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LIETUVOS ISTORIJOS INSTITUTAS

Savas ir kitas
Siuolaikiniais poililtnar
Contemporary Approaches
to the Self and the Other
Sudare Vida S avoniakait6

I/fI

IeEII)YKLA

Vilnius
2014

UDK

316.3

Tirrinys

5a267

Kny go s lei dyb q fin an s av o

Pratarme...7
Preface... 9

tt

Lietuvos mokslo taryba

[vadas: ar paZistame sova

Nacionaline lituanistikos pletros 2009-2015 metq programa


(Projekto finansavimo sutartis Nr. LIT- S-44)

Introduction: Approaches to

1. ANTROPOLOGIJAIR
CHRISTIAN GIORDANO

Against the Conformisnr,


Lesson Learned from
Recenzentai:

VYTIS tTUTNINSKAS

prof. dr. Rimantas Balsys

Ethnology between the


'Tradition' and'Identiqpr

dr. Darius Dauk5as

.,

VIDA SAVONIAKAITf,

Antropologija ir etn@ifl
2. EUROPOS TAPATYBI'U
VLADISLAV B. SOTIROIrS
The European Union amdi
\MALDEMAR KULIGOSTII

The Invention of

'\trd anil

Images from Central


ILZE BOLDANE

Latvian Ethnic

3. ETNINES GRUPES

Lietuvos istorijos institutas, 2014


Vida Savoniakaitd, sudarymas, 2014

Straipsniq autoriai, 2014

ISBN

97 8 -995s -847 -8A

-9

VITALIIA STRA
Tarp sugyvenimo ir 1xf
santykiai Rytq ir
JURTIUS UNUKO\rTe[nf,

Lietuvitl [vaizdis Vilni


slavakalbiq gyventrfq

..

Turinys
Pratarme...7
Preface... 9
[vadas : ar paZistame sava

ir kita?

..

. 11

Introduction: Approaches to the Self and the Other. Summary . . . 32

1. ANTROPOLOGIIA IR ETNOLOGIJA
CHRISTIAN GIORDANO

Against the Conformism of the Anthropologically Correct':


Lesson Learned from Hermeneutical Approaches . . . 37
vYTrs drunnINsKAS
Ethnology between the Paradigms of

'Tradition' and'Identity' . . .

53

vrDA sAvoNrnrarrs

Antropologija ir etnolo gljapostmodernybeje . . . 73

2,

EUROPOS TAPATYBIV PAZINIMAS

vLADrsLAv B.

sorrnovri

The European Union and The European

Identity

..

99

WALDEMAR KULIGOWSKI
The Invention of 'We' and 'Them' in National Anthems.
Images from Central Europe . . 123

rLzE

rornANs

Latvian Ethnic Stereotypes: Studies and Results . . . 139

3. ETNINES

GRUPES PARIBIUOSE

VTTALTIA STRAVTNSTTENE

Tarp sugyvenimo ir prie5i5kumo: tarpetniniai


santykiai Rytq ir Pietryiiq Lietuvoje (1944-L953 m.) . . . L63

uNuxovldrus
Lietuviq [vaizdis Vilniaus kra5to
slavakalbiq gyventojq akimis . . .

JURTIUs

183

Pratarme

DArvA nadr0Na rrt-vvdrNr ENt

Individuali tautins savimonds rai5ka Lietuvos paribio


bendruomeneje: saya

/ kita

..

. 209

4. TAPATYBE IR SEIMA
rNGA zr,lr.r.LTNt

Lituan istikos

Tapatybe etni5kai mi5riose Seimose: teorines interpretacijos . . . 241

Seimos samprata Siq dientl miesto kulturoje:

idomu atsalqrti i klry*ry


naujausios mokslines di
Socialinig ir humanitarfrnfu

tarp tradicijos ir dabarties . . . 257

diais tarpdalykiniais

kasa paur5rvrt-SarcNrnNn

tfintotsi

kutturw
kinta kartu su mokfu iir
filosofijoie,

5.

ZENTLAI KULTUROSE
vrrA rvANAUsKArrr - 5rr rurr nNii
Sapnas kaip folklorinds kultfiros tyrimq objektas:
tarpdisciplini5kumo gelmds ir seklumos . . . 28I

vertybes kartais ffi trrt


pologijos iretn@iim
modernybes bei

pliuralizmo. KladHnis

ARvYDAS cRr5rus
Ribos tarp ,,savo"

vYTAUTAs
Emic

ir

ir ,,kitd'

Siq dienq Lietuvos

karo aviacijoje

ruutNAs

etic poZiurio aktualumas etnosemiologiniuose

tautodailes tyrimuose . . . 339

ir (ar) teorija.

RAMANAUsKATTE, nruAs vArSNys

Mokslo kalbos: savi ar svetimi? . . . 397

Autoriai... 421
Notes on Contributors . . . 426

Dulykine rodykle . . . 431

i5lrffi

apiemokslo,M

XX a. tarpukario kontekstai . . . 367


EGTDTJA

ikitokultorq@
Daugiakult[rese
ta. Naujausi Siudaikiniril
tarp jq ir *keitimmi'
cijos procesai

drpartrnNt

Etnografrja Lietuvoje: praktika

. 307

moksluose pmovfo:timieil

6. MOKSLO KALBOS
AUKSUoTn

..

siekiame

nagriffi-

DZiaugitrmiirtrSrn

tema,20l3m-qnlb
surengtoje

ir

kitas Siuolaikinfore

parengtuosetrry
sakiusiems

sr*rDpmfi

Realialdi sarc

lqos iSivairiqimft.
istorijos instihffio emroOi*
Dariui

Staliunulgfff

The European Union and


The European Identity
\TLADISLAV B. SOTIROVIC

.)

with relations between on the one hand the


supporters of the pan-European identity, which has to take the place of
the particular national ones, and on the other hand the proponents of
maintaining specific national identities as the top priority within the

