Del San Transport Lines vs. C&A Construction, Inc.

GR 156034 October 1, 2003
 The undisputed facts reveal that respondent C & A Construction, Inc. was engaged by the
National Housing Authority (NHA) to construct a deflector wall at the Vitas Reclamation
Area in Vitas, Tondo, Manila. The project was completed in 1994 but it was not formally
turned over to NHA.
 On October 9, 1994, M/V Delsan Express, a ship owned and operated by petitioner Delsan
Transport Lines, Inc., anchored at the Navotas Fish Port for the purpose of installing a
cargo pump and clearing the cargo oil tank. At around 12:00 midnight of October 20,
1994, Captain Demetrio T. Jusep of M/V Delsan Express received a report from his radio
head operator in Japan5 that a typhoon was going to hit Manila in about eight (8) hours.7
At approximately 8:35 in the morning of October 21, 1994, Capt. Jusep tried to seek
shelter at the North Harbor but could not enter the area because it was already
congested.8 At 10:00 a.m., Capt. Jusep decided to drop anchor at the vicinity of Vitas
mouth, 4 miles away from a Napocor power barge. At that time, the waves were already
reaching 8 to 10 feet high. Capt. Jusep ordered his crew to go full ahead to counter the
wind which was dragging the ship towards the Napocor power barge. To avoid collision,
Capt. Jusep ordered a full stop of the vessel.9 He succeeded in avoiding the power barge,
but when the engine was re-started and the ship was maneuvered full astern, it hit the
deflector wall constructed by respondent.10 The damage caused by the incident
amounted to P456,198.24.
WON Capt. Jusep is guilty of negligence in deciding to transfer the vessel to the North
Harbor only at 8:35 a.m. of October 21, 1994?
WON Del San Transport Lines is solidary liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code for the
quasi-delict committed by Capt. Jusep?
In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that Capt. Jusep was
negligent in deciding to transfer the vessel only at 8:35 in the morning of October 21, 1994. As
early as 12:00 midnight of October 20, 1994, he received a report from his radio head operator in
Japan19 that a typhoon was going to hit Manila20 after 8 hours.21 This, notwithstanding, he did
nothing, until 8:35 in the morning of October 21, 1994, when he decided to seek shelter at the
North Harbor, which unfortunately was already congested. The finding of negligence cannot be
rebutted upon proof that the ship could not have sought refuge at the North Harbor even if the
transfer was done earlier. It is not the speculative success or failure of a decision that determines
the existence of negligence in the present case, but the failure to take immediate and
appropriate action under the circumstances. Capt. Jusep, despite knowledge that the typhoon
was to hit Manila in 8 hours, complacently waited for the lapse of more than 8 hours thinking that
the typhoon might change direction.22 He cannot claim that he waited for the sun to rise instead
of moving the vessel at midnight immediately after receiving the report because of the difficulty
of traveling at night. The hour of 8:35 a.m. is way past sunrise. Furthermore, he did not transfer
as soon as the sun rose because, according to him, it was not very cloudy23 and there was no
weather disturbance yet.
When he ignored the weather report notwithstanding reasonable foresight of harm, Capt.
Jusep showed an inexcusable lack of care and caution which an ordinary prudent person would
have observed in the same situation.25 Had he moved the vessel earlier, he could have had
greater chances of finding a space at the North Harbor considering that the Navotas Port where
they docked was very near North Harbor.26 Even if the latter was already congested, he would
still have time to seek refuge in other ports.
