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Document 1 of 1

The effects of corporate governance on performance and financial distress


Author: Hassan Al-Tamimi, Hussein A
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Abstract: Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to investigate the UAE national banks' practices of corporate
governance (CG) and the perception of the UAE national banks of the effects of CG on performance and
financial distress. Design/methodology/approach - A modified questionnaire has been developed, divided into
two parts. The first part covers disclosure and transparency, executive compensation, relationship with
shareholders, governance structure, policies and compliance, relationship with stakeholders, and board of
directors. The second part deals with performance and financial distress. Findings - The results indicate that
UAE banks are aware of the importance of disclosure transparency, executive compensation, the relationship
with shareholders and stakeholders, and the role of the board of directors. The results also indicate that the
corporate governance practices of UAE national banks are acceptable. In addition, the results reveal that there
is a significant positive relationship between CG practices of UAE national banks and disclosure and
transparency, shareholders' interests, stakeholders' interests, and the role of the board of directors.
Furthermore, the results indicate that there is an insignificant positive relationship between CG practices of UAE
national banks and performance level, and that there is a significant positive relationship between financial
distress and CG practices of UAE national banks. Finally, the study found that there is no significant difference
in the level of CG practices between the UAE's national conventional banks and its Islamic banks.
Originality/value - The current study is considered the first of its kind conducted on the UAE. To the best of the
author's knowledge, no such studies have been conducted regarding the effect of CG on performance and
financial distress of UAE national conventional and Islamic banks.
Full text: Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the UAE national banks' practices of corporate governance (CG),
and the perception of the UAE national banks of the effect of CG on performance and financial distress. This
study attempts to answer the question: are UAE banks aware of the importance of disclosure transparency,
executive compensations, the relationship with shareholders, stakeholders and the role of board of directors?
Also an attempt will be made to answer the question: are CG practices of UAE banks within an acceptable
level? Numerous studies have been published about CG in general and CG and performance, but not that much
about CG and financial distress. [16] Imen (2007) indicated in this regard that the number of bank failures and
financial distress during the last two decades raises questions on the competency of the governance practices
of the banking system and it is assumed that the UAE banking system might not be exempted in this regard. To
the best knowledge of the author, the current study of CG practices of UAE banks might be considered the first
study of its kind which represents the main motivation of the study.
The UAE has 51 commercial banks, 23 of which are national banks with the remaining 28 being foreign banks.
Among the national banks, there were eight Islamic banks as of the end of 2009. The total assets of the UAE
banks were AED 1,521 billion in 2009 (about US$414 billion). The national banks' total assets were AED 976
billion (about US$267.8 billion), constituting 64 percent of UAE banks' total assets. The eight Islamic banks' total
assets represent about 17 percent of the national banks' total assets and about 11 percent of the total assets of
UAE banks ([9] Emirates Bank Association, 2009). The study covers the national banks only, as the foreign
banks are branches with their head office located abroad. Most of CG elements of these foreign banks are
mainly decided by their head office, such as board members, board compensation, relationship with
shareholders, and CG structure and policies.
The paper is structured as follows: literature review and development of hypotheses, research method and data,
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testing the study hypotheses, and conclusions.


Literature review and development of hypotheses
Literature review
The following is an attempt to summarize the main conclusions of some of the most recent research conducted
about CG practices.
CG and performance
[13] Huang (2010) examined the effects of board structure and ownership on a bank's performance using a
sample of 41 commercial banks in Taiwan. The results indicated that board size, number of outside directors,
and family owned shares are positively associated with bank performance, whereas the number of supervisory
directors has a negative influence on performance. The findings provide empirical support for CG, which
improves the performance of banks with a dual board system in Taiwan. The relations between dimensions of
CG and corporate performance of Lebanese banks were examined by [6] Chalhoub (2009). He found significant
relationships between performance and five dimensions of CG comprising governance as daily practice:
governance literacy, code of ethics, transparency, shareholders' participation in governance, and accountability.
On the other hand, the study found insignificant correlation between performance and three dimensions of CG,
namely, governance training, transparency, and shareholder input in decisions.
The relationship between CG efficiency and Saudi banks' performance was investigated by [1] Al-Hussein and
Johnson (2009). They found a strong relationship between the efficiency of CG structure and bank
performance, which reflects the positive impact of CG practices on performance. However, they also concluded
that the relationships between the efficiency of CG structure and bank performance of government and local
ownership groups were not significant.
