G.R. No.

102976 October 25, 1995

IRON
AND
STEEL
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA
CORPORATION, respondents.

AUTHORITY, petitioner,
CRISTINA

FERTILIZER

Petitioner Iron and Steel Authority ("ISA") was created by Presidential

Decree (P.D.) No. 272 dated 9 August 1973 in order, generally, to develop
and promote the iron and steel industry in the Philippines.
National Steel Corporation is an entity owned by the National Government
and planning to expound in Iligan city pursuant to Proclamation No. 2239.
Some of the land were occupied by private respondent Maria Cristina
Fertilizer Corporation ("MCFC"), Letter of Instruction (LOI), No. 1277, also
dated 16 November 1982, was issued directing the NSC to "negotiate with
the owners of MCFC, for and on behalf of the Government, for the
compensation of MCFC's present occupancy rights on the subject land."
Negotiations went on and petitioner initiated an eminent proceedings.
While the trial was going on, the statutory existence of ISA expired. So
MCFC filed a motion to dismiss because petitioner ceased to be a juridical
person.
The trial court dismissed the case.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration that despite its expiration, its juridical
existence subsist
On CA,it affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Solicitor argued that being its principal, the petitioner has the right to be
substituted.
Private respondent said that failure of the congress to enact a law that
extended the term of ISA displayed a clear intent to terminate ISA.
ISSUE: WON ISA delegated power was terminated when its statutory
term was terminated?
HELD: No. the court held ISA was an agent of the Philippines. And it
is non-incorporated agency.

We consider that the ISA is properly regarded as an agent or delegate of the

Republic of the Philippines. The Republic itself is a body corporate and
juridical person vested with the full panoply of powers and attributes which
are compendiously described as "legal personality." The relevant definitions
are found in the Administrative Code of 1987:
Sec. 2. General Terms Defined. Unless the specific words of the text, or
the context as a whole, or a particular statute, require a different meaning:
(1) Government of the Republic of the Philippines refers to the corporate
governmental entity through which the functions of government are
exercised throughout the Philippines, including, save as the contrary appears
from the context, the various arms through which political authority is made
effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the autonomous regions,
the provincial, city, municipal or barangay subdivisions or other forms of
local government.
xxx xxx xxx
(4) Agency of the Government refers to any of the various units of the
Government, including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or
government-owned or controlled corporation, or a local government or a
distinct unit therein.
xxx xxx xxx
(10) Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not
integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or
jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers,
administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually
through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered
institutions and government-owned or controlled corporations.

The court also considered ISA as an non-incorporated agency. When the

statutory term of a non-incorporated agency expires, the powers, duties and
functions as well as the assets and liabilities of that agency revert back to,
and are re-assumed by, the Republic of the Philippines, in the absence of
special provisions of law specifying some other disposition thereof such as,
e.g., devolution or transmission of such powers, duties, functions, etc. to
some other identified successor agency or instrumentality of the Republic of

the Philippines. Since, in the instant case, ISA is a non-incorporated agency

or instrumentality of the Republic, its powers, duties, functions, assets and
liabilities are properly regarded as folded back into the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines and hence assumed once again by the Republic,
no special statutory provision having been shown to have mandated
succession thereto by some other entity or agency of the Republic.
Since ISA was a real party interest at the start of the expropriation
proceedings, and being an entity representing the Republic of the
Philippines, he can be substituted. it follows that the Republic of the
Philippines is entitled to be substituted in the expropriation proceedings as
party-plaintiff in lieu of ISA, the statutory term of ISA having expired. Put a
little differently, the expiration of ISA's statutory term did not by itself
require or justify the dismissal of the eminent domain proceedings.
The court held that expiration of the statutory term of ISA did not rendered
the delegated authority null and void. The powers and functions of ISA have
reverted to the Republic of the Philippines upon the termination of the
statutory term of ISA, the question should be addressed whether fresh
legislative authority is necessary before the Republic of the Philippines may
continue the expropriation proceedings initiated by its own delegate or
agent.

[G.R. No. 142801-802. July 10, 2001]

BUKLOD NG KAWANING EIIB, CESAR POSADA, REMEDIOS G.

PRINCESA,
BENJAMIN
KHO,
BENIGNO
MANGA,
LULU
MENDOZA, petitioners, vs. HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RONALDO B.
ZAMORA, HON. SECRETARY JOSE PARDO, DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE,
HON. SECRETARY BENJAMIN DIOKNO, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET
AND
MANAGEMENT,
HON.
SECRETARY
ARTEMIO
TUQUERO,
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, respondents.
On June 30, 1987, former President Corazon C. Aquino, issued Executive
Order No. 127[3] establishing the Economic Intelligence and Investigation
Bureau (EIIB) as part of the structural organization of the Ministry of
Finance.[4]
Later on she issued MO 225 that EIIB shall be of primary responsibility for
anti-smuggling operations.
When Estrada was the president, it sought for the deactivation of the EIIB.
So he created through EO 196 for Anti- Smuggling Task Force ADuana.
On March 29,2000, Estrada issued EO223 that all EIIB personnel shall be
deemed separated from service pursuant to a bonafied reorganization.
ISSUE: Won the president have the authority to reorganized the
executive department?
HELD: YES.
Section 48 of R.A. 7645 provides that:
Sec. 48. Scaling Down and Phase Out of Activities of Agencies Within the
Executive Branch. The heads of departments, bureaus and offices and
agencies are hereby directed to identify their respective activities which are
no longer essential in the delivery of public services and which may
be scaled down, phased out or abolished, subject to civil service rules and
regulations. X x x. Actual scaling down, phasing out or abolition of the
activities shall be effected pursuant to Circulars or Orders issued for the
purpose by the Office of the President.
Said provision clearly mentions the acts of scaling down, phasing out and
abolition of offices only and does not cover the creation of offices or transfer
of functions.

