You are on page 1of 103

G.R. No.

L-27360

February 28, 1968

HON. RICARDO G. PAPA, as Chief of Police of Manila; HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, as
Commissioner of Customs; PEDRO PACIS, as Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila;
and MARTIN ALAGAO, as Patrolman of the Manila Police Department, petitioners,
vs.
REMEDIOS MAGO and HILARION U. JARENCIO, as Presiding Judge of Branch 23, Court
of First Instance of Manila, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioners.
Juan T. David for respondents.
ZALDIVAR, J.:
This is an original action for prohibition and certiorari, with preliminary injunction filed by
Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of Manila; Juan once Enrile, Commissioner of Customs; Pedro
Pacis, Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila; and Martin Alagao, a patrolman of the Manila
Police Department, against Remedios Mago and Hon. Hilarion Jarencio, Presiding Judge of
Branch 23 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, praying for the annulment of the order issued
by respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila under date
of March 7, 1967, which authorized the release under bond of certain goods which were seized
and held by petitioners in connection with the enforcement of the Tariff and Customs Code, but
which were claimed by respondent Remedios Mago, and to prohibit respondent Judge from
further proceeding in any manner whatsoever in said Civil Case No. 67496. Pending the
determination of this case this Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the
respondent Judge from executing, enforcing and/or implementing the questioned order in Civil
Case No. 67496 and from proceeding with said case.
Petitioner Martin Alagao, head of the counter-intelligence unit of the Manila Police
Department, acting upon a reliable information received on November 3, 1966 to the effect that a
certain shipment of personal effects, allegedly misdeclared and undervalued, would be released
the following day from the customs zone of the port of Manila and loaded on two trucks, and
upon orders of petitioner Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of Manila and a duly deputized agent of
the Bureau of Customs, conducted surveillance at gate No. 1 of the customs zone. When the
trucks left gate No. 1 at about 4:30 in the afternoon of November 4, 1966, elements of the
counter-intelligence unit went after the trucks and intercepted them at the Agrifina Circle, Ermita,
Manila. The load of the two trucks consisting of nine bales of goods, and the two trucks, were
seized on instructions of the Chief of Police. Upon investigation, a person claimed ownership of
the goods and showed to the policemen a "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected in
Informal Entry No. 147-5501", issued by the Bureau of Customs in the name of a certain
Bienvenido Naguit.
Claiming to have been prejudiced by the seizure and detention of the two trucks and their
cargo, Remedios Mago and Valentin B. Lanopa filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a
petition "for mandamus with restraining order or preliminary injunction, docketed as Civil Case
No. 67496, alleging, among others, that Remedios Mago was the owner of the goods seized,
having purchased them from the Sta. Monica Grocery in San Fernando, Pampanga; that she
hired the trucks owned by Valentin Lanopa to transport, the goods from said place to her
residence at 1657 Laon Laan St., Sampaloc, Manila; that the goods were seized by members of
the Manila Police Department without search warrant issued by a competent court; that anila
Chief of Police Ricardo Papa denied the request of counsel for Remedios Mago that the bales
be not opened and the goods contained therein be not examined; that then Customs

Commissioner Jacinto Gavino had illegally assigned appraisers to examine the goods because
the goods were no longer under the control and supervision of the Commissioner of Customs;
that the goods, even assuming them to have been misdeclared and, undervalued, were not
subject to seizure under Section 2531 of the Tariff and Customs Code because Remedios Mago
had bought them from another person without knowledge that they were imported illegally; that
the bales had not yet been opened, although Chief of Police Papa had arranged with the
Commissioner of Customs regarding the disposition of the goods, and that unless restrained
their constitutional rights would be violated and they would truly suffer irreparable injury. Hence,
Remedios Mago and Valentin Lanopa prayed for the issuance of a restraining order, ex parte,
enjoining the above-named police and customs authorities, or their agents, from opening the
bales and examining the goods, and a writ of mandamus for the return of the goods and the
trucks, as well as a judgment for actual, moral and exemplary damages in their favor.
On November 10, 1966, respondent Judge Hilarion Jarencio issued an order ex
parte restraining the respondents in Civil Case No. 67496 — now petitioners in the instant case
before this Court — from opening the nine bales in question, and at the same time set the
hearing of the petition for preliminary injunction on November 16, 1966. However, when the
restraining order was received by herein petitioners, some bales had already been opened by
the examiners of the Bureau of Customs in the presence of officials of the Manila Police
Department, an assistant city fiscal and a representative of herein respondent Remedios Mago.
Under date of November 15, 1966, Remedios Mago filed an amended petition in Civil
Case No. 67496, including as party defendants Collector of Customs Pedro Pacis of the Port of
Manila and Lt. Martin Alagao of the Manila Police Department. Herein petitioners (defendants
below) filed, on November 24, 1966, their "Answer with Opposition to the Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction", denying the alleged illegality of the seizure and detention of the goods
and the trucks and of their other actuations, and alleging special and affirmative defenses, to wit:
that the Court of First Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction to try the case; that the case fell
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals; that, assuming that the court had
jurisdiction over the case, the petition stated no cause of action in view of the failure of
Remedios Mago to exhaust the administrative remedies provided for in the Tariff and Customs
Code; that the Bureau of Customs had not lost jurisdiction over the goods because the full duties
and charges thereon had not been paid; that the members of the Manila Police Department had
the power to make the seizure; that the seizure was not unreasonable; and the persons
deputized under Section 2203 (c) of the Tariff and Customs Code could effect search, seizures
and arrests in inland places in connection with the enforcement of the said Code. In opposing
the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, herein petitioners averred in the court below
that the writ could not be granted for the reason that Remedios Mago was not entitled to the
main reliefs she prayed for; that the release of the goods, which were subject to seizure
proceedings under the Tariff and Customs Code, would deprive the Bureau of Customs of the
authority to forfeit them; and that Remedios Mago and Valentin Lanopa would not suffer
irreparable injury. Herein petitioners prayed the court below for the lifting of the restraining order,
for the denial of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, and for the dismissal of the
case.
At the hearing on December 9, 1966, the lower Court, with the conformity of the parties,
ordered that an inventory of the goods be made by its clerk of court in the presence of the
representatives of the claimant of the goods, the Bureau of Customs, and the Anti-Smuggling
Center of the Manila Police Department. On December 13, 1966, the above-named persons
filed a "Compliance" itemizing the contents of the nine bales.

Herein respondent Remedios Mago, on December 23, 1966, filed an ex parte motion to
release the goods, alleging that since the inventory of the goods seized did not show any article
of prohibited importation, the same should be released as per agreement of the patties upon her
posting of the appropriate bond that may be determined by the court. Herein petitioners filed
their opposition to the motion, alleging that the court had no jurisdiction to order the release of
the goods in view of the fact that the court had no jurisdiction over the case, and that most of the
goods, as shown in the inventory, were not declared and were, therefore, subject to forfeiture. A
supplemental opposition was filed by herein petitioners on January 19, 1967, alleging that on
January 12, 1967 seizure proceedings against the goods had been instituted by the Collector of
Customs of the Port of Manila, and the determination of all questions affecting the disposal of
property proceeded against in seizure and forfeiture proceedings should thereby be left to the
Collector of Customs. On January 30, 1967, herein petitioners filed a manifestation that the
estimated duties, taxes and other charges due on the goods amounted to P95,772.00. On
February 2, 1967, herein respondent Remedios Mago filed an urgent manifestation and
reiteration of the motion for the release under bond of the goods.
On March 7, 1967, the respondent Judge issued an order releasing the goods to herein
respondent Remedios Mago upon her filing of a bond in the amount of P40,000.00, and on
March 13, 1967, said respondent filed the corresponding bond.
On March 13, 1967, herein petitioner Ricardo Papa, on his own behalf, filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order of the court releasing the goods under bond, upon the ground that
the Manila Police Department had been directed by the Collector of Customs of the Port of
Manila to hold the goods pending termination of the seizure proceedings.
Without waiting for the court's action on the motion for reconsideration, and alleging that
they had no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, herein petitioners
filed the present action for prohibition and certiorari with preliminary injunction before this Court.
In their petition petitioners alleged, among others, that the respondent Judge acted without
jurisdiction in ordering the release to respondent Remedios Mago of the disputed goods, for the
following reasons: (1) the Court of First Instance of Manila, presided by respondent Judge, had
no jurisdiction over the case; (2) respondent Remedios Mago had no cause of action in Civil
Case No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila due to her failure to exhaust all
administrative remedies before invoking judicial intervention; (3) the Government was not
estopped by the negligent and/or illegal acts of its agent in not collecting the correct taxes; and
(4) the bond fixed by respondent Judge for the release of the goods was grossly insufficient.
In due time, the respondents filed their answer to the petition for prohibition
and certiorari in this case. In their answer, respondents alleged, among others: (1) that it was
within the jurisdiction of the lower court presided by respondent Judge to hear and decide Civil
Case No. 67496 and to issue the questioned order of March 7, 1967, because said Civil Case
No. 67496 was instituted long before seizure, and identification proceedings against the nine
bales of goods in question were instituted by the Collector of Customs; (2) that petitioners could
no longer go after the goods in question after the corresponding duties and taxes had been paid
and said goods had left the customs premises and were no longer within the control of the
Bureau of Customs; (3) that respondent Remedios Mago was purchaser in good faith of the
goods in question so that those goods can not be the subject of seizure and forfeiture
proceedings; (4) that the seizure of the goods was affected by members of the Manila Police
Department at a place outside control of jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs and affected
without any search warrant or a warrant of seizure and detention; (5) that the warrant of seizure
and detention subsequently issued by the Collector of Customs is illegal and unconstitutional, it
not being issued by a judge; (6) that the seizing officers have no authority to seize the goods in

question because they are not articles of prohibited importation; (7) that petitioners are estopped
to institute the present action because they had agreed before the respondent Judge that they
would not interpose any objection to the release of the goods under bond to answer for whatever
duties and taxes the said goods may still be liable; and (8) that the bond for the release of the
goods was sufficient.
The principal issue in the instant case is whether or not, the respondent Judge had acted
with jurisdiction in issuing the order of March 7, 1967 releasing the goods in question.
The Bureau of Customs has the duties, powers and jurisdiction, among others, (1) to
assess and collect all lawful revenues from imported articles, and all other dues, fees, charges,
fines and penalties, accruing under the tariff and customs laws; (2) to prevent and suppress
smuggling and other frauds upon the customs; and (3) to enforce tariff and customs laws. 1 The
goods in question were imported from Hongkong, as shown in the "Statement and Receipts of
Duties Collected on Informal Entry". 2 As long as the importation has not been terminated the
imported goods remain under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of customs. Importation is deemed
terminated only upon the payment of the duties, taxes and other charges upon the articles, or
secured to be paid, at the port of entry and the legal permit for withdrawal shall have been
granted. 3 The payment of the duties, taxes, fees and other charges must be in full. 4
The record shows, by comparing the articles and duties stated in the aforesaid "Statement
and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry" with the manifestation of the Office of the
Solicitor General 5 wherein it is stated that the estimated duties, taxes and other charges on the
goods subject of this case amounted to P95,772.00 as evidenced by the report of the appraiser
of the Bureau of Customs, that the duties, taxes and other charges had not been paid in full.
Furthermore, a comparison of the goods on which duties had been assessed, as shown in the
"Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry" and the "compliance" itemizing
the articles found in the bales upon examination and inventory, 6 shows that the quantity of the
goods was underdeclared, presumably to avoid the payment of duties thereon. For example,
Annex B (the statement and receipts of duties collected) states that there were 40 pieces of
ladies' sweaters, whereas Annex H (the inventory contained in the "compliance") states that in
bale No. 1 alone there were 42 dozens and 1 piece of ladies' sweaters of assorted colors; in
Annex B, only 100 pieces of watch bands were assessed, but in Annex H, there were in bale No.
2, 209 dozens and 5 pieces of men's metal watch bands (white) and 120 dozens of men's metal
watch band (gold color), and in bale No. 7, 320 dozens of men's metal watch bands (gold color);
in Annex B, 20 dozens only of men's handkerchief were declared, but in Annex H it appears that
there were 224 dozens of said goods in bale No. 2, 120 dozens in bale No. 6, 380 dozens in
bale No. 7, 220 dozens in bale No. 8, and another 200 dozens in bale No. 9. The articles
contained in the nine bales in question, were, therefore, subject to forfeiture under Section 2530,
pars. e and m, (1), (3), (4), and (5) of the Tariff and Customs Code. And this Court has held that
merchandise, the importation of which is effected contrary to law, is subject to forfeiture, 7 and
that goods released contrary to law are subject to seizure and forfeiture. 8
Even if it be granted, arguendo, that after the goods in question had been brought out of
the customs area the Bureau of Customs had lost jurisdiction over the same, nevertheless,
when said goods were intercepted at the Agrifina Circle on November 4, 1966 by members of
the Manila Police Department, acting under directions and orders of their Chief, Ricardo C.
Papa, who had been formally deputized by the Commissioner of Customs, 9 the Bureau of
Customs had regained jurisdiction and custody of the goods. Section 1206 of the Tariff and
Customs Code imposes upon the Collector of Customs the duty to hold possession of all
imported articles upon which duties, taxes, and other charges have not been paid or secured to
be paid, and to dispose of the same according to law. The goods in question, therefore, were

under the custody and at the disposal of the Bureau of Customs at the time the petition
for mandamus, docketed as Civil Case No. 67496, was filed in the Court of First Instance of
Manila on November 9, 1966. The Court of First Instance of Manila, therefore, could not exercise
jurisdiction over said goods even if the warrant of seizure and detention of the goods for the
purposes of the seizure and forfeiture proceedings had not yet been issued by the Collector of
Customs.
The ruling in the case of "Alberto de Joya, et al. v. Hon. Gregorio Lantin, et al.," G.R. No.
L-24037, decided by this Court on April 27, 1967, is squarely applicable to the instant case. In
the De Joya case, it appears that Francindy Commercial of Manila bought from Ernerose
Commercial of Cebu City 90 bales of assorted textiles and rags, valued at P117,731.00, which
had been imported and entered thru the port of Cebu. Ernerose Commercial shipped the goods
to Manila on board an inter-island vessel. When the goods where about to leave the customs
premises in Manila, on October 6, 1964, the customs authorities held them for further
verification, and upon examination the goods were found to be different from the declaration in
the cargo manifest of the carrying vessel. Francindy Commercial subsequently demanded from
the customs authorities the release of the goods, asserting that it is a purchaser in good faith of
those goods; that a local purchaser was involved so the Bureau of Customs had no right to
examine the goods; and that the goods came from a coastwise port. On October 26, 1964,
Francindy Commercial filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition
for mandamus against the Commissioner of Customs and the Collector of Customs of the port of
Manila to compel said customs authorities to release the goods.
Francindy Commercial alleged in its petition for mandamus that the Bureau of Customs
had no jurisdiction over the goods because the same were not imported to the port of Manila;
that it was not liable for duties and taxes because the transaction was not an original
importation; that the goods were not in the hands of the importer nor subject to importer's
control, nor were the goods imported contrary to law with its (Francindy Commercial's)
knowledge; and that the importation had been terminated. On November 12, 1964, the Collector
of Customs of Manila issued a warrant of seizure and identification against the goods. On
December 3, 1964, the Commissioner of Customs and the Collector of Customs, as
respondents in the mandamus case, filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the grounds of lack
of jurisdiction, lack of cause of action, and in view of the pending seizure and forfeiture
proceedings. The Court of First Instance held resolution on the motion to dismiss in abeyance
pending decision on the merits. On December 14, 1964, the Court of First Instance of Manila
issued a preventive and mandatory injunction, on prayer by Francindy Commercial, upon a bond
of P20,000.00. The Commissioner of Customs and the Collector of Customs sought the lifting of
the preliminary and mandatory injunction, and the resolution of their motion to dismiss. The
Court of First Instance of Manila, however, on January 12, 1965, ordered them to comply with
the preliminary and mandatory injunction, upon the filing by Francindy Commercial of an
additional bond of P50,000.00. Said customs authorities thereupon filed with this Court, on
January 14, 1965, a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction. In resolving
the question raised in that case, this Court held:
“This petition raises two related issues: first, has the Customs bureau jurisdiction to seize the
goods and institute forfeiture proceedings against them? and (2) has the Court of First Instance
jurisdiction to entertain the petition for mandamus to compel the Customs authorities to release
the goods?
“Francindy Commercial contends that since the petition in the Court of first Instance was filed
(on October 26, 1964) ahead of the issuance of the Customs warrant of seizure and forfeiture
(on November 12, 1964),the Customs bureau should yield the jurisdiction of the said court.

”The record shows, however, that the goods in question were actually seized on October 6,
1964, i.e., before Francindy Commercial sued in court. The purpose of the seizure by the
Customs bureau was to verify whether or not Custom duties and taxes were paid for their
importation. Hence, on December 23, 1964, Customs released 22 bales thereof, for the same
were found to have been released regularly from the Cebu Port (Petition Annex "L"). As to goods
imported illegally or released irregularly from Customs custody, these are subject to seizure
under Section 2530 m. of the Tariff and Customs Code (RA 1957).
“The Bureau of Customs has jurisdiction and power, among others to collect revenues from
imported articles, fines and penalties and suppress smuggling and other frauds on customs; and
to enforce tariff and customs laws (Sec. 602, Republic Act 1957).
“The goods in question are imported articles entered at the Port of Cebu. Should they be found
to have been released irregularly from Customs custody in Cebu City, they are subject to seizure
and forfeiture, the proceedings for which comes within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs
pursuant to Republic Act 1937.
Said proceeding should be followed; the owner of the goods may set up defenses therein
(Pacis v. Averia, L-22526, Nov. 20, 1966.) From the decision of the Commissioner of Customs
appeal lies to the Court of Tax Appeals, as provided in Sec. 2402 of Republic Act 1937 and Sec.
11 of Republic Act, 1125. To permit recourse to the Court of First Instance in cases of seizure of
imported goods would in effect render ineffective the power of the Customs authorities under the
Tariff and Customs Code and deprive the Court of Tax Appeals of one of its exclusive appellate
jurisdictions. As this Court has ruled in Pacis v. Averia,supra, Republic Acts 1937 and 1125 vest
jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture proceedings exclusively upon the Bureau of Customs and
the Court of Tax Appeals. Such law being special in nature, while the Judiciary Act defining the
jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance is a general legislation, not to mention that the former are
later enactments, the Court of First Instance should yield to the jurisdiction of the Customs
authorities.
It is the settled rule, therefore, that the Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction
over imported goods, for the purposes of enforcement of the customs laws, from the moment the
goods are actually in its possession or control, even if no warrant of seizure or detention had
previously been issued by the Collector of Customs in connection with seizure and forfeiture
proceedings. In the present case, the Bureau of Customs actually seized the goods in question
on November 4, 1966, and so from that date the Bureau of Customs acquired jurisdiction over
the goods for the purposes of the enforcement of the tariff and customs laws, to the exclusion of
the regular courts. Much less then would the Court of First Instance of Manila have jurisdiction
over the goods in question after the Collector of Customs had issued the warrant of seizure and
detention on January 12, 1967. 10 And so, it cannot be said, as respondents contend, that the
issuance of said warrant was only an attempt to divest the respondent Judge of jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the case. The court presided by respondent Judge did not acquire
jurisdiction over the goods in question when the petition for mandamus was filed before it, and
so there was no need of divesting it of jurisdiction. Not having acquired jurisdiction over the
goods, it follows that the Court of First Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction to issue the
questioned order of March 7, 1967 releasing said goods.
Respondents also aver that petitioner Martin Alagao, an officer of the Manila Police
Department, could not seize the goods in question without a search warrant. This contention
cannot be sustained. The Chief of the Manila Police Department, Ricardo G. Papa, having been
deputized in writing by the Commissioner of Customs, could, for the purposes of the
enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, effect searches, seizures, and arrests, 11 and it was

. or to stop and search and examine any vehicle. Thus. That while the trucks were on their way. 69 L. search and examine any vehicle. or automobile for contraband goods. 790. . could lawfully effect the search and seizure of the goods in question.W. envelope or other container wherever found when he had reasonable cause to suspect the presence therein of dutiable articles introduced into the Philippines contrary to law.R. Neither our state nor the Federal Constitution directly prohibits search and seizure without a warrant. pass through or search any land. 379. citing Carroll v. and like goods in course of transportation and concealed in a movable vessel. they were intercepted without any search warrant near the Agrifina Circle and taken to the Manila Police Department. Ct. People v. with his unit. . 100). persons exercising police authority under the customs law may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws.R.. . 215. United States. . “Again.. but also to stop. 39 A. .L. that section was referred to and treated as operative by this court in Von Cotzhausen v.L.. Case (320 Mich. 799. we note that petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen did not have to make any search before they seized the two trucks and their cargo. The question whether a seizure or a search is unreasonable in the language of the Constitution is a judicial and not a legislative question. . which has multiplied by quantity production and taken possession of our highways in battalions until the slower. 1815 (3 Stat. 201. package. it was made lawful for customs officers not only to board and search vessels within their own and adjoining districts. Comp. 14 Stat. p. Jur. While a possession in the sense of private ownership. 190 N. wares.. that petitioner Ricardo G. chap. made the search and seizure of the two trucks loaded with the nine bales of goods in question at the Agrifina Circle. for a year and expired. 15 counterparts has ever been attacked as unconstitutional. The Tariff and Customs Code authorizes him to demand assistance of any police officer to effect said search and seizure. 27 L. Neither § 3061 nor any of its earlier In the instant case." 17 It is our considered view. and the vehicle or beast as well. whether by the person in charge of the vehicle or beast or otherwise. 389. Stat. search and examine any vehicle. 503. revived § 2 of the Act of 1815. The baffling extent to which they are successfully utilized to facilitate commission of . 1865. ed. articles or other movable property when the same may be subject to forfeiture or liable for any fine imposed under customs and tariff laws. all of the circumstances under which it is made must be looked to. The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is construed as recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a search warrant may readily be obtained and a search of a ship. 45 S. and in the following second and fourth Congresses. Petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had authority to effect the seizure without any search warrant issued by a competent court. for trial and forfeiture. The Act of February 28. and also to inspect. trunk. 541. ed. the question raised by defendant's counsel was whether an automobile truck or an automobile could be searched without search warrant or other process and the goods therein seized used afterwards as evidence in a trial for violation of the prohibition laws of the State. there is still authority to the effect that no search warrant would be needed under the circumstances obtaining in the instant case. at L. chap. and with a capacity for speed rivaling express trains. Case.. 790. store or building. 27 A.S.his duty to make seizure. He was given authority by the Chief of Police to make the interception of the cargo. and if they should find any goods. 320 Mich. The Court said: . 13 Stat. In their original petition. 389. 2 Sup. urging the constitutional provision forbidding unreasonable searches and seizures. Chief of Police of Manila.R. “The automobile is a swift and powerful vehicle of recent development. 132. . they furnish for successful commission of crime a disguising means of silent approach and swift escape unknown in the history of the world before their advent. Anno. 39 A. as is sometimes asserted. inclosure. beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law.) In the case of People v. . United States. 178. at L. The question of their police control and reasonable search on highways or other public places is a serious question far deeper and broader than their use in so-called "bootleging" or "rum running. 12 He could lawfully open and examine any box. wagon. or had been introduced into the United States in any manner contrary to law. 441. at L.. in the court below Remedios Mago and Valentin Lanopa did not even allege that there was a search. 267 U. are rare. that except in the case of the search of a dwelling house. Only "unreasonable" search and seizure is forbidden. 16 But in the search of a dwelling house. considering a legal provision similar to Section 2211 of the Philippine Tariff and Customs Code. when concealed in a dwelling house of similar place. a difference made as to the necessity for a search warrant between goods subject to forfeiture. Their active use is not in homes or on private premises. beast or person on which or whom they should suspect there was merchandise which was subject to duty.R. The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said warrant in the instant case. above described. 2 Fed. Indeed. . Same counsel contended the negative. and the latter has the legal duty to render said assistance. 67. the privacy of which the law especially guards from search and seizure without process. animaldrawn vehicles. Stat. beast or person reasonably suspected of holding or conveying such article as aforesaid. where they were detained. 13 It cannot be doubted.S. . the Code provides that said "dwelling house may be entered and searched only upon warrant issued by a judge or justice of the peace. or envelope or any person on board. Nazro. Rep. But even if there was a search. motorboat. 686).W. 14 This was what happened precisely in the case of Lt. of any cargo. 94). This Act was renewed April 27. 379. . chap. (47 Am. The substance of this section was re-enacted in the 3d section of the Act of July 18. 107 U. said as follows: “Thus contemporaneously with the adoption of the 4th Amendment. § 5763. 315. where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. 543.. 27 A. 18 All that they complained of was. not being a dwelling house. we find in the first Congress. 190 N. warehouse. . 686. therefore. Constructed as covered vehicles to standard form in immense quantities..L. pp. to seize and secure the same." which is itself is no small matter. The Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to enter. which they had probably cause to believe had been so unlawfully brought into the country. with their easily noted individuality. 232. chap. or merchandise thereon. at L. by the 2d section of the Act of March 3.. and likewise to stop. .. 219.L. Martin Alagao who. 1161. and amended petition. 1866. without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases.231. it has been held that: Our conclusion finds support in the case of Carroll v. Ct. and was thereafter embodied in the Revised Statutes as § 3061. search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk. but in determining whether a seizure is or is not unreasonable. 1816 (3 Sta.. wherein the court. 513-514. they are but a vehicle constructed for travel and transportation on highways. therefor. 2d ed. Papa. 280. among others. where readily they could be put out of reach of a search warrant. 540.

but nowhere does the road reach the Mexican border. to robbery. Pp. 80. J. 1973 413 U.C. J. Page 413 U. uncovered marihuana.2d 459. and there was no consent by petitioner. is a matter of common knowledge. We do not consider it necessary... § 176a (1964 ed. 285. chastity. to discuss the incidental issues raised by the parties in their pleadings. The Government seeks to justify the search on the basis of § 287(a)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The petitioner was stopped by the United States Border Patrol on State Highway 78 in California. The only asserted justification for this extravagant license to search is § 287(a)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. It is undenied that the Border Patrol had no search warrant. S. In all of these operations. and BLACKMUN and REHNQUIST. was convicted of having knowingly received. 1967.C. dated March 7. enforcing and/or implementing his order of March 7. Remedios Mago. and1äwphï1. and POWELL.S. 266 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT Syllabus Petitioner. Bengzon. 413 U.392 U. Whether search of and seizure from an automobile upon a highway or other public place without a search warrant is unreasonable is in its final analysis to be determined as a judicial question in view of all the circumstances under which it is made. 269-272. 267 MR." as authorized by . 71-6278 Argued March 19 and 28.232 U. S. which provides for warrantless searches of automobiles and other conveyances "within a reasonable distance from any external boundary of the United States.413 U. the agents are acting within the Constitution when they stop and search automobiles without a warrant. JJ. rape. POWELL.J. 413 U. J. Castro.. in Civil Code No.not even the "reasonable suspicion" found sufficient for a street detention and weapons search in Terry v. 275. concealed. WHITE. the road meanders north as well as east -. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila. 272275. (c) Declaring permanent the preliminary injunction issued by this Court on March 31. and from proceeding in any manner in said case. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila. it is argued. 1967 restraining respondent Judge from executing.ñët Almeida-Sanchez v. Having declared that the seizure by the members of the Manila Police Department of the goods in question was in accordance with law and by that seizure the Bureau of Customs had acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the purpose of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws.. and decency. joined. S. as probable cause was lacking." The Court of Appeals upheld the search on the basis of the Act and regulation. JJ. United States No. His sole contention on appeal was that the search of his automobile that uncovered the marihuana was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment and that. Ohio. and that there was no probable cause of any kind for the stop or the subsequent search -. The Attorney General's regulation defines "reasonable distance" as "within 100 air miles from any external boundary of the United States. as the officers had no warrant or reason to believe that petitioner had crossed the border or committed an offense. all in the asserted interest of detecting the illegal importation of aliens. reversed. J. Williams. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.L. without probable cause to believe the cars contain aliens. BRENNAN. burglary. for having been issued without jurisdiction. from those against morality. Concepcion. a Mexican citizen and holder of a valid work permit. WHEREFORE. as follows: (a) Granting the writ of certiorari and prohibition prayed for by petitioners. the order of respondent Judge Hilarion U. and finally. Jarencio. It is so ordered. The petitioner in this case. 266 (1973) Almeida-Sanchez v. and his car was thoroughly searched. S. Permanent checkpoints are maintained at certain nodal intersections. Pp. to the exclusion of the Court of First Instance of Manila.B. Dizon. The Border Patrol conducts three types of surveillance along inland roadways. S. post.P. Held: The warrantless search of petitioner's automobile. (d) Ordering the dismissal of Civil Case No.). Reyes. 452 F.ñët (e) Ordering the private respondent. delivered the opinion of the Court... Upon that problem a condition. United States. At about the point where the petitioner was stopped.crime of all degrees. post. S. (a) The search cannot be justified on the basis of any special rules applicable to automobile searches. We have thus resolved the principal and decisive issue in the present case. MARSHALL. under the rule of Weeks v. Pp. S." as authorized by regulations to be promulgated by the Attorney General. 383. which simply provides for warrantless searches of automobiles and other conveyances "within a reasonable distance from any external boundary of the United States. (b) Declaring null and void. concur. and at all points it lies north of U.S. the marihuana should not have been admitted as evidence against him.S. temporary checkpoints are established from time to time at various places. 413 U. 8 U. for the purposes of this decision. filed a dissenting opinion. C. The basic facts in the case are neither complicated nor disputed. 413 U. 143. 1967 in Civil Case No. C.S. The petitioner was some 26 air miles north of the border when he was stopped.S. S. United States. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila. filed a concurring opinion. Sanchez.1äwphï1. p. a major east-west highway entirely within the Page 413 U. judgment is hereby rendered. confronts proper administration of our criminal laws.. in which BURGER. 233. violated the Fourth Amendment. Angeles and Fernando. challenges the constitutionality of the Border Patrol's warrantless search of his automobile 25 air miles north of the Mexican border. 413 U. The search.. 1973 Decided June 21.. JJ. which was used to convict petitioner of a federal crime. made without probable cause or consent. and facilitated the transportation of a large quantity of illegally imported marihuana in violation of 21 U. 66 Stat. 268 United States that connects the Southwest with the west coast.407 U. J. there are roving patrols such as the one that stopped and searched the petitioner's car. S. and Adams v. to pay the costs. made without probable cause or consent. STEWART.J. and not a theory. joined. in which DOUGLAS. 269-275. § 1357(a)(3). The road is essentially an east-west highway that runs for part of its course through an undeveloped region. (b) The search was not a border search or the functional equivalent thereof. nor can it be justified by analogy with administrative inspections. 1. p. and murder. a Mexican citizen holding a valid United States work permit.. and even without probable cause to believe the cars have made a border crossing. Makalintal. S.

. S. 348 (Brandeis. that the search of the petitioner's car was constitutional under any previous decision of this Court involving the search of an automobile. S. 452 F. at 267 U. at 406 U. S. 581. City of Seattle. S. if possible. S. of course. that a stop and search of a moving automobile can be made without a warrant. and ammunition will be subject to effective inspection. It is also without . In Biswell." Id. by contrast. S. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recognized that the search of petitioner's automobile was not a "border search. As the Court stated in Biswell: "It is also plain that inspections for compliance with the Gun Control Act pose only limited threats to the dealer's justifiable expectations of privacy. the Court noted the pervasive system of regulation and reporting imposed on licensed gun dealers. and United States v. Municipal Court. S. S. Ashwander v. 541. Moreover. Colonnade Catering Corp. in Colonnade and Biswell. Carroll has been followed in a line of subsequent cases. there must be probable cause for the search." It is clear. The search thus embodied precisely the evil the Court saw in Camara when it insisted that the "discretion of the official in the field" be A central difference between those cases and this one is that businessmen engaged in such federally licensed and regulated enterprises accept the burdens as well as the benefits of their trade. 42. [Footnote 1] but the Carroll doctrine does not declare a field day for the police in searching automobiles. [Footnote 3] probable cause. there was no such assurance that the individual searched was within the proper scope of official scrutiny -. firearms. 603-604. whereas the petitioner here was not engaged in any regulated or licensed business. S.387 U." In seeking a rationale for the validity of the search in this case.406 U.2d 459. S. Automobile or no automobile.See also See v. 534536. But these case fail to support the constitutionality of this search. It is undoubtedly within the power of the Federal Government to exclude aliens from the country. S. Camara. at387 U. warrantless inspections of commercial enterprises engaged in businesses closely regulated and licensed by the Government. v. at 387 U. 532533. Instead. the Government thus understandably sidesteps the automobile search cases. 311. at 406 U. S. 538. II Since neither this Court's automobile search decisions nor its administrative inspection decisions provide any support for the constitutionality of the stop and search in the present case. 8 CFR § 287. JUSTICE WHITE wrote for the Court in Chambers v. The dealer is not left to wonder about the purposes of the inspector or the limits of his task. there was no reason Page 413 U.regulations to be promulgated by the Attorney General. S. Ibid. Biswell. 132.1.397 U. In Camara v. the searching officers knew with certainty that the premises searched were in fact. S. we are left simply with the statute that purports to authorize automobiles to be stopped and searched. who did not have a warrant. In the present case. I No claim is made. 944. Chae Chan Ping v. S. to consider the constitutionality of the search. It is settled. 387 U. . 297 U. When a dealer chooses to engage in this pervasively regulated business and to accept a federal license. the Government relies heavily on cases dealing with administrative inspections. 153. the Court held that administrative inspections to enforce community health and welfare regulations could be made on less than probable cause to believe that particular dwellings were the sites of particular violations. both approved Page 413 U.S. in a manner consistent with the Fourth Amendment. 269 Page 413 U. the Court stressed the long history of federal regulation and taxation of the manufacture and sale of liquor. he does so with the knowledge that his business records.. S. Tennessee Valley Authority. 406 U.S.267 U. [Footnote 2] As MR. S. much less that he was guilty of the commission of an offense. 406 U. United States. 399 Page 413 U. S. the Court has insisted upon probable cause as a minimum requirement for a reasonable search permitted by the Constitution. The businessman in a regulated industry in effect consents to the restrictions placed upon him. United States. Id. The Court inCarroll approved a portion of the Volstead Act providing for warrantless searches of automobiles when there was probable cause to believe they contained illegal alcoholic beverages.130 U. supra. S. We granted certiorari. without a warrant and "within a reasonable distance from any external boundary of the United States. 272 whatever to believe that he or his automobile had even crossed the border.S. 397 U. concurring). The Attorney General's regulation. 76-77." circumscribed by obtaining a warrant prior to the inspection. 1.that is. Yet the Court insisted that the inspector obtain either consent or a warrant supported by particular physical and demographic characteristics of the areas to be searched. of course. 315-316. That narrow exception to the warrant requirement was first established in Carroll v. Each licensee is annually furnished with a revised compilation of ordinances that describe his obligations and define the inspector's authority. 130 U. utilized for the sale of liquor or guns. 312 n. nor could one be. S. S. S." but upheld its validity on the basis of Two other administrative inspection cases relied upon by the Government are equally inapposite.387 U. Marey. 316. 523. . But under familiar principles of constitutional adjudication. The search in the present case was conducted in the unfettered discretion of the members of the Border Patrol." Id. 288. 51: "In enforcing the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. 271 the above-mentioned portion of the Immigration and Nationality Act and the accompanying regulation. defines "reasonable distance" as "within 100 air miles from any external boundary of the United States. or consent. J. 72.S. United States. InColonnade. at 397 U. 270 U. The Court recognized that a moving automobile on the open road presents a situation "where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. that no Act of Congress can authorize a violation of the Constitution. 406 U.297 U. our duty is to construe the statute. 461. 399 U.

But the search of the petitioner's automobile by a roving patrol. none is so effective in cowing a population. 616. 274 is well to recall the words of Mr. S. [Footnote 5] was of a wholly different sort. I protest. and his belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought in. crushing the spirit of the individual and putting terror in every heart. 154.116 U. Mr. Justice Jackson. on a California road that lies at all points at least 20 miles north of the Mexican border.S. have a right to free passage without interruption or search unless there is Page 413 U. S. S. United States. United States. 160. S. The Court that decided Carroll v. 275 267 U. But that Court resisted the pressure of official expedience against the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment. S. are not mere second-class rights. searches at an established station near the border. dissenting). United States. at 267 U.doubt that this power can be effectuated by routine inspections and searches of individuals or conveyances seeking to cross our borders. 338 U. Whatever the permissible scope of intrusiveness of a routine border search might be. [Footnote 4] Reversed. Among deprivations of rights. searches of this kind may in certain circumstances take place not only at the border itself. Travelers may be so stopped in crossing an international boundary because of national self protection reasonably requiring one entering the country to identify himself as entitled to come in. entitled to use the public highways. that search violated the petitioner's Fourth Amendment right to be free of "unreasonable searches and seizures. S. 273 Accordingly.. See also Boyd v. It is precisely the predictability of these pressures that counsels a resolute loyalty to constitutional safeguards." Brinegar v.S. and thus subject all persons lawfully using the . Louis airport after a nonstop flight from Mexico City would clearly be the functional equivalent of a border search. at 267 U. For known to a competent official authorized to search. J.the enforcement of the Prohibition laws. Page 413 U. In the absence of probable cause or consent. 153-154." 267 U. It Page 413 U. probable cause for believing that their vehicles are carrying contraband or illegal merchandise. that the problem of deterring unlawful entry by aliens across long expanses of national boundaries is a serious one.338 U. but at its functional equivalents as well. United States: "Travelers may be so stopped in crossing an international boundary because of national selfprotection reasonably requiring one entering the country to identify himself as entitled to come in. sat during a period in our history when the Nation was confronted with a law enforcement problem of no small magnitude -. supra. might be functional equivalents of border searches. Chief Justice Taft's opinion for the Court distinguished between searches at the border and in the interior. For another example. As the Court stated in Carroll v. soon after his return from the Nuremberg Trials: "These [Fourth Amendment rights]." It is not enough to argue. and clearly controls the case at bar: "It would be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition agent were authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of finding liquor. 180 (Jackson. and his belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought in. But those lawfully within the country. S. the judgment of the Court of Appeals is example. a search of the passengers and cargo of an airplane arriving at a St. Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first and most effective weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary government. The needs of law enforcement stand in constant tension with the Constitution's protections of the individual against certain exercises of official power. as does the Government. but belong in the catalog of indispensable freedoms. S. at a point marking the confluence of two or more roads that extend from the border." highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such a search.

As the accused acceded thereto.S. 16308. Asuncion guilty beyond reasonable doubt for possession of regulated drugs punishable under Section 16. Pursuant thereto. the Chief of the Malabon Police Anti-Narcotics Unit ordered his men to conduct patrol on the area with specific instruction to look for a certain vehicle with a certain plate number and watch out for a certain drug pusher named Vic Vargas. The accused told the policemen that he just borrowed the said car and he is not the owner thereof.1216 gram) containing Methamphetamine Hydrochloride and another small plastic packet marked #2 A. February 1. The team proceeded to Barangay Tañong where they were joined by their confidential informant and the latter informed them that a gray Nissan car is always parked therein for the purpose of selling shabu. and control one (1) small plastic packet marked #1 A. is charged with violation of Section 16. Jose Maria M. otherwise known as the “Dangerous Drugs Act”. unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession.A. entitled “People of the Philippines v. the above-named accused. respondents. in the Municipality of Malabon.” Upon arraignment. petitioner. RESOLUTION MARTINEZ. J. 12-6-93 (G. are as follows: “Accused Jose Maria Asuncion y Marfori. . No. wt-0.: Petitioner seeks reconsideration of the resolution of the Honorable Court dated February 10. finding the petitioner Jose Maria M. Article III of Republic Act No. ASUNCION. While patrolling along Leoño Street.R. without being authorized by law. 12-6-93 (g. PO3 Parcon. 1993. Advincula conducted a search on the vehicle and he found a plastic packet containing white substance suspected to be methamphetamine hydrochloride (Exhibit D-1) beneath the driver’s seat. 1997. The said petition seeks a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in C. – GR CR. as found by the trial court. No. did.A. vs. The facts of the case. Article III of Republic Act 6425 in an Information which reads: “That on or about the 6th day of December 1993. Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. the confidential informant pointed the gray Nissan car to the policemen and told them that the occupant thereof has shabu in his possession. the latter groped something protruding from his underwear. in compliance with the order of the Malabon Municipal Mayor to intensify campaign against illegal drugs particularly at Barangay Tañong. 6425. [G. which denied his Petition for Review on Certiorari for his failure to sufficiently show Evidence for the prosecution shows that on December 6. 1999] JOSE MARIA M. Advincula then asked the accused if they can inspect the vehicle. which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Malabon.that respondent Court of Appeals had committed a reversible error in rendering the questioned judgment. PO3 Pilapil and a police aide were dispatched at around 11:45 in the evening. The policemen immediately flagged down the said car along First Street and approached the driver. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. which when voluntarily taken out by the accused turned out to be a plastic packet containing white substance suspected to be methamphetamine hydrochloride (Exhibit D). A press conference was conducted the following day presided by Northern Police District Director Pureza during which the accused admitted that the methamphetamine hydrochloride were for his personal use in his shooting. the accused pleaded not guilty. wt-0. custody. However. Branch 170. when he was frisked by Advincula at the headquarters. also known as Binggoy and/or Vic Vargas. then and there willfully. who turned out to be herein accused Jose Maria Asuncion y Marfori. a movie actor using the screen name Vic Vargas and who is also known as Binggoy. Asuncion”.0594 gram) containing Methamphetamine Hydrochloride which substances when subjected to chemistry examination gave positive results for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride otherwise known as ‘Shabu’. Metro Manila.A.S. and adopted by the appellate court. 125959. The accused was thereafter taken at the police headquarters for the purpose of taking his identification. SPO1 Advincula.

