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SECTION 22

No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.


RULES
an ex post facto law is one
(a) which makes an act done criminal before the passing of the law and which was innocent when
committed, and punishes such action;
(b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed;
(c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the
crime when it was committed.
(d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law
required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant.
(e) every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the situation of a person to
his disadvantage. This Court added two more to the list, namely:
(f) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty or
deprivation of a right which when done was lawful;
(g) deprives a peson accused of crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled,
such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.(Lacson v.
Executive Secretary, GR 128096 January 20, 1999)
Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectively of penal laws. (Lacson v. Executive
Secretary, GR 128096 January 20, 1999
*People v. Ferrer - 48 SCRA 382
Facts: Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that declared RA1700 or the AntiSubversive Act of 1957 as a bill of attainder. Thus, dismissing the information of subversion against the
following: 1.) Feliciano Co for being an officer/leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP)
aggravated by circumstances ofcontempt and insult to public officers, subversion by a band and aid of
armed men to afford impunity. 2.) Nilo Tayag and 5 others, for being members/leaders of the NPA,
inciting, instigating people to unite and overthrow the Philippine Government. Attended by
AggravatingCircumstances of Aid or Armed Men, Craft, and Fraud. The trial court is of opinion that 1.)
The Congress usurped the powers of the judge 2.) Assumed judicial magistracy by pronouncing the
guilt of the CPP without any forms of safeguard of a judicial trial. 3.) It created a presumption of
organizational guilt by being members of the CPP regardless of voluntariness.
The Anti Subversive Act of 1957 was approved 20June1957. It is an act to outlaw the CPP and similar
associations penalizing membershiptherein, and for other purposes. It defined the Communist Party
being although a political party is in fact an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government, not
only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal means. It declares that the
CPP is a clear and present danger to the security of the Philippines. Section 4 provided that affiliation
with full knowledge of the illegal acts of the CPP is punishable. Section 5 states that due investigation
by a designated prosecutor by the Secretary of Justice be made prior tofiling of information in court.
Section 6 provides for penalty forfurnishing false evidence. Section 7 provides for 2 witnesses in open
court for acts penalized by prision mayor to death. Section 8 allows the renunciation of membership to
the CCP through writing under oath. Section 9 declares the constitutionality of the statute and its valid
exercise under freedom if thought, assembly and association.
Issue: Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder/ ex post facto law.
Held: The court holds the VALIDITY Of the Anti-Subversion Act of 1957. A bill of attainder is solely a
legislative act. It punishes without the benefit of the trial. It is the substitution of judicial determination
to a legislative determination of guilt. In order for a statute be measured as a bill of attainder, the
following requisites must be present: 1.) Thestatute specifies persons, groups. 2.) the statute is applied
retroactively and reach past conduct. (A bill of attainder relatively is also an ex post facto law.) In the
case at bar, the statute simply declares the CPP as an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the
Government for purposes of example of SECTION 4 of the Act. The Act applies not only to the CPP but
also to other organizations having the same purpose and their successors. The Acts focus is on the
conduct not person. Membership to this organizations, to be UNLAWFUL, it must be shown that
membership was acquired with the intent to further the goals of the organization by overt acts. This is

the element of MEMBERSHIPwith KNOWLEDGE that is punishable. This is the required proof of a
members direct participation. Why is membership punished.Membership renders aid and
encouragement to the organization.Membership makes himself party to its unlawful acts.
Furthermore, the statute is PROSPECTIVE in nature. Section 4 prohibits acts committed after approval
of the act. The members of the subversive organizations before the passing of this Act is given an
opportunity to escape liability by renouncing membership in accordance with Section 8. The statute
applies the principle of mutatis mutandis or that the necessary changes having been made. The
declaration of that the CPP is an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Philippine Government should
not be the basis of guilt. This declaration is only a basis of Section 4 of the Act. The EXISTENCE OF
SUBSTANTIVE EVIL justifies the limitation to the exercise of Freedom of Expression and Association in
this matter. Before the enactment of the statute and statements in the preamble, careful investigations
by the Congress were done. The court further stresses that whatever interest in freedom of speech and
association is excluded in the prohibition of membership in the CPP are weak considering NATIONAL
SECURITY and PRESERVATION of DEMOCRACY. The court set basic guidelines to be observed in the
prosecution under RA1700. In addition to proving circumstances/ evidences of subversion, the
following elements must also be established:
1. Subversive Organizations besides the CPP, it must be proven that the organization purpose is to
overthrow the present Government of the Philippines and establish a domination of a FOREIGN
POWER.Membership is willfully and knowingly done by overt acts. 2. In case of CPP, the continued
pursuance of its subversive purpose.Membership is willfully and knowingly done by overt acts.
*Virata v. Sandiganbayan - 202 SCRA 680
Facts: In this case, petitioner is one of the defendants in Civil Case which was filed by PCGG involves
the recovery of ill- gotten wealth amassed by the defendants during the twenty year reign of former
President Ferdinand Marcos. Asserting that the foregoing allegations are vague and are not averred
with sufficient definiteness as to enable him to effectively prepare his responsive pleading, petitioner
Virata filed a motion for a bill of particulars.
Issue: 1. WHETHER OR NOT THE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ADMITTING THE BILL OF PARTICULARS
SUBMITTED BY THE REPUBLIC. 2. WHETHER OR NOT THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE
PCGG ARE AUTHORIZED BY LAW TO DEPUTIZE A COUNSEL TO FILE THE BILL OF PARTICULARS IN
BEHALF OF THE REPUBLIC.
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Held: A bill of particulars is a complementary procedural document consisting of an amplification or
more particularized outline of a pleading, and being in the nature of a more specific allegation of the
facts recited in the pleading. It is the office of the bill of particulars to inform the opposite party and
the court of the precise nature and character of the cause of action or defense which the pleader has
attempted to set forth and thereby to guide his adversary in his preparations for trial, and reasonably
to protect him against surprise at the trial. It gives information of the specific proposition for which the
pleader contends, in respect to any material and issuable fact in the case, and it becomes a part of the
pleading which it supplements. It has been held that a bill of particulars must inform the opposite party
of the nature of the pleaders cause of action or defense, and it must furnish the required items of the
claim with reasonable fullness and precision. Generally, it will be held sufficient if it fairly and
substantially gives the opposite party the information to which he is entitled, as required by the terms
of the application and of the order therefor. It should be definite and specific and not contain general
allegations and conclusions. It should be reasonably certain and as specific as the circumstances will
allow. Guided by the foregoing rules and principles, we are convinced that both the bill of particulars
dated November 3, 1993 and the Limited Bill of Particulars of October 22, 1992 are couched in such
general and uncertain terms as would make it difficult for petitioner to submit an intelligent responsive
pleading to the complaint and to adequately prepare for trial. The bill of particulars dated November
3, 1993: Clearly from the foregoing allegation, the Republic failed miserably to amplify the charge
against Virata because, instead of supplying the pertinent facts and specific matters that form the
basis of the charge, it only made repetitive allegations in the bill of particulars that Virata supported
and assisted the formation of the corporation concerned, which is the very same charge or allegation
in paragraph 14 (m) of the expanded Second Amended Complaint which requires specifications and
unfailing certainty. As such, the important question as to what particular acts of Virata that constitute
support and assistance in the formation of Erectors Holding, Incorporated is still left unanswered, a
product of uncertainty. We now take a closer look at the Limited Bill of Particulars dated October 22,
1992. The said bill of particulars was filed by the Republic to amplify the charge of Viratas being a

