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Beaty v. Commonwealth
On November 8, 2000, Logan County Deputy Sheriff Jimmy Phelps observed
a white Chevrolet erratically weaving from side to side on the highway. Upon
stopping and approaching the vehicle, Phelps detected a strong odor of anhydrous
ammonia. Appellant was the driver of the Chevrolet; his g.f., Marion Ann Hanks, was
in the passenger seat. Phelps asked Appellant to exit the vehicle, and as he did so,
Phelps observed that he was unsteady on his feet. Appellant failed the field sobriety
tests and was arrested and charged with DUI. Because his breath test was negative,
Phelps concluded that Appellant was under the influence of a substance other than
alcohol. Appellant refused to submit to a blood or urine test at a local hospital.
A search incident to the arrest revealed substantial evidence of illegal drug
activity. In a bag concealed in the area of his groin, A possessed three small bags of
marijuana, a bag of cocaine, a set of scales, and other assorted drug paraphernalia.
When Hanks was asked to exit the vehicle by another officer, she attempted to hide
under the vehicle a bag containing marijuana and rolling papers. Officers found
marijuana seeds in the first seat, open containers of beer and gin, and, in the glove
compartment, a prescription pill bottle containing crack cocaine and bearing the name
"Kenneth Huskey," who, as explained infra, was the boyfriend of the vehicle's owner.
The back seat and trunk of the vehicle contained a meth lab.
The vehicle was owned by Hank's friend, Pamela Kuhl. Appellant and Hanks
testified that they had borrowed the car merely to do laundry and were ignorant of the
contents of the back seat and trunk. Hanks claimed that the car was always messy and
that she had noticed the equipment in the back seat. Kuhl, and Kuhl's boyfriend,
Kenneth Huskey, testified that the car was empty when they loaned it to Hanks in the
early afternoon of November 8th, 2000.
Appellant contends that he was denied... His theory was that Kuhl believed
that Hanks and Huskey were secret paramours and, after discovering the affair, Kuhl
contrived to loan Hanks the mobile meth lab in order to incriminate Hanks and
eliminate her as a rival for Huskey's affections. Kuhl normally loaned her car to hanks
to drive her daughter to school, so Kuhl would have assumed that Hanks would be the
driver on November 8th, 2000. However, the scheme went awry. Appellant ended up
as the driver, and though the trap was set for Hanks, it ensnared the Appellant instead.
The trial court sustained the Commonwealth's objection to the admission of
this evidence. [The court also excluded a doc and cross examination.]
Appellant contends that the document and cross-examination, both evincing
Kuhl's jealousy, should have been admitted substantively as probative of his defense
theory that it was Kuhl, not appellant, who placed the met lab and materials in the car.
#1. Whether Appellant was denied of his Due Process right to present a defense to the
methamphetamine-related offenses by exclusion of evidence that Pamela Kuhl, the
owner of the vehicle, had a motive to commit the offenses.
Appellant's only defense to the meth related charges was that Kuhl was the
perpetrator. Likewise, in Chambers, the unconstitutionally excluded evidence was
probative of the defendant's theory that a third person was the actual perpetrator of the
charged offense. For the same reasons, we have been adamant that a D "has the right
to introduce evidence that another person committed the offense with which he is

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charged". A trial court may only infringe upon this right when the defense theory is
unsupported, speculative, and far-fetched and could thereby confuse or mislead the
Federal courts have also specifically recognized the importance of the D's
right to produce evidence of a third party.
Appellant did attempt to offer a defense to the meth-related charges: that Kuhl
planted the meth-related products in the vehicle without his knowledge. The
testimony and doc support his theory by substantiating Kuhl's jealously of Hanks and
worry that Hanks would "break up" Kuhl's relationship with Huskey. The doc also
illustrated that K's affection for the scheming, evidenced by her admissions on the
cardboard doc that "we were trying to 'set him up' and 'we planned it".
The Court reversed the charges related to the methamphetamine laboratory
and remanded for a new trial.
State v. Deffebaugh
Before sending the informant to purchase the cocaine, the Coffeyville police
searched the informant to verify that she had no drugs on her person or in her car. An
officer attached a listening device under the informant's clothing so officers could
monitor the controlled purchase. After recording the serial number for each bill, an
officer gave the informant $30 for purchasing the cocaine.
The informant drove to a house that Coffeyville police had bee observing for
drug activity and parked her car along the curb. Officers followed the informant to the
location of the purchase and observed the transaction from a distance to avoid being
detected. Four black males approached the informant's car. The officers were too far
way to visually identify the men, but Detective Robson recognized two voices over
the audio transmitter, one being that of Calvin Shobe.
The informant, who was not familiar with any of the men at her car, provided
the officers with a description of the man named "Jimmie" who had taken her money
and given her two rocks of cocaine. Based on the informant's description, Detective
Robson prepared two photo line ups and showed them to the informant within 24
hours of the controlled purchase. The informant did not select any of the pictures in
the first photo array but selected Deffebaughs photo from the second photo line up
without any hesitation.
Within 24 hours of the controlled purchase, Detective Robson sustained a
search warrant for the house associated with the controlled purchases. When the
warrant was executed, the police found Deffebaugh and 10 other black males in the
house, along with cash, cocaine, and guns. Deffebaugh claimed ownership of some of
the money found on the floor, including one of the marked bills from the controlled
At trial, Deffebaugh called Shobe to testify that Shobe was present at the
controlled purchase but Deffebaugh was not there. The state objected to Shobe's
testimony, claiming that Deffebaugh failed to give notice of an alibi defense. The trial
court prohibited Shobe from testifying that Shobe was present at the controlled
purchase but that Deffebaugh as not there.
#1. Whether or not the trial court correctly prohibited Shobe from testifying regarding
Deffebaugh's presence at the drug sale.