The foregoing provision evidently shows that the President is authorized to

effect organizational changes including the creation of offices in the
department or agency concerned.
The law that vests the president to reorganize is the PD 1772. It is
Presidential Decree No. 1772 which amended Presidential Decree No.
1416. These decrees expressly grant the President of the Philippines the
continuing authority to reorganize the national government, which includes
the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to
transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities
and to standardize salaries and materials.
In the whereas clause of E.O. No. 191, former President Estrada anchored
his authority to deactivate EIIB on Section 77 of Republic Act 8745 (FY 1999
General Appropriations Act), a provision similar to Section 62 of R.A. 7645
quoted in Larin, thus;
Sec. 77. Organized Changes. Unless otherwise provided by law or directed
by the President of the Philippines, no changes in key positions or
organizational units in any department or agency shall be authorized in their
respective organizational structures and funded from appropriations provided
by this Act.
We adhere to the precedent or ruling in Larin that this provision recognizes
the authority of the President to effect organizational changes in the
department or agency under the executive structure. Such a ruling further
finds support in Section 78 of Republic Act No. 8760. [22] Under this law, the
heads of departments, bureaus, offices and agencies and other entities in
the Executive Branch are directed(a) to conduct a comprehensive review of
their respective mandates, missions, objectives, functions, programs,
projects, activities and systems and procedures; (b) identify activities which
are no longer essential in the delivery of public services and which may be
scaled down, phased-out or abolished; and (c) adopt measures that will
result in the streamlined organization and improved overall performance of
their respective agencies.[23] Section 78 ends up with the mandate that
the actual streamlining and productivity improvement in agency organization
and operation shall be effected pursuant to Circulars or Orders issued for the
purpose by the Office of the President.[24]The law has spoken clearly.

Under Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as
the Administrative Code of 1987), the President, subject to the policy in the
Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency,
shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure
of the Office of the President. For this purpose, he may transfer the
functions of other Departments or Agencies to the Office of the
President. In Canonizado v. Aguirre,[25] we ruled that reorganization
involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition
thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. It takes place
when there is an alteration of the existing structure of government offices or
units therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility
between them. The EIIB is a bureau attached to the Department of Finance.
[26]
It falls under the Office of the President. Hence, it is subject to the
Presidents continuing authority to reorganize.
The reorganization was valid. Republic Act No. 6656 [28] provides for the
circumstances which may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the
removal of civil service employees made as a result of reorganization, to
wit: (a) where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in
the
new
staffing
pattern
of
the
department
or
agency
concerned; (b) where an office is abolished and another performing
substantially the same functions is created; (c) where incumbents are
replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment,
performance and merit; (d) where there is a classification of offices in the
department or agency concerned and the reclassified offices perform
substantially the same functions as the original offices, and (e) where the
removal violates the order of separation.[29]
An examination of the pertinent Executive Orders [30] shows that the
deactivation of EIIB and the creation of Task Force Aduana were done in
good faith. It was not for the purpose of removing the EIIB employees, but
to achieve the ultimate purpose of E.O. No. 191, which is economy. While
Task Force Aduana was created to take the place of EIIB, its creation does
not entail expense to the government.
Firstly, there is no employment of new personnel to man the Task Force.
E.O. No. 196 provides that the technical, administrative and special staffs of
EIIB are to be composed of people who are already in the public service,
they being employees of other existing agencies. Their tenure with the Task
Force would only be temporary, i.e., only when the agency where they

belong is called upon to assist the Task Force. Since their employment with
the Task force is only by way of detail or assignment, they retain their
employment with the existing agencies. And should the need for them
cease, they would be sent back to the agency concerned.
Secondly, the thrust of E.O. No. 196 is to have a small group of military men
under the direct control and supervision of the President as base of the
governments anti-smuggling campaign. Such a smaller base has the
necessary powers 1) to enlist the assistance of any department, bureau, or
office and to use their respective personnel, facilities and resources;
and 2) to select and recruit personnel from within the PSG and ISAFP
for assignment to the Task Force. Obviously, the idea is to encourage the
utilization of personnel, facilities and resources of the already existing
departments, agencies, bureaus, etc., instead of maintaining an independent
office with a whole set of personnel and facilities. The EIIB had proven itself
burdensome for the government because it maintained separate offices in
every region in the Philippines.
And thirdly, it is evident from the yearly budget appropriation of the
government that the creation of the Task Force Aduana was especially
intended to lessen EIIBs expenses. Tracing from the yearly General
Appropriations Act, it appears that the allotted amount for the EIIBs general
administration,
support,
and
operations
for
the
year
1995,
[31]
[32]
was P128,031,000;
for 1996, P182,156,000;
for 1998, P219,889,000;
[33]
[34]
and, for 1999, P238,743,000.
These amounts were far above
[35]
the P50,000,000
allocation to the Task Force Aduana for the year 2000.