dummy, nominee or agent stated in paragraphs 17 and 18 of the expanded Second Amended
Complaint. In the subsequent bill of particulars dated November 3, 1993, the said charge was qualified
by the Republic in the sense that Virata allegedly acted only as an agent.
Furthermore, as correctly
asserted by petitioner Virata, the Limited Bill of Particulars contains new matters which are not covered
by the charge that Virata acted as agent of his co-defendants in the expanded Second Amended
Complaint. Apparently, as may be examined from the three paragraphs of the Limited Bill of
Particulars, Virata, in so doing the acts, can not be considered as an agent of any of his codefendants, on the contrary, the factual circumstances stated in the said bill of particulars indicate
that Virata acted on behalf of the government, in his official capacity as a government officer. This
observation is established by the allegations that Virata acted as a member of the Central Bank
Monetary Board, as chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Export and Foreign Loan
Guarantee Corporation, and, when he executed the Agreement with Meralco on July 7, 1978
concerning the sale of certain properties, he acted as the Finance Minister of the government and as a
representative of the Republic in the contract. In performing the said acts, he, therefore, acted as an
agent of the government, not as an agent of his co-defendants, which is the charge against him in the
expanded Second Amended Complaint. Accordingly, the allegations in the Limited Bill of Particulars
are irrelevant and immaterial to the charge that Virata acted as an agent of his co-defendants. As
clearly established by the foregoing discussion, the two bills of particulars filed by the Republic failed
to properly amplify the charges leveled against Virata because, not only are they mere reiteration or
repetition of the allegations set forth in the expanded Second Amended Complaint, but, to the large
extent, they contain vague, immaterial and generalized assertions which are inadmissible under our
procedural rules. We are of the opinion that the Limited Bill of Particulars dated October 22, 1992
signed by Ramon Felipe IV and the Bill of Particulars dated November 3, 1993 signed by Reynaldo Ros
are valid pleadings which are binding upon the Republic because the two lawyer-signatories are legally
deputized and authorized by the Office of the Solicitor General and the Presidential Commission on
Good Government to sign and file the bills of particulars concerned.
Realizing that it can not
adequately respond to this Courts order of April 6 1993 (G.R. No. 106527) requiring the Republic to
submit the bill of particulars concerning the first three charges against Virata, the Office of the Solicitor
deemed it better to seek the help of the Presidential Commission on Good Government by availing the
services of the latters lawyer who would directly file the required bill of particulars in behalf of the
Republic. This circumstance prompted the Office of the Solicitor General to manifest before the
Sandiganbayan on August 20, 1993 that it would be the PCGG which would file the required bill of
particulars and move that it be excused from doing so as the PCGG, being in-charge of investigating
the case, was in a better position than the OSG. Armed with this authority given by the OSG, the
PCGG, through one of its deputized prosecutors, Reynaldo Ros, filed the bill of particulars dated
November 3, 1993 to amplify the first three charges against Virata stated in paragraphs 14 b(ii), 14g,
and 14 m
of the expanded Second Amended Complaint.
The action of the OSG in seeking the
assistance of the PCGG is not without legal basis. The Administrative Code of 1987, which virtually
reproduces the powers and functions of the OSG enumerated in P.D. No. 478 (The Law Defining the
Powers and Functions of the Office of the Solicitor General), provides it.
Contrary to Viratas
contention, the Solicitor General did not abdicate his function and turn over the handling of the instant
case to the PCGG. Nowhere in the manifestation and motion filed by the OSG on August 20, 1993 is
there an iota or indication that the OSG is withdrawing from the case and that the PCGG is taking over
its prosecution. What the OSG did was merely to call the PCGG for assistance and authorize it to
respond to the motion for a bill of particulars filed by Virata. The OSG was impelled to act this way
because of the existence of the special circumstance that the PCGG, which has the complete records of
the case and being in charge of its investigation, was more knowledgeable and better informed of the
facts of the case than the OSG. The authority, therefore, of Attorney Reynaldo Ros to sign and submit
in behalf of the Republic the bill of particulars dated November 3, 1993 is beyond dispute because 1)
he was duly deputized by the PCGG in pursuance to its power to prosecute cases of ill-gotten wealth
under Executive Order No. 14 of May 14, 1986, 2) the OSG empowered the PCGG to file the bill of
particulars as evidenced by the OSGs manifestation and motion filed on August 20, 1993, and 3) there
was no abdication of OSGs duty by giving the PCGG the authority to file the bill of particulars. On the
other hand, the deputation of Ramon Felipe IV by the Solicitor General to sign and file the Limited Bill
of Particulars is based on Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 478. The Solicitor General is mandated
by law to act as the counsel of the Government and its agencies in any litigation and matter requiring
the services of a lawyer. In providing the legal representation for the Government, he is provided with
vast array of powers, which includes the power to retain and compensate lawyers on contractual basis,
necessary to fulfill his sworn duty with the end view of upholding the interest of the Government.
Thus, the Solicitor General acted within the legal bounds of its authority when it deputized Attorney
Felipe IV to file in behalf of the Republic the bill of particulars concerning the charges stated in

paragraph 17 and 18 of the expanded Second Amended Complaint.