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Although the defense does not generally have to disclose the names of defense
witnesses prior to trial, the disclosure of alibi witnesses is an exception to that rule.
The purpose of this statute is to protect the State from last minute, easily fabricating
defenses. The notice requirement allows the State to investigate and call rebuttal
witnesses if necessary.
The Court of Appeals resolved the ambiguity in this statute by placing a more
emphasis on the second, more specific sentence. It concluded that Shobe was not an
alibi witness under this statute because Shobe could not testify regarding
Deffebaugh's specific whereabouts at the time of the drug sale. Instead of treating
Shobe as an alibi witness, the Court of Appeals concluded that Shobe was an
eyewitness and so his identity and testimony did not have to be disclosed prior to trial.
Based on that analysis, the Court of Appeals reversed Deffebaugh's conviction,
holding that the trial court erroneously prohibited Shobe from testifying as an
This decision is supported by a historical analysis of the world "alibi". In
Latin, the meaning of alibi literally means "somewhere else." The word alibi was first
used in the English language in the legal context as an adverb meaning "elsewhere".
By the end of the 18th century, the world "alibi" was used as a noun meaning a "plea
of being elsewhere at the time of the crime.
We affirm the Court of Appeals decision reversing the district court's
interpretation of KSA 22-3218 and remand the matter for a new trial.
State v. Sedlock
The D is the father of JT, the victim in this matter. JT was a 4th grade student
at Grand Lake School on April 7th, 2003. On that day, the assistant principle,
Jacqueline Holmes, called JT's parents to inform them that he had been sent to the
office due to disciplinary problems. JT's parents had a conference with Ms. Holmes,
and the D then checked JT out of school. When leaving the office, the D kicked JT in
the buttocks and then kneed him in the back. Ms. Holms was concerned about JT's
well-being, so she called the police. Deputy Larry Broussard responded to Ms.
Holme's call and then went to the D's residence. While at the D's residence, Deputy
Broussard observed various injuries to JT and arrested the D.
#1. Whether the D's actions were justified as punishment for JT's behavior at school.
#2. Whether or not the D's exercise of discipline was reasonable.
The D argues that his actions were justified as punishment for JT's behavior at
school. "Justification can be claimed when the conduct is reasonable discipline of
minors by a parent".
We find that the evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the spanking
D administered upon JT caused pain and suffering that exceeded the bounds of
reasonable discipline and was, therefore, not justified.
It is abundantly clear to me that JT required some degree of of discipline. He
had already failed the fourth grade once and was well on his way to failing a second
time. The record reveals that JT's attitude toward his education and behavioral
obligations left much to be desired, and this attitude has existed for an extended

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period of time. Thus, the D was faced with the task of, in some manner, redirecting
JT's attention to his shortcomings at school-both from an academic and behavioral
perspective. I do not disagree with the conclusion that the D's disciplinary measures
were excessive. The question is whether they cross the line into criminal activity.
People v. Romero
The roots of this case are planted in a simple street scene. A group of men
were crossing the road when Alex Bernal sped around the corner in his vehicle, and
had to quickly brake. Words were exchanged, threats were hurled, and moments later
Bernal was dying with a knife wound to his heart.
D testified that when Bernal came around the corner in the car, he yelled,
"Slow down, fool". After Bernal parked and got out of his car, he and the D began
fighting. De separated from the group and approached the driver because he felt he
had to protect his younger brother. The fighting stopped, and D started to walk away.
Bernal then struck him from behind. At this point D retrieved a knife from an
unknown person, and began swinging it at Bernal to scare him away. As D swung the
knife, Bernal was backing up. D testified "I had to stop him. From there, I didn't think
of nothing else, you know". Bernal kicked D a couple of times, and D swung the knife
at him. His only intention was to stop Bernal, who was kicking toward him. D,
however, admitted, "I can't say that I was scared." D felt he had to stop Bernal from
getting past him. However, he said, "I can't explain me doing what I did to him...". D
acknowledged stabbing Bernal in the heart, but claimed he was attempting to stab
Bernal in the leg. While admitting responsibility for Bernal's death, the D maintained
he never intended anyone to die.
#1. Whether culture should be taken into considerations for justification for someone's
Given the law, we conclude the testimony of Professor Jankowski was
irrelevant to whether D actually believed he was in imminent danger of death or great
bodily injury, and whether such a believe was objectively reasonable. We are unsure
what D means by his reference to the sociology of poverty, and how it might affect his
actual beliefs and the objective reasonableness of those beliefs. Similarly, even if we
assume street fighters have special understanding of what is expected of them, and
that this is soething with which the jurors are not acquainted, why is it relevant? Are
street fighters expected to kill every person they fight with, regardless of their
Also, even if the D had a strong motivation to protect his younger brother, this
does not answer the question of why it is necessary to use deadly force. Self-defense
and the defense of another are both recognized by law.