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Lesson for July 5, 2014, Saturday
Atty. Mike Asuncion
1. Understand the concept of Remedial Law, its meaning, scope and sources:
1) BUSTOS V. LUCERO, G.R. No. L-2068, October 20, 1948

2. Distinguish between Substantive Law and Remedial Law

3. Study the rule-making power of the Supreme Court, including the limitations thereon and the power to
amend and suspend procedural rules:
2) SHIOJI V. HARVEY, G.R. No. 18940, April 27, 1922; 43 Phil. 333
3) ECHEGARAY V. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, G.R. No. 132601, January 19, 1999 (NOT October 12, 1998), 301 SCRA 96

c. Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the Government Service Insurance System from
Payment of Legal Fees, A.M. No. 082-01-0, February 11, 2010
4) FABIAN V. DESIERTO, G.R. No. 129742, September 16, 1998; 295 SCRA 470
5) DE GUZMAN V. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. No. 103276, April 11, 1996, 256 SCRA 171

4. Read on the nature of Philippine courts and the different kinds thereof:
6) MARCOS V. CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP, G.R. No. L-4663, May 30, 1951, 89 Phil. 246 (1951)

5. Understand the principle of judicial hierarchy:

7) TANO V. SOCRATES, G.R. No. 110249, August 21, 1997, 278 SCRA 154

6. Study the doctrine of judicial stability:

8) YAU V. THE MANILA BANKING CORPORATION, G.R. No. 126731, July 11, 2002, 384 SCRA 340
10) UY V. CA, G.R. No. 83897, November 9, 1990, 191 SCRA 275 (1990)

11) ARATUC VS COMELEC, Gr. No. L-49705-09, February 8, 1979, 88 SCRA 251


Gr. No. L-2068, October 20, 1948, 81 Phil 640
The petitioner herein, an accused in a criminal case, filed a
motion with the Court of First Instance after he had been bound
over to that court for trial, praying that the record of the case be
remanded to the justice of the peace court, the court of origin, in
order that the petitioner might cross-examine the complainant and
her witnesses in connection with their testimony, on the strength of
which warrant was issued for the arrest of the accused. The motion
was denied and that denial is the subject matter of this proceeding.
According to the memorandum submitted by the
petitioner's attorney to the Court of First Instance in support of his
motion, the accused, assisted by counsel, appeared at the
preliminary investigation. In that investigation, the justice of the
peace informed him of the charges and asked him if he pleaded
guilty or not guilty, upon which he entered the plea of not guilty.
"Then his counsel moved that the complainant present her evidence
so that she and her witnesses could be examined and crossexamined in the manner and form provided by law."
The fiscal and the private prosecutor objected, invoking
section 11 of rule 108, and the objection was sustained. "In view
thereof, the accused's counsel announced his intention to renounce
his right to present evidence," and the justice of the peace
forwarded the case to the court of first instance. Whether
accused, after renouncing his right to present evidence, and by
reason of that waiver he was committed to the corresponding court
for trial, is estopped.
Whether or not the respondent judge did not act in excess
of his jurisdiction or in abuse of discretion in refusing to grant the
accused's motion to return the record for the purpose set out
We are of the opinion that the respondent judge did not
act in excess of his jurisdiction or in abuse of discretion in refusing to
grant the accused's motion to return the record for the purpose set
out therein. In Dequito and Saling Buhay vs. Arellano, G.R. No. L1336, recently promulgated, in which case the respondent justice of
the peace had allowed the accused, over the complaint's objection,
to recall the complainant and her witnesses at the preliminary
investigation so that they might be cross-examined, we sustained the
justice of the peace's order.
We said that section 11 of Rule 108 does not curtail the
sound discretion of the justice of the peace on the matter. We said
that "while section 11 of Rule 108 defines the bounds of the
defendant's right in the preliminary investigation, there is nothing in
it or any other law restricting the authority, inherent in a court of
justice, to pursue a course of action reasonably calculated to bring
out the truth."
But we made it clear that the "defendant can not, as a
matter of right, compel the complaint and his witnesses to repeat in
his presence what they had said at the preliminary examination