[28] Wang and Xiao (2006) investigated the relationship between CG characteristics and the risk of financial
distress in the context of the Chinese transitional economy. They used a sample of 96 financially distressed
companies and 96 healthy companies. They found that large shareholder ownership, state ownership, and the
proportion of independent directors are negatively associated with the probability of distress. Additionally,
managerial agency costs are badly detrimental to a company's financial status. The results also indicate that the
degree of balanced ownership, managerial ownership, board size, and CEO duality do not significantly affect
the probability of default.
CG and financial crisis
It is worth mentioning here that sound CG has been the main factor in the remarkable resilience of the
Australian banking sector in the face of the global financial crisis, according to [11] Hawtrey (2009) in his study
of Australian banks.
The effect of some governance factors like ownership, independent directors, and agency costs on financial
distress were also examined by [14] Li et al. (2008). The main findings of their study were a negative
relationship between financial stress and ownership concentration, state ownership, ultimate owner,
independent directors, and auditors' opinion. On the other hand, the study found positive relationship between
administrative expense ratio and the likelihood of financial distress.
[20] Persons (2007) in his study "Corporate governance in Thailand: what has been done since the 1997
financial crisis?" indicates that Thailand has taken many steps to improve its CG, including voluntary
approaches such as best practice guidelines for board of directors and audit committees, and CG rating; and
mandatory approaches such as enhancing the rights of minority shareholders and creditors, increasing the
board of directors' accountability, making accounting and auditing standards consistent with internationally
acceptable standards, and strengthening the enforcement of securities regulation.
[24] Lee and Yeh (2004) examined the correlation between CG and financial distress in Taiwan. The data
suggest that three variables that proxy for CG (the percentage of directors occupied by the controlling
shareholder; the percentage of controlling shareholders holding shares pledged for bank loans (pledge ratio);
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and the deviation in control away from the cash flow rights) are positively related to the risk for financial distress
in the following year. They also concluded that firms with weak CG are vulnerable to economic downturns and
the probability of falling into financial distress increases.
[23] Simpson and Gleason (1999) investigated board structure, ownership, and financial distress in banking
firms. The following aspects of ownership and governance were considered: ownership by directors and offices,
ownership by the CEO, number of directors, percentage of inside directors, and CEO duality. The results
indicate a lower probability of financial distress when one person is both the CEO and chairman of the board,
but the other factors did not have a significant effect.
Other studies
[26] Swain (2009) reviewed the existing codes of CG in India. He analyzed the CG structures and practices in
HDFC Bank by using a case study methodology. The study used both primary and secondary data. The results
indicated that India has a good CG mechanism and disclosure practices on par with world counterparts.
CG practices of Islamic banks were examined by [10] Ghayad (2008). The study dealt with two CG issues: the
role of depositors and the effect of Shari'a board on the CG of Islamic banks. The study concluded that the
practice of the investigated Islamic banks indicates that such banks must have a Shari'a advisory board with
good knowledge in finance to help the management of the bank develop new products in accordance with
Shari'a rules. In order to achieve better CG in Islamic banks, it has been proposed to broaden the scope of
investment accounts holder represented in the board of the bank.
[27] Union Arab Banks (2007) conducted a survey in 2007 on CG of the Arab banking sector. They developed a
questionnaire for their survey, which the current study will use with some modification. The survey covered six
Arab countries: Egypt, Qatar, Yemen, Oman, UAE, and Jordan. The study had several main conclusions:
- the banks surveyed have in place a good general framework for good CG;
- they also have written policies on CG and codes of ethics, they experience to a large extent equitable
treatment of shareholders, and they protect to a large extent the rights of their stakeholders;
- they enjoy a high level of disclosure of information and financial transparency;
- they have internal and independent persons on their boards, but independent directors do not have a majority
presence on these boards;
- they have a special committee for supervising and monitoring major business functions; and finally
- they do not take into consideration the evaluation of clients' CG practices in their credit risk assessment
systems.
[3] Polo (2007), in her article "Corporate governance of banks: the current state of the debate", emphasizes the
regulatory aspect and indicates that regulatory intervention is the most important corporate control mechanism
in banking. The same conclusion was reported by Levine and Levine (2006), who heavily questioned the
present banking regulatory framework. Furthermore, [18] Mullineux (2006) emphasizes that a good CG of banks
requires regulations to balance the interests of depositors, taxpayers, and the shareholders.