[G.R. No. 152845. August 5, 2003]

DRIANITA BAGAOISAN, FELY MADRIAGA, SHIRLY TAGABAN,
RICARDO SARANDI, SUSAN IMPERIAL, BENJAMIN DEMDEM,
RODOLFO DAGA, EDGARDO BACLIG, GREGORIO LABAYAN, HILARIO

JEREZ, and MARIA CORAZON CUANANG, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL

TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION, represented by ANTONIO DE GUZMAN
and PERLITA BAULA,respondents.
President Joseph Estrada issued on 30 September 1998 Executive Order No.
29, entitled Mandating the Streamlining of the National Tobacco
Administration (NTA), a government agency under the Department of
Agriculture. The order was followed by another issuance, on 27 October
1998, by President Estrada of Executive Order No. 36, amending Executive
Order No. 29, insofar as the new staffing pattern was concerned, by
increasing from four hundred (400) to not exceeding seven hundred fifty
(750) the positions affected thereby. In compliance therewith, the NTA
prepared and adopted a new Organization Structure and Staffing Pattern
(OSSP) which, on 29 October 1998, was submitted to the Office of the
President.
Petitioners occupying different positions received a termination letter. So
they filed a case for certiorari,prohibition and mandamus.
The RTC decided that petitioners be appointed to the OSSP positions. So NTA
appealed at the CA. the CA reversed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE: whether or not the President, through the issuance of an
executive order, can validly carry out the reorganization of the NTA?
HELD: YES.
The questioned Executive Orders No. 29 and No. 36 have not abolished the
National Tobacco Administration but merely mandated its reorganization
through the streamlining or reduction of its personnel.
Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB vs. Zamora[7] ruled that the President, based on
existing laws, had the authority to carry out a reorganization in any branch
or agency of the executive department. In said case, Buklod ng Kawaning
EIIB challenged the issuance, and sought the nullification, of Executive Order
No. 191 (Deactivation of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation
Bureau) and Executive Order No. 223 (Supplementary Executive Order No.
191 on the Deactivation of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation
Bureau and for Other Matters) on the ground that they were issued by the
President with grave abuse of discretion and in violation of their
constitutional right to security of tenure. The Court explained:

The general rule has always been that the power to abolish a public office is
lodged with the legislature. This proceeds from the legal precept that the
power to create includes the power to destroy. A public office is either
created by the Constitution, by statute, or by authority of law. Thus, except
where the office was created by the Constitution itself, it may be abolished
by the same legislature that brought it into existence.
The exception, however, is that as far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the
executive department are concerned, the Presidents power of control may
justify him to inactivate the functions of a particular office, or certain laws
may grant him the broad authority to carry out reorganization
measures. The case in point is Larin v. Executive Secretary [280 SCRA
713]. In this case, it was argued that there is no law which empowers the
President to reorganize the BIR. In decreeing otherwise, this Court
sustained the following legal basis, thus:
`Initially, it is argued that there is no law yet which empowers the President
to issue E.O. No. 132 or to reorganize the BIR.
`We do not agree.
`x x x

xxx

`Section 48 of R.A. 7645 provides that:

``Sec. 48. Scaling Down and Phase Out of Activities of Agencies Within the
Executive Branch. The heads of departments, bureaus and offices and
agencies are hereby directed to identify their respective activities which are
no longer essential in the delivery of public services and which may
be scaled down, phased out or abolished, subject to civil service rules and
regulations. x x x. Actual scaling down, phasing out or abolition of the
activities shall be effected pursuant to Circulars or Orders issued for the
purpose by the Office of the President.
`Said provision clearly mentions the acts of `scaling down, phasing out and
abolition of offices only and does not cover the creation of offices or transfer
of functions. Nevertheless, the act of creating and decentralizing is included
in the subsequent provision of Section 62 which provides that:
``Sec. 62. Unauthorized organizational changes. Unless otherwise
created by law or directed by the President of the Philippines, no
organizational unit or changes in key positions in any department or agency

shall be authorized in their respective organization structures and be funded

from appropriations by this Act.
`The foregoing provision evidently shows that the President is authorized to
effect organizational changes including the creation of offices in the
department or agency concerned.
`x x x

xxx

`Another legal basis of E.O. No. 132 is Section 20, Book III of E.O. No. 292
which states:
``Sec. 20. Residual Powers. Unless Congress provides otherwise, the
President shall exercise such other powers and functions vested in the
President which are provided for under the laws and which are not
specifically enumerated above or which are not delegated by the President in
accordance with law.
`This provision speaks of such other powers vested in the President under
the law. What law then gives him the power to reorganize? It is
Presidential Decree No. 1772 which amended Presidential Decree No.
1416. These decrees expressly grant the President of the Philippines the
continuing authority to reorganize the national government, which includes
the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to
transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities
and to standardize salaries and materials. The validity of these two decrees
are unquestionable. The 1987 Constitution clearly provides that `all laws,
decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letter of instructions and other
executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain
operative until amended, repealed or revoked. So far, there is yet no law
amending or repealing said decrees.
Now, let us take a look at the assailed executive order.
In the whereas clause of E.O. No. 191, former President Estrada anchored
his authority to deactivate EIIB on Section 77 of Republic Act 8745 (FY 1999
General Appropriations Act), a provision similar to Section 62 of R.A. 7645
quoted in Larin, thus:
`Sec. 77. Organized Changes. Unless otherwise provided by law
or directed by the President of the Philippines, no changes in key positions or
organizational units in any department or agency shall be authorized in their