before the issuance of the order of arrest." We called attention to
the fact that "the constitutional right of an accused to be confronted
by the witnesses against him does not apply to preliminary hearings'
nor will the absence of a preliminary examination be an
infringement of his right to confront witnesses." As a matter of fact,
preliminary investigation may be done away with entirely without
infringing the constitutional right of an accused under the due
process clause to a fair trial.
The foregoing decision was rendered by a divided court.
The minority went farther than the majority and denied even any
discretion on the part of the justice of the peace or judge holding
the preliminary investigation to compel the complainant and his
witnesses to testify anew. Upon the foregoing considerations, the
present petition is dismissed with costs against the petitioner.

G.R. No. 18940, April 27, 1922; 43 Phil. 333
S. Shioji filed an action against Toyo Kisen Kaisah and Pacific
Mail Stemship Co. (Toyo) in CFI Manila. Oct. 31, 1920 CFI Decided
against defendants (J. Concepcion), joint and several P19,533.49.
Defendants perfected appeal by Bill of Exceptions filed with the
office of the clerk of the SC on Feb 16,1922 and received by parties
the day after (Feb17).
Rule 21 Appellants have 30days from receipt to file briefs.
Accordingly here it expired March 19. Mar 22 (3days after expiry of
pd.) Appellant (Shioji) filed a motion for additional period. Mar 24
- SC denied and dismissed the appeal pursuant to Rule24(a). 15 days
later (April 22) decision became final and execution was issued.
However prior to the levy Toyo FILED: Action for prelim
injunction in CFI (J. Harvey/defendant here) based primarily on:
judgment of the SC is unconscionable and was rendered without
due process of law, and that Rule24(a) under which the judgment
was rendered is unconstitutional, and being in conflict with the law
is null and void. J. Harvey issued the preliminary injunction.
COUNTERMOVE: Shioji FILED a complaint in prohibition in SC, which
SC immediately issued.
Whether or not the action of J. Harvey in assuming
jurisdiction to interpret and review the judgment of the SC and to
obstruct execution thereof is proper.
No. It is not proper. A judge of the lower court cannot enforce
different decrees than those rendered by the superior court. When
a cause has been appealed from CFI to SC, and a judgment is
rendered by the latter, no interference therewith by the lower court
can be tolerated through any proceedings other than such as are
directed by the appellate court. Sibbald v. US: The inferior court is
bound by the decree as the law of the case, and must carry it into

G.R. No. 132601, January 19, 1999 (NOT October 12, 1998)
301 SCRA 96
On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the
execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on that same day.
The public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the
TRO arguing that the action of the SC not only violated the rule on
finality of judgment but also encroached on the power of the
Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting
a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on the execution of Echegaray
despite the fact that the finality of judgment has already been
rendered that by granting the TRO, the Honorable Court has in
effect granted reprieve which is an executive function.

and threats. Petitioner filed an administrative complaint against
private respondent.
Ombudsman found private respondent guilty of
misconduct and meted out the penalty of suspension without pay
for 1 year. After private respondent moved for reconsideration, the
Ombudsman discovered that the private respondents new counsel
had been his classmate and close associate, hence, he inhibited
himself. The case was transferred to respondent Deputy
Ombudsman who exonerated private respondent from the
administrative charges. Petitioner appealed to the SC by certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Whether or not Section 27 of RA 6770 which provides for appeals in
administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman
to the SC in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is valid

No. Respondents cited sec 19, art VII. The provision is

simply the source of power of the President to grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after
conviction by final judgment. The provision, however, cannot be
interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the
The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save
the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the simple
reason that there is no higher right than the right to life.
For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the
Executive can protect the right to life of an accused after his final
conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate
powers of the three branches of our government.

The revised Rules of Civil Procedure preclude appeals from

quasi-judicial agencies to the SC via a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45. Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be
brought through a petition for review on certiorari but only from
judgments and final orders of the courts enumerated in Sec. 1
thereof. Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial
agencies are now required to be brought to the CA on a verified
petition for review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule
43 which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a
uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies.
Section 27 of RA 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal
to the SC from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the
proscription in Sec. 30, Art. VI of the Constitution against a law
which increases the appellate jurisdiction of the SC.

