CASE ANALYSIS

G.R. No. 193459

February 15, 2011

MA.
MERCEDITAS
N.
GUTIERREZ Petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, RISA
HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, DANILO D. LIM, FELIPE PESTAO, EVELYN
PESTAO, RENATO M. REYES, JR., SECRETARY GENERAL OF BAGONG
ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN); MOTHER MARY JOHN MANANZAN, COCHAIRPERSON OF PAGBABAGO; DANILO RAMOS, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF
KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP); ATTY. EDRE OLALIA, ACTING
SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF PEOPLE'S LAWYERS
(NUPL); FERDINAND R. GAITE, CHAIRPERSON, CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY,
RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
(COURAGE); and JAMES TERRY RIDON OF THE LEAGUE OF FILIPINO
STUDENTS
(LFS), Respondents.
FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR., Respondent-Intervenor.
Respondents are Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Danilo Lim, and spouses Felipe
and Evelyn Pestao (Baraquel group), Renato Reyes, Jr., Mother Mary John
Mananzan, Danilo Ramos, Edre Olalia, Ferdinand Gaite and James Terry
Ridon (Reyes group) Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez House Of
Representatives Committee On Justice
Private respondents Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, et.al. (Baraquel group) filed
an impeachment complaint against petitioner. On August 3, 2010, private
respondents Renato Reyes et.al. (Reyes group) filed another impeachment
complaint. Both impeachment complaints were endorsed by different
Party-List Representatives.
On August 10, 2010, House Majority Leader Neptali Gonzales II, as
chairperson of the Committee on Rules, instructed the Deputy Secretary
General for Operations to include the two complaints in the Order of
Business, which was complied with by their inclusion in the Order of
Business for the following day.
During its plenary session, the House of Representatives simultaneously
referred both complaints to public respondent.
After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 1, 2010,
found both complaints sufficient in form, which complaints it considered to
have been referred to it at exactly the same time.
Meanwhile, the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the
15th Congress was published on September 2, 2010.
Petitioner invokes the Courts expanded certiorari jurisdiction to
"determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.

Ombudsman Gutierrez alleged that the cases investigated and filed by the
Ombudsman against Chairman Tupas, Jr. and his father influenced the
impeachment proceedings against her in such a way that bias and
vindictiveness played a big part in arriving at the finding of sufficiency of
form and substance of the complaints against her. She added that the
indecent and precipitate haste displayed by the Committee in finding
the Baraquel, et. al. and the Reyes, et. al. complaints sufficient in form and
substance is a clear indication of bias
Public Respondent contends that the petition is premature
and not yet ripe for adjudication since petitioner has at her disposal
a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of the proceedings
before public respondent. Public respondent argues that when petitioner
filed the present petition on September 13, 2010, it had not gone beyond
the determination of the sufficiency of form and substance of the two
complaints. Hence, certiorari is unavailing.
IV. Objectives of the parties
Petitioner filed petitions for certiorari and prohibition challenging
Resolutions of September 1 and 7 alleging that she was denied due
process and that these violated the one-year bar rule on initiating
impeachment proceeding
On 13 September 2010, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition before the Supreme Court seeking to enjoin the Committee on
Justice from proceeding with the impeachment proceedings.
The petition prayed for a temporary restraining order.
The following day, during the en banc morning session of 14 September
2010, the majority of the Court voted to issue a status quo ante
order suspending the impeachment proceedings against petitioner.
After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 7, 2010,
found the two complaints, which both allege culpable violation of the
Constitution and betrayal of public trust, sufficient in substance. The
determination of the sufficiency of substance of the complaints by public
respondent, which assumed hypothetically the truth of their allegations,
hinged on the issue of whether valid judgment to impeach could be
rendered thereon. Petitioner was served also on September 7, 2010 a
notice directing her to file an answer to the complaints within 10 days.
VI. Issues
A. PROCEDURAL ISSUES:
a. Does the Supreme Court have the power to determine
whether public respondent committed a violation of the
Constitution in the exercise of its discretion relating to
impeachment proceeding?
b. Is the petition premature and not yet ripe for adjudication?
c. Does an impeachment complaint need to allege only one
impeachable offense?
d. When do we reckon the start of the one-year ban?