This research paper deals

European Union (EU). Certainly,the EU continues to expand its borders,

individual national currencies are becoming unified into the common


EU curren cy - Euro (), and the political and economic climates are
gravitating towards pan-continental unification. However, what does
this unification process mean in terms of identity? The crucial question
is: will the success of the EU rest solely in economic and political interdependence or will a strong pan-European identity emerge in a fashion
similar to what we see in the United States, Australia, France, New Zealand, etc.? This research paper will try to identify already existing views
and models in regard to the creation of the pan-European identity before
addressing additional factors which have to be taken into consideration
as well as. In order to reach our goal we will present theoretical models
and empirical research results on the issue in scientific literature, mass
media journals and different public questioners dealing with the topic
of our investigation, followed by our practical conclusions.
The EU is tod ay a composition of 28 member states across the
European continent with a perspective to include more member states
from the East in the future within the common policy of the so-called
'Eastward Enlargement'. Currently, the status of the candidate states
have Montenegro, Turkey, Serbia (without Kosovo) and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. On May 7th,20A9 started the initiative
given by Poland of closer relations and cooperation between the EU and

100

VLADISLAV B. SOTIROVId

The European Union and The European Identity

several post-Soviet republics: Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Belarus,


Ukraine and Moldova. The initiative became a program of the'Eastern

ethnic indifference can be describednsil


hold the cltrzenship of a state (regane

Partnership' with the final task to attract those countries to finally become the members of the EU. It is obviously that the EU have a great

etc.) form the people of the state-

chance to become more than present-day 28 member states, but the


crucial question of the 'Eastward Enlargement' policy still left unsolved:

Bnflr

tity is derived from the concept of e ci


the nation as its people (inhabita@ d
model's formula'state-nation-langutd

the question of internal coherence, stability, functionality and above all


solidarity among all so different and historically antagonistic member
states and their national and ethnolinguistic groups.l Nevertheless, the

the world including, for instance, Frer


Canada, Australia, Switzerland, Ngn'&

EU eastward enlargement with possible inclusion of Turk.y and former


socialist states of ex-Yugoslavia and ex-USSR is for sure the biggest chal-

five basic princiPles:

The French model of ethnic

1. It uses a state-nation

lenge to the whole EU institutional, political and financial construction

from the very beginning of the present-day EU in 1951 (the European


Coal and Steel Community). But moreover, it is 'a major challenge for
our understanding of the meaning of Europe as a geographical, social
and cultural space. It is also a question of the identity of Europe as one
shaped by social or systemic integration' (Delanty 2003:8). In the other
words, if the EU political construction is intended to survive for a longer
period of time it is necessary to be developed and accepted a sense of a
common pan-European identity among its citizens. Otherwise, the EU
will degrade-itself to the integration level of the EFTA: just a common
market folqre goods and capital.

Ethnic Indifference and


The Pan-European ldentity
In our strong opinion, if the pan-European identity is going really to
succeed it must follow the main features of the French model of ethnic
indifference according to whiCh, all citizens within the state borders
belong to the state-nation identity. This model presupposes and the use
of only one official language in the public sphere. The French model of

On the very important issue of who are the Europeans and how does this matter for
politics, see (Checkel, Katzenstein 2009: L3Z-L66).

indil

md cq

state over the nation-

2. It creates a civic society as olfr


by the German model of ethn*

3. It creates a nationally-lingutrlil
4. It integrates minorities into u
5. It leads to no ethno-linguistfur
assimilate them.
However, at the first glance, thcm
seems an ideal way to establish the PG

amht
fuctinffi
which mustbe ironed out. The
to now) 28 historically unique ParB"m
members (in 2004,20A7 and 2013) fril
a highly expressed ethno-linguistic m

when the model became deePlY

their particular ethno-linguistic ilcil


that even one-party dictatorial rqffru
Yugoslavia could not succeed to

The issue of connection between

iffiofr

nationeEr

particulurty at the Balkans, is more coql


frequently sustained and protected thc fl
religious differences played an importrilr
weaker nationalities, as in the cases ofCtr
(Merdjanova 2000: 235).

101

The European Union and The European Identity

ethnic indifference can be described as a model in which all persons who

hold the cltrzenship of a state (regardless on ethnic or national origin,


etc.) form the people of the state. Basically, this model of a group identity is derived from the concept of a cittzenship-nation which defines
the nation as its people (inhabitants) plus their citizenship. Simplified
rnodel's formula'state-nation-language' is implied in many states across
the world includirg, for instance, France, the United States of America,

Canada, Australia, Switzerland, New Zealand and Belgium.


The French model of ethnic indifference is built on the following
five basic principles:

1. It uses a state-nation model emphasizing the importance of the


state over the nation.
2.

It creates a civic society

as opposed

to an ethnic society favored

by the German model of ethnic differelrce.


3. It creates a nationally-linguistic homogeneous state.
4.
5.

It integrates minorities into society.


It leads to no ethno-linguistic minorities with a consequence to
assimilate them.

However, at the first glance, the French model of ethnic indifference


seems an ideal way to establish the pan-European identity. Nevertheless,
when the model became deeply analyzed there are fundamental issues
which must be ironed out. The factis that the EU is a collaboration of (up
to now) 28 historically unique parts. Thirteen of them arenewly accepted
members (in 2004,2007 and 2OL3) from the former Eastern Europe with

highly expressed ethno-linguistic nationalism for the sake to protect


their particular ethno-linguistic identity.2 We have to remind ourselves
that even one-party dictatorial regimes of the former Soviet Union or
a

Yugoslavia could not succeed to introduce widely accepted supranational

Z The issue of connection between nationalism

and identity in the Eastern Europe, and


particulurly at the Balkans, is more complex if we know that the 'national churches

frequently sustained and protected the national identity. In international conflicts


religious differences played an important role in defence mechanisms, especially of
weaker nationalities, as in the cases of Catholicism in Ireland and in Prussian Poland'
(Merdjanova 2000: 235).