Gr. No. 129742, September 16, 1998, 295 SCRA 470

G.R. No. 103276, April 11, 1996, 256 SCRA 171



Petitioner Teresita Fabian was the major stockholder and

President of PROMAT Construction Development Corporation which
was engaged in the construction business. Private respondent Nestor
Agustin was the District Engineer of the First Metro Manila
Engineering District. PROMAT participated in the bidding for
government construction projects, and private respondent,
reportedly taking advantage of his official position, inveigled
petitioner into an amorous relationship. Their affair lasted for some
time, in the course of which, private respondent gifted PROMAT with
public works contracts and interceded for it in problems concerning
the same in his office. When petitioner tried to terminate their
relationship, private respondent refused and resisted her attempts
to do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation

SC En Banc Resolution denied with finality petitioners

motion for reconsideration of the Supreme Courts
Decision affirming his conviction by the Sandiganbayan of violation
of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for his
alleged failure to account for P200,000.00 received for certain official
training programs of the Department of Agriculture.
As the Sandiganbayan and the Court saw it then,
petitioners guilt was duly established by 1) lone prosecution witness
Josephine Angeles testimony that no such training programs were
held at the designated places, and 2) petitioners failure to present a
single receipt to support due disbursement of the P200,000.00.
In this Omnibus Motion, petitioner, for the first time, seeks
to be relieved from what he considers as the serious and costly



mistake of his former lawyers in demurring to the prosecution
evidence after court leave was denied, the effect of which deprived
him of presenting before the Sandiganbayan the pieces of
documentary evidence that would have completely belied the
accusation against him.
Annexed to the Omnibus Motion are photocopies of the
list of expenses and receipts in support of the liquidation voucher
showing due disbursement of the P200,000.00 received for training
programs actually conducted - the original records of which are all
along kept in the Records Section of the Bureau of Plant Industry as
per letter of the Bureau Director Emillano P. Gianzon and which are
readily available. Petitioner now appeals to the Courts sense of
justice and equity that these documents be summoned and
appreciated by the Court itself or by the Sandiganbayan after
remanding the case thereto.
When required by the Court to comment on the Omnibus
Motion, the Solicitor General, representing respondents, was
granted no less than eight (8) extensions to do so, the last one with
warning that no further extension will be given. None was filed.
Instead, the Solicitor General filed a ninth (9th) motion for extension
which was denied considering the warning contained in the eighth
(8th) extension. The tenth (10th) motion for extension was merely
noted by the Court. Thereafter, the Court in a Resolution dated
August 15, 1995 required the Solicitor Generals Office to 1) SHOW
CAUSE why it should not be disciplinarily dealt with for its repeated
failure to file comment and 2) file its comment, both within ten (10)
days from notice. In compliance therewith, the Solicitor Generals
Office filed its Comment and Explanation. The Court accepted such
Explanation, noted the Comment filed and required petitioner to file
a Reply thereto within ten (10) days from notice in a Resolution
dated October 10, 1995. A Reply was thus filed by petitioner in due
The Solicitor Generals Office argument in its Comment:
Petitioners Omnibus Motion is violative of the Courts adopted
policy on second motions for reconsideration.
Petitioners Reply: The Omnibus Motion is not violative
of the prohibition on second motions for reconsideration since such
motion does not seek leave to file a second motion for
reconsideration but for leave to vacate the first Motion For
Reconsideration filed on May 6, 1994 and in its stead to admit the
Omnibus Motion containing the petitioners documentary
evidence and arguments. Thus, petitioners Motion to vacate the
first motion for reconsideration is but necessary to his defense that
he should be excused from the mistake of his former lawyers.
After carefully considering anew petitioners plight and
keeping in mind that substantial rights must ultimately reign
supreme over technicalities, this Court is swayed to reconsider.
May be liberally construed to serve the end of
justice. The power of this Court to suspend its own rules or to
except a particular case from its operations whenever the purposes
of justice require it, cannot be questioned. In not a few instances,
this Court ordered a new trial in criminal cases on grounds not
mentioned in the statute, viz: retraction of witness, negligence or
incompetency of counsel, improvident plea of guilty, disqualification