At any rate, whether or not the
lawyer-signatories are duly deputized would not be decisive in the resolution of this case considering
that the two bills of particulars filed by the Republic are mere scraps of paper which miserably failed to
amplify the charges against Virata. For the Republics failure to comply with the courts order to file
the required bill of particulars that would completely and fully inform Virata of the charges against him,
the dismissal of the action against him is proper based on Section 3, Rule 17 of the Revised Rules of
Court and the relevant jurisprudence thereon. Simple justice demands that as stated earlier, petitioner
must know what the complaint is all about. The law requires no less. Although this Court is aware of
the Governments laudable efforts to recover ill-gotten wealth allegedly taken by the defendants, this
Court, however, cannot shrink from its duty of upholding the supremacy of the law under the aegis of
justice and fairness. This Court in dismissing the action against the petitioner has rightfully adhered in
the unyielding tenet - principia, non homines - the rule of law, not of men.
Trinidad v. CA - 202 SCRA 106
Facts: In an information that was filed in the then CFI, herein petitioner, Atty. Tomas Trinidad, was
charged with violation of P.D. 957 for non-delivery of title.
Issue:
Held: Under the fourth assigned error, herein petitioner maintains that PD 957 impairs the obligations
of the vendee (Ms. Dimabuyu) in the contract to sell and that it is an ex post facto law as the provision
thereof provides retroactive effect. The contention is likewise without merit. Quoting the Solicitor
General, the respondent appellate court aptly rebutted this argument, thus: Under P.D. 957, after the
complainant had fully paid for the lo in question, appellant (herein petitioner) as administrator of t
Mother Earth Realty Development Corporation, was legally bound cause the issuance of the
corresponding transfer certificate of title in the name of the buyer. The failure of appellant (herein
petitioner) to do so is punishable under the penal provisions of Section 39 of said decree. Likewise,
under P.D. 957, it is not required that the buyer should pay the taxes. The buyer is only required to pay
for the registration of the Deed of Sale with the Register of Deeds for the issuance of the title but it
does not mention the payment of taxes. With respect to th alleged devaluation of the peso, suffice it to
state that at the time thde contract was executed, the full price of the lot was already agreed upon by
the complainant and the corporation. Lastly, appellant (herein petitioner) asserts that P.D. 957 is an ex
post facto law as the penal provision thereof provides retroactive effect. P.D. 957 cannot be assailed as
an ex post facto law. The act made punishable thereunder is the failure of the owner- developer or
administrator to deliver the title of the lot or unit to the buyer upon full payment, not the execution of
a deed of sale or contract to sell over such lot or unit before the passage of the law. In the instant case
although the contract to sell was executed long before the enactment of P.D. 957, the failure of
appellant (herein petitioner) to deliver the title over the lot upon full payment transpired when the
decree was already in effect. Such law is not ex post facto for the simple reason that what is being
punished is the failure to deliver such title after the enactment of the Decree on July 12, 1976.
People v. Taguba - 229 SCRA 188
Facts: Respondents were both charged with eight counts of illegal recruitment and three counts of
estafa in separate informations
Issue:
Held: The Court agrees that the appellants cannot be convicted of illegal recruitment on a large scale
because only two of the complainants, Jesus Garcia and Elena Santiago, categorically testified that
their recruitment came after February 10, 1986. This was the date when P.D. 2018, the law defining
and penalizing illegal recruitment in a large scale, took effect. P.D. 2018 cannot apply to the appellants
retroactively as it would be an ex post facto law to them. A law is ex post facto if it refers to a criminal
act, punishes an act which was innocent when done, and retroacts to the disadvantage of the accused.
Prior to the said date, recruiting on a large scale was not yet punished with the penalty imposed in the
said decree.
People v. Sandiganbayan 211 SCRA 241