102

VLADISLAV B. SOTIROVId

identity of 'homo Sovieticus', 'homo Yugoslavicus' respectively, among


their citizens.3
Here the crucial question is how it is possible to 'assimilate' the
ethno-linguistic cultures in the case of the EU (or the United States of
Europe - USE), as the way of the full integration according to the French
model of state-nation formation that is presented above? In our belief,
the only possible way to do this is in fact to develop a common sense of
solidarity based on a common sense of a pan-European identity rather
than to 'assimilate' in a real meaning of the word (and a French real
experience from L795 onward) so ethno-culturally different EU milieu
at least for two very reasons: 1) it is not necess ary, and 2) practically it
would be impossible. An extra problem is that the EU is in a unique
world-wide situation as it is still multiethnic experiment and not truly
unified as a 'state' in a real meaning of the term although in many ways
it plays the role of it.4
The French model is, anyway, a great starting point, but modifications are necessary to make it applicable to the situation of the EU or in
the future in the USE. However, cont rary to the French model of ethnic
indifference, the German model of ethnic difference (the 'languagenation-state' formula) is in our opinion not practicable and applicable
for the creation of the pan-European identity and a common solidarity
based on it for the sake of better and stronger internal EU integration as
it fosters ethno-linguistic differences, ethno-nationalism and historical
particularities.5
Some of research results of the public opinion in the EU say that
'according to a poll conducted by the European Commission in all 25
member states last yea\ more than two-thirds of respondents say they
feel'attached' to Europe. Fifty-seven percent see their identity as having
(rr
a 'European dimension' in the near future, up five percentage points

The European Union and The European Idcmffir

from lggg,while 4l percent


(Bennhold

tkirfi

say

2005). As the EU citizmm

question is why did it haPPen?


The next Part of the

PaPerwiltuf
bC

European identity in order to try

The ConcePts oi The Pan-Europ


There are many discussions on

th ql

ropean identity. We think that the Sr


to investigate how do the EU citizml

identity. In the next Paragraph wu rf


search results on this issue.

According to the Herald Tr;W


they feel 'European' still rank thcir r

European one, oPinion Polls sbw'B{


a third says theY feel more EuroPcu

according to a survey bY Time nnrytr,


conducted by Eur ob arometer furnil il
EU citizens saw themselves as

citiuu

their country -th


in their countrY, while 68% were Pm
4lo/o

as citizens of

people feel more attached to

theirom

than to EuroPg 67%o) (EuroPean lfd


The question is what canses ffi
despite the exPansion of the EU

'd

suming that the Pan-EuroPean ilcn


intercultural relations follows uthn t
of Europe as sPace of encountersbt

For instance, according to the 1981-census in Yugoslavia, it was only 5,4o/o 'Yugoslavs'
(L,2L9,000) out of 22,428,000 inhabitants of the country (Denitch 1994 29).
On this problem, see (McCormick, Olsen 2004;Nelsen, Stubb 2003;Wiener Diez}009;
Cini, P6rez-S ol6rzano Borragan 2013).

On the question of ethnicity and nationalism, see (Guibernau, Rex 1997:43-79).

'European identity' would be el}oql


tifications and would be constautlTm

others.'united in DiversitF' woulilr


political and cultural practices' ft r

The European Union and The European Identity

103

from Lggg,while 4l percent say their identity remains entirely national'


(Bennhold 2005). As the EU cltizens are feeling'attached'to Europe, the
question is why did it haPPen?
The next part of the paper will try to define the concepts of the panEuropean identity in order to try to give an answer to this questioll.

The Concepts of The Pan-European Identity


There are many discussions on the question how to establish a pan-European identity. We think that the starting step in this process is firstly

to investigate how do the EU cittzens feel the idea of the pan-European


identity. In the next paragraph we will present some of the relevant research results on this issue.

According to the Herald Tribune,'most of the EU citizens who say


they feel 'European' still rank their national identity higher than their
European one, opinion polls show. But among those aged 2L to 35, almost
a third says they feel more European than Germ&o, French or ltalian,
according to a survey by Time magazrnein 2001'. Additionall)r u survey
conducted by Eurobarometer found that at the end of 2004 only 47o/o of
EU citizens saw themselves as citizens of both their country and Europe,
felt pride
A1o/o as citizens of their country only. 860/o of the interviewees
were proud of being European. In general,
people feel more attached to their country (92o/o), region (88%), city (S7Vo)
than to Europe (67%o) (European Values and Identity 2006).

in their country, while

680/o

The question is what causes this lack of the pan-European identity


despite the expansion of the EU and a falling of the borders? First, as-

suming that the pan-European identity emerges from an exchange of


intercultural relations follows what it refers to as the constructivist view
of Europe as space of encounters: 'as identities undergo constant chan8e,
'European identity' would be encompassing multiple meanings and iden-

tifications and would be constantly redefined through relationships with


others. 'United in Diversity'would mean the participation in collective
political and cultural practices. It would be wrong and impossible to