B. FACTUAL ISSUES:
a. When is an impeachment complaint deemed initiated?
b. Do the Impeachment Rules provide for comprehensible
standards in determining the sufficiency of form and
substance?
c. May the Supreme Court look into the narration
of facts constitutive of the offenses vis--vis petitioners
submissions disclaiming the allegations in the complaints?
d. Was petitioner denied of due process, because of the delay in
the publication of the Impeachment Rules?
Holdings and Findings
PROCEDURAL FINDINGS
a. There exists no constitutional basis for the contention that
the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedi
ngs would upset the system of checks and balances.
Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and
"one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both
are
integral components of the calibrated system of independ
ence and interdependence that insures that no branch
of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by
the Constitution. Indubitably, the Court is not asserting its
ascendancy over the Legislature in this instance, but
simply upholding the supremacy of the Constitution as the
repository of the sovereign will.
Under the doctrine of expanded judicial review, the
Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of
impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead,
it provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the
languageof Baker v. Carr,"judicially discoverable standards
" for determining the validity of the exercise of such
discretion, through the power of judicial review.
b. In the present petition, there is no doubt that questions on
the validity of the simultaneous referral of the two
complaints and on the need to publish as a mode
of promulgating the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings of the House (Impeachment Rules) present
constitutional vagaries which call for immediate
interpretation.The unusual act of simultaneously referring
to public respondent two impeachment complaints
presents a novel situation to invoke judicial power.
Petitioner cannot thus be considered to have acted
prematurely when she took the cue from the constitutional
limitation that only one
impeachment proceeding should be initiated against an i
mpeachable officer within a period of one year.

Petitioner argues that public respondent gravely abused

its discretion when it disregarded its own Impeachment
Rules, which provides that "the Rules
of Criminal Procedure
under the Rules of Court shall, as far as practicable, apply
toimpeachment proceedings before the House." Petitioner
invokes the application of Section 13, Rule 110 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure on one offense per complaint
rule.
To petitioner, the two impeachment complaints are
insufficient in form and substance since each charges
her with both culpable violation of the Constitution and
betrayal of public trust.
c. HELD: The Constitution allows the indictment for multiple
impeachment offenses, with each charge representing an
article of impeachment, assembled in one set known as
the
"Articles of Impeachment." It, therefore, follows that an
impeachment complaint need not allege only one
impeachable offense.
Francisco doctrine states that the term "initiate" means to
file the complaint and referral of the complaint to
the Committee on Justice. Once an impeachment
complaint has been initiated, another impeachment
complaint may not be filed against the same official within
a one year period. Therefore, the one-year period ban is
reckoned not from the filing of the first complaint, but on
the date it is referred to the House Committee on Justice.
Petitioner submits that referral could not be the
reckoning point of initiation because "something prior to t
hat hadalready been done. This is wrong. Following
petitioners line of reasoning, the verification of the
complaint or the
endorsement by a member of the House steps done
prior to the filing would already initiate the impeachment
proceedings.
FACTUAL FINDINGS
a.

There are two components of the act of initiating the

complaint: the filing of the impeachment complaint and the referral
by the House Plenary to the Committee on Justice. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated
meaning, filed and initiated), another impeachment complaint
may not be filed against the same official within a one year period.
b. Contrary to petitioner contention, theImpeachment Rules are clear
in echoing the constitutional requirements and providing that there
must be a "verified complaint or resolution," and that the substance
requirement is met if there is "a recital of facts constituting the
offensecharged and determinative of the jurisdiction of thecommitte
e.In fact, it is only in the Impeachment Rules where adetermination
of sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment complaint

is made necessary. This

requirementis not explicitly found in the Constitution which merelyr
equires a "hearing." (Section 3[2], Article XI). In the discharge of its
constitutional duty, the House deemed that a
finding of sufficiency of form and substance in an impeachment
complaint is vital "to effectively carry out" the impeachment
process, hence, such additional requirement in the Impeachment
Rules.
c. NO. This issue would "require the Court to make a determination of
what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a
purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound
discretion of the legislature (Francisco vs. House of
Representatives.)The Supreme Court discussed the
difference between publication and promulgation. To recall, days
after the 15th Congress opened on July 26, 2010 or on August 3,
2010, public respondent provisionally adopted the Impeachment
Rules of the 14th Congress and thereafter published on September
2, 2010 its Impeachment Rules, admittedly substantially identical
with that of the 14thCongress, in two newspapers of general
circulation. Citing Taada v. Tuvera, petitioner contends that
she was deprived of due process since the Impeachment Rules
was published only on September 2, 2010 a day after publicrespond
ent ruled on the sufficiency of form of thecomplaints. She likewise
tacks her contention on Section 3 (8), Article XI of the
Constitution which directs that
"Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively
carry out the purpose of this section. "
Ratio Decidendi
The provisional adoption of the previous Congress Impeachment Rules is
within the power of the House to promulgate its rules on impeachment to
effectively carry out the avowed purpose. Moreover, the rules on
impeachment, as contemplated by the framers of the Constitution, merely
aid or supplement
the procedural aspects of impeachment. Being procedural in nature, they
may be given retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive
application of procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who
may feel that he is adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally
objectionable. The reason for this is that, as a general rule, no vested right
may attach to, nor arises from, procedural laws."
IX. Disposition
The petition is dismissed. the assailed resolutions of September 1, 2010 and
September 7, 2010 of public respondent, the house of representatives committee on
justice, are not unconstitutional. the status quo ante order issued by the court on
September 14, 2010 is lifted.