The trial court erred in applying the emergency rule. Under this rule, one who
suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to
consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not

I. if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method. however. the emergency rule is not applicable to the instant case because the danger where Capt. that the horses then ran up and on which street they came into collision with the carromata in .31 it was held that it is not necessary to state that petitioner was negligent in the supervision or selection of its employees. Jusep. the driver of which cracked a whip and made some other noises. the plaintiff. unless the danger in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence. that the required diligence of a good father of a family pertains not only to the selection. Martinez vs. when a delivery wagon belonging to the defendant used for the purpose of transportation of fodder by the defendant. that while unloading the forage and in the act of carrying some of it out. So also. and to which was attached a pair of horses. petitioner presented no evidence that it formulated rules/guidelines for the proper performance of functions of its employees and that it strictly implemented and monitored compliance therewith. crowded close to the sidewalk on the left-hand side of the street and stopped. 1908. In Viron Transportation Co. Jusep found himself was caused by his own negligence. Allegations of negligence against the employee and that of an employer-employee relation in the complaint are enough to make out a case of quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. but that instead of passing by the defendant's wagon and horses ran into the carromata occupied by said plaintiff with her child and overturned it. Carmen Ong de Martinez. another vehicle drove by. and also injuring the carromata itself and the harness upon the horse which was drawing it. that the delivery wagon had sent to deliver some forage at Paco Livery Stable on Calle Herran. who was driving his delivery wagon at the time the accident occurred. and that for the purpose of delivery thereof the cochero driving the team as defendant's employee tied the driving lines of the horses to the front end of the delivery wagon and then went back inside of the wagon for the purpose of unloading the forage to be delivered. Clearly. 1910 Facts:  That on the 11th day of September. was riding in a carromata on Calle Real. but also to the supervision of employees. Jusep because the latter is a licensed and competent Master Mariner.guilty of negligence. petitioner should therefore be held liable for the negligent act of Capt. severely wounding said plaintiff by making a serious cut upon her head. It should be stressed. who is the owner/operator of M/V Delsan Express. It is not enough that the employees chosen be competent and qualified. In the case at bar. city of Manila. Jusep who at the time of the incident acted within the scope of his duty... There is no question that petitioner. and the driver was thrown from the inside of the wagon out through the rear upon the ground and was unable to stop the horses. Failing to discharge the burden. inasmuch as its negligence is presumed by operation of law. along the lefthand side of the street as she was going. came along the street in the opposite direction to that the in which said plaintiff was proceeding.  These facts are not dispute. Buskirk GR L-5691 December 27. v. Delos Santos. which frightened the horses attached to the delivery wagon and they ran away. The defense raised by petitioner was that it exercised due diligence in the selection of Capt. Inc. petitioner cannot disclaim liability on the basis of respondent’s failure to allege in its complaint that the former did not exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees. and that thereupon the driver of the said plaintiff's carromata. but the defendant presented evidence to the effect that the cochero. is also the employer of Capt. P. district of Ermita. observing that the delivery wagon of the defendant was coming at great speed. however. inasmuch as the employer is still required to exercise due diligence in supervising its employees. was a good servant and was considered a safe and reliable cochero. in order to give defendant's delivery wagon an opportunity to pass by.

in which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable. was riding. That maxim at most only creates a prima facie case. But such are not their natural or customary results. Art. and many other circumstances. liable for the negligence of such driver in handling the team. Guardians are liable for the damages caused by minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live with them. A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done. To hold that. Finally. that he had driven one of the horses several years and the other five or six months. In our judgment.itc-alf Accidents sometimes happen and injuries result from the most ordinary acts of life. therefore. It is something invoked in favor of the plaintiff before defendant's case showing the conditions and circumstances under which the injury occurred. therefore. the creative reason . that the cochero was experienced and capable. The fact that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is sometimes successfully invoked in such a case. the actor is necessarily negligent. and is a question to be determined by the jury from the facts of each case The act of defendant's driver in leaving the horses in the manner proved was not unreasonable or imprudent. and that only in the absence of proof of the circumstances under which the act complained of was performed. The obligation imposed by preceding article is demandable. Issue: Old Civil Code ata pero ditto kasi based yung issue . Art. 1902. The father. but not when the damages should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed. The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage. Acts the performance of which has not proved destructive or injurious and which have. Held: Note: Person’s case under customs.which the plaintiff. can not be held to be themselves unreasonable or imprudent. Indeed the very reason why they have been permitted by society is that they beneficial rather than prejudicial. no accident due to such practice. The State is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent. It appears from the undisputed evidence that the horses which caused the damage were gentle and tractable. we are of the opinion that the judgment must be reversed upon the ground that the evidence does not disclose that the cochero was negligent. because such an act once resulted in accident or injury. 1903. is liable for the damages caused by the minors who live with them. of leaving them in the condition in which they were left on the day of the accident. Owners of directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for the damages caused by the employees in the service of the branches in which the latter may be employed or on account of their duties. WON an employer who has furnished a gentle and tractable team and a trusty and capable driver is. or those in charged of his horse. Carmen Ong de Martinez. under the last paragraph of the above provisions. does not in any sense militate against the reasoning presented. The degree of care required of the plaintiff. is to go far. that he had been in the habit. The defendant himself was not with the vehicle on the day in question. not only for personal acts and omissions. It cannot be said that the fact of leaving the horse unhitched is in itself negligence. and on his death or incapacity the mother. Whether it is negligence to leave a horse unhitched must be depend upon the disposition of the horse. at the time of the injury. is that which would be exercised by a person of ordinary care and prudence under like circumstances. the cochero of the defendant was not negligent in leaving the horses in the manner described by the evidence in this case. been acquiesced in by society for so long a time that they have ripened into custom. whether he was under the observation and control of some person all the time. that to leave the horses and assist in unloading the merchandise in the manner described on the day of the accident was the custom of all cochero who delivered merchandise of the character of that which was being delivered by the cochero of the defendant on the day in question. that they had never run away up to that time and there had been. but also for those of the persons for whom they should be responsible. during all that time. which custom was sanctioned by their employers. masters or directors of arts and trades are liable for the damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody.