104

VLADISLAV B. SOTIROVIC

fix EU borders' (ibid.). The critics of this theoretical concept claim that
it overestimates the ability to adapt, underestimates the need for stability and 'too much diversity can eventually lead to the loss of identity,
orientation and coherence, and therefore undermine democracy and
established communities' (ibid.). Nevertheless, we believe that any kind
ofsuccessful and functional concept ofthe pan-European identity has
to be developed within the framework of the liberal democracy.6
With a little period gone by since the EU more than doubled in
size, adding 13 new members f5om 2004 to 2013, it is quite difficult to
claim preciselywhat is the future of the pan-European identity. Without
any ability to conduct empirical tests the effect of Europe as space of
encounters can only be discussed theoretically leading to inconclusive
results. Nevertheless, we thinkthat there is a reason for optimism. Both
the EU and Europe are rapidly changing, but the question is will this
change constantly redefine the multiple meanings of European identity
portrayed by the view of Europe as a space of encounters?7
Ifthe EU is not solely a Europe ofspace ofencounters, then the question becomes how to define the pan-European identity? For the theory
ofthe EU (the USE and Europe as a continent) as a space ofencounters
certainly has its fair share of critics allowing for alternative definitions
to arise. One of the most prosperous starting points for establishing the
pan-European identity is the common (unifying) culture and (positive)
history throughout the Old continent.8 The so-called'communitarians'
believe in the view (concept) of Europe of culture or European family of
nations. This view is defined as: 'The European identity has emerged from
common movements in religion andphilosophy, politics, science andthe
arts. Therefore, they tend to exclude Turkey from the ranks ofpossible
future member states and argue a stronger awareness of the Christian
(or |udeo-Christian) tradition. 'United in diversity' is taken to refer to
On debates on the concept of the liberal democracltsee (Hobson 2012). On the question
of borders and identities, see (Ellis, Klusdkovez}A7).
On multilingual encounters in Europe, see (Ungea Krzyzanowski, Wodak 20L4).

On the problem of current challenges of writing European history, see (Cole, Ther
2010).

The European Union and The European

l&ili

Europe as a'familY of nations" Onfi


borders' (EuroPean Values and ldm

think that two most imPil


excludes the inclusion of minorityp
opposes TurkeY's EU membershltr
We

nalistic approach is usually the rEfr


Furthermore, defining the Pan-Eu
n ill undoubtedly bring forth furfu
throughout the EU (or in the fu
tensions flared in the Netherlad'rl
brutally murdered by u citizen offil

Gogh's controversial film aborfr S


Dutch Film Director 2004)- In respo
of Amsterdam banging Pots ad 1
speech. Several mosques were

almt

Dutch extremists (or Patriots* fr


('guest worker') question is a hiSftil
decades. The situation revolves ar u
moving to Germany from the mru

positions and helP the economy bl


that they would go back to tkir I
achieved her economic succes$

It

stay and many had children urto'


In general, it is essential for tk B

national minorities; therefore, a vi


Europe of culture seems to be a trl
which could certainlY backfire cr
the EU. In the other words, it 1$ hi

tion that encomPasses EuroPe ar r

On the question of forms of culturalpl


10 On the question of Turkey's accessfonrl
see

(Bogdani 2010; AkqaY, Bahri

ml3j

11 On gasterbaiter question in German;'l

The European Union and The European Identity

105

Europe as a'family of nations'. On this basis, it is high time to define EtT

borders' (European Values and Identity 2006).


We think that two most important lacks of this concept are: 1) it
excludes the inclusion of minority populations within the EU'; and 2) it
opposes Turkey's EU membership.lO The factis that such culture-natio-

nalistic approach is usually the main source of conflict within the EU.
Furthermore, defining the pan-European identity as Europe of culture

rvill undoubtedly bring forth further tensions with the minority groups
throughout the EU (or in the future tl. USE). For instance, in 2004,
tensions flared in the Netherlands after filmmaker Theo van Gogh was
brutally murdered by u citizen of Moroccan descent in response to van
Gogh's controversial film about the Islamic culture (Gunman Kills
Dutch Film Director 2004). In response, the protestors took to the streets
of Amsterdam banging pots and pans as an expression of freedom of
speech. Several mosques were also burnt throughout the country by the
Dutch extremists (or patriots?). Further, in Germany, the gastarbeiter
('guest worker') question is a highly contested issue during several last
decades. The situation revolves around a large portion of people who are
moving to Germany from the mid-1960's onwards in order to fill vacant
positions and help the economy to grow. However, the original idea was
that they would go back to their native countries after Germany had
achieved her economic success. However, most gastarbeiters decided to
stay and many had children who were born and raised in Germany.ll
In general, it is essential for the European well being to incorporate its
national minorities; therefore, a view of the pan-European identity as a
Europe of culture seems to be a radical and very dangerous definition,
which could certainly backfire causing immense difficulties throughout
the EU. In the other words, it is highly advisable to search for a definition that encompasses Europe as a whole without excluding the beliefs,

On the question of forms of cultural pluralism, see (Kymlicka 2000: 123-178).


10 On the question of Turkey's accession to the EU and the question of identity challenge,
see (Bogdani 2010; Akgay, Bahri 2}L3;MacMillan 2013).
11 On gasterbaiter question in Germany, see (Klopp 2002; Chin 2011).

106

vLADrsLAv B. sorrnovri

customs, and history of both the national minorities (autochthonous or


not) and the stateless nations in Europe.,,

Thlthird

applicable concept can be Europe of citizens or Constitutional Patriotism.r3 The main attributes of this concept are: '[Establis-

hing a] common political culture, or civic identity, based on universal


principles of democracy, human rights,the rule of law etc. expressed in
the framework of a common public sphere and political participation
(or 'constitutional patriotism', a term coined by the German scholar
]iirgen Habermas). Th.y believe that cultural identities, religious beliefs etc. should be confined to the private sphere. For them, European
identity will emerge from common political and civic practices, civil
society organizations and strong EU institutions. 'United in diversity',
according to this view means that the citizens share the same political
and civic values, while at the same time adhering to different cultural
practices. The limits of the community should be a question of politics,
not culture' (European Values and Identity 2006). Surely, this view
calls for an assimilation of local patriotism and identities which is now
reserved for the regional and private spheres, but on the general level of
12 On Europe's stateless nations, see (Bodlore-Penla ez 2A11). This unique atlas takes us
on a Panoramic tour of the stateless nations in Europe today. It maps their physical
and linguistic character, and graphically summarises their history, politics and present

position. The Alsacians, Basques, Corsicans, Frisians, the Scots and the Welsh are all
cultural and political identity.
This atlas depicts the marvellous mosaic that is Europe today, and paints a picture of
a future Europe of flourishing small nations.
13 Among many concepts on definition of the European identity,
|tirgen Habermas's
understanding of the term through the concept of Constitutional patriotism is one
of the most attractive. This concept was especially relevant during the drafting and
peoples who are not sovereign and are fighting for their

discussing the possible implications of the EU Constitution in2004. However the'No'


votes in referendums in France and the Netherlands in 2005 abolished for some time

the possibility of a Constitution for the EU, thus changing the nature and the focus
of discussions on the pan-European identity. However, the concept of Constitutional
Patriotismhas still plenty to offer to contribute to those debates pn the pan-European
identity. On the post-constitutional debates, the possibility of the evolution of the concept, the new forms of interpretation of the term and its relevance to the pan-European
identity, see (Werner Miiller 2007;Giirdag Z0t4).