A survey was conducted by CFA Institute (2006), in which an e-mail invitation containing a link to a web-based
survey was distributed to 3,780 CFA charter holders and CFA Institute members in Hong Kong and China. The
respondents were presented with 16 CG-related issues, which were categorized under:
- board composition, structure, and mechanisms;
- relationship with stakeholders and shareholders; and
- disclosure and transparency.
Survey respondents in China encouraged a continued evolution of the existing system, with particular attention
to improving shareholder rights and transparency of financial reporting. Executive compensation and the
separation of the roles of CEO and chairman were seen as becoming more important. The study also concluded
that other activities that will receive institutional scrutiny as they develop in China include disclosure
requirements regarding related-party transactions and procedures for mergers and takeovers. The most
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important recommendation of this study was that it is important to the Chinese market and to Chinese
companies generally to continue along the path of improving CG structures in consultation with the investor
community and consistent with global best practices for CG.
The impact of CG on the financial supervisory activity of the authorities was examined by [17] Monaci (2006).
He concluded that if governance mechanisms work effectively, supervisory authorities intervene only rarely,
because this means that the market is efficient. [21] Reaz and Arun (2006) investigated CG of the banking
sector in Bangladesh. They used a structured questionnaire survey to find out the prevailing situation in the
banking sector regarding the core elements of CG such as ownership/shareholding structure, control of firms,
board issues, management contracts and compensation, audit, and disclosure. Their study concludes that
political interference and failure by the regulators has contributed to governance problems in the banks.
From the above literature review, the following conclusions can be derived:
- There is a significant relationship between performance and CG.
- There is a negative relationship between ownership concentration, state ownership, ultimate owner,
independent directors, and auditors' opinion and financial stress.
- Some studies questioned heavily the present banking regulatory framework.
- A good CG of banks requires regulations to balance the interests of depositors, taxpayers, and the
shareholders.
- Large shareholder ownership, state ownership, and the proportion of independent directors are negatively
associated with the probability of distress.
- Firms with weak CG are vulnerable to economic downturns, and the probability of falling into financial distress
increases.
- There is a lower probability of financial distress when one person is both the CEO and chairman of the board.
Research hypotheses
Based on the stated purpose, the literature review, and research questions, the following hypotheses are
formulated:

H1. There is a significant positive relationship between CG practices of UAE national banks and disclosue
(trasparency) shareholders' interests, stackholders' interests, and the role of board of directors.
The assumption here and based on the above mentioned studies (CFA Institute, 2006; [27] Union Arab Banks,
2007; [10] Ghayad, 2008) is that the practice of CG is affected by these factors. Therefore, the purpose is to
investigate which of these factors has explained more the behavior of CG:

H2. There is a significant positive relationship between CG practices of UAE national banks and performance
level. The formulation of this hypothesis is based on the assumption that the best CG practices, the more
improvement in performance level ([13] Huang, 2010; [6] Chalhoub, 2009; [1] Al-Hussein and Johnson, 2009).

H3. There is a significant negative relationship between CG practices of UAE national banks and financial
distress. An attempt will be made to examine if there is any relationship between CG practices of UAE national
banks and financial distress which has been examined before in the context of other countries not UAE ([11]
Hawtrey, 2009; [14] Li et al. , 2008; [20] Persons, 2007).

H4. There is a significant difference in the level of CG practices between the UAE national conventional banks
and Islamic banks. The purpose of formulating this hypothesis is to compare CG practices between two groups,
the conventional banks and Islamic banks, as there is a general impression indicating that conventional banks
are better than Islamic banks regarding CG practices.