00 to Cynthia Pomasin (Cynthia). Gina Sesista.000.00 as moral damages.00 for continuous hospitalization and medical expenses of Spouses Pomasin. without prior objection or notice.000. vs. finding itself unprejudiced by such practice. 554) It is a matter of common knowledge as well as proof that it is the universal practice of merchants to deliver merchandise of the kind of that being delivered at the time of the injury. Consorcia Pomasin.00 for . Tolson (139 U. Cynthia. His other daughter Laarni. extended financial assistance to respondents by giving them P1.        The opposing parties gave two different versions of the incident. Ought the public now. the owner of the truck. Antonio Sesista and Sonia Perol sustained injuries. P500. 2011 Facts:  Two vehicles. Albay last 12 August 1994.[5] On the other hand. another granddaughter Dianne Pomasin Pagunsan. P1. To avoid collision. in turn. has acquiesced for years without objection. he saw a tractor-trailer coming from the opposite direction and encroaching on the jitney’s lane. in the manner in which that was then being delivered. respondents filed a complaint for damages against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo.000. Polangui. The public.000. On the other hand.00 as exemplary damages. He testified that while the jitney was passing through a curve going downward. Ricky Ponce. was traversing the opposite lane going towards Naga City. 551). the jitney driver. figured in a vehicular mishap along Maharlika Highway in Barangay Agos.000. one of Gregorio’s daughters. Unfortunately. Laarni Pomasin (Laarni) was driving the jitney towards the direction of Legaspi City while the tractor-trailer. he noticed a jitney on the opposite lane falling off the shoulder of the road. Jabon and one of the passengers in the tractor-trailer were injured. executed an Affidavit of Desistance.00 each immediately after the accident and P200. On 14 November 1994.000. Respondents prayed for indemnification for the heirs of those who perished in the accident at P50. imprudence and carelessness of petitioners. It has not been productive of accidents or injuries. it began running in a zigzag manner and heading towards the direction of the truck. P30. Vicente Pomasin..000. and that it is the universal practice to leave the horses in the manner in which they were left at the time of the accident. Gregorio Pomasin (Gregorio).for the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur disappears. Jabon recounted that while he was driving the tractor-trailer. Gregorio was injured and brought to the Albay Provincial Hospital in Legaspi City. Laarni’s father. driven by Claudio Jabon (Jabon).00 for hospitalization. P250. Thereafter. to be permitted to reverse the practice of decades and thereby make culpable and guilty one who had every reason and assurance to believe that he was acting under the sanction of the strongest of all civil forces. through the courts. This is demonstrated by the case of Inland and Seaboard Costing Co. Albert Tison (Tison). The jitney was hit by the tractor-trailer and it was dragged further causing death and injuries to its passengers.00 each. Tison vs Pomasin GR 173180 August 24.000. They alleged that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence. The tractor-trailer was likewise damaged. Andrea Pomasin Pagunsan.000. His daughter. the jitney still hit the left fender of the tractor-trailer before it was thrown a few meters away.S. Jabon immediately swerved the tractor-trailer to the right where it hit a tree and sacks of palay. and granddaughter Annie Jane Pomasin Pagunsan expired at the hospital. was on board the jitney and seated on the passenger’s side. Reynaldo Sesista. His wife. the custom of a people? We think not. medical and burial expenses. P350. a tractor-trailer and a jitney.[4] Multiple death and injuries to those in the jitney resulted. This is the custom in all cities. where the court said (p. sister Narcisa Pomasin Roncales and Abraham Dionisio Perol died on the spot.