respective organizational structures and funded from appropriations provided

by this Act.
We adhere to the x x x ruling in Larin that this provision recognizes the
authority of the President to effect organizational changes in the department
or agency under the executive structure. Such a ruling further finds support
in Section 78 of Republic Act No. 8760. Under this law, the heads of
departments, bureaus, offices and agencies and other entities in the
Executive Branch are directed (a) to conduct a comprehensive review of this
respective mandates, missions, objectives, functions, programs, projects,
activities and systems and procedures; (b) identify activities which are no
longer essential in the delivery of public services and which may be scaled
down, phased-out or abolished; and (c) adopt measures that will result in
the streamlined organization and improved overall performance of their
respective agencies. Section 78 ends up with the mandate that the actual
streamlining and productivity improvement in agency organization and
operation shall be effected pursuant to Circulars or Orders issued for the
purpose by the Office of the President. The law has spoken clearly. We are
left only with the duty to sustain.
But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President to reorganize
any department or agency in the executive branch does not have to end
here. We must not lose sight of the very source of the power that which
constitutes an express grant of power. Under Section 31, Book III of
Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of
1987), the President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in
order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing
authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the
President. For this purpose, he may transfer the functions of other
Departments or Agencies to the Office of the President. In Canonizado vs.
Aguirre [323 SCRA 312], we ruled that reorganization involves the reduction
of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of
economy or redundancy of functions. It takes place when there is an
alteration of the existing structure of government offices or units therein,
including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between
them. The EIIB is a bureau attached to the Department of Finance. It falls
under the Office of the President. Hence, it is subject to the Presidents
continuing authority to reorganize.

It having been duly established that the President has the authority to carry
out reorganization in any branch or agency of the executive department,
what is then left for us to resolve is whether or not the reorganization is
valid. In this jurisdiction, reorganizations have been regarded as valid
provided they are pursued in good faith. Reorganization is carried out in
`good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more
efficient. Pertinently, Republic Act No. 6656 provides for the circumstances
which may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the removal of civil
service employees made as a result of reorganization, to wit: (a) where
there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing
pattern of the department or agency concerned; (b) where an office is
abolished and another performing substantially the same functions is
created; (c) where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms
of status of appointment, performance and merit; (d) where there is a
classification of offices in the department or agency concerned and the
reclassified offices perform substantially the same functions as the original
offices, and (e) where the removal violates the order of separation.[8]
The Court of Appeals, in its now assailed decision, has found no evidence of
bad faith on the part of the NTA; thus In the case at bar, we find no evidence that the respondents committed bad
faith in issuing the notices of non-appointment to the petitioners.
Firstly, the number of positions in the new staffing pattern did not
increase. Rather, it decreased from 1,125 positions to 750. It is thus
natural that ones position may be lost through the removal or abolition of an
office.
Secondly, the petitioners failed to specifically show which offices were
abolished and the new ones that were created performing substantially the
same functions.
Thirdly, the petitioners likewise failed to prove that less qualified employees
were appointed to the positions to which they applied.
x
x

x x x.

Fourthly, the preference stated in Section 4 of R.A. 6656, only means that
old employees should be considered first, but it does not necessarily follow

that they should then automatically be appointed. This is because the law
does not preclude the infusion of new blood, younger dynamism, or
necessary talents into the government service, provided that the acts of the
appointing power are bonafide for the best interest of the public service and
the person chosen has the needed qualifications.[9]

G.R. No. 106611 July 21, 1994

COMMISSIONER
OF
INTERNAL
REVENUE, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CITYTRUST BANKING CORPORATION and
COURT OF TAX APPEALS, respondents

Petitioner assails the decision of the CA and its resolution upholding the
CTAs decision to refund the respondent City trust Banking Corporation.
It appears that in a letter dated August 26, 1986, herein private respondent
corporation filed a claim for refund with the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR) in the amount of P19,971,745.00 representing the alleged aggregate
of the excess of its carried-over total quarterly payments over the actual
income tax due, plus carried-over withholding tax payments on government
securities and rental income, as computed in its final income tax return for
the calendar year ending December 31, 1985.
The solicitor general argued that the mere averment that Citytrust incurred a
net loss in 1985 does not ipso facto merit a refund.
The case was submitted solely for decision based on evidence by citytrust
but was unable to present evidence due to the failure of the BIR to transmit
the said documents.
petitioner filed with the tax court a manifestation and motion praying for the
suspension of the proceedings in the said case on the ground that the claim
of Citytrust for tax refund in the amount of P19,971,745.00 was already
being processed by the Tax Credit/Refund Division of the BIR, and that said
bureau was only awaiting the submission by Citytrust of the required
confirmation receipts which would show whether or not the aforestated
amount was actually paid and remitted to the BIR.
Citytrust filed an opposition thereto, contending that since the Court of Tax
Appeals already acquired jurisdiction over the case and, further, that the
proceedings therein could not be suspended by the mere fact that the claim
for refund was being administratively processed, especially where the case
had already been submitted for decision.
The tax court denied the motion to suspend proceedings.
The Solicitor General filed A motion for the reconsideration that the
statements and certificates of taxes allegedly withheld are not conclusive
evidence of actual payment and remittance of the taxes withheld to the BIR.
ISSUE: WON the claim of the Citytrust bank be granted by the CIR even
there is lacking in the evidence presented?
HELD: NO.

The grant of a refund is founded on the assumption that the tax return is
valid, that is, the facts stated therein are true and correct. The deficiency
assessment, although not yet final, created a doubt as to and constitutes a
challenge against the truth and accuracy of the facts stated in said return
which, by itself and without unquestionable evidence, cannot be the basis for
the grant of the refund.
It is a well settled principle that the Government is not bound by the errors
committed by its agents. 19In the performance of its governmental functions,
the State cannot be estopped by the neglect of its agent and officers.
Although the Government may generally be estopped through the
affirmative acts of public officers acting within their authority, their neglect
or omission of public duties as exemplified in this case will not and should
not produce that effect.
It is axiomatic that the Government cannot and must not be estopped
particularly in matters involving taxes. Taxes are the lifeblood of the nation
through which the government agencies continue to operate and with which
the State effects its functions for the welfare of its constituents. 21The errors
of certain administrative officers should never be allowed to jeopardize the
Government's financial position, 22especially in the case at bar where the
amount involves millions of pesos the collection whereof, if justified, stands
to be prejudiced just because of bureaucratic lethargy.
To award such refund despite the existence of that deficiency assessment is
an absurdity and a polarity in conceptual effects. Herein private respondent
cannot be entitled to refund and at the same time be liable for a tax
deficiency assessment for the same year.