1994].”[3] On August 6. People v. with petitioner arguing that the Court of Appeals erred:[5] I. Thus. III. 1994. 234 SCRA 555. The suspected methamphetamine hydrochloride confiscated from the accused (Exhibits D and D-1) were transmitted to the NBI Forensic Chemistry Division (Exhibit A). judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Jose Maria Asuncion y Marfori guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 16. being illegally obtained. Simon. and the Branch Clerk of Court is directed to turn over the same to the Dangerous Drugs Board for proper disposition. hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of one (1) year eight (8) months and twenty (20) days as minimum. Sixto Morico (G. subject matter of this case. “The Methamphetamine Hydrochloride.R.” [6] A motion for reconsideration of this resolution was filed on March 17. On February 10. No. So sacred is this right that no less then the fundamental law of the land[8] ordains it. search and seizure can be made without a valid warrant issued by competent judicial authority. arguing that the warrantless search was illegal. that he was told to board at the back seat by the policemen who took over the wheels. 102522. Cost de officio. After a careful examination. the rule that search and seizure must be supported by a valid warrant is not absolute.00. “SO ORDERED. (supra). supra) and People v. IN AFFIRMING THE FINDING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE PROBABLE CAUSE REQUIRED TO EFFECT A WARRANTLESS ARREST AND SEARCH EXIST UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES AS NARRATED BY THE PROSECUTION’S WITNESSES. the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner. 1995]) and the fine of THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P3. People v. Metro Manila in Criminal Case No.000. a decision was rendered by the trial court finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged. The ‘shabu’ recovered.00) imposed on the accused (appellant) is hereby deleted in accordance with the Supreme Court’s ruling in People v. 92660.R. “SO ORDERED. Judrito Adava y Balasbas. and that he is not aware of what happened at 11:45 in the evening as he was then sleeping at the said office. 1997. On April 30.000. the appealed decision (Dated June 14. that he was thereafter brought at the Office of the Malabon Police Anti-Narcotics Unit. petitioner sought the reconsideration of the said dismissal on “grave constitutional considerations”. [June 5. “No pronouncement as to costs. Republic Act 6425 and considering the quantity of the Methamphetamine Hydrochloride involved in this case. 1996. 1994. the accused denied the charges against him.[7] Hence. in view of the foregoing. the accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of SIX (6) Months of arresto mayor in its maximum period as minimum to FOUR (4) Years and TWO (2) Months of prision correctional in its medium period as maximum (People v. as maximum.”[1] On June 14. People v. On the other hand. Well-entrenched in this country is the rule that no arrest. Petitioner also argued that the raising of constitutional issues necessitated a re-examination of the issues presented.Advincula further testified that prior to this incident. the First Division of this Court issued a resolution denying the petition for review on certiorari “for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show that the respondent court had committed any reversible error in rendering the questioned judgment. to three (3) years six (6) months and twenty (20) days. was inadmissible as evidence. However. IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT’S RULING THAT THE TIME OF COMMISSION IS NOT MATERIAL IN PROVING THE OFFENSE CHARGED. between 8:00 and 9:00 o’clock in the evening. a Notice of Appeal was filed and the records of the case were transmitted by the trial court to the Court of Appeals. they already had an encounter with the accused but the latter was able to evade them. The dispositive portion of the said decision states: “WHEREFORE. 1993. that he acceded to be brought at the Pagamutang Bayan ng Malabon for drug test but only his blood pressure was checked in the said hospital. 1997. a regulated drug (Exhibits B and C). The search of a moving vehicle is one of the doctrinally accepted exceptions to the Constitutional mandate that no search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a warrant . this Court is called upon to resolve the constitutional issues raised by the petitioner in his motion for reconsideration. Sixto Morico. is forfeited in favor of the government.”[2] On June 29. and to pay a fine of P3. and that they did not secure a search warrant for the reason that the accused uses different vehicles and they cannot get his exact identity and residence. 1994) of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 170) in Malabon. Judrito Adava y Balasbas (G. 14254-MN is hereby MODIFIES as to the penalty imposed but AFFIRMED in all other respects. a petition for review on certiorari was filed before this Court. IN AFFIRMING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE DEFENSE EVIDENCE ARE MERE DENIALS WHICH CANNOT OVERRIDE THE POSITIVE ASSERTIONS OF THE PROSECUTION’S WITNESSES. upon the finality of this decision. 1996 a decision was rendered by the appellate court. He testified that on December 6. Nicolas. 241 SCRA 67. the dispositive portion of which states: “WHEREFORE. he was abducted at gun point in front of the house where his son lives by men who turned out to be members of the Malabon Police AntiNarcotics Unit.[4] Thus. and upon examination yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride. this Court finds no cogent reason to overturn the decision of the appellate court. Article III. July 14. No. In this pleading. premises considered. II.

since the shabu was discovered by virtue of a valid warrantless search and the petitioner himself freely gave his consent to said search. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. it is clear that they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. [15] As the Solicitor General argued: “. . Otherwise. the operatives had to act quickly. who was then able to evade arrest. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension. they would again lose their subject whom they reasonably believed to be committing a crime at that instance. It was also held in that case that evidence of probable cause should be determined by judge and not by law enforcement agents. We might add that a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. Taken as a whole. they were uncertain as to the time he would show up in the vicinity. [12] wherein it was held that warrantless arrests could not be justified unless the accused was caught in flagrante delicto or a crime was about to be committed or had just been committed. taking into account reports that petitioner used different cars in going to and from the area. There would be no more time for them to secure a search warrant. for example. SPO1 Antonio Advincula. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. .issued by a judge after personally determining the existence of probable cause. “… the rules governing search and seizure have over the years been steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of practicality. as a result of what are popularly called ‘buy-bust’ operations of the narcotics agents. Therefore. in the case of People v. things and persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge – a requirement which borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to another with impunity. particularly the positive testimonies of the apprehending police officers. it has been held that the findings of the lower court respecting the credibility of witnesses are accorded great weight and respect since it had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses as they testified before the court. comply with the law. This is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained.With this knowledge and experience. Yet they did nothing. His name was known. the narcotic operatives had reasonable ground to believe that the gray Nissan car referred to by their confidential informant was one of the vehicles being used by their subject so that when the same was pointed to them by their confidential informant. Arca.[11] From the foregoing. he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. Here it was held that vessels and aircrafts are subject to warrantless searches and seizures for violation of the customs law because these vehicles may be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction before the warrant can be secured. [13] In ruling for defendant-appellant Aminnudin. And from the information they had received. indeed. From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses. the evidence for the prosecution. to wit: “In the many cases where this Court has sustained the warrantless arrest of violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act. it has always been shown that they were caught red-handed. The date of its arrival was certain.[10] elucidated on the rationale for the exemption of searches of moving vehicles from the coverage of the requirement of search warrants. Rule 113 was clearly applicable because at the precise time of arrest the accused was in the act of selling the prohibited drug. The vehicle was identified. The dictates of urgency necessitated the flagging down of the vehicle.” “In the case at bar. the Court justified its stand in this manner: “In the case at bar. they obviously no longer had the time to apply for a search warrant. [17] In this case. the place. Finally. Time and again. at the moment of his arrest. when the police officers suddenly sighted petitioner’s gray Nissan Sentra. there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge after personal determination by him of the existence of probable cause. PO3 Enriqueto Parcon and PO3 Rolando Pilapil. Contrary to the averments of the government. to justify the issuance of a warrant. the accused-appellant was not.’ This Court. the accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed or had just been committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Appellant had vigorously argued for the application of the rule enunciated in the case of People v. with the information that the occupant thereof was carrying shabu. committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. more than met the quantum of proof needed to find the petitioner guilty beyond . No effort was made to First of all. it could be seen that the case under review presented different factual circumstances which would not call for the application of the ruling in the Aminnudin case. any search could not be considered as an incident to a lawful arrest if there was no warrant of arrest and the arrest did not come under the exceptions allowed by Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. this Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from this time-honored precept. Even expediency could not be invoked to dispense with the obtention of the warrant as in the case of Roldan v. Secondly.”[16] Thus. Idel Aminnudin y Ahni. the prohibited drugs found as a result were admissible in evidence. there was probable cause as the same police officers had a previous encounter with the petitioner. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team. to which the latter agreed. even though the police authorities already identified the petitioner as an alleged shabu dealer and confirmed the area where he allegedly was plying his illegal trade. Lo Ho Wing. The identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him. As such.”[14] The apprehending officers even sought the permission of petitioner to search the car. To all appearances. had determined on his own authority that a ‘search warrant was not necessary. Corollarily. they could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause. the police authorities were justified in searching the petitioner’s automobile without a warrant since the situation demanded immediate action. they were uncertain as to the type of vehicle petitioner would be in. [9] The prevalent circumstances of the case undoubtedly bear out the fact that the search in question was made as regards a moving vehicle – petitioner’s vehicle was “flagged down” by the apprehending officers upon identification. “The present case presented no such urgency.

reasonable doubt. The appellate court was correct in giving scant consideration of the
petitioner’s defense, which consisted of mere denials of the incidents narrated by the
prosecution witnesses. Like all other cases involving the possession of prohibited drugs, it was
argued by the petitioner that he had been “framed-up”. But then, in drug related cases, for this
defense to prosper, the evidence must be clear and convincing.[18]
Unfortunately for petitioner, his defense was anchored only on a single document – a
medical certificate signed by a Dr. Aster Sagun, Jr. of the Pagamutang Bayan ng Malabon.
[19]
Said document, according to the defense, proved that petitioner was indeed forcibly abducted
by the police, brought to the said hospital at around 9:00 o’clock in the evening and afterwards
was brought to the police station, where he slept until the alleged time of his “arrest”. To the
mind of this Court, petitioner placed too much reliance on said document, which did not even
give an inch towards proving their allegations. The medical certificate could not possibly prove
anything more than the fact that petitioner had his blood pressure checked at said hospital at
said time. To claim that it proved something more would be to venture into speculation and
guesswork.
One final note. Considering the fact that less than one (1) gram of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or “shabu” was found in the possession of petitioner, this Court agrees with the
penalty imposed by the appellate court as this in line with previous decisions on the matter.[20]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-25434 July 25, 1975
HONORABLE ARSENIO N. ROLDAN, JR., in his capacity as Acting Commissioner,
Philippine Fisheries Commission, and THE PHILIPPINE NAVY, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE FRANCISCO ARCA, as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Manila (Branch 1) and MORABE, DE GUZMAN & COMPANY, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz and Solicitor Augusto M. Amores for petitioners.
J. C. Yuseco and A.R. Narvasa for private respondent.

MAKASIAR, J.:
A petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain respondent Judge
from enforcing his order dated October 18, 1965, and the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction thereunder issued.
On April 3, 1964, respondent company filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a civil case
docketed as No. 56701 against petitioner Fisheries Commissioner Arsenio N. Roldan, Jr., for the
recovery of fishing vessel Tony Lex VI (one of two fishing boats in question) which had been
seized and impounded by petitioner Fisheries Commissioner through the Philippine Navy.
On April 10, 1964, respondent company prayed for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
with respondent court, but said prayer was, however, denied.
On April 28, 1964, the Court of First Instance of Manila set aside its order of April 10, 1964 and
granted respondent company's motion for reconsideration praying for preliminary mandatory
injunction. Thus, respondent company took Possession of the vessel Tony Lex VI from herein
petitioners by virtue of the abovesaid writ.
On December 10, 1964, the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed Civil Case No. 56701 for
failure of therein petitioner (respondent company herein) to prosecute as well as for failure of

therein defendants (petitioners herein)to appear on the scheduled date of hearing. The vessel,
Tony Lex VI or Srta. Winnie however, remained in the possession of respondent company.
On July 20, 1965, petitioner Fisheries Commissioner requested the Philippine Navy to
apprehend vessels Tony Lex VI and Tony Lex III, also respectively called Srta. Winnie and Srta.
Agnes, for alleged violations of some provisions of the Fisheries Act and the rules and
regulations promulgated thereunder.
On August 5 or 6, 1965, the two fishing boats were actually seized for illegal fishing with
dynamite. Fish caught with dynamite and sticks of dynamite were then found aboard the two
vessels.
On August 18, 1965, the Fisheries Commissioner requested the Palawan Provincial Fiscal to file
criminal charges against the crew members of the fishing vessels.
On September 30, 1965, there were filed in the court of First Instance of Palawan a couple of
informations, one against the crew members of Tony Lex III, and another against the crew
members of Tony Lex VI — both for violations of Act No. 4003, as amended by Commonwealth
Acts Nos. 462, 659 and 1088, i.e., for illegal fishing with the use of dynamite. On the same day,
the Fiscal filed an ex parte motion to hold the boats in custody as instruments and therefore
evidence of the crime (p. 54, rec.), and cabled the Fisheries Commissioner to detain the vessels
(p. 56, rec.).
On October 2 and 4, likewise, the Court of First Instance of Palawan ordered the Philippine Navy
to take the boats in custody.
On October 2, 1965, respondent company filed a complaint with application for preliminary
mandatory injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 62799 with the Court of First Instance of
Manila against herein petitioners. Among others, it was alleged that at the time of the seizure of
the fishing boats in issue, the same were engaged in legitimate fishing operations off the coast
of Palawan; that by virtue of the offer of compromise dated September 13, 1965 by respondent
company to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the numerous violations of the
Fishery Laws, if any, by the crew members of the vessels were settled.

And again, on October 15, 1965, herein petitioners filed their memorandum praying for the
denial of the application for preliminary mandatory injunction. On the same day, October 15,
1965, herein petitioners filed an urgent motion to submit additional documentary evidence.
On October 18, 1965, herein petitioners, as defendants in said Civil Case No. 62799, filed their
answer to the complaint with affirmative defenses, reiterating the grounds in their opposition to
the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and adding that herein private
respondent admitted committing the last violation when it offered in its letter dated September
21, 1965 to the Acting Commissioner of Fisheries, to compromise said last violation (Exh. 12,
pp. 60-61, rec.).
On said day, October 18, 1965, the respondent Judge issued the challenged order granting the
issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and issued the preliminary writ upon the
filing by private respondent of a bond of P5,000.00 for the release of the two vessels(pp. 95-102,
rec.).
On October 19, 1965, herein petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the order issuing
the preliminary writ on October 18, 1965 on the ground, among others, that on October 18, 1965
the Philippine Navy received from the Palawan Court of First Instance two orders dated October
2 and 4, 1965 requiring the Philippine Navy to hold the fishing boats in custody and directing that
the said vessels should not be released until further orders from the Court, and that the bond of
P5,000.00 is grossly insufficient to cover the Government's losses in case the two vessels,
which are worth P495,000.00, are placed beyond the reach of the Government, thus frustrating
their forfeiture as instruments of the crime (pp. 103-109, rec.).1äwphï1.ñët
On November 23, 1965, respondent Judge denied the said motion for reconsideration (p. 110,
rec.).
WE rule that the respondent Judge of the Manila Court of First Instance acted without
jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion when he issued on October 18, 1965 the order
directing the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and when he refused to
reconsider the same.
I

On October 9, 1965, petitioners, represented by the Solicitor General, opposed the abovementioned complaint, alleging among others, that: (1) the issuance of the writ would disrupt
the status quo of the parties and would render nugatory any decision of the respondent court
favorable to the defendant; (2) that the vessels, being instruments of a crime in criminal cases
Nos. 3416 and 3417 filed with the Court of First Instance of Palawan, the release of the vessels
sans the corresponding order from the above-mentioned court would deprive the same of its
authority to dispose of the vessels in the criminal cases and the Provincial Fiscal would not be
able to utilize said vessels as evidence in the prosecution of said cases; (3) that as petitioners
herein were in possession of one of the vessels in point, they cannot now be deprived of the
legal custody thereof by reason of the dismissal of Civil Case No. 56701; (4) that petitioner
Fisheries Commissioner has the power to seize and detain the vessels pursuant to Section 5 of
Republic Act No. 3215 in relation to Sections 903 and 2210 of the Revised Tariff and Customs
Code; (5) that respondents herein have not exhausted administrative remedies before coming to
court; (6) that the compromise agreement approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and indorsed to the Fisheries Commissioner is never a bar to the prosecution of the
crime perpetrated by the crew members of the vessels belonging to respondent company.

When the respondent Judge issued the challenged order on October 18, 1965 and the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction pursuant thereto, the fishing vessels were already under the
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Palawan by virtue of its orders of October 2 and 4,
1965, upon motion of the Provincial Fiscal (pp. 54, 55, rec.), directing the Philippine Navy to
detain (pp. 108, 109, rec.) said vessels, which are subject to forfeiture as instruments of the
crime, to be utilized as evidence in Criminal Cases Nos. 3416 and 3417 for illegal fishing
pending in said court (pp. 54-55, rec.). The said vessels were seized while engaging in
prohibited fishing within the territorial waters of Palawan (pp. 45, 48,-53, rec.) and hence within
the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Palawan, in obedience to the rule that "the place
where a criminal offense was committed not only determines the venue of the action but is an
essential element of jurisdiction"(Lopez vs. Paras, L-25795, Oct. 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 616, 619).
The jurisdiction over the vessels acquired by the Palawan Court of First Instance cannot be
interfered with by another Court of First Instance. The orders of October 2 and 4, 1965 by the
Palawan Court of First Instance expressly direct the Philippine Navy "to hold in custody" the two
vessels and that "same should not be released without prior order or authority from this Court"
(pp. 108, 109, rec.). Only the Palawan court can order the release of the two vessels. Not even

the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources nor the Fisheries Commissioner can direct
that the fishing boats be turned over to private respondent without risking contempt of court.
The grave abuse of discretion committed by the respondent Judge was heightened by the fact
that he did not reconsider his order of October 18, 1965 after he was informed by petitioners in
their motion for reconsideration filed on October 19, 1965 that the Palawan Court of First
Instance had already issued the two orders dated October 2 and 4, 1965 directing the Philippine
Navy to hold in custody the fishing boats until further orders.
It is basic that one court cannot interfere with the judgments, orders or decrees of another court
of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having equal power to grant the relief sought by
injunction; because if coordinate courts were allowed to interfere with each other's judgments,
decrees or injunctions, the same would obviously lead to confusion and might seriously hinder
the administration of justice (Ongsinco, etc. vs. Tan, et al., 97 Phil. 330; PNB vs. Javellana, 92
Phil. 525; Montesa vs. Manila Cordage Company, 92 Phil. 25; Hubahib vs. Insular Drug
Company, 64 Phil. 119; Hacbang, et al. vs. The Leyte Auto Bus Company, et al., G.R. No. L17907, May 30, 1963, 8 SCRA, 103, 107-109; NPC vs. Hon. Jesus de Vera, G.R. No. L-15763,
Dec. 22, 1961, 3 SCRA, 646, 648; Cabigao vs. del Rosario, 44 Phil. 182; Araneta & Uy vs.
Commonwealth Insurance Company, 55 OG 431; Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol.
III, 1970 ed., p. 64).
As early as October 2 and 4, 1965, the two boats were already in custodia legis under the sole
control of the Palawan Court of First Instance. The Manila Court of First Instance cannot
interfere with and change that possession (Hacbang vs. Leyte Bus Co., Inc., supra; NPC vs.
Hon. Jesus de Vera, supra).
It is immaterial that the vessels were then in the Philippine Navy basin in Manila; for the same in
no way impugns the jurisdiction already vested in the Palawan court, which has custody thereof
through the Philippine Navy. This is analogous to the situation in Colmenares versus Villar (L27124, May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 186, 188-9), wherein We ruled "where the illegal possession of
firearms was committed in the town where the Court sits, the fact that the firearms were
confiscated from the accused in another town does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court" (pp.
186, 189).
It is likewise of no moment that the herein respondents were not notified by the herein
petitioners of the seizure of the questioned vessels by the Philippine Navy, because such
previous notice is not required by law.
II
The dismissal on December 10, 1964 of the first Civil Case No. 56701 by the Court of First
Instance of Manila had the necessary effect of automatically dissolving the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction issued therein on April 28, 1964, directing the return of fishing vessel Tony
Lex VI (pp. 156-157, rec.). Such a preliminary writ, like any other interlocutory order, cannot
survive the main case of which it was but an incident; because "an ancillary writ of preliminary
injunction loses its force and effect after the dismissal of the main petition" (National Sugar
Workers' Union, etc., vs. La Carlota Sugar Central, et al., L-23569, May 25, 1972, 45 SCRA 104,
109; Lazaro vs. Mariano, 59 Phil. 6Z7, 631; Saavedra vs. Ibañez, 56 Phil. 33, 37; Hi Caiji vs.
Phil. Sugar Estate and Development Company, 50 Phil. 592, 594).1äwphï1.ñët

Moreover, the writ of preliminary injunction issued on April 28, 1964 in Civil Case No. 56701 was
directed against the detention of the vessel Tony Lex VI for violations committed prior to August
5, 1965, and therefore cannot and does not extend to the seizure and detention of said vessel
for violations on August 5 or 6, 1965, which violations were not and could not possibly be the
subject-matter of said Civil Case No. 56701 which was filed on April 3, 1964 (p. 12, rec.).
III
Herein petitioners can validly direct and/or effect the seizure of the vessels of private respondent
for illegal fishing by the use of dynamite and without the requisite licenses.
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 3512 approved on March 20, 1963 empowers the Fisheries
Commissioner to carry out the provisions of the Fisheries Act, as amended, and all rules and
regulations promulgated thereunder, to make searches and seizures personally or through his
duly authorized representatives in accordance with the Rules of Court, of "explosives such
as ... dynamites and the like ...; including fishery products, fishing equipment, tackle and other
things that are subject to seizure under existing fishery laws"; and "to effectively implement the
enforcement of existing fishery laws on illegal fishing."
Paragraph 5 of Section 4 of the same Republic Act 3512 likewise transferred to and vested in
the Philippine Fisheries Commission "all the powers, functions and duties heretofore exercised
by the Bureau of Customs, Philippine Navy and Philippine Constabulary over fishing vessels and
fishery matters ..."
Section 12 of the Fisheries Act, otherwise known as Republic Act No. 4003, as amended,
prohibits fishing with dynamites or other explosives which is penalized by Section 76 thereof "by
a fine of not less than P1,500.00 nor more than P5,000.00, and by imprisonment for not less
than one (1) year and six (6) months nor more than five (5) years, aside from the confiscation
and forfeiture of all explosives, boats, tackles, apparel, furniture, and other apparatus used in
fishing in violation of said Section 12 of this Act." Section 78 of the same Fisheries Law provides
that "in case of a second offense, the vessel, together with its tackle, apparel, furniture and
stores shall be forfeited to the Government."
The second paragraph of Section 12 also provides that "the possession and/or finding, of
dynamite, blasting caps and other explosives in any fishing boat shall constitute a presumption
that the said dynamite and/or blasting capsand explosives are being used for fishing purposes in
violation of this Section, and that the possession or discovery in any fishing boat or fish caught
or killed by the use of dynamite or other explosives, under expert testimony, shall constitute a
presumption that the owner, if present in the fishing boat, or the fishing crew have been fishing
with dynamite or other explosives." (Emphasis supplied).
Under Section 78 of the Fisheries Act, as amended, any person, association or
corporation fishing in deep sea fishery without the corresponding license prescribed in Sections
17 to 22 Article V of the Fisheries Act or any other order or regulation deriving force from its
provisions, "shall be punished for each offense by a fine of not more than P5,000.00, or
imprisonment, for not more than one year, or both, in the discretion of the Court; Provided, That
in case of an association or corporation, the President or manager shall be directly responsible
for the acts of his employees or laborers if it is proven that the latter acted with his knowledge;
otherwise the responsibility shall extend only as far as fine is concerned: Provided, further, That
in the absence of a known owner of the vessel, the master, patron or person in charge of such
vessel shall be responsible for any violation of this Act: and Provided, finally, That in case of a

1968. is a search or seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest (Alvero vs. Justice Fernando. 39-40. U. p.000. 871-74. to search and seize any vessel or air craft as well as any trunk. The same exception should apply to seizures of fishing vessels breaching our fishery laws.). were committed on August 5 or 6. without prejudice to the filing of the necessary criminal action. 1963. When the Philippine Navy. which violations private respondent. from March 28. a fine in the amount of P5.00 was imposed on its owners-operators. 46-47. 46.. Under Section 13 of Executive Order No. 34. apprehended on August 5 or 6. therefore. Thus their apprehension without a warrant of arrest while committing a crime is lawful. . rec.). 1965 (pp. 22 SCRA 857. for comitting the same violation on June 19. 41-42. and illegally fishing with explosives and without fishing license required by Sections 17 and 18 of the Fisheries Law (pp. Philippine Constitutional Law. 132.00 for all said prior violations. the motion for reconsideration of which order was denied by the Commissioner of Fisheries in an order dated August 17. fishing . the renewal of the fishing boat license of Tony Lex VI was suspended for one year from the time said boat was moored at Pier 14 at North Harbor. Rule 113. p. Consequently. 6. hence it is not practicable to require a search warrant before such search or seizure can be constitutionally effected (Papa vs. 1964 (pp. 158. 1972. 35-36. pursuant to the order dated May 19.S. 1966 ed.000. 1972 ed. 1963 (p. 1950. apparel. Winnie. 46-47. when apprehended on August 5 or 6. rec. Feb. rec. Caroll vs..00 was imposed on the owners-operators of fishing boat Tony Lex VI pursuant to the order of June 4. Justice Fernando. 1964 and was actually ordered forfeited to the Government pursuant to the order of June 2. 1965.) cannot be invoked by the respondents because the said compromise referred to about thirty violations of the fisheries law committed by the private respondent from March 28. 1964 issued by the Commissioner of Fisheries pending the final determination of the case against it for illegal fishing with explosives on January 21. 389 of December 23. Again. Gonzales. The Bill of Rights. the fishing boat Tony Lex III was suspended from operating and was ordered moored at Pier 14. 1964 for repeated violations of Section 12 of the Fisheries Act (pp. among others. the operation of Tony Lex VI was suspended by the Commissioner of Fisheries in an order dated April 1. upon request of the Fisheries Commissioner. Tony Lex III and Tony Lex VI. pp. Manila. 63-64. 1964 issued by the Commissioner of Fisheries (pp. As heretofore intimated.second offense.. 1963 to March 11. 1964. 770. its equipment and dynamites therein was equally valid as an incident to a lawful arrest.).). as amended.000. rec. 34 of October 27. Section 2210 of the Tariff and Customs Code. rec. Magoncia vs. the two fishing boats were apprehended on numerous occasions for fishing with dynamite from March 28. without prejudice to the institution of a criminal case against its owner and/or operator. For illegal fishing with dynamite on March 28.. 1965 the fishing boats Tony Lex III and Tony Lex VI.. that since January 28. The violations by the two vessels of private respondent by reason of which these vessels were apprehended and detained by the Philippine Navy upon request of the Commissioner of Fisheries.ñët As a matter of fact. Such previous violations of Sections 12. Mago.. the fishing boat Tony Lex VI together with its tackle. arrest a person (a) who has committed.). The Bill of Rights. It appears. reorganizing the Armed Forces of the Philippines. 224). 149. 1972 ed. 48-53. "to assist the proper governmental agencies in the enforcement of laws and regulations pertaining to . without a warrant.. Another exception to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant for a valid search and seizure. Agnes and Srta. 1963 until August 5 or 6. bag or envelope on board and to search any person on board for any breach or violation of the customs and tariff laws. 17 and 18 of the Fisheries Act committed by the two fishing boats. furniture and all other apparatus used in fishing was ordered confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government and a fine in the amount of P5. both vessels were found to be without any license or permit for coastwise trade or for fishing and unlawfully fishing with explosives. 28. otherwise known respectively as Srta. 637.38. The alleged compromise approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on September 13. rec. In the case at bar. package. a police officer or a private individual may. apparel. North Harbor.1äwphï1." (46 OG 5905. 1963. 62. 158-159. rec. 1965 (p. 1963. 225.ñët The operation of the fishing boat Tony Lex III was suspended pursuant to the order dated January 28. is actually committing or is about to commit an offense in his presence. rec. rec. 267.1äwphï1. 76 Phil. 37-38. Palacio.). Manila (pp. L-27360. 37. or (c) who is a prisoner who has escaped from confinement while serving a final judgment or from temporary detention during the pendency of his case or while being transferred from one confinement to another (Sec. 774. 300). furniture and storesshall be forfeited to the Government" (Emphasis supplied). sought to compromise by offering to pay a fine of P21. Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and air crafts for violations of the customs laws have been the traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant. as amended by PD No. Under our Rules of Court. the vessel together with its tackle.). Revised Rules of Court). as owner-operator. 1964 (p. the seizure of the vessel. and that the fishing vessel Tony Lex VI was suspended for one year from May 24. the Philippine Navy has the function. these vessels were found to be without the necessary license in violation of Section 903 of the Tariff and Customs Code and therefore subject to seizure under Section 2210 of the same Code. rendered the said vessels subject to forfeiture under Sections 76 and 78 of the Fisheries Act. 1964 issued by the Commissioner of Fisheries (pp. because the vessel can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the search warrant must be sought before such warrant could be secured. 1965.). They are usually equipped with powerful motors that enable them to elude pursuing ships of the Philippine Navy or Coast Guard. pursuant to the order of June 2. 5911). 1964.). 1965.). authorized any official or person exercising police authority under the provisions of the Code. (b) who is reasonably believed to have committed an offense which has been actually committed. rec. rec. For illegal fishing again with explosives on April 25. 80 Phil. 34. 1964.. 1964 of the Commissioner of Fisheries(pp. for which reason their owners and crew were accordingly indicted by the Provincial Fiscal of Palawan for illegal fishing with dynamite and without the requisite license (pp.) and remained suspended until its apprehension on August 5 or 6. 1963 to March 11. For illegal fishing with explosives on March 23. rec. the members of the crew of the two vessels were caught in flagrante illegally fishing with dynamite and without the requisite license. p. Dizon. 1963.

R. 47. JJ. The word boat in its ordinary sense. 45. 199 U. plaintiff-appellee. which did not recommend such a compromise for the violation on August 5 or 6. Esguerra. as amended). 4003. large or small. Muñoz Palma and Martin. 60-61. 1991 Hence. 88017 January 21. vs. the accepted definition of vessel includes "every description of water craft.000. as amended. otherwise the Department Secretary or any of his sub-alterns can render criminal prosecutions for violations of the fisheries law a mere mockery. The said approval was granted after the private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the indorsement dated March 5. vs.. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. any compromise shall be upon the recommendation of the Fisheries Commission (Section 80[i].). 1965. WITH COSTS AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENT. No. took no part.ñët The two fishing vessels Tony Lex III and Tony Lex VI likewise fall under the term vessel used in Sections 17. Even private respondent refers to said fishing boats as fishing vessels "engaged in fishing operations" or "in commercial fishing" in paragraph IV of its complaint in Civil Case No. They can also fall under the term fishing equipment employed in Section 4 of Republic Act No. used or capable of being used as a means of transportation on water" (Cope versus Vallete. etc. rec. means any water craft (Monongahela River Construction. 4003. 4003). the Fisheries Commissioner requested the Provincial Fiscal to institute the criminal cases (pp. It is not in the public interest nor is it good policy to sustain the viewpoint that the Department Secretary can compromise criminal cases involving public. because a fishing equipment is never complete and cannot be effectively used in off-shore or deep-sea fishing without the fishing boat or fishing vessel itself. 780). etc. 41 Phil. Castro (Chairman. . 158-159. 43-45. There can be no dispute that the term fishing boat (employed in the second paragraph of Section 12 of the Fisheries Act applies to the vessels Tony Lex III and Tony Lex VI. Act No. 1965 against the owners and the members of the crew of the vessels (pp. rec. . Ipil.). It should be noted that in the first indorsement dated September 13. 34-42. ARE HEREBY SET ASIDE AS NULL AND VOID.. defendants. vs. 76 and 78. 104 Fed. LIM CHENG HUAT alias ANTONIO LIM and REYNALDO TIA y SANTIAGO. rec. 1965. One Dredge Boat. 884. 1965 (pp.S. And these two vessels of private respondent certainly come under the termfishing vessels employed in paragraph 5 of Section 4 of the same Republic Act 3512 creating the Fisheries Commission.) and the Provincial Fiscal filed the corresponding informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 82.). Act No. precludes such a compromise the moment the Fisheries Commissioner decides to prosecute the criminal action in accordance with Sections 76 and 78 of the other penal provisions of the fisheries law. 65. Sec. rec. THE PETITION IS HEREBY GRANTED AND THE ORDER OF RESPONDENT JUDGE DATED OCTOBER 18.). WHEREFORE. 169 Fed. the Department Secretary "believes that the offer made by the company was an implied admission of violations of said provisions of the Fisheries Law and regulations. as amended. not private. rec. J. 62799 (p. 77 NE 363. 4003. Revised Penal Code. 48-53. the power to compromise would exist only before a criminal prosecution is instituted. Gloria.. G. no useful purpose can be served in trying to distinguish between boat and vessel with reference to Tony Lex III and Tony Lex VI. as well as the term boats utilized in the second paragraph of Section 76 of the Fisheries Act. vessels within the meaning of the termvessel used in Sections 903 and 2210 of the Tariff and Customs Code. for defendant-appellant. 895. 18.. concur. Charles Barnes Co." (pp. 58-64. defendant-appellant. On the contrary.. 63. Furthermore.). Hardsaw. U. 78. As a matter of fact. Holmes. 1965 of Section 12 in relation to Sections 76 and 78 of Act No. vs. The fishing vessels together with all their equipment and the dynamites found therein are not only evidence of the crime of illegal fishing but also subject to forfeiture in favor of the Government as instruments of the crime (Art. 1965 of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources approving the compromise fine of P21. as well as in its various communications to the Fisheries Commissioner (pp.00 for the various violations committed previous to August 5 or 6. THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTION ISSUED THEREUNDER AND THE ORDER DATED NOVEMBER 23. 1965 of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources disapproving the offer by private respondent to pay the fine by way of compromise. 3512. Section 80(j) of Act No. and Yu Con vs. 625.).Moreover. The fishing boats Tony Lex III and Tony Lex VI are likewise Segundo M. rec. 149-155. LO HO WING alias PETER LO. LO HO WING alias PETER LO. Teehankee. 3416 and 3417 on September 30.1äwphï1. offenses after the indictment had been instituted in court. 365).S. 158. Jr. The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Upon seeing appellant and Tia leave the airport. as amended. looked after their luggage. did then and there willfully. he saw two other men with appellant. were charged with a violation of Section 15. Tia went to appellant's room to talk to him. Tia was able to telephone Captain Palmera to inform him of their expected The day after they arrived in Hongkong. J. 1987. After Lim and appellant finished their conversation. Upon arriving there. Afterwards. customs examiners inspected their luggage. From the red traveling bag. Word was passed on to the other members of the team that the suspects were in sight. a regulated drug under Republic Act No. Suspecting the crystalline powder to be a dangerous drug. one of the operatives." Tia regularly submitted reports of his undercover activities on the suspected criminal syndicate. Along Imelda Avenue. Lim expressed a desire to hire a male travelling companion for his business nips abroad. Meanwhile.1987. The sergeant then opened the tea bag and examined its contents more closely. including the one previously opened. Appellant and Tia boarded the taxicab after putting their luggage inside the back compartment of the vehicle. That evening. Appellant joined the second man and sniffed the smoke emitted by the burning substance. approached the taxicab. while the other was burning substance on a piece of aluminum foil using a cigarette lighter. and asked the driver to open the baggage compartment. He was informed that their cargo consisted of Chinese drugs. After an evaluation of the information thus received. he had the three traveling bags opened for inspection. appellant and Tia left for Hongkong on board a Philippine Airlines flight. Tia and appellant boarded a train bound for Guangzhou. pried the lid open.000. Tia offered his services and was hired. 1987.:p This case involves the unlawful transport of metamphetamine. Sgt. Nothing else of consequence was recovered from the other bags. conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another. received a tip from one of its informers about an organized group engaged in the importation of illegal drugs. the recruitment of confidential men and "deep penetration agents' was carried out to infiltrate the crime syndicate. Meanwhile. Tia was introduced to his co-accused Lim Cheng Huat (hereinafter referred to as Lim) by another confidential agent named George on August 3. the operatives were ordered to take strategic positions around the arrival area. in the People's Republic of China. Contrary to law. Two operatives stationed just outside the arrival area were the first ones to spot the suspects emerging therefrom. Before departing from Guangzhou however. Tia saw the paper tea bags when the cans were opened for examination during the purchase. Metro Manila. Tia asked the latter what they would be bringing back to the Philippines. 1987. a team composed of six operatives headed by Captain Palmera was formed to act on the tip given by Tia. 1 The antecedent facts of the case as found by the trial court are as follows: In July 1987. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. One of its derivatives is metamphetamine hydrochloride. the Special Operations Group. a regulated drug. As part of the operations. and to pay the costs. GANCAYCO. they checked in at a hotel.date of return to the Philippines as declared in his round-trip plane ticket-October 6. The pertinent portion of the information reads as follows: That on or about the 6th day of October. October 6. the latter hailed a taxicab. the officer-in-charge of OPLAN SHARON 887. upon being instructed. Tia stayed in the room for about twenty minutes before going back to his room to sleep. The operatives requested from the suspects permission to search their luggage. then named Manila International Airport. the above-named accused. The tin cans of tea were brought out from the traveling bag of appellant. and gunrunning. A tin can of tea was taken out of the red traveling bag owned by appellant. without authority of law. 1987 at two o'clock in the afternoon. Captain Luisito Palmera. before Branch 114 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. The operatives also spotted Lim meeting their quarry. One was fixing the tea bags. Appellant kept the cans of tea in his hotel room. Before they departed. in Pasay City. Lim met the newly-arrived pair at the arrival area. the other taxicab carrying Lim sped away in an attempt to escape. dispatch or transport 56 teabags of Metamphetamine. Upon entering. and officially informed the Dangerous Drugs Board of Tia's activities. Article III of the aforementioned statute otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Their co-accused Reynaldo Tia was discharged as a state witness. Appellant had with him his red traveling bag with wheels. the operatives who first spotted them followed them. a project codenamed "OPLAN SHARON 887" was created in order to bust the suspected syndicate. Lim followed in another taxi cab. The contents of the cans were not closely examined. a unit of the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) of the Philippine Constabulary (PC). the team proceeded to the NAIA. After a briefing. Captain Palmera notified the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) Detachment at the airport for coordination. . The plane landed at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA). and appellant was cleared along with Tia. pulled out a paper tea bag from the can and pressed it in the middle to feel its contents. On October 4. on schedule. filed with his superiors the reports submitted to him. Some crystalline white powder resembling crushed alum came out of the bag. unlawfully and feloniously deliver. Reynaldo Tia (hereinafter referred to as Tia). As a "deep penetration agent. Tia was introduced to Peter Lo (hereinafter referred to as appellant). Roberto Cayabyab. Lim talked to appellant. they returned to the hotel. whom Tia found out to be the person he was to accompany to China in lieu of Lim. and rested for a few hours. Lim and Tia met anew on several occasions to make arrangements for a trip to China. One of those recruited was the discharged accused. The operatives disembarked from their car. together with co-accused Lim Cheng Huat alias Antonio Lim and Reynaldo Tia. while Tia. Meanwhile. the two returned to Manila via a China Airlines flight. The next day. 6425. Tia and appellant were taken to the CIS Headquarters in Quezon City for questioning.00 each. a total of six (6) tin cans were found. to pay a fine of P25. notoriously known in street parlance as "shabu" or "poor man's cocaine. In the course of those meetings. They were sentenced to suffer life imprisonment. the car of the operatives overtook the taxicab ridden by appellant and Tia and cut into its path forcing the taxi driver to stop his vehicle. smuggling of contraband goods. Three pieces of luggage were retrieved from the back compartment of the vehicle. Only appellant and co-accused Lim Cheng Huat were convicted. On the expected date of arrival." Appellant Peter Lo. Appellant was pulling along his red traveling bag while Tia was carrying a shoulder bag. The pair thereafter went to a local store where appellant purchased six (6) tin cans of tea.

The tests were also positive for metamphetamine." appellant contends that he cannot also be held liable therefor because the act of transporting necessarily requires a point of destination. Article III of Republic Act No. He reasons that the PC-CIS officers concerned could very well have procured a search warrant since they had been informed of the date and time of a arrival of the accused at the NAIA well ahead of time. There is no doubt that law enforcers caught appellant and his co-accused in flagrante delicto of transporting a prohibited drug. Anent the first assignment of error. There are at least three (3) wellrecognized exceptions thereto. The circumstances of the case clearly show that the search in question was made as regards a moving vehicle. transporting or dispatching fifty-six (56) tea bags containing metamphetamine. which must still be present in such a case. Cayabyab during the search and seizure was sent to the PC-INP Crime Laboratory for preliminary examination. Lim was likewise apprehended and brought to the CIS Headquarters for interrogation. The belief was based on intelligence reports gathered from surveillance activities on the suspected syndicate. We cite with approval the averment of the Solicitor General. The contentions are futile attempts to strain the meaning of the operative acts of which appellant and his co-accused were charged in relation to the facts of the case. DISPATCHING OR TRANSPORTING METAMPHETAMINE. As set forth in the case of Manipon. Sandiganbayan. transport or distribute any regulated drug (emphasis supplied). of which appellant was touted to be a member. It is immaterial whether or not the place of destination is reached. which reads: The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty thousand to thirty thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who. thereby implying that the accused were being charged of the three specified acts in the alternative. During the investigation of the case. Therefore. Article III of the Constitution.Meanwhile.accused did not intend to bring the metamphetamine anywhere. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE ON THE ACCUSED AS ILLEGAL. appellant contends that the warrantless search and seizure made against the accused is illegal for being violative of Section 2. as amended. the important thing is that there was probable cause to conduct the warrantless search. It is also argued that "dispatching' cannot apply either since appellant never sent off or disposed of drugs." The fact that there is actual conveyance suffices to support a finding that the act of transporting was committed. The tea bag opened by Sgt. This is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained. unless authorized by law. 4 We might add that a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that "it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. a valid warrant was not necessary to effect the search on appellant and his co-accused. But such knowledge was clearly insufficient to enable them to fulfill the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISCHARGING REYNALDO TIA TO TESTIFY FOR THE PROSECUTION. Appellant now assigns three errors alleged to have been committed by the trial court. 2 We affirm. 6425. Samples from each of the fifty-six (56) tea bags were similarly tested. Furthermore. appellant argues. deliver. that the rules governing search and seizure have over the years been steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of practicality. as contained in the appellee's brief. dispose. shall sell. specifically two (2) days in advance. the place. In this connection." 5 In the instant case. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF DELIVERING. they had no place of destination. The term "transport" is defined as "to carry or convey from one place to another. The second assignment of error is likewise lacking in merit. things and persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge—a requirement which borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to another with impunity. As for "transporting. Jr.e. which again is non. Aside from this. Appellant was charged and convicted under Section 15. The conjunction "or' was used. II. Tests conducted on a sample of the crystalline powder inside the tea bag yielded a positive result that the specimen submitted was metamphetamine. The contentions are without merit. The fact that the search and seizure in question were made on a moving vehicle. A REGULATED DRUG. i. the anti-narcotics agents had both time and opportunity to secure a search warrant. it was firmly established from the factual findings of the trial court that the authorities had reasonable ground to believe that appellant would attempt to bring in contraband and transport it within the country. [2] a search of a moving vehicle. As correctly averred by appellee. the trial court gave full credence to the testimonies of the government anti-narcotics operatives. a regulated drug. does not automatically make the warrantless search herein fall within the coverage of the well-known exception to the rule of the necessity of a valid warrant to effect a search because. vs. and [3] seizure of evidence in plain view (emphasis supplied). . The information charged the accused of delivering. the argument of appellant gives rise to the illogical conclusion that he and his co. They contained a total of fifty-six (56) paper tea bags with white crystalline powder inside instead of tea leaves. they were also certain as to the expected date and time of arrival of the accused from China. In rendering a judgment of conviction. the second taxicab was eventually overtaken by two other operatives on Retiro Street. the three suspects were indicted. as aforementioned. Quezon City. namely: I. III. 3 these are: [1] a search incidental to an arrest. that search and seizure must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule." 6 The operative words in the definition are "to carry or convey. Still and all. to whom the said court applied the well-settled presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. Appellant argues that he cannot be convicted of "delivery" because the term connotes a source and a recipient. the latter being absent under the facts of the case. Hence.existent under the given facts. the six tin cans recovered from the traveling bag of appellant were opened and examined.

