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THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee,

MARCOSA PEALOSA and ENRIQUE RODRIGUEZ, defendants-appellants.
Article 475 of the prevailing Penal Code provides as follows:
Any minor who shall contract marriage without the consent of his or her parents or of the persons who for
such purpose stand in their stead shall be punished with prision correccional in its minimum and medium
The accused were convicted in the lower court for the violation of this article, it appearing from the evidence
adduced that the accused, Marcosa Pealosa, was not 21 years of age on the 3rd day of May, 1901, when she
married the codefendant, and that she contracted the marriage without the consent of her father.
Should the judgment appealed from be affirmed if the woman was in fact less than 21 years of age, without
taking into consideration what was her belief concerning her age? Many instances can be called to mind in
which there may exist an error in good faith concerning this point. A man who is about to marry and is
ignorant of his exact age seeks and obtains a certified copy of the registry of his baptism. From this it appears
that he was born twenty-one years before the 1st day of June, let us say. He marries on the 15th day of June.
It develops later that the person who took the copy of the registry of baptism read July as June, and as a
matter of fact the man in question did not complete his twenty-one years until the 1st day of July, fifteen days
after his marriage. Can such a one be convicted of a violation of article 475? It would seem that this case is
included within those of the article. He was in fact a minor when he married, and he married without the
consent of his parents. It is true that so far as the parent is concerned the offense has been committed, but
can the same be said with reference to the State in the absence of a voluntary violation of the law? Article 1
of the Code does not contain the word "with malice" that are to be found in the Code of 1822; nevertheless
Pacheco, the eminent commentator, has said that those words are included in the word "voluntary" (El Codigo
Penal Concordado y Comentado, Vol. I, folio 74, third edition); and he states positively that crime can not
exist without intent.
Other commentators, without being in entire conformity with Pacheco, nevertheless are agreed up to a
certain point. Groizard says: "Such is the general rule; so it is ordinarily." (Codigo Penal de 1870, Vol. I, folio
37.) Viada says that "in the majority of cases, in the absence of intent there has been no crime; but that there
can exist in some cases the latter without the former." (Vol. I, Codigo Penal Reformado de 1870, folio 16.)
Silvela says: "In effect if suffices to remember the first article, which states that where there is no intent there
is no crime, ... in order to assert without fear or mistake that in our Code the substance of a crime does not
exist if there is not a deed, an act which falls within the sphere of ethics, if there is not a moral wrong." (Vol.
2, Derecho Penal, folio 169.)
The theory that the absence of the words "with malice" in the prevailing Code has this effect is supported by
the provisions of article 568 which says: "He who by reckless negligence commits an act which would
constitute a grave crime if malice were present shall be punished," etc.
The Supreme Court in several successive sentences has followed the same doctrine: "It is indispensable that
this (action) in order to constitute a crime should carry with it all the malice which the volition and intention
to cause the evil which may be the object of the said crime suppose. (Judgment of May 31, 1882.)
In a cause for falsity the facts involved were that the defendant had married "before the municipal judge of
the pueblo of Rubete without other ceremony than the simple manifestation and expression of his wishes and
those of the woman Leonor with whom he married before said municipal judge; that relying upon that, on
account of his ignorance and lack of instruction, on the 27th of June, 1882, and the 5th of April, 1884, in the
municipal court of the pueblo of Polopos he registered as legitimate children his sons, Jose and Emilio the
offspring of the illicit union of the defendant and Leonor Gonzalez." For the crime of falsity committed by
reckless negligence the Criminal Audiencia of Albunol condemned the said defendant to the penalty of four
months and one day of arresto mayor. The Supreme Court annulled said sentence "considering that whatever
might be the civil effects of the registration of his three sons entered by the accused in the Civil and Parochial
Registers, it can not partake of the nature of a crime for lack of the necessary element of volition or intent to
offend, essential to every punishable act or omission; neither did he act with negligence." (Judgment of March
16, 1892.)
