No. 15-10295-C

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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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 Luther Strange, Attorney General,

 Defendant-Appellant 

, v. Cari D. Searcy, et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellees

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 On appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama Case No. 1:14-cv-208-CG-N

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R

EPLY IN SUPPORT OF

T

IME

-S

ENSITIVE

M

OTION TO

S

TAY

(

RULING REQUESTED BY

F

EB

.

 

9,

 

2015)

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 Luther Strange

 Attorney General

Andrew L. Brasher*

Solicitor General

James W. DavisLaura Howell

 Assistant Attorneys General

 O

FFICE OF THE

A

LABAMA

A

TTORNEY

G

ENERAL

 501 Washington Avenue Montgomery, AL 36130 (334) 353-2609 (334) 353-8440 (fax) abrasher@ago.state.al.us February 2, 2015

 

Case: 15-10295 Date Filed: 02/02/2015 Page: 1 of 12

 

Strange v. Searcy

Appeal No. 15-10295-C C1 of 1

CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS

Appellant Luther Strange, Attorney General, pursuant to 11th Cir. R. 26.1-1, certifies that the following persons have an interest in the outcome of this case and/or appeal: 1.

 

Alabama Probate Judges Association, Amicus 2.

 

Agricola, Algert, Counsel for Amicus 3.

 

Bentley, Robert, Governor and Amicus 4.

 

Brasher, Andrew L., Solicitor General 5.

 

Davis, James W., Assistant Attorney General 6.

 

Granade, Hon. Callie V. S., United States District Judge 7.

 

Hernandez, Christine C., Counsel for Appellee 8.

 

Howell, Laura E., Assistant Attorney General 9.

 

Kennedy, David G., Counsel for Appellee 10.

 

McKeand, Kimberly, Appellee 11.

 

Searcy, Cari D., Appellee 12.

 

Strange, Luther, Attorney General s/ Andrew L. Brasher Andrew L. Brasher

Solicitor General

 Counsel for the Appellant

Case: 15-10295 Date Filed: 02/02/2015 Page: 2 of 12

 

 

1

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF TIME-SENSITIVE MOTION TO STAY

Alabama Attorney General Luther Strange submits this reply in support of his time-sensitive motion to stay the District Court’s Order and Judgment during the pendency of this appeal. The plaintiffs have not rebutted our showing that the law and public interest favor a stay of the lower court’s ruling until either the Supreme Court or this Court decides whether states must recognize same-sex marriage. Each of the four factors at issue—(1) the merits, (2) irreparable harm to the movant, (3) harm to the adverse parties, and (4) the public interest—weighs strongly in favor of granting a stay.

See Garcia-Mir v. Meese

, 781 F.2d 1450, 1453 (11th Cir. 1986).

A. The Attorney General is likely to succeed on the merits.

As we explained in the motion to stay, the trial court’s judgment is due to be reversed because: (1) it did not follow binding Supreme Court precedent; (2) it defined the fundamental right to marry as the right to marry anyone of any sex, even though that formulation of the right to marry is not deeply rooted in our history or tradition; and (3) it did not even mention our expert’s testimony that recognizing opposite-sex marriage promotes the state’s interest in linking children to their biological parents—an interest that is not promoted by recognizing same-sex marriages because one or more of the child’s biological parents are necessarily not a party to the marriage.

Case: 15-10295 Date Filed: 02/02/2015 Page: 3 of 12