of an attorney de officio to represent the accused in trial court, and
where a judgment was rendered on a stipulation of facts entered
into by both the prosecution and the defense.
Similarly, in a considerable host of cases has this
prerogative been invoked to relax even procedural rules of the most
mandatory character in terms of compliance, such as the period to
appeal. Let us not forget that the rules of procedure should be
viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial
justice, must always be avoided. Even the Rules of Court envision
this liberality.
This power to suspend or even disregard the
rules can be so pervasive and encompassing so as to alter even that
which this Court itself has already declared to be final, as we are
now compelled to do in this case.


G.R. No. L-4663, May 30, 1951, 89 Phil. 246 (1951)
These are two special civil actions of mandamus instituted
by the same petitioners against the respondents General CourtMartials composed each of different members or officers of the
Philippine Army, in which it is alleged that the respondents Military
Tribunals excluded unlawfully the petitioners from the enjoyment of
their right to appear as counsel for the accused prosecuted before
said tribunals, to which the petitioners are entitled because they are
attorneys duly admitted to practice law in the Philippine Courts, on
the ground that they are disqualified or inhibited by section 17,
Article 17 of the Constitution to appear as counsel for said
Whether or not the prohibition contained in the above
quoted section 17 of our Constitution is applicable to the

Yes. We are of the opinion and therefore hold that it is
applicable, because the words "any court" includes the General
Court-Martial, and a court-martial case is a criminal case within the
meaning of the above quoted provisions of our Constitution.
It is obvious that the words "any court," used in
prohibiting members of Congress to appear as counsel "in any
criminal case in which an officer or employee of the Government is
accused of an offense committed in relation to his office," refers,
not only to a civil, but also to a military court or a Court-Martial.
Because, in construing a Constitution, "it must be taken as
established that where words are used which have both a restricted

and a general meaning, the general must prevail over the restricted
unless the nature of the subject matter of the context clearly
indicates that the limited sense is intended." (11 American
Jurisprudence, pp. 680-682).
In the case of Ramon Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff of the
Philippine Army, 43 Off. Gaz., 855, we did not hold that the word
"court" in general used in our Constitution does not include a CourtMartial; what we held is that the words "inferior courts" used in
connection with the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to
"review on appeal certiorari or writ of error, as the law or rules of
court may provide, final judgments of inferior courts in all criminal
cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment,"
as provided for in section 2, Article VIII, of the Constitution, do not
refer to Courts-Martial or Military Courts.
Notwithstanding that the court-martial is only an
instrumentality of the executive power having no relation or
connection, in law, with the judicial establishments of the country, it
is yet, so far as it is a court at all, and within its field of action, as
fully a court of law and justice as is any civil tribunal. As a court of
law, it is bound, like any court, by the fundamental principles of law,
and, in the absence of special provision of the subject in the military
code, it observes in general the rules of evidence as adopted in the
common-law courts. As a court of justice, it is required by the terms
of its statutory oath, (art. 84.) to adjudicate between the U.S. an the
accused "without partiality, favor, or affection," and according, not
only to the laws and customs of the service, but to its "conscience,"
i.e. its sense of substantial right and justice unaffected by
technicalities. In the words of the Attorney General, court-martial
are thus, "in the strictest sense courts of justice. (Winthrop's Military
Law and Precedents, Vol. 1 and 2, 2nd Ed., p. 54.)
The fact that a judgment of conviction, not of acquittal,
rendered by a court-martial must be approved by the reviewing
authority before it can be executed (Article of War 46), does not
change or affect the character of a court-martial as a court. A
judgment of the Court of First Instance imposing death penalty must
also be approved by the Supreme Court before it can be executed.