SO ORDERED. Appellant argues that deep penetration agents such as Tia "have to take risks and accept the consequences of their actions. ." 8 The argument is devoid of merit. Otherwise.R. which reads in part: Sec. as ordered by the trial court. G. the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto and the appeal is thereby DISMISSED. the discharge of an accused is left to the sound discretion of the lower court. appellant contests the discharge of accused Reynaldo Tia to testify for the prosecution on the ground that there was no necessity for the same. the act of transporting a prohibited drug is a malum prohibitum because it is punished as an offense under a special law.the court may direct one or more of the accused to be discharged with their consent so that they may be witnesses for the state . regardless of criminal intent. appellant alleges that the testimony of Sgt. Moreover. As such. Therefore. The corroborative testimony of the PC-CIS operative does not debunk the claim of the prosecution that there is absolute necessity for the testimony of accused Tia. the discharge. upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case. No costs. 9In the instant case. WHEREFORE. The discharge of accused Tia was based on Section 9. since the information included the acts of delivery. Roberto Cayabyab regarding the facts surrounding the commission of the offense proves that the discharge of accused Tia is unnecessary. Finally. the mere commission of said act is what constitutes the offense punished and suffices to validly charge and convict an individual caught committing the act so punished. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General. Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. Article III of Republic Act No. proof beyond reasonable doubt of the commission of any of the acts so included is sufficient for conviction under Section 15. "JANE" and "JUANA". 1995 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. as amended. Interruption necessarily infers that an act had already been commenced. It is a wrong because it is prohibited by law. vs. 7 As to the third assigned error. 6425. Therefore. JEAN BALINGAN Y BOBBONAN alias "SUSAN". No. (emphasis supplied). 9. Discharge of the accused to be state witness.The situation in the instant case is one where the transport of a prohibited drug was interrupted by the search and arrest of the accused. plaintiff-appellee. The trial court has the exclusive responsibility to see that the conditions prescribed by the rule exist. there would be nothing to interrupt. stands. considering the foregoing. appellant does not allege that any of the conditions for the discharge had not been met by the prosecution. The allegation is baseless. it cannot be considered a wrong. . 105834 February 13. Without the law punishing the act. — When two or more persons are jointly charged with the commission of any offense. . accused-appellant. The fact of corroboration of the testimonies bolsters the validity of the questioned discharge precisely because paragraph (a) of the aforequoted rule on discharge requires that the testimony be substantially corroborated in its material points. Appellant himself admits that the sergeant's testimony corroborates the testimony of the discharged accused. dispatch or transport.

: . Baguio City. l989. Lt. he went up the bus described by Pat. Obrera announced a routinary check-up identified himself as a policeman to Balingan and asked her permission to check her luggage . she went by jeep to the Dangwa bus terminal where she boarded a bus going to Manila. to stop the bus when it reaches the place. three (3) kilos and 500 grams from Baguio City to Metro Manila. Lt. Obrera and Pat. . Obrera ordered Cpl. otherwise known as "The Dangerous Drugs Act. Obrera instructed him to move out and proceed to the Police Checkpoint at Kennon Road going to the Philippine Military Academy. 12 Instead of going directly to the bus station. Art. The prosecution evidence established that on August 31. 4. Garcia soon reported seeing Balingan move out from her residence at Brookside and board a taxicab which proceeded to the direction of Bonifacio Street. the bus moved out (on its way) to Manila via Kennon Road. unlawfully and feloniously and knowingly transport and deliver prohibited drugs consisting of marijuana leaves weighing. Appellant was arrested and brought to the Baguio City Police Station. denied the prosecution's version. During he interrogation. 1988. 6 Samples were taken from the bundles and preliminary tests were conducted on them by Pat. He opened the luggage in the luggage carrier overhead and above Balingan and found suspected marijuana in it. Garcia from the Philippine Rabbit Terminal in the City proper. As instructed. the abovenamed accused. The conduct of the operations which led to the apprehesion of appellant was accurately narrated by the trial court in its Decision. who was at the Kennon Road Checkpoint. . She also reported the make and place number of the taxicab which Balingan boarded.) when the Dangwa bus she was riding left the terminal. more or less. appellant Jean Bobbonan Balingan was arraigned and pleaded not guilty 1 to the charge of Violation of Sec. dated October 24. Several officers boarded the bus. Garcia to proceed to the Philippine Rabbit Terminal in case Balingan would go there. Lt. Pat. 7 Using the Duquonois levine reagent test. Ong to fetch Cpl. where she was investigated and consequently incarcerated. That was already at 11:30 o'clock in the morning. Esper Chinonchon. Pat. 4 The surveillance yielded positive results. Lt. as lone witness. 1988. Meanwhile. 15 . who must have intercepted Cpl. Manuel Obrera2 formed a surveillance team monitor appellant's movements. 3 The team was deployed at different places in Baguio City. Philippines. in the samples. Lt. Kimay. CONTRARY TO LAW. Figueroa. He passed the information that appellant was going to Manila with a bag filled with marijuana. Obrera instructed Pat. the vehicle was flagged down by policemen at a checkpoint at Kennon Road. viz. also reported that the taxicab described by the latter passed along Bonifacio Rotunda. Kimay stopped the bus at the Kennon Road Checkpoint. an active component of marijuana. the prosecution and the accused presented divergent versions of what occurred on August 31. which alleges: That on or about the 31st day of August. the Narcotics Intelligence Division of the Baguio City Police Station received a telephone call from an unnamed male informant. From there. did then and there wilfully. Ong arrived at the checkpoint less than a minute after the bus (did) and immediately boarded it. in the City of Baguio. Ong tailed the bus at about fifteen to twenty meters behind. 1988. Upon receiving the report. She claimed that prior to her arrest. Despite her protestations. Juanito G. J. Obrera tries to arrest Balingan but the latter resisted and tried to bite his hand and furthermore held tightly (onto) the window pane. Bueno. After some thirty minutes. Lt. Lt. Bueno informed Lt. 10 Appellant. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. .PUNO. 1988. so that she would be the one to bring out Balingan from the bus. and he saw Balingan on the third or fourth seat behind the driver's seat. In the meantime. II of Republic Act No. She was allegedly on such an errand when she was arrested by narcotics agents on August 31. There. (I)n the luggage carrier above her head was the gray luggage earlier described by Cpl. including appellant's house on Brookside and bus stations. Pat. carrying nothing but her purse and handkerchief. 1988. 6425. Kimay. in violation of the abovementioned provisions of law. 8 Further laboratory examinations concluded on the contents of the bag by P/Capt. Carlos V. Obrera. Thereupon. 5 The gray bag confiscated from appellant contained suspected marijuana flowering tops divided into four bundles separately wrapped in plastic bags. Obrera asked Pat. Balingan was wearing a pink dress and carrying a gray luggage (like a "maleta") with orange or yellow belts. Lt. 14Shortly after. Garcia.m. From his post at the Dangwa Bus Station. she passed by her daughter's boarding house at Brookside to drop off some money. Part of her duties was to go to Manila to pick up orders for Chinonchon's woodcarving enterprise. she was living at Asin Road. the officer insisted that she was "Susan" and that she owns the gray bag. Cpl. 9 forensic chemist and chief of the PC-INP Crime Laboratory at Camp Dangwa. Garcia arrived and pulled Balingan out of the bus and brought her to the Baguio City Police Station and there locked her up in jail. appellant insisted on her innocence. At the trial that ensued. (S)he did not respond and just looked outside the window. 11 Appellant testified that she left Asin Road early in the morning of that fateful August day. He then left and positioned himself with Ong at the Lakandula burned area to wait for the bus to depart. At about 11:00 o'clock of the same morning. Benguet yielded the following: Qualitative examination conducted on the above-mentioned specimen gave POSITIVE result to the test of marijuana. Acting on the information. Obrera promptly proceeded to the bus station to verify the report. then P/Lt. Kimay Jr." under an Information. Lt. Obrera and Lt. Obrera that Balingan boarded a Dangwa Bus with plate number NTU153 bound for Manila. La Trinidad. without any authority of law. a prohibited drug. He pulled out the luggage and turned it over to Lt. 13 It was around eleven o'clock in the morning (11:00 a. and one of them took a gray bag from somewhere. he remained inside the bus holding the confiscated luggage while the other passengers alighted from the bus. he found traces of THC. . in the house of her employer.: On April 4. Garcia's message.

The contentions are without writ. The confiscated marijuana flowering tops are hereby declared forfeited in favor of the Government. the place. Contrary to the contention of appellant. since as the trial court stated in the impugned Decision: The prosecution also offered the testimonies of Cpl. and hereby sentences her to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment. Appellant raises two (2) basic issues. sentenced as follows: 16 and WHEREFORE. appellant submits that the trial court erred in: (1) not acquitting her on the ground that her guilt had not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. and to pay the costs. We hold that the prosecution was able to adduce evidence to prove appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. as amended. Ong but after the direct testimony of Garcia and even before Ong could take the stand. public vehicle. this Court gave its approval to a warrantless search done on a taxicab which yielded the illegal drug commonly known as shabu. as contained in the appellee's brief. Branch 4. the cross examination of Garcia and the presentation of Ong were dispensed with. the antinarcotics agents had both time and opportunity to secure a search warrant. seizure. a valid warrant was not necessary to effect the search on appellant and his co-accused. vs. it was firmly established from the factual findings of the trial court that the authorities had reasonable ground to believe that . upon inspection. (3) convicting her based entirely on conclusions based on hearsay and conducted evidence. which if considered will lead to her acquittal. As correctly averred by appellee. In this appeal. Obrera's. In this connection. and [3] seizure of evidence in plain view (emphasis supplied). the accused shall be certified with her preventive imprisonment under the terms and conditions prescribed in Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code. Lo Ho Wing. We might add that a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that "it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. The search and seizure in the case at bench happened in a moving. things and persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge — a requirement which boarders on the impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to another with impunity. Furthermore. In the service of her sentence. we raciocinated: Anent the first assignment of error. 19 The prosecution clinched its evidence against appellant with the uncontested finding of P/Capt. This is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained. He reasons that the FC-CIS officers concerned could very well have procured a search warrant since they had been informed of the date and time of arrival of the accused at the NAIA well ahead of time." In the instant case. to pay a fine of P20. search. that he alone testified on the whole surveillance. the Branch Clerk of the Court is directed to turn them over to the Dangerous Drugs Custodian (NBI) for disposition in accordance with law. He was able to establish that: appellant had physical possession of the subject gray luggage bag from the time she left her house at Brookside until she boarded and sat on the third row behind the driver of Dangwa bus with plate number NTU-153 bound for Manila. We cite with approval the averment of the Solicitor General. they found the subject gray bag on the overhead luggage compartment corresponding to appellant's seat.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. (5) holding that there was sufficient probable cause for the police officers to believe that she was then and there committing a crime so as to justify the warrantless search and seizure of the bag.000. [2] a search of a moving vehicle. and we find no cogent reason to set aside its characterization. and. We also find no merit in appellant's argument that the marijuana flowering tops should be excluded as evidence. there were no major discrepancies in Obrera's testimony that would compromise his credibility as a witness. 17 We are not persuaded by appellant's arguments. and upon the finality of this decisions.After trial. There are at least three (3) well-recognized exceptions thereto. 193 SCRA 122 (1991). In the recent case of People vs. specifically two (2) days in advance. Figueroa that the bundles found inside the gray luggage bag seized from appellant contained marijuana. After a painstaking analysis the trial court found Obrera's testimony credible. The fact that the search and seizure in question were made an a moving vehicle. the bag was found to contain suspected marijuana flowering tops which even during preliminary tests yielded positive for the presence of THC. The circumstances of the case clearly show that the search in question was made as regards a moving vehicle. does not automatically make the warrantless search herein fall within the coverage of the well-known exception to the rule of the necessity of a valid warrant to effect a search because. and arrest proceedings does not detract at all from the prosecution's case. Therefore. the second is whether the search done inside the Dangwa bus and the consequent seizure of the marijuana flowering tops were some in violation of the Constitution. (4) holding that she was caught in the act of transporting the subject prohibited drugs based on hearsay evidence. they being the products of an alleged illegal warrantless search. We affirm the trial court's Decision. The first issue is whether the required quantum of proof to support her guilt was established by the prosecution. SO ORDERED. starting from the receipt by him of an informant's tip. that search and seizure must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule. and (6) not including the subject prohibited drugs which are clearly products of an illegal search. appellant argues. Garcia and Pat. as aforementioned. the defense admitted that their testimonies would be corroborative to Lt. these are: [1] a search incidental to an arrest. hence. that the rules governing search and seizure have over the years been steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of practicality. Jr. the Court finds and declares the accused JEAN BALINGAN Y BOBBONAN guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal transportation of prohibited drugs as charged. (2) not considering material evidence on record. an active component of marijuana. As set forth in the case of Manipon. appellant was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City. In that case. appellant contends that the warrantless search and seizure made against the accused is illegal for being violative of Section 2. Sandiganbayan. Article III of the Constitution. conducted a search of the same bus at the Kennon Road checkpoint. Carlos V. Witness Obrera clearly set forth in his three-day testimony 18 the events that led to appellant's arrest.

Their surveillance operations revealed that appellant. IN VIEW WHEREOF. Cost against appellant. they were also certain as to the expected date and time of arrival of the accused from China. petitioners. No. (Citations omitted. yielded marijuana. upon inspection. G. Still and all. Aside from this. TOMAS DUMPIT. the important thing is that there was probable cause to conduct the warrantless search.: . Under those circumstances. of which appellant was touted to be a member. the conviction of appellant JEAN BOBBONAN BALINGAN is affirmed in toto. 120852 October 28. MENDOZA. J. SO ORDERED. her bag. When the moving. whose movements had been previously monitored by the Narcotics Division boarded a Dangwa bus bound for Manila carrying a suspicious looking gray luggage bag.appellant would attempt to bring in contraband and transport it within the country. the warrantless search in the case at bench is not bereft of a probable cause. SPOUSES JAMES BRETT and JUNE PRILL BRETT. the warrantless search of appellant's bag was not illegal. COURT OF APPEALS. But such knowledge was clearly insufficient to enable them to fulfill the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant.R. which must still be present in such a case. vs. respondents. OBRA and BRIG. The belief was based on intelligence reports gathered from surveillance activities on the suspected syndicate.) Unquestionably. 1999 BENJAMIN D. GEN. public bus was stopped. The Baguio INP Narcotics Intelligence Division received an information that appellant was going to transport marijuana in a bag to Manila.

and exemplary damages in the total amount of P100. petitioner Obra wrote private respondents and Ms. Small-Scale Mining Permit or any permit was issued to James Brett within the Gillies Property in Palasa-an.D.00 for violation of constitutional right and P10. Benguet. On June 26. It was alleged: A certain James Brett and June Prill Brett have since 1981 been illegally mining the above-named Gillies property. On appeal. No. The truck was impounded by the military and prevented from leaving the area except on mercy missions to transport sick soldiers and workers to the hospital and when used to buy food supplies for the men inside the camp. any member or unit of the PC. La Trinidad.000. to Col. complaining that private respondents. extracting ore and mining without permit. 1995. Hence. Mankayan.000. of the Court of Appeals affirming an award of P100. when necessary.00 and attorney's fees in the total amount of P10. The following day. Mankayan. under Art. this petition.nêt After trial. the trial court ruled that. made by the BMGS stating that "no Mines Temporary Permit." Supposedly attached to the request was a certified true copy of a certification. Grybos. with an application for temporary restraining order. For your ready reference we are enclosing some documents and pictures regarding the matter. The pertinent portion of Obra's letter to Dumpit reads: [In connection with the complaint of Ms.000. The contentions are without merit. 1985 at Palasa-an.00 for attorney's fees made by the Regional Trial Court. the Regional Director of the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences (BMGS) in Baguio City. Kindly call up the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences. On the same day. Tomas Dumpit. 1985. shall be gathered and collated in order for this Office to take the appropriate action thereon . 6 private respondents were entitled to actual and compensatory damages. 1281. after finding that private respondents had no permit to conduct mining activities in the contested area. Baguio. plus costs of suit. Mankayan.D. Jeannette M. if there be any. Mankayan. the appellate court affirmed the decision in toto. The provisions of P. 1281. 20 and 21. 1985. Benguet belonging to Gillies family. of the Civil Code. Grybos wrote him a letter on behalf of the Gillies heirs of Palasa-an. in favor of the Government. They alleged that the truck had been seized without prior investigation to determine the existence of probable cause and that this was in violation of private respondents' constitutional rights under Art. moral damages. informing them that the BMGS was going to conduct an ocular inspection and field investigation on July 2-5. with the request that the latter "stop momentarily any mining operation or activity. 1 dated June 21. 1985. Palasa-an. . barangay or any qualified person to police mining activities. 32. No. 1985." 7 They claim that petitioner Obra made his request to his co-petitioner in good faith and solely for the purpose of maintaining the status quo while the investigation of Grybos' complaint was being conducted. 32 of the Civil Code and the ruling in Aberca v." Private respondents then filed a complaint 4 for injunction and damages. On July 18.This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision. Provincial Commander of Benguet. then the Commanding General of the Regional Unified Command I (RUC-1) of the Philippine Constabulary (PC). had been conducting illegal mining activities in an area in Bgy. the court gave judgment to private respondents. with the Regional Trial Court. with headquarters at Camp Bado Dangwa. We request further that their operations be stopped and their mining equipments (sic) be confiscated.1âwphi1. . Branch 8. which petitioners invoke in their defense. Accordingly." Copies of the letters were furnished petitioner Dumpit with the request that assistance be extended by RUC-1 "to insure the success and peaceful outcome of the investigation. June 27. in relation to Arts. 3 Petitioner Benjamin D. of the tools and equipment used in the commission of an offense" and "to deputize. 1985. Jeannette M. as well as the facts surrounding the case. A similar letter 2 was sent by petitioner Obra on June 27. PETTTIONERS COULD NOT BE HELD LIABLE FOR DAMAGES IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THEIR DUTY IN GOOD FAITH. private respondents had been deprived of the use and enjoyment of property without due process of law. Mankayan. police agency. Gen. Petitioners contend: 1. Bernardo Estepa. Morales seized. . of Baguio and Benguet. of Baguio and Benguet in favor of private respondents. It found that no investigation had been conducted either by petitioner Obra or his office or by petitioner Dumpit to verify the complaint of Jeannette Grybos before the vehicle was ordered seized by them. an Isuzu "ELF" truck (ABX-587) belonging to private respondents as it was entering the "Mamakar" mining area in Palasa-an. The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. and that. Petitioners invoke P. PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF DAMAGES. 1985. Benguet until the controversy or case has been resolved by [the BMGS]. Mankayan. petitioner Obra wrote Brig. Said vehicle passes through the military outpost located at the main entrance of Camp Dangwa.00. Obra was. read: . of James and June Prill Brett in Palasa-an. 5 On August 8. elements of RUC-1 under Major Guillermo Densen and led by Sgt. Grybos. dated June 20. Benguet. on July 1. 2. Benguet. at the time material to this case. Benguet in connection with Grybos' complaint and requesting them and their witnesses to be present at the investigation "so that all legal and technical matters. when such truck will be apprehended so that this Office could take appropriate action therein. the trial court issued a temporary restraining order directing petitioners to cease and desist from preventing the subject truck from leaving the mine site. spouses James Brett and June Prill Brett. Ver. Branch 8.000.] we are enlisting the assistance of your command by way of checking and apprehending a truck colored blue and yellow lining which is used in transporting illegally mined ores from Palasa-an. requesting assistance in apprehending a truck allegedly used by private respondents in illegal mining in the area. as a result. We would like therefore to have their operations investigated and inspected. the court issued a writ of preliminary injunction. Mankayan. 19." The facts are as follows: Accordingly. Benguet to Baguio City. as amended. 1985. authorizing the Regional Director of the BMGS to "order the seizure and confiscation. Josefino A.

civil and/or military. 10 The truck was seized while it was entering the mining area. any member or unit of the PC. and on those occasions when he drove the truck out of the mining area. an investigation was to be held on July 2-5. . papers. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search. when necessary. Morales of the RUC-I that the same could not leave the mining area in Palasa-an. however. the Court finds that the petitioners do not seriously dispute that the private respondents were. Petitioners contend that these provisions of the Decree were justified under Art. merely validated the grant by law to nonjudicial officers of the power to issue warrants of arrest or search warrants. police agency.Sec. was not presented in evidence nor does a copy thereof appear in the records. . The certification.12 With regard to the search of moving vehicles. The arguments of the petitioners that there was no distraint and/or seizure because the keys of the truck were always in the possession of private respondents' driver Kiyabang. on several occasions. IV. that. this had been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. The Bureau of Mines shall have jurisdictional supervision and control over all holders of mining claims or applicants for and/or grantees of mining licenses. of the tools and equipment used in the commission of the offense and the minerals extracted by the offender. deprived of the use of their Isuzu "ELF" Truck when the private respondents' foreman and the driver of the truck were told by Sgt. Nor indeed could the seizure of the vehicle be justified under the "moving vehicle" doctrine. to wit: xxx xxx xxx f. care must be taken that constitutional and legal safeguards are not disregarded. there was absolutely no justification for the disregard of procedures for issuing search and seizure orders. Bagista. including mining service contracts and service contracts insofar as their mining activities are concerned. 6. it was on missions of mercy and for purposes of the needs of the military personnel assigned in the Palasa-an mining area. 1986. The Bureau of Mines shall have the following powers and functions. barangay or any qualified person to police all mining activities. the issue in this case is not whether petitioner Obra had authority to issue a search warrant and to deputize the military to assist in his investigation. On the contrary. The question is whether he conducted an investigation and found probable cause for ordering the seizure and impoundment of private respondents' vehicle. as petitioner Obra's letters to private respondents and to Grybos clearly stated. even without warrant. in favor of the government.) To arrest or order the arrest. and these. To the contrary. in doing so. petitioner Obra's only basis for ordering the seizure of the vehicle was an alleged certification from the BMGS that no mining permit had been issued to private respondents. 11 As held in People v. are facetious. and the same was parked in front of the building where the military team specifically assigned for that particular mission was staying. There could not have been. although it was the first to work the claim. 8 The above provision of the 1973 Constitution. such a warrantless search has been held to be valid as long as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime in the vehicle to be searched. gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of probable cause. xxx xxx xxx Sec. therefore. . to say the least. Ver. "as per . of any person who has committed or is in the act of committing any of the offenses defined under Presidential Decree No. permits. and institute whatever action that may be necessary relative thereto. The Court of Appeals rightly concluded then that petitioners violated private respondents' constitutional rights to due process and to security against unreasonable searches and seizure in ordering the seizure and impoundment of private respondents' vehicle. and in the exercise of such authority. and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated. "per orders". in the light of the undisputed fact that the military men led by Sgt. Mankayan. This in no way. it was not transporting minerals outside of the area. However. 1985 precisely to determine the veracity of the allegations in Grybos' complaint. after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. and the persons or things to be seized. 13 the military is not to be restrained from pursuing their task or carrying out their mission with vigor. however. houses. 3. Benguet. Morales did not allow him to drive the truck out of the Palasa-an mining area. and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge. the truck left the Palasa-an mining area. Apparently. but did not in any way exempt these officers from the duty of determining the existence of probable cause as basis for the issuance of such warrants. it shall have the power to enlist the aid and support of all law enforcement agencies of the Government. g. in its resolution 9 dated May 12. and that the private respondents voluntarily and maliciously refused to use or enjoy their own truck . §3 of the 1973 Constitution which provided that — The right of the people to be secure in their persons. always with a soldier on board the truck. indeed. however. leases and/or operators thereof. any finding of probable cause that the truck was being used for any illegal mining activities. As we said in Aberca v. or any other laws being implemented by the Bureau of Mines. . Indeed. and deserve no serious consideration. There was. a distraint and at least constructive seizure by the military men led by Sgt. . and particularly describing the place to be searched.) To deputize. In this case. therefore. The answer is: he did not. Morales. and seize and confiscate or order the seizure and confiscation. 463. or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law. the BMGS found that private respondent June Prill Brett had a valid and subsisting mining claim within the area and that it was the Gillies family which had no permit or lease from the government. For as the trial court held: 14 From all the above arguments and counter-arguments.

. P. These findings and conclusions of the trial court.e. Guillermo Densen. 1985 (Exh. as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Morales and his men. Petitioner Obra's interpretation of the law that grants him "jurisdictional supervision and control" over persons and things that have something to do with mines and mining (Sec. 1985. acting on the request of petitioner Obra. in our view. the petition is DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. were based on the lettercomplaint of Jeannette Grybos received by said Office also on June 26. "without prerequisite conditions such as a prior preliminary investigation of the case" (taken from the above quotation from petitioners' Memorandum). 1281) authorizes him to distrain and seize private respondents' truck. He claims that all he did was to endorse the request to Major Densen. but.1âwphi1. when you received that letter of Engr. 21 It was clear from petitioner Obra's letter to petitioner Dumpit that assistance was sought for the seizure of private respondents' truck. the first thing I did is just to designate an action officer and my instruction is to coordinate with Director Obra and undertake necessary action. were not preceded by and based on an investigation conducted by Petitioner Obra or his Office. Jeannette M. is the language of Article 32. That was my only instruction to the late Maj. Morales and his men on July 1. the Intelligence Officer of RUC-1. to coordinate with the BMGS and implement the order accordingly. 18 ATTY. Specifically. there could not have been any other foreseeable consequence but the eventual seizure of the truck. when petitioner Dumpit endorsed the request to his subordinates for proper action." 17 Petitioner Dumpit himself testified. [T]he decisive factor in this case. 1985. your Honor. as he actually did through Sgt. While it would certainly be too naive to expect that violators of human rights would easily be deterred by the prospect of facing damage suits. The petitioners' claim that this did not violate the constitutional right of the private respondents to due process because of the aforequoted reasons completely ignores the fundamental rule that laws should not be so interpreted or implemented as to violate the provisions of the constitution. effectively depriving the latter of its use and enjoyment of their property. Thus. clearly violates the provision of the Bill of Rights on due process . thus: SOL. Petitioner Dumpit was a ranking military official. responsible for the transgressions joint tortfeasors. it should nonetheless be made clear in no uncertain terms that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are directly. WHEREFORE.nêt . The ruling in Aberca. . It is unseemly for him to claim that he was merely executing a ministerial act. whereby he was requesting assistance. it is not disputed by the petitioners that Petitioners Obra's request for the "checking and apprehending" of private respondents' truck by Petitioner Dumpit's RUC-I Command on June 26. Grybos. Densen. Otherwise. . he had no knowledge of the acts of his subordinates since they did not file an "after-incident report" which was the standard procedure in these cases. . The law speaks of an officer or employee or person "directly" or "indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Densen to enter the mining site and that all operations in the mining area will be stopped? A I left it to the discretion of my subordinate. . C) and the actual apprehension of said truck by Sgt. Obra." of the Isuzu Ilf truck of the private respondents. the one directly responsible) who must answer for damages under Article 32. Private respondents' witnesses testified that when they asked the military men who stopped them upon their entry to the "Mamakar" mining site. Art. did you take? A On the letter of Director Obra dated June 26. GALACE: Q Major Densen did not go to the mining site of [Palasa-an]? A My instruction was very clear. 32 of the Civil Code makes liable any public officer who is directly or indirectly responsible for violating an individual's constitutional rights. . the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party.orders. B). the late Maj. coordinate with Director Obra and take the necessary appropriate action. No. the soldiers told them that they were acting upon the orders of "the general in Camp Dangwa. instead. Petitioner Dumpit cannot evade responsibility for his acts by claiming that he merely performed a ministerial duty in ordering the implementation of petitioner Obra's request. 1985 (Exh. 32 could easily be avoided by the mere plea that the officer concerned was only carrying out a ministerial duty. Likewise." 16 Sgt. 6. These contentions have no merit. are binding on this Court in the absence of any showing that they are contrary to the evidence in the record. what action. 19 Art. 20 is stated as follows: . xxx xxx xxx A I referred that letter when I received it from Director Obra to the Action Officer. petitioner Dumpit claims that unlike the superior officers in Aberca. which has been reiterated in subsequent cases. It was sufficiently proved in this case that the seizure of the truck was effected upon the orders of petitioner Dumpit. period. Q You did not authorize Maj. . 15 On the other hand. . DAVID: Q This letter refers to a complaint by Mrs.D. if any. as well as indirectly. Thus. Morales even issued a certification that the truck was seized "as per orders. it is not the actor alone (i.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT. 92.S. UNITED STATES. 234 (1968) 390 U. No. Decided March 5.S.SO ORDERED. . 1968. 1968. 390 U. Argued January 18. HARRIS v. UNITED STATES. 234 HARRIS v.

234. they came across incriminating evidence. searched the car. Petitioner's conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals over his contention that the card had been illegally seized following a warrantless search. argued the cause for the United States. [390 U.S. I assume it has survived [390 U. to place a property tag on it. Ker v. concurring. Beytagh. The officer then seized the card and brought it into the precinct. Francis X. the automobile registration card belonging to the victim of the robbery. He then saw the registration card. 234. It has long been settled that objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence. 370 F. The search completed. and without a warrant. Stepping out of the car. to remove all valuables from it. Proceeding to the front door on the passenger side. We affirm. but of a measure taken to protect the car while it was in police custody. Weinstein argued the cause for petitioner. We granted certiorari to consider the problem presented under the Fourth Amendment. After a cursory search of the car. The trial court. Petitioner was charged with robbery under the District of Columbia Code. The police decided to impound the car as evidence. affirmed. and tied a property tag on the steering wheel. MR. 57 (1924). JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. the officer opened the car door for the purpose of rolling up a window and thus protecting the car and its contents.. he searched the trunk. Returning to the car. (2) while engaged in the performance of their duty to protect the car. On opening the door. which lay face up on the metal stripping over which [390 U.S. Paul H. 236] the door closes.S. 231. Hester v. Held: The card was subject to seizure and introducible in evidence since it was not discovered by means of a search in the technical sense. Affirmed. 23. a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed. Assistant Attorney General Vinson. 222901. was plainly visible. Nothing in the Fourth Amendment requires the police to obtain a warrant in these narrow circumstances. rolled up the windows. the arresting officer proceeded to the lot to which petitioner's car had been towed. PER CURIAM. Jr. MR. 374 U. after a hearing. Though Preston v. the officer saw.C. and locked the doors. were to the effect that the discovery of the card was not the result of a search of the car. United States.C. is not mentioned in the Court's opinion. Lee. Pursuant to this regulation. 323 . The precise and detailed findings of the District Court. D. 274 U. 265 U.2d 477. and confronted petitioner with the registration card. Coolidge v.S. however. D. to roll up the windows. granted. 238] Petitioner's automobile had been seen leaving the site of the robbery. At his trial in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. the officer opened the door in order to secure the window and door. New Hampshire No. The officer returned to the precinct. 237] because in the present case (1) the car was lawfully in police custody. in order to search the vehicle. and the police were responsible for protecting the car. 1003 (1967). and to attach to the vehicle a property tag listing certain information about the circumstances of the impounding. Petitioner disclaimed all knowledge of the card. 235] two to seven years. petitioner moved to suppress an automobile registration card belonging to the robbery victim. holding that the card had been obtained by means of an unlawful search. with the name of the robbery victim on it. App. United States v. which the Government sought to introduce in evidence. accepted by the Court of Appeals.S. Code Ann. exposed to plain view. near his home. 386 U. It reached the precinct about an hour and a quarter after petitioner. and the full Court of Appeals affirmed petitioner's conviction. the registration card. California. a police officer searched an impounded car held as evidence of a robbery. 42 -43 (1963). The car was traced and petitioner was arrested as he was entering it. The sole question for our consideration is whether the officer discovered the registration card by means of an illegal search. 559 (1927). he rolled up an open window on one of the back doors.S. but was plainly visible to the officer who had a right to be in a position of viewing it. It had begun to rain. The admissibility of evidence found as a result of a search under the police regulation is not presented by this case. 376 U. This card was used as evidence in petitioner's trial. 364 . At this moment. 125 U. brought petitioner to the car. the windows of the car were open and the door unlocked. We hold that he did not. On the brief were Acting Solicitor General Spritzer.S. Once the door had lawfully been opened. The Government's petition for rehearing en banc was. and to lock the doors. the arresting officer took petitioner to a police station. with two judges dissenting. Beatrice Rosenberg and Julia P.S. United States.S. The officer entered on the driver's side. On appeal.Pursuant to a departmental regulation. JUSTICE DOUGLAS. Cooper.S. Petitioner was convicted of the crime charged and sentenced to imprisonment for a period of [390 U. With him on the brief was Laurence Levitan. ruled that the card was admissible. and not engaged in an inventory or other search of the car. and a crane was called to tow it to the precinct. 234. A regulation of the Metropolitan Police Department requires the officer who takes an impounded vehicle in charge to search the vehicle thoroughly. 234.

our single duty is to determine the issues presented in accord with the Constitution and the law.. Pp. Even assuming. delivered the opinion of the Court. S. (a) The seizure of the car in the driveway cannot be justified as incidental to the arrest. 2. filed a concurring opinion. The test was inconclusive on the murder. 493. Unaware of the visit of the other officers who had been shown the guns and knowing little about the murder weapon. J. knew in advance the car's description and location. New Hampshire. 492. S. on the evening of January 13. 14. C. 42. JJ. J. S. C. acting as a justice of the peace.. but.J. was parked in petitioner's driveway. 403 U. Maroney. Pp. 1971 Decided June 21. Pp. Pamela Mason. apparently in response to a man's telephone call for a babysitter. S. Cf. 333 U. Pp. S. WHITE. petitioner was convicted. S. Eight days later. 403 U. 1971 403 U.J. Co. during its course. 443 CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE Syllabus Police went to petitioner's home on January 28. As in every case. as made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth. they took the guns. post. two other policemen came to the house and questioned petitioner's wife to check petitioner's story and corroborate his admission of the theft. in which BURGER.. 3. Held: 1. filed a concurring Page 403 U. after a thaw. Vacuum sweepings from the car as well as from the clothing were used as evidence at the trial. 403 U. BLACK. on that date. S. post. and hence they needed no warrant.2d 547. S. S. the police asked about any guns there might be in the house.. to question him about a murder. DOUGLAS. and the State Supreme Court affirmed. 455-457. joined. United States. 403 U. 510. left her home in Manchester. (b) Under the circumstances present here -. 1964.267 U. J. 132. S. intended to seize it when they entered on petitioner's property.. are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment -.. are clearly inapplicable. on the facts of this case. post. 403 U. in which BURGER. and no contraband or dangerous objects were involved. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court. 403 U. along with one of the guns made available by petitioner's wife. she was not acting as the instrument or agent of the police. the police may. In petitioner's absence. Dyke v. and HARLAN (as to Parts I.where the police for some time had known of the probable role of the car in the crime. that the police could properly have made a warrantless search of the car in the driveway when they arrested petitioner. and were shown four by petitioner's wife which she offered to let them take. filed a concurring and dissenting opinion. After one policeman first declined the offer. filed a concurring and dissenting opinion. S. on February 21 and on two occasions the next year. at the time of the arrest. petitioner had had ample opportunity to destroy incriminating evidence. they could not have done so at their leisure after its removal. J. 453-482. and MARSHALL.399 U. BURGER. Pp. II-D. in making these and the other items available to the police.arguendo. p. STEWART.J. 403. That exception is inapplicable to the facts of the instant case. (as to Part III). C. and he agreed to take a lie detector test on February 2. and BLACKMUN. 10. * We are called upon in this case to decide issues under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments arising in the context of a state criminal trial for the commission of a particularly brutal murder.. without prior approval by judge or magistrate. was subsequently towed to the police station. The police. Following the overruling of pretrial motions to suppress that evidence. because it was not issued by a "neutral and detached magistrate.333 U. On February 19. evidence in "plain view. petitioner admitted a theft. he showed them three guns. p." Johnson v. HARLAN. No search and seizure were implicated in the February 2 visit when the police obtained the guns and clothing from petitioner's wife. 458-464.H. 403 U. reversed and remanded. 1964." and. and only when the discovery of the evidence is inadvertent.. who exerted no effort to coerce or dominate her. 260 A. MR. a 14-year-old girl. The car. and the special exceptions for automobile searches in Carroll v..391 U. where. United States.. a warrantless search and seizure of the car cannot be justified under those exceptions. Pp. and III).J.subject only to a few specifically established and well Page 403 U. in a portion of Part I and in Parts II and III of which BURGER. which. 216. the house was guarded at the time of arrest and petitioner had no access to the car -. 449-453. along with various articles of petitioner's clothing his wife made available to them. BRENNAN. S." though not for that reason alone. The basic constitutional rule is that "searches conducted outside the judicial process. (c) Under certain circumstances. a warrant to search petitioner's automobile was applied for by the police chief and issued by the Attorney General (who had assumed charge of the investigation and was later the chief prosecutor at the trial). were not obligated to refuse her offer for them to take the guns. 444 defined exceptions. S. The warrant for the search and seizure of petitioner's automobile did not satisfy the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. In the course of their inquiry. 484-490. where the police had ample opportunity to obtain a valid warrant. p.Argued January 12. p. which took place inside the house. and Chambers v. 464-473. 490. 109 N.S. it was searched. during a heavy snowstorm. 445 and dissenting opinion. Taylor Implement Mfg. S. without a warrant seize. S. and. 403 U. and. post. 403 U. C. J. her body was found by the side of a major . joined.there were no exigent circumstances justifying the warrantless search even had it been made before the car was taken to the police station. joined. S. petitioner was arrested in his house for the murder.

Coolidge was held in jail on an unrelated charge that night. but he was released the next day. 449 I The petitioner's first claim is that the warrant authorizing the seizure and subsequent search of his 1951 Pontiac automobile was invalid because not issued by a "neutral and detached magistrate. and a third time in April.378 U. two days after it was seized. 13-14: . who had personally taken charge of all police activities relating to the murder. Edward Coolidge. having learned from a neighbor that the petitioner. and does suspect and believe. and attempted to show through microscopic analysis that there was a high probability that the clothes had been in contact with Pamela Mason's body. On February 19. and he was sentenced to life imprisonment. if he owned any guns. at the time of the arrest. Finally. that there are certain objects and things used in the Commission of said offense. At the conclusion of the meeting.333 U. which the prosecution claimed was the murder weapon. S. That evening. Page 403 U.H.H. S. 1965.357 U.22-caliber Mossberg rifle. S. the Manchester police chief made formal application. and was later to serve as chief prosecutor at the trial. S. S. During the course of the interview. They asked Page 403 U. She had been murdered.a ." The warrants were then signed and issued by the Attorney General himself. in January. we need not consider his further argument that the allegations under oath supporting the issuance of the warrant were so conclusory as to violate relevant constitutional standards. which ruled the evidence admissible. and the police immediately began a massive investigation. The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction. He agreed to do so on the following Sunday. On the following Sunday. N. the cars were towed to the police station. she was told that both cars had been "impounded." and probably would not be home that night. . The jury found Coolidge guilty. Coolidge.north-south highway several miles away. apparently in part because the police believed that she would be harassed by reporters if she were accessible to them. The event created great alarm in the area. it was decided that there was enough evidence to justify the arrest of Coolidge on the murder charge and a search of his house and two cars.Stat. Coolidge was waiting with her mother-in-law for her husband's return. Pretrial motions to suppress all this evidence were referred by the trial judge to the New Hampshire Supreme Court. and we granted certiorari to consider the constitutional questions raised by the admission of this evidence against Coolidge at his trial. The police arrested Coolidge in his house on the day the warrant issued." His wife was in the house throughout the interview. 10. Cf. Page 403 U. They also asked whether he would take a lie detector test concerning his account of his activities on the night of the disappearance.H. where the lie detector test was to be administered. again a year later. The plainclothesmen told Mrs. 448 they were plainly visible both from the street and from inside the house where Coolidge was actually arrested. under oath. 403. Conflicting ballistics testimony was offered on the question whether the bullets found in Pamela Mason's body had been fired from this rifle. United States. United States. but was told that she must stay elsewhere. Coolidge asked whether she might remain in the house with her small child.Rev. . Under New Hampshire law in force at that time. including particles of gun powder. On January 28. although dark had fallen. taken from the Pontiac were introduced in evidence against him. 106 N. 208 A. and concealed in or upon a certain vehicle. 1965. 186. now kept. the police called a towing company. At Coolidge's subsequent jury trial on the charge of murder. When she asked whether she might take her car. the State accumulated a quantity of evidence to support the theory that it was he who had killed Pamela Mason.2d 547. to-wit: 1951 Pontiac two-door sedan. S. where Mrs. Justice Jackson. and proceeded to question Mrs." and that the police would provide transportation for her. for the arrest and search warrants. New Hampshire. They asked Coolidge's mother to leave. had been away from home on the evening of the girl's disappearance. § 595:1 (repealed 1969). 260 A.2d 322. [Footnote 2] Also introduced in evidence was one of the guns taken by the police on their Sunday evening visit to the Coolidge house -. the police went to his house to question him." Since we agree with the petitioner that the warrant was invalid for this reason. writing for the Court in Johnson v. 480. about two and a half hours after Coolidge had been taken into custody. his day off. S. 926. 108. . These two policemen were not the two who had visited the house earlier in the week. the cars were parked in the Coolidge driveway. a policeman called Coolidge early in the morning and asked him to come down to the police station for the trip to Concord. and some clothes that Mrs. and that.S. At this meeting. The 1951 Pontiac was searched and vacuumed on February 21. 399 U. among other things. Mrs. acting as a justice of the peace. S. they obtained from her four guns belonging to Coolidge. vacuum sweepings. as part of an attempt by the State to show by microscopic analysis that it was highly probable that Pamela Mason had been in Coolidge's car. Aguilar v. Coolidge that her husband was in "serious trouble. the results of the investigation were presented at a meeting between the police officers working on the case and the Page 403 U.Ann. [Footnote 1] During the ensuing two and a half weeks. stated that the affiant "has probable cause to suspect and believe. It appears that. Coolidge thought her husband might have been wearing on the evening of Pamela Mason's disappearance. the only warrant that concerns us here. 446 him. two shotguns and a rifle. and herewith offers satisfactory evidence. the prosecution introduced vacuum sweepings of the clothes taken from the Coolidge house that same Sunday evening. all justices of the peace were authorized to issue search warrants. Giordenello v. 333 U. and they apparently did not know that Coolidge had displayed three guns for inspection during the earlier visit. The classic statement of the policy underlying the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment is that of Mr. 447 State Attorney General. The complaint supporting the warrant for a search of Coolidge's Pontiac automobile. two plainclothes policemen arrived at the Coolidge house. Texas. Some time later. and he produced three. and. The police later described his attitude on the occasion of this visit as fully "cooperative. 109 N.

relied upon the theory that. 481-482. United States." Further." "367 U. in Johnson. 471. S. 357 U. S. that 'a healthy federalism depends upon the avoidance of needless conflict between state and federal courts' by itself urging that" "[f]ederal-state cooperation in the solution of crime under constitutional standards will be promoted. consequently. 371. 285 U. S. S. confronted with the showing of probable cause made by the Manchester chief of police. would have issued the warrant in question." whereas.) It is urged that the New Hampshire statutes which. United States. Justice Jackson is that prosecutors and policemen simply cannot be asked to maintain the requisite neutrality with regard to their own investigations -." Page 403 U. 658. First. to be decided by a judicial officer. S. S.269 U. Giordenello v.392 U. United States. it echoed the sentiment of Elkins v. the determination was formalized here by a writing bearing the title "Search Warrant. S. 389 U. but the State has not attempted to uphold the warrant on any such artificial basis. 364. 356-357. Mapp sounded no death knell for our federalism." . searches and seizures to meet 'the practical demands of effective criminal investigation and law enforcement' in the States.371 U. 33. 23. 450 United States.251 U." Cf. S. S. formulated rules of evidence to be applied in federal criminal prosecutions. at the time of the searches here involved. 221. who was unquestionably authorized as a justice of the peace to issue warrants under then-existing state law. 643]. Page 403 U.389 U. it is not forbidden the States under the Fourteenth. S. 269 U. . . this Court has . This position was premised on a passage from the opinion of this Court in Ker v.318 U. S. S. 486. 464." it is enough to cite Agnello v. . S. 341. at 364 U.367 U. . . at 357 U. at 374 U. against unlawful search and seizure are to be protected even if the same result might have been achieved in a lawful way. it is enough to answer that there could hardly be a more appropriate setting than this for a per se rule of disqualification. Ohio. As for the proposition that the existence of probable cause renders noncompliance with the warrant procedure an irrelevance. 392 U. S. in fact. if only by recognition of their now mutual obligation to respect the same fundamental criteria in their approaches. S. . rather than a case-by-case evaluation of all the circumstances. . . 385. act as a "neutral and detached magistrate."The point of the Fourth Amendment. That such a procedure was indeed workable from the point of view of the police is evident from testimony at the trial in this case: "The Court: You mean that another police officer issues these [search warrants]?" "The Witness: Yes. the whole point of the basic rule so well expressed by Mr.285 U. Mancusi v. the State argues that the Attorney General. 251 U." See also Jones v.S. When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is. established no assumption by this Court of supervisory authority over state courts . 497-498. did. and. . instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. S. 371 U. S. . the determination of probable cause was made by the chief "government enforcement agent" of the State the Attorney General -. 374 U. 31: "Preliminary to our examination of the search and seizures involved here. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate. v. S. ("[T]he rights . 20. the State claims that any magistrate. United States.357 U. [Footnote 3] Cf. . 347. Captain Courture and Captain Shea and Captain Loveren are J. Lefkowitz.P. But the New Hampshire Supreme Court. S. And such searches are held unlawful notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing probable cause. United States.the "competitive enterprise" that must rightly engage their single-minded attention. In the exercise of its supervisory authority over the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts . . Any assumption that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate's disinterested determination to issue a search warrant will justify the officers in making a search without a warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity. S. is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. United States v. . Mapp. S. Rather. To the first proposition.'s. Silverthorne Lumber Co. decided in 1925: "Belief. 451 "workable rules governing arrests. "McNabb v. it must be recognized that the" "principles governing the admissibility of evidence in federal criminal trials have not been restricted . 318 U. United States. there was no piece of paper involved. supra. rather. that an article sought is concealed in a dwelling house furnishes no justification for a search of that place without a warrant. S. 392. however well founded. DeForte. Without disrespect to the state law enforcement agent here involved. S. 332. even if the warrant procedure here in issue would clearly violate the standards imposed on the Federal Government by the Fourth Amendment. as a rule. . it implied no total In this case. . which often is not grasped by zealous officers. S. . To be sure." (Emphasis in Ker. California. supra.374 U.who was actively in charge of the investigation and later was to be chief prosecutor at the trial. Katz v. S. . permitted a law enforcement officer himself to issue a warrant was one of those id. 493. it might be helpful for us to indicate what was not decided inMapp \[v. to those derived solely from the Constitution.") obliteration of state laws relating to arrests and searches in favor of federal law. and leave the people's homes secure only in the discretion of police officers. at 367 U. in upholding the conviction. 452. United States. however. . 452 Page 403 U. 34. authorized by Ker. S. not by a policeman or government enforcement agent. Wong Sun v.