In a cause prosecuted against the Chinese Sy-Ticco and against Don Guillermo Partier, in the court of Quiapo,
for falsification of trade-marks, the Criminal Chamber of the Audiencia of Manila condemned the Chinaman to
two years and some months of presidio correccional, and Partier to one year and some months of similar
imprisonment. A writ of error was sued out in the name of Partier. The Supreme Court annulled this sentence,
"considering that the moral element of the crime, or, in other words, existence or nonexistence of intent and
malice in the commission of an act designated and punished by the law as criminal is essentially a question
of fact for the exclusive judgment and determination of the trial court."

Considering that the act charged against the accused, Guillermo Partier, of having printed in his lithographic
establishment the trade-mark of the cigarette packages of the Insular factory by virtue of a supposed order of
the owner of said factory, to whose injury the Chinaman Abelardo Zacarias Sy-Ticco ordered him to do the
said fraudulent printing, can not be considered (from the facts declared proved in the final sentence of
acquittal of the Court of First Instance, accepted in its entirety and without any addition by the Appellate
Court) as constituting intentional participation or cooperation in deed of falsification and defraudation
committed by the former, since it does not appear in any part of the sentence that Partier was in connivance
with Sy-Ticco nor that he had any reason to suspect the true character of him who, styling himself the
representative of Seor Santa Marina, the owner of the La Insular factory, gave him the order to print the
trade-mark of this factory on the packages, which were to be used to hold cigarettes. (Judgment of December
30, 1896.)
The judgment of October 4, 1893, is of the same tenor. It is not necessary to hold in this action that no crime
mentioned in the Code can exist without intent. It suffices for the present to decide, as we do decide, that
one can not be convicted under article 475 when by reason of a mistake of fact there does not exist the
intention to commit the crime.
It remains for us to apply this principle to the facts of the present case. The defendant has stated that she
believed that she was born in 1879; that so her parents had given her to understand ever since her tenderest
age; that she had not asked them concerning her age because her father had given her to so understand
since her childhood. Her father was present in the court room as the complaining witness. If his daughter was
deviating from the truth it would have been an easy matter for him to have testified denying the truth of
what she had stated. It is evident that he was interested in the conviction of his daughter, and the fact that
the complaining witness did not contradict her obliges us to accept as true the statements of the witness.
Being true, they disclose that she acted under a mistake of fact; that there was no intention on her part to
commit the crime provided for and punished the article 475.
As for the husband, it has been proved that two days before the marriage was celebrated he received a letter
from the woman in which she said that she was 21 years of age. This letter the defendant showed to the
clergyman who married them. The woman when the marriage ceremony was performed took an oath before
the clergyman, in the presence of her husband, that she was 21 years of age. The defendant testifies that he
had no suspicion that the woman was a minor. This statement has not been contradicted and we consider
that it suffices to demonstrate that the defendant acted under a mistake of fact, and in conformity with the
principle laid down in this opinion he has not been guilty of a violation of article 475 in connection with article
13, No. 3, nor in any other manner.
The conviction of the defendants in accordance with article 568, together with article 29 of General Orders,
No. 58, has not been prayed for, and even if it had been we do not consider the evidence sufficient to sustain
a conviction in accordance with this article. Her husband has the right to accept the sworn statement of the
woman. The only person whom she could ask for information was her father, and he had told her age
For the reasons above set forth the sentence of the lower court is reversed with reference to both defendants,
acquitting them freely with costs of suit de oficio.
It is so ordered.
G.R. No. L-47722
July 27, 1943
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
ANTONIO Z. OANIS and ALBERTO GALANTA, defendants-appellants.
Charged with the crime of murder of one Serapio Tecson, the accused Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta,
chief of police of Cabanatuan and corporal of the Philippine Constabulary, respectively, were, after due trial,
found guilty by the lower court of homicide through reckless imprudence and were sentenced each to an
indeterminate penalty of from one year and six months to two years and two months of prison correccional
and to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P1,000. Defendants
appealed separately from this judgment.