The European Union and The European ldeutily

the whole EU only the common

ParE

have to be on agenda. However, thc c

of citizens or Constitutional patriotiil


artificial in distinguishing the priuel
and universal spheres of life. Thffi cI

nal-cultural differences by this qPPmr


of solidarity can only occur from ft
togeth er (ibid.).It means that the orry

ofpartar
Otherwise, it will no6 fu

established on the entire sum

sympathies.

period of

time.

However, now the Practical gcril


solidarity replace in the real life of fu

nistic cultures based on different cod


Catholicism, Protestantism, Islam, O
answe\ d proposal from the EU Cffi

if we will teach at the schools onlyf


relations between the EU nations-n It
building solidarity effects within trc I
historians as something like'genocfuht
of washing brains' so experienced in I
Finally, the view of Europe of citizctat
a major setback

in late MaY and eanf

Dutch electoral bodies voted a resod


the proposed EU Constitution- Wb h

to the Article IV, section 447 of thc


constitutional treaty is not valid $nlnt
(Caldwell 2005).
The extreme portrayal of the

ffi

titutional patriotism is what is beim6


Europ r-', lphrase firstlY coined bY Wi
14 Told during the workshop conversatim
Academy 2001).

il

The European Union and The European Identity

107

the whole EU only the common pan-European patriotism and identity


have to be on agenda. However, the critics of the concept of Europe
of citizens or Constitutional patriotism state that this approach is too
artificial in distinguishing the private and public, ils well as subjective

and universal spheres of life. These critics also claim that the national-cultural differences by this approach are ignored, but the feelings
of solidarity can only occur from the cultural feelings of belonging
together (ibid.).It means that the common solidarity feeling has to be
established on the entire sum of particular national-cultural reciprocity

sympathies. Otherwise, it will not function properly and for a longer


period of time.
However, now the practical question is: can common citizenship
solidarity replace in the real life of the EU crttzens historically antagonistic cultures based on different confessional denominations (Roman
Catholicism, Protestantism, Islam, Orthodoxy, and |udaism). As an
answer, a proposal from the EU Commission

in Brussels came: it can

if we will teach at the schools only positive historical experiences of the


relations between the EU nations.la In spite of this, such approach of
building solidarity effects within the EU will surely be labeled by the
historians as something like 'genocide against the science' or the 'politics
of washing brains' so experienced in all kinds of totalitarian regimes.
Finally, the view of Europe of citizens or Constitutional patriotism took
a major setback in late May and early fune 2005, when the French and
Dutch electoral bodies voted a resounding'No' on a referendum to ratify
the proposed EU Constitution. We have to remember that according
to the Article IV, sectio n 447 of the proposed EU Constitution, the
constitutional treaty is not valid unless all countries of the EU ratify it
(Caldwell 2005).
The extreme portrayalof the concept of Europe of citizens or Cons-

titutional patriotism is what is being labeled as the 'United States of


Europe', & phrase firstly coined by Winston Churchill in his address in
14

Told during the workshop conversation in Brussels at the (Transatlantic Summer


Academy 2001).

108

VLADISLAV B. SOTIROVId

Ziirrichin 1946. This theory states that the nation-states of the EU would
give into the state-nation concept of the EU thus losing their sovereignty
in the process. The outcome would be a result similar to the fifty states
in the United States of America. In this context, the Belgian PM Gry
Verhofstadt proposed the idea to have a core of federal Europe within
the European Union, involvlng those states who wished to participate.
According to his idea, five policy areas should be fed eralized: 1) an European social-economic policy;Z) technology cooperation; 3) a common
justice and security poli cy; 4) a common diplom acy; and 5) a common
European army.ls

Whether to be a proponent of Europe of citizens, Europe of culture or


Europe as space of encountersview, one similarity that all three concepts
has to share has to be, in our opiniofl, o consensus on preconditions
necess ary for the emergence of the pan-European identity. These preconditions can be in the followirg spheres:
Politics: the strengthening of democratic participation at all levels
and more democracy at the EU level in particular.
Education and culture: strengthening of the European dimension
in certain subjects (especially history), more focus on language
learnitrB, more exchangs, etc.
Social and economic cohesion: counteracting social and economic

differences.

The European union and The European

crucial role in the emergence of th


paragraphs address these additiom[il
At the heart of the creation ofe'd
fact that the borders within the

In the other words, at the same timr


the EU member states, esPeciallT o
Agreement (June 14th, 1985) folh
(1990) which led to creation of tI[e,S

the EU wall-borders with the out-ill


Together with the Schengen AtE

om
to be a 'European'. For instancq trG
aching staffexchange (mobilrtfl Pq
successful factors which strongly

million Europeans to studY abmdr


to 2005. This unique oPPortunitf

compassing a kind of mixture from all of them. The existing views also
neglect very important issues of additional factors which could play a
15 On this issue, see (Serfaty 2000).

rn

in/of another country, 1nfffi


common EuroPean identitY- TheTm
Learning Programe'from zOOn brf
of transcontinental experience aof, s

ence life

18

A lifting of the labor resffi


important additional factor in crunj
16 On this problem, see

The above presented views address possible concepts which can be


applied in the practice in order to establish the pan-European identity,
yet it is probably difficult to choose one view over another without en-

zuh

EU areable to travel freelywithoma


fact that many of the outsiders ffui
even very difficult, bureaucratic P1q

European integration.