Chief.by legal and constitutional means in England. whether by day or by night. ." [Footnote 8] In times of unrest.401 U. his car was outside in the driveway.a right of personal security against arbitrary intrusions by official power. as a prelude to a search." Thus. But even under preChimel law. supra.Whiteley v. which was taken to stand "for the proposition. Justice Bradley's admonition in his opinion for the Court almost a century ago in Boyd in terms of the law as it existed before Chimel v. S. ." Chimel. United States. S. is worth repeating here: "It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive form. the search stands on no firmer ground than if there had been no warrant at all.policy to go out of the department. . 453 unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment -. so that the first condition of a warrantless "search incident" is met. . 616. 455 Page 403 U. Williams v. Coolidge was arrested inside his house. are per se "A. The exceptions are "jealously and carefully drawn. [Footnote 5]" But it is too plain for extensive discussion that this now abandoned New Hampshire method of issuing "search warrants" violated a fundamental premise of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments -. Justice Frankfurter put it in Wolf v. your answer is to the effect that you never go out of the department for the Justice of the Peace?" of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen. If times have changed. and Mapp v. as if it consisted more in sound than in substance. as such. S.a premise fully developed and articulated long before this Court's decisions in Ker v. that a warrantless search 'incident to a lawful arrest' may generally extend to the area that is considered to be in the 'possession' or under the 'control' of the person arrested. therefore. 25. The care was not touched until Coolidge had been removed from . [Footnote 10] A The State's first theory is that the seizure on February 19 and subsequent search of Coolidge's Pontiac were "incident" to a valid arrest. 635. the changes have made the values served by the Fourth Amendment more." [Footnote 6] and there must be "a showing by those who seek exemption ." [Footnote 7] "[T]he burden is on those seeking the exemption to show the need for it. we must not lose sight of the Fourth Amendment's fundamental guarantee. but did so only prospectively. Warden. 401 U. . 567 n. 338 U. [Footnote 9] and by revolution on this continent -.116 U.339 U." We find no escape from the conclusion that the seizure and search of the Pontiac automobile cannot constitutionally rest upon the warrant issued by the state official who was the chief investigator and prosecutor in this case. did not need the commentary of recent history to be condemned. It is therefore implicit in 'the concept of ordered liberty. [Footnote 4]" "The Witness: It hasn't been our -. This can only be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for the security of person and property should be liberally construed. Mr. inter alia. 27-28: "The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police -. As Mr.338 U. which substantially restricted the "search incident" exception to the warrant requirement. United States. S. supra. S. they must. Page 403 U. 56.367 U.which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment -. It is the duty The leading case in the area before Chimel was United States v. the most basic constitutional rule in this area is that "Q. S. If the seizure and search are to be justified. at 395 U. S. Ohio. 760. 116 U. Your policy and experience is to have a fellow police officer take the warrant in the capacity of Justice of the Peace?" "searches conducted outside the judicial process. In this case. 643. we assess the State's argument II Page 403 U. be justified on some other theory. 456 The State proposes three distinct theories to bring the facts of this case within one or another of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. Since he was not the neutral and detached magistrate required by the Constitution. And since the events in issue took place in 1964. But the values were those of the authors of our fundamental constitutional concepts. but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that way.401 U. namely. In times not altogether unlike our own they won -. important. A close and literal construction deprives them of half their efficacy. not less. 560. that the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative. California. and leads to gradual depreciation of the right. S. let me ask you. S. S."The Court: Well. The knock at the door. the State's position is untenable. " Page 403 U. S. 454 v. Colorado. S. S. this basic law and the values that it represents may appear unrealistic or "extravagant" to some. S. 646. California. reducing everyman's scope to do as he pleases in an urban and industrial world. 11.' and. enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause. That has been our practice. and against any stealthy encroachments thereon. Right. 752. without authority of law but solely on the authority of the police. by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. S. Rabinowitz. whether caused by crime or racial conflict or fear of internal subversion.is basic to a free society. In considering them. without prior approval by judge or magistrate.subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions.395 U. We assume that the arrest of Coolidge inside his house was valid.

and search it there. motor boat. S.376 U.382 U. 36. (Emphasis in Shipley. . S. Agnello v.399 U. then a search [of his car] made at another place.399 U. . United States. whenever the police may make a legal contemporaneous search under Carroll. S.. Chambers v. on the night in question. S. as we have pointed out elsewhere. Dyke v. [Footnote 12] Page 403 U. where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. 399 U. 51. 376 U. that the police might have searched the Pontiac in the driveway when they arrested Coolidge in the house. United States. 364. justify a warrantless search inside the house." The objects that the police are assumed to have had probable cause to search for in the car were neither stolen nor contraband nor dangerous. 399 U. but it was not actually searched until two days later. 30-31. 269 U. at 399 U. Coolidge was aware that he was a suspect in the Mason murder." "[T]he opportunity to search is fleeting." to be considered below) that suggests "[a]n automobile . at 376 U. The underlying rationale of Carroll and of all the cases that have followed it is that there is "a necessary difference between a search of a store. the occupants are alerted. has no applicability to this case. 33. 483. and a search of a ship.395 U. S. arguendo. at 267 U. He had already had ample opportunity to destroy any evidence he thought incriminating. 395 U. 47. S. 153. Carroll did indeed hold that "contraband goods concealed and illegally transported in an automobile or other vehicle may be searched for without a warrant. For this Court has repeatedly held that. the Court followed and reaffirmed Carroll. Vale v. Maroney. . 30. There is no suggestion that. Louisiana.S. But even granting that the police had probable cause to search the car. because the car is "movable. In two later cases. 459 liquor. the car was being used for any illegal purpose. Search-incident doctrine. . and the car's contents may never be found again if a warrant must be obtained. in Chambers. There is nothing in search-incident doctrine (as opposed to the special rules for automobiles and evidence in "plain view. 42. S. 367. and search it at their leisure without a warrant. S." where there is probable cause. These cases make it clear beyond any question that a lawful pre-Chimel arrest of a suspect outside his house could never. MR. and there was no indication that he meant to flee. S." Page 403 U. and. S.) In this case. S. Co. S. the police had known for some time of the probable role of the Pontiac car in the crime. "exigent circumstances" justify the warrantless search of "an automobile stopped on the highway. was an almost indispensable instrumentality in large-scale violation of the National Prohibition Act. S. 42. it is doubtful whether the police could have carried out a contemporaneous search of the car under Rabinowitz standards. It was then seized and taken to the station. dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a proper official warrant readily may be obtained. [Footnote 11] Even assuming. and. [Footnote 15] in the conditions of the time. and became contraband." 267 U. James v.391 U. in short. S. California. quoting from Shipley v.Preston v.S. makes plain that they could not legally seize the car. 818. S. S. United States. 132. they may also seize the car. In circumstances virtually identical to those here. but he had been extremely cooperative throughout the investigation. 458 B The second theory put forward by the State to justify a warrantless seizure and search of the Pontiac car is that. JUSTICE BLACK's opinion for a unanimous Court held that." Id. 819. (Emphasis supplied. under Carroll v. 216. . . we did so again. California.the scene. the application of the Carroll case to these facts would extend it far beyond its original rationale. at 269 U. . 460 for contraband goods. 486. and it was regularly parked in the driveway of his house. "[o]nce an accused is under arrest and in custody. The opportunity for search was thus hardly "fleeting. even under Rabinowitz. . quoting from Stoner v. by itself.'"" Such searches had been explicitly authorized by Congress. . Page 403 U. Taylor Implement Mfg.) Cf.376 U. S. Louisiana.) As we said in Chambers. take it to the police station. S. Cf. supra.399 U. S. the police may make a warrantless search of an automobile whenever they have probable cause to do so. remove it. is simply not incident to the arrest. wagon or automobile. [Footnote 16] each involving an occupied automobile stopped on the open highway and searched for contraband Page 403 U. 457 a different result where the arrest is made inside the house and the search outside and at some distance away.267 U. "the seizing officer shall have reasonable or probable cause for believing that the automobile which he stops and seizes has contraband liquor therein which is being illegally transported. without a warrant. and the car itself therefore was treated somewhat as an offender. supra." (Emphasis supplied. under our decision last Term in Chambers v." [Footnote 13] provided that First. S. [Footnote 17] And last Term. Maroney. S. [Footnote 14]" "[a] search may be incident to an arrest "only if it is substantially contemporaneous with the arrest and is confined to the immediatevicinity of the arrest.

S. at 267 U. S. come across some other article of incriminating character. Co. 465. 462 And surely there is nothing in this case to invoke the meaning and purpose of the rule of Carroll v. 43. S. after he had voluntarily admitted the officers at both front and back doors. [Footnote 23] The word "automobile" is not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth Amendment fade away and disappears. we hold that the "plain view" exception to the warrant requirement is inapplicable to this case. Finally.. The Coolidge premises were guarded throughout the night by two policemen.390 U. Chambers. [Footnote 24] Chimel v. long after the police had had the Pontiac towed to the station house. 466 U. 463 Since Carroll would not have justified a warrantless search of the Pontiac at the time Coolidge was arrested. in the vast majority of cases. Hester v. by no possible stretch of the legal imagination can this be made into a case where "it is not practicable to secure a warrant. this case is controlled by Dyke v. supra. Frazier v.394 U. J. the police may inadvertently come across evidence while in "hot pursuit" of a fleeing suspect. and this was enough. by itself. where the police may stop and search an automobile under Carroll. hot pursuit. the case of Cooper v. United States.S. Ker v.386 U. S. 234. United States. no fleeting opportunity on an open highway after a hazardous chase. United States.282 U. When Coolidge had been taken away. at least so far as the automobile exception is concerned. 374 U. 153. for the reasons that follow. Page 403 U. 467 . Go-Bart Importing Co.285 U. Where the initial intrusion that brings the police within plain view of such an article is supported not by a warrant. and the "automobile exception. the police informed Mrs. United States. search incident to lawful arrest. Cupp. Hayden. California. but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. to condemn the subsequent search at the station house. Stanley v. supra. Cf. and. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification -whether it be a warrant for another object. two officers were sent to guard the back door while the main party approached from the front. 461 Page 403 U. the later search at the station house was plainly illegal. 57. 344. S. S. Two police officers then drove her in police car to the house of a relative in another town."Carroll. the police lacked probable cause to seize or search the defendant's automobile at the time of his Page 403 U. it is unnecessary to consider the applicability Of Cooper. and they stayed with her there until around midnight.387 U. supra. Warden v. the "plain view" doctrine has been applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused. Cf. or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused -. It is well established that.. There. not even the inconvenience of a special police detail to guard the immobilized automobile. the "plain view" doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges. [Footnote 19] Page 403 U. the later search at the station house was therefore illegal. 358. The problem with the "plain view" doctrine has been to identify the circumstances in which plain view has legal significance.394 U. as such. any evidence seized by the police will be in plain view. 452. 557.no alerted criminal be on flight. Page 403 U. cf. 464 arrest.385 U. Supposing the seizure to be thus An example of the applicability of the "plain view" doctrine is the situation in which the police have a warrant to search a given area for specified objects. Since the seizure was therefore Page 403 U. without resistance of any kind on his part. S. Lefkowitz. As in Dyke. and we may assume that the police had probable cause to seize the automobile. S.265 U. California. no confederates waiting to move the evidence. Thus. S. 465 house. Georgia. but by one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. 282 U. concurring in result). S. 58. S. What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. S. [Footnote 18] illegal. Coolidge was arrested inside the house. is said to support a subsequent warrantless search at the station house. rather than being simply the normal concomitant of any search." and. 762-763.When the police arrived at the Coolidge house to arrest him. 394 U. Steele v. 571 (STEWART. in the course of the search. the extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them. Here there was probable cause. [Footnote 21] C The State's third theory in support of the warrantless seizure and search of the Pontiac car is that the car itself was an "instrumentality of the crime. that she and her baby had to spend the night elsewhere. 731. [Footnote 20] Rather. 206. at least at the moment of seizure. S. 294. Of course. And an object that comes into view during a search incident to arrest that is appropriately limited in scope under existing law may be seized without a warrant. supra. legal or illegal. Lewis v. But it is important to keep in mind that. to the subsequent search. United States v. is of no help to the State. [Footnote 22] But.S. under certain circumstances. supra." despite its label. S. S. S. 498. since that case held only that. S. the seizure is also legitimate. Hayden. at 395 U. S. v. with or without probable cause. at 374 U. S. S. S. the police may seize evidence in plain view without a warrant. no contraband or stolen goods or weapons.and permits the warrantless seizure. Coolidge. California. they may also seize it and search it later at the police station. is simply irrelevant. might be seized by the police on Coolidge's property because it was in plain view. the distinction between an "instrumentality of crime" and "mere evidence" was done away with byWarden v. Of course. Taylor Implement Mfg. In short. S. There was no way in which he could conceivably have gained access to the automobile after the police arrived on his property. Harris v. United States -. 285 U. United States. S. but no exigent circumstances justified the police in proceeding without a warrant. the only other adult occupant of the lawful.267 U. 395 Page 403 U. and that she could not use either of the Coolidge cars.

347. 497-498. while the inconvenience of procuring a warrant to cover an inadvertent discovery is great. and the case remanded to the New Hampshire Supreme Court. S. e. 699. alone. particularly describing . S. 471 unreasonable" in the absence of "exigent circumstances. The requirement of a warrant to seize imposes no inconvenience whatever. 493. at 395 U. but of a general. such as hot pursuit or search incident to lawful arrest. MR. United States. But to extend the scope of such an intrusion to the seizure of objects -. Since that theme is a recurring one in controversies over the proper meaning and scope of the Fourth Amendment. this Court has repeatedly stated and enforced the basic rule that the police may not enter and make a warrantless seizure. The second. S. And. . S. S." Incontrovertible testimony of the senses that an incriminating object is on premises belonging to a criminal suspect may establish the fullest possible measure of probable cause. S. Johnson v.379 U. Georgia.335 U. United States. Warden v. there is often not a great deal of difference between the situations closest to it on either side. 357 U. United States.334 U. . 294. of course. Marron v. But even where the object is contraband. [Footnote 25] Page 403 U. 643. it is apparent that the "plain view" exception cannot justify the police seizure of the Pontiac car in this case. this initial intrusion is justified by a warrant or by an exception such as "hot pursuit" or search incident to a lawful arrest. the seizure of an object in plain view is consistent with the second objective. 468 a piece of evidence. The premise here is that any intrusion in the way of search or seizure is an evil.387 U. McDonald v. where the police know in advance the location of the evidence and intend to seize it. First. S. then there is a violation of the express constitutional requirement of "Warrants . and sometimes dangerous -. 192. See.g. United States. that no amount of probable cause can justify a warrantless search or seizure absent "exigent circumstances. distinct objective is that those searches deemed necessary should be as limited as possible. but by one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. S.333 U. Stanley v. Chimel v. S." The initial intrusion may. they knew the automobile's exact description and location well in advance. . [the] things to be seized. S. And this is not a case involving contraband or stolen goods or objects dangerous in themselves. concurring in result). Stanford v. exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings. and so was the subsequent search at the station house. as just stated. [Footnote 26] The rationale of the exception to the warrant requirement. The "plain view" doctrine is not in conflict with the first objective. United States. United States. In each case. S. [Footnote 28] Page 403 U. Jones v.. and the problem is not that of intrusion per se. United States. Trupiano v.286 U. 476. See. The first of these is that plain view. Page 403 U. 116 U. But where the discovery is anticipated. S. 610. Since evidence obtained in the course of the search was admitted at Coolidge's trial.Cf. S. S. the police inadvertently come upon Page 403 U. since it does not convert the search into a general or exploratory one. 451. S. J. S. S. [Footnote 27] Page 403 U. 473 The seizure was therefore unconstitutional. United States. S.367 U.365 U. supra. at 394 U. United States. This is simply a corollary of the familiar principle discussed above. 395 U. S. 571-572 (STEWART." If the initial intrusion is bottomed upon a warrant that fails to mention a particular object.357 U. United States. Here. Chapman v. is that a plain view seizure will not turn an initially valid (and therefore limited) search into a "general" one. S. be legitimated not by a warrant. The police had ample opportunity to obtain a valid warrant. Katz v. 470 Much the most important part of the conflict that has been so notable in this Court's attempts over a hundred years to develop a coherent body of Fourth Amendment law has been caused by . S. McDonald v.to require them to ignore it until they have obtained a warrant particularly describing it. S. Texas. Ohio. The warrant accomplishes this second objective by requiring a "particular description" of the things to be seized.335 U. Where. S.g. The rationale for the "plain view" exception is evident if we keep in mind the two distinct constitutional protections served by the warrant requirement. S. the situation is altogether different. there is a single theme that runs through what he has to say about the two exceptions. 474 unstartling proposition that. 624-630.not contraband nor stolen nor dangerous in themselves -. D In his dissenting opinion today. 195-196.S. when a line is drawn.. because plain view does not occur until a search is in progress. JUSTICE WHITE marshals the arguments that can be made against our interpretation of the "automobile" and "plain view" exceptions to the warrant requirement.to the evidence or to the police themselves -. it would often be a needless inconvenience. e. rather than piecemeal. though the police know its location and intend to seize it. Mapp v. or at least none which is constitutionally cognizable in a legal system that regards warrantless searches as "per se Page 403 U. 469 The second limitation is that the discovery of evidence in plain view must be inadvertent. or by an extraneous valid reason for the officer's presence.275 U. the judgment must be reversed.389 U. 1. 451. As against the minor peril to Fourth Amendment protections. Boyd v.which the police know in advance they will find in plain view and intend to seize would fly in the face of the basic rule that no amount of probable cause can justify a warrantless seizure. 10. is never enough to justify the warrantless seizure of evidence.S. . the magistrate's scrutiny is intended to eliminate altogether searches not based on probable cause. it seems appropriate to treat his views in this separate section. 275 U. The limits on the doctrine are implicit in the statement of its rationale. Beyond the Page 403 U. 761-762. so that no intrusion at all is justified without a careful prior determination of necessity. given the initial intrusion. 472 In the light of what has been said.. Hayden. Taylor v. once an otherwise lawful search is in progress. they intended to seize it when they came upon Coolidge's property. there is a major gain in effective law enforcement. at 116 U. the specific evil is the "general warrant" abhorred by the colonists. California.

If the arrest without a warrant is per se reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 478 arrest warrant. at 395 U. It is accepted. that a search or seizure carried out on a suspect's premises without a warrant is per se unreasonable. arrest him. The most common situation in which Fourth Amendment issues have arisen has been that in which the police enter the suspect's premises. From this it was said to follow that the full-scale . but whether the search was reasonable. if the police are under no circumstances required to obtain an arrest warrant before entering to arrest a person they have probable cause to believe has committed a felony. and that its scope must therefore be strictly defined in terms of the justifying "exigent circumstances. the more fundamental question of when the police may arrest a man in his house without a warrant has been little considered in the federal courts.disagreement over the importance of requiring law enforcement officers to secure warrants. if the very substantial intrusion implied in the entry and arrest are "reasonable" in Fourth Amendment terms. papers. as our cases concerning automobile searches. at least as a matter of principle. 475 presence of "exigent circumstances. and United States v. was that a warrantless entry for the purpose of arrest on probable cause is legitimate and reasonable no matter what the circumstances." It might appear that the difficult inquiry would be when it is that the police can enter upon a person's property to seize his "person . S." obtain an arrest warrant before entering a man's house to seize his person. what searches and seizures may the police carry out without prior authorization by a magistrate?" searches and seizures inside a man's house without warrant are per se unreasonable in the absence of some one of a number of well defined "exigent circumstances. The Court there applied the basic rule that the "search incident to arrest" is an exception to the warrant requirement. supra. then the less intrusive search incident to arrest must also be reasonable. however. either on the ground that the warrant was improperly issued because there was not probable cause.331 U. Both sides to the controversy appear to recognize a distinction between searches and seizures that take place on a man's property -. was open to the criticism that it was absurd to permit the police to make an entry in the dead of night for purposes of seizing the "person" by main force. United States. S. [Footnote 32] or on the ground that the police search and seizure went beyond that which they could carry out as an incident to the execution of the arrest warrant. that the notion that the warrantless entry of a man's house in order to arrest him on probable cause is per se legitimate is in fundamental conflict with the basic principle of Fourth Amendment law that Page 403 U. and then carry out a warrantless search and seizure of evidence. If no warrant is ever required to legitimate the extremely serious intrusion of a midnight entry to seize the person. But the law has not developed in this fashion. supra. S.g. It is clear. then it can be argued plausibly that a warrant should never be required to legitimate a very sweeping search incident to such an entry and arrest. and sharply contrasting answers to this question have been assayed by this Court in the past. the evidence seized may later be challenged. . applied after the fact of search or seizure when the police attempt to introduce the fruits in evidence. and effects. the conflict has been over the question of what qualifies as an "exigent circumstance. [Footnote 31] With respect to searches and seizures carried out on a suspect's premises. supra. the search and seizure went beyond permissible limits. Where there is a warrant for the suspect's arrest. street searches and administrative searches make clear. then it makes sense as well to require a warrant to seize other items that may be on the premises. and then refuse them permission to seize objects lying around in plain sight. even if the arrest was valid. 476 Page 403 U. Neither exigency can conceivably justify the far-ranging searches authorized under Harrisand Rabinowitz." The exigency in question arises from the dangers of harm to the arresting officer and of destruction of evidence within the reach of the arrestee. The answer of the dissenting opinion of MR.his home or office -. E. then it is difficult to perceive why a search incident in the style of Harris andRabinowitz is not per se reasonable as well. [Footnote 35] Perhaps because each of these lines of attack offers a plethora of litigable issues. Rabinowitz. The contrasting answer in Harris v.. The approach taken in Trupiano. on the other hand." without prior judicial approval. that there was no probable cause to arrest. was that a valid entry for purposes of arrest served to legitimate warrantless searches and seizures throughout the premises where the arrest occurred.and those carried out elsewhere.The more common inquiry has therefore been: "Assuming a valid police entry for purposes of arrest. This Court has chosen on a number of occasions to assume the validity of an arrest and decide the case before it on the issue of the scope of permissible warrantless search. Others have argued with equal force that a test of reasonableness. electronic surveillance. 776-780. however.S. California. supported by no decision of this Court. California. It is arguable that. This argument against the Trupiano approach is of little force so long as it is assumed that the police must. . affords ample safeguard for the rights in question. so that "[t]he relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant. United States." This conflict came to the fore in Chimel v. [Footnote 34] or that. was that no searches and seizures could be legitimated by the mere fact of valid entry for purposes of arrest so long as there was no showing of special difficulties in obtaining a warrant for search and seizure. supra. [Footnote 33] Where the police act without an Page 403 U. The answer of Trupiano v." [Footnote 30] As to other kinds of intrusions. Some have argued that a determination by a magistrate of probable cause as a precondition of any search or seizure is so essential that the Fourth Amendment is violated whenever the police might reasonably have obtained a warrant but failed to do so. S. Chimel v. then. The question of the scope of search and seizure once the police are on the premises would appear to be subsidiary to the basic issue of when intrusion is permissible. the suspect may argue that an arrest warrant was necessary. there has been disagreement about the basic rules to be applied. 395 U. S. in the absence of one of a number of defined exceptions based on "exigent circumstances. unless the police can show that it falls within one of a carefully defined set of exceptions based on the The approach taken in Harris and Rabinowitz was open to the criticism that it made it so easy for the police to arrange to search a man's premises without a warrant Page 403 U. If the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant to enter and seize the person. The situation is different. 145. however spacious those premises might be. JUSTICE WHITE in Chimel." [Footnote 29] Two very broad. S. 477 that the Constitution's protection of a man's "effects" became a dead letter.

and Chambers v. there was no "exigent circumstance" to justify their failure to obtain a warrant. The warrant requirement has been a valued part of our constitutional law for decades. if we take the viewpoint of a judge called on only to decide in the abstract. JUSTICE WHITE takes a basically similar approach to the question whether the search of the automobile in Page 403 U.S. Such a reexamination "would confront us with a grave constitutional question. or any other portable container in a house. The fundamental objection. Mississippi.subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions." United States v. JUSTICE WHITE's view that warrantless entry for purposes of arrest and warrantless seizure and search of automobiles are per se reasonable so long as the police have probable cause. then.where there was no stopping and the vehicle was unoccupied -. supra. is that it proves too much. Indeed. if we simply ignore the warrant requirement -. and it has determined the result in scores and scores of cases in courts all over this country. [Footnote 37]" is not so frail that its continuing vitality depends on the fate of a supposed doctrine of warrantless arrest. however. appears to be a classic example of the doctrine that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable in the absence of exigent circumstances. a trunk. seize and search an unoccupied vehicle parked on the owner's private property. are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment -. If it is reasonable for the police to make a warrantless nighttime entry for the purpose Page 403 U.S. Maroney. supra. 479 this case can be justified under Carroll v. United States. and we would simply have read the Fourth Amendment out of the Constitution. None of the cases cited by MR. an important working part of our machinery of government. S. so long as the police could reasonably make a warrantless nighttime entry onto Coolidge's property in order to arrest him. or backyard. dissenting). given probable cause. S. supra. since the intrusion was less substantial. Every word in the opinion indicates the Court's adherence to the underlying rule and its care in delineating a limited exception. sitting en banc. United States." The case of Warden v. then surely it must be reasonable as well to make a warrantless entry to search for and seize vital evidence of a serious crime. 371 U. The confinement of the exceptions to their appropriate scope was the function of Chimel v. then it is absurd to prevent them from seizing his automobile as evidence of the crime. then "[t]he exceptions cannot be enthroned into the rule.were also reasonable. S. Wong Sun v. at 371 U. JUSTICE WHITE disposes of this "grave constitutional question. S. 481 a "hot pursuit" justification for the police entry into the defendant's house without a warrant for his arrest. 480 of arresting a person in his bed. whether the forceful nighttime entry into a dwelling to arrest a person reasonably believed within. 395 U. upon probable cause that he had committed a felony. then it is hard to see why they need a warrant to seize and search a suitcase.Carroll. [Footnote 36] But we find it unnecessary to decide the question in this case. JUSTICE WHITE's dissenting opinion. MR. has unanimously reached the same conclusion. JUSTICE WHITE is correct that it has generally been assumed that the Fourth Amendment is not violated by the warrantless entry of a man's house for purposes of arrest. S. operating as a matter of course to check the "well-intentioned but mistakenly over-zealous executive officers" [Footnote 38] who are a part of any system of law enforcement. under circumstances where no reason appears why an arrest warrant could not have been sought. 772-775. If it is to be a true guide to constitutional police action. Hayden. 721.in short. argues once again that. with no showing at all of an emergency. is consistent with the Fourth Amendment. then by the same logic any search or seizure could be carried out without a warrant. MR. California. The application of the basic rule of Fourth Amendment law therefore requires that the fruits of the warrantless seizure be suppressed. supra. supra. it is but a short step to the position that it is never necessary for the police to obtain a warrant before searching and seizing an automobile. it might be wise to reexamine the assumption. Read thus. after the fact. a shopping bag. California. without a warrant. given probable cause. make a warrantless entry for the purpose of making an arrest. JUSTICE WHITE appears to adopt exactly this view when he proposes that the Court should "treat searches of automobiles as we do the arrest of a person. S. S. rather than just a pious phrase. whenever they have probable cause.394 U. supra. although there were no exigent circumstances whatever. or should be. 728. The rule that "searches conducted outside the judicial process. at 395 U. JUSTICE WHITE that the police may.S.search incident to arrest was also reasonable." Jones v. If we were to agree with MR. garage.. Yet. 481-482. The same conflict arises in this case. 499-500. S. namely. if MR. the case quite evidently does not extend to the situation at bar. And MR. at 339 U.Carroll comes to stand for something more. provided that they have probable cause. it would be difficult to see the basis for distinguishing searches of houses and seizures of effects. on its face. and that seizures and searches of automobiles are likewise per se reasonable. See also Davis v. The stopping of a vehicle on the open highway and a subsequent search amount to a major interference in the lives of the occupants. since it was a lesser intrusion. S. 482 . and planned all along to seize it. without prior approval by judge or magistrate. If the police may. It is not an inconvenience to be somehow "weighed" against the claims of police efficiency. 80 (Frankfurter. Rabinowitz. Carroll held such an interference to be reasonable without a warrant. to the line of argument adopted by MR. JUSTICE WHITE in his dissent in this case and in Chimel v. It is. 394 U. Using reasoning of this sort. where we dealt with the Page 403 U. not being used for any illegal purpose. certainly stands by negative implication for the proposition that an arrest warrant is required in the absence of exigent circumstances. J. S." If we were to accept MR. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. It may be thought to follow a fortiori that the seizure and search here -. whether the police have behaved "reasonably" under all the circumstances -. Since the police knew of the presence of the automobile.where the Court elaborated Page 403 U. 357 U. United States. at 357 U.

The "plain view" exception is intimately linked with the search-incident exception. who would put the 'liberal construction' approach of cases like Miranda \[v." Post at 403 U. Coolidge confessed to stealing $375 from his employer. S. Coolidge was apparently motivated in part by a desire to check his story against whatever she might say.can be easily understood and applied by courts and law enforcement officers alike. as in Trupiano. Such an approach might dispose of this case clearly and certainly enough. 449-450 (concurring in judgment). 58. Seen 24. one way or another. Page 403 U. but. But I perceive in these cases the essential tension that springs from the uncertain mandate which this provision of the Constitution gives to this Court." "without apparent reason. JUSTICE WHITE believes we might achieve clarity and certainty would be the adoption of his proposal that we treat entry for purposes of arrest and seizure of an automobile alike as per se reasonable on probable cause. while he was being interrogated at the police station. JUSTICE WHITE's alternative suggestion that clarity and certainty. A remark by Page 403 U. The trial judge found as a fact. the efficient administration of justice counsels consideration of the second substantial question under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments presented by this case. supra. JUSTICE WHITE s dissent characterizes the coexistence of Chimel. S." or that we have "abandoned any attempt" to find reasoned distinctions in this area. in Chimel v. 707-708 and n. And as to the automobile exception. that we cease today "to strive for clarity and consistency of analysis. as the similar arguments put forward in dissent in the two cases indicate clearly enough. 424. and do not suggest here. I suppose. JUSTICE WHITE. supra. the police knew very little about the weapon that had killed Pamela Mason. 402 U. 485 understand this contention. a word about Trupiano v. and the ample opportunity for obtaining a warrant. S. After the group returned from Concord to Manchester. the determining factors are advance police knowledge of the existence and location of the evidence. The petitioner contends that. it would cast into limbo the whole notion of a Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. S. above. See 334 U. But it is no less nonsense to suggest. at 334 U. S. and that the principle it reflects -.S.386 U. III Because of the prospect of a new trial. Chambers. California. S. California. the police had made it a practice to ask all those questioned . Of course. 521. as the cases discussed in 403 U.116 U. Presumably one of the ways in which MR. The time is long past when men believed that development of the law must always proceed by the smooth incorporation of new situations into a single coherent analytical framework. that. We are convinced that the result reached in this case is correct. February 2. 403 U. S. and this case as "punitive. supra. he would take vehement exception to any such cavalier treatment of this Court's decisions. and a principle that preserves and protects the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment.402 U.] andBoyd v. To begin with. however spacious. S. In order to Page 403 U. We need accept neither the "clarity and certainty" of a Fourth Amendment without a warrant requirement nor the facile consistency obtained by wholesale overruling of recently decided cases. 616 (1886)." Post at 403 U. Surely. 519. supra. S. during the course of the test. No trick of logic will make them all perfectly consistent. corresponds with that given inTrupiano. it would be nonsense to pretend that our decision today reduces Fourth Amendment law to complete order and harmony. 520. It is a principle that should work to protect the citizen without overburdening the police. and in part by the need for some corroboration of his admission to the theft from his employer. and Coolidge apparently made a number of statements which the police immediately checked out as best they could. Maroney." "unexplained. 403 U. Our discussion of "plain view" in 403 U. as well as coherence and credibility. 436. 517. post at 403 U. 484 MR. but. as we have tried to show above. we held that a search of the person of an arrestee and of the area under his immediate control could be carried out without a warrant. Cooper. 757. S. that the police must obtain a warrant if they anticipate that they will find specific evidence during the course of such a search.assumption that a search "incident" to a lawful arrest may encompass all of the premises where the arrest occurs." "extravagant. S. quite apart from his strong disagreement on the merits. since we cannot adopt all its implications. S. might also be achieved by modifying Chimel and overruling Chambers and Cooper. as does MR. when the police obtained a rifle and articles of his clothing from his home on the night of Sunday. supra. at the time of the visit. California. S." and "inexplicable. S. During the extensive investigation following the discovery of the body. JUSTICE HARLAN concerning the Fifth Amendment is applicable as well to the Fourth: "There are those. S. and the record supports him. To permit warrantless plain view seizures without limit would be to undo much of what was decided in Chimel. A The lie detector test administered to Coolidge in Concord on the afternoon of the 2d was inconclusive as to his activities on the night of Pamela Mason's disappearance. MR. the interrogation about Coolidge's movements on the night of the disappearance continued." "inconsistent. S. The bullet that had been retrieved was of small caliber. The decision to send two officers to the Coolidge house to speak with Mrs. 483 to bring clarity and certainty to a body of law that lower courts and law enforcement officials often find confusing. although both are arguably inconsistent with Trupiano. Here. United States. Byers. but the police were unsure whether the weapon was a rifle or a pistol. S.that the police must obtain a warrant when they intend to seize an object outside the scope of a valid search incident to arrest -. police intention to seize it. 403 U. 1964. It is urged upon us that we have here a "ready opportunity. Finally. S. they engaged in a search and seizure violative of the Constitution. And it is difficult to take seriously MR. we do not question the decisions of the Court inCooper v. We did not indicate there. 521. United States. 521. and Chambers v. The decisions of the Court over the years point in differing directions and differ in emphasis.384 U. we do not "reinstate" Trupiano." California v.384 U. Arizona. 27.However. it is necessary to review in some detail the circumstances of the February 2 episode. side-byside with the balancing approach of Schmerber \[v.] and perceive nothing more subtle than a set of constructional antinomies to be utilized as convenient bootstraps to one result or another.

I will get them in the bedroom. 330 F. you had nothing to hide. and in no way coercive." The three went into the bedroom. and. Since we concerning the clothes Coolidge had been wearing on the night of the disappearance was logical. Goldberg. 290 P. The police gave her a receipt for the guns and the clothing. in light of all the circumstances of the case. the exclusionary rule is properly applicable to the evidence taken from the Coolidge house on the night of February 2. must be regarded as having acted as an "instrument" or agent of the state when she produced her husband's belongings. United States.273 U. S. Gambino v.275 U. you may take them. sought out her husband's guns and clothing and then taken them to the police station to be used as evidence against him. 'No. then. including Coolidge himself. . when Mrs. convention of openness and honesty. of her "A. Coolidge could not or did not "waive" her husband's constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures." "Q. and they might take what they wanted?" "A. She then produced four pairs of trousers. I believe I asked if they wanted the guns. is whether Mrs." Elkins v. Coolidge brought out the guns and clothing and then handed them over to the police." The two policemen also asked Mrs. Coolidge took all four guns out of the closet. without more. and that they were not motivated by a desire to find the murder weapon.2d 505 (1955). Consequently.364 U. and to ask the owners for permission to run tests on those that met the very general description of the murder weapon. one might doubt the competence of the officers involved had they not asked exactly the questions they did ask. Coolidge what her husband had been wearing on the night of the disappearance.' I said. Page 403 U. I can't recall if I said that then or before. S. Indeed. If. 310.whether they owned any guns. That was it. when the police visited Mrs. Tarantino. as they had asked those questioned earlier in the investigation." and their target is official misconduct. 953 (1964). They are "to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way -. took the various articles to the police station. Among these are the simple. Her account continued: "A. 486 The two plainclothesmen asked Mrs. we need not consider the petitioner's further argument that Mrs. 'We have nothing to hide. S. Coolidge on the night of the 2d. not to repair. S. Coolidge. cert. McDowell. The exclusionary rules were fashioned "to prevent. S. 487 Yet it cannot be said that the police should have obtained a warrant for the guns and clothing before they set out to visit Mrs. The question presented here is whether the conduct of the police officers at the Coolidge house was such as to make her actions their actions for purposes of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and their attendant exclusionary rules. According to her testimony at the pretrial suppression hearing. and uncertainty as to what course is most likely to be helpful to the absent spouse. 45 Cal. Coolidge was the victim of a search and seizure within the constitutional meaning of those terms. 206.2d 590. I don't recall.by removing the incentive to disregard it. There was nothing to compel them to announce to the suspect that they intended to question his wife about his movements on the night of the disappearance or about the theft from his employer. Did you feel at that time that you had something to hide?" cannot accept this interpretation of the facts. wholly on her own initiative. "We will come with you. Cf. The test.' then the other gentleman turned around and said. S. they were unaware of the previous visit during which Coolidge had shown other officers three guns. People v. And surely. there no doubt always exist forces pushing the spouse to cooperate with Page 403 U." "* * * *" "Q. No. she replied. Once Mrs. but often powerful. S. United States. Coolidge. Coolidge whether her husband had been at home on the night of the murder victim's disappearance. and she replied that he had not. "Yes.'" "Q.?'" "A. of these incentives to full disclosure or active cooperation with the police. 377 U. at some time. She also brought out a hunting jacket. Coolidge. after a search of the Coolidge cars not here in issue.256 U. 465. 28. it is argued." One of the officers replied. see Byars v. where Mrs. Had Mrs.2d 30 (CA3). Did you go further and say. 217. and indicated that her husband had probably worn either of two of them on that evening. it must be upon the basis that some type of unconstitutional police conduct occurred. 489 The first branch of the petitioner's argument is that. the policemen were surely acting normally and properly when they asked her. Cf. the fear that secretive behavior will intensify suspicion. about any guns there might be in the house. S. she was acting as an "instrument" of the officials.S. you indicated to them that. United States. Coolidge had admitted them. United States v. 'We might as well take them. denied. as far as you were concerned. The question B Page 403 U. Nor can it be said that they should have obtained Coolidge's permission for a seizure they did not intend to make. But it is no part of the policy underlying the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to discourage citizens from aiding to the utmost of their ability in the apprehension of criminals. 364 U. One gentleman said. The trial judge found as a fact that. 488 the police. S. Coolidge. there can be no doubt under existing law that the articles would later have been admissible in evidence. But. In a situation like the one before us. when Mrs. complying with a "demand" made by them. since they had no intention of rummaging around among Coolidge's effects or of dispossessing him of any of his property. But there is nothing constitutionally suspect in the existence. Burdeau v. as the petitioner's argument suggests. 'If you would like them. They then asked her if her husband owned any guns. Page 403 U.

with perfect courtesy. or. and that she believed that she had nothing to hide.own accord. To hold that the conduct of the police here was a search and seizure would be to hold. The two officers who questioned her behaved. it was not incumbent on the police to stop her or avert their eyes. The crux of the petitioner's argument must be that. There is not the slightest implication of an attempt on their part to coerce or dominate her. Coolidge replied. for that matter. or have asked her whether she had been authorized by her husband to release them. and there is nothing to indicate that she realized that he had offered only three of them for inspection on that occasion. that a criminal suspect has constitutional protection against Page 403 U. in effect. . "If you would like them." to which Mrs. "We might as well take them. they should have replied that they could not take them. Coolidge described her own motive as that of clearing her husband. rather than simply describing them. after one policeman had declined the offer. produced the guns and clothes for inspection. when Mrs. good faith effort by his wife to clear him of suspicion. it is well to keep in mind that Mrs. It is so ordered. as her own testimony shows. and the case is remanded to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 490 the adverse consequences of a spontaneous. She had seen her husband himself produce his guns for two other policemen earlier in the week. Coolidge asked the policemen whether they wanted the guns. you may take them. the other turned and said." In assessing the claim that this course of conduct amounted to a search and seizure. [Footnote 39] The judgment is reversed. S. to direct her actions by the more subtle techniques of suggestion that are available to officials in circumstances like these. or have first telephoned Coolidge at the police station and asked his permission to take them. Instead.