G.R. No. 110120 March 16, 1994

LAGUNA
LAKE
DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL JN. SERAPIO, Presiding Judge RTC,
Branch 127, Caloocan City, HON. MACARIO A. ASISTIO, JR., City Mayor of
Caloocan and/or THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF CALOOCAN, respondents.

The Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish, Brgy.
Camarin, Caloocan City, filed a letter complaint with the Laguna Lake
Developemtn Authority to stop the operation of the 8.6 hectare of garbage
dumpsite in Tala Estate due to its harmful effects.
The city government was found out not have secured an Environmental
Compliance Certificate or ECC.
A test was conducted and found out that the water contains bacteria so the
LLDA issued a Cease and Desist Order ordering the city government to stop
its operation.
It was stopped for a while but was able to resume so the LLDA issued
another order enjoining the city from continuing and also with the help of
the PNP in carrying the said order.
On rtc, the government filed an action for declaration of nullity of the said
order contending that it had the sole power of promoting the health and
safety of its people.
Rtc issued a temporary restraining order against LLDA.
LLDA contended that the said order is reviewable by the CA and not by the
RTC.
A consolidation of cases was ordered and after a decision was rendered
enjoining the LLDA.
LLDA filed a petition for certiorari in the SC.
The SC refered the case to the CA.
The CA promulgated a decision that RTC has no jurisdiction and that the
cease and desist order of the LLDA be set aside.
The LLDA contended that as an administrative agency which was granted
regulatory and adjudicatory powers and functions by Republic Act No. 4850
and its amendatory laws, Presidential Decree No. 813 and Executive Order
No. 927, series of 1983, it is invested with the power and authority to issue
a cease and desist order pursuant to Section 4 par. (c), (d), (e), (f) and (g)
of Executive Order No. 927 series of 1983.

Issue: WON does the LLDA have the power and authority to issue a
"cease and desist" order under Republic Act No. 4850 and its
amendatory laws, on the basis of the facts presented in this case,
enjoining the dumping of garbage in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin,
Caloocan City.
HELD: YES.
The cease and desist order issued by the LLDA requiring the City
Government of Caloocan to stop dumping its garbage in the Camarin open
dumpsite found by the LLDA to have been done in violation of Republic Act
No. 4850, as amended, and other relevant environment laws, 23 cannot be
stamped as an unauthorized exercise by the LLDA of injunctive powers. By
its express terms, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and
Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, authorizes the LLDA to "make, alter
or modify order requiring the discontinuance or pollution." Section 4, par.
(d) explicitly authorizes the LLDA to make whatever order may be necessary
in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
Sec. 4. Additional Powers and Functions. The authority shall have the
following powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Issue orders or decisions to compel compliance with the provisions of this
Executive Order and its implementing rules and regulations only after proper
notice and hearing.
(d) Make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution
specifying the conditions and the time within which such discontinuance
must be accomplished.
(e) Issue, renew, or deny permits, under such conditions as it may
determine to be reasonable, for the prevention and abatement of pollution,
for the discharge of sewage, industrial waste, or for the installation or
operation of sewage works and industrial disposal system or parts thereof.
(f) After due notice and hearing, the Authority may also revoke, suspend or
modify any permit issued under this Order whenever the same is necessary
to prevent or abate pollution.

(g) Deputize in writing or request assistance of appropriate government

agencies or instrumentalities for the purpose of enforcing this Executive
Order and its implementing rules and regulations and the orders and
decisions of the Authority.
The court said that it would be a mistake that the action of the LLDA to issue
a cease and desist order to be wrong when it has the power "to make, alter
or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution" is expressly and
clearly bestowed upon the LLDA by Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983.
Assuming arguendo that the authority to issue a "cease and desist order"
were not expressly conferred by law, there is jurisprudence enough to the
effect that the rule granting such authority need not necessarily be
express. 25 While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has
only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a settled
rule that an administrative agency has also such powers as are necessarily
implied in the exercise of its express powers. 26 In the exercise, therefore, of
its express powers under its charter as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body
with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region, the authority of
the LLDA to issue a "cease and desist order" is, perforce, implied. Otherwise,
it may well be reduced to a "toothless" paper agency.
The issuance, therefore, of the cease and desist order by the LLDA, as a
practical matter of procedure under the circumstances of the case, is a
proper exercise of its power and authority under its charter and its
amendatory laws. Had the cease and desist order issued by the LLDA been
complied with by the City Government of Caloocan as it did in the first
instance, no further legal steps would have been necessary.
The charter of LLDA, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, instead of
conferring upon the LLDA the means of directly enforcing such orders, has
provided under its Section 4 (d) the power to institute "necessary legal
proceeding against any person who shall commence to implement or
continue implementation of any project, plan or program within the Laguna
de Bay region without previous clearance from the LLDA."

[G.R. No. 132601. October 12, 1998]

LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO, petitioner, vs. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
and THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, THE
EXECUTIVE JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY
AND THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON
CITY, BRANCH 104, respondents.