petitioners countered that it was Laarni’s negligence which proximately caused the accident.000. and cost of suit. P100. the passenger’s vision is not as good as that of the driver from the vantage point of the driver’s seat especially in nighttime. more reasonably reliable. The problem in the license of Jabon is not the proximate cause of the accident. thus rendering a passenger’s opportunity for observation on the antecedent causes of the collision lesser than that of the driver. Laarni Pomasin was negligent. P50. So that as between the respective versions of the plaintiffs thru their passenger and that of the defendants thru their driver as to the cause or antecedent causes that led to the vehicular collision in this case. In the case of a running or travelling vehicle. simply because the attention of the passenger is not as much concentrated on the driving as that of the driver.the proximate cause of the accident --. We give weight to this finding greater than the opposite conclusion reached by the appellate court that the driver of the tractortrailer caused the vehicular collision. The trial court expounded. the zigzagging jeep hitting the left fender of . he does not have to direct his attention to the safe conduct of the travelling vehicle.00 per court appearance. One reason why the trial court found credible the version of Jabon was because his concentration as driver is more focused than that of a mere passenger. consequently the capacity for observation of the latter of the latter on the matter testified to which is the precise point of inquiry --.000. Notwithstanding the affidavit. especially in highway travel which doubtless involves faster speed than in ordinary roads. Ratio: First Issue: The trial court found that the jitney driver was negligent.00 for litigation expenses.000. In their Answer. the driver is concentrated on his driving continuously from moment to moment even in long trips. This most particularly holds true in vehicular collision or accident cases which oftentimes happen merely momentarily or in the split of a second. rendering his opportunity for observation on the precise cause of the accident or collision or immediately preceding thereto not as much as that of the driver whose attention is continuously focused on his driving. this Court is more inclined to believe the story of defendant’s driver Claudio Jabon that the jitney driven by Laarni Pomasin fell off the shoulder of the curved road causing it to run thereafter in a zigzag manner and in the process the two vehicles approaching each other from opposite directions at highway speed came in contact with each other. Issue: WON the testimony of Claudio Jabon or Laarni Pomasin was to be given more credence by the court? Who was negligent? WON the the lack of authority of Jabon to drive a tractor in his license is the proximate cause of the accident? Held: The testimony of Claudio Jabon is to be given more weight. one overriding consideration is their opportunity for observation in getting to know or actually seeing or observing the matter they testify to. While in the case of a mere passenger. They further claimed that Cynthia was authorized by Spouses Pomasin to enter into an amicable settlement by executing an Affidavit of Desistance.00 as attorney’s fees plus P1. Petitioners counterclaimed for damages. petitioners complained that respondents filed the instant complaint to harass them and profit from the recklessness of Laarni. loss of income of Cynthia. the version of the driver of defendant should ordinarily be more reliable than the version of a mere passenger of Plaintiffs’ vehicle. as he may even doze off to sleep if he wants to. thus: In the appreciation of the testimony of eye-witnesses. as in fact he may converse with other passengers and pay no attention to the driving or safe conduct of the travelling vehicle. This being so.