Examination of the applicant. Laurel. but this is not entirely true. petitioner. depositions were taken of the complainant's two witnesses in addition to the affidavit executed by them. to prevent arbitrary and indiscriminate use of the warrant. 8 Implementing this requirement. Invoking these provisions.SEC. 71410 November 25. continues to dwindle against the onslaughts of authoritarianism. dating back through the mists of history to the mighty English kings in their fortresses of power. As we can do no less if we are to be true to the mandate of the fundamental law. 3. BRANCH XXXVIII. a search warrant must be supported by probable cause to be determined by the judge or some other authorized officer after examining the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. houses. J: Once again we are asked to annul a search warrant on the ground that it violates the Constitution. Chief of Staff 6 as referring to "such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched." As held in a long line of decisions. following a brief debate. Commenting on this matter. respondents. 4. 4 To be valid. As a matter of fact. The challenged search warrant was issued by the respondent judge on May 10. He asks that their admission be temporarily restrained (which we have) 1 and thereafter permanently enjoined. papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated.respondence shag be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court. however. readily accepted the proposal and it was thereafter. CRUZ. GONZALES. and the persons or things to be seized. before issuing the warrant. or when public safety and order require otherwise. We must cherish and protect it all the more now because it is like a prodigal son returning. ROAN. We are among the fortunate few. 1984. The articles seized from him are sought to be used as evidence in his prosecution for illegal possession of firearms. in addition to any affidavits presented to him. after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. 9 It is correct to say. 4. The petitioner claims that no depositions were taken by the respondent judge in accordance with the above rule. 5 Probable cause was described by Justice Escolin in Burgos v. the officers conducting the search found in the premises one Colt Magnum revolver and eighteen live bullets which they confiscated. or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law. 2 The petitioner's house was searched two days later but none of the articles listed in the warrant was discovered. approved by the Convention. No. Although the condition did not appear in the corresponding provision of the federa Constitution of the United States which served as our model it was then already embodied in the Code of Criminal Procedure. the probable cause must refer to only one specific offense. and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge. THE HONORABLE ROMULO T. and attach them to the record. we do annul. Their number. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MARINDUQUE. 3 However. (1) The privacy of communication and cor. the lowly subject had his own castle where he was monarch of all he surveyed. PRESIDING JUDGE. That right has endured through the ages albeit only in a few libertarian regimes. Even then. 7 The inclusion of the requirement for the "examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce" was a refinement proposed by Delegate Vicente J. One of the most precious rights of the citizen in a free society is the right to be left alone in the privacy of his own house. Delegate Jose P.R. the respondent judge declared: . 1986 JOSEFINO S. That right has ancient roots. vs. (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Nevertheless. — The municipal or city judge must. Francisco in the1934 Constitutional Convention. No less important. This was his humble cottage from which he could bar his sovereign lord and all the forces of the Crown. His purpose was the strengthening of the guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures. They are now the bases of the charge against the petitioner. there must be a specific description of the place to be searched and the things to be seized. G. and particularly describing the place to be searched. That right is guaranteed in the following provisions of Article IV of the 1973 Constitution: SEC. THE PROVINCIAL COMMANDER. PC-INP MARINDUQUE. The right of the people to be secure in their persons. the Rules of Court provided in what was then Rule 126: SEC. personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing. Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights of that body. THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF MARINDUQUE. able again to enjoy this right after the ordeal of the past despotism. the petitioner claims he was the victim of an illegal search and seizure conducted by the military authorities. regrettably. that the complainant himself was not subjected to a similar interrogation.

" The suggestion is that he would not have asked any questions at all if the affidavit had already been completed when it was submitted to him. was insufficient to justify the issuance of the warrant sought. 14 Even assuming then that it would have sufficed to take the depositions only of the witnesses and not of the applicant himself. In this case. as we held in a previous case. both of whom likewise presented to me their respective affidavits taken by Pat. if he knew and understood the same. except that they were made in the form of answers to the questions put to them by the respondent judge. or if the acts related were really done openly. A search warrant is still necessary. The fact that they did bother to do so indicates that they themselves recognized the necessity of such a warrant for the seizure of the weapons the petitioner was suspected of possessing. As the application was not yet subscribed and sworn to." and only because "the application was not yet subscribed and swom to. an intimidation that the petitioner could not resist. the subject thereof is necessarily illegal per se. The examining magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the application. 1984. We. 20 We do not agree. was waived when the petitioner voluntarily submitted to the search and manifested his conformity in writing. Maximo Abad. it was not because: 1) there was no valid search warrant. among others. hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to the record. Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida. of course. by their own personal information. he did not ask his own searching questions. The respondent judge almost unquestioningly received the witnesses' statement that they saw eight men deliver arms to the petitioner in his house on May 2. 1866 and considered malum prohibitum. Josue V. not merely routinary or proforma. Prohibited articles may be seized but only as long as the search is valid. and Tohilida said he saw everything through an open window of the house while he was near the gate. who both claimed to be "intelligence informers. if he knew and understood the same. standing alone. the Solicitor General argues that whatever defect there was. In short. The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he niay produce and attach them to the record. then the military authorities could have just entered the premises and looked for the guns reportedly kept by the petitioner without bothering to first secure a search warrant. The respondents also argue that the Colt Magnum pistol and the eighteen have bullets seized from the petitioner were illegal per se and therefore could have been taken by the military authorities even without a warrant. Lining. 17 This was supposedly done overtly. or whether it was on the first floor or a second floor. . an he did was question Captain Quillosa on the contents of his affidavit only "to ascertain.Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita. What we see here is pressure exerted by the military authorities. He limited himself to the contents of the affidavit. considering that these acts were against the law. as required by settled jurisprudence.38 caliber revolvers. and 2) absent such a warrant. the military officers who entered the petitioner's premises had no right to be there and therefore had no right either to seize the pistol and bullets. to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it wifl be found later that his declarations are false. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause. If the rule were otherwise. if the claimed probable cause is to be established. 1984. Mauro P. the declarations of the witnesses were readily accepted and the search warrant sought was issued forthwith.D. the meaningful remark made by Tohilida that they were suspicious of the petitioner because he was a follower of the opposition candidate in the forthcoming election (a "Lecarista") 16 did not excite the respondent judge's own suspicions. 19 One may well wonder why it did not occur to the respondent judge to ask how the witness could be so certain even as to the caliber of the guns. 10 By his own account.45 caliber pistols and two were. the right thereto was not validly waived by the petitioner. As this Court held in Mata v. The respondent judge also declared that he "saw no need to have applicant Quillosa's deposition taken considering that he was applying for a search warrant on the basis of the information provided by the aforenamed witnesses whose depositions as aforementioned had already been taken by the undersigned. Confronted with the armed presence of the military and the presumptive authority of a judicial writ. to establish the apphcant's claims. These would have been judicious questions but they were injudiciously omitted. among others. He did not take the applicant's deposition in writing and attach them to the record. the applicant was asking for the issuance of the search warrant on the basis of mere hearsay and not of information personally known to him. Instead. rendering the search warrant invalid." 13 The rationale of the requirement. His application. In any case. I proceeded to examine Captain Quillosa on the contents thereof to ascertain. there was here. Quinosa personally filed his application for a search warrant on May 10. Hence.The truth is that when PC Capt. Possession of the said articles. or how far he was from the window." 12 In other words. who practically coerced the petitioner to sign the supposed waiver as a guaranty against a possible challenge later to the validity of the search they were conducting. a police investigator assigned to the PC-INP command at Camp Col. or why his presence was not noticed at all." shows that they were in the main a mere restatement of their allegations in their affidavits. is to provide a ground for a prosecution for perjury in case the applicant's declarations are found to be false. in the full view of the witnesses. This should have put him on guard as to the motivations of the witnesses and alerted him to possible misrepresentations from them. the Wegal articles could be taken even without a warrant. It was therefore necessary for the witnesses themselves. This was not. It does not follow that because an offense is malum prohibitum. he appeared before me in the company of his two (2) witnesses. Given the repressive atmosphere of the Marcos regime. Significantly. Nonetheless. 18 He could even positively say that six of the weapons were. as we see it. 15 A study of the depositions taken from witnesses Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida. but the subjects of this kind of offense may not be summarily seized simply because they are prohibited. there is still the question of the sufficiency of their depositions. the petitioner had no choice but to submit. it is urged. It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive. therefore. 21 the manifestation merely of our traditional Filipino hospitality and respect for authority. Bayona: 11 Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. Afterwards. together with the affidavit presented to him. he subscribed and swore to the same before me. The above-discussed defects have rendered the search warrant invalid. was violative of P.

Our restraining order of August 6." Chief Justice Concepcion observed that the exclusionary rule was nonetheless "the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction" against abuse. however. 1-84 issued by the respondent judge on May 10. the said articles must remain incustodia legis. But as we said and did in Burgos. The respondents cannot even claim that they stumbled upon the pistol and bullets for the fact is that these things were deliberately sought and were not in plain view when they were taken. a warrantless search may be made incidental to a lawful arrest. Gutierrez. is made permanent. JJ.J. of course. the conclusion is that the petitioner's pistol and bullets were confiscated illegally and therefore are protected by the exclusionary principle.. filed a motion for the quashal of the search warrant by the respondent judge in accordance with the normal procedure. Melencio-Herrera. will the wrong be repressed. Stonehill v. . Fernan. be used as evidence against the petitioner in the criminal action against him for illegal possession of firearms. Pending resolution of that case. is hereby declared null and void and accordingly set aside.It is true that there are certain instances when a search may be validly made without warrant and articles may be taken validly as a result of that search. 1984. Diokno established this rule which was later expressly affirmed in the 1973 Constitution. it is true that the petitioner should have. C. though. "this procedural flaw notwithstanding. 27 Clearly. " The pistol and bullets cannot. know that it cannot profit by their wrong. Feria. 24 Vessels and aircraft are also traditionally removed from the operation of the rule because of their mobility and their relative ease in fleeing the state's jurisdiction. the rule having been violated and no exception being applicable. concur. we take cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of the constitutional issues raised. No costs. the instant case does not come under any of the accepted exceptions. 26 And it has also been held that prohibited articles may be taken without warrant if they are open to eye and hand and the peace officer comes upon them inadvertently. Finally. While conceding that there may be occasions when the criminal might be allowed to go free because "the constable has blundered. 25The individual may knowingly agree to be searched or waive objections to an illegal search. The decision cited Judge Learned Hand's justification that "only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials. 28 WHEREFORE. Jr and Paras. SO ORDERED. 22 as when the person being arrested is frished for weapons he may otherwise be able to use against the arresting officer. before coming to this Court. Yap. Teehankee.. Hence. Motor cars may be inspected at borders to prevent smuggling of aliens and contraband 23 and even in the interior upon a showing of probable cause. For example.1985. Search Warrant No. Alampay.

poseur buyer. Amado Ani. team leader. December 14. about 1:30 P. Mari Musa was then asked where the P20. (2) T/Sgt. a buy-bust was planned. At Suterville. 1993 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. T/Sgt. Ani turned over to Sgt. Jesus Belarga. who came out of his house. 3 At the trial. T/Sgt. At the time Sgt. "E") for P10. Section 4 of Republic Act No. Convinced that the contents were marijuana. Jesus Belarga from M/Sgt. MARI MUSA y HANTATALU. 1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City. AMADO ANI. The same civilian informer had also described to him the appearance of Mari Musa. accused-appellant. and two women. Foncargas was assigned as back-up security.and (3) Athena Elisa P. ROMERO. of the 9th Narcotics Command (NARCOM) of Zamboanga City. Jesus Belarga. Jr. Ani walked back towards his companions and raised his right hand. The second time. in this appeal. The information filed on December 15. Branch XII.00 was and he told the NARCOM team he has given the money to his wife (who had slipped away). Ani returned to the NARCOM office and turned over the newspaper-wrapped marijuana to T/Sgt. Belarga inspected the stuff turned over to him and found it to be marijuana. Sgt.00 (with SN GA955883) by Belarga. there were four persons inside his house: Mari Musa.: The appellant. slipped away from the house. 1989 against the appellant reads: That on or about December 14. Ani approached Mari Musa. Ani opened the two wrappers and inspected the contents. who was later known as Mari Musa's wife. 1989. Belarga's team was composed of Sgt. Amado Ani was assigned as the poseur buyer for which purpose he was given P20. the woman. who acted as poseur-buyer in the buybust operation made against the appellant. Jesus Belarga. Mari Musa. 1989. 1989. Sgt. Anderson. another NARCOM agent. wilfully. finding him guilty of selling marijuana in violation of Article II. did then and there. The evidence of the prosecution was summarized by the trial court as follows: Prosecution evidence shows that in the morning of December 13. who was the NARCOM team leader of the buy-bust operation. as amended. Philippines. while the rest of the NARCOM group positioned themselves at strategic places about 90 to 100 meters from Mari Musa's house. Noh Sali Mihasun. Amado Ani was able to buy one newspaper-wrapped dried marijuana (Exh. riding the two civilian vehicles. two (2) wrappers containing dried marijuana leaves.R. Murillo for accused-appellant. not being authorized by law. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. another boy. proceeded to Suterville.00 marked money with him. Zamboanga City. vs. G. in company with a NARCOM civilian informer. Chief of Investigation Section. in the City of Zamboanga.. to the house of Mari Musa to which house the civilian informer had guided him. Arriving at the target site. The buy-bust money had been taken by T/Sgt. after he had succeeded to buy the marijuana. So Sgt.00 marked money. leader of a NARCOTICS COMMAND (NARCOM) team based at Calarian. namely: (1) Sgt. 1990. "L" & "L-l" ) The team under Sgt. The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Ani said he wanted some more stuff. unlawfully and feloniously sell to one SGT. seeks. Ani first approached Mari Musa. Pablo L. Amado Ani. After receiving the money. plaintiff-appellee. 6425. the prosecution presented three (3) witnesses. and for which Belarga signed a receipt (Exh. Belarga frisked Mari Musa but could not find the P20. 1990.M. Mari Musa went back to his house and came back and gave Amado Ani two newspaper wrappers containing dried marijuana. 96177 January 27. CONTRARY TO LAW. J. No. Sgt. The two NARCOM teams proceeded to the target site in two civilian vehicles. sped towards Sgt. . the above-named accused. Sgt. Sgt. Sgt. the Document Examiner and Forensic Chemist of PC-INP Crime Laboratory of Regional Command (RECOM) 9. Zamboanga City. The next day. Biong.00. the appellant pleaded not guilty. also of the 9th Narcotics Command of Zamboanga City. Ani gave Mari Musa the P20. The two NARCOM teams. one of whom Ani and Belarga later came to know to be Mari Musa's wife. Mari Musa was then placed under arrest and brought to the NARCOM office. instructed Sgt. Belarga. Ani with the NARCOM team returned to Mari Musa's house. Sgt. Sgt. dated August 31. Ani joined Belarga's team and returned to the house. the reversal of the decision. A pre-arranged signal was arranged consisting of Sgt. and asked Ani what he wanted. Amado Ani to conduct surveillance and test buy on a certain Mari Musa of Suterville. knowing the same to be a prohibited drug. Ani. Amado Ani. Belarga could see what went on between Ani and suspect Mari Musa from where he was. Sgt. otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Ani proceeded to the house of Mari Musa. Ani's raising his right hand. Information received from civilian informer was that this Mari Musa was engaged in selling marijuana in said place. Lego and Sgt. Belarga also found a plastic bag containing dried marijuana inside it somewhere in the kitchen. 2 Upon his arraignment on January 11.

was handcuffed and when Mari Musa asked why. The NARCOM agents were just silent. Mari Musa was in his house at Suterville. T/Sgt. Musa.) T. Three NARCOM agents. his wife was inside the one room of their house. "B-1") on the same day. "J-3".00. 1989. his one-year old child. T/Sgt. Zamboanga City. The trial court summarized the version of the defense.000. "E-1").M. Ahara Musa. and (2) Ahara R. "C" & "D"). "L"). While Mari Musa was maltreated. and his signature thereon (Exh. The NARCOM agents did not ask permission to enter the house but simply announced that they were NARCOM agents. About 1:30 that afternoon. 1989 (Exh. Mari Musa first gave his name as Hussin Musa. In the NARCOM office. Mari Musa denied the NARCOM agents' charge that he had sold two wrappers of marijuana to them. through her initial and the weight of each specimen written with red ink on each wrapper (Exhs. he did not know. Anderson also identified her Chemistry Report (Exh. Jesus Belarga. Ani.00 bill which he had given to his wife. got inside Mari Musa's house whose door was open. 5 After trial. dated December 14.Belarga the two newspaper-wrapped marijuana he had earlier bought from Mari Musa (Exhs. Mari Musa said. the trial court rendered the assailed decision with the following disposition: WHEREFORE. Mari Musa was brought in a pick-up." After that single question. who introduced themselves as NARCOM agents. 1989. is not credible because: (1) prior to the buy-bust operation. Mari Musa said he had not been arrested for selling marijuana before. The document stated that the marijuana belonged to Mari Musa and Mari Musa was asked to sign it. he is sentenced to life imprisonment and to pay the fine of P20. Mari Musa was brought to the Fiscal's Office by three NARCOM agents. The very day he was arrested (on cross-examination Mari Musa said it was on the next day). Mrs. The writing or document was interpreted to Mari Musa in Tagalog. Mrs. the Forensic Chemist of the PC Crime Laboratory. the poseur-buyer. 6425. Faisal. Mari Musa was brought to the City Jail. Mari Mari Musa said four bullets were then placed between the fingers of his right hand and his fingers were pressed which felt very painful. Zamboanga City. "C" and "D"). examined the marijuana specimens subjecting the same to her three tests. Belarga identified the two buy-bust newspaper wrapped marijuana through his initial. With him were his wife. Musa. the following testified as witnesses: (1) the accused-appellant Mari H. She also identified the one newspaper-wrapped marijuana bought at the test-buy on December 13. Athena Elisa P. his wife. Art II of Rep. he said his wife was outside the NARCOM building. "B"). "J-2". putting their child to sleep. 9 . Anderson identified in court the two newspaper wrapped marijuana bought at the buy-bust on December 14. "J-4" and "J-5"). and he had a wife and a very small child to support. upon instruction by T/Sgt. who was living with him. dressed in civilian clothes. 8 Whereupon. The fiscal asked him if the marijuana was owned by him and he said "not. then. Zamboanga City. Mari Musa gave his true name — Mari Musa. Jesus Belarga turned over the two newspaper-wrapped marijuana (bought at the buybust). "J". his wife joining him to the NARCOM Office at Calarian. 1989. a woman manicurist. "J" & sub-markings. at about 1:30 in the afternoon. All submitted specimens she examined gave positive results for the presence of marijuana. The appellant claims that the testimony of Sgt. Belarga on the same day. But Mari Musa refused to sign because the marijuana did not belong to him. 7 He reported the successful operation to T/Sgt. 1989. Ani nor the other NARCOM agents were personally known by the appellant or vice-versa. Inside the NARCOM Office. neither Sgt. 4. Ani. Mari Musa said he did not tell the fiscal that he had been maltreated by the NARCOM agents because he was afraid he might be maltreated in the fiscal's office. and (2) there was no witness to the alleged giving of the two wrappers of marijuana by the appellant to Sgt. (Exh. the NARCOM agents told him for clarification. "B-2") and the stamp of the PC Crime Laboratory marked "RECEIVED" (Exh. He also did not know if the plastic bag belonged to his brother. Sgt. 1989. he conducted a test-buy operation on the appellant whereby he bought one wrapper of marijuana for P15. The NARCOM agents found a red plastic bag whose contents. Act No. 1989. which was stamped "RECEIVED" by the PC Crime Laboratory (Exh. known as Ara. Ani testified that on December 13. "B-1"). Belarga conducted a conference to organize a buy-bust operation for the following day. the appellant contends that his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt and impugns the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. The turnover of the marijuana specimen to the PC Crime Laboratory was by way of a letter-request. dated December 14. 1989. Lego inside the kitchen of Mari Musa) to the PC Crime Laboratory. addressed to the PC Crime Laboratory (Exh. The NARCOM agents searched Mari Musa's house and Mari Musa asked them if they had a search warrant. "C-1" and "D-1"). 4 For the defense. that he had received from them a P20. Mari Musa said he was not told that he was entitled to the assistance of counsel. finding accused Mari Musa y Hantatalu guilty beyond reasonable doubt of selling marijuana and pursuant to Sec. He did not sell marijuana because he was afraid that was against the law and that the person selling marijuana was caught by the authorities. dated December 14. through her markings (Exh. Mrs. 6 In this appeal." (written on Exhs. dated December 14. Sgt. and a male cousin named Abdul Musa. Musa. "B") and his signature thereon (Exh. while he was being manicured at one hand. thus: [O]n December 14. or his father. although he himself told the NARCOM agents he wanted to be assisted by counsel. He also identified the letter-request. for laboratory examination. Mrs. The NARCOM agents boxed him and Mari Musa lost consciousness. the words "buy-bust" and the words "December 14. the latter imposed without subsidiary imprisonment. Anderson. Anderson reported the results of her examination in her Chemistry Report D-100-89. "J-1". who was living in another house about ten arms-length away. 2:45 P. "L-1"). Mari Musa was investigated by one NARCOM agent which investigation was reduced into writing. 1989.00 from the latter. the one newspaper-wrapped marijuana (bought at the test-buy) and the plastic bag containing more marijuana (which had been taken by Sgt. Later on. Belarga also identified the receipt of the P20 marked money (with SN GA955883) (Exh.

to be direct. I saw that Sgt.. Belarga's testimony reads: 22 Q Now. the rolling of ordinary cigarettes are different from those of marijuana cigarettes. Upon reaching the place. Belarga instructed Sgt. Ani's credibility. Zamboanga City. did you see what happened (sic)? A Yes. The appellant. incredible to believe that they could discern the type of rolling done on those cigarettes from the distance where they were observing the alleged sale of more or less 10 to 15 meters. Ani was with the team of T/Sgt. Sgt. Zamboanga City. The agents searched the appellant and unable to find the marked money. Ale does not apply here because the policeman in that case testified that he and his companion were certain that the appellant therein handed marijuana cigarettes to the poseurbuyer based on the appearance of the cigarette sticks. Ani which was to be used in the buy- . the appellant contends that the uncorroborated testimony of Sgt. thereafter received by Mari Musa and went inside the house and came back later and handed something to Sgt. Ale 20 where the Court observed that from a distance of 10-15 meters. lucid and forthright. at 1:30 p. prosecution and subsequent conviction of the appellant. Ani. Belarga to have seen. The relevant portion of T/Sgt. Ani can not stand as basis for his conviction. Biong were boarded. after a careful reading of the record.12 Sgt. Ani conducted a test-buy and he successfully bought a wrapper of marijuana from the appellant. stating that: This Court cannot give full credit to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses marked as they are with contradictions and tainted with inaccuracies. they asked him where it was. Ani on the following material points: (1) T/Sgt. the Court has held that what matters is not an existing familiarity between the buyer and the seller. Ani because they do not know each other is without merit. The appellant invokes People v. The contention that the appellant could not have transacted with Sgt. Ani. Belarga led a team of NARCOM agents who went to Suterville.00 marked bill to Sgt. the appellant asked Sgt. T/Sgt. 13 From his position. Foncardas went to the place of operation. it deserves credence. argues that it was impossible for the appellant to sell marijuana while his wife. In the instant case. Zamboanga City on December 13. 26 (5) T/Sgt. two NARCOM teams in separate vehicles headed by T/Sgt. Biñan testified that they were able to tell that the four cigarettes were marijuana cigarettes because according to him. again to cast doubt on the credibility of Sgt. Ani regarding the buy-bust operation. Belarga could not have been certain that what Sgt. 19 these factors may sometimes camouflage the commission of the crime. Ani the following day. 10 Sgt. Ani handed something to him. for quite often. Moreover. it was not impossible for T/Sgt. Belarga. 1989. Lego and Biong. cousin and manicurist were present. Lego.17 The appellant. Outside the house. the NARCOM agents positioned themselves at strategic places. 1984. Ani proceeded to the house near the road and he was met by one person and later known as Mari Musa who was at the time wearing short pants and later on I saw that Sgt. Sgt. also questions the credibility of T/Sgt. Belarga then organized a team to conduct a buy-bust operation the following day. The appellant submits that since T/Sgt. Belarga admitted that he was about 90 meters away from Sgt. People v. however. nevertheless. but their agreement and the acts constituting the sale and delivery of the marijuana. November 13. Through this previous transaction. Suterville. 14 After the exchange. the fact that the other people inside the appellant's house are known to the appellant may have given him some assurance that these people will not report him to the authorities. Belarga. Ani to conduct a surveillance and test-buy operation on the appellant at Suterville. Sgt. besides assailing Sgt. which was to be used in the operation. he could not have possibly witnessed the sale. Ani went back to their office and reported a successful operation and turned over to T/Sgt. which resulted in the apprehension. Ani. finds the testimony of Sgt. 1989. Belarga. Sgt. a policeman cannot distinguish between marijuana cigarette from ordinary ones by the type of rolling done on the cigarette sticks. Belarga gave a P20. his testimony. 1989. Ani.00 bill and the appellant went inside the house and brought back two paper wrappers containing marijuana which he handed to Sgt. Ani gave him the marked P20. Belarga and a certain Sgt. Belarga one wrapper of marijuana. 23 (2) later that same day. Ani and the appellant. 21 In the case at bar. Belarga did not positively claim that he saw the appellant hand over marijuana to Sgt. 10). 24 (3) T/Sgt. Ani was able to gain the appellant's confidence for the latter to sell more marijuana to Sgt. What he said was that there was an exchange of certain articles between the two. which the Court earlier ruled to be convincing. Ani could see that there were other people in the house. which was the appellant's house located in Laquian Compound. from a distance of 90-100 meters.On December 14. As the Court observed in People v. 16 The Court. Sgt. Paco. corroborated the direct evidence. But the place of the commission of the crime of selling prohibited drugs has been held to be not crucial 18 and the presence of other people apart from the buyer and seller will not necessarily prevent the consummation of the illegal sale. Contrary to the contention of the appellant. ma'am. The day before the buy-bust operation. Ani received from the appellant was marijuana because of the distance. do you remember whether Sgt. Ani approached the other NARCOM agents and made the pre-arranged signal of raising his right hand. Sgt. And since T/Sgt. went inside the house and made the arrest. Ani hand to the appellant "something" and for the latter to give to the former "something. Ani asked him for some more marijuana. the parties to the transaction may be strangers. Ani what he wanted. whose other members were Sgts. p. T/Sgt. Sgt. 11 Sgt. 25 (4) on December 14." Notwithstanding the fact that T/Sgt. Belarga allegedly did not see the sale. Sgt. Ani was able to reach the house of Mari Musa? A Yes. The appellant said that he gave it to his wife. Sgt. Ani approached the house.m. 15 The NARCOM agents. Ani. Being totally untainted by contradictions in any of the material points. Q After reaching Mari Musa. It is however.00 bill by T/Sgt. ma'am. Q Could you please tell us? A From our vehicle the stainless owner type jeep where Sgt. during the buy-bust operation. presented by Sgt. The Court rejected this claim. accompanied by Sgt. Ani was given a marked P20. (tsn.

observed through the open doorway of the kitchen. Section 12 of the Rules of Court expressly authorizes a warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest. " 38 Hence. the NARCOM agents searched the person of the appellant after arresting him in his house but found nothing. contraband. Sgt. Ani and an exchange of articles took place. The admissibility of the package was challenged before the U. — A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense. or otherwise subject to seizure. e. found and seized a plastic bag hanging in a corner. upon which lay a brick-shaped package containing green leafy substance which he recognized as marijuana. It appears that after Sgt. be used to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendant's guilt. the following: The right of the people to be secure in their persons. the appellant said that he gave the marked money to his wife. The defendant wife emerged from the kitchen." the "plain view" doctrine will not justify the seizure of the object where the incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the "plain view" of the object. the Court has ruled that the fact that the police officers who accompanied the poseur-buyer were unable to see exactly what the appellant gave the poseur-buyer because of their distance or position will not be fatal to the prosecution's case 30 provided there exists other evidence. after observing that it was not unreasonable for the officer to walk to the doorway of the adjacent kitchen on seeing the defendant wife emerge therefrom. Belarga and Sgt. 27 (6) upon the arrival of the NARCOM agents in Suterville. houses. in the kitchen. Ani. the U. "[t]he most important exception to the necessity for a search warrant is the right of search and seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest.. 35 While a valid search warrant is generally necessary before a search and seizure may be effected. . At the trial. which held. 29 The corroborative testimony of T/Sgt. Section 2. 47 Stated differently. and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. 39 In the case at bar. Search incident to lawful arrest. and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witness he may produce. in conformity with the doctrine laid down in Stonehill v. the Court has ruled that "[a]n officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested any money or property found upon his person which was used in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime or which might furnish the prisoner with the means of committing violence or of escaping. . without a search warrant.bust operation. the Constitution. They searched him to retrieve the marked money but didn't find it. the latter moved in and arrested the appellant inside the house. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification — whether it be a warrant for another object. hot pursuit. Additionally. the testimony of the poseur-buyer. Of course. The warrantless search and seizure. the extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them. but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. obtained from the building manager a passkey to defendants' apartment. Upon being questioned. in a buy-bust operation conducted to entrap a drug-pusher. . 44 The "plain view" doctrine may not. Zamboanga City.S. exceptions to this rule are recognized. as an incident to a suspect's lawful arrest. 36 the Court stated that. Supreme Court ruled that the warrantless seizure of the marijuana was legal on the basis of the "plain view" doctrine and upheld the admissibility of the seized drugs as part of the prosecution's evidence. 43The U. 31 Thereafter. Diokno. 41 In Ker v. 34 declares inadmissible.g. 28 the appellant met Sgt. Supreme Court. may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. Thus. or which may be used as evidence in the trial of the cause .S. There is no doubt that the warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest authorizes the arresting officer to make a search upon the person of the person arrested. Ani proceeded to the house of the appellant while some agents stayed in the vehicles and others positioned themselves in strategic places.S. and one of the officers. Ani gave the pre-arranged signal to the other NARCOM agents. As early as 1909. or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused — and permits the warrantless seizure." 37 Rule 126. and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable. Supreme Court stated the following limitations on the application of the doctrine: What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. any evidence obtained in violation of the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. There they found the defendant husband in the living room. it must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime. search incident to lawful arrest. thus: Sec. however. T/Sgt. Belarga described as a "cellophane colored white and stripe hanging at the corner of the kitchen. Belarga strengthens the direct evidence given by Sgt. the "plain view" doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges. the law enforcement agents may seize the marked money found on the person of the pusher immediately after the arrest even without arrest and search warrants. without securing a search warrant but having information that the defendant husband was selling marijuana from his apartment. papers. since the officer merely saw what was placed before him in full view. that "the discovery of the brick of marijuana did not constitute a search." 32 They asked the appellant about its contents but failing to get a response. Lego went to the kitchen and noticed what T/Sgt. 33 Built into the Constitution are guarantees on the freedom of every individual against unreasonable searches and seizures by providing in Article III. 12. The package of marijuana was used as evidence in prosecuting defendants for violation of the Narcotic Law. California 42 police officers. 40 Objects in the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. They then searched the entire house and. in Alvero v. 46 It has also been suggested that even if an object is observed in "plain view. and entered it. after identifying himself. 45 Furthermore. The "plain view" doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused. the appellant questioned the admissibility of the plastic bag and the marijuana it contains but the trial court issued an Order ruling that these are admissible in evidence. Dizon. they opened it and found dried marijuana leaves. Furthermore. direct or circumstantial. which is sufficient to prove the consummation of the sale of the prohibited drug The appellant next assails the seizure and admission as evidence of a plastic bag containing marijuana which the NARCOM agents found in the appellant's kitchen. a small scale atop the kitchen sink.

they had no clue as to its contents. the NARCOM agents searched the whole house and found the plastic bag in the kitchen. where the police officer had reason to walk to the doorway of the adjacent kitchen and from which position he saw the marijuana. they opened it and found the marijuana. and Melo.In the instant case. among other pieces of evidence. The NARCOM agents had to move from one portion of the house to another before they sighted the plastic bag. Gutierrez. California. Davide. Section 3(2) of the Constitution. in any way. Moreover. when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging in one corner of the kitchen. its transprarency. Failing to retrieve the marked money which they hoped to find. They had to ask the appellant what the bag contained. Belarga and the two wrappings of marijuana sold by the appellant to Sgt. Bidin. the damaging effect of the other pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution to prove that the appellant sold marijuana. diminish. the NARCOM agents in this case went from room to room with the obvious intention of fishing for more evidence. Jr. that its contents are obvious to an observer. Unlike Ker vs. The plastic bag was. the NARCOM agents in this case could not have discovered the inculpatory nature of the contents of the bag had they not forcibly opened it. 48 We. the guilt of the appellant of the crime charged has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. or otherwise. the "plain view" doctrine does not apply and the marijuana contained in the plastic bag was seized illegally and cannot be presented in evidence pursuant to Article III. SO ORDERED. California. however. Even assuming then. the appellant was arrested and his person searched in the living room.. Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. the appeal is DISMISSED and the judgment of the Regional Trial Court AFFIRMED. Unlike Ker v. WHEREFORE. hold that under the circumstances of the case. JJ. The exclusion of this particular evidence does not. in violation of Article II. where the marijuana was visible to the police officer's eyes. Ani. whether by its distinctive configuration. therefore. not within their "plain view" when they arrested the appellant as to justify its seizure. concur." what may be said to be the object in their "plain view" was just the plastic bag and not the marijuana. The incriminating nature of the contents of the plastic bag was not immediately apparent from the "plain view" of said object. . It cannot be claimed that the plastic bag clearly betrayed its contents. We hold that by virtue of the testimonies of Sgt. When the appellant refused to respond.. that the NARCOM agents inadvertently came across the plastic bag because it was within their "plain view. therefore. Ani and T/Sgt. Jr.

The Narcom agents decided to entrap and arrest "Jun" in a buy-bust operation. 000. Upon inquiry. Accused-appellant Doria was left standing at the door. Philippines." For five (5) minutes. He asked Violeta where "Totoy" was but she replied he was not there. The team found the door of "Neneth's" house open and a woman inside. The market price of one kilo of marijuana was then P1. Chief of the North Metropolitan District PNP Narcom. accused-appellant stayed in the car.08 grams in violation of the above-cited law. PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box under the dining table. PO3 Manlangit set aside P1.600. From this sum. he gave in and took them to "Totoy's" house. 5 An hour later.600. They frisked "Jun" but did not find the marked bills on him. were found to be dried marijuana fruiting tops of various weights totalling 7. 2 The prosecution contends the offense was committed as follows: In November 1995. 1999 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. P03 Manlangit forthwith arrested "Jun" as SPO1 Badua rushed to help in the arrest. CONTRARY TO LAW. a meeting between the Narcom agents and "Jun" was scheduled on December 5.641. It was only then that the police learned that "Jun" is Florencio Doria y Bolado while "Neneth" is Violeta Gaddao y Catama. 10 The prosecution story was denied by accused-appellants Florencio Doria and Violeta Gaddao. in relation to Section 21 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972." His suspicion aroused. Standing by the door. accused-appellants Florencio Doria y Bolado and Violeta Gaddao y Catama @ "Neneth" were charged with violation of Section 4. Superintendent Pedro Alcantara. a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. deliver and give away to another eleven (11) plastic bags of suspected marijuana fruiting tops weighing 7. SPO1 Badua recovered the marked bills from "Neneth. G. 125299 January 22. vs." They took "Neneth" and "Jun. Cortes designated P03 Manlangit as the poseur-buyer and SPO1 Badua as his back-up. One of the men. P03 Manlangit handed "Jun" the marked bills worth P1. he was at the gate of his house reading a tabloid newspaper.641. 9 The bricks. Turning towards them. administer. Curious onlookers and kibitzers were.600. then and there willfully. SPO1 Simultaneous with the box's discovery. 1995. Florencio Doria. P/Insp. gave the team P2.00 as PO3 Manlangit looked over "Neneth's" house. 1995 in the City of Mandaluyong. conspiring. The plastic wrapper and its contents appeared similar to the marijuana earlier "sold" to him by "Jun. 6 "Jun" led the police team to "Neneth's" house nearby at Daang Bakal. When Violeta entered her house.00.08 grams. and the rest of the team as perimeter security. the CI and the rest of the team were waiting. did." There were many "Totoys" in their area and as the men questioning him were strangers. Doria saw box on top of the . "Jun" appeared and the CI introduced PO3 Manlangit as interested in buying one (1) kilo of marijuana. P03 Manlangit marked the bills with his initials and listed their serial numbers in the police blotter. received information from two (2) civilian informants (CI) that one "Jun" was engaged in illegal drug activities in Mandaluyong City.Edmund Badua and four (4) other policemen as members. confederating and mutually helping and aiding one another and without having been authorized by law. PO3 Manlangit entered "Neneth's" house and took hold of the box. Kamuning. The one (1) brick of dried marijuana leaves recovered from "Jun" plus the ten (10) bricks recovered from "Neneth's" house were examined at the PNP Crime Laboratory. 7 SPO1 Badua asked "Neneth" about the P1. surrounding them. "Jun" instructed P03 Manlangit to wait for him at the corner of Shaw Boulevard and Jacinto Street while he got the marijuana from his associate. 1995. When accused-appellant denied the charge. members of the North Metropolitan District. Nolasco Cortes as team leader and PO3 Celso Manlangit. 1995 at E. Two men appeared and asked him if he knew a certain "Totoy. J.R. The policemen came out of the house and they saw Violeta Gaddao carrying water from the well. overheard one of the men say that they found a carton box. At 7:20 of the same morning. On December 5.00 — a one thousand peso bill and six (6) one hundred peso bills 3 — as money for the buy-bust operation. the CI went to the PNP Headquarters at EDSA. its contents and the marked bills and turned them over to the investigator at headquarters.00. "Jun" identified the woman as his associate. Philippine National Police (PNP) Narcotics Command (Narcom).: On December 7. Jacinto Street in Mandaluyong City. The Narcom agents formed Team Alpha composed of P/Insp." together with the box. then still at the door.600. at 6:00 in the morning. 1995. eleven (11) in all. As arranged by one of the CI's. plaintiff-appellee. No. a 33-year old carpenter. "Jun" revealed that he left the money at the house of his associate named "Neneth. the above-named accused. "Jun" took out from his bag an object wrapped in plastic and gave it to P03 Manlangit. Accused-appellant Doria. FLORENCIO DORIA y BOLADO and VIOLETA GADDAO y CATAMA @ "NENETH. 4 The team rode in two cars and headed for the target area. Quezon City to prepare for the buy-bust operation. three men were already inside. He saw that one of the box's flaps was open and inside the box was something wrapped in plastic. the men led him to their car outside and ordered him to point out the house of "Totoy. unlawfully and feloniously sell." accusedappellants." 8 The policemen arrested "Neneth. He peeked inside the box and found that it contained ten (10) bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves. "Jun" appeared at the agreed place where P03 Manlangit. testified that on December 5. Thereafter. by that time." The men took accused-appellant inside his house and accused him of being a pusher in their community. accused-appellant denied knowing any "Totoy. 00 to cover operational expenses. Doria knocked on the door of "Totoy's" house but no one answered. at 7:00 in the morning. 1 The information reads: That on or about the 5th day of December. pushed open the door and he and his companions entered and looked around the house for about three minutes. later identified as P03 Manlangit. PUNO.

aged 5. Jayson. SO ORDERED. thus: I THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESSES FOR THE PROSECUTION WHEN THEIR TESTIMONIES WERE SHOT WITH DISCREPANCIES. She was pumping water when a man clad in short pants and denim jacket suddenly appeared and grabbed her left wrist. II . aged 3. She woke her children and bathed them. Totoy Gaddao. 7659 which explicitly state that: The maximum penalty shall be imposed if the offense was committed by any person who belongs to an organized/syndicated crime group. aged 8. Then they headed for home. and that her husband never returned to their house after he left for Pangasinan. however. 13 Before this Court. Her eldest son. the provisions of Sec. accused-appellant Doria assigns two errors.00) each without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. She left the twins at home leaving the door open. The men opened the box and showed her its contents. 11 Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao. accused-appellant woke up at 5:30 in the morning and bought pan de sal for her children's breakfast. Arvy. She denied the charge against her and Doria and the allegation that marked bills were found in her person. 23. She found out later that the man was P03 Manlangit. the penalty imposable in this case is reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos. Inside her house were her co-accused Doria and three (3) other persons.000. the Court is hereby constrained to sentence (hereby sentences) said FLORENCIO DORIA y BOLADO @ "Jun" and VIOLETA GADDAO y CATAMA @ "Neneth" to DEATH and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500. Branch 156.08 grams) shall be turned over to the Dangerous Drugs Board.table. Totoy. He said that he and Totoy Gaddao sometimes drank together at the neighborhood store. had left for Pangasinan five days earlier. According to the amendatory provisions of Sec. they are both CONVICTED of the present charge against them. That day. Accused-appellant Doria further declared that his co-accused. FLORENCIO DORIA y BOLADO @ "Jun" and VIOLETA GADDAO y CATAMA @ "Neneth" having been established beyond reasonable doubt. They were brought to police headquarters where they were investigated. Ten minutes later. claimed that on December 5. The box was closed and tied with a piece of green straw. NBI for destruction in accordance with law. Her husband. Let the entire records of this case be forwarded immediately to the Supreme Court for mandatory review. The trial court found the existence of an "organized/syndicated crime group" and sentenced both accused-appellants to death and pay a fine of P500. Let a Commitment Order be issued for the transfer of accused DORIA from the Mandaluyong City Jail to the New Bilibid Prisons.M. 14 Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao contends: I THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY DESPITE THE INCREDIBILITY OF THE POLICE VERSION OF THE MANNER THE ALLEGED BUY-BUST WAS CONDUCTED. and accompanied Arjay to school. Muntinlupa City and also for accused GADDAO for her transfer to the Correctional Institute for Women. she carried her youngest son. the twins Raymond and Raynan. An organized/syndicated crime group means a group of two or more persons collaborating. They asked her about a box on top of the table.00 each. Arvy. Mandaluyong City where she lived with her husband and five (5) children.641. Taking into consideration. also of Republic Act No. she and Jayson remained standing in front of the school soaking in the sun for about thirty minutes. 12 After trial. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows: WHEREFORE. Totoy's wife. INCONSISTENCIES AND THAT THE CORPUS DELICTI OF THE MARIJUANA ALLEGEDLY TAKEN FROM APPELLANT WAS NOT POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED BY THE POSEUR-BUYER. Pasig City convicted the accused-appellants. Along the way.000. This closeness. a 35-year old rice vendor. however. the Regional Trial Court. Simon. and Jason. Mandaluyong City. 234 SCRA 555. 6425 and which was exhaustively discussed in People v. the guilt of accused. a housepainter. namely. The box was open and had something inside. She said she did not know anything about the box and its contents. Arjay. II THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE MARIJUANA FRUITINGS FOUND INSIDE THE CARTON BOX AS THESE WERE OBTAINED THROUGH A WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND DOES NOT COME WITHIN THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE. she was at her house at Daang Bakal. left for school at 6:45 A. 7659 which cover violations of Sec. 4 of Republic Act No. did not extend to Violeta. Violeta Gaddao. This was the first time she saw the box. they passed the artesian well to fetch water. is the wife of his acquaintance. aged 10. 13 of Republic Act No. After seeing Arjay off. The man pulled her and took her to her house. 1995. P03 Manlangit ordered him and Violeta to go outside the house and board the car. confederating or mutually helping one another for purposes of gain in the commission of any crime. The confiscated marijuana bricks (7. Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao confirmed that her co-accused Florencio Doria was a friend of her husband.