Additional Factors on Creation of


The pan-European Identity

ldcd

(Zarotti20ll)'

Affi
ry

17 'Erasmus' (European Community


dents) program was proposed by the

and was accepted by the EC Council in


(EFTA) member countries becam putr

of the EU works from t995. The task

dt

enlightenment.'Erasmus' Program hm
breaches of 'socrates' Program to

vftilil

budget.
18 On this issue, see (Eitel Kathrin 201&

fi

The European Union and The European Identity

109

crucial role in the emergence of the pan-European identity. The next


paragraphs address these additional factors.
At the hgart of the creation of a strong pan-European identity is the
fact that the borders within the EU have dissipated and the cltizens of the
EU are able to travel freely without any visa requirements regardless the
fact that many of the outsiders ('foreigners') have to pass a certain, and
even very difficult, bureaucratic procedure in order to get the EU visa.
In the other words, at the same time of lifting the wall-borders between
the EU member states, especially of those who signed the Schengen
Agreement (June 14th, 1985) followed by the Schengen Convention
(1990) which led to creation of the Schengen Area (March 26th, 1995),
the EU waIl-borders with the outside world became even stronger.l6
Together with the Schengen Area policy there are additionally very
successful factors which strongly contribute to the creation of the feeling

to be a 'European'. For instance, the 'Erasmus/Socrates' student and teaching staffexchange (mobility) program (est . L987) has allowe dfor L.2

million Europeans to study abroad within Europe (Bennhold 2005)t' up


to 2005. This unique opportunity allows students and teachers to experience life in/of another country participating to their understanding of a
common European identity. The'Erasmus/Socrates' program ('Lifelong
Learning Programe' from 2OA7) is just one element for a diversification
of transcontinental experience and surely a part of the EU policy of the
European integration.ls

A lifting of the labor restrictions within the whole EU is a very


important additional factor in creatitg the common European identity
16 On this problem, see (Zatottr2011).
17 'Erasmus' (European Community Action Scheme for the

Mobility of University Stu-

dents) program was proposed by the European Communityb (EC) Commission in 1985
and was accepted by the EC Council in 1987.The European Free Trade Association's

(EFTA) member countries became part of this program in 1991. 'socrates' Program
of the EU works from L995. The task of this program is to make better EU policy of
enlightenment. 'Erasmus' program became the most important branch out of six
breaches of 'socrates' program to which it is given 55o/o out of total'socrates' Program
budget.
18 On this issue, see (Eitel Kathrin 2010; Gilbert 2012).

110

VLADISLAV B. SOTIROVId

and feelings of solidarity as a basis for the further process of (stronger)


European integration. In this respect, for instance, the EU has passed a
law after May 2004 requirirg from all old member states (EU-15) to lift

their labor restrictions on the EU-8 (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland,


CzechRepublic, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Hungary) by the year 20L1. Following this requirement, Swgden, Ireland, and the United Kingdom were
the first to lift their labor restrictions. Finland, Spain, Portugal, Italy, and
Greece are now completely open to the EU-8 as a result of such a policy.

At the beginning Denmark allows EU-8 citizens stay up to 6 months to


search for a job, if they find one they are allowed to work legally and to
arrange their residence permits. For the citizens of Bulgaria and Romania
(accepted in 2007 to the EU), only Sweden and Finland have completely
lifted all restrictions from the very beginning, with the other member
states implementing permit schemes. Today, traveling from place to place
within the EU and working in different EU countries has been made both
easier and cheaper.le Budget airlines offer extremely competitive prices to
destinations across the continent, while the interconnectivity of bus and
rail lines offer easy access throughout Europe often at discounted prices
as well. The lack of restrictions and the access to move comfortably has
created a new understanding of the European unity and subsequently
of the pan-European identity.
If a strong pan-European identity has to emerge, conventional wisdom will tell us that it will certainly begin with the young generations
who easily adapt to the change and novelties. The possibilities to become
the 'European' for the youth are numerous, with the open borders within

the EU, and strong cultural and educational EU exchange programs,


such as above mentioned 'Erasmus/SocratS', etc. The fact is that the
possibilities for the young Europeans today are vast compared to the
past. Technological advancements, like the internet, make cross-cultural communication both easy and effective. All of these facilities are

The European Union and The European

Iffi1

European solidarity and identity-

Iifu

national youth councils protects andn


the EU and beyond. Many comPkr
emerged, including the EU Youth

fur

European Youth Portal. By protectiq


networks are paving the way for the

the process, the interaction

betmt

help to break down cultural barrfomn


European identity formation. As m

bG
identity - they are asked to go bqh

European youth] are not asked

s[
It iru

closer together. We ate creatin8 a

but a characteristic.
(Bennhold 2005).20

a problem

As the EU becomes more ceffi


cation has become common PIaa' a
cation has become essential. The Sq;
phenomenon, serving as an auxiliaryl
globe and more

importantlYthruryh

English language emerged as a rmxl&

the colonial policy of the British Eq


the United States into an ecbnomk a
century (Universal Language.

It'ihfi

&q
and subsequently as defacfo auxiliery

language has established itself as a

nication which can significantty

perfi

solidarity and identity creation-2r


as an

ry

auxiliary and mediator languq

languages and therefore spends hearilfi

undoubtedly contributing to the process of creation of the common pan19 On the evolution of the labor law within the EU, the distinct national and regional
approaches to the question of employment and welfare, and the pressures for change

within a further enlarged EU,

see

(Barnard 2012; Hardy, Butler 20ll).