In the afternoon of December 24, 1938. Captain Godofredo Monsod, Constabulary Provincial Inspector at
Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, received from Major Guido a telegram of the following tenor: "Information received
escaped convict Anselmo Balagtas with bailarina and Irene in Cabanatuan get him dead or alive." Captain
Monsod accordingly called for his first sergeant and asked that he be given four men. Defendant corporal
Alberto Galanta, and privates Nicomedes Oralo, Venancio Serna and D. Fernandez, upon order of their
sergeant, reported at the office of the Provincial Inspector where they were shown a copy of the abovequoted telegram and a newspaper clipping containing a picture of Balagtas. They were instructed to arrest
Balagtas and, if overpowered, to follow the instruction contained in the telegram. The same instruction was

given to the chief of police Oanis who was likewise called by the Provincial Inspector. When the chief of police
was asked whether he knew one Irene, a bailarina, he answered that he knew one of loose morals of the
same name. Upon request of the Provincial Inspector, the chief of police tried to locate some of his men to
guide the constabulary soldiers in ascertaining Balagtas' whereabouts, and failing to see anyone of them he
volunteered to go with the party. The Provincial Inspector divided the party into two groups with defendants
Oanis and Galanta, and private Fernandez taking the route to Rizal street leading to the house where Irene
was supposedly living. When this group arrived at Irene's house, Oanis approached one Brigida Mallare, who
was then stripping banana stalks, and asked her where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the place and
upon further inquiry also said that Irene was sleeping with her paramour. Brigida trembling, immediately
returned to her own room which was very near that occupied by Irene and her paramour. Defendants Oanis
and Galanta then went to the room of Irene, and an seeing a man sleeping with his back towards the door
where they were, simultaneously or successively fired at him with their .32 and .45 caliber revolvers.
Awakened by the gunshots, Irene saw her paramour already wounded, and looking at the door where the
shots came, she saw the defendants still firing at him. Shocked by the entire scene. Irene fainted; it turned
out later that the person shot and killed was not the notorious criminal Anselmo Balagtas but a peaceful and
innocent citizen named Serapio Tecson, Irene's paramour. The Provincial Inspector, informed of the killing,
repaired to the scene and when he asked as to who killed the deceased. Galanta, referring to himself and to
Oanis, answered: "We two, sir." The corpse was thereafter brought to the provincial hospital and upon
autopsy by Dr. Ricardo de Castro, multiple gunshot wounds inflicted by a .32 and a .45 caliber revolvers were
found on Tecson's body which caused his death.
These are the facts as found by the trial court and fully supported by the evidence, particularly by the
testimony of Irene Requinea. Appellants gave, however, a different version of the tragedy. According to
Appellant Galanta, when he and chief of police Oanis arrived at the house, the latter asked Brigida where
Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the place, and upon further inquiry as to the whereabouts of Anselmo
Balagtas, she said that he too was sleeping in the same room. Oanis went to the room thus indicated and
upon opening the curtain covering the door, he said: "If you are Balagtas, stand up." Tecson, the supposed
Balagtas, and Irene woke up and as the former was about to sit up in bed. Oanis fired at him. Wounded,
Tecson leaned towards the door, and Oanis receded and shouted: "That is Balagtas." Galanta then fired at
On the other hand, Oanis testified that after he had opened the curtain covering the door and after having
said, "if you are Balagtas stand up." Galanta at once fired at Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, while the latter
was still lying on bed, and continued firing until he had exhausted his bullets: that it was only thereafter that
he, Oanis, entered the door and upon seeing the supposed Balagtas, who was then apparently watching and
picking up something from the floor, he fired at him.
The trial court refused to believe the appellants. Their testimonies are certainly incredible not only because
they are vitiated by a natural urge to exculpate themselves of the crime, but also because they are materially
contradictory. Oasis averred that be fired at Tecson when the latter was apparently watching somebody in an
attitudes of picking up something from the floor; on the other hand, Galanta testified that Oasis shot Tecson
while the latter was about to sit up in bed immediately after he was awakened by a noise. Galanta testified
that he fired at Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, when the latter was rushing at him. But Oanis assured that
when Galanta shot Tecson, the latter was still lying on bed. It is apparent from these contradictions that when
each of the appellants tries to exculpate himself of the crime charged, he is at once belied by the other; but
their mutual incriminating averments dovetail with and corroborate substantially, the testimony of Irene
Requinea. It should be recalled that, according to Requinea, Tecson was still sleeping in bed when he was shot
to death by appellants. And this, to a certain extent, is confirmed by both appellants themselves in their
mutual recriminations. According, to Galanta, Oanis shot Tecson when the latter was still in bed about to sit
up just after he was awakened by a noise. And Oanis assured that when Galanta shot Tecson, the latter was
still lying in bed. Thus corroborated, and considering that the trial court had the opportunity to observe her
demeanor on the stand, we believe and so hold that no error was committed in accepting her testimony and
in rejecting the exculpatory pretensions of the two appellants. Furthermore, a careful examination of Irene's
testimony will show not only that her version of the tragedy is not concocted but that it contains all indicia of
veracity. In her cross-examination, even misleading questions had been put which were unsuccessful, the
witness having stuck to the truth in every detail of the occurrence. Under these circumstances, we do not feel
ourselves justified in disturbing the findings of fact made by the trial court.