Facts: Assailed in this petition is the resolution promulgated by the Sandiganbayan which granted the
private respondent's motion to quash the information for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) on the ground of prescription of the crime charged.
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Issue:
Held: Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 which was approved on March 16, 1982, amending Section 11 R.A. No.
3019 by increasing from ten (10) to fifteen (15) years the period for the prescription or extinguishment
of a violation of the Anti- Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, may not be given retroactive application to
the "crime" which was committed by Paredes in January 1976 yet, for it should be prejudicial to the
accused. It would deprive him of the substantive benefit of the shorter (10 years) prescriptive period
under Section 11, R.A. 3019, which was an essential element of the "crime" at the time he committed
it. To apply B.P. Blg. 195 to Paredes would make it an ex post facto law for it would after his situation to
his disadvantage by making him criminally liable for a crime that had already been extinguished under
the law existing when it was committed. An ex post facto law is defined as: A law passed after the
occurrence of a fact or commission of an act, which retrospectively changes the legal consequences or
relations of such fact or deed. By Art. I, Sec. 10 of U.S. Const., the states are forbidden to pass "any ex
post facto law". Most all state constitutions contain similar prohibitions against ex post facto laws. An
"ex post facto law" is defined as a law which provides for the infliction of punishment upon a person for
an act done which, when it was committed, was innocent; a law which aggravates a crime or makes it
greater than when it was committed; a law that changes the punishment or inflicts a greater
punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed; a law that changes the rules of
evidence and receives less or different testimony than was required at the time of the commission of
the offense in order to convict the offender; a law which, assuming to regulate civil rights and
remedies only, in effect imposes a penalty or the deprivation of a right which, when done, was lawful; a
law which deprives persons accused of crime of some lawful protection to which they have become
entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or of the proclamation of amnesty;
every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the situation of a person to his
disadvantage. Since an ex post facto law is proscribed by our Constitution (Sec. 22, Article 111, 1987
Constitution), the Sandiganbayan committed no reversible error in ruling that Paredes may no longer
be prosecuted for his supposed violation of R.A. 3019 in 1976, six (6) years before B.P. Blg. 195 was
approved on March 16, 1982. The new prescriptive period under that law should apply only to those
offense which were committed after the approval of B.P. 195.
Co v. CA 227 SCRA 444
Facts: A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 was filed by the salvage
company against petitioner with the Regional Trial Court. The case eventuated in petitioners
conviction of the crime charged on the basis that a check issued merely to guarantee the performance
of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22. Pending litigation, Ministry of Justice Circular
No. 4 (which excludes guarantee check from application of B.P. Blg. 22) was subsequently reversed by
Ministry Circular No. 12 which ruled that a check issued merely to guarantee the performance of an
obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. There he
sought exoneration upon the theory that it was reversible error for the Regional Trial Court but the
Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction.
Issue: Whether or not Ministry Circular No. 12 dated August 8, 1984 declaring the guarantee check will
no longer be considered as a valid defense be actively applied.
HELD: No. Decision of the Court of Appeals and RTC were set aside. Criminal prosecution against
accused-petitioner was dismissed. It would seem that the weight of authority is decidedly in favor of
the proposition that the Courts decision of September 21, 1987 in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987)
that a check issued merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by
B.P. Blg. 22 should not be given retrospective effect to the prejudice of the petitioner and other
persons situated, who relied on the official opinion of the Minister of Justice that such a check did not
fall within the scope of B.P. Blg. 22. This is after all a criminal action all doubts in which, pursuant to
familiar, fundamental doctrine, must be resolved in favor of the accused. Everything considered, the
Court sees no compelling reason why the doctrine of mala prohibita should override the principle of
prospectivity, and its clear implications as herein above set out and discussed, negating criminal
liability.

Rosales v. CA - 255 SCRA 123


Facts: Rosales was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Northern Samar with murder and illegal
possession of firearms. The accused now comes to us on a petition for review. He argues that the
killing on 26 September 1982 was in self-defense. Bulan was trespassing on the fishpond over which
he was overseer.[13] The firing of his shotgun into the air was a reasonable exercise of his authority as
overseer and further showed he had no intention to kill. He had to defend himself when Bulan
struggled to wrest possession of the gun since he could have been killed himself. However, trial court
rendered judgment finding accused Leovigildo Rosales guilty of homicide and imposing upon him the
penalty of imprisonment of ten (10) years of prision mayor as minimum, to seventeen (17) years of
reclusion temporal as maximum.
Issue: Whether or not PD 1866 can be retroactively applied in this case
Held: No. P.D. No. 1866 prescribing the higher penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
reclusion perpetua approved on 29 June 1983 cannot be retroactively applied in this case which
transpired on 26 September 1982 inasmuch as this law is unfavorable to the accused.
Subido v. Sandiganbayan 266 SCRA 379
Facts: The petitioners were charged with Arbitrary Detention. In compliance with the order of the
Sandiganbayan, the prosecution filed its Opposition to the Motion to Quash on 28 September 1995. It
contended that it was clear from 4(b) of R.A. No. 7975 that the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over
both the offense charged and the persons of the accused considering that the basis of its jurisdiction
is the position of the accused in the government service when the offense charged was committed and
not the nature of the offense charged, provided the said offense committed by the accused was in the
exercise of his duties and in relation to his office. The fact then that accused Subido was already a
private individual was of no moment. In a Supplement to the Motion to Quash filed on 9 October 1995,
the petitioners further asserted that: (1) the allegations in the information were vague; (2) under Rules
of Procedure to Govern Deportation Proceedings, the grant or denial of bail to an alien in a deportation
proceeding was discretionary upon the Commissioner, hence could not be subject to a charge of
arbitrary detention; (3) petitioner Subido was separated from the service before the effectivity of R.A.
No. 7975, hence retroactive application thereof would be prejudicial to him.
Issue: Whether or not the retroactive application of R.A 7975 to the petitioner would be prejudicial to
him.
Held: No. The petitioners overlook the fact that for purposes of 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, the
reckoning point is the time of the commission of the crime. This is plain from the last clause of the
opening sentence of paragraph (a), 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as further amended by R.A. No. 7975. That
petitioner Parina held a position with a salary grade of less than 27 at the time of the commission of
the alleged arbitrary detention is of no moment. He is prosecuted as a co- conspirator of petitioner
Subido, a principal accused, who held a position higher than grade 27.
Sesbreno v. CBAA 270 SCRA 360
Facts: Petitioner purchased from Estrella Benedicto Thereafter, petitioner declared the real property
constructed on the said lots for purposes of tax assessment as a residential house of strong materials
with a floor area of sixty (60) square meters. Effective in the year 1980, the declared property was
assessed by Respondent City Assessor of Cebu City under Tax Declaration No. 02-20454 at a market
value of P60,000.00 and an assessed value of P36,900.00.[6] During a tax-mapping operation
conducted in February 1989, the field inspectors of the Cebu City Assessor discovered that the real
property declared and assessed under Tax Declaration No. 02-20454 was actually a residential building
consisting of four (4) storeys with a fifth storey used as a roof deck. The building had a total floor area
of 500.20 square meters. The area for each floor was 100.04 square meters. The building was found to
have been made of Type II-A materials. Tan two (2) parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-55917 issued by the Register of Deeds of Cebu City.
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Issue. Whether or not CBAAs assessment was unconstitutional.
Held: Equally unmeritorious is petitioner's contention that the imposition of back taxes on his property
is unconstitutional for being violative of Section 22,= Article III of the 1987 Constitution. When both