Research method and data
Research instrument
The researcher used a modified questionnaire that was mainly based on two surveys, the first conducted by [27]
Union Arab Banks (2007) and the second the China Corporate Governance Survey conducted by CFA Institute
(2007). The modified questionnaire consists of 44 questions using a five-point Likert scale, and includes two
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parts. The first part covers six elements of CG namely, disclosure and transparency, executive compensation,
relationship with shareholders, governance structure, policies and compliance, relationship with stakeholders
and the role of board of directors. The main reason of including these elements is to get responses that enable
researcher to answer research questions and to test research hypotheses. However, although the questionnaire
used is mainly based on two previously tested questionnaires, the researcher eliminating, adding, or rewording
some of the questions included in the first draft. As to assess the scales' content validity, the questionnaire draft
was piloted by three academicians and three practitioners, to examine the scales, as was suggested by [8]
Devellis (1991). The first part consists of 31 questions: three questions about disclosure and transparency; two
questions devoted to executive compensation; seven questions about the relationship with shareholders; ten
questions assigned to governance structure, policies, and compliance; three questions about the relationship
with stakeholders; and six questions devoted to the role of the board of directors. The second part deals with
performance and financial distress and consists of 13 questions: nine questions about performance indicators
and four questions assigned to financial distress. Regarding performance indicators, the purpose is to analyse
perception of respondents which is based on their experience regarding performance. The same can be said
regarding financial distress. For example, one of the aspects about financial distress is questioning liquidity
problem during the last two years. The needed answer is to show to what extent the respondent agrees or
disagrees with the existence of this problem. For some respondents, a shortage of AED 5 million represents a
sever problem based on their experience, but it might not be considered a sever problem from the point of view
of the other respondents.
Sampling and data collection
The targeted population are those heavily involved in CG of the UAE national banks. The questionnaires were
distributed to one, two, or three senior managers who are directly responsible for CG of the 23 national banks.
The number was decided by the bank's management concerned. The questionnaires were directly distributed
by the researcher. This method gave the researcher a good chance to meet the managers who are directly
involved in CG and have a clear picture about CG practices. It is worth mentioning here that based on the
interviews conducted by the researcher there are big differences in CG practices among UAE national banks.
Some of the UAE national banks have received awards for best practices and some have created a separate
unit for CG, whereas others give little attention to CG and still need to make further efforts in this regard. This
can be mainly attributed to the fact that there is no regulation enforcing the UAE banks' compliance with CG
requirements. The UAE Central Bank has issued guidelines in this regard encouraging UAE banks to follow CG
best practices, but they are not obliged to do so ([5] Central Bank of the UAE, 2006).
From the 47 questionnaires distributed to the senior mangers of UAE national banks involved in corporate
governance, we received 43 responses, of which two were excluded because of incomplete data. The
remaining 41 usable questionnaires represent an effective response rate of around 82 percent of the total
targeted mangers.
Reliability
The modified questionnaire adopted in this study consists of two parts. The first part is related to CG
characteristics and includes 31 questions distributed over six characteristics. Reliability of the measures was
assessed with the use of Cronbach's . It consists of estimates of how much variation in scores of different
variables is attributable to chance or random errors ([22] Selltiz et al. , 1976). As a general rule a coefficient
greater than or equal to 0.7 is considered acceptable and a good indication of construct reliability ([19] Nunnally,
1978). Cronbach's for the six characteristics ranges from 0.837 to 0.893. The values of Cronbach's indicate
that all of these characteristics are reliable (Table I [Figure omitted. See Article Image.]).
Descriptive statistics
Table II [Figure omitted. See Article Image.] provides descriptive statistics for the six characteristics of CG,
performance, and financial distress. Mean values shown in Table II [Figure omitted. See Article Image.] reveal
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that the mean value for all categories is more than 2.5. This value gives a positive answer on the research
questions. The mean values indicate that the UAE banks are aware of the importance of disclosure
transparency, executive compensation, the relationship with shareholders and stakeholders, and the role of the
board of directors. It can be seen that the participants earned the highest score for the role of board of directors
among the six elements of CG, followed by disclosure and transparency, executive compensation, relationship
with stakeholders, relationship with shareholders, and governance structure, policies, and compliance.
The results also give a good indication about the seriousness of UAE banks regarding CG practices. This
conclusion is supported by the respondents' answers on the ten questions about governance structure, policies,
and compliance, as the mean value is 3.6 which is more than 2.5.
It can be concluded that CG practices of UAE national banks are acceptable based on the respondents'
answers on the first part, the six characteristics of CG. However, based on the interview conducted by the
author, some banks were making excellent progress regarding CG practices, but unfortunately in some other
banks there are few employees who understand the meaning of CG and even some who think that CG is the
same as corporate banking. CG practices had already been questioned by some of the above mentioned
studies such as [3] Polo (2007) and Levine and Levine (2006).
Testing the study's hypotheses
In order to assess the predictive ability of the six characterstics of CG, a linear regression analysis was
performed with corporate governance (GOV) as the dependent variable. In addition, the effect of CG on
performance and financial distress is also examined with corporate governance (GOV) as independent variable
and performance and financial distress as dependent variables. The first regression model is as follows:
Equation 1 [Figure omitted. See Article Image.] where:
GOV - corporate governance, structure, policies, and compliance (as a proxy of CG).