On June 25, 1996, Leo Echagaray convicted for the crime of rape raised the
constitutionality of the RA 7659 (death penalty law) and the imposition pf
the death penalty for the crime of rape.
Congress change the mode of execution from death penalty to electrocution
to lethal injection and later on passed RA 8177 AN ACT DESIGNATING
DEATH BY LETHAL INJECTION AS THE METHOD OF CARRYING OUT CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ARTICLE 81 OF THE REVISED
PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED BY SECTION 24 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7659.
The Secretary of Justice promulgated the Rules and Regulations to
Implement Republic Act No. 8177 ("implementing rules") [6] and directed the
Director of the Bureau of Corrections to prepare the Lethal Injection Manual.
On March 2, 1998, petitioner filed a Petition[8] for Prohibition, Injunction
and/or Temporary Restraining Order to enjoin respondents Secretary of
Justice and Director of the Bureau of Prisons from carrying out the execution
by lethal injection of petitioner under R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing
rules as these are unconstitutional and void for being: (a) cruel, degrading
and inhuman punishment per se as well as by reason of its being (b)
arbitrary, unreasonable and a violation of due process, (c) a violation of the
Philippines' obligations under international covenants, (d) an undue
delegation of legislative power by Congress, (e) an unlawful exercise by
respondent Secretary of the power to legislate, and (f) an unlawful
delegation of delegated powers by the Secretary of Justice to respondent
Director.
ISSUE: WON there is undue delegation of legislative power in RA
8177 to the Sec. of Justice and the Director of Bureau of Corrections.
HELD: No. Empowering the Secretary of Justice in conjunction with the
Secretary of Health and the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, to
promulgate rules and regulations on the subject of lethal injection is a form
of delegation of legislative authority to administrative bodies.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of
government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division
in the framing of our Constitution. Each department of the government has
exclusive cognizance of matters placed within its jurisdiction, and is supreme
within its own sphere.[45] Corollary to the doctrine of separation of powers is
the principle of non-delegation of powers. "The rule is that what has been

delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed in a Latin maxim: potestas

delegata non delegari potest."[46] The recognized exceptions to the rule are
as follows:
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28 (2) of
Article VI of the Constitution;
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23 (2) of
Article VI of the Constitution;
(3) Delegation to the people at large;
(4) Delegation to local governments; and
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies.[4
Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the
power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of
a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of
powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself - it must set forth therein the
policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate [49] - and
(b) fix a standard - the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or
determinable - to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions.[50]
Considering the scope and the definiteness of R.A. No. 8177, which changed
the mode of carrying out the death penalty, the Court finds that the law
sufficiently describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the
scope of his authority.[51]
R.A. No. 8177 likewise provides the standards which define the legislative
policy, mark its limits, map out its boundaries, and specify the public
agencies which will apply it. it indicates the circumstances under which the
legislative purpose may be carried out. [52] R.A. No. 8177 specifically requires
that "[t]he death sentence shall be executed under the authority of the
Director of the Bureau of Corrections,endeavoring so far as possible to
mitigate the sufferings of the person under the sentence during the lethal
injection
as
well
as
during
the
proceedings
prior
to
the
[53]
execution."
Further, "[t]he Director of the Bureau of Corrections shall take
steps to ensure that the lethal injection to be administered is sufficient to
cause the instantaneous death of the convict." [54] The legislature also
mandated that "all personnel involved in the administration of lethal injection

shall be trained prior to the performance of such task." [55] The Court cannot
see that any useful purpose would be served by requiring greater detail.
[56]
The question raised is not the definition of what constitutes a criminal
offense,[57] but the mode of carrying out the penalty already imposed by the
Courts. In this sense, R.A. No. 8177 is sufficiently definite and the exercise
of discretion by the administrative officials concerned is, to use the words of
Justice Benjamin Cardozo, canalized within banks that keep it from
overflowing.
Thus, the Court finds that the existence of an area for exercise of discretion
by the Secretary of Justice and the Director of the Bureau of Corrections
under delegated legislative power is proper where standards are formulated
for the guidance and the exercise of limited discretion, which though
general, are capable of reasonable application.[58]
It is also noteworthy that Article 81 of the Revised Penal Code which
originally provided for the death penalty by electrocution was not subjected
to attack on the ground that it failed to provide for details such as the kind
of chair to be used, the amount of voltage, volume of amperage or place of
attachment of electrodes on the death convict. Hence, petitioner's
analogous argument with respect to lethal injection must fail.
A careful reading of R.A. No. 8177 would show that there is no undue
delegation of legislative power from the Secretary of Justice to the Director
of the Bureau of Corrections for the simple reason that under the
Administrative Code of 1987, the Bureau of Corrections is a mere constituent
unit of the Department of Justice.[59] Further, the Department of Justice is
tasked, among others, to take charge of the "administration of the
correctional system."[60] Hence, the import of the phraseology of the law is
that the Secretary of Justice should supervise the Director of the Bureau of
Corrections in promulgating the Lethal Injection Manual, in consultation with
the Department of Health
G.R. No. 96409 February 14, 1992
CITIZEN
J.
ANTONIO
M.
CARPIO, petitioner,
vs.
THE
EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY,
THE
SECRETARY
OF
LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE and THE
NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents.