it can be argued that Jabon should have swerved to the right upon seeing the jitney zigzagging before it collided with the tractor-trailer. Second Issue: Driving without a proper license is a violation of traffic regulation. In hindsight. and only as a general rule. The factual setting of the event testified on must certainly be considered. though. it does not necessarily follow that between the opposing testimonies of a driver and a passenger.[28] Likewise controlling is our ruling in Añonuevo v. On this point. “loaded with passengers with topload” “was running in a zigzag manner. which explains why it was running in a zigzag manner before it hit the tractor-trailer. While it is logical that a driver’s attention to the road travelled is keener than that of a mere passenger. Clearly. understandably in this case. However. There is a preponderance of evidence that the tractor-trailer was in fact ascending. the legal presumption of negligence arises if at the time of the mishap. v. the jitney had the tendency to accelerate. the former is more credible. leaving the driver without sufficient time and space to maneuver a vehicle the size of a tractor-trailer uphill and away from collision with the jitney oncoming downhill. Neither can it be inferred that Jabon was negligent. we held that a causal connection must exist between the injury received and the violation of the traffic regulation. The declaration of Jabon with respect to the road condition was straightforward and consistent. The appellate court labelled the trial court’s rationalization as a “sweeping conjecture”[19] and countered that Gregorio was actually occupying the front seat of the jitney and had actually a clear view of the incident despite the fact that he was not driving. Jabon and his testimony is more credible. The fall into the shoulder of the road can result in the loss of control of the jitney. of violation of law. is without legal consequence unless it is a contributing cause of the injury. The fact that the jitney easily fell into the road shoulder. like any other negligence. in Sanitary Steam Laundry.” Going downward. Negligence. Court of Appeals. supports the trial court’s conclusion that the jitney was indeed going downhill which. Accidents. a person was violating any traffic regulation. the negligence of Gregorio’s daughter. the violent impact resulting in the lighter vehicle. it may be repeated. happen in an instant. Laarni was the proximate cause of the accident. consisting in whole or in part. arising . that gives credence to the further testimony of Jabon that the herein respondent’s jitney. prodded by the inconsistency of Gregorio’s testimony. being thrown away due to the disparate size of the truck. There was no showing that the tractor-trailer was speeding. the jitney.” It is this conclusion. Court of Appeals[29] where we reiterated that negligence per se. The recollection of Gregorio veered from “curving and downward” to uphill. Inc. so that. was the original testimony of Gregorio that the road was “curving and downward. its speed could not be more than that of a fully loaded jitney which was running downhill in a zigzagging manner. Considering its size and the weight of the tractor-trailer. It must be proven that the violation of the traffic regulation was the proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it substantially contributed thereto. an undebated fact.the truck all the way to the fuel tank. it should also be considered that the logic will hold only if the two are similarly circumstanced. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code. and.

In the instant case. Añonuevo. aiming to provide compensation for the harm suffered by those whose interests have been invaded owing to the conduct of other. Makati City. need not be sufficient in itself in establishing liability for damages. Jabon was able to sufficiently explain that the Land Transportation Office merely erred in not including restriction code 8 in his license. respectively. an accident occurred at the corner of EDSA and Ayala Avenue. particularly on December 15. while convenient. Dungga (SPO1 Dungga).  Maintaining that it has been subrogated to the rights and interests of the assured by operation of law upon its payment to the latter. 2012 Facts:  At around 5 o’clock in the morning of December 17. After all. Since the onus on Añonuevo is to conclusively prove the link between the violations and the accident.000. Malayan Insurance Co. for it seeks to impute culpability arising from the failure of the actor to perform up to a standard established by a legal fiat. among others. we can deem him as having failed to discharge his necessary burden of proving the cyclist’s own liability. The doctrine (and Article 2185.from the mere violation of a traffic statute. he relied on a putative presumption that these violations in themselves sufficiently established negligence appreciable against the cyclist. no causal connection was established between the tractortrailer driver’s restrictions on his license to the vehicular collision. and the accident itself. requiring them to pay the amount it had paid to the assured. insuring the aforementioned Mitsubishi Galant against third party liability. Previously. When respondents refused to settle their . who was driving a car. Senior Police Officer 1 Alfredo M. (2) an Isuzu Tanker with plate number PLR 684. tort law is remunerative in spirit. for that matter) is undeniably useful as a judicial guide in adjudging liability. these two vehicles were shoved forward and the front left portion of the Mitsubishi Galant rammed into the rear right portion of the Isuzu Tanker. Malayan Insurance claimed in its Complaint dated October 18. are not intractable so as to forbid rebuttal rooted in fact. own damage and theft. to wit: (1) a Nissan Bus operated by Aladdin Transit with plate number NYS 381. and (4) a Mitsubishi Galant with plate number TLM 732. of the Fuzo Cargo Truck. Furthermore. Malayan Insurance sent several demand letters to respondents Rodelio Alberto (Alberto) and Enrico Alberto Reyes (Reyes). 1995. Instead. involving four (4) vehicles. Alberto GR 194320 February 1. the Isuzu Tanker was in front of the Mitsubishi Galant with the Nissan Bus on their right side shortly before the vehicular incident. 1999 that it paid the damages sustained by the assured amounting to PhP 700. But the doctrine should not be rendered inflexible so as to deny relief when in fact there is no causal relation between the statutory violation and the injury sustained. Due to the strong impact. PV-025-00220 in favor of First Malayan Leasing and Finance Corporation (the assured). All three (3) vehicles were at a halt along EDSA facing the south direction when the Fuzo Cargo Truck simultaneously bumped the rear portion of the Mitsubishi Galant and the rear left portion of the Nissan Bus. Having insured the vehicle against such risks. In said case. 1994. the registered owner and the driver. (3) a Fuzo Cargo Truck with plate number PDL 297. vs.” We took the occasion to state that: The rule on negligence per se must admit qualifications that may arise from the logical consequences of the facts leading to the mishap. did not attempt “to establish a causal connection between the safety violations imputed to the injured cyclist. Malayan Insurance issued Car Insurance Policy No. Presumptions in law.  Based on the Police Report issued by the on-the-spot investigator.

