1 00, 1 04- 1 06, 1 20, 1 3 5, 1 37- 1 4 1 , 1 45 , 1 47,
1 49, 1 52- 1 5 5 , 1 57, 1 5 8, 1 65 , 1 87
Sauneron, Serge 50
Savage-Rumbaugh, E. Sue 9, 1 4
Schacter, Daniel L. 1 23
Scherer, Klaus R. 1 1 4
Schooler, Jonathan W. 1 47
Schopen, Gregory 77
Schouten, Maurice K.D. 83, 2 1 2
Schuchardt, Hugo 5 8
Schwartz, Jeffrey M. 1 29, 1 6 1
scientific 5 , 74, 75, 82, 87, 89, 90, 92, 1 1 4, 1 69, 1 86
Searle, John A. 1 8, 2 1 , 60, 9 1 , 1 33
seclusion 1 48, 1 70, 1 80, 1 82, 1 88, 1 89, 1 95 , 20 1 , 207
secondary trace 97
seeking system 1 1 3, 1 68 , 1 69, 1 97
Seligman, Martin E.P. 205
semantic 1 5, 36, 48, 49, 50, 53, 54, 62, 64, 65, 66, 67, 9 1 , 1 22
semantic etymologizing 36, 49, 50, 66, 67
semantic etymology 49
Senghas, Ann 1 6
sexual instinct 8 5 , 86, 1 38, 1 53, 1 73, 1 74, 1 75
sexuality 85, 92, 1 35 , 1 37- 1 39, 1 4 1 , 1 47, 1 49, 1 5 1 , 1 5 8, 1 73,
1 74
Shamdasani, Sonu 92
Sherman 9, 1 1 , 1 2, 1 3, 1 5, 24, 28, 34, 48, 54
sign 43, 45, 1 04, 1 05 , 1 45, 1 67
signless 1 44, 1 45, 1 46, 20 1 , 2 1 6
signless absorption 1 46
signless-absorption-of-mind 1 44, 1 45 , 20 1 , 2 1 6
Siok, Wai Ting 45
Skinner, Burrhus Frederic 96
Slater, Lauren 80
slip 1 28, 1 29, 1 82
260
Index
social reality 1 8
Socrates 65, 66, 67
Solms, Mark 1 06, 1 08, 1 09, 1 1 1 , 1 1 3, 1 22, 1 86, 1 97
speech 4, 3 1 , 32, 34, 49, 53, 54, 60, 6 1 , 1 28, 1 7 8
Spiegel, David 29, 1 02, 1 1 9, 1 45 , 1 59, 1 60
Spitzer, Carsten 1 07
Staal, Frits 25, 32, 36, 38
Stace, W. T. 27
stage-of-meditation 1 48, 1 60, 1 80, 1 8 1 , 1 88, 1 89, 2 1 6
Stangroom, Jeremy 40
Stephenson, F. Richard 7 5
Stitch, Steven 8 3
Strachey, James 2 1 6
Strivay, Lucienne 1 1
Strobach, Anika 5 1
Strong, John 79
sublimated 1 54, 1 58
sublimation 86, 87, 1 49, 1 53, 1 74
suffering 78, 79, 80, 8 1 , 83, 1 3 5, 1 59, 1 8 1 , 200, 20 1
Sumitani, M. 1 50
symbol 1 0, 1 7, 36, 5 6, 57, 68
symbolic 4, 5 , 9-3 1 , 34, 3 5 , 37-44, 46, 48, 53, 5 5, 68, 69, 1 03
symbolic reference 1 1 , 1 5, 1 6, 25, 27, 28, 29, 34, 3 5 , 38, 39, 4 1 ,
42, 48, 53, 5 5 , 68, 69
symbolic threshold 1 0, 1 2, 1 4, 2 1 , 28, 30, 34, 42, 68, 69
syntactical 1 0
syntax 30, 43, 49, 60, 6 1 , 68, 8 1
system of the unconscious 1 1 3, 1 69
T
tabula rasa, see also blank slate 1 0 8

Taglialatela, Jared 1 4
Tallerman, Maggie 57, 6 1 , 62, 65, 66, 67
Tantric 32
Tavris, Carol 1 70
Taylor, John G. 1 1 5, 1 1 6
26 1
ABSORPTION
tension 99, 1 00, 1 03 , 1 04, 1 06, 1 07, 1 1 7, 1 1 9, 1 20, 1 22- 1 28,

1 32, 1 34, 1 42- 149, 1 5 1 , 1 53, 1 54, 1 5 5, 1 58, 1 60, 1 631 68, 1 70, 1 7 1 , 1 82, 1 86, 1 97, 207
Thayer, Julian F. 1 07
therapist 93, 1 1 9, 1 2 1 , 1 22, 1 26, 1 27, 1 30, 1 3 1 , 1 89
therapy 93, 1 1 8, 1 1 9, 1 2 1 , 1 22, 1 26, 1 3 5, 1 60
thirst 79, 1 37, 1 59, 1 87, 2 1 6
Tononi, Giulio 1 09, 1 1 1 , 1 1 2, 1 6 1 , 1 69
Tooby, John 1 50
trace 69, 9 5 , 97- 1 07, 1 1 1 , 1 1 3, 1 1 7, 1 1 8, 1 1 9, 1 2 1 - 1 24, 1 27,
1 3 1 , 1 34, 1 4 1 , 1 49, 1 53- 1 5 5, 1 6 1 , 1 64- 1 66, 1 69, 1 70
trace unit 97- 1 00, 1 24, 1 34, 1 65, 1 66, 1 70
transference 93, 1 2 1 , 1 26
Turnbull, Oliver 1 06, 1 1 3, 1 22, 1 86, 1 97
Turner, Mark 1 8, 36, 74
u
unconscious 29, 88, 89, 9 1 , 92, 93, 1 08, 1 1 0- 1 1 3, 1 2 1 , 1 22, 1 6 1 ,