Public Respondents CBAA and City Assessor imposed back taxes on petitioner's property, they did not
violate the rule that laws shall have only prospective applicability. Respondents were only applying PD
464 which had been in effect since 1974. Besides, Section 25 of PD 464 is not penal in character;
hence, it may not be considered as an ex post facto law.
People v. Burton 268 SCRA 531
Facts: Appellant, a British national, was convicted by RTC of Pasig City for attempting to transport 5.6
kilograms of hashish, a prohibited drug, through the Ninoy Aquino International Airport. Though
caught in flagrante delicto, he denies criminal liability therefor on the novel ground that he was not
aware that his traveling bags contained the prohibited drug. He also challenges the credibility of the
lawmen who apprehended him. He was found guilty of the crime charged by the RTC and he is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00.
Issue: Whether or not retroactive application of RA 7659 can be applied to the appellant
Held: No. The trial court imposed the penalty of life imprisonment plus a fine of twenty thousand
pesos as the crime was committed on December 26, 1992 or about a year before Republic Act No.
7659, imposing the penalty of reclusin perpetua to death, came into effect on December 31, 1993.
Retroactive application of said law would not be advantageous to appellant in view of the increased
range of penalty and conjunctive fine prescribed, where the quantity of prohibited drugs is 750 grams
or more. A more succint explanation in People vs. Ballagan states: First, the wealth of jurisprudence
in cases wherein life imprisonment is imposed is to the effect that said penalty, unlike reclusin
perpetua, does not carry accessory penalties. In the event that Republic Act No. 7659 is applied
retrospectively to appellant, he has to suffer not only reclusin perpetua but also the accessory
penalties.
*Lacson v. Executive Secretary, GR 128096 January 20, 1999
FACTS:This is a petition for prohibition and mandamus filed by petitioner Panfilo M. Lacson and
petitioners-intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. questioning the constitutionality of
Sections 4 and 7 of Republic Act 8249 an Act which further defines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. They also seek to prevent the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with the trial of
Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057 against them on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner and
intervenors further argued that the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 to the Kuratong Baleleng cases
constitutes an ex post facto law for they are deprived of their right to procedural due process as they
can no longer avail of the two tiered appeal which they had allegedly acquired under R.A. 7975.
ISSUE: WON RA 8249 is an ex post facto law.
HELD: NO. There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. In Calder v. Bull, an ex post facto law is one (a)
which makes an act done criminal before the passing of the law and which was innocent when
committed, and punishes such action; or (b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it
was committed; or (c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law
annexed to the crime when it was committed. (d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives
less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense in order
to convict the defendant. (e) every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the
situation of a person to his disadvantage. This Court added two more to the list, namely: (f) that which
assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a
right which when done was lawful; (g) deprives a peson accused of crime of some lawful protection to
which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a
proclamation of amnesty. Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectively of penal laws. R.A.
8249 is not a penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal
laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their
violations; or those that define crimes, treat of their nature and provide for their punishment. R.A.
7975, which amended P.D. 1606 as regards the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and
other procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural
statue, i.e. one which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can
properly administer justice. Not being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be
challenged as unconstitutional.

People v. Nitafan, GR 107964-66 February 1, 1999


FACTS: Three criminal informations for violation of Central Bank Circular 960, as amended in relation
to Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265, were filed against Imelda Marcos before he RTC of Pasig, to
which she pleaded guilty. These informations were consolidated upon motion of the prosecution with
21 other cases pending before the RTC of Manila which relate to or form part of a series of transactions
devised by then President Marcos and private respondent to hide their ill- gotten wealth. The cases
were re-raffled and were assigned to respondent Judges sala. Without any corresponding motion from
private respondent, but after giving the prosecution the chance to show cause why the cases should
not be dismissed, respondent judge muto proprio dismissed the three cases, one of them on the
ground that the subject CB Circular is an ex post facto law, and the two on the ground that the
prosecution of private respondent was part of a sustained political vendetta by some people in the
government aside from what he considered as a violation of private respondents right against double
jeopardy. Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioners elevated the case before
the Supreme Court via petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: WON the Judge can declare the CB Circular an ex post facto law even though it was not
assailed.
HELD: NO. To rule that the CB Circular is an ex post facto law is to say that it is unconstitutional.
However, neither private respondent nor the Solicitor-General challenges it. This Court, much more
the lower courts, will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute or rule nor declare it void unless
directly assailed in an appropriate action.
Fajardo v. CA, GR 128508 February 1, 1999
FACTS: On May 26, 1988, petitioner Daniel Fajardo was convicted for violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of eight months imprisonment. He appealed, but
the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court likewise denied his petition for
review on certiorari of his conviction. Upon the remand of the record to the lower court, on June 2,
1995, petitioner filed a motion for probation contending that he was eligible for probation because at
the time he committed the offense in 1981, an accused who had appealed his conviction was still
qualified to apply for probation and that the law that barred an application for probation of an accused
who had interposed an appeal was ex post facto in its application, and, hence, not applicable to him.
But still, the trial court denied his application for probation. The Court of Appeals also denied his
petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: WON PD 1990, which amend PD 968, providing that no application for probation shall be
entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction is
an ex post facto law.
HELD: Presidential Decree No. 1990, is valid. Presidential Decree No. 1990, enacted on October 5,
1985, was printed in Volume 81 of the Official Gazette dated December 30, 1985 but said issue was
released for circulation only on July 1, 1986; hence, P.D. 1990 became effective after fifteen (15) days
from July 1, 1986, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code, or on July 16, 1986. It is not ex post
facto in its application. The law applies only to accused convicted after its effectivity. An ex post facto
law is one that punishes an act as a crime which was innocent at the time of its commission.
Presidential Decree No. 1990, like the Probation Law that it amends, is not penal in character. It may
not be considered as an ex post facto law. In this case, At the time of the commission of the offense
charged - violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 - in 1981, petitioner could have appealed if convicted
and still availed himself of probation. However, petitioner was convicted on May 26, 1988, and he
appealed. At that time, petitioner no longer had the option to appeal and still apply for probation if
unsuccessful in the appeal. Presidential Decree No. 1990 was then in full effect. Hence, he could no
longer apply for probation since he had appealed.
People v. Valdez, GR 127663 March 11, 1999
FACTS: The Regional Trial Court, Branch 45, Urdaneta, Pangasinan convicted as charged the accusedappellant Rolando Valdez for the complex crime of Multiple Murder with Double Frustrated Murder and
Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions (Presidential Decree No. 1866) and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of death and the prison term of reclusion perpetua, respectively. The conviction was