marginal fishermen granted with privileges provided in Section 149
of the Local Government Code, invoking the invalidity of the abovestated enactments as violative of their preferential rights.
Whether the ordinances in question, which prohibit the
fishing of certain marine species in Palawan, are constitutional
and/or valid.
Laws (including ordinances enacted by local government
units) enjoy the presumption of constitutionality. To overthrow this
presumption, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative contradiction.
In short, the conflict with the Constitution must be shown beyond
reasonable doubt. Where doubt exists, even if well-founded, there
can be no finding of unconstitutionality. To doubt is to sustain. In
light of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined
in the Local Government Code (LGC) and the powers granted therein
to local government units under Section 16 (the General Welfare
Clause), and under Sections 149, 447(a) (1) (vi), 458(a)(1)(vi) and
468(a)(1)(vi), which involve the exercise of police power, the validity
of the Ordinances cannot be doubted. The ordinance also find full
support under Republic Act 7611 (Strategic Environmental Plan for
Palawan Act), approved on 19 June 1992; which adopts a
comprehensive framework for the sustainable development of
Palawan compatible with protecting and enhancing the natural
resources and endangered environment of the province, which serve
to guide the local government of Palawan and the government
agencies concerned in the formulation and implementation of plans,
programs and projects affecting said province. The first objective (to
establish a "closed season" for the species of fish or aquatic animals
covered therein for a period of five years) is well within the
devolved power to enforce fishery laws in municipal waters which
allows the establishment of "closed seasons." The second objective
(to protect the coral in the marine waters of the City of Puerto
Princesa and the Province of Palawan from further destruction due
to illegal fishing activities) falls within both the general welfare
clause of the LGC and the express mandate thereunder to cities and
provinces to protect the environment and impose appropriate
penalties for acts which endanger the environment.

G.R. No. 110249, August 21, 1997, 278 SCRA 154
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princessa enacted
ordinance no. 15-92 banning the shipment of live fish and
lobster outside Puerto Princessa City for a period of 5 years. In the
same light, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan also enacted a
resolution that prohibits the catching, gathering, buying, selling and
possessing and shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic
organisms for a period of 5 years within the Palawan waters. The
petitiones Airline Shippers Association of Palawan together with
marine merchants were charged for violating the above ordinance
and resolution by the city and provincial governments. The
petitioners now allege that they have the preferential rights as


G.R. No. 126731, July 11, 2002, 384 SCRA 340
Petitioner Esteban Yau, a judgment creditor of Ricardo
Silverio, Sr., applied for, and was granted a writ of execution to
satisfy the judgment. It appears, however, that the only property of
Silverio that could be found is his proprietary membership share in
the Manila Golf and Country Club. Accordingly, the sheriff levied

upon such share, and during the public auction sale, Yau emerged as
the highest bidder, and a corresponding Certificate of Sale was
issued in his name. However, at the time of the execution sale, the
shares Silverio were apparently subject to a prior levy pursuant to
separate writs of preliminary attachment by the Manila Banking
Corporation (Manila Bank). Yau then filed separate motions to
intervene in the cases involving said shares, and one trial court
granted said motion, but the second motion was denied by the
other. Accordingly, the shares were transferred to Yaus name.
Manila Bank thereafter filed a petition for certiorari before the CA,
which was granted. The Court of Appeals found that since the shares
were in custodia legis, the order was null and void.
Whether or not the intervention, which led to the transfer to Yau of
the shares is valid
The contention of Manila bank that Yau has no legal interest in the
matter in litigation lacks buoyancy. Under Section 2, Rule 12 of the
Revised Rules of Court, which was the governing law at the time the
instant case was decided by the trial court and the appellate court, a
person may, before or during trial, be permitted by the Court in its
discretion to intervene in an action, if he has legal interest in the
matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an
interest against both, or when he is so situated as to be adversely
affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the
custody of the court or of an officer thereof. Yau falls under the last
instance. It is recognized that a judgment creditor who has reduced
his claim to judgment may beallowed to intervene and a purchaser
who acquires an interest in property upon which an attachment has
been levied may intervene in the underlying action in which the writ
of attachment was issued for the purpose of challenging the
attachment. Clearly, Yau, being the judgment creditor of Silverio and
the purchaser at the public auction sale of the Silverio share, would
be adversely affected by the disposition of the Silverio share, subject
of the writ of attachment should a decision be rendered in favor of
Manila bank and, as such, has standing to intervene to protect his
interest. Besides, no purpose will be served by not allowing Yau to
protect his interests where the Silverio share is under custodia legis.
If we follow the contention of Manila bank, this would result in a
violation of the aforementioned principle of judicial stability or noninterference. Lastly, onthe matter of allowing the intervention after
trial, suffice it to state that the rules now allow intervention before
rendition of judgment by the trial court. After trial and decision in a
case, intervention can no longer be permitted. The permissive tenor
of the provision on intervention shows the intention of the Rules to
give to the court the full measure of discretion in permitting or
disallowing the same. The rule on intervention was evidently
intended to expedite and economize in litigation by permitting
parties interested in the subject matter,or anything related therein,
to adjust the matter in one instead of several suits.