The true fact, therefore, of the case is that, while Tecson was sleeping in his room with his back towards the
door, Oanis and Galanta, on sight, fired at him simultaneously or successively, believing him to be Anselmo
Balagtas but without having made previously any reasonable inquiry as to his identity. And the question is
whether or not they may, upon such fact, be held responsible for the death thus caused to Tecson. It is
contended that, as appellants acted in innocent mistake of fact in the honest performance of their official
duties, both of them believing that Tecson was Balagtas, they incur no criminal liability. Sustaining this theory

in part, the lower court held and so declared them guilty of the crime of homicide through reckless
imprudence. We are of the opinion, however, that, under the circumstances of the case, the crime committed
by appellants is murder through specially mitigated by circumstances to be mentioned below.
In support of the theory of non-liability by reasons of honest mistake of fact, appellants rely on the case of
U.S. v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil., 488. The maxim is ignorantia facti excusat, but this applies only when the mistake
is committed without fault or carelessness. In the Ah Chong case, defendant therein after having gone to bed
was awakened by someone trying to open the door. He called out twice, "who is there," but received no
answer. Fearing that the intruder was a robber, he leaped from his bed and called out again., "If you enter the
room I will kill you." But at that precise moment, he was struck by a chair which had been placed against the
door and believing that he was then being attacked, he seized a kitchen knife and struck and fatally wounded
the intruder who turned out to be his room-mate. A common illustration of innocent mistake of fact is the
case of a man who was marked as a footpad at night and in a lonely road held up a friend in a spirit of
mischief, and with leveled, pistol demanded his money or life. He was killed by his friend under the mistaken
belief that the attack was real, that the pistol leveled at his head was loaded and that his life and property
were in imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. In these instances, there is an innocent mistake of
fact committed without any fault or carelessness because the accused, having no time or opportunity to
make a further inquiry, and being pressed by circumstances to act immediately, had no alternative but to
take the facts as they then appeared to him, and such facts justified his act of killing. In the instant case,
appellants, unlike the accused in the instances cited, found no circumstances whatsoever which would press
them to immediate action. The person in the room being then asleep, appellants had ample time and
opportunity to ascertain his identity without hazard to themselves, and could even effect a bloodless arrest if
any reasonable effort to that end had been made, as the victim was unarmed, according to Irene Requinea.
This, indeed, is the only legitimate course of action for appellants to follow even if the victim was really
Balagtas, as they were instructed not to kill Balagtas at sight but to arrest him, and to get him dead or alive
only if resistance or aggression is offered by him.
Although an officer in making a lawful arrest is justified in using such force as is reasonably necessary to
secure and detain the offender, overcome his resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if he escapes,
and protect himself from bodily harm (People vs. Delima, 46 Phil, 738), yet he is never justified in using
unnecessary force or in treating him with wanton violence, or in resorting to dangerous means when the
arrest could be effected otherwise (6 C.J.S., par. 13, p. 612). The doctrine is restated in the new Rules of Court
thus: "No unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in making an arrest, and the person arrested shall
not be subject to any greater restraint than is necessary for his detention." (Rule 109, sec. 2, par. 2). And a
peace officer cannot claim exemption from criminal liability if he uses unnecessary force or violence in
making an arrest (5 C.J., p. 753; U.S.vs. Mendoza, 2 Phil., 109). It may be true that Anselmo Balagtas was a
notorious criminal, a life-termer, a fugitive from justice and a menace to the peace of the community, but
these facts alone constitute no justification for killing him when in effecting his arrest, he offers no resistance
or in fact no resistance can be offered, as when he is asleep. This, in effect, is the principle laid down,
although upon different facts, in U.S. vs. Donoso (3 Phil., 234, 242).