Congress passed Republic Act No. 6975 entitled "AN ACT ESTABLISHING
THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT
OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES"
as the consolidated version of House Bill No. 23614 and Senate Bill No. 463.
Following the said Act's approval by President Corazon C. Aquino on
December 13, 1990, it was published on December 17, 1990.
Petitioner as citizen, taxpayer and member of the Philippine Bar sworn to
defend the Constitution, filed the petition now at bar on December 20, 1990,
seeking this Court's declaration of unconstitutionality of RA 6975 with prayer
for temporary restraining order.
Petitioner herein respectfully advances the view that RA 6975 emasculated
the
National
Police
Commission
by
limiting
its
power
"to administrative control" over the Philippine National Police (PNP), thus,
"control" remained with the Department Secretary under whom both the
National Police Commission and the PNP were placed.
Issue: WON RA 6975 limits the administrative control of the National
Police Commission over the PNP when it was placed under the DILG?
HELD: The court answered in the negative.
Recognized is the principle that the President has control of all executive
departments, bureaus, and offices to lay at rest petitioner's contention on
the matter.
This presidential power of control over the executive branch of government
extends over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest
clerk 17 and has been held by us, in the landmark case of Mondano
vs.Silvosa, 18 to mean "the power of [the President] to alter or modify or
nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance
of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the
latter." It is said to be at the very "heart of the meaning of Chief
Executive." 19
Equally well accepted, as a corollary rule to the control powers of the
President, is the "Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency". As the President
cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same time and
in person, 20 he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet members.

Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single

executive, 21 "all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of
the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments
are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where
the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person on
the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the
multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive
are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of
the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the
regular course of business, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief
Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive." 22 (emphasis ours)
Thus, and in short, "the President's power of control is directly exercised by
him over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority,
control the bureaus and other offices under their respective jurisdictions in
thes executive department." 23
Additionally, the circumstance that the NAPOLCOM and the PNP are placed
under the reorganized Department of Interior and Local Government is
merely an administrative realignment that would bolster a system of
coordination and cooperation among the citizenry, local executives and the
integrated law enforcement agencies and public safety agencies created
under the assailed Act, 24 the funding of the PNP being in large part
subsidized by the national government.
Such organizational set-up does not detract from the mandate of the
Constitution that the national police force shall be administered and
controlled by a national police commission as at any rate, and in fact, the
Act in question adequately provides for administration and control at the
commission level, as shown in the following provisions, to wit:
Sec. 14. Powers and Functions of the Commission. The Commission shall
exercise the following powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(i) Approve or modify plans and programs on education and training,
logistical requirements, communications, records, information systems,
crime laboratory, crime prevention and crime reporting;

(j) Affirm, reverse or modify, through the National Appellate Board,

personnel disciplinary actions involving demotion or dismissal from the
service imposed upon members of the Philippine National Police by the Chief
of the PNP;
(k) Exercise appellate jurisdiction through .the regional. appellate boards
over administrative cases against policemen and over decisions on claims for
police benefits;
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 26. The Command and direction of the PNP shall be vested in the Chief
of the PNP . . . Such command and direction of the Chief of the PNP may be
delegated to subordinate officials with respect to the units under their
respective commands, in accordance with the rules and regulations
prescribed by the Commission. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 35. . . . To enhance police operational efficiency and effectiveness, the
Chief of the PNP may constitute such other support units as may be
necessary subject to the approval of the Commission. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 37. . . . There shall be established a performance evaluation system
which shall be administered in accordance with the rules, regulations and
standards; and a code of conduct promulgated by the Commission for
members of the PNP. . . .
xxx xxx xxx

[G.R. No. 149724. August 19, 2003]

DEPARTMENT
OF
ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL
RESOURCES,represented herein by its Secretary, HEHERSON T.
ALVAREZ,petitioner, vs. DENR REGION 12 EMPLOYEES, represented

by BAGUIDALI KARIM, Acting President of COURAGE (DENR Region

12 Chapter), respondents.
On November 15, 1999, Regional Executive Director of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources for Region XII, Israel C. Gaddi, issued a
Memorandum[3] directing the immediate transfer of the DENR XII Regional
Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal (formerly Marbel), South
Cotabato. The Memorandum was issued pursuant to DENR Administrative
Order No. 99-14, issued by then DENR Secretary Antonio H. Cerilles.
It provided for the redefinition of functions and realignment of administrative
units in the regional and field offices. Pursuant to EO 192, it also provided
for a government wide reorganization.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the reorganization of the Regional Office
but was later on denied.
A petition for certiorari was filed and was dismissed outright.
ISSUE: Whether the DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize
the DENR.
HELD: YES.
respondents cannot, by means of an injunction, force the DENR XII Regional
Offices to remain in Cotabato City, as the exercise of the authority to
transfer the same is executive in nature.
It is apropos to reiterate the elementary doctrine of qualified political
agency, thus:
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single
executive, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the
Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the
Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the
exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious
executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed
by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries
of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of
business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. [16]

This doctrine is corollary to the control power of the President as provided

for under Article VII, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
However, as head of the Executive Department, the President cannot be
expected to exercise his control (and supervisory) powers personally all the
time. He may delegate some of his powers to the Cabinet members except
when he is required by the Constitution to act in person or the exigencies of
the situation demand that he acts personally.
In Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora, [18] this Court upheld the continuing
authority of the President to carry out the reorganization in any branch or
agency of the executive department. Such authority includes the creation,
alteration or abolition of public offices.[19] The Chief Executives authority to
reorganize the National Government finds basis in Book III, Section 20 of
E.O. No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, viz:
Section 20. Residual Powers. Unless Congress provides otherwise, the
President shall exercise such other powers and functions vested in the
President which are provided for under the laws and which are not
specifically enumerated above or which are not delegated by the President in
accordance with law.
Further, in Larin v. Executive Secretary,[20] this Court had occasion to rule:
This provision speaks of such other powers vested in the President under the
law. What law then gives him the power to reorganize? It is Presidential
Decree No. 1772 which amended Presidential Decree No. 1416. These
decrees expressly grant the President of the Philippines the continuing
authority to reorganize the national government, which includes the power
to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer
functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities and to
standardize salaries and materials. The validity of these two decrees is
unquestionable. The 1987 Constitution clearly provides that all laws,
decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other
executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain
operative until amended, repealed or revoked. So far, there is yet no law
amending or repealing said decrees.