OF RETRIEVAL FROM HER OF THE SAME. for the mere purpose of instituting a criminal prosecution against him. the term "entrapment" has a generally negative meaning because it is understood as the inducement of one to commit a crime not contemplated by him. his eagerness in committing the crime. cajoling or importuning. the entrapment defense will fail even if a police agent used an unduly persuasive inducement. have adopted the "objective" test. 22 the first Supreme Court decision to acknowledge the concept: "Entrapment is the conception and planning of an offense by an officer. the methods employed on behalf of the government to bring about the crime "cannot be countenanced. 40 The test of entrapment is whether the conduct of the law enforcement agent was likely to induce a normally law-abiding person. and (b) the origin of the criminal design in the minds of the government officials rather than that of the innocent defendant.THE PNP OFFICERS' VERSIONS AS TO WHERE THE BUY-BUST MONEY CAME FROM ARE INCONSISTENT WITH ONE ANOTHER AND ALSO REEKS WITH INCREDIBILITY. It is claimed that the "subjective" test creates an "anything goes" rule.30 When entrapment is raised as a defense. 32 All relevant facts such as the accused's mental and character traits. 24 It is recognized that in every arrest. or public officials furnished the accused an opportunity for commission of the offense. etc. Not every deception is forbidden.45 Hence. the accused might not have committed the particular crime unless confronted with inordinate inducements. are considered to assess his state of mind before the crime. Once established. even if his guilt has been established. this reflects the notion that the courts should not become tainted by condoning law enforcement improprieties. 27 The law tolerates the use of decoys and other artifices to catch a criminal. American federal courts and a majority of state courts use the "subjective" or "origin of intent" test laid down in Sorrells v. his reputation. 46 Both the "subjective" and "objective" approaches have been criticized and objected to. 41for purposes of this test." 35 If the accused was found to have been ready and willing to commit the offense at any favorable opportunity. the transactions leading up to the offense. 16 Entrapment has received judicial sanction when undertaken with due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards. IV THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY OF THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH LEADING TO THE SEIZURE OF THE MARIJUANA ALLEGEDLY FOUND INSIDE THE HOUSE OF ACCUSEDAPPELLANT. the interaction between the accused and law enforcement officer and the accused's response to the officer's inducements. are not. the purely "objective" test eliminates entirely the need for considering a particular accused's predisposition. 44 Proponents of this test believe that courts must refuse to convict an entrapped accused not because his conduct falls outside the legal norm but rather because. 21 The classic definition of entrapment is that articulated by Justice Roberts in Sorrells v. AT BEST. there is no entrapment and the accused must be convicted. Initially. 17 Entrapment was unknown in common law. 47 Delving into the accused's character and predisposition obscures the more important task of judging police behavior and prejudices the accused more generally. such that the crime is the product of the creative activity of the law enforcement officer. State38 rendered by the Supreme Court of Alaska. and the admissibility of the pieces of evidence obtained therefrom. the search of her person and house. 18 Entrapment sprouted from the doctrine of estoppel and the public interest in the formulation and application of decent standards in the enforcement of criminal law. United States.20 In the American jurisdiction. 37 This test was first authoritatively laid down in the case of Grossman v. For the goal of the defense is to deter unlawful police conduct. the fact that a person acting as a decoy for the state. The type of entrapment the law forbids is the inducing of another to violate the law. WHICH IN CONSEQUENCE RESULTS IN THE EVIDENCE. It is a judicially created twentieth-century American doctrine that evolved from the increasing use of informers and undercover agents in the detection of crimes. 48 On the other extreme. an accused has the burden of providing sufficient evidence that the government induced him to commit the offense. 29 It is a positive defense. activities. such as badgering. his past offenses. friendship or pleas of desperate illness. Entrapment is recognized as a valid defense 28 that can be raised by an accused and partakes of the nature of a confession and avoidance. The focus of the inquiry is on the accused's predisposition to commit the offense charged. 15 The assigned errors involve two principal issues: (1) the validity of the buy-bust operation in the apprehension of accused-appellant Doria. other than one who is ready and willing. Several other states have subsequently adopted the test by judicial pronouncement or legislation. Here. 39 The inquiry is focused on the inducements used by government agents. particularly liquor and narcotics offenses. however. no level of police deceit. It ignores the possibility that no matter what his past crimes and general disposition were. the burden shifts to the governmet to show otherwise. trickery. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment employed by peace officers as an effective way of apprehending a criminal in the act of the commission of an offense. it is presumed that a law-abiding person would normally resist the temptation to commit a crime that is presented by the simple opportunity to act unlawfully. Accused-appellants were caught by the police in a buy-bust operation. His . and (2) the validity of the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Gaddao. percuasion or fraud of the officers. the gravity of the crime. the court considers the nature of the police activity involved and the propriety of police conduct. 36 Some states. and the difficulty of detecting instances of its commission are considered in judging what the effect of the officer's conduct would on a normal person. or that the accused is aided in the commission of the crime in order to secure the evidence necessary to prosecute him. or fraud carried out by law enforcement officers or the agents to induce a defendant to commit a crime. badgering or other unsavory practices will be deemed impermissible. the criminal intent originates in the mind of the accused and the criminal offense is completed. the "seduction" of an otherwise innocent person into a criminal career. but overbearing conduct. 42 Official conduct that merely offers such an opportunity is permissible." 23 It consists of two (2) elements: (a) acts of percuasion. and his procurement of its commission by one who would not have perpetrated it except for the trickery. 19 It also took off from a spontaneous moral revulsion against using the powers of government to beguile innocent but ductile persons into lapses that they might otherwise resist. 26 Where. there is a certain amount of entrapment used to outwit the persons violating or about to violate the law. 25 Where the criminal intent originates criminal in the mind of the entrapping person and the accused is lured into the commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute him. NIL. i. on police conduct. 33 The predisposition test emphasizes the accused's propensity to commit the offense rather than the officer's misconduct 34 and reflects an attempt to draw a line between a "trap for the unwary innocent and the trap for the unwary criminal. his state of mind and inclination before his initial exposure to government agents.e. sympathy. there is entrapment and no conviction may be had. if the court determines that an accused was predisposed to commit the crime charged. NEBULOUS. however. AT WORST.. 43 or appeals to sentiments such as pity. United States 31 to determine whether entrapment actually occurred. III THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY AND SENTENCING HER TO DEATH DESPITE THE MANIFESTLY IRRECONCILABLE INCONSISTENCIES IN THE VERSIONS OF THE POLICE AS TO HOW AND BY WHOM THE ALLEGED BUY-BUST MONEY WAS RECOVERED FROM HER. not on the accused and his predisposition to commit the crime. to commit the offense." To some extent.

Yutuc 76thereby sustaining his defense that led to his acquittal. Tan Tiong. but upon the diligence of its own officials. It is rare for any member of the public. assists the thief in carrying out the plan. we further held. Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng 63 we first laid down the distinction between entrapment vis-a-vis instigation or inducement. not the predisposition of the accused to commit the crime. Conversely. or hired informer. In People v. 55 The hybrid approaches combine and apply the "objective" and "subjective" tests alternatively or concurrently. to be willing to assist in the enforcement of the law. 49 The undisputed fact that the accused was a dangerous and chronic offender or that he was a shrewd and active member of a criminal syndicate at the time of his arrest is relegated to irrelevancy. or that detectives feigning complicity in the act were present and apparently assisting in its commission. 81 These offenses are carried on in secret and the violators resort to many devices and subterfuges to avoid detection. . 67 In People v. theft. adopting the "objective" approach has not precluded us from likewise applying the "subjective" test. it has become common practice for law enforcement officers and agents to engage in buy-bust operations and other entrapment procedures in apprehending drug offenders. or. 57 The conduct of the BIR agent was condemned as "most reprehensible. 82 . the evidence that the accused did not sell or smoke marijuana and did not have any criminal record was likewise admitted in People v. Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng. provided the original design was formed independently of such agent. has often been condemned and has sometimes been held to prevent the act from being criminal or punishable. 60 In People v. Phelps. Entrapment in the Philippines is not a defense available to the accused. Mere deception by the detective will not shield defendant. free from the influence or instigation of the detective. not upon the voluntary action of aggrieved individuals. may have an important bearing upon the question of whether the conduct of the police and and their agents was proper. Phelps has been followed in a series of similar cases. and their violation gives rise to crimes mala prohibita. It is necessary. . Smith. 69 The pronouncement of the Court of Appeals in People v. then the analysis turns to whether the accused was predisposed to commit the crime. arson. and. Boholst. the BIR agent." The instigator practically induces the would-be accused into the commission of the offense and himself becomes a co-principal. not against particular individuals. at least if known by the police. 68 the Court of Appeals further declared that "entrapment is no bar to the prosecution and conviction of the lawbreaker. The fact that an agent of an owner acts as a supposed confederate of a thief is no defense to the latter in a prosecution for larceny. therefore. The distinction between entrapment and instigation has proven to be very material in antinarcotics operations." 58 In People v. the general rule is that it is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its commission were purposely placed in his way. Galicia was affirmed by this Court in People v. 50 Objections to the two tests gave birth to hybrid approaches to entrapment. that government in detecting and punishing violations of these laws. If this objective test is satisfied. 78 They are not the traditional type of criminal law such as the law of murder. We accorded significance to the fact that it was Smith who went to the accused three times to convince him to look for an opium den where both of them could smoke this drug. It is generally held that it is no defense to a prosecution for an illegal sale of liquor that the purchase was made by a "spotter. etc. We ruled that the apprehending officer did not induce the accused to import opium but merely entrapped him by pretending to have an understanding with the Collector of Customs of Cebu to better assure the seizure of the prohibited drug and the arrest of the surreptitious importers. The "objective" test first applied in United States v. there was no evidence sufficient to convict the accused. persistent and effective" by the police officer and that outside of his testimony. 52 the Florida Supreme Court declared that the permissibility of police conduct must first be determined. Quoting 16 Corpus Juris. is not contrary to public policy. if the offense was committed by him. actually induced him to commit the crime in order to prosecute him. this Court has examined the conduct of law enforcers while apprehending the accused caught inflagrante delicto. As early as 1910. It is instigation that is deemed contrary to public policy and illegal. our courts have mainly examined the conduct of the apprehending officers. In United States v. like anti-gambling laws are regulatory statutes. 70Entrapment. rely. Especially is this true in that class of cases where the offense is one of a kind habitually committed. 74 we applied both tests by examining the conduct of the police officers in a buy-bust operation and admitting evidence of the accused's membership with the notorious and dreaded Sigue-Sigue Sputnik Gang. a very high one" causing the accused to sell the explosives. We found that there was inducement. 53 In Baca v. as distinguished from mere entrapment. testified that Phelps' apprehension came after he overheard Phelps in a saloon say that he liked smoking opium on some occasions. and while instigation. It is instigation that is a defense and is considered an absolutory cause. "direct. but there are cases holding the contrary. 65 The distinction above-quoted was reiterated in two (2) decisions of the Court of Appeals. We also considered accused's previous his convictions of other crimes 75 and held that his opprobrious past and membership with the dreaded gang strengthened the state's evidence against him. . — While it has been said that the practice of entrapping persons into crime for the purpose of instituting criminal prosecutions is to be deplored. spies or stool pigeons. We stated that the Customs secret serviceman smoothed the way for the introduction of opium from Hongkong to Cebu after the accused had already planned its importation and ordered said drug. rape. no matter how furiously he condemns acts mala prohibita. State. Smith's testimony was disregarded." detective. 61 we convicted the accused after finding that there was no inducement on the part of the law enforcement officer. 77 They are rules of convenience designed to secure a more orderly regulation of the affairs of society. ways and means are resorted to by the peace officer for the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreaker in the execution of his criminal plan. the larceny is nevertheless committed. 64 we held: ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION. This means that the police must be present at the time the offenses are committed either in an undercover capacity or through informants. and the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. 62 It was also in the same case of People v. either by showing lack of predisposition to commit the crime for which he is charged. and where a person approached by the thief as his confederate notifies the owner or the public authorities. 59 we acquitted the accused of the crime of selling explosives after examining the testimony of the apprehending police officer who pretended to be a merchant. In recent years. Some states in the United States now combine both the "subjective" and "objective" 51 In Cruz v. being authorised by them to do so. In entrapment. that deal with crimes mala in se or those inherently wrongful and immoral. Tiu Ua.predisposition. 72 To determine whether there is a entrapment or instigation. Galicia. Anti-narcotics laws. Abella. 54 the New Mexico Supreme Court modified the state's entrapment analysis by holding that "a criminal defendant may successfully assert a defense of entrapment.79 Laws defining crimes mala prohibita condemn behavior directed. 80 Violation is deemed a wrong against society as a whole and is generally unattended with any particular harm to a definite person. The police officer offered "a tempting price. 56 we acquitted the accused from the offense of smoking opium after finding that the government employee. State. but against public order. 66the appellate court declared that "there is a wide difference between entrapment and instigation. In People v. 73 Nevertheless. 71 It can thus be seen that the concept of entrapment in the American jurisdiction is similar to instigation or inducement in Philippine jurisprudence. that the police exceeded the standards of proper investigation. or that the criminal act was done at the 'decoy solicitation' of persons seeking to expose the criminal. a BIR personnel.

At the same time. Police Officer. straightforward and categorical manner and his credibility was not crumpled on cross-examination by defense counsel. ARIAS. 96 the testimony of the informant may be dispensed with as it will merely be corroborative of the apprehending officers' eyewitness testimonies. a person who accepts payment from the police in the apprehension of drug peddlers and gamblers also accept payment from these persons who deceive the police. must be the subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense.Though considered essential by the police in enforcing vice legislation. Contrary to accused-appellant Doria's claim. were identified and marked in court. the offer to purchase. They all spring from common motivations. spontaneous..nêt In the case at bar. whether or not through an informant. the Narcom agents placed this one (1) brick of marijuana recovered from appellant Doria inside the carton box lumping it together with the ten (10) bricks inside. it is a type of lawless enforcement. I must protest the line of questioning considering the fact that we are now dealing with eleven items when the question posed to the witness was what was handed to him by Jun? COURT So be it. Along with illegal search and seizures. 98 The inconsistencies in P03 Manlangit's and SPO1 Badua's testimonies and the other police officers' testimonies are minor and do not detract from the veracity and weight of the prosecution evidence. If there is overwhelming evidence of habitual delinquency. corrupt and exploitative law enforcers. 86 Criminal activity is such that stealth and strategy. pimp. or a desire to report an accomplishment to their superiors. PROSECUTOR Witness bringing out from the said box. particularly unsuspecting provincial hicks. the offer to purchase the drug. P03 Manlangit handed the marked money to accused-appellant Doria as advance payment for one (1) kilo of marijuana. extortion. or other petty criminal. Each is condoned by the sinister sophism that the end. The source of the money for the buy-bust operation is not a critical fact in the case at bar. Moreover. the payment of the "buy-bust" money. whether to the informant alone or the police officer. how were you able to identify that box? A This is the box that I brought to the crime laboratory which contained the eleven pieces of marijuana brick we confiscated from the suspect. 90 Courts should not allow themselves to be used as an instrument of abuse and injustice lest an innocent person be made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses. 85 The use of shady underworld characters as informants. The non-presentation of the confidential informant is not fatal to the prosecution. . sir. It is enough that the prosecution proved that money was paid to accused-appellant Doria in consideration of which he sold and delivered the marijuana. and the imposed secrecy that inevitably shrouds all drug deals have compelled this Court to be extra-vigilant in deciding drug cases. As well put by the Supreme Court of California in People v. Tell the court.1âwphi1. 97 There is no need to present the informant in court where the sale was actually witnessed and adequately proved by prosecution witnesses. Like the informant. 91 We therefore stress that the "objective" test in buy-bust operations demands that the details of the purported transaction must be clearly and adequately shown. 93 It is well-settled that except when the appellant vehemently denies selling prohibited drugs and there are material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the arresting officers. Each is a substitute for skillful and scientific investigation. 83 Equally odious is the bitter reality of dealing with unscrupulous. when you identified that box. juris tantum. the informant was accompanied by PO3 Manlangit who posed as the buyer of marijuana. of regularity in the performance of official duty by law enforcement agents raised by the Solicitor General be applied with studied restraint. false arrest. however. however. the spectacle that government is secretly mated with the underworld and uses underworld characters to help maintain law and order is not an inspiring one. recidivism or plain criminal proclivity. the promise or payment of the consideration until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale. 88 It is thus imperative that the presumption. . This is why the carton box contained eleven (11) bricks of marijuana when brought before the trial court. Criminals must be caught but not at all cost. PO3 Manlangit testified in a frank. vengeance. P03 Manlangit's testimony was corroborated on its material points by SPO1 Badua. Accused-appellant Doria was apprehended when he later returned and handed the brick of marijuana to P03 Manlangit. This presumption should not by itself prevail over the presumption of innocence and the constitutionally-protected rights of the individual. 89 It is the duty of courts to preserve the purity of their own temple from the prostitution of the criminal law through lawless enforcement. This must start from the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher. 87 [E]ntrapment is a facet of a broader problem. wiretapping. examining the conduct of the police should not disable courts into ignoring the accused's predisposition to commit the crime. Q Please open it and show those eleven bricks. 92 The manner by which the initial contact was made.. unscrupulous law enforcers' motivations are legion — harassment. illegal detention and the third degree. VALDEZ. the confidential informant system breeds abominable abuse. At the pre-arranged meeting. For whatever noble purpose it serves. Courts should look at all factors to determine the predisposition of an accused to commit an offense in so far as they are relevant to determine the validity of the defense of inducement. blackmail. although necessary weapons in the arsenal of the police officer. the one kilo of marijuana "sold" by him to PO3 Manlangit was actually identified by PO3 Manlangit himself before the trial court. the evidence shows that it was the confidential informant who initially contacted accused-appellant Doria.' justifies the employment of illegal means. The informant himself maybe a drug addict. his back-up security. Informants are usually not presented in court because of the need to hide their identity and preserve their invaluable service to the police. then this must also be considered. 94 or there are reasons to believe that the arresting officers had motives to testify falsely against the appellant. the relative ease with which illegal drugs may be planted in the hands or property of trusting and ignorant persons. become as objectionable police methods as the coerced confession and the unlawful search. when dealing with known criminals of the 'criminal class. and the delivery of the illegal drug. pickpocket. Counsel for Violeta Gaddao: Your Honor. After appellants' apprehension. ATTY. Frequently. Barraza. Counsel for Florencio Doria: Mr. This Court has taken judicial notice of this ugly reality in a number of cases 84 where we observed that it is a common modus operandi of corrupt law enforcers to prey on weak and hapless persons. The one (1) brick recovered from appellant Doria and each of the ten (10) bricks. 95 or that only the informant was the poseurbuyer who actually witnessed the entire transaction. Thus: ATTY.

where are those markings? A Here. how did you know that those are the eleven bricks? xxx xxx xxx A I have markings on these eleven bricks. ARIAS May we make it of record that the witness is pulling out them after item from the box showed to him and brought in front of him. my signature. COURT Let the prosecution do its own thing and leave the appreciation of what it has done to the court. Q What are you sure of? A I am sure that this is the brick that was given to me by one alias Jun. VALDEZ Your Honor. PROSECUTOR May we place on record that the one that was enclosed. sir.. COURT Noted. etc. The court saw it. sir. sir. Exhibit "A" then the other letters and figures on this plastic? A This one. . COURT Noted. your Honor.ATTY. Q Point to the court. I want to make it of record that there are other entries included in the enclosure. A This CLM. PROSECUTOR May it be of record that this was just entered this morning. Q I am asking you about this "itim" and not the "asul. . PROSECUTOR Witness showed a white wrapper and pointing to CLM and the signature. my initials with the date. I made the signature. your Honor. your Honor." Q To stress. This is the Exhibit "A" which I marked before I brought it to the PCCL. may we just limit the inquiry to the basic question of the fiscal as to what was handed to him by the accused Jun. your Honor. there are also entries included in that enclosure where it appears D-394-95 also Exhibit "A." Q How about this one? PROSECUTOR Your Honor. your Honor. your Honor. your Honor? A Because I marked it with my own initials before giving it to the investigator and before we brought it to the PCCL. Q What makes you so sure? Q Now tell the court. COURT Why do you know that that is the thing? Are you sure that is not "tikoy?" A Yes. ." ATTY. there is already a ruling by this Honorable Court. xxx xxx xxx PROSECUTOR May we request that a tag be placed on this white plastic bag and this be marked as Exhibit "D?" COURT Mark it as Exhibit "D. that was not pointed to by the witness. sir. Q What makes you so sure? A I am sure that this is the one. ARIAS Your Honor. A This brick is the one that was handed to me by the suspect Jun. the date and the time and the Exhibit "A. sir. despite reconsideration. ATTY. who made the entries of this date. sir. the date and the time and this Exhibit "A. the signature. A I don't know who made this marking. Q Whose signature is that? ATTY." etc." I was the one who made these markings. VALDEZ We submit. sir.

arrest a person: (a) When.101 Again. the police are not only authorized but duty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant. however. that the warrants were not necessary because the arrest was made in "hot pursuit" and the search was an incident to her lawful arrest. and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending. 5. Sec.. 970 grams SSL" be marked as our Exhibit "D-2?" COURT Tag it. Q Whereat? A At the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto Street. the search of her person and residence. is actually committing. a person may be arrested without a warrant if he "has committed. is actually committing. or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. VALDEZ. Mark it. sir. Q This particular exhibit that you identified. Appellant cannot capitalize on the circumstance that the money and the marijuana in the case at bar did not change hands under the usual "kaliwaan" system. Q This particular exhibit that you identified. your Honor. xxx xxx xxx 103 A It was given to me by suspect Jun. . the warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao must fall under any of the three (3) instances enumerated in Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as aforequoted. To be lawful. the decisive fact is that the poseur-buyer received the marijuana from the accused-appellant. When an accused is apprehended in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation. however shows otherwise: ATTY.600. sir. without a warrant. or is attempting to commit an offense. the wrapper and the contents was given to you by whom? A It was given to me by suspect Jun. Arrest without warrant. including the newspaper and white plastic wrapping were marked as Exhibits "D.buyer and the pusher. Q How about the other items that you were able to recover? xxx xxx xxx A These other marijuana bricks. the arresting officer. It is claimed.00 strains credulity. This brick. because according to Jun the money which I gave him was in the hands of Neneth and so we proceeded to the house of Neneth. the person to be arrested has committed. Exhibit A. 111 The prosecution admits that appellant Gaddao was arrested without a warrant of arrest and the search and seizure of the box of marijuana and the marked bills were likewise made without a search warrant." and "D-2" and described as weighing nine hundred seventy (970) grams. Counsel for appellant Gaddao: We submit at this juncture. The direct testimony of PO3 Manlangit. 110 (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures. as above-quoted. Our Constitution proscribes search and seizure without a judicial warrant and any evidence obtained without such warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. because during our follow-up. or is attempting to commit an offense. sir. Warrantless arrests are allowed in three instances as provided by Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. 105 The rule is. Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following instances: 106 (1) search incident to a lawful arrest. and this alleged brick of marijuana with a piece of paper. the wrapper and the contents was given to you by whom? (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed. and the seizure of the box of marijuana and marked bills are different matters. Q Whereat? A At the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto St. 104 The warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao. 102 We also hold that the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Doria is not unlawful. when lawful. and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. 108 (3) search in violation of customs laws. There is no rule of law which requires that in "buy-bust" operations there must be a simultaneous exchange of the marked money and the prohibited drug between the poseur. however. xxx xxx xxx 99 The first brick identified by P03 Manlangit was the brick of marijuana "given to [him] by suspect Jun" at the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto Streets.107 (2) search of a moving motor vehicle.Q Now. with a newspaper wrapping with a piece of paper inside which reads: "D-394-95. not absolute." "D-l. 100 We also reject appellant's submission that the fact that P03 Manlangit and his team waited for almost one hour for appellant Doria to give them the one kilo of marijuana after he "paid" P1. 109(4) seizure of evidence in plain view. that there will be no basis for that question. — A peace officer or a private person may. in his presence. sir." Appellant Doria was caught in the act of committing an offense. sir. to wit: Under Section 5 (a).

it was SPO1 Badua who can testify regarding this buy-bust money. A These other marijuana bricks. the other items that you were able to recover? A I saw her outside. Q As far as you can see. Answer. the marked money which Jun gave her. Q And what happened upon arrival thereat? A We saw alias Neneth inside the house and we asked him to give us the buy-bust money. sir. Witness.' Q Carrying a baby? A No. sir. she was just outside the house? A No. according to you SPO1 Manlangit approached her? A PO3 Manlangit. Q She was not about to commit any crime because she was just outside the house doing her daily chores. . sir. sir. That is correct. sir. she was just inside her house? Q During all the time that this confrontation. sir. sir. because according to Jun the money which I gave him was in the hands of Neneth and so we proceeded to the house of Neneth. Q Now. she was not committing any crime. sir.Q How about. sir. Q Whereat? A At Daang Bakal near the crime scene at Shaw Boulevard. We asked her to give us the money. Q You did not approach her because P03 Manlangit approached her? SPO1 Badua testified on cross-examination that: A Yes. sir. VALDEZ: We submit at this juncture. is it not? A Yes. when you reached the house of Aling Neneth. sir. Am I correct? A I just saw her outside. Q So you were just an on-looker to what Manlangit was doing. Q And what happened? A At this instance. because precisely according to you your role in this buy-bust operation was as a back-up? A Yes. sir. that there will be no basis for that question. sir. Q But the fact is. your Honor. Mr. sir. Aling Neneth was there? A Yes. Q What was your intention in going to the house of Aling Neneth? A To arrest her. COURT There is. sir. Q You mentioned "him?" A Her. if any memory of your testimony is correct. xxx xxx xxx 112 A She was 'sa bandang poso. Q She was fetching water as a matter of fact? ATTY. because during our follow-up. sir. Q And at that point in time you already wanted to arrest her. you were just in the side lines? A I was just watching. Q At that particular time when you reached the house of Aling Neneth and saw her outside the house. sir. arrest or whatever by SPO3 Manlangit was taking place.

Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and maybe introduced in evidence.. If there is no showing that the person who effected the warrantless arrest had.600. Money. 113 Accused-appellant Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the buy-bust operation to give ground for her arrest under Section 5 (a) of Rule 113.00 was recovered from the person of Aling Neneth. is based an actual facts."114 In fact. 121 The . Neneth? Q It was Manlangit who got the money from Aling Neneth? A P03 Manlangit.e. however. Q You did not even know who got the money from Aling Neneth? PROSECUTOR: There is no basis for this question. knowledge of facts implicating the person arrested to the perpetration of a criminal offense. sir. Save for accused-appellant Doria 's word. Q Manlangit got the marijuana? A Yes. she was going about her daily chores when the policemen pounced on her. sir. it was Manlangit maybe? A I saw it. 116 A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause. Q And the money from Aling Neneth? A I don't know. ATTY." 115 The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when. She was not committing any crime. coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest. COURT: Sustained. sir. That's right? A Yes. not from the person of Aling Neneth. 118 Appellant Doria did not point to appellant Gaddao as his associate in the drug business. Is that what you are trying to tell the Court? A No. the amount of P1. your Honor. Q It was taken from the house of Aling Neneth. sir. in his own right. i. 119 with or without her knowledge. This brings us to the question of whether the trial court correctly found that the box of marijuana was in plain view. 117 Accused-appellant Gaddao was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged identification made by her co-accused. the Narcom agents had no reasonable grounds to believe that she was engaged in drug pushing. in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers. Appellant Doria may have left the money in her house. Q Alright. sir. but as the person with whom he left the marked bills. the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense. A The buy-bust money was recovered from the house of Aling Neneth. there 's no testimony on that. I will ask you a question and I expect an honest answer. Q What you are now saying for certain and for the record is the fact that you were not the one who retrieved the money from Aling Neneth.120 Since the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Gaddao was illegal. your Honor. sir. making its warrantless seizure valid. supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. declared in his direct examination that appellant Doria named his co-accused in response to his (PO3 Manlangit's) query as to where the marked money was. with or without any conspiracy. PROSECUTOR: No basis. Contrary to the finding of the trial court. the arrest is legally objectionable. sir. ATTY. the buy-bust money. This identification does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that appellant Gaddao conspired with her co-accused in pushing drugs. VALDEZ: I am through with this witness.Q Who got the alleged marijuana from inside the house of Mrs. According to the records. "Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests without warrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 must be based upon "probable cause" which means an "actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. Neither could the arrest of appellant Gaddao be justified under the second instance of Rule 113. there was no occasion at all for appellant Gaddao to flee from the policemen to justify her arrest in "hot pursuit. PO3 Manlangit. VALDEZ: I was asking him precisely. it follows that the search of her person and home and the subsequent seizure of the marked bills and marijuana cannot be deemed legal as an incident to her arrest.

122 The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. no. its transparency. The difficulty arises when the object is inside a closed container. sir. contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. sir. . then the contents are in plain view and may be seized. sir. Q This carton. VALDEZ Yes. sir. . Where the object seized was inside a closed package. 126 It is clear that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. the Narcom agent who found the box. nasaan ang buy-bust money namin?" sir. A Like this. testified on cross-examination as follows: COURT Go down there. 123 In the course of such lawful intrusion. Q No. Show to the court. sir. if the package is such that an experienced observer could infer from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article. A Yes. or if its contents are obvious to an observer. Q I noticed that this carton has a cover? A Yes. VALDEZ: PROSECUTOR So here we are. When you and Badua arrived. Q I ask you were the flaps of the cover raised or closed? A It was open. 124 The object must be open to eye and hand 125 and its discovery inadvertent. PROSECUTOR Can we describe it? ATTY. Not like that. if the package proclaims its contents. 129 PO3 Manlangit. he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. what's this. then the article is deemed in plain view. 127 In other words. ATTY. whether by its distinctive configuration. A Yes. according to you was under a table? A Yes. Q At that particular instance. 128 It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime."plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area. did you mention anything to Aling Neneth before getting the carton? A I think it was Badua who accosted Aling Neneth regarding the buy-bust money and he asked "Sa iyo galing ang marijuanang ito. sir. no. you saw the carton? A Yes. contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime. you went inside the house? A Yes. Aling Neneth was inside the house? One flap is inside and the other flap is standing and with the contents visible. INTERPRETER Witness went down the witness stand and approached a carton box. (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent. Q At this juncture. dining table. sir. the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. However. sir. sir. Q Did you mention anything to Aling Neneth? A I asked her. COURT Q Badua demanded from Aling Neneth the buy-bust money? Noted. Q And got hold of this carton? A Yes. .

. sir. PRESECUTOR Panero. with plastic. sir. is it not [sic]? A I just don't know if she was frisked already by Badua. Q Marked "Snow Time Ice Pop? A Yes. dining table. sir. your Honor. Q In fact. . you did not know whether Badua already retrieved the buy-bust money from her? A Yes. Q What you see is a carton? A Yes. sir. A Yes. That's a piece of plastic. sir. By reading it . Q You were the one who got this? A Yes. A Yes. sir. sir. sir. Q At that particular point in time. sir. sir. Q Somewhere here? A Yes. Q Under the table according to you? PROSECUTOR . ATTY. Because I am objecting to the words a piece of plastic. sir. Q With a piece of plastic visible on top of the carton? A Yes. For the record. wait. . . It was in plain view. sir. Aling Neneth was not yet frisked. Gadao was in possession of the buy-bust money because according to you. there was nothing yet as far as you were concerned to validate the fact that Mrs. A It's far. sir. Q You went inside the house? Q That is all that you saw? A Yes. . sir. Q Who got hold of this? A I was the one. where he saw it? A Here. sir. . VALDEZ A Two and a half meters from the door.Q Making reference to the marijuana that was given by alias Jun? A Yes. Q How far was this from the door? Q You were only able to verify according to you . Q You did not have any search warrant? PROSECUTOR A Yes. you did not know if the alleged buy-bust money was already retrieved by Badua? PROSECUTOR May we request the witness to place it. sir. Q When you proceeded to take hold of this carton.

P03 Manlangit had a view of the interior of said house. VALDEZ ATTY. Ice Pop? A I presumed it was also marijuana because it may . VALDEZ I'm not even asking you that question so why are you voluntarily saying the information. Not even a man with very kin [sic] eyes can tell the contents here. With due respect. no even Superman . 'I think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part. The Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike against any manner of high-handedness from the authorities. He did not know exactly what the box contained that he had to ask appellant Gaddao about its contents. he admitted that he merely presumed the contents to be marijuana because it had the same plastic wrapping as the "buy-bust marijuana. And according to the Court. Two and a half meters away was the dining table and underneath it was a carton box." A close scrutiny of the records reveals that the plastic wrapper was not colorless and transparent as to clearly manifest its contents to a viewer. said. however. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. you were able to . it cannot be more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the protection of the liberty of every individual in the realm. it could be "tikoy. sir. . xxx xxx xxx 130 P03 Manlangit and the police team were at appellant Gaddao's house because they were led there by appellant Doria. Each of the ten (10) bricks of marijuana in the box was individually wrapped in old newspaper and placed inside plastic bags — white. COURT Leave that to the court. But as demanding as this campaign may be. The Narcom agents testified that they had no information on appellant Gaddao until appellant Doria name her and led them to her. again. Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the right of the individual in the name of order. pink or blue in color. A piece of plastic may be big or a small one. . As Justice Holmes. sir. sir. ATTY. 134 It was not immediately apparent to PO3 Manlangit that the content of the box was marijuana. . Q It could be ice cream because it says Snow Pop. it will connote . for record purposes. let's place the size of the plastic. 140 . 132 On cross-examination. 133 PO3 Manlangit himself admitted on cross-examination that the contents of the box could be items other than marijuana. Let the prosecutor do that for you. this is not a piece of plastic. Aminnudin. especially the susceptible youth.' It is simply not allowed in the free society to violate a law to enforce another. 131 Standing by the door of appellant Gaddao's house. The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends the efforts of our law enforcement officers against those who would inflict this malediction upon our people. I withdraw that. 136 The fact that the box containing about six (6) kilos of marijuana 137 was found in the house of accused-appellant Gaddao does not justify a finding that she herself is guilty of the crime charged. PROSECUTOR Leave that to the court. 138 Apropos is our ruling in People v. 139 viz: Q Canned goods? A Yes. including the basest of criminals. Q Siopao? A Yes. ." is it not [sic]? A Yes. especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself. Look at this. what I am saying is. . In his direct examination. 135 It was fruit of the poisonous tree and should have been excluded and never considered by the trial court. PO3 Manlangit said that he was sure that the contents of the box were marijuana because he himself checked and marked the said contents. sir. . however praiseworthy their intentions.By reading it. The marijuana was not in plain view and its seizure without the requisite search warrant was in violation of the law and the Constitution. Q The only reason according to you. . A It's the same plastic. Next question. . What is that? What can you say. The box was partially open and revealed something wrapped in plastic. Q I am not asking you what your presumptions are. Fiscal? I'm asking you? COURT PROSECUTOR Continue. I'm asking you what it could possibly be.

2. Administration. delivery. Sale.00 to P10 million. Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. 3307-D is reversed and modified as follows: 1. as amended by Section 13 of Republic Act No.000. give away to another. 7659 punishes the "sale. the decision of the Regional Trial Court. — The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. has failed to prove that accused-appellant Gaddao conspired with accused-appellant Doria in the sale of said drug. 142 IN VIEW WHEREOF. distribution and transportation of a prohibited drug" with the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from P500. unless authorized by law. however. xxx xxx xxx In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs. thecorpus delicti. dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug. i. Delivery. shall sell. Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao y Catama is acquitted. accused-appellant Doria sold and delivered nine hundred seventy (970) grams of marijuana to PO3 Manlangit. the poseur-buyer.600. administration. the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.000. administer.00).00 which he received. .e. deliver.Section 4 of Republic Act No. SO ORDERED. Pasig City acting as a Special Court in Criminal Case No. the lower penalty of reclusion perpetua must be imposed. what is material is the submission of proof that the sale took place between the poseur-buyer and the seller thereof and the presentation of the drug. as evidence in court. Branch 156. 6425. There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances. and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who. Accused-appellant Florencio Doria y Bolado is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of five hundred thousand pesos (P500.. to wit: Sec. or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions. 141 The prosecution has clearly established the fact that in consideration of P1. distribute. The prosecution. 4.

in fact.. According to her and her co-accused delos Reyes. Accused-appellant Zenaida Bolasa meanwhile asserts that the search in her residence was likewise illegal as her arrest preceding it was illegal. papers and effects. 125754 December 22. where she was working as a waitress. It protects the privacy and sanctity of the person himself against unlawful arrests and other forms of restraint. According to Roberto delos Reyes. and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable." 1 They entered the house and introduced themselves as police officers to the occupants and thereupon confiscated the tea bags and some drug paraphernalia. 3 and prevents him from being irreversibly "cut off from that domestic security which renders the lives of the most unhappy in some measure agreeable. just entered his room when he was arrested. As such. Since the prosecution did not present the two (2) arresting officers the version of the prosecution cannot stand on its own.: An anonymous caller tipped off PO3 Dante Salonga and PO3 Albert Carizon in the early evening of 11 September 1995 that a man and a woman were repacking prohibited drugs at a certain house in Sta. Upon learning that Zenaida was repacking marijuana inside their room. 1999 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. the marijuana seized from her could not be properly used as evidence against her. of the 1987 Constitution provides — The right of the people to be secure in their persons. ZENAIDA BOLASA Y NAKOBOAN and ROBERTO DELOS REYES. They arrested the two (2) who turned out to be the accused Zenaida Bolasa y Nakoboan and Roberto delos Reyes. Brigida St. vs. plaintiff-appellee." 4 . Caloocan City.R. She insists that the trial court should not have given credence to the testimony of PO3 Albert Carizon as the same was hearsay. this Court finds itself with no other recourse but to strike down the process adopted by the prosecution and acquit accused-appellants for insufficiency of evidence and reasonable doubt. The constitutional provision sheathes the private individual with an impenetrable armor against unreasonable searches and seizures. and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. PO3 Salonga and PO3 Carizon together with SPO1 Fernando Arenas immediately proceeded to the house of the suspects and parked their car some three hundred (300) meters away. Significantly. Maintaining his innocence in this appeal. Art. papers. Zenaida Bolasa and Roberto delos Reyes were thus charged with violation of Sec. The trial court upon finding the version of the prosecution to be more plausible convicted both accused Zenaida Bolasa and Roberto delos Reyes of the crime charged and sentenced each of them not only to reclusion perpetuabut also to pay a fine of P500. accused-appellants. of RA 6425 otherwise known as The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. 2 Both accused appealed. When they reached the house they "peeped (inside) through a small window and .000. Both however denied on the witness stand ownership over the confiscated tea bags and drug implements. she narrated that at 7:30 in the evening of 11 September 1995 she was on her way to 9th Avenue. BELLOSILLO. III. 2. Art. he and his wife were merely tenants in the house of Zenaida Bolasa and at the time he was arrested he had just arrived from work. Consequently. II. PO3 Carizon had no personal knowledge regarding the conduct of the arrest and search thus making his testimony hearsay. She denied knowing PO3 Carizon and the fact that the latter saw her repacking marijuana inside her house. Bolasa likewise impugns the identity of the items confiscated from her person vis-a-vis those which were submitted for laboratory examination and charges that the failure of the prosecution to satisfactorily establish the chain of custody over the specimen is damaging to its case. No. . although separately. Assuming he was indeed repacking marijuana when the police officers arrived. Karuhatan. after a meticulous evaluation of the evidence at hand. They walked towards their quarry's lair accompanied this time by their unnamed informer.00. Thus. houses. he immediately ordered her to leave. G. As she was about to leave the house she met a certain "Rico" and conversed with him for some time. accused-appellant Roberto delos Reyes insists he had just arrived from work and had. the police officers had to lean first on the window in order to observe the activities inside the room. J. Metro Manila. We sustain the appeal. PO3 Carizon was not among the arresting officers. The State cannot in a cavalier fashion intrude into the persons of its citizens as well as into their houses. 8. Valenzuela. This case clearly illustrates how constitutional guarantees against illegal arrests and seizures can be violated by overzealous police officers in the arrest of suspected drug offenders. he claims it would have been inconceivable for them to know what he was doing inside his room considering the height of his window. He and Zenaida were then brought to the Valenzuela Police Station for questioning and subsequently detained. . Subsequent examination of the tea bags by NBI Forensic Chemist Rubie Calalo confirmed the suspicion that the tea bags contained marijuana.On the part of Zenaida Bolasa. Sec. each one represented by a separate counsel. saw one man and a woman repacking suspected marijuana. Unfortunately however it was at that precise moment that police authorities entered and announced their presence.

Mendoza. the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity. accused-appellants had just committed. and 7. Muntinlupa City. 6 An arrest is lawful even in the absence of a warrant: (a) when the person to be arrested has committed. Search of a moving vehicle. the arresting officers had no personal knowledge that at the time of their arrest. Consented warrantless search. The police officers intentionally peeped first through the window before they saw and ascertained the activities of accused-appellants inside the room. accused-appellants were not prisoners who have escaped from a penal establishment. Second. consequently. and. the accompanying search was likewise illegal. 6. 5. First. (d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search. were committing. is actually committing..e. JJ. or a stop and frisk. First. On the contrary. they should have secured a search warrant prior to effecting a valid arrest and seizure.. the arresting officers had no personal knowledge that a crime was committed nor did they have any reasonable ground to believe that accused-appellants committed it. customs search. Highly regulated by the government. and. WHEREFORE. their arrest is illegal. Perforce. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest (Sec. Buena and De Leon. Art. After conducting the surveillance and determining the existence of probable cause for arresting accused-appellants. Third. (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent. it cannot even fall under exigent and emergency circumstances. for the evidence at hand is bereft of any such showing. 9 hence. SO ORDERED. Their Jailers — the Correctional Institution for Women. 3. 8. of RA 6425 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE for insufficiency of evidence and on reasonable doubt. II. arrests and seizures in the following instances are not deemed "unreasonable" and are thus allowed even in the absence of a warrant — 1. the 12 July 1996 Decision of the Regional Trial Court finding accused-appellants Zenaida Bolasa y Nakoboan and Roberto delos Reyes guilty of violating Sec.. i. or is about to commit an offense in his presence. there was no valid intrusion. 7 A person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense. was not inadvertently discovered. Quisumbing. Stop and Frisk." 5 Thus. 12. concur. the evidence. Mandaluyong City. The arrest being illegal ab initio. Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence). and the Bureau of Corrections. Exigent and emergency circumstances. In like manner. Jr. Search of evidence in "plain view. the search cannot be categorized as a search of a moving vehicle. for Roberto delos Reyes — are DIRECTED to implement this Decision immediately and to report to this Court within five (5) days from receipt hereof their compliance herewith WITHOUT DELAY.For sure. As already discussed. (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are. a . or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. (c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending. accused-appellants were illegally arrested. (b) when an offense has in fact been committed and he has reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed it. or were about to commit a crime.. the tea bags later on found to contain marijuana. their acquittal must follow in faithful obeisance to the fundamental law. both are ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED immediately from confinement unless held for another lawful cause. Every evidence thus obtained during the illegal search cannot be used against accusedappellants. 2. this constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition against all searches and seizures as it obviously operates only against searches and seizures that are "unreasonable. a consented warrantless search. 4. Second. Neither can it be said that the objects were seized in plain view. it indicates that the apprehending officers should have conducted first a surveillance considering that the identities and address of the suspected culprits were already ascertained. 8 The manner by which accused-appellants were apprehended does not fall under any of the above-enumerated categories." The elements are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties. for Zenaida Bolasa y Nakoboan. Customs search.