It is, however, suggested that a notorious criminal "must be taken by storm" without regard to his right to life
which he has by such notoriety already forfeited. We may approve of this standard of official conduct where
the criminal offers resistance or does something which places his captors in danger of imminent attack.
Otherwise we cannot see how, as in the present case, the mere fact of notoriety can make the life of a
criminal a mere trifle in the hands of the officers of the law. Notoriety rightly supplies a basis for redoubled
official alertness and vigilance; it never can justify precipitate action at the cost of human life. Where, as
here, the precipitate action of the appellants has cost an innocent life and there exist no circumstances
whatsoever to warrant action of such character in the mind of a reasonably prudent man, condemnation
not condonation should be the rule; otherwise we should offer a premium to crime in the shelter of official
The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence, the killing being intentional and not
accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the
incident of another act performed without malice. (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939). In the words of Viada, "para
que se celifique un hecho de imprudencia es preciso que no haya mediado en el malicia ni intencion alguna
de daar; existiendo esa intencion, debera calificarse el hecho del delito que ha producido, por mas que no
haya sido la intencion del agente el causar un mal de tanta gravedad como el que se produjo." (Tomo 7,
Viada Codigo Penal Comentado, 5.a ed. pag. 7). And, as once held by this Court, a deliberate intent to do an
unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence (People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil., 232;
People vs. Bindor, 56 Phil., 16), and where such unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in the identity of the
intended victim cannot be considered as reckless imprudence (People vs. Gona, 54 Phil., 605) to support a
plea of mitigated liability.

As the deceased was killed while asleep, the crime committed is murder with the qualifying circumstance
ofalevosia. There is, however, a mitigating circumstance of weight consisting in the incomplete justifying
circumstance defined in article 11, No. 5, of the Revised Penal Code. According to such legal provision, a
person incurs no criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right
or office. There are two requisites in order that the circumstance may be taken as a justifying one: (a) that
the offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right; and (b) that the injury or
offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise
of such right or office. In the instance case, only the first requisite is present appellants have acted in the
performance of a duty. The second requisite is wanting for the crime by them committed is not the necessary
consequence of a due performance of their duty. Their duty was to arrest Balagtas or to get him dead or alive
if resistance is offered by him and they are overpowered. But through impatience or over-anxiety or in their
desire to take no chances, they have exceeded in the fulfillment of such duty by killing the person whom they
believed to be Balagtas without any resistance from him and without making any previous inquiry as to his
identity. According to article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty lower by one or two degrees than that
prescribed by law shall, in such case, be imposed.
For all the foregoing, the judgment is modified and appellants are hereby declared guilty of murder with the
mitigating circumstance above mentioned, and accordingly sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from
five (5) years of prision correctional to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, with the accessories of the
law, and to pay the heirs of the deceased Serapio Tecson jointly and severally an indemnity of P2,000, with
Yulo, C.J., Bocobo, Generoso and Lopez Vito, A., concur.
G.R. No. 24978
FERNANDO DE FERNANDO, defendant-appellant.
W. A. Armstrong for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
This appeal has been taken by the defendant Fernando de Fernando from the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Zamboanga, in which he was held guilty of the crime of murder and sentenced to suffer the
penalty of twenty years cadena temporal, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Buenventura Paulino in the
sum of P1,000 and to pay the costs, by virtue of a complaint filed by the fiscal charging with the said crime.
As a basis for his appeal the accused assigns the following errors as committed by the trial court: (1) in
holding that the acts committed by the accused constituted the crime for murder; (2) in not holding that the
accused was exempt from criminal liability and in not acquitting him.