Applying the doctrine of qualified political agency, the power of the

President to reorganize the National Government may validly be delegated to
his cabinet members exercising control over a particular executive
department.
Similarly, in the case at bar, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the
DENR by ordering the transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from
Cotabato City to Koronadal, South Cotabato. The exercise of this authority
by the DENR Secretary, as an alter ego, is presumed to be the acts of the
President for the latter had not expressly repudiated the same.

G.R. No. 96681 December 2, 1991

HON. ISIDRO CARIO, in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Education, Culture & Sports, DR. ERLINDA LOLARGA,
in
her
capacity
as
Superintendent
of
City
Schools
of

Manila, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, GRACIANO BUDOY, JULIETA
BABARAN, ELSA IBABAO, HELEN LUPO, AMPARO GONZALES, LUZ DEL
CASTILLO, ELSA REYES and APOLINARIO ESBER, respondents.
On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school
teachers, among them members of the Manila Public School Teachers
Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook
what they described as "mass concerted actions" to "dramatize and
highlight" their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public
authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to
the latter's attention.
The teachers participating in the mass actions were served with an order of
the Secretary of Education to return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal,
and a memorandum directing the DECS officials concerned to initiate
dismissal proceedings against those who did not comply and to hire their
replacements. Those directives notwithstanding, the mass actions continued
into the week, with more teachers joining in the days that followed. 3
For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the CHR complainants (private
respondents) were administratively charged on the basis of the principal's
report and given five (5) days to answer the charges. They were also
preventively suspended for ninety (90) days "pursuant to Section 41 of P.D.
807" and temporarily replaced (unmarked CHR Exhibits, Annexes F, G, H).
An investigation committee was consequently formed to hear the charges in
accordance with P.D. 807. 5
The case eventually resulted in a Decision of Secretary Cario dated
December 17, 1990, rendered after evaluation of the evidence as well as the
answers, affidavits and documents submitted by the respondents, decreeing
dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and the suspension for nine
(9) months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo.
The respondent filed their complaint in the CHR and the commission
scheduled a dialogue and sent a subpoena at the Sec. of Education.
The Chairman presiding, and Commissioners Hesiquio R. Mallilin and Narciso
C. Monteiro, proceeded to hear the case;" it heard the complainants' counsel
(a) explain that his clients had been "denied due process and suspended

without formal notice, and unjustly, since they did not join the mass leave,"
and (b) expatiate on the grievances which were "the cause of the mass leave
of MPSTA teachers, (and) with which causes they (CHR complainants)
sympathize." 12 The Commission thereafter issued an Order13 reciting these
facts and making the following disposition:
To be properly apprised of the real facts of the case and be accordingly
guided in its investigation and resolution of the matter, considering that
these forty two teachers are now suspended and deprived of their wages,
which they need very badly, Secretary Isidro Cario, of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports, Dr. Erlinda Lolarga, school superintendent of
Manila and the Principal of Ramon Magsaysay High School, Manila, are
hereby enjoined to appear and enlighten the Commission en banc on
October 19, 1990 at 11:00 A.M. and to bring with them any and all
documents relevant to the allegations aforestated herein to assist the
Commission in this matter. Otherwise, the Commission will resolve the
complaint on the basis of complainants' evidence.
Through the Office of the Solicitor General, Secretary Cario sought and was
granted leave to file a motion to dismiss the case that the CHR has no
jurisdiction over the case.
In an Order dated December 28, 1990, respondent Commission denied Sec.
Cario's motion to dismiss and required him and Superintendent Lolarga "to
submit their counter-affidavits within ten (10) days . . . (after which) the
Commission shall proceed to hear and resolve the case on the merits with or
without respondents counter affidavit."
ISSUE: whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has the
power under the Constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of
justice, 19 or even a quasi-judicial agency, 20 it has jurisdiction or
adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or hear
and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human
rights violations involving civil or political rights.
HELD: The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have
no such power; and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to
be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or
duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of

adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and
make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving
civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be
likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial
agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining
therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly
speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and
making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the
authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the
controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and
definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided
by law. 21 This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have. 22
The proposition is made clear by the constitutional provisions specifying the
powers of the Commission on Human Rights.
The Commission was created by the 1987 Constitution as an independent
office. 23 Upon its constitution, it succeeded and superseded the Presidential
Committee on Human Rights existing at the time of the effectivity of the
Constitution. 24 Its powers and functions are the following 25
(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human
rights violations involving civil and political rights;
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for
contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of
all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and
provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the
underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection;
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;
(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information
to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights;
(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human
rights and to provide for compensation to victims of violations of human
rights, or their families;

(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty

obligations on human rights;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or
whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient
to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its
authority;
(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in
the performance of its functions;
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and
(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.
As should at once be observed, only the first of the enumerated powers and
functions bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment. The
Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power
toinvestigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political
rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any
person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it
may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in
accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any investigation
conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant immunity from
prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of
documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the
truth. It may also request the assistance of any department, bureau, office,
or agency in the performance of its functions, in the conduct of its
investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required by its
findings. 26
But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts
of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate
or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have
well understood and quite distinct meanings.