G.R. No. 71365, June 18, 1987, 151 SCRA 161
Writ of execution was issued for the unpaid amount since
the Madayag court agreed with the petitioner that there was no
agreement to waive the amount.
The sheriff levied on the machineries and equipment of
the private respondent and again levied on the logs of the private
respondent which logs were subsequently bought by the petitioner
at an auction sale and later sold to Union Plywood Corporation.
The private respondent filed Civil Case to nullify the
sheriff's proceedings with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction
against the petitioner and the sheriff. The complaint was an action
for damages with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction.
Tamayo court issued a restraining order addressed to the
sheriff to cease and desist from further taking possession of and/or
disposing of the logs.
The petitioner filed a motion before the Madayag court for
the issuance of an alias writ of execution in Civil Case which motion
was granted.
On the other hand, the private respondent obtained
another restraining order in Civil Case before the Tamayo court.
The petitioner filed a motion to dismiss before Tamayo court on the
ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the action but was denied. This order of denial was later affirmed by
the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court.
In affirming the questioned orders of the Tamayo court,
the appellate court ruled that Civil Case No. 9301 for damages with
prayer for writ of preliminary injunction before Branch 132 of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati (Tamayo court) is separate and
different from Civil Case No. 3963 before Branch 145 of the same
court (Madayag court) in that the cause of action in the former is
predicated on the failure of private respondent to ship its quota of
5,000 cubic meters of logs thereby resulting in petitioner's losses
and damages.
The court further ruled that since the writ of execution
was void, the levy made on the property was also void. Therefore,
the Madayag court (Branch 145) never had custody over the
property, subject matter of the action. Under this premise, the court
stated that it was 'the Tamayo court which acquired custodial
possession over the subject matter of the controversy, when it
assumed jurisdiction over the case for damages.

Whether or not being a coordinate and co-equal court.
Branch 132 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, has the power to
restrain, through the issuance of a restraining order, the execution
of the judgment of Branch 145 of the same court.
At the time the Tamayo court assumed jurisdiction of Civil
Case No. 9301, the Madayag court was still in the process of
executing the judgment in Civil Case No. 3963. The record reveals
that the amount of P257,091.82 representing the accrued interests