266 for her to be able to make a satisfactory explanation. Accounting Department (Ms.00). which was paid to Ms. petitioners.) No.s issued to YSP. which he described as follows: G. she would be placed on preventive suspension to protect the interests of the company. showed that the price per bottle is P320. 14 In a letter 15 to Co dated 10 February 1990. 629552 (shown to the undersigned). Catolico received a memorandum 6 from WATEROUS Vice President-General Manager Emma R. which sustained the reinstatement and monetary awards in favor of private respondent 4 and denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.00 per unit. Irene Soliven. she confirmed that the check amounting to P640. YSP. Co warning her not to dispense medicine to employees chargeable to the latter's accounts because the same was a prohibited practice. WATEROUS Supervisor Luzviminda E. No.As regards the first memorandum. WATEROUS Control Clerk Eugenio Valdez informed Co that he noticed an irregularity involving Catolico and Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals. A case in point is medicine purchased under our Purchase Order (P. .R. 19045 is priced at P384. WDRC paid the amount of P3. On 31 July 1989." since fellow employee Irene Soliven "obtained the medicines in bad faith and through misrepresentation when she claimed that she was given a charge slip by the Admitting Dept.O. On 5 March 1990. EMMA CO. upon conversation with Ms. within twenty-four hours. Ms.00 or an over price of P64. Catolico." It appears that the amount in question (P640. 005160-93. In said letter she protested Saldaña's invasion of her privacy when Saldaña opened an envelope addressed to Catolico. 222832 dated December 15. vs. ." thereby assailing the 30 September 1993 decision 2 and December 1993 Resolution 3 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC-NCR CA No. Inc. 12 and she was granted a 48-hour extension from 1 to 3 February 1990. her side of the reported irregularity. 8 In a memorandum 9 dated 21 November 1989. 10 Forthwith. she was informed that effective 6 February 1990 to 7 March 1990. 1 This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks to declare private respondent Antonia Melodia Catolico (hereafter Catolico) not a "true Servant.00) had been pocketed by Ms.. 10. 13 In a letter dated 2 February 1990. 1990 and Feb. Catolico regarding the check but she denied having received it and that she is unaware of the overprice.840. Estelita Reyes) confirmed that the difference represents refund of jack-up price of ten bottles of Voren tablets per sales invoice no.00 thru MBTC Check No. WATEROUS Supervisor Luzviminda Bautro.: Nor is he a true Servant [who] buys dear to share in the Profit with the Seller. besides she was not authorized to deal directly with the suppliers. Catolico through China Bank check no. 1990 respectively regarding our imposition of preventive suspension on you . Inc. 266 representing purchase of ten (10) bottles of Voren tablets at P384. No. . Bautro warned Catolico against the "rush delivery of medicines without the proper documents." Catolico then asked the company to look into the fraudulent activities of Soliven. Catolico even asked Ms. . respondents. Inc. 1997 WATEROUS DRUG CORPORATION and MS. Catolico did not deny her responsibility but explained that her act was "due to negligence. Catolico. thus: We received your letter of explanation and your lawyer's letter dated Feb. bukas. However. . Catolico. as this would impair the company's control of purchases and. Inc. issued a memorandum 16 notifying Catolico of her termination. to determine the discrepancy and it was found that the cost per bottle was indeed overpriced. Verification was made to YSP. However. 5 The facts are as follows: Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by petitioner Waterous Drug Corporation (hereafter WATEROUS) on 15 August 1988. Catolico requested access to the file containing Sales Invoice No. 266 as per their check voucher no. through her counsel." On 29 January 1990.00 was actually received by Ms. Co issued another memorandum 7 to Catolico warning her not to negotiate with suppliers of medicine without consulting the Purchasing Department. . as it sprang from an earlier incident between her and Co's secretary. DAVIDE. As a matter of fact. JR. Saldana answered her "talagang ganyan. 2. explained that the check she received from YSP was a Christmas gift and not a "refund of overprice. 19045 with YSP Sales Invoice No.O. On the same date. 892068 dated November 9.O. 1988. The undersigned talked to Ms. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ANTONIA MELODIA CATOLICO. Co asked Catolico to explain. Catolico asked for additional time to give her explanation. Saldana. on 2 February 1990. Previews P. 113271 October 16. J. (hereafter YSP). Saldana if she opened the envelope containing the check but Ms. EDRC Espana Pharmacy Clerk." She also averred that the preventive suspension was ill-motivated. in her memorandum 11 dated 37 January 1990.00 per bottle (or total of P640.00 while P. 1989 .

as correctly held by the NLRC. Labor Arbiter Alex Arcadio Lopez found no proof of unfair labor practice against petitioners.00/bottle only.000. constituted substantial evidence of dishonesty. Your actuation constitutes an act of dishonesty detrimental to the interest of the company. with no basis to conclude that Catolico pocketed the amount in collusion with YSP. the check was discovered in violation of the constitutional provision on the right to privacy and communication. Catolico likewise disputes petitioners' claim that the audit report and her initial response that she never received a check were sufficient to justify her dismissal.21 Separation pay (3 years) 4. in light of the decision in the People v. 21 the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of one's person from interference by government and cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government. 20 It concluded: With the smoking gun evidence of respondents being rendered inadmissible. Finally. Anent the third ground. Catolico asserts that petitioners' evidence is too "flimsy" to justify her dismissal. and (b) the incident involving the opening of envelope addressed to private respondent does not warrant the application of the constitutional provisions. Nevertheless. the NLRC affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter on the ground that petitioners were not able to prove a just cause for Catolico's dismissal from her employment.00 drawn by YSP in favor of complainant. but modified the dispositive portion of the appealed decision by deleting the award for illegal suspension as the same was already included in the computation of the aggregate of the awards in the amount of P35.00 actually represents the refund of over price of said medicines and this was confirmed by Ms.858.00/bottle with previous price of P320.305. In its decision 19 of 30 September 1993. In its Comment which we required to be filed in view of the adverse stand of the OSG. Company rules do not prohibit an employee from accepting gifts from clients. it declared that the check was inadmissible in evidence pursuant to Sections 2 and 3(1 and 2) of Article III of the Constitution. But. petitioners insist that Catolico had been receiving "commissions" from YSP. and there is no indication in the contentious check that it was meant as a refund for overpriced medicines. as well as her "lame excuse" that it was a Christmas gift from YSP.00 Backwages 26. by virtue of the constitutional right invoked by complainants.401. Article III of the 1987 Constitution. III. Besides." and to show that any investigation was conducted. Marti. or probably from other suppliers. and illegal suspension. Catolico filed before the Office of the Labor Arbiter a complaint for unfair labor practice. said letters failed to rebut the evidences [sic] in our possession which clearly shows that as a Pharmacist stationed at Espana Branch. The NLRC then dismissed the appeal for lack of merit. . Estelita Reyes." The OSG was also convinced that Catolico's dismissal was based on just cause and that Catolico's admission of the existence of the check. And contrary to the findings of NLRC. Accordingly. he decided in favor of Catolico because petitioners failed to "prove what [they] alleged as complainant's dishonesty. On 5 May 1990. back wages for one year. In her Comment.. Their motion for reconsideration having been denied. II. the OSG echoed petitioners' argument that there was no violation of the right of privacy of communication in this case. 1990. as it would not be to the best interest of the parties. consistent with her position that what she received was a token gift. All that can be gathered from the audit report is that there was apparently an overcharge.for acts of dishonesty. you actually made Purchase Orders at YSP Phils. petitioners filed this special civil action for certiorari.86. respondents' case falls apart as it is bereft of evidence which cannot be used as a legal basis for complainant's dismissal. Public respondent gravely erred in applying Section 3. In its Manifestation in Lieu of Comment. and that the check issued to her on 9 November 1989 was not the first or the last. you are hereby terminated effective March 8.401. the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) disagreed with the NLRC's decision.50 1/12 of P26. As to the first and second grounds. However. as it was of the persuasion that (a) the conclusions reached by public respondent are inconsistent with its findings of fact. Accordingly. it was inadmissible in evidence. illegal dismissal.15 ————— TOTAL AWARD P35. YSP Phils.86 ————— Petitioners seasonably appealed from the decision and urged the NLRC to set it aside because the Labor Arbiter erred in finding that Catolico was denied due process and that there was no just cause to terminate her services. and the additional sum of P2. Accounting Department. He thus declared the dismissal and suspension illegal but disallowed reinstatement. Inc. hence. for 10 bottles of Voren tablets at P384. She thus concluded that her dismissal was based on a mere suspicion." Arbiter Lopez computed the award in favor of Catolico as follows: 30 days Preventive Suspension P2. and she had no duty to turn it over to her employer. It then prays that we dismiss this petition. Hence. It observed that Catolico was given "several opportunities" to explain her side of the check controversy.." constituted breach of confidence. petitioners submit that. which her co-employee saw when the latter opened the envelope.238. 22 adding that petitioner WATEROUS was justified in opening an envelope from one of its regular suppliers as it could assume that the letter was a business communication in which it had an interest.858.00 for illegal suspension "representing 30 days work. the dismissal was without just cause and due process. which is anchored on the following grounds: I. he awarded separation pay to Catolico computed at one-half month's pay for every year of service. and concluded that the opportunities granted her and her subsequent explanation "satisfy the requirements of just cause and due process. When she denied having received a check from YSP. Catolico was given ample opportunity to explain her side of the controversy. A check which you received in the amount of P640. It found that petitioner's evidence consisted only of the check of P640. Due process was duly accorded to private respondent. she meant that she did not receive any refund of overprice.50 2.000. Inc. the NLRC contends that petitioners miserably failed to prove their claim that it committed grave abuse of discretion in its findings of fact. The check in issue was given to her. 17 In his decision 18 of 10 May 1993. Public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in its findings of facts. aggravated by her "propensity to violate company rules. They also maintained that Catolico occupied a confidential position and that Catolico's receipt of YSP's check.

however. that the evidence against private respondent was inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of her constitutional rights of privacy of communication and against unreasonable searches and seizures which is hereby set aside. On the contrary. submitted.00 per bottle." which were not. Control Clerk Eugenio C. including legal representation.00 per box. the instant petition must fail. . It is not true. It clearly appears then that Catolico's dismissal was based on hearsay information. 32 Besides. 005160-93 are AFFIRMED. through Ms." the said check was never presented in evidence. Procedural due process requires that an employee be apprised of the charge against him. they or their officers should have disapproved the transaction. Ms. 222832.00 "thru MBTC Check No. It is settled that the burden is on the employer to prove just and valid cause for dismissing an employee. Co. and its failure to discharge that burden would result in a finding that the dismissal is unjustified. he correctly awarded separation pay to Catolico. Catolico in violation of the [company] procedure. Hearsay evidence carries no probative value. except as to the third ground. which has a previous price of only P320. Suspicion is not among the valid causes provided by the Labor Code for the termination of employment. while the purchase order dated 5 October 1989 30 priced the Voren tablets at P384. Consequently. being merely a pharmacist. Catolico did not oppose or raise an objection. allowed ample opportunity to be heard and defend himself. whims. Despite the memorandum warning Catolico not to negotiate with suppliers of medicine. 35 In this case. she did not handle "confidential information or sensitive properties. we find no reason to revise the doctrine laid down in People vs. or that she had the opportunity to transact. Catolico was also unjustly dismissed. Again. made an under the table deal with YSP Phils. It is evident from the Supervisor's memorandum that Catolico was dismissed because of an alleged anomalous transaction with YSP. as the purchase orders indicate. their evidence does not establish that there was an overcharge. A thorough review of the record leads us to no other conclusion than that. I verified the matter to YSP Phils. Estelita Reyes confirmed that there was really an overprice and she said that the difference was refunded through their check voucher no. only the Supervisor knew. The purchase order dated 16 August 1989 29 stated that the Voren tablets cost P320. As such. Unfortunately for petitioners. although Catolico was given an opportunity to explain her side. what Valdez called an "under the table deal" with YSP. much less benefit from. it was never shown that petitioners paid for the Voren tablets. 25 Here. there was no proof that she ever transacted. SO ORDERED." She was doing the task of a saleslady: selling drugs and making requisitions when supplies were low. which in no case can justify an employee's dismissal. Separation pay in lieu of reinstatement is computed at one month's salary for every year of service. If the price increase was objectionable to petitioners. through a China Bank Check No. with the said suppliers. that the citizens have no recourse against such assaults. Labor Arbiter Lopez computed the separation pay at one-half month's salary for every year of service. Catolico was denied due process. Finally. This set of facts emphasizes the exceedingly incredible situation proposed by petitioners. 892068 dated November 9. Catolico was not at all involved in the sale of the Voren tablets. respectively. to supply WDRC needed medicines like Voren tablets at a jack-up price of P384. 24 In the case at bar. she was dismissed from the service in the memorandum of 5 March 1990 issued by her Supervisor after receipt of her letter and that of her counsel. and assisted by a representative if the employee so desires. The Supervisor's memorandum spoke of "evidences [sic] in [WATEROUS] possession. Assuming that there was an overcharge. the two purchase orders for the Voren tablets were recommended by Director-MMG Mario R. 23 Ample opportunity connotes every kind of assistance that management must accord the employee to enable him to prepare adequately for his defense. verified by AVP-MNG Noli M. to which class of employees the term "trust and confidence" is restricted. 33 As regards the constitutional violation upon which the NLRC anchored its decision. The purchase orders were silent as to Catolico's participation in the purchase.. 629552 which was shown to me and the payee is Melodia Catolico. given reasonable time to answer the charge. to determine the discrepancy and I found out that the cost per bottle was indeed overpriced. Costs against petitioners. who claims to have discovered Catolico's inappropriate transaction. The difference in price may then be attributed to the different packaging used in each purchase order. we will uphold the award of separation pay as fixed by the Labor Arbiter.00. however. nor was any receipt from YSP offered by petitioners. Concededly. What the "evidences" [sic] other than the sales invoice and the check were.Finally. the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the challenged decision and resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission dated 30 September 1993 and 2 December 1993. Catolico was not shown to be a managerial employee.840. since it has been determined by the Labor Arbiter that Catolico's reinstatement would not be to the best interest of the parties. Catolico insists that she could not have breached the trust and confidence of WATEROUS because. stated in his affidavit: 26 4. the two purchase orders for Voren tablets presented by petitioners do not indicate an overcharge. through the former's memorandum 28 of 29 January 1990. Estelita Reyes never testified nor executed an affidavit relative to this case. petitioners had no one to blame for their predicament but themselves. Catolico's dismissal then was obviously grounded on mere suspicion. 27 Besides. as counsel for Catolico claims. While Valdez informed Co. WATEROUS proved unequal to the task. Panuncio. 1989. No hearing was ever conducted after the issues were joined through said letters. 31 and even the dismissal of an employee for loss of trust and confidence must rest on substantial grounds and not on the employer's arbitrariness. Valdez. or suspicion. There was no occasion for Catolico to initiate. thus. such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities. caprices. viz. 1989. WHEREFORE. 5. and as said counsel admits. Moreover. My findings revealed that on or before the month of July 31. Marti 34 that the Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by private individuals. Lopez and approved by Vice President-General Manager Emma R. The Accounting Department of YSP Phils.00 per bottle of 50 mg. we have to reject the statements attributed to her by Valdez. except as to its reason for upholding the Labor Arbiter's decision. in NLRC-NCR CA No. that WATEROUS paid YSP P3.

together with his team composed of Sgt. 4 REGALADO. the latter pointed to them. 1989. Branch 103. the driver of the car. At around midnight of November 30. Also. the 4th Marine Battalion of the Philippine Marines occupied Villamor Air Base. Ramon Briones. accused-appellant. 1994 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. Lamberto Bicus. docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. At that moment. S/Sgt. then only six meters away. Henry Aquino. which attack resulted in the wounding of Sgt. METRO MANILA. The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. and Channel 4. custody and control. the above-named accused. S/Sgt. allegedly committed as follows: That on or about the 5th day of DECEMBER.M. various government establishments and military camps in Metro Manila were being bombarded by the rightist group with their "tora-tora" planes. The surveillance. parked the vehicle around ten to fifteen meters away from the Eurocar building near P.: The incidents involved in this case took place at the height of the coup d' etat staged in December. Sagario to start the car and leave the area. while the Scout Rangers took over the Headquarters of the Philippine Army. Sagario on the right thigh. appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. without first securing the necessary license and/or permit to possess the same from the proper authorities. was conducted pursuant to an intelligence report received by the division that said establishment was being occupied by elements of the RAM-SFP as a communication command post. However. R. which actually started on the night of November 30. Nobody in the surveillance team was able to retaliate because they sought cover inside the car and they were afraid that civilians or bystanders might be caught in the cross-fire.. and within the jurisdiction of this The records show that in the early morning of December 1. which were tried jointly by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Rodolfo Tor and several John Does were charged with attempted homicide allegedly committed on December 1. 1 Accused-appellant Rolando de Gracia was charged in two separate informations for illegal possession of ammunition and explosives in furtherance of rebellion. In Criminal Case No. Sgt. Soria. Ruiz. did then and there willfully. but was acquitted of attempted homicide. After a while. Efren Soria of the Intelligence Division. the government television station. At that time. drew their guns and fired at the team. 1866. Chito Henson and several John Does whose true names and identities have not as yet been ascertained. vs. J. conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another. Crispin Sagario. Simon and a Sgt. by then and there participating therein and publicly taking arms against the duly constituted authorities. of Presidential Decree No. National Capital Region Defense Command. CHITO HENSON and JOHN DOES. 1989 at around 10:00 P. Q-90-11755. ammunition and/or explosive. Chito Henson. was on board a brown Toyota car conducting a surveillance of the Eurocar Sales Office located at Epifanio de los Santos Avenue in Quezon City. and without authority of law. come to an agreement and decision to commit the crime of rebellion. and for attempted homicide. Maj. 1989 in Quezon City upon the person of Crispin Sagario who was shot and hit on the right thigh. Rolando de Gracia. PHILIPPINES. 1989. respectively. the following to wit: Five (5) bundles of C-4 or dynamites Six (6) cartoons of M-16 ammunition at 20 each One hundred (100) bottles of MOLOTOV bombs G. ammunition and explosives and pursuant to their conspiracy heretofore agreed upon by them and prompted by common designs. 1989. Nicolas R. Metro Manila. for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. 2 In Criminal Case No. Q-90-11756. unlawfully. in QUEZON CITY. the Army Operations Center. Rolando de Gracia. A crowd was then gathered near the Eurocar office watching the on-going bombardment near Camp Aguinaldo. 102009-10 July 6. he admitted that he is not authorized to possess any firearms. a group of five men disengaged themselves from the crowd and walked towards the car of the surveillance team. penalized under Section 1. Maj. ROLANDO DE GRACIA. As they passed by the group. Ramos. II for accused-appellant. ROLANDO DE GRACIA. one S/Sgt.Honorable Court. 1989. 1989 by ultra-rightist elements headed by the Reform the Armed Forces MovementSoldiers of the Filipino People (RAM-SFP) against the Government. Tuazon Street. plaintiff-appellee. paragraph 3. Henry Aquino had earlier alighted from the car to conduct his surveillance on foot. accused. Nos. disrupting and jeopardizing its activities and removing from its allegiance the territory of the Philippines or parts thereof. M/Sgt. Q-90-11755 and Q-90-11756. were charged with the crime of illegal possession of ammunition and explosives in furtherance of rebellion. feloniously and knowingly have in their possession. who was then seated in front. 3 The parties likewise stipulated that there was a rebellion during the period from November 30 up to December 9. . During the arraignment. Appellant was convicted for illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion. saw the approaching group and immediately ordered Sgt. and armed with said dynamites. some elements of the Philippine Army coming from Fort Magsaysay occupied the Greenhills Shopping Center in San Juan. Crispin Sagario.

he was ordered to get out of his house and made to lie on the ground face down. or in connection with the crimes of rebellion. 1989. Sgt. Sgt. and "molotov" bombs inside one of the rooms belonging to a certain Col. If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm. R. According to him. He testified that when the military raided the office. First. saw appellant De Gracia inside the office of Col. A uniform with the nametag of Col. appellant again went to see Matillano because he had no job. 135. he was tasked to guard the office of Col. and he did not have actual possession of the explosives. They were then made to sign an inventory. the first one to enter the Eurocar building. ammunition or machinery. Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. He claims that intent to possess. To accomplish the object of this law the proprietary concept of the possession can have no bearing whatsoever. according to them. the explosives were already there. He denies. the same perils to public security. 6 This has to be so if the manifest intent of the law is to be effective. which is necessary before one can be convicted under Presidential Decree No. he was inside his house. intent to commit the crime is not necessary. No search warrant was secured by the raiding team because. Appellant Rolando de Gracia gave another version of the incident. 1991. damage to property and destruction of valuable resources of the country. but found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion and sentenced him to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua. however. M/Sgt. which the law penalizes exist whether the unlicensed holder of a prohibited weapon be its owner or a borrower. Sale. at that time there was so much disorder considering that the nearby Camp Aguinaldo was being mopped up by the rebel forces and there was simultaneous firing within the vicinity of the Eurocar office. Second. Matillano. aside from the fact that the courts were consequently closed. dispose. together with "Obet" and "Dong" who were janitors of the building. Moreover. Matillano which is located at the right side of the building. He denies that he was at the Eurocar Sales Office on December 1. of the explosives and ammunition confiscated by the raiding team. Matillano kaya sabi nila ito na lang bata niya ang ipitin natin. 1. Patricio Pacatang. It is sufficient that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the . or possess any firearms. C. P. the court recommends that Rolando de Gracia be extended executive clemency after serving a jail term of five (5) years of good behavior. part of firearms. The series of coup d' etats unleashed in the country during the first few years of the transitional government under then President Corazon P. 1866 which seek to nip in the bud and preempt the commission of any act or acts which tend to disturb public peace and order. at around 6:30 A. delos Santos raided the Eurocar Sales Office. tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition. a small nipa hut which is adjacent to the building. holding a C-4 and suspiciously peeping through a door. If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of. What the law requires is merely possession which includes not only actual physical possession but also constructive possession or the subjection of the thing to one's control and management. as a rule.M. He avers that he does not know anything about the explosives and insists that when they were asked to stand up. insurrection or subversion. if so. Appellant stated that he visited Col. That judgment of conviction is now challenged before us in this appeal. Matillano in 1987 at the stockade of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police (PC-INP). he is neither the owner nor a tenant of the building where the ammunition and explosives were found." On February 22. he was guarding the explosives for and in behalf of Col. five bundles of C4 dynamites. 1866 provides as follows: Sec. Gutierrez and that appellant is supposedly a "boy" therein. The first issue to be resolved is whether or not intent to possess is an essential element of the offense punishable under Presidential Decree No. or incident to. As a result of the raid. and elements of the 16th Infantry Battalion under one Col. Presidential Decree No. written in Tagalog. Acquisition. Matillano was also found. it made a recommendation that "(i)nasmuch as Rolando de Gracia appears to be merely executing or obeying orders and pursuant to the spirit contained in the 2nd paragraph of Art. and which criminal acts have resulted in loss of human lives. Magallion. the trial court rendered judgment 5 acquitting appellant Rolando de Gracia of attempted homicide. was not present in the case at bar. Unlawful Manufacture. 1989. 1989. deal in. Matillano.. Matillano eh may atraso daw sa kanila si Col. he was merely employed by Col. Matillano then told him that he could stay in the PCINP stockade and do the marketing for them. Sgt. The rule is that ownership is not an essential element of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. — The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture. appellant worked for Matillano. De Gracia was the only person then present inside the room. that he was inside the room of Col. Matillano when the raiding team barged in and that he had explosives in his possession. Lacdao. The same evils. he contends that when the raiding team arrived at the Eurocar Sales Office on December 5. the team arrested appellant. Presidential Decree No. whether appellant De Gracia did intend to illegally possess firearms and ammunition. as well as Soprieso Verbo and Roberto Jimena who were janitors at the Eurocar building. Matillano which is located at the right portion of the building. Matillano as an errand boy. Oscar Obenia. They were able to find and confiscate six cartons of M-16 ammunition. 1866 and. ammunition and explosives. Col. De Gracia believes that the prosecution witnesses were moved to testify against him because "bata raw ako ni Col. M-shells of different calibers. the penalty of death shall be imposed. acquire. Aquino attest to the ever-growing importance of laws such as Presidential Decree No.As a consequence. 8 in which case good faith and absence of criminal intent are not valid defenses. The group was able to confirm later that the owner of Eurocar office is a certain Mr. 1989. Virgilio Babao as team leader. 1866. 1866 was passed because of an upsurge of crimes vitally affecting public order and safety due to the proliferation of illegally possessed and manufactured firearms. 9 When the crime is punished by a special law. he was in Antipolo to help in the birthday party of Col. Appellant principally contends that he cannot be held guilty of illegal possession of firearms for the reason that he did not have either physical or constructive possession thereof considering that he had no intent to possess the same. a searching team composed of F/Lt. From that time until his arrest at the Eurocar office. I. In July. he claims that on November 30. 7 But is the mere fact of physical or constructive possession sufficient to convict a person for unlawful possession of firearms or must there be an intent to possess to constitute a violation of the law? This query assumes significance since the offense of illegal possession of firearms is a malum prohibitum punished by a special law. Matillano. 1989. of December 5. and that he knew Matillano was detained because of the latter's involvement in the 1987coup d' etat. the penalty of death shall be imposed.

Matillano does not constitute illegal possession thereof because there was no intent on his part to possess the same. appellant denied any knowledge about the explosives. 1866.special law. incidental. considering the gravity of the offense for which herein appellant stands to be convicted and the penalty sought to be imposed. although there is physical or constructive possession. and that he intended to possess the same. "molotov" bombs. A fortiori. taking into consideration the prior and coetaneous acts of the accused and the surrounding circumstances. 19 Under such urgency and exigency of the moment. to delve into the legality of the warrantless search conducted by the raiding team. or harmless possession or control of a firearm cannot be considered a violation of a statute prohibiting the possession of this kind of weapon. As a former soldier. Hence. but he did intend to commit an act. Even an ordinarily prudent man would be put on guard and be suspicious if he finds articles of this nature in a place intended to carry out the business of selling cars and which has nothing to do at all. there was sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and there committing a crime. and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. in order that one may be found guilty of a violation of the decree. Coming now to the case before us. This is not important in convicting a person under Presidential Decree No. and various kinds of ammunition which were confiscated by the military from his possession. casual. however. it must still be shown that there was animus possidendi or an intent to possess on the part of the accused. 18 The courts in the surrounding areas were obviously closed and. a search warrant could lawfully be dispensed with. The presence of an unusual quantity of high-powered firearms and explosives could not be justifiably or even colorably explained. we deem it our bounden duty. where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused. While the matter has not been squarely put in issue. On the basis of the foregoing disquisition. Criminal intent here refers to the intention of the accused to commit an offense with the use of an unlicensed firearm. Malmstedt 20 and bears reiteration: While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search was made over the personal effects of accused. under the circumstances of the case. for that matter. and attempted to flee. there was general chaos and disorder at that time because of simultaneous and intense firing within the vicinity of the office and in the nearby Camp Aguinaldo which was under attack by rebel forces. Animus possidendi is a state of mind which may be determined on a case to case basis. discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed. The next question that may be asked is whether or not there was a valid search and seizure in this case. or where the accused was acting suspiciously. His pretension of impersonal or indifferent material possession does not and cannot inspire credence. as in a gun store. Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this Court as valid. the military operatives. Furthermore. because of existence of probable cause. In the first (intent to commit the crime). 16 Prior to the raid. the place where the explosives were found is not a military camp or office. The required probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not determined by any fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of each case. The trial judge himself manifested that on December 5. 17 The Eurocar Sales Office is obviously not a gun store and it is definitely not an armory or arsenal which are the usual depositories for explosives and ammunition. that appellant De Gracia actually intended to possess the articles confiscated from his person. While mere possession. In the present case. nor one where such items can ordinarily but lawfully be stored. without regard to any other criminal or felonious intent which the accused may have harbored in possessing the firearm. to believe and conclude that he is familiar with and knowledgeable about the dynamites. thereby compelling the former to break into the office. Thus. a temporary. Under the foregoing circumstances. had reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being committed. Intent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act must be distinguished. Then. Oscar Abenia categorically testified that he was the first one to enter the Eurocar Sales Office when the military operatives raided the same. directly or indirectly. 12 such as Presidential Decree No. a distinction should be made between criminal intent and intent to possess. 11 Such intent to possess is. Furthermore. even if such possession was made in good faith and without criminal intent. however. and we so hold. in light of advertence thereto by the parties. the raiding team had no opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant from the courts. he cannot feign ignorance on the import of having in his possession such a large quantity of explosives and ammunition. it is sufficient that the accused had no authority or license to possess a firearm. it is our considered opinion that the instant case falls under one of the exceptions to the prohibition against a warrantless search. since he was merely employed as an errand boy of Col. 15 The raid was actually precipitated by intelligence reports that said office was being used as headquarters by the RAM. an arsenal or armory. The view that we here take is in consonance with our doctrinal ruling which was amply explained in People vs. 1989 when the raid was conducted. There was consequently more than sufficient probable cause to warrant their action. It is not controverted that appellant De Gracia is a former soldier. the building and houses therein were deserted. It is primarily and solely engaged in the sale of automobiles. taking into account the facts obtaining in this case. is sufficient to convict a person for illegal possession of a firearm. having served with the Philippine Constabulary prior to his separation from the service for going on absence without leave (AWOL). with the trade of firearms and ammunition. his court was closed. and he saw De Gracia standing in the room and holding the several explosives marked in evidence as Exhibits D to D-4. 10 II. 1866. there is no offense committed. Matillano. it is apparent. therefore. their Commanding Officer also received information that a Caucasian . there is no doubt in our minds that appellant De Gracia is indeed guilty of having intentionally possessed several firearms. without criminal intent. A person may not have consciously intended to commit a crime. there was a surveillance conducted on the premises wherein the surveillance team was fired at by a group of men coming from the Eurocar building. 13 At first. he alternatively contended that his act of guarding the explosives for and in behalf of Col. Prosecution witness Sgt. by the very nature of things. and that act is. Aside from the persistent reports received by the NARCOM that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. 14 We do not hesitate. What exists in the realm of thought is often disclosed in the range of action. explosives and ammunition without the requisite license or authority therefor. It is admitted that the military operatives who raided the Eurocar Sales Office were not armed with a search warrant at that time. there must be criminal intent. for as long as the animus possidendi is absent. the occupants thereof refused to open the door despite requests for them to do so. in the second (intent to perpetrate the act) it is enough that the prohibited act is done freely and consciously. under the situation then prevailing. the crime itself. When the military operatives raided the place. In the first place. Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonable. In addition. it would be absurd for him not to know anything about the dangerous uses and power of these weapons. Concomitantly.

. or for committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion. when ordered to do so. the crime of illegal possession of firearms committed in the course or as part of a rebellion. as a specific offense. there was a rebellion. even if considered highly advantageous to the prosecution and onerous to the accused. arson. would be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law enforcement. in the light of such circumstances. taken together as a whole. to quell the rebellion. 1866 defines and punishes. and no extensive search was initially made. homicide. vs. 21 applicable. To deprive the NARCOM agents of the ability and facility to act accordingly. to the present case: The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements. From these circumstances arose a probable cause which justified the warrantless search that was made on the personal effects of the accused. et al. particularly at the Camelot Hotel. unlawful possession of an unlicensed firearm in furtherance of rebellion may give rise to separate prosecutions for a violation of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. that accused was required to present his passport. including. therefore.. III. 1989. the police officers had to act quickly and there was no time to secure a search warrant. Obviously the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of violence against government forces. The arrest or capture is thus impelled by the exigencies of the situation that involves the very survival of society and its government and duly constituted authorities. or other offenses. to readily present his identification papers when required to do so? The receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession. only managed to arouse the suspicion of the officer that accused was trying to hide his identity." The court below held that appellant De Gracia. we find the principle enunciated in Umil. 1866. this is a matter within the exclusive prerogative of the President whose decision thereon should be insulated against any tenuous importunity. is distinct from the crime of rebellion punished under Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code. during the course of the inspection. however. explosives and ammunition seized and recovered from him was for the purpose and in furtherance of rebellion. In the Tangliben case. most assuredly so in case of invasion. and also a violation of Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code on rebellion. . who has nothing to hide from the authorities. there was no time to obtain a search warrant. The failure of accused to present his identification papers. the Court has explained that said provision of the law will not be invalidated by the mere fact that the same act is penalized under two different statutes with different penalties. erroneously and improperly used by the court below as a basis in determining the degree of liability of appellant and the penalty to be imposed on him. 24 with variant elements. 23 It follows that. led the NARCOM officers to reasonably believe that the accused was trying to hide something illegal from the authorities. San Fernando. who had been servicing the personal needs of Col. We accept this finding of the lower court. Matillano (whose active armed opposition against the Government. and by the information received by the NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession. et al. 1866 which. Double jeopardy in this case cannot be invoked because the first is an offense punished by a special law while the second is a felony punished by the Revised Penal Code. Accused Tangliben who was acting suspiciously and pointed out by an informer was apprehended and searched by the police authorities. The arrest. Ergo. Consequently. It was held that when faced with on-the-spot information. at first. 1989 up to and until December 9. In any event. or any other milder acts but really in pursuance of the rebellious movement. It was only when one of the officers noticed a bulge on the waist of accused. Ramos. Pampanga. the police authorities conducted a surveillance at the Victory Liner Terminal located at Bgy. If killing and other acts of violence against the rebels find justification in the exigencies of armed hostilities which (are) of the essence of waging a rebellion or insurrection. than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. Presidential Decree No. is guilty of the act of guarding the explosives and "molotov" bombs for and in behalf of the latter. 1866. The above provision of the law was. As earlier stated. a few hours before the apprehension of herein accused. For is it not a regular norm for an innocent man. When NARCOM received the information. The Revised Penal Code treats rebellion as a crime apart from murder. need not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by a judge of the existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if the offense is bailable. It was a legal malapropism for the lower court to interject the aforestated provision of the Revised Penal Code in this prosecution for a crime under a special law. that might conceivably be committed in the course of a rebellion. Said information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM the very same morning that accused came down by bus from Sagada on his way to Baguio City. the acts of the NARCOM officers in requiring the accused to open his pouch bag and in opening one of the wrapped objects found inside said bag (which was discovered to contain hashish) as well as the two (2) teddy bears with hashish stuffed inside them. in one case involving the constitutionality of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. our next inquiry is whether or not appellant's possession of the firearms. subject to the presence of the requisite elements in each case. In addition. It must be observed that. It must be made clear that appellant is charged with the qualified offense of illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion under Presidential Decree No. by analogy. In other words. 22 As a matter of fact. it was stipulated and admitted by both parties that from November 30. is more an act of capturing them in the course of an armed conflict. San Nicolas. in law. The trial court found accused guilty of illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code which states that "any person merely participating or executing the command of others in a rebellion shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period. to the detriment of society. the NARCOM officers merely conducted a routine check of the bus (where accused was riding) and the passengers therein. there is no basis for its recommendation for executive clemency in favor of appellant De Gracia after he shall have served a jail term of five years with good behavior. that a Caucasian travelling from Sagada to Baguio City was carrying with him prohibited drugs.coming from Sagada on that particular day had prohibited drugs in his possession. based on information supplied by some informers. to search even without warrant. was well known). plus the suspicious failure of the accused to produce his passport. were prompted by accused's own attempt to hide his identity by refusing to present his passport. such as illegal possession of firearms. These are two separate statutes penalizing different offenses with discrete penalties. merely seizing their persons and detaining them while any of these contingencies continues cannot be less justified. against persons engaged in the traffic of dangerous drugs.

C. the nature and quantity of the items — 5 bundles of C-4 dynamites. His manifestation of innocence of those items and what he has been guarding in that office is not credible for: (a) he was a former military personnel. in the company of his boss. Matillano on November 30. 25 Presidential Decree No. but its recommendation therein for executive clemency and the supposed basis thereof are hereby DELETED. WHEREFORE. Padilla. albeit with an erroneous recommendation in connection therewith. They are for offensive operations. Consequently. 1989 many soldiers and ex-soldiers were present which self-evidently discloses that De Gracia. 1989 was a military coup d' etat. Narvasa. concur. (c) it appears that he is the only person tasked with caretaking (sic) there in the Matillano office. De Gracia was earlier seen with some men who fired upon a car of the AFP intelligence agents. we are duly convinced that the firearms. was still very much at home and constantly in touch with soldiers and the armed rebellion of November 30. At the time the offense charged in this case was committed under the governance of that law.J. and (d) as heretofore discussed. (b) at the birthday party of Col. Matillano he went down to Eurocar Sales Building from Antipolo to stay guard there. Puno and Mendoza. explosives and ammunition confiscated from appellant De Gracia were illegally possessed by him in furtherance of the rebellion then admittedly existing at that time. the impugned judgment of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED. appellant De Gracia could only be sentenced to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua which was correctly meted out by the trial court. 6 cartons of M-16 ammo and 100 bottles of molotov bombs indicate that the reports received by the military that the Eurocar Sales Building was being used by the rebels was not without basis. JJ. the imposition of the death penalty was proscribed by the Constitution.Withal. Those items are clearly not for one's personal defense. 1989 to December 8 or 9.. . which shows that he is a highly trusted right-hand man of Col. Matillano. SO ORDERED. De Gracia admitted that per instruction of Col. 1866 imposes the death penalty where the illegal possession of firearms and ammunition is committed in furtherance of rebellion. In the words of the court a quo: 2.. with costs against accused-appellant.

vs. et al. 6. ID. Yte when they heard someone in the kitchen uttered "ito na. like the NBI. March 9. a procedure. accused-appellant. J p: Appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pablo City.000. REMEDIAL LAW. Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which specifically provides that no search of a house. SEARCH WARRANT. — Irreconcilable and unexplained contradictions in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses cast doubt on the guilt of appellant and his culpability to the crime charged. OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED. While in said decision. The accused-appellant was seated at the sala together with Sgt. VIOLATIVE OF THE SPIRIT AND LETTER OF THE LAW. the accused above-named. The National Bureau of Investigation.. Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. He is likewise required to deliver the property seized to the judge who issued the warrant.." Apparently. vs. ADMISSION. ID. Mariano Almeda. No. unlawfully and feloniously distribute and sell marijuana and confiscated in her possession is a plastic bag containing 100 grams of dried marijuana leaves and three (3) rolls of magazine newspaper containing marijuana. G. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. SYLLABUS 1. ID.. this Court recognized the fact that the objects seized were retained by the agents of the Anti-Usury Board.. is inadmissible in evidence against the accused-appellant for having been obtained in violation of her rights as a person under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense. it was alleged: "That on or about November 17. SEARCH. 1986. — It is true that the police were able to get an admission from the accused- 5. HIGHLY IRREGULAR. 141) to justify the retention by the police and the NBI of the custody of the allegedly confiscated specimens. CASE AT BAR. Absent such approval. ID. Again. yet the Court also held that it was "for the reason that the custody of said agents is the custody of the issuing officer or court. wherein members of a raiding party can roam around the raided premises unaccompanied by any witness. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. 89373..R. ID. (70 Phil. ID. 1986. 1993. without being authorized by law. as amended. — As we have ruled in Eduardo Quintero vs. neither was she informed of her right to the assistance of counsel and the fact that the document may be used as evidence against her. ID. the retention having been approved by the latter. INADMISSIBLE. Branch 30. EXCEPTION. in the City of San Pablo. sentencing her to pay a fine of Twenty-Five Thousand (P25. ID. 4. et al. Romeo F. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. but it also imposes upon the person making the search the duty to issue a detailed receipt for the property seized. instead of being turned over to the Justice of the Peace of Sagay. ID.. and only then will their custody be considered custody of the court. In the Information filed by Second Assistant City Fiscal Rogelio B. (People of the Philippines vs. in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. the search of the accused-appellant's house was conducted in violation of Section 7. This requirement is mandatory to ensure regularity in the execution of the search warrant. the police officers have authority to retain possession of the marijuana and more so. together with a true and accurate inventory thereof duly verified under oath.. * in Criminal Case No. Remorosa) 2. plaintiff-appellee. to deliver the property to another agency. The records show that the accused-appellant was not informed of her right not to sign the document. Alcantara for accused-appellant. ID.appellant that marijuana was found in her possession but said admission embodied in a document entitled "PAGPAPATUNAY" previously prepared by the police. — The claim of the accused-appellant that the marijuana was planted is strengthened by the manner in which the search was conducted by the police authorities. is violative of both the spirit and the letter of the law. a dangerous drug. et al. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972). DECISION PADILLA. YOLANDA GESMUNDO. approval by the court which issued the search warrant is necessary for the retention of the property seized by the police officers. ID.. 3. EVIDENCE. did then and there wilfully.. IRRECONCILABLE CONTRADICTIONS IN TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES CAST DOUBT ON GUILT OF ACCUSED. as the only witnesses available as prescribed by law are made to witness a search conducted by the other members of the raiding party in another part of the house.00) pesos with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.. Reynaldo M. 4358-SP imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua on the accusedappellant for violation of Section 4. Javier of San Pablo City. Article II of Republic Act No. The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. — The trial judge cites the case of Yee Sue Koy. Violation of said rule is in fact punishable under Article 130 of the Revised Penal Code.. room or any other premise shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter. November 21. PROPERTY SEIZED MUST BE DELIVERED TO THE JUDGE WHO ISSUED THE WARRANT. EVIDENCE. CONTRARY TO LAW." Thus." 1 The facts as presented by the prosecution are stated in the decision of the trial court as follows: . — Not only does the law require the presence of witnesses when the search is conducted. City of San Pablo. these duties are mandatory and are required to preclude substitution of the items seized by interested parties. SEARCH MADE WITHOUT THE PRESENCE OF OCCUPANT.