At the trial the following facts were proven beyond a reasonable doubt: Before the day of the crime several
Moro prisoners had escaped from the Penal Colony of San Ramon, Zamboanga. The residents of the barrio of
Municahan of the municipality of Zamboanga were alarmed by the presence of three suspicious looking
persons who were prowling around the place. The accused Fernando de Fernando who, at that time, was a
municipal policeman, when passing in front of the house of one Remigio Delgado, was called by the latter's
daughter Paciencia Delgado, who stated that her father wished to see him. When the policeman came up the
house Remigio Delgado informed him that three unknown and suspicious looking persons, dressed in blue,
prowling around his house. The accused remained in the said house talking with Paciencia Delgado, both
being seated on a bench near the window. While they were thus talking, at about 7 o'clock at night, there
appeared in the dark, at about 4 meters from the stairs, a person dressed in dark clothes, calling "Nong
Miong." At the time the accused nor Paciencia Delgado knew who was thus calling. The accused inquired
what he wanted but instead of answering he continued advancing with bolo in hand. Upon seeing this
Fernando de Fernando took out his revolver and fired a shot in the air. As he saw that the unknown continued
to ascend the staircase he fired at him. The unknown disappeared and ran to the house of a neighbor Leon
Torres, where, after placing upon a table the bolos that he carried, he fell on the floor and expired. Remigio
Delgado, who was in the kitchen and had recognized the voice of the unknown, on hearing the shots ran into
the parlor, took hold of the arm of the defendant and asked him why he had fired at Buenventura Paulino.
Fernando de Fernando only said "Let me go, that is a cross eyed person" and immediately repaired to the
house of the teniente of the barrio, Santiago Torres, from where he telephoned to the chief of police advising
him of what had happened. When the body was examined it was found that a bullet had penetrated the base
of the neck at the right, imbedding itself in the left side under the skin.
The status of the accused on the night in question was that of an agent of the law, to whom notice had been
given of the presence of suspicious looking persons who might be the Moro prisoners who had escaped from
the Penal Colony of San Ramon. The appearance of a man, unknown to him, dressed in clothes similar in color

to the prisoner's uniform who was calling the owner of the house, and the silence of Paciencia Delgado, who
did not at the time recognize the man, undoubtedly caused the accused to suspect that the unknown man
was one of the three persons that the owner of the house said were prowling around the place. The suspicion
become a reality in his mind when he saw that the man continued ascending the stairs with a bolo in his
hand, not heeding his question as to who he was. In the midst of these circumstances and believing
undoubtedly that he was a wrongdoer he tried to perform his duty and first fired into the air and then at the
alleged intruder. But it happened that what to him appeared to be wrongdoer was the nephew of the owner of
the house who was carrying three bolos tied together. At that psychological moment when the forces of far
and the sense of duty were at odds, the accused was not able to take full account of the true situation and
the bundle of bolos seemed to him to be only one bolo in the hands of a suspicious character who intended to
enter the house. There is, however, a circumstance that should have made him suspect that the man was not
only a friend but also a relative of the owner of the house from the fact he called "Nong Miong," which
indicated that the owner of the house might be an older relative of the one calling, or an intimate friend; and
in not asking Paciencia Delgado who was it was that was calling her father with such familiarity, he did not
use the ordinary precaution that he should have used before taking such fatal action.
Taking into consideration the estate of mind of the accused at the time, and the meaning that he gave to the
attitude of the unknown person, in shooting the latter he felt that he was performing his duty by defending
the owners of the house against an unexpected attack, and such act cannot constitute the crime of murder,
but only that of simple homicide. He cannot be held guilty, however, as principal with malicious intent,
because he thought at the time that he was justified in acting as he did, and he is guilty only because he
failed to exercise the ordinary diligence which, under the circumstances, he should have by investigating
whether or not the unknown man was really what he though him to be. In firing the shot, without first
exercising reasonable diligence, he acted with reckless negligence.
The crime committed by the caused, therefore, is homicide through reckless negligence defined and punished
in article 568, in relation with article 404, of the Penal Code, the penalty prescribed by law arresto mayor in
its maximum degree to prision correcional in its minimum degree.
In view of the foregoing and reversing the appealed judgment, the accused is held guilty of the crime of
homicide through reckless negligence, and he is sentenced to suffer one year prision correcional, to pay the
amount of P500 to the heirs of the deceased as an indemnity, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, the costs and with credit of one-half of the preventive imprisonment already suffered. So ordered.