and attorney's fees, which formed part of the judgment, remained
unpaid by the private respondent. The claim of the private
respondent that per verbal agreement, the petitioner waived the
payment of accrued interests and attorney's fees is part of the
execution proceedings in Civil Case No. 3963. As we ruled in the case
of Seavan Carrier, Inc., v. GTI Sports wear Corporation (137 SCRA
The general rule is "A case in which an execution has been
issued is regarded as still pending so that all proceedings on the
execution are proceedings in the suit. There is no question that the
court which rendered the judgment has a general supervisory control
over its process of execution and this power carries with it the right
to determine every question of fact and law which may be involved
in the execution." (Vda. de Paman v. Seneris, 115 SCRA 709).
Moreover, it has been stated that it is "When the judgment has been
satisfied that the same passes beyond review, for satisfaction
thereof is the last act and end of the proceedings. Payment
produces permanent and irrevocable discharge." (Moran, Comments
on the Rules of Court, 1979 ed., Vol. II, p. 405). (at pp. 586-587)
(Emphasis supplied).
Moreover, Deputy Sheriff Nequinto who was restrained by
the Tamayo court for his acts in levying on the logs belonging to the
private respondent under the alleged dead writ of execution was a
ministerial officer of the Madayag court in relation to Civil Case No.
3963. As such an officer, the deputy sheriff is under the control and
supervision of the Madayag court to the exclusion of the other
courts. The Tamayo court never acquired jurisdiction over him. The
alleged irregularities in the execution of the judgment brought about
by the enforcement of a dead writ of execution must be litigated in
the Madayag Court which issued the controversial writ of execution.
Therefore, Branch 132 of the Makati Regional Trial Court
clearly interfered with the execution proceedings of Civil Case No.
3963 of Branch 145 of the same court. The Tamayo court abused its
discretion in assuming jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 9301 to annul
proceedings of deputy sheriff Nequinto by issuing restraining orders
to stop the deputy sheriff and the petitioner from enforcing the June
6, 1984 writ of execution issued by the Madayag court in Civil Case
No. 3963. It is the Madayag court which should look into the
questioned irregularities in the sheriff's proceedings.

Petitioner Cabang filed a Partial Sheriffs Return, stating the
effectuation of the writ.
A third party claim was filed by Wilson Ting and Yu Hon
(private respondents herein) addressed to petitioner Cabang
asserting ownership over the properties attached
Yu filed a motion to dissolve the aforementioned writ of
preliminary attachment; alleging among others, that being the
absolute owners of the personal properties listed in their third party
claim which were illegally seized from them they were willing to file
a counterbond for the return thereof; which motion was opposed by
plaintiff Uy.
Third party claimants Wilson Ting and Yu Hon filed a complaint for
Damages with application for preliminary injunction against Esteban
Uy and Nilo Cabang (co-petitioners herein) in the then Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch 52, Quezon City ('the court a quo' for short)
which case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-35128 ('the second
case' for short). The complaint alleged inter alia that the plaintiffs
are the owners of the personal properties reflected in the Partial
Sheriffs Return which have been attached and seized by defendant
On the same day (June 7, 1982) that plaintiff Uy filed his
exparte motion for writ of execution he and Cabang filed a motion
to quash or dissolve status quo order in the case a quo as
defendants therein on the ground that the court "has no jurisdiction
to interfere with properties under custodia legis on orders of a court
of co-equal and co-ordinate jurisdiction" and that plaintiffs'
complaint is not for recovery of properties in question.
On June 24, 1982, plaintiff Uy in the first case filed his ex
parte motion to authorize Sheriff to sell the attached properties
enumerated in Sheriff Cabang's partial return filed on April 19, 1982,
on the ground that the properties under custodia legis were
perishable especially those taken from No. 65 Speaker Perez,
Quezon City.
In the case a quo the court denied defendants', Uy and
Cabang, motion to quash or dissolve the status quo order.
In its decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Judge not to have committed a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in issuing the order dated August 24, 1982, denying petitioners'
motion to quash the writ of preliminary attachment, and the order
dated October 10, 1983, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss the
complaint a quo.

Gr. No. 83897, November 9, 1990, 191 SCRA 275 (1990)
Esteban B. Uy, Jr. (herein petitioner) filed a complaint
against Sy Yuk Tat for sum of money, damages, with preliminary
attachment in the then Court of First Instance of Rizal. On the same
day, said court issued a writ of preliminary attachment and
appointed Deputy Sheriff Nilo S. Cabang (co-petitioner herein) as
Special Sheriff to implement the writ. The same court issued a
break-open order upon motion filed by petitioner Uy.