TRAN - disclosure and transparency.
COMP - executive compensation.
SHAR - relationship with shareholders.
STAK - relationship with stakeholders.
BOARD - board of directors.
Before testing the contribution of the above-mentioned independent variables to the regression model, the
possibility of a multicollinearity problem among these variables needs to be addressed. A multicollinearity test
was carried out to assess the degree of correlation among the independent variables. Table III [Figure omitted.
See Article Image.] provides the correlations among these variables. The "rule of thumb" test, as proposed by
[2] Anderson et al. (1990) suggests that any correlation coefficient exceeding (0.7) indicates a potential
problem. The table reveals that there is a multicollinearity problem. Therefore, one independent variable was
dropped from the regression model, namely the relationship with shareholders variable (SHAR). However, the
elimination of this variable does not affect the structure of the model as shareholders represent one of the
components of the stakeholders.
Table IV [Figure omitted. See Article Image.] shows the results of the first regression model. It can be seen from
the table that R2 is 0.68. This indicates that the three independent variables explain 68 percent of the variations
of CG. This R2 is significant at the 1 percent level. The estimated coefficients of the four independent variables
were, as expected, positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level in the case of the stakeholders
variable (STAK) and at the 5 percent level in the case of disclosure and transparency and board of directors.
However, the value of coefficient of the excecutive compensation (COMP) variable is as expected positive but is
statistically insignificant. This is consistent with the findings reached by [6] Chalhoub (2009), [27] Union Arab
Banks (2007), [21] Reaz and Arun (2006) and CFA Institute (2006). The results confirm the H1 , which states:
there is a significant positive relationship between CG practices of UAE banks and disclosure and trasparency,
shareholders' interests, stakeholders' interests, and the role of board of directors.
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The second and the third regression models are as follows: Equation 2 [Figure omitted. See Article Image.]
where:
GOV - corporate governance, structure, policies, and compliance (as a proxy of CG).
PERF - performance.
FDIS - financial distress.
Table V [Figure omitted. See Article Image.] shows the results of the second regressions. It can be seen from
the table that R2 is -0.018. This indicates that the independent variable (CG) explains -1.8 percent of the
variations of performance, but is statistically insignificant. The estimated coefficient of the independent variable
was as expected, positive but statistically insignificant. The results did not confirm H2 , which means CG
negatively affects performance. This is consistent with the findings of [25] Staikouras et al. (2007), but
inconsistent with the findings of [13] Huang (2010), [6] Chalhoub (2009), [11] Hawtrey (2009) and [1] Al-Hussein
and Johnson (2009), who reported a positive relationship between CG and performance. This conclusion
requires that UAE national banks review CG practices and take the necessary actions for improvement. Based
on the interviews conducted by the author, these results might be expected as most of the UAE national banks
reported concerns regarding board of directors composition, executive compensation, and CG culture.
Table VI [Figure omitted. See Article Image.] reveals the regression results of the third model, in which financial
distress is considered as a dependent variable and CG as the independent variable. The independent variable
(CG) explains 7.1 percent of the variations of financial distress but is statistically insignificant. The estimated
coefficient of the independent variable (CG) was unexpected, positive and statistically significant at the 10
percent level. The results did not confirm H3 . This is consistent with the findings of [24] Lee and Yeh (2004),
but inconsistent with the findings of [28] Wang and Xiao (2006) and [23] Simpson and Gleason (1999).
It can be concluded here that the results did not reflect the reality or expose the effect of financial crisis, and that
therefore the results should be interpreted with caution. The evidence for this concern is the dramatic decline in
net profits in 2008 of most of the UAE national banks as a result of the financial crisis. For example, net profit of
the third, fifth, and sixth largest banks declined by 34, 31 and 13.6 percent, respectively ([9] Emirates Bank
Association, 2009).
Finally, H4 is tested by using one-way ANOVA analysis. H4 states: there is a significant difference in the level of
CG practices between the UAE conventional banks and Islamic banks. Table VII [Figure omitted. See Article
Image.] reveals that there is no significant difference between the UAE national conventional and Islamic banks
regarding CG practices, which means H4 is rejected. These results were not expected because most of the
UAE Islamic banks are new, therefore they are not in a position to compete with the well established banks (the
conventional banks).