00 with legal interest from the time of the filing of the complaint. on the other hand. in turn. sideswiped the Fuzo Cargo Truck.  In their Answer. Malayan Insurance was constrained to file a complaint for damages for gross negligence against respondents. coming from the service road of EDSA. “Hearsay is not limited to oral testimony or statements.00 and. Section 44. since its proximate cause was the reckless driving of the Nissan Bus driver. The Nissan Bus. Malayan Insurance presented the testimony of its lone witness. in Civil Case No. the Fuzo Cargo Truck hit the rear end of the Mitsubishi Galant.   Issue: WON the police report is admissible evidence to support the claim of Malayan insurance? WON there was a valid subrogation to Malayan of the claim of damages of the insured owner of the Mitsubishi gallant? Held: Yes it is admissible.000. among which are entries in official records. on the other hand. as well as oral statements. Concomitantly. Ratio: Malayan Insurance contends that. As discussed in D. 99-95885. even without the presentation of the police investigator who prepared the police report. maneuvered its way towards the middle lane without due regard to Reyes’ right of way.M. especially since respondents failed to make a timely objection to its presentation in evidence. said report is still admissible in evidence. ruled in favor of Malayan Insurance and declared respondents liable for damages. a witness can testify only to those facts which the witness knows of his or her personal knowledge. Respondents also controverted the results of the Police Report. a motor car claim adjuster. which. 3. Cost of suit. causing damage to the latter in the amount of PhP 20. respondents asserted that they cannot be held liable for the vehicular accident.[16] Respondents counter that since the police report was never confirmed by the investigating police officer. which are derived from the witness’ own perception. The amount of P700. 2.  After the termination of the pre-trial proceedings. This is known as the hearsay rule. Inc. Reyes stepped hard on the brakes but the braking action could not cope with the inertia and failed to gain sufficient traction.000. trial ensued. Attorney’s fees of P10. hit the rear end of the vehicle in front of it. failed to present any evidence. Indeed. As a consequence. Such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what the witness has learned. Yes there is a valid subrogation. They alleged that the speeding bus. that is. In its Decision dated February 2. Rule 130 provides: . a witness may not testify on matters which he or she merely learned from others either because said witness was told or read or heard those matters. The dispositive portion reads: WHEREFORE. the general rule that excludes hearsay as evidence applies to written. judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff against defendants jointly and severally to pay plaintiff the following: 1.liability.000. v. CA. under the rules of evidence. Respondents. When the Nissan Bus abruptly stopped.” There are several exceptions to the hearsay rule under the Rules of Court. who attested that he processed the insurance claim of the assured and verified the documents submitted to him. Consunji. the trial court. 2009. asserting that it was based solely on the biased narration of the Nissan Bus driver. it cannot be considered as part of the evidence on record.