based on the evidence presented by the prosecution that on September 17, 1995 at around 8:00
oclock in the evening, William Montano, Randy Tibule, Jean Marie Garcia, Willie Acosta, Sandra
Montano and Ramon Garcia, Jr. rode on a tricycle driven by Ramon Garcia in going to Sitio Cabaoangan
to attend the wedding party of Jean Maries cousin. On their way, they met the appellant and his
companions who were armed with guns, and without any warning, they pointed their guns and fired at
them which caused the instantaneous death of Jean Marie Garcia, Willie Acosta, Sandra Montano, and
Ramon Garcia, Jr. and fatal injuries to William Montano and Randy Tibule. The appellant denied any
participation in the said incident and he questioned his conviction claiming, among others, that the
trial court erred in failing to consider motive on the part of Bernardo Castro to fire at, as he actually
fired at the occupants of the motorized tricycle.
ISSUE: WON RA 8294 is applicable to the accused.
HELD: Republic Act No. 8294 took effect on July 6, 1997, fifteen days after its publication on June 21,
1997. The crimes involved in the case at bar were committed on September 17, 1995. As in the case
of any penal law, the provisions of Republic Act No. 8294 will generally have prospective application.
In cases, however, where the new law will be advantageous to the accused, the law may be given
retroactive application (Article 22, Revised Penal Code). Insofar as it will spare accused-appellant in
the case at bar from a separate conviction for the crime of illegal possession of firearms, Republic Act
No. 8294 may be given retroactive application in Criminal Case No. U-8749 (for Illegal Possession of
Firearm) subject of this present review. However, the use of an unlicensed firearm in the case at bar
cannot be considered as a special aggravating circumstance in Criminal Case No. U-8747 (for Complex
Crime of Multiple Murder), also under review herein, because it will unduly raise the penalty for the
four counts of murder from four reclusion perpetua to that of four-fold death. Insofar as this particular
provision of Republic Act No. 8294 is not beneficial to accused-appellant because it unduly aggravates
the crime, this new law will not be given retroactive application, lest it might acquire the character of
an ex-post facto law.
People v. Ringor, G.R. No. 123918, December 9, 1999
FACTS: For automatic review is the Decision dated November 13, 1995 of Branch 6 of the Regional Trial
Court in Baguio City, finding accused-appellant Augusto Loreto Ringor, Jr. guilty of the crime of murder
and sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of death in Criminal Case No. 13102-R, also guilty of
illegal possession of firearms under P.D. No. 1866 in Criminal Case No. 13100-R
ISSUE: WON the RA 8294 which make the use of unlicensed firearm as aggravating circumstance in
murder or homicide shall be applied in the present case.
HELD: NO. With respect to the conviction of accused-appellant for illegal possession of firearms under
P. D. No. 1866, it was held in the case of People vs. Molina and reiterated in the recent case of People
vs. Ronaldo Valdez, that in cases where murder or homicide is committed with the use of an unlicensed
firearm, there can be no separate conviction for the crime of illegal possession of firearms under P.D.
No. 1866 in view of the amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 8294. Thereunder, the use of
unlicensed firearm in murder or homicide is simply considered as an aggravating circumstance in the
murder or homicide and no longer as a separate offense. Furthermore, the penalty for illegal
possession of firearms shall be imposed provided that no other crime is committed.In other words,
where murder or homicide was committed, the penalty for illegal possession of firearms is no longer
imposable since it becomes merely a special aggravating circumstance.Thus, before R.A. No. 8294
(which took effect on July 6, 1997) made the use of unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance
in murder or homicide, the penalty for the murder committed by accused-appellant on June 23, 1994
was not death, as erroneously imposed by the trial court. There was yet no such aggravating
circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm to raise the penalty for murder from reclusion perpetua to
death, at the time of commission of the crime.The amendatory law making the use of an unlicensed
firearm as an aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide, cannot be applied here because the
said provision of R.A. No. 8294 is not favorable to accused-appellant, lest it becomes an ex post facto
law.
People v. Magbanua, G.R. No. 128888, December 3, 1999
FACTS:27 February 1997 RTC convict accused-appellant Charito Isug Magbanua guilty of the crime of
rape, described and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 11 of Republic