20 On the European transnational identitp r


Balibar 2004; Risse 2010).
2L On the question of the English languqrn
Ranta 2010; Seidlhofet 2Al1; Jenkins zOU

The European Union and The European Identity

111

European solidarity and identity. Moreover, the interconnectivity of the


Lrational youth councils protects and aids the voice of youth throughout

the EU and beyond. Many complex networks of the youth councils have
emerged, including the EU Youth Forum, the Council of Europe, and the

European Youth Portal. By protecting the voices of youth today, these

networks are paving the way for the leaders of tomorrow. Throughout
the process, the interaction between the national youth councils would
help to break down cultural barriers and aid in the process of the panEuropean identity formation. As one of the EU officials said: 'they [the
European youth] are not asked to give up their national or regional

identity

- they are asked to go beyond it, and that it what pulls them

closer together. We are creating a community in which diversity is not


a

problem but a characteristic. It is an integral part of feelirg European'

(Bennhold

2005).20

As the EU becomes more centralized and intercultural communication has become common place, an established means of communication has become essential. The English language has become a global
phenomenon, serving as an auxiliary language for the citizens across the
globe and more importantly throughout whole Europe as a continent. The

English language emerged as a world-wide language largely as a legacy of

the colonial policy of the British Empire and as well as the evolution of
the United States into an ecbnomic and political super power in the 20th
century (Universal Language. Wikipedia).For these reasons the English
language has established itself as a linguafranca in international business
and subsequently as defacto auxiliary language for international commu-

nication which can significantly participate in the process of the European

solidarity and identity creation.2l Despite the rise of the English language
as an auxiliary and mediator language, the EU still has almost 30 official
languages and therefore spends heavily on translational services. In fact, for

20 On the European transnational identity and citizenship, see (Ber ezin, Schain 2003;
Balibar 2004;Risse 2010).
2l On the question of the English language as a modern lingua franca, see (Mauranen,
Ranta 2010; Seidlhofer 2Al1; Jenkins 2014).

LL2

VLADISLAV B. SOTIROVId

ldcd

The European Union and The European

instance,

practically it has a decisive effect

oni

annuai

can help to establish a common

ilEil

in 2005 the total amount was 1123 million, which is 1% of the


g.r.tal budget of the European Union. Divided by the population

of the EU, this comes to 2.?8 per person per year' (Europa: Languages

ger generations. For instance,

and Europ e2007). However, the EU has no plans of reducing the amount

Eur ov i s i o n

of official languages anytime soon and accordirg to the official website


of the EU this is justified as follows: 'in the interests of democ racy and

Regardless on the factthat

transparency it has opted to maintain the existing system. No Member


State government is willing to relinquish its own language, and candidate
countries want to have theirs added to the list' (ibid.).The EU has decided
not to switch to one official language (the English?) by now because of at

o ng

withfo

conte st encapsulatcr

(very) low quality, there are and


as a good

manyffst

thm

promoter of the pan-Eurrql

A development of common Eurq

'it would cut offmost people in the EU from an un-

ofthepil
Such steps are already done and htrcl
For instance, in professional golfdh

derstanding of what the EU was doing. Whichever language were chosen


for such a role, most EU citizens would not understand it well enough to

American team in the semi-annualf,il


of creating a European Union Otrm1i

complywith its laws or avail themselves oftheir rights, or be able to express


itwell enough to playanypart in EU affairs', and Z) bfthe EU

survey shows that only 5% of the UUr

least two reasons: 1)

themselves in

languags, English is the most widely known as either the first or second
language in the EU: but recent surveys show that still fewer than half the

EU population have any usable knowledge of it (ibid.). However, despite


the EU decision to keep almost 30 official languages, having a common
communicator amongst everyday citizens is essential for creating of a
common identity. Moreover, English language is often the preferred taught
language for foreign students partaking in many different'Erasmus/Socrates' exchange locations. While the EU statistics claim that the half of the
EU population has no usable knowledge ofthe English language, naturally

this statistic weighs heavily towards the older population. As addressed


in the previous section a role of the youth in establishing a pan-European
identity is (very) probably crucial one. With the English language (or any
other) as a lingua franca, the speaking youth brake cultural barriers and
this process is going to continue for sure in the future.22
The role of pop-culture supported by transnational mass media is
particularly important for creation of the common European identity as

me importance for creation

them feel more European (Pan-Eurqr


ropean sport competitions such asfu

League and UEFA Cup or baslretfud

strongly contribute in creation ofthc


although such competitions

might$

from a pop-culture sense, the ffi


often take pride in supporting the ffi
events both aid and hurt the estaHidu
Furthermore, international footbaM r
and the FIFA World C,rp, like simit
other mass popr"lar sports, put strNt
they see individual states competiry
glory (aside from enormous finamir
not necessarily detrimental to the B
are not asked to give up their natim
23 Onthe role of transnational mass mediefr
(Briiggemann, Schultz- Forberg 2009).

22 Onthe question of language and language policy of the EU and within the European
continent, see (Barbour, Carmichael 2000; Phillipson 2004; Arzoz 2008).

24 OnEurovision songcontest and Europeanil


2013).

The European Union and The European Identity

11,3

practically it has a decisive effect on

it.23 In many instances pop-culture


can help to establish a common identity particularly among the younger generations. For instance, within the music industry, each year the

Eurovision songcontest encapsulates the attention of millions ofviewers.


Regardless on the fact that many experts stress that the context of it is of
(very) low quality, there are and those who are seeing the Eurovision song
as a good

promoter of the pan-European identity and recipr

ocity.2a

A development of common European sport teams is also of an extreme importance for creation of the pan-European identity and solidarity.

further built-up in the future.