as long as the above requisites could be adequately proved. there is no dispute that SPO1 Dungga.M. Respondents failed to make a timely objection to the police report’s presentation in evidence. under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. PICOP Resources. the police report is still admissible in evidence We agree with Malayan Insurance. however. Respondents. in turn. Consunji. or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. they are deemed to have waived their right to do so. As a rule of evidence. or. and while the mere happening of an accident or injury will not generally give rise to an inference or presumption that it was due to negligence on defendant’s part. or in one jurisdiction. that the thing or instrumentality speaks for itself. the third requisite is lacking. respondents cannot evade liability by virtue of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. aside from the statement in the police report. which allegation is totally . (b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his or her duties. the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. and (c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him or her stated. the facts or circumstances accompanying an injury may be such as to raise a presumption. In the case at bar.[ As a result. or at least permit an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant. The concept of res ipsa loquitur has been explained in this wise: While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed. In Alvarez v. which must have been acquired by the public officer or other person personally or through official information. x x x where it is shown that the thing or instrumentality which caused the injury complained of was under the control or management of the defendant. and that the occurrence resulting in the injury was such as in the ordinary course of things would not happen if those who had its control or management used proper care. there is sufficient evidence. which. case is quite elucidating: Petitioner’s contention. point to the reckless driving of the Nissan Bus driver as the proximate cause of the collision. in the absence of explanation by the defendant. still. Here. the presentation of the police report itself is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule even if the police investigator who prepared it was not presented in court. Thus. Even if We consider the inadmissibility of the police report in evidence. hit the rear end of the vehicle in front of it. as sometimes stated. reasonable evidence. the thing or transaction speaks for itself. this Court reiterated the requisites for the admissibility in evidence. as an exception to the hearsay rule of entries in official records. Notably. the on-the-spot investigator. The D. however. what is not clear is whether SPO1 Dungga had sufficient personal knowledge of the facts contained in his report. that the injury arose from or was caused by the defendant’s want of care. prepared the report. thus: (a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so. or some other person who is charged with negligence. Inc. none of the parties disputes the fact that the Fuzo Cargo Truck hit the rear end of the Mitsubishi Galant. loses relevance in the face of the application of res ipsa loquitur by the CA. literally. The effect of the doctrine is to warrant a presumption or inference that the mere fall of the elevator was a result of the person having charge of the instrumentality was negligent. thus. and he did so in the performance of his duty.Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines. or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law. which means. However.

ASIAKONSTRUCT could not object to COMFAC’s offer of evidence nor present evidence in its defense. no contributory negligence was attributed to the driver of the Mitsubishi Galant. Also. the presumption of negligence remains. As this Court held in Asian Construction and Development Corporation v. Consequently. the presumption of negligence may be rebutted or overcome by other evidence to the contrary. who actively participated in the initial stages of the case stopped attending the hearings when COMFAC was about to end its presentation. therefore. this allegation was self-serving and totally unfounded. and as We have mentioned earlier. claim that the documents presented by Malayan Insurance do not indicate certain important details that would show proper subrogation. and the court cannot. is compelled to allege negligence in general terms and to rely upon the proof of the happening of the accident in order to establish negligence. all the requisites for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are present. Respondents. As noted by Malayan Insurance. Finally. it is partly based upon the theory that the defendant in charge of the instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has no such knowledge.unsupported by any evidence on record. the requisites for the application of the res ipsa loquitur rule are the following: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent. (2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence. however. respondents had all the opportunity. Even if respondents avert liability by putting the blame on the Nissan Bus driver. and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. Thus. Bernard Dy. Validity of Subrogation Malayan Insurance contends that there was a valid subrogation in the instant case. true. What is at once evident from the instant case. ASIAKONSTRUCT was deemed by the trial court to have waived its chance to do so. as evidenced by the claim check voucher and the Release of Claim and Subrogation Receipt[31] presented by it before the trial court. and.M. Inc. Consequently. still. thereby creating a reasonable presumption of negligence on the part of respondents. that respondents failed to present any evidence before the trial court. Atty. Consunji. but failed to object to the presentation of its evidence. As mentioned above. the CA erred in dismissing the complaint for Malayan Insurance’s adverted failure to prove negligence on the part of respondents. the Fuzo Cargo Truck was under the exclusive control of its driver. It is unfortunate. To reiterate. It is worth mentioning that just like any other disputable presumptions or inferences. however.[29] In the instant case. however. COMFAC Corporation: The rule is that failure to object to the offered evidence renders it admissible. We note that ASIAKONSTRUCT’s counsel of record before the trial court. As explained in D. respondents are deemed to have waived their right to make an objection. it is astonishing that respondents never even bothered to file a cross-claim against the owner or driver of the Nissan Bus. on its own. is the presence of all the requisites for the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur. Thus.. disregard such evidence. And assuming that this allegation is. indeed. res ipsa loquitur is a rule of necessity which applies where evidence is absent or not readily available. Thus. . the Fuzo Cargo Truck would not have had hit the rear end of the Mitsubishi Galant unless someone is negligent. Reyes.