1 69, 206, 2 1 0
Underhill, Evelyn 205, 206
unpleasurable 99, 1 06, 1 42, 1 45
urge 87, 99, 1 0 1 , 1 02, 1 04- 1 07, 1 1 7- 1 20, 1 23, 1 27, 1 34, 1 36,
1 37, 1 38, 1 4 1 , 1 49, 1 7 1 , 1 87
v
Van Bloss, Nick 1 29

Van Driem, George 1 6, 5 8, 68
Van Eck, Dingmar 83
Van Eeden, Frederik 16
Van Laerhoven, Eddy 5
Vergote, A. 87
w
Wallace, B. Alan 205

Wall, Pat 1 50
262
Index
Walshe, Maurice 200
Warren, Richard M. 2 1 , 49
Watson, Peter 8 1
Watt, Douglas F. 1 09
web 1 4, 24-29, 38, 44, 45, 46
Wegner, Daniel L. 1 29, 209, 2 1 0, 2 1 1
Weissweiler, Eva 1 1 9
Werner, Heinz 50
Whipple, Beverly 82, 1 44, 1 5 1 , 1 52
Whitman, Walt 1 1 3
Wilson, John A. 50
Wilson, Sir David 53
Wong, Alana T. 1 23
working hypothesis 73, 74, 75, 76, 79, 84, 1 59, 1 7 5 , 208
Wray, Alison 33, 56-64, 67
Wulff, David M. 26
Wynne, Alexander 78
x
Xuanzang 74
y
Yanomamo 40
Yaska 67
Yong, Ed 45
Z
Zaleski, Carol 52
Zen 1 1 5
263
CPSIA infonnation can be obtained at www . ICGtesting.com

Printed in the USA
LVOW 1 2 s 1 65509 1 0 1 3
3 5 6 1 84LV00008BI1 1 021P
111 1 111 1111 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 11
9 783906 000 2 4 4

Absorption - Human Nature and Buddhist Liberation

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Absorption - Human Nature and Buddhist Liberation

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Buddhism Series

HUMAN NATURE AND BUDDHIST LIBERATION

Copyright 20 1 2 Johannes Bronkhorst

PART I: THE SYMBOLIC MIND

................ . ......... ......................

ApPENDIX I: Semantic etymologies

.......... ... .......... .... .... . . ..

................. ......... .... ........

ApPENDIX 2: Symbolic rderence and the origin of languagc. . .... . . . 55

PART II: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE BUDDHA

................................... .................................... ........... ..........................

OUTLINE OF A PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY

............ . ....... .... .................. .... .

.......... .. ........ .. .... ..

... .......... .................. ........ ..... .........

.... ........... ............ . .... ..

. .... ........ .. .. .... .. . .................... ..

ApPENDIX I: The main texts, with a psychological commentar y

........................... .................... . .................. .. . .... ..

. . .. .. .. ... ..... .... ...

.. .................................... ... ........................... .. ......... .. . ......... . .

..... .......... ....

...... ... ...

... ... .. ... ............

Technical Terms and their Sanskrit and Pali Equivalents . .. .

.................................. ....... .... ....

...... ...... .... .. .

..................................... .............................. ........... .................. .

My most fundamental objective is to urge a change

Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (p. viii-ix) .

of ideas) , concurring views of others, possible objections, and

sophical soteriology: Bronkhorst on absorption" by Eddy Van Laer

The Symbolic Mind

The evolutionary proximity of human beings to other primates

In research carried out during the seventies at Georgia State

ABSORPTION, PART I: T H E SYMBOLIC MIND

The more specific aim of the experiment was to find out

experienced by so-called feral children, may human infants not succeed

ABSORPTION, PART I: THE SYMBOLIC MIND

See Deacon, 1 997, Part Two : Brain (pp. 1 45-3 1 8 ).

guistic utterances, i.e., primarily words. However, these same

ABSORPTION, PART I: T H E SYMBOLIC MIND

There is no single circuit activity or code that corresponds

A shift of context can change the qualia that are parts of

ABSORPTION, PART I: T H E SYMBOLIC MIND

now be created that take us away from our immediate impulses

would be no detachment from immediate arousal and compul

sessed of languages composed, first, oflexicons made up of symbols in

ABSORPTION, PART I: THE SYMBOLIC MIND

by tectonic, meteorological and organic processes. They

Searle, 1 999: llS.

1 6 See, e.g., Turner, 1 99 6; Deacon & Cashman, 2009: 49 6 ff.; Boyd,

Our human environment contains not just food and

rative. Indeed, [ ..]

when we let in these words

tend to take over, creating us out of the raw materials

Our fundamental tactic of self-protection, self-control,

I? Cpo Hirstein, 2005: 239: "The creative process of confabulation, its

ABSORPTION, PART I: THE SYMBOLIC MIND

We may sum up what precedes by citing once more Deacon

1 . Symbolic representation affects the way we experience the

objects to which a function has been attributed (bank-notes

ABSORPTION, PART I: THE SYMBOLIC MIND

that includes us as active agents, we need to distinguish