Conclusions
In this study an attempt has been made to investigate the UAE national banks' practices of CG and the
perception of the UAE national banks of the effect of CG on performance and financial distress.
A modified questionnaire has been developed. The targeted population are those heavily involved in CG at UAE
national banks. The questionnaires were distributed to one, two, or three senior managers. The number was
decided by the most senior managers who are directly responsible for corporate governance of the 23 national
banks. The questionnaires were directly distributed by the researcher. This method gave the researcher a good
chance to meet the managers who are directly involved in CG and who have a clear picture about CG practices.
The results indicate that the UAE banks are aware of the importance of disclosure transparency, executive
compensations, the relationship with shareholders and stakeholders, and the role of the board of directors. The
results also indicate that CG practices of UAE national banks are acceptable. In addition, the results reveal that
there is a significant positive relationship between CG practices of UAE national banks and disclosure and
transparency, shareholders' interests, stakeholders' interests, and the role of the board of directors.
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Furthermore, the results indicate that there is an insignificant positive relationship between CG practices of UAE
national banks and performance level, and that there is a significant positive relationship between financial
distress and CG practices of UAE national banks. Finally, the study found that there is no significant difference
in the level of CG practices between the UAE's national conventional banks and its Islamic banks. Regarding
the implication of the results of this research, as the UAE national banks are aware of the vital role of CG
according to the findings reached, therefore, it is important to concentrate more on CG practices. However, the
results indicate that the role of CG practices is not good enough in the case of financial distress or financial
crisis, which means that there is still a space for improvement in CG practices.
The author would like to thank the University of Sharjah for the research grant.
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27. Union Arab Banks (2007), Survey Results: Corporate Governance Survey of the Arab Banking Sector,
available at: www.cipe.org/regional/mena/pdf/CGSurveyJanuary2007.pdf.
28. Wang, Z.-J. and Xiao, L.D. (2006), "Corporate governance and financial distress", The Chinese Economy,
Vol. 39 No. 5, pp. 5-27.
Further Reading
1. Bektas, E. and Kaymak, K. (2009), "Governance mechanisms and ownership in an emerging market: the
case of Turkish banks", Emerging Markets Finance &Trade, Vol. 45 No. 6, pp. 20-32.
2. Che Haat, M.H., Abdul Rahman, R. and Mahenthiran, S. (2008), "Corporate governance, transparency and
performance of Malaysian companies", Managerial Auditing Journal, Vol. 23 No. 8, pp. 744-78.
3. Ezat, A. and El-Masry, A. (2008), "The impact of corporate governance on the timeliness of corporate internet
reporting by Egyptian listed companies", Managerial Finance, Vol. 34 No. 12, pp. 848-67.
4. Liew, P.K. (2007), "Corporate governance reforms in Malaysia: the key leading players' perspectives",
Corporate Governance, Vol. 15 No. 5, pp. 724-40.
Appendix
About the author
Hussein A. Hassan Al-Tamimi is an Associate Professor at the College of Business Administration at Sharjah
University. He holds a PhD degree in Business Finance from Dundee University. His research interests include
corporate governance, capital budgeting, financial performance, risk management and behavioural finance.
Hussein A. Hassan Al-Tamimi can be contacted at: hussein@sharjah.ac.ae
AuthorAffiliation
Hussein A. Hassan Al-Tamimi, Department of Accounting, Finance and Economics, University of Sharjah,
Sharjah, United Arab Emirates
Illustration
Equation 1
Equation 2
Table I: The six characteristics of CG and their internal consistency
Table II: Descriptive statistics
Table III: The correlation coefficients between independent variables
Table IV: Summary of regression results - first model
Table V: Summary of regression results - second model
Table VI: Summary of regression results - third model
Table VII: The results of analysis of variance for national banks and Islamic banks
Publication title: Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance
Volume: 20
Issue: 2
Pages: 169-181

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Publication year: 2012


Publication date: 2012
Year: 2012
Publisher: Emerald Group Publishing, Limited
Place of publication: London
Country of publication: United Kingdom
Publication subject: Law, Business And Economics--Banking And Finance
ISSN: 13581988
Source type: Scholarly Journals
Language of publication: English
Document type: Feature
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/13581981211218315
ProQuest document ID: 1014250981
Document URL: http://search.proquest.com/docview/1014250981?accountid=25704
Copyright: Copyright Emerald Group Publishing Limited 2012
Last updated: 2012-07-16
Database: ProQuest Health Management,Banking Information Source

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