. a construction worker of D. Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation: Subrogation is the substitution of one person by another with reference to a lawful claim or right. fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower. and is the mode that equity adopts to compel the ultimate payment of a debt by one who. the evidence becomes part of the evidence in the case. It contemplates full substitution such that it places the party subrogated in the shoes of the creditor. It accrues simply upon payment by the insurance company of the insurance claim. We have held that payment by the insurer to the insured operates as an equitable assignment to the insurer of all the remedies that the insured may have against the third party whose negligence or wrongful act caused the loss. M. and he may use all means that the creditor could employ to enforce payment. nor does it grow out of. in justice.Note also that when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered. stating that:  [The] [v]ictim was rushed to [the] Rizal Medical Center in Pasig. ought to pay. of the same date. D. It is designed to promote and to accomplish justice. Dr. then there is a valid subrogation in the case at bar. Because of a party’s failure to timely object. CA GR 137873 April 20.] at around 2:15 p. Facts:  At around 1:30 p. 2001 *Hindi ko masyado ma gets to. it is only but proper that Malayan Insurance be subrogated to the rights of the assured. the bolt or pin which was merely inserted to connect the chain block with the [p]latform.m.M.. Consunji vs.000 to the assured. indeed. it must so state in the form of a timely objection and it cannot raise the objection to the evidence for the first time on appeal. Thereafter. got loose xxx causing the whole [p]latform assembly and . Errol de Yzo[. equity. As explained in Keppel Cebu Shipyard.  Investigation disclosed that at the given time. so that he who is substituted succeeds to the rights of the other in relation to a debt or claim.m. paki try basahin in the original pero try ko explain din sa Monday. Pasig City to his death.  PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police District investigated the tragedy and filed a report dated November 25. Metro Manila where he was pronounced dead on arrival (DOA) by the attending physician. Consunji. Bearing in mind that the claim check voucher and the Release of Claim and Subrogation Receipt presented by Malayan Insurance are already part of the evidence on record. Renaissance Tower Building on board a [p]latform made of channel beam (steel) measuring 4. The principle covers a situation wherein an insurer has paid a loss under an insurance policy is entitled to all the rights and remedies belonging to the insured against a third party with respect to any loss covered by the policy. The doctrine of subrogation has its roots in equity. The right of subrogation is not dependent upon.8 meters by 2 meters wide with pinulid plywood flooring and cable wires attached to its four corners and hooked at the 5 ton chain block. Juego together with Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo [were] performing their work as carpenter[s] at the elevator core of the 14th floor of the Tower D. and good conscience. Considering the above ruling. when suddenly. 1990. Inc. 1990. November 2. and since it is not disputed that the insurance company. date and place. while victim Jose A. paid PhP 700. Jose Juego. including its remedies or securities. Inc. all the parties are considered bound by any outcome arising from the offer of evidence properly presented. any privity of contract. v.

Inc.  After trial. held that the case at bar came under exception because private respondent was unaware of petitioner´s negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund. D.M. In the course of availing the remedies provided under the Workmen’s Compensation law. among other defenses. the widow’s prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. Had the claimant been aware. And the falling of the [p]latform was due to the removal or getting loose of the pin which was merely inserted to the connecting points of the chain block and [p]latform but without a safety lock.  It is thus manifest that Jose A. the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego. she would’ve opted to avail of a better remedy than that of which she already had. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is held liable under the grounds of negligence. Petitioner does not cite any other evidence to rebut the inference or presumption of negligence arising from the application of res ipsa loquitur.1  On May 9. Held/Ratio: The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (the thing or transaction speaks for itself) is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for damages against the deceased’s employer. to the exclusion of all further claims under other laws. Tower D of the building under construction thereby crushing the victim of death. thus a reasonable presumption or inference of appellant’s negligence arises. (2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence. . Maria. however. Consunji. The employer raised. The claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of their employment could be filed only under the Workmen´s Compensation Law. 1991. It has the following requisites: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent. The Court of Appeals. Jose Juego’s widow. Whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of death have a right of selection or choice of action between availing themselves of the worker’s right under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual. save his two (2) companions who luckily jumped out for safety. the claimants are deemed to have waived theirknown right of the remedies provided by other laws. or to establish any defense relating to the incident.the victim to fall down to the basement of the elevator core. Juego was crushed to death when the [p]latform he was then on board and performing work. fell. moral and exemplary) from the employers by virtue of the negligence or fault of the employers or whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both actions. and (3)the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. All the requisites for the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur are present in the case at bar.