Act No. 7659, otherwise referred to as the Death Penalty Law, against his own daughter and
sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of death.
ISSUE: WON provision for death penalty can be imposed retroactively against the petitioner
HELD:NO. Republic Act No. 7659 which took effect on 31 December 1993, cannot be applied
retroactively because, to do so, would go against the constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws.
For this reason, in order for the death penalty to be imposable, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to
establish beyond a shadow of doubt that the case of the accused is already covered by Republic Act
No. 7659. In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to discharge this burden. A perusal of the
information reveals that the alleged rapes were committed in 1991 and the days thereafter. Clearly,
since the time frame specified in the information antedates the effectivity date of Republic Act No.
7659, said law cannot be made applicable to the case of appellant.
Republic v. Desierto, GR 136506, Aug. 23, 2001
FACTS:The accuse convicted for violation of Republic Act No. 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)4 initiated the complaint for violation of
R.A. No. 3019 before the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). The complaint alleged,
that respondent Cojuangco, Jr., taking advantage of his close relationship with then President Marcos,
had caused the latter to issue favorable decrees to advance his personal and business interests, had
caused the government through the National Investment Development Corporation (NIDC) to enter
into a contract with him under terms and conditions grossly disadvantageous to the government and
that respondents were directly or indirectly interested for personal gain or had material interest in the
transactions requiring the approval of a board, panel or group of which they were members, in
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act to the grave damage and prejudice of public
interest, the Filipino people, the Republic of the Philippines, and the coconut farmers. Subsequently,
the ombudsman acquitted the accuse ruling that RA 3019 had already prescribed when the complaint
was file since the prescription period for violation of the Anti-Graft Practices Act was ten (10) years.
The complaint for violation of R.A. No. 3019 was filed before the PCGG on February 12, 1990 or more
than fifteen (15) years after the birth of the allegedly illegal contract. OSG allege that the action of the
state in confiscating ill-gotten wealth are imprescriptible pursuant to section 15, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution which provides: The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public
officials or employees, from them or their nominees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches, or
estoppel.
ISSUE:WON the imprescriptible act of state under section 15 article 11of the constitution would violate
the accuseds right against ex post facto
HELD:YES. The Solicitor General asserts that the dismissed complaint is for violation of R.A. No. 3019,
or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the prosecution thereof is actually a suit intended to
recover ill-gotten wealth from public officials, and therefore covered by R.A. No. 1379, entitled "An Act
Declaring Forfeited in Favor of the State Any Property Found to Have been Unlawfully Acquired By Any
Public Officer or Employee and Providing for the Procedure Therefor" under R.A. No. 1379
in
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto: that Section 15 of Article XI
of the Constitution applies only to civil actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth, and not to criminal
cases such as the complaint against the respondents Conversely, prescription of criminal cases are
governed by special laws on prescription. Furthermore, to construe Section 15, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution in order to give it retroactive application to the private respondents will run counter to
another constitutional provision, that is, Section 22, Article III
People v. Torres - 501 SCRA 591
FACTS: Dexter Torres was charged with violation of Section 8, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425,
as amended, for unlawful possession of 831.91 grams of marijuana fruiting tops, a prohibited drug; as
well as Section 16, Article III of the same law for illegal possession of 0.26 grams of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a regulated drug commonly known as shabu.
ISSUE:WON RA 9165 increasing penalty for illegal possession of drugs be imposed

HELD:NO. Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002, increased the penalty for illegal possession of less than five (5) grams ofshabu to imprisonment
of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty years and a fine ranging from three hundred thousand
(P300,000.00) to four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00). However, since this law is not favorable
to appellant, it cannot be given retroactive application in the instant case. This is the mandate of
Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, which reads: ART. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. Penal
laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of felony, who is not a
habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the
publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.
The same law also changed the penalty for illegal possession of 500 grams or more of marijuana to
life imprisonment to death, and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 toP10,000,000.00. Obviously, the
amendment of the penalty from reclusion perpetua to life imprisonment to death in R.A. No. 9165
cannot, likewise, be applied retroactively to the present case since it would also be unfavorable to
appellant.
Salvador v. Mapa - ____SCRA 34 [2008]
FACTS:The Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, (the Committee), through
Atty. Orlando L. Salvador (Atty. Salvador), filed this Petition to nullify the Resolution of the Office of the
Ombudsman in dismissing the criminal complaint of violation of SEC. 3(e) AND (g) OF R.A. 3019,
against respondents ruling that: To reiterate, the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loans was
created on October 8, 1992 under Administrative Order No. 13. Subsequently, Memorandum Order No.
61, dated November 9, 1992, was issued defining the criteria to be utilized as a frame of reference in
determining behest loans. Accordingly, if these Orders are to be considered the bases of charging
respondents for alleged offenses committed, they become ex-post facto laws which are proscribed by
the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 are ex post facto laws.
HELD: NO. Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 violate the prohibition against
ex post facto laws for ostensibly inflicting punishment upon a person for an act done prior to their
issuance and which was innocent when done. An ex post facto law has been defined as one (a)
which makes an action done before the passing of the law and which was innocent when done
criminal, and punishes such action; or (b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was
when committed; or (c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law
annexed to the crime when it was committed; or (d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and
receives less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense
in order to convict the defendant. This Court added two (2) more to the list, namely: (e) that which
assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a
right which when done was lawful; or (f) that which deprives a person accused of a crime of some
lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or
acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty. The constitutional doctrine that outlaws an ex post facto law
generally prohibits the retrospectivity of penal laws. Penal laws are those acts of the legislature which
prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations; or those that define crimes, treat of
their nature, and provide for their punishment. The subject administrative and memorandum orders
clearly do not come within the shadow of this definition. Administrative Order No. 13 creates the
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, and provides for its composition and
functions. It does not mete out penalty for the act of granting behest loans. Memorandum Order No.
61 merely provides a frame of reference for determining behest loans. Not being penal laws,
Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 cannot be characterized as ex post facto
laws. There is, therefore, no basis for the Ombudsman to rule that the subject administrative and
memorandum orders are ex post facto.
Republic v. Eugenio - 545 SCRA 384
FACTS: Following the promulgation of Agan case, a series of investigations concerning the award of the
NAIA 3 contracts to PIATCO were undertaken by the Ombudsman and the Compliance and Investigation
Staff (CIS) of petitioner Anti- Money Laundering Council (AMLC). Under the authority granted by the
Resolution, the AMLC filed an application to inquire into or examine the deposits or investments of
Alvarez, Trinidad, Liongson and Cheng Yong before the RTC and ruled in granting the AMLC the
authority to inquire and examine the subject bank accounts of Alvarez, Trinidad, Liongson and Cheng