Whether or not the properties levied and seized by virtue

of a writ of attachment and later by a writ of execution, were under
custodia legis and therefore not subject to the jurisdiction of
another co-equal court where a third party claimant claimed
ownership of the same properties.
While it is true that property in custody of the law may not
be interfered with, without the permission of the proper court, this
rule is confined to cases where the property belongs to the
defendant or one in which the defendant has proprietary interests.
But when the Sheriff, acting beyond the bounds of his office seizes a

stranger's property, the rule does not apply and interference with
his custody is not interference with another court's order of
It has been seen that a separate action by the third party
who claims to be the owner of the property attached is appropriate.
If this is so, it must be admitted that the judge trying such action
may render judgment ordering the sheriff or whoever has in
possession of the attached property to deliver it to the plaintiff
claimant or desist from seizing it. It follows further that the court
may make an interlocutory order, upon the filing of such bond as
may be necessary, to release the property pending final adjudication
of the title. Jurisdiction over an action includes jurisdiction on
interlocutory matter incidental to the cause and deemed necessary
to preserve the subject matter of the suit or protect the parties'
interests. This is self-evident. (Manila Herald Publishing Co. Inc. v.
Ramos, supra).
The power of the court in the execution of judgments
extends only over properties unquestionably belonging to the
judgment debtor. The levy by the sheriff of a property by virtue of a
writ of attachment may be considered as made under the authority
of the court only when the property levied upon belongs to the
defendant. If he attaches properties other than those of the
defendant, he acts beyond the limits of this authority. The court
issuing a writ of execution is supposed to enforce its authority only
over properties of the judgment debtor. Should a third party appear
to claim the property levied upon by the sheriff, the procedure laid
down by the Rules is that such claim should be the subject of a
separate and independent action.
Neither can petitioner complain that they were denied
their day in court when the Regional Trial Court issued a writ of
preliminary attachment without hearing as it is well settled that its
issuance may be made by the court ex parte. As clearly explained by
this Court, no grave abuse of discretion can be ascribed to
respondent Judge in the issuance of a writ of attachment without
notice to petitioners as there is nothing in the Rules of Court which
makes notice and hearing indispensable and mandatory requisites in
its issuance.
In like manner, the sale of the disputed properties at the
public auction, in satisfaction of a judgment of a co-equal court does
not render the case moot and academic. The undeviating ruling of
this Court in such cases is that attachment and sale of properties
belonging to a third person is void because such properties cannot
be attached and sold at public auction for the purpose of enforcing a
judgment against the judgment debtor.

Gr. No. L-49705-09, February 8, 1979, 88 SCRA 251
On April 7, 1978, election for the position of Representativ
e to the BatasangPambansa
Philippines. The cases at bar concern only the results of the elections
in Region XII which comprises the provinces of Lanao Del Sur, Lanao
Norte,Maguindanao, North Cotabato and Sultan Kudarat, and the citi
es of Marawi, Iligan andCotabato. Tomatic Aratuc sought the
suspension of the canvass then being undertaken byRegional Board
of Canvassers in Cotabato City and in which, the returns in 1,966 out
of 4,107voting centers in the whole region had already been
ASupervening Panel headed by Commissioner of Election Hon. Vena
ncio S. Duque hadconducted the hearings of the complaints of the
petitioners therein of the alleged irregularities inthe election records
of the mentioned provinces. On July 11, 1978, the Regional Board
of Canvassers issued a resolution, over the objection of the
Konsensiya ng Bayan candidates,declaring all the eight Kilusan ng
Bagong Lipunan candidates elected. Appeal was taken by theKB
candidates to the Comelec. On January 13, 1979, the Comelec issued
its questionedresolution declaring seven KBL candidates and one KB
firsteight places, and ordering the Regional Board of Canvassers to pr
oclaim the winningcandidates. The KB candidates interposed the
present petition.
Whether or not respondent Comelec has committed grave
abuse of discretion,amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
As the Superior administrative body having control over boards of
canvassers, the Comelec may review the actuations of the Regional
Board of Canvassers, such as by extending its inquiry beyond the
election records of the voting centers in questions. The authority
of the Commission is in reviewing such actuations does not spring
from any appellant jurisdiction conferred by any provisions of the
provisionanywhere in the election Code, but from the plenary prerog
ative of direct control andsupervision endowed to it by the
provisions in Section 168. And in administrative law, it is a too well
settled postulate to need any supporting citation here, that a
superior body or office having supervision and control over another
may do directly what the latter is supposed to do or ought to have