For instance, in professional golf there is a European team who faces an
American team in the semi-annual Ryder Cup. There has been discussion
of creating a European Union Olympic team; however, a Eurobarometer
survey shows that only 5o/o of the EU citizens claim that this would make
them feel more European (Pan-European Identity Wikipedia).A pan-European sport competitions such as football's (soccer) UEFA Champions
League and UEFA Cup or basketball Euro League and Euro Cup can
strongly contribute in creation of the feelings to be European. However,
although such competitions might help define the pan-European identity
from a pop-culture sense, the events also aid to national pride as fans
often take pride in supporting the teams from their country. Thus such
events both aid and hurt the establishment of the pan-European identity.
Furthermore, international football competitions such as UEFlfs Euro
and the FIFA World Crp, like similar competitions in basketball and
other mass popular sports, put strong emphasis on national pride as
they see individual states competing against one another for pride and
glory (aside from enormous financial compensations). Such events are
not necessarily detrimental to the European identity if the Europeans
are not asked to give up their national or regional identity - if they are
Such steps are already done and have to be

23 Onthe role

of transnational mass media for creation of the pan-European identity, see


(Briiggemann, Schultz-Forber g ZA0\.

24 OnEurovision songcontest and European identity, see (Tragaki2}L3;Fricker Gluhovic


2oL3).

LL4

VLADISLAV B. SOTIROVIC

asked to go beyond it, what would probably pulls them closer together.

In the other words, it has to be created a community in which diversity


id not a problem, but a characteristic in order that national-regional
differences would become integral parts of the feelings to be European
(Bennhold 2005).
In 2005, the internet domain .elt was launched under the title Your
European ldentity. In order to register a .eu domain one must be located in the EU (Pan-European Identity Wikipedia).This step indicates a
common gravitation towards switching to a European mentality. The
success of the .eu domain system has been extremely positive. The same

is expecting and from the policy of labeling the EU products as made


in European Union.
Finally, the common EU currency known as the Euro () has to play
one of the real factors in making the EU citizens to feel themselves as
the Europeans.2s The existence of a common EU currency and monetary union means above all an acceptance to live in a common state (the
USE) what is and the final political purpose of the whole process of the
so-called 'Europ eanization' from 1951 onwards. In the other words, to
accept to live in a common political unity in a form of a state with the
others above all means acceptance of a common reciprocity and solidarity based on a common (pan-European) identity.'u

The European Union and The European

ldcd

to ostracize national minorities in


identity. For

definite EuroPean

ft

ilGil

young generations. These are the genq


change and these arethe

generatimr

identity. Through free mobility ofl$o


exchange programs, the opportunilft
immense. Communication is easforiln

and'\ecr
d citizens to dcd
These are the advancementswhichd

ments, such as the internet,


language has allowe

values and common pop-culture flqm

future the Europeans would furfu


expected that more clear European ild
It is true that the EU alwaYs u
just trade. Without political purpul

fall apart (Bialasiewicz 2008: 72|-To


pan-European identity (alongsi& rl
identities) is a crucial project

ofkeqi

of the EU (or some kind of the tffi


together for the very reason that urfil
solidarity and common wish to lm
framework (state).
We have to say that there are fu
world in relation to the nature offtr
,

Conclusion

1. 'People-nation state'- orged


inhabitants.

The European identity seems fit to take on a new a life given the EU con-

tinuous expansion. The workable concept of a European identity should


fell within the framework set by the theory of ethnic indiference which
allows citizens not to give up their national identity but to expand their
identity into a pan-European one. Different proponents support different views of the European identity, be rt Europe as space of encounters,
Europe of culture or Europe of citizens. It is particularly important not

2.

'Cultural-nation state' - f,[


shared culture by its subiec&

3. 'C1ass-nation state'

oqgmfr

longing of its subjects.


4. 'Nation of state citizens' - u
tive basis of legally interpmil

7-ll).

In this context, we strongtf bd


25 Onthe Euro currency, see (Marsa 2011).
26 Onthis problem, see (Fligstein 2010).

standing and democratic type of tfu

The European Union and The European Identity

115

to ostracize national minorities in the process of defining the European


identity. For a definite European identity to emerge one must focus on the
young generations. These are the generations which are willing to adapt to
change and these are the generations which will carry forth the European
identity. Through free mobility of labor, the lack ofvisas, and intercultural
exchange programs, the opportunities to experience another nation are
immense. Communication is easier than ever with technological advancements, such as the internet, and the emergence of English as an auxiliary
language has allowe d citizens to clearly communicate with one another.

will enable a European identity. Shared


values and common pop-culture surely help link the continent. If in the
future the Europeans would further unite in their diversity it could be
expected that more clear European identity will emerge.
It is true that the EU always needed a political purpose beyond
just trade. Without political purpose the EU construction will start to
fall apart (Bialasiewicz 2008: 72). To create and to maintain a common
pan-European identity (alongside with particular national and regional
identities) is a crucial project of keeping the whole political construction
of the EU (or some kind of the United States of Europe in the future)
together for the very reason that without common identity no common
solidarity and common wish to live together within the same political
framework (state).
We have to say that there are four existing types of the states in the
world in relation to the nature of their subjects:
1. 'People-nation state' - organizedon the ethnic basis of the state's
inhabitants.
2. 'Cultural-nation state' organized on the basis of commonly
shared culture by its subjects.
3. 'Class-nation state' - organtzed on the ground of the class belonging of its subjects.
4. 'Nation of state cltizens' - organized politically on the normative basis of legally interpreted individual rights (Lepsius L982:
These are the advancements which

7-ll).
In this context, we strongly believe that the only successful, long
standing and democratic type of the state building applied in the case

( LL6

vLADrsLAv B. sorrnovrd

of the United States of Europe is the last fourth one for the reason that
only arConstitutional patriotism can be a functional framework for the
creation of the pan-European identity which has to be followed by the
change of the political system of the EU in order to be more compatible

with the common European identity."

The European Union and The European

Iffi

Caldwell Christopher. 2005. Why Did fu


ekly Standard. lune 13th (<httpr ttv,lrn
Articles/0

0/00 0/0

ffi
Im,

05/690ciqgwaspl

Checkel |effrey, Katzenstein Peter (ds)-

University Press.
Chin Rita. 2011. The Guest Worker
University

Qudtun;

Press.

Cini Michell e, Plrez-Sol6rzano Borragrn

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