Yong, the trial court being satisfied that there existed p]robable cause to believe that the deposits in
various bank accounts are related to the offense of violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Meanwhile, the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman wrote a letter requesting the AMLC
to investigate the accounts of Alvarez, PIATCO, and several other entities involved in the nullified
contract. The letter adverted to probable cause to believe that the bank accounts were used in the
commission of unlawful activities that were committed in relation to the criminal cases involving
violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Attached to the letter was a memorandum on why the
investigation of the accounts is necessary. In response to the letter of the Special Prosecutor, the AMLC
promulgated Resolution No. 121 Series of 2005 which authorized the executive director of the AMLC to
inquire into and examine the accounts named in the letter, including one maintained by Alvarez with
DBS Bank and two other accounts in the name of Cheng Yong with Metrobank. Lilia Cheng, wife of
cheng yong, argues that the AMLA, being a substantive penal statute, has no retroactive effect and the
bank inquiry order could not apply to deposits or investments opened prior to the effectivity of Rep.
Act No. 9164, or on 17 October 2001. Thus, she concludes, her subject bank accounts, opened
between 1989 to 1990, could not be the subject of the bank inquiry order lest there be a violation of
the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.
ISSUE:WON there has been a violation of the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.
HELD:YES. As applied to the AMLA, it is plain that no person may be prosecuted under the penal
provisions of the AMLA for acts committed prior to the enactment of the law on 17 October 2001.
prohibition against ex post facto laws apply to the interpretation of Section 11, a provision which does
not provide for a penal sanction but which merely authorizes the inspection of suspect accounts and
deposits. Prior to the enactment of the AMLA, the fact that bank accounts or deposits were involved in
activities on enumerated in Section 3 of the law did not remove such accounts from the shelter of
absolute confidentiality. Prior to the AMLA, in order that bank accounts could be examined, there was
need to secure either the written permission of the depositor or a court order authorizing such
examination, assuming that they were involved in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public
officials, or in a case where the money deposited or invested was itself the subject matter of the
litigation. application of the bank inquiry order as a means of inquiring into records of transactions
entered into prior to the passage of the AMLA would be constitutionally infirm, offensive as it is to the
ex post facto clause. Still, we must note that the position submitted by Lilia Cheng is much broader
than what we are willing to affirm. She argues that the proscription against ex post facto laws goes as
far as to prohibit any inquiry into deposits or investments included in bank accounts opened prior to
the effectivity of the AMLA even if the suspect transactions were entered into when the law had
already taken effect.
Valeroso v. People - 546 SCRA 450
FACTS: Petitioner was charged with the crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under
the first paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended. Petitioner moved to reconsider but his
motion was denied. appealed to the CA. On May 4, 2004, the appellate court affirmed with modification
the RTC disposition. It provides that "[t]he penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in,
acquire, dispose, or possess any firearm, part of firearm, ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument
used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition." P.D. No. 1866, as
amended, was the governing law at the time petitioner committed the offense on July 10, 1996.
However, R.A. No. 8294 amended P.D. No. 1866 on July 6, 1997, during the pendency of the case with
the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appellate court is correct in affirming the modification of the RTC disposition.
HELD: YES. As a general rule, penal laws should not have retroactive application, lest they acquire the
character of an ex post facto law. An exception to this rule, however, is when the law is advantageous
to the accused. According to Mr. Chief Justice Araullo, this is "not as a right" of the offender, "but
founded on the very principles on which the right of the State to punish and the commination of the
penalty are based, and regards it not as an exception based on political considerations, but as a rule
founded on principles of strict justice." Although an additional fine of P15,000.00 is imposed by R.A.
No. 8294, the same is still advantageous to the accused, considering that the imprisonment is lowered
to prision correccional in its maximum period from reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
reclusion perpetua under P.D. No. 1866. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, prision correccional

maximum which ranges from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6) years, is the
prescribed penalty and will form the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence. The minimum term
shall be one degree lower, which is prision correccional in its medium period (two [2] years, four [4]
months and one [1] day to four [4] years and two [2] months). Hence, the penalty imposed by the CA
is correct. The penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium, as
minimum term, to six (6) years of prision correccional maximum, as maximum term.
Presidential v. Desierto - 548 SCRA 295
FACTS: President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13 creating the Presidential Ad Hoc
Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans (Committee). By Memorandum Order No. 61, the functions of
the Committee were subsequently expanded by including in its investigation, inventory and study all
non-performing loans, whether behest or non-behest. It likewise provided for the following criteria
which might be utilized as frame of reference in determining a behest loan. Several loan accounts were
referred to the Committee for its investigation, including the loan transactions between Comptronics
Philippines, Inc. (CPI), now Integrated Circuits Philippines (ICPI), and the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP). After examining and studying the loan transactions, the Committee determined that
they bore the characteristics of a behest loan as defined under Memorandum Order No. 61.
Consequently, Atty. Orlando L. Salvador, Consultant of the Committee filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman a sworn complaint for violation of Section 3(e)(g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, or the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, against the Concerned Members of the DBP Board of Governors,
and Concerned Directors and Officers of ICPI. The Ombudsman dismissed the case and so was the
motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 are ex post facto
laws.
HELD: NO. The Court do not agree with the Ombudsmans declaration that Administrative Order No. 13
and Memorandum Order No. 61 cannot be applied retroactively to the questioned transactions because
to do so would violate the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. An ex post facto law
has been defined as one (a) which makes an action done before the passing of the law and which
was innocent when done criminal, and punishes such action; or (b) which aggravates a crime or makes
it greater than it was when committed; or (c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater
punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed; or (d) which alters the legal
rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the
commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant; or (e) which assumes to regulate civil
rights and remedies only, but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when
exercised was lawful; or (f) which deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to
which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a
proclamation of amnesty. The constitutional proscription of ex post facto laws is aimed against the
retrospectivity of penal laws. Penal laws are acts of the legislature which prohibit certain acts and
establish penalties for their violations; or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for
their punishment. Administrative Order No. 13 does not mete out a penalty for the act of granting
behest loans. It merely creates the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact- Finding Committee on Behest Loans and
provides for its composition and functions. Memorandum Order No. 61, on the other hand, simply
provides the frame of reference in determining the existence of behest loans. Not being penal laws,
Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 cannot be characterized as ex-post facto
laws.