Regina Via G. GarciaPersons and Family Relations

CALIFORNIA CLOTHING, INC. vs. QUIONESG.R. No. 175822 (October 23, 2013)
A. Legal FactsRespondent, Shirley G. Quiones, a ticketing agent of Cebu Pacific
Air, bought a pair of
black jeans worth P2,098.00 from Guess USA Boutique. While she was on her way t
o Mercury Drug Store, aGuess employee approached her and said that she failed to
pay for the black jeans. Nevertheless, shepresented an official receipt and suggested
that they should talk about the matter in the Cebu PacificOffice located within the
mall. While they were in the office, the Guess employees allegedly humiliatedher in
front of the clients of Cebu Pacific, repeatedly demanded payment and even
searched the
respondents wallet
to check how much MONEY she had. Another argument ensued and after
that,respondent went home. The Guess employees submitted two letters to the
Director of Cebu Pacificnarrating the incident but the said letters were not
received.Respondent filed a complaint for damages against the petitioners, California
Clothing, Inc.,Excelsis Villagonzalo, Imelda Hawayon and Michelle S. Ybaez,
alleging that due to the incident, shesuffered physical anxiety, sleepless nights,
mental anguish, fright, serious apprehension, besmirchedreputation, moral shock and
humiliation. She demanded payment for moral, nominal, and exemplarydamages, as
well a
s attorneys fees and litigation expenses.
Petitioners stated that they approached the respondent to clarify whether or not
payment wasmade and that they approached and talked to the respondent in a
gentle and polite manner. They soughtpayment for moral and exemplary damages,
attorney
s fees and litigation expenses as counterclaim.The Regional Trial Court dismissed
both the complaint and counterclaim stating that thepetitioners acted in good faith
and the respondent was the one who put herself in that situation by invitingthe Guess
employees to the Cebu Pacific Office to discuss about the issue of payment.
However, theCourt of Appeals reversed and set aside the Regional Trial Court
decision stating that there waspreponderance of evidence showing the petitioners
acted in bad faith but, Hawayon and Villagonzalowere absolved from liability due to
good faith. Since petitioners acted in bad faith, respondent was entitled
to damages and attorneys fees.
B. Legal IssueWhether or not petitioners acted in bad faith which resulted to the
Court of Appeals awarding
moral damages and attorneys fees to respondent, Shirley G. Quiones.
C. RulingYes, petitioners acted in bad faith and the award for moral damage
s and attorneys
fees torespondent was proper. The Supreme Court
affirmed the Court of Appeals decision.
The principle ofabuse of rights under Article 19 of the Civil Code is present in the
case. Respondent complained whenpetitioners embarrassed her and insisted that
she did not pay for the black jeans despite the issuance ofan official receipt in her
favor.The court cited the case of
Carpio vs. Valmonte
in which the elements of abuse of rights wereenumerated.

The elements of abuse of rights are as follows: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2)
which isexercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of
prejudicing or injuring another. The elements stated are
complete in the present case. First, petitioners continued to insist that there was no
payment made whenrespondent already presented the black jeans with the original

receipt. Second, they accused therespondent that not only did she fail to pay for the
black jeans but she intentionally stole it and quickly leftthe shop
. Third, the letters sent to the respondents employer was not only i
ntended to ask for assistancein collection of the payment but also
to ruin the respondents reputation.
The exercise of rights is subject to limitations. Thus, it must be in accordance with
the purpose ofits establishment and not abused.Respondent was awarded
P50,000.00
as moral damages and P20,000.00 as attorneys fees.