Pfc. LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING FAITH AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE WITNESSES FOR THE PROSECUTION DESPITE VARIANCE AND MATERIAL CONTRADICTIONS. Sgt." 4 A notice of appeal was filed on 21 April 1989 with the Regional Trial Court which. 7 The accused-appellant herself also testified that Sgt. This was confirmed later on by her with the issuance of her Report No. Atanacio of the RTC of San Pablo City. with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. Accused refused. (TSN. "Upon reaching the residence of the accused. Rizalde Perez and Brgy. accused was made to acknowledge in writing that the dried marijuana flowering tops were taken from her possession and control inside her residence. Yte left word that she. ibid). was seized by abdominal pains which made her cry. She identified Sgt. But Sgt. p — 6. 11-13. Branch 32. she was brought to the police station and detained. Captain Capuno executed their sworn statements. "H"). But Sgt. pp. premises considered. pp. Spurned. to pay the fine of P25. Luciano states that he actually saw the accused-appellant selling marijuana to his civilian informer outside the house of the accused-appellant. On that same day. While seated at the sala. . Luciano. ibid). San Pablo City. December 16. II. the Court hereby renders judgment finding the accused Yolanda Gesmundo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Section 4. Under extreme pressure and promised that they will just talk with her at the City Hall. Luciano positioned himself at the ground floor of the hotel and watched. Yte was showing to accused-appellant something which he claimed to be a search warrant when someone uttered the following words "ito na" coming from the direction where the kitchen of the house is. ibid). on the same day. Her arrest did not result from a "buy-bust" operation supposedly conducted by police officers. (TSN. the NBI Forensic Chemist Salud Manguba issued a Certification with a finding that per preliminary examination which she made. (TSN. on the other hand. "The confiscated specimens are forfeited in favor of the government and to be disposed of in accordance with law. ordered the elevation of the records of the case to this Court. the trial court rendered its decision. p — 3. Yte showed her the search warrant obtained by the police. ibid). Yte and PFC Jose Luciano to be among the group. is as follows: "On November 17. "The police forthwith brought the accused to the police station where she was properly booked. After the discovery. 1986 at around 1:00 p. (Tsn. of that day. "On November 18." 3 On 14 April 1989. that same day Luciano applied for a search warrant." 2 Accused-Appellant's version. Judge Geronima Pueblo Atanacio of RTC. 7-8. She vehemently denied the accusation of Sgt. San Pablo City. Then she was made to sign a prepared document with her name already printed on it. Immediately thereafter. Capt. Yte was invited by accused appellant to enter the house while PFC Luciano was left in the jeep that was parked near the house. Although Pfc. Afterwards. was planted by the police officers. so as to apprehend her with a larger amount. He actually saw the accused selling marijuana to his civilian informer by the door outside the house of the accused. "At about 2:00 p. The accused led the team into her kitchen and she pointed to a metal basin on top of a table as the hiding place of the dried marijuana flowering tops contained in a plastic bag marked ISETANN. the police officers decided to let her go and effect her arrest later in the day through a search warrant. Brgy. thereafter with another police officer. she (accused) was not placed under police custody at that very moment. 6425. Sgt. Yte persisted and accusedappellant. the dispositive portion of which reads: "WHEREFORE. son of her former landlord.000. III. reasoning out that it would be unfair since she is totally unaware of this thing. Capt. That before the incident in question. LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED ON THE BASIS OF AN ILLEGALLY SEIZED AND OR PLANTED EVIDENCE. She begged the team not to search and to leave her house. after examining the contents.A. the police team were allowed entry inside the house on the strength of the said search warrant shown to the accused. Article II. the accused was photographed together with the confiscated items. Assailing the Regional Trial Court's decision both on questions of law and fact. Thereafter. together with Sgt. should be careful as she might be the next to be charged with drug pushing. Yte asked help from accused-appellant to testify against one Warner Marquez. p — 5. a raiding police team armed with Search Warrant No. as amended without any modifying circumstance to consider. Angel Capuno for them to be accompanied by him in serving the said warrant at the residence of the accused located at the Cocoland Compound of said barangay. Pat. Capuno also affixed his countersignature thereto. Branch XXXII of the Court. hereby sentences her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. But the police team insisted on their search. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING PROSECUTION'S EXHIBITS "F" — "F-1" AND "F-2" IN THE ABSENCE OF COMPETENT EVIDENCE THAT THEY WERE THE ONES ALLEGEDLY SEIZED AND RECOVERED FROM THE HOUSE OF THE ACCUSED. Yte who. accused. who was then seven (7) months on the family way. Sgt. went to the residence of the Brgy. Pat. 10 issued by Hon. accusedappellant assigns the following errors allegedly committed by the trial court: "I. 8 The controversy centers on the allegation by the accused-appellant that the marijuana supposedly seized by the raiding police team in her possession. police officer Jose Luciano gave money and instructed his civilian informer to buy marijuana from the accused at the back of the Cocoland Hotel at Brgy. Yte and told him that she does not know anything about it. the confiscated items gave positive results for marijuana (Exh. while accused-appellant was in the terrace of their house located at Barangay del Remedio. as declared by the Court Interpreter of said Branch (a defense witness)." 5 The accused-appellant's conviction by the lower court is anchored on the marijuana seized in her possession and control by virtue of a Search Warrant issued by Judge Atanacio. Luciano handed the bag to Sgt. "E"). The accused cried upon reading the contents of the warrant. a jeep with policemen on board arrived. Rather. for drug pushing.m. The police also recovered from a native "uway" cabinet dried marijuana flowering tops wrapped separately in three (3) pieces of Komiks paper.00. in the morning of November 17." . Angelito Caraan was dispatched to the NBI requesting for the lab examination of the items confiscated from the accused. . p — 4. Yte proceeded to the kitchen and saw PFC Luciano holding a plastic bag with four other companions who entered the house through the back door which was opened at that time. Del Remedio. 6 There is no question that a search warrant was issued by Judge Geronima P. ibid). 1988). Sgt. (TSN. She. 1986. DDN-86-2639 (Exh. "The bail bond for her provisional liberty is hereby cancelled and the accused is hereby ordered immediately incarcerated. (TSN. Yte remained undaunted and was forcing her for the second time to testify against Marquez. R. . confronted the accused-appellant and insisted that the plastic bag came from her. 1986.m. accused-appellant was constrained to sign said document.

et al. Jose V. Yte when they heard someone in the kitchen uttered "ito na". the Barangay Chairman. While in said decision. 10 Sgt. is inadmissible in evidence against the accused-appellant for having been obtained in violation of her rights as a person under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense. Yte contradicted Pfc. 19 As we have ruled in Eduardo Quintero vs. Not only does the law require the presence of witnesses when the search is conducted. the claim of the accused-appellant that the marijuana was planted is strengthened by the manner in which the search was conducted by the police authorities. it may be asked. And when asked by the trial judge.The Investigation Report prepared by Pfc." Furthermore. 20 a procedure. Pfc. et al. . they found dried marijuana leaves. Apparently. Luciano pointed out during his direct examination that it was the accused-appellant who actually gave the marijuana leaves to Sgt. the search of the accused-appellant's house was conducted in violation of Section 7. it must be part of the records of the case. The trial court held that the fact of discovery of the hole at the backyard was merely for the purpose of reporting the hiding place of the marijuana. Luciano's testimony. room or any other premise shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter. vs. Bayani R. 13 But how. Yte as Chief of Intelligence and Investigation Division stated that: "5. At about 171430 H November 1986. on crossexamination. Luciano) was asked by Sgt. Yte asserted that the marijuana leaves were surrendered by the accusedappellant to Pfc. During his cross examination. together with a true and accurate inventory thereof duly verified under oath. 22 The accused-appellant also contends that the prosecution failed to present evidence to prove that the marijuana marked as exhibit in court are the same marijuana allegedly confiscated by the police from her. the trial court held that it takes "judicial notice of the usual practice of the San Pablo City police force of retaining possession of confiscated specimens suspected of being marijuana by immediately forwarding them to the NBI or to an NBI accredited physician for preliminary examination and/or laboratory examination before filing a case with the city prosecutor's office." 26 The mere tolerance by the trial court of such a practice does not make it right. 24 Again. however. such practice violates the mandatory requirements of the law and defeats the very purpose for which they were enacted. the latter having been turned over to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). as the only witnesses available as prescribed by law are made to witness a search conducted by the other members of the raiding party in another part of the house. The police authorities in the case at bar testified that they submitted an inventory to the court without the marijuana. . could one conclude that it was the hiding place. We must be absolutely convinced that marijuana was actually surrendered by the accused-appellant and not planted as claimed by her. Luciano upon the presentation of the search warrant and before the search was actually conducted. Romeo F. but it also imposes upon the person making the search the duty to issue a detailed receipt for the property seized. this Court recognized the fact that the objects seized were retained by the agents of the Anti-Usury Board. This requirement is mandatory to ensure regularity in the execution of the search warrant. During the search we discovered a hole at the backyard of the house of the suspect with a big biscuit can inside the hole and on top of the cover a flower pot was placed wherein the marijuana were kept. neither was she informed of her right to the assistance of counsel and the fact that the document may be used as evidence against her. Mariano Almeda. The records show that an inventory was not part of the documents transmitted from Branch 32 (the warrant issuing branch) to Branch 30 (the trial branch) of the RTC of San Pablo City. 141) to justify the retention by the police and the NBI of the custody of the allegedly confiscated specimens. Bayani Yte. Sgt. Luciano as Investigating Officer and which was noted by Sgt. Whether an inventory was actually made by the police was not clearly established in the trial court. these duties are mandatory and are required to preclude substitution of the items seized by interested parties. said that the only marijuana confiscated by the police was the one contained in the white plastic bag. Yte in the kitchen. Fiscal Javier requested the marking of a photograph depicting buried marijuana on the ground for the purpose of showing the place where the dried marijuana was recovered. and he also saw other marijuana wrapped in a komiks magazine found in an uway cabinet or rattan cabinet. 11 Angel Capuno. if no marijuana was actually seen inside? Moreover. more or less 100 grams on top of the dining table. the court Interpreter said that Judge Atanacio (who issued the warrant) confirmed that she does not have among her files the inventory supposedly submitted by the police. It would seem that the raiding party "could not put their act together". is violative of both the spirit and the letter of the law. Sgt. as to how much marijuana was recovered and where. affirmed the investigation report when he testified that during the search. Sgt. But this was not so. and that he (Pfc. The National Bureau of Investigation." 9 On direct examination. Violation of said rule is in fact punishable under Article 130 of the Revised Penal Code. Remorosa: 18 "Irreconcilable and unexplained contradictions in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses cast doubt on the guilt of appellant and his culpability to the crime charged. Yte merely answered: "That was the testimony of Pat. 23 He is likewise required to deliver the property seized to the judge who issued the warrant. Luciano said that the marijuana leaves contained inside the plastic bag covered by a basin weighed about 800 grams since he himself weighed them on the weighing scale found in the accused-appellant's house. 14 Not only are there inconsistencies as to what was recovered and where but also as to whom the marijuana was supposed to have been surrendered by the accused. 15 Unfortunately. during the pre-trial. The accusedappellant was seated at the sala together with Sgt. instead of being turned over to the Justice of the . wherein members of a raiding party can roam around the raided premises unaccompanied by any witness. (70 Phil. Luciano that accused personally . 12 In all their testimonies. in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. Pfc. Puhawan to come inside the house and they saw the other marijuana leaves wrapped in a magazine located at the uway cabinet. we conducted raid at said residence and premises. Speculations as to the probability of tampering with the evidence cannot then be avoided. 21 The records show that the accused-appellant was not informed of her right not to sign the document. On the issue of non-delivery of the seized marijuana to the court. Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which specifically provides that no search of a house. The contention is well taken. 16 When asked to explain why their inconsistent statements. there was no mention of any marijuana obtained from a flower pot placed on top of a biscuit can inside a hole at the backyard of the accused's house as stated in the investigation report. It is true that the police were able to get an admission from the accused-appellant that marijuana was found in her possession but said admission embodied in a document entitled "PAGPAPATUNAY" previously prepared by the police. Confiscated were more or less 100 grams of dried marijuana leaves and three rolls of magazine newspaper containing marijuana which is ready for disposal. The trial judge cites the case of Yee Sue Koy. on the other hand. Clearly. placed inside a plastic bag and covered by a metal basin. As held in People of the Philippines vs. " 17 We do not agree with the trial court in its conclusion that these discrepancies are trivial. 25 If indeed an inventory of the seized items was made. et al.

U. the retention having been approved by the latter. the element of sale must be unequivocally established. Sgt.Peace of Sagay. Salud Manguba. And yet. Absent such approval. approval by the court which issued the search warrant is necessary for the retention of the property seized by the police officers. and thus. the prosecution in the Information averred that the accused-appellant engaged in the distribution and sale of marijuana. object of the supposed sale. . v. 2 Phil. Roberto Toledo y Tejario alias "OBET .S. the act of delivering. SO ORDERED. albeit not limited to. to deliver the property to another agency. . there were no identifying marks on the plastic bag. Parayno. then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt. The trial court held that the possession of a considerable quantity of marijuana. 718. there is no proof that the police really found marijuana in the house of the accused. Besides. The commission of the offense of illegal sale of marijuana requires merely the consummation of the selling transaction. People v. coupled with the fact that the accused-appellant is not a user of prohibited drugs. this Court is constrained to set aside the lower court's findings. Pacana. distribute and deliver marijuana as held in People of the Philippines vs. From a careful review of the proceedings a quo. the appellant is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged. Yte himself testified during cross-examination that accused-appellant was not actually dispensing marijuana when the search warrant was served. presented in court to support the allegation of the prosecution that accusedappellant was engaged in the sale of marijuana. 28 How sure are we then that the marijuana submitted for examination was the same marijuana allegedly seized from the accused-appellant? Lastly. as held by this Court. asserted that when the police officer turned over said items to the NBI. the reiteration by the Court of the trial court's pronouncement amounts to an obiter dictum. The basis of the conviction of the accused in said case was his confession. a person is always presumed innocent until proven guilty. She is ordered immediately released from detention unless she is being held for some other legal cause or ground." 27 Thus. the accused-appellant was not caught in the act of selling marijuana. and we hold that the guilt of the accused-appellant Yolanda Gesmundo has not been established beyond reasonable doubt. what the law proscribes is not only the act of selling but also. the Forensic Chemist who examined the marijuana allegedly confiscated by the police from the appellant. like the NBI. 31 Neither was the marijuana. yet the Court also held that it was "for the reason that the custody of said agents is the custody of the issuing officer or court. The identity of the marijuana which constitutes the corpus delicti must be established before the court. What is important is that the poseur-buyer received the marijuana from the accused. . Also. Having made no return or inventory to the warrant-issuing court. (People v. and on reasonable doubt. the appealed judgment is REVERSED. and only then will their custody be considered custody of the court. Maano. " ." 29 It is also required that the marijuana received by the poseur-buyer be presented as evidence in court. indicates an intention of the accused-appellant to sell. the police officers have no authority to retain possession of the marijuana and more so. 33 WHEREFORE. Moreover. 30 Undisputedly. In order to sustain conviction for selling prohibited drugs. If the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two (2) or more explanations." 32 The reliance of the trial court on the above-mentioned case is not quite accurate. 48). 24 SCRA 3. 47 Phil.

8 In this appeal. 5 Another witness. He denied knowing PFC Rosales and stated that the latter was not with the arresting group. 1 In his appeal before this Court. Tacloban City. composed of Patrolmen Arpon and Buena. He testified that on said date. Cpl. Liza Madeja-Sabong. Felix Dacut. accused-appellant contends that the failure of the prosecution to present the confidential informant-turned poseur-buyer is a violation of his constitutional right to know the witnesses against him and meet them in court. he did not testify as to the conversation between the confidential informant and the accused-appellant. when asked if he knew the whereabouts of one Cresencio de la Cruz. plaintiff-appellee. 4 Accused-appellant flatly denied selling the three sticks of marijuana cigarettes. the former handed the latter two P5.00 bills with serial numbers MU80883 and MU840129. he assails his conviction on the ground that entrapment was never clearly established by the prosecution's evidence. vs. Leyte and sentenced to thirty years' imprisonment. Accused-appellant was brought to the police station where upon investigation. as well as a barangay tanod. At around 4:15 p. likewise testified that he knows the accused-appellant to be of good moral character and that the latter was used in the past as an agent both in buy-bust and sellbust operations. he was asleep in his house from two o'clock until past four o'clock in the afternoon. Therefore. accused-appellant. said testimony would be plain hearsay and unworthy of credence. the latter handed sticks of suspected marijuana cigarettes to the former. was within earshot. he allegedly admitted that the marijuana in his possession was for sale and that a friend of his named Francing was the source of the prohibited drug.00 bills were presented as evidence 10 and a photocopy of the same. after the conversation of their confidential agent with accusedappellant. In return. Espina held that as between the positive identification and assertion of the arresting officers and the mere unsubstantiated denial by the accusedappellant. The witness testified that they informed accused-appellant about his constitutional rights before the investigation and that the latter understood them. 2 He asserted that he had never been charged or convicted of any crime and that he was also a confidential agent of the Regional Security Unit. A buy-bust operation was then set up after conducting surveillance on the accused-appellant. He also testified that the investigators forced him to affix his signature on a piece of paper. The trial court found the prosecution's evidence weightier inasmuch as the arresting officers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their public functions which has not been rebutted by the defense.m. the team deployed themselves in the area in such a way as to see clearly the transaction.: For selling marijuana. their confidential agent informed PFC Rosales and his team. accused-appellant Cesar Lacbanes was arrested and charged with violating Section 4. However.00 bills were seized from his possession. introduced themselves as members of the Narcotics Section and arrested him. the team approached accused-appellant. Tacloban City. the prosecution's star witness.R. they allegedly forgot to put down in writing accused-appellant's admission of guilt. the former is more worthy of credence. would like to take him to the police station to answer some questions. 88684 March 20. NB-134-86 3 that the three suspected marijuana cigarettes were positive for marijuana. This Court is not persuaded. J. He was awakened by his father who told him that a certain Lieutenant Boy Saranza.00 bills in his possession and recovered three sticks of suspected marijuana cigarettes. of October 3. a forensic chemist of the PC Crime Laboratory. the contents of which he did not know at the time but which turned out to be a receipt for property seized. The trial court also found the defense' s version of the incident inherently incredible stating it was hard to believe that accused-appellant. who affirmed her own findings and declared in Chemistry Report No. Coupled with the presumption is the lack of any proof of improper motives on their part. would readily sign a blank sheet of paper presented to him by the authorities without any protest or objection. 6 Capt. the faithful reproduction of which . The said receipt showed that the three sticks of marijuana cigarettes and the two marked P5. Thereupon. Madriaga and Lt. corroborated accused-appellant's claim that he was a confidential agent or a civilian informer of the Regional Security Unit. the defense pointed out that although PFC Rosales. Sgt. ROMERO. CESAR LACBANES. He also contended that since the testimony of PFC Rosales revolves around the confidential informant who cannot corroborate the same. At the police station. that the former made contact with accused-appellant.The only other witness for the prosecution was Lt. G. a member of the Narcotics Section of the Tacloban Police Station who testified that his command received information that accused-appellant had been peddling marijuana cigarettes in Tacloban City.00 bills and the three marijuana sticks. Manuel Abuda of the INP. together with Patrolmen Arpon and Buena. He claimed that the policemen filed this case against him when he could not give any information about NPAs. he answered in the negative. Article II of Republic Act 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act. 9 The P5. Judge Pedro S. They found the two P5. According to PFC Rosales. No. 1986 at the corner of Burgos and Tarcela Streets. Saranza. Thereafter. He was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Palo. PFC Rosales did testify that he saw the poseur-buyer and accused-appellant exchange the two P5. 1997 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. a prohibited drug. 7 On the issue of credibility. Moreover. The prosecution relied on the testimony of PFC Ricardo Rosales. a barangay tanod and a confidential agent of the military who reached second year high school. the prosecution failed to establish clearly the fact of entrapment. Neither did accused-appellant's introduction of evidence of good character convince the trial court of his innocence as he was unable to overcome the evidence for the prosecution.

Simon 29 and People v. 16 Accused-appellant. in . however.A. 20 this Court held that in the absence of proof of any intent on the part of police authorities to falsely impute such a serious crime against appellant.A. as well as the two P5. where his testimony would be merely corroborative or cumulative. 6425. They have been obtained in violation of his right as a person under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense. this Court held that the absence of the marked money does not create a hiatus in the evidence for the prosecution as long as the sale of the dangerous drugs is adequately proven and the drug subject of the transaction is presented before the court. merely denied that he sold the three sticks of marijuana cigarettes. . In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs. With the passage of R. the penalty should have been reclusion perpetua to death and a fine of five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos. Ganguso. unfortunately. . however. In People v. 23 that there is no rigid or textbook method of conducting buy-bust operations. De Las Marinas. 7659. 7659. 12 This Court held in People v.A. Accordingly. they should be given retroactive effect. Under the said provision. however. the imposable penalty. 26 This Court cannot. for the prosecution failed to prove that he was assisted by counsel at the time. what is material and indispensable is the submission of proof that the sale of illicit drug took place between the seller and the poseur-buyer. 1993. 27 this Court held that "conforme to these documents are declarations against interest and tacit admissions of the crime charged. he claimed that he was framed up by the policemen because he did not supply them with information regarding NPAs. on his part. this Court held in People v. deserves full credit. 30 if the quantity of the marijuana involved is less than 750 grams. this Court will undauntedly sustain the findings of the lower court. The police officers may decide that time is of the essence and dispense with the need for prior surveillance. 28 that it is the police officers who confiscated the same who should have signed such receipt. De Lara. Flexibility is a trait of good police work. Republic Act No. would materially affect the result of the case. In his direct examination. especially when the buy-bust team members were accompanied to the scene by their informant. . particularly Sec." This Court also declared in People v. 22 it has been held that prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of an entrapment operation. 15 This Court has ruled in several cases that non-presentation of the informer. . if considered. Vocente 13 that: The commission of the offense of illegal sale of marijuana requires merely the consummation of the selling transaction whereby as in this case.00 bills. 14 There was no need to present the poseur-buyer as PFC Rosales witnessed the whole transaction where the marked money was exchanged for three sticks of marijuana cigarettes. 11 The three sticks of marijuana cigarettes were also presented before the trial court and identified by PFC Rosales as the ones recovered from the poseur-buyer. Such a confession obtained in violation of the Constitution is inadmissible in evidence. this is a violation of the constitutional right of appellant to remain silent. he should have presented his father in court to corroborate his version that he was in the latter's house when he was apprehended. as long as it is positive and clear and not arising from an improper motive to impute a serious offense to the accused. Time and again. must prevail over the self-serving and uncorroborated claim of appellant that she had been framed. 19 Such failure on the part of the accused-appellant to muster convincing proof of a frameup lends credence to the version of the prosecution. 24 The defense even admitted that the photocopy of the marked money was a faithful reproduction of the ones found in the person of accusedappellant. he alleged that the policemen were retaliating against him for working for the Regional Security Unit instead of for them. in effect." However. Under the provisions of Section 20. The identity of the tea bag of marijuana which constitutes the corpus delicti was established before the court. while said receipt of property seized is inadmissible in evidence. it was sufficiently established by the categorical and positive assertions of witnesses as shown in the records. were seized from him. Here he was. If he tried to use alibi as defense. accused-appellant alleged that the marked money was not presented as proof before the trial court. as amended. The settled rule is that the testimony of a lone prosecution witness. this Court has ruled that the findings of the lower court with regard to the credibility of witnesses are accorded great weight and respect since it had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses as they testified before the court.A. In the instant case. 6425. the quantity of prohibited drugs involved was immaterial. there being nothing in the records to show that he was assisted by counsel. 4. since merely unexplained possession of prohibited drugs is punished by law. the arresting officers were led to the scene by the poseur-buyer. are inexistent here. Neither does this Court condone such practice for this is tantamount to an extra-judicial confession for the commission of the offense. Since the offense was committed in 1986. which became effective on December 31. 13 amending Sec. Additionally. the penalty to be imposed shall now depend on the quantity. as in this case. and as interpreted by this court in the case of People v. the accused handed over the tea bag of marijuana upon the agreement with the poseur-buyer to exchange it for money. Tranca. 25 Nonetheless. Contrary to said submission. this Court finds accused-appellant Cesar Lacbanes guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sec. Granting that there was no surveillance conducted before the buy-bust operation. 17 Accused-appellant's claim of a "frameup" is not credible as he gave conflicting motives of the police authorities therefor. What is important is the fact that the poseur-buyer received the marijuana from the appellant and that the contents were presented as evidence in court. of R. In People v. accused-appellant was caught in flagranti delicto. II. Nevertheless. 21 The accused-appellant tried to argue on his behalf that no surveillance was conducted before the buy-bust operation. through his statements implied that he was a victim of a "frameup. however. the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty. In People v. is not fatal to the prosecution's case. that indeed accused-appellant committed the offense of selling the three sticks of marijuana cigarettes. Ang Chun Kit. as well as the doctrine that findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect. 18 In the crossexamination conducted by the prosecution. favorable to accused-appellant. Clear and convincing evidence are required to prove the defense of "frameup" which. Proof of the transaction suffices. made to admit the commission of the offense without informing him of his right. . frameup is a defense that has been invariably viewed by the Court with disfavor as it is a common and standard line of defense in most prosecutions arising from violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.was admitted by the defense. Undoubtedly. was likewise proffered in the trial court. 6425 as last amended by R. Inasmuch as the amendatory provisions are. the marked money was presented as proof during the direct examination of PFC Rosales. Accused-appellant. (Emphasis supplied) In other words. Velasco. like alibi. Art. 4 of R. Unless substantial facts and circumstances have been overlooked or misunderstood by the latter which. . accept as evidence the receipt for property seized purportedly signed by accused-appellant as proof that the three sticks of marijuana cigarettes.

77-5781 Argued October 3. United States. the better analysis of the principle that Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights that may not be asserted vicariously should focus on the extent of a particular defendant's rights under that Amendment. 1978 Decided December 5. WHITE. and now affirm. United States. Pp. 439 U. in which BURGER. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed. Katz v. J. Jones v.. 435 U. 257.. the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant should suffer an indeterminate penalty of FOUR (4) years and Two (2) days of prision correccional. At their trial. 439 U. post. Pp. 130 unlawful search. may not be vicariously asserted. S. petitioners were convicted in an Illinois court of armed robbery at a trial in which the rifle and shells were admitted as evidence. and therefore could claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment. 138-140.J. and neither has ever asserted that he owned the rifle or shells seized. De Lara. S. joined. adhering to the doctrine in the earlier case... 2. 46 Ill.389 U. S. Rakas v. 439 U. filed a dissenting opinion. WHEREFORE.E. 439 U..S.394 U. JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. 174. filed a concurring opinion. Illinois No. Subsequently. police stopped the suspected getaway car. We granted certiorari in light of the obvious importance of the issues raised to the administration of criminal justice. Pp. 31 there was no evidence of the weight of the three sticks of marijuana cigarettes seized in the case at bar. United States. Nevertheless. he is hereby ordered RELEASED immediately. distinguished. POWELL. Since accused-appellant has already served ten years. 439 U. S. C. and BLACKMUN. J. As in People v. S. prision correccional. S.S. 165.3d 569. whereby any criminal defendant at whom a search was "directed" would have standing to contest the legality of that search and object to the admission at trial of evidence obtained as a result of the search. 150. MR. . Petitioners. Neither petitioner is the owner of the automobile. affirmed. 156. J. S. this Court resolved the doubt in favor of accused-appellant and concluded that the quantity involved was: (i) below 750 grams. S. 133-138. to EIGHT (8) years and ONE (1) day of prision mayor.362 U. and a person aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search of a third person's premises or property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights infringed. JJ. The phrase "legitimately on premises" coined in Jones v. Ill. S.. and STEWART. 148-149. and their convictions were affirmed on appeal. POWELL. 922 (1978). shall be within the range of prision correccional (from six [6] months and one [1] day to six [6] years) to reclusion temporal depending upon the quantity of marijuana involved. joined." Alderman v. joined. p. The holding in Jones can best be explained by the fact that Jones had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises he was using. Hence. Page 439 U. but the trial court denied the motion on the ground that petitioners lacked standing to object to the lawfulness of the search of the car because they concededly did not own either the car or the rifle and shells. Pp. C. THIRD DIVISION Syllabus After receiving a robbery report.. and who failed to show that they had any legitimate expectation of privacy in the glove compartment or area under the seat of the car in which they were merely passengers. who asserted neither a property nor a possessory interest in the automobile searched nor an interest in the property seized. Held: 1. unless he is being held for some other legal grounds. S. United States. creates "too broad a gauge" for measurement of Fourth Amendment rights. two months and seventeen days. 360 N. 140-148. and (ii) not less than 250 but not more than 499 grams. The rule of standing to raise vicarious Fourth Amendment claims should not be extended by a so-called "target" theory. and seizure and denied their motion to suppress the evidence. which the owner was driving and in which petitioners were passengers. . REHNQUIST. In any event. "Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which .2d 1252.394 U. as minimum. as maximum. Upon searching the car. the maximum imposable penalty should be prision mayor and the minimum. in which BRENNAN.SO ORDERED. and STEVENS. MARSHALL. post.. S. were not entitled to challenge a search of those areas. rather than on any theoretically separate but invariably intertwined concept of standing. . which is beyond the maximum penalty imposed for his offense. 1978 439 U. in which BURGER. the police found a box of rifle shells in the glove compartment and a sawed-off rifle under the front passenger seat and arrested petitioners.the event that the conviction should be affirmed.App. 129 4. 347. p. Petitioners were convicted of armed robbery in the Circuit Court of Kankakee County.J. the prosecution offered into evidence a sawed-off rifle and rifle shells that had been seized by police during a search of an automobile in which petitioners had been passengers. The Illinois Appellate Court held that petitioners lacked standing to object to the allegedly Page 439 U. 3. 128 CERTIORARI TO THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS. JJ. supra. Before trial petitioners had moved to suppress the rifle and shells on Fourth Amendment grounds. delivered the opinion of the Court.

I
Because we are not here concerned with the issue of probable cause, a brief description of the
events leading to the search of the automobile will suffice. A police officer on a routine patrol
received a radio call notifying him of a robbery of a clothing store in Bourbonnais, Ill., and
describing the getaway car. Shortly thereafter, the officer spotted an automobile which he
thought might be the getaway car. After following the car for some time and after the arrival of
assistance, he and several other officers stopped the vehicle. The occupants of the automobile,
petitioners and two female companions, were ordered out of the car, and, after the occupants
had left the car, two officers searched the interior of the vehicle. They discovered a box of rifle
shells in the glove compartment, which had been locked, and a sawed-off rifle under the front
passenger seat. App. 111. After discovering the rifle and the shells, the officers took petitioners
to the station and placed them under arrest.
Before trial petitioners moved to suppress the rifle and shells seized from the car on the ground
that the search violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. They conceded that they did
not own the automobile, and were simply passengers; the owner of the car had been the driver
of the vehicle at the time of the search. Nor did they assert that they owned the rifle or the shells
seized. [Footnote 1] The prosecutor
Page 439 U. S. 131
challenged petitioners' standing to object to the lawfulness of the search of the car because
neither the car, the shells nor the rifle belonged to them. The trial court agreed that petitioners
lacked standing, and denied the motion to suppress the evidence. App. 224. In view of this
holding, the court did not determine whether there was probable cause for the search and
seizure. On appeal after petitioners' conviction, the Appellate Court of Illinois, Third Judicial
District, affirmed the trial court's denial of petitioners' motion to suppress because it held that,

evidence obtained as a result of the search. Alternatively, petitioners argue that they have
standing to object to the search underJones because they were "legitimately on [the] premises"
at the time of the search.
The concept of standing discussed in Jones focuses on whether the person seeking to
challenge the legality of a search as a basis for suppressing evidence was himself the "victim" of
the search or seizure. Id. at 362 U. S. 261. [Footnote 2] Adoption of
Page 439 U. S. 133
the so-called "target" theory advanced by petitioners would, in effect, permit a defendant to
assert that a violation of the Fourth Amendment rights of a third party entitled him to have
evidence suppressed at his trial. If we reject petitioners' request for a broadened rule of standing
such as this, and reaffirm the holding of Jones and other cases that Fourth Amendment rights
are personal rights that may not be asserted vicariously, we will have occasion to reexamine the
"standing" terminology emphasized in Jones. For we are not at all sure that the determination of
a motion to suppress is materially aided by labeling the inquiry identified in Jones as one of
standing, rather than simply recognizing it as one involving the substantive question of whether
or not the proponent of the motion to suppress has had his own Fourth Amendment rights
infringed by the search and seizure which he seeks to challenge. We shall therefore consider, in
turn, petitioners' target theory, the necessity for continued adherence to the notion of standing
discussed in Jones as a concept that is theoretically distinct from the merits of a defendant's
Fourth Amendment claim, and, finally, the proper disposition of petitioners' ultimate claim in this
case.
A

"without a proprietary or other similar interest in an automobile, a mere passenger therein lacks
standing to challenge the legality of the search of the vehicle.

We decline to extend the rule of standing in Fourth Amendment cases in the manner suggested
by petitioners. As we stated in Alderman v. United States,394 U. S. 165, 394 U. S. 174 (1969),
"Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which, like some other constitutional rights, may
not be vicariously

Page 439 U. S. 132

Page 439 U. S. 134

46 Ill.App.3d 569, 571, 360 N.E.2d 1252, 1253 (1977). The court stated:"

asserted." See Brown v. United States,411 U. S. 223, 411 U. S. 230 (1973); Simmons v. United
States,390 U. S. 377, 390 U. S. 389(1968); Wong Sun v. United States,371 U. S. 471, 371 U. S.
492 (1963); cf. Silverman v. United States,365 U. S. 505, 365 U. S. 511(1961); Gouled v. United
States,255 U. S. 298, 255 U. S. 304 (1921). A person who is aggrieved by an illegal search and
seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search of a third
person's premises or property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights
infringed. Alderman, supra at 394 U. S. 174. And since the exclusionary rule is an attempt to
effectuate the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment, United States v. Calandra,414 U. S.
338, 414 U. S. 347 (1974), it is proper to permit only defendants whose Fourth Amendment
rights have been violated to benefit from the rule's protections. [Footnote 3] See Simmons v.
United States, supra at 390 U. S. 389. There is no reason to think that a party whose rights have
been infringed will not, if evidence is used against him, have ample motivation to move to
suppress it. Alderman, supra at 394 U. S. 174. Even if such a person is not a defendant in the
action, he may be able to recover damages for the violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, see
Monroe v. Pape,365 U. S. 167 (1961), or seek redress under state law for invasion of privacy or
trespass.

"We believe that defendants failed to establish any prejudice to their own constitutional rights,
because they were not persons aggrieved by the unlawful search and seizure. . . . They wrongly
seek to establish prejudice only through the use of evidence gathered as a consequence of a
search and seizure directed at someone else, and fail to prove an invasion of their own
privacy. Alderman v. United States (1969), 394 U. S. 165. . . ."
Id. at 571-572, 360 N.E.2d at 1254. The Illinois Supreme Court denied petitioners leave to
appeal.
II
Petitioners first urge us to relax or broaden the rule of standing enunciated in Jones v. United
States,362 U. S. 257 (1960), so that any criminal defendant at whom a search was "directed"
would have standing to contest the legality of that search and object to the admission at trial of

In support of their target theory, petitioners rely on the following quotation from Jones:
"In order to qualify as a 'person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure,' one must have
been a victim of a search or seizure, one against whom the search was
Page 439 U. S. 135
directed, as distinguished from one who claims prejudice only through the use of evidence
gathered as a consequence of a search or seizure directed at someone else."
362 U.S. at 362 U. S. 261 (emphasis added). They also rely on Bumper v. North Carolina,391 U.
S. 543, 391 U. S. 548 n. 11 (1968), and United States v. Jeffers,342 U. S. 48 (1951).
The above-quoted statement from Jones suggests that the italicized language was meant
merely as a parenthetical equivalent of the previous phrase "a victim of a search or seizure." To
the extent that the language might be read more broadly, it is dictum which was impliedly
repudiated in Alderman v. United States, supra, and which we now expressly reject.
In Jones, the Court set forth two alternative holdings: it established a rule of "automatic"
standing to contest an allegedly illegal search where the same possession needed to establish
standing is an essential element of the offense charged, [Footnote 4] and, second, it stated that
"anyone legitimately on premises where a search occurs may challenge its legality by way of a
motion to suppress." 362 U.S. at 362 U. S. 264, 362 U. S. 267.See Combs v. United States,408
U. S. 224, 408 U. S. 227 n. 4 (1972); Mancusi v. DeForte,392 U. S. 364, 392 U. S. 368 n. 5
(198);Simmons v. United States, supra at 390 U. S. 390. Had the Court intended to adopt the
target theory now put forth by petitioners, neither of the above two holdings would have been
necessary, since Jones was the "target" of the police search in that case. [Footnote 5] Nor
does United States v. Jeffers, supra, or

"[T]he [target] rule would entail very substantial administrative difficulties. In the majority of
cases, I would imagine that the police plant a bug with the expectation that it may well produce
leads to a large number of crimes. A lengthy hearing would, then, appear to be necessary in
order to determine whether the police knew of an accused's criminal activity at the time the bug
was
Page 439 U. S. 137
planted and whether the police decision to plant a bug was motivated by an effort to obtain
information against the accused or some other individual. I do not believe that this administrative
burden is justified in any substantial degree by the hypothesized marginal increase in Fourth
Amendment protection."
Ibid. When we are urged to grant standing to a criminal defendant to assert a violation, not of his
own constitutional rights, but of someone else's, we cannot but give weight to practical
difficulties such as those foreseen by Mr. Justice Harlan in the quoted language.
Conferring standing to raise vicarious Fourth Amendment claims would necessarily mean a
more widespread invocation of the exclusionary rule during criminal trials. The Court's opinion
in Alderman counseled against such an extension of the exclusionary rule:
"The deterrent values of preventing the incrimination of those whose rights the police have
violated have been considered sufficient to justify the suppression of probative evidence even
though the case against the defendant is weakened or destroyed. We adhere to that judgment.
But we are not convinced that the additional benefits of extending the exclusionary rule to other
defendants would justify further encroachment upon the public interest in prosecuting those
accused of crime and having them acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence which
exposes the truth."

Page 439 U. S. 136
Bumper v. North Carolina, supra, support the target theory. Standing in Jeffers was based on
Jeffers' possessory interest in both the premises searched and the property seized. 342 U.S.
at 342 U. S. 49-50, 342 U. S. 54; see Mancusi v. DeForte, supra, at 392 U. S. 367-368; Hoffa v.
United States,385 U. S. 293, 385 U. S. 301 (1966); Lanza v. New York,370 U. S. 139, 370 U. S.
143, and n. 10 (1962). Similarly, in Bumper, the defendant had a substantial possessory interest
in both the house searched and the rifle seized. 391 U.S. at 391 U. S. 548, n. 11.
In Alderman v. United States, Mr. Justice Fortas, in a concurring and dissenting opinion, argued
that the Court should "include within the category of those who may object to the introduction of
illegal evidence one against whom the search was directed.'" 394 U.S. at 394 U. S. 206-209.
The Court did not directly comment on Mr. Justice Fortas' suggestion, but it left no doubt that it
rejected this theory by holding that persons who were not parties to unlawfully overheard
conversations or who did not own the premises on which such conversations took place did not
have standing to contest the legality of the surveillance, regardless of whether or not they were
the "targets" of the surveillance. Id. at 394 U. S. 176. Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring and
dissenting, did squarely address Mr. Justice Fortas' arguments, and declined to accept
them. Id. at 394 U. S. 188-189, n. 1. He identified administrative problems posed by the target
theory:

Id. at 394 U. S. 174-175. Each time the exclusionary rule is applied, it exacts a substantial social
cost for the vindication of Fourth Amendment rights. Relevant and reliable evidence is kept from
the trier of fact and the search for truth at trial is deflected. See United States v. Ceccolini,435 U.
S. 268, 435 U. S. 275 (1978); Stone v. Powell,428 U. S. 465, 428 U. S. 489-490 (1976); United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 414 U. S. 348-352. Since our cases generally
Page 439 U. S. 138
have held that one whose Fourth Amendment rights are violated may successfully suppress
evidence obtained in the course of an illegal search and seizure, misgivings as to the benefit of
enlarging the class of persons who may invoke that rule are properly considered when deciding
whether to expand standing to assert Fourth Amendment violations. [Footnote 6]
B
Had we accepted petitioners' request to allow persons other than those whose own Fourth
Amendment rights were violated by a challenged search and seizure to suppress evidence
obtained in the course of such police activity, it would be appropriate to retainJones' use of
standing in Fourth Amendment analysis. Under petitioners' target theory, a court could determine
that a defendant had standing to invoke the exclusionary rule without having to inquire into the
substantive question of whether the challenged search or seizure violated the Fourth

Amendment rights of that particular defendant. However, having rejected petitioners' target
theory and reaffirmed the principle that the

Amendment doctrine than under the heading of standing, we think the decision of this issue will
rest on sounder logical footing.

"rights assured by the Fourth Amendment are personal rights, [which] . . . may be enforced by
exclusion of evidence only at the instance of one whose own protection was infringed by the
search and seizure,"

C

Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. at 390 U. S. 389, the question necessarily arises whether it
serves any useful analytical purpose to consider this principle a matter of standing, distinct from
the merits of a defendant's Fourth
Page 439 U. S. 139
Amendment claim. We can think of no decided cases of this Court that would have come out
differently had we concluded, as we do now, that the type of standing requirement discussed
in Jones and reaffirmed today is more properly subsumed under substantive Fourth Amendment
doctrine. Rigorous application of the principle that the rights secured by this Amendment are
personal, in place of a notion of "standing," will produce no additional situations in which
evidence must be excluded. The inquiry under either approach is the same. [Footnote 7] But we
think the better analysis forthrightly focuses on the extent of a particular defendant's rights under
the Fourth Amendment, rather than on any theoretically separate, but invariably intertwined,
concept of standing. The Court in Jones also may have been aware that there was a certain
artificiality in analyzing this question in terms of standing, because, in at least three separate
places in its opinion, the Court placed that term within quotation marks. 362 U.S. at 362 U. S.
261, 362 U. S. 263, 362 U. S. 265.
It should be emphasized that nothing we say here casts the least doubt on cases which
recognize that, as a general proposition, the issue of standing involves two inquiries: first,
whether the proponent of a particular legal right has alleged "injury in fact," and, second,
whether the proponent is asserting his own legal rights and interests, rather than basing his
claim for relief upon the rights of third parties. See, e.g., Singleton v. Wulff,428 U. S. 106, 428 U.
S. 112 (1976); Warth v. Seldin,
Page 439 U. S. 140
422 U. S. 490, 439 U. S. 499 (1975); Data Processing Service v. Camp,397 U. S. 150, 397 U. S.
152-153 (1970). But this Court's long history of insistence that Fourth Amendment rights are
personal in nature has already answered many of these traditional standing inquiries, and we
think that definition of those rights is more properly placed within the purview of substantive
Fourth Amendment law than within that of standing. Cf. id. at 397 U. S. 153, and n. 1; Barrows v.
Jackson,346 U. S. 249, 346 U. S. 256 n. 4 (1953); Hale v. Henkel,201 U. S. 43, 201 U. S. 69-70
(1906). [Footnote 8]
Analyzed in these terms, the question is whether the challenged search and seizure violated the
Fourth Amendment rights of a criminal defendant who seeks to exclude the evidence obtained
during it. That inquiry, in turn, requires a determination of whether the disputed search and
seizure has infringed an interest of the defendant which the Fourth Amendment was designed to
protect. We are under no illusion that, by dispensing with the rubric of standing used
in Jones, we have rendered any simpler the determination of whether the proponent of a motion
to suppress is entitled to contest the legality of a search and seizure. But by frankly recognizing
that this aspect of the analysis belongs more properly under the heading of substantive Fourth

Here, petitioners, who were passengers occupying a car which they neither owned nor leased,
seek to analogize their position to that of the defendant in Jones v. Unite States.
Page 439 U. S. 141
In Jones, petitioner was present at the time of the search of an apartment which was owned by a
friend. The friend had given Jones permission to use the apartment and a key to it, with which
Jones had admitted himself on the day of the search. He had a suit and shirt at the apartment,
and had slept there "maybe a night," but his home was elsewhere. At the time of the search,
Jones was the only occupant of the apartment, because the lessee was away for a period of
several days. 362 U.S. at 362 U. S. 259. Under these circumstances, this Court stated that,
while one wrongfully on the premises could not move to suppress evidence obtained as a result
of searching them, [Footnote 9] "anyone legitimately on premises where a search occurs may
challenge its legality." Id. at 362 U. S. 267. Petitioners argue that their occupancy of the
automobile in question was comparable to that of Jones in the apartment, and that they
therefore have standing to contest the legality of the search -- or, as we have rephrased the
inquiry, that they, like Jones, had their Fourth Amendment rights violated by the search.
We do not question the conclusion in Jones that the defendant in that case suffered a violation
of his personal Fourth Amendment rights if the search in question was unlawful.
Page 439 U. S. 142
Nonetheless, we believe that the phrase "legitimately on premises" coined in Jones creates too
broad a gauge for measurement of Fourth Amendment right. [Footnote 10] For example, applied
literally, this statement would permit a casual visitor who has never seen, or been permitted to
visit, the basement of another's house to object to a search of the basement if the visitor
happened to be in the kitchen of the house at the time of the search. Likewise, a casual visitor
who walks into a house one minute before a search of the house commences and leaves one
minute after the search ends would be able to contest the legality of the search. The first visitor
would have absolutely no interest or legitimate expectation of privacy in the basement, the
second would have none in the house, and it advances no purpose served by the Fourth
Amendment to permit either of them to object to the lawfulness of the search. [Footnote 11]
We think that Jones, on its facts, merely stands for the unremarkable proposition that a person
can have a legally sufficient interest in a place other than his own home so that the Fourth
Amendment protects him from unreasonable governmental intrusion into that place. See362
U.S. at 362 U. S. 263,
Page 439 U. S. 143
362 U. S. 265. In defining the scope of that interest, we adhere to the view expressed
in Jones and echoed in later cases that arcane distinctions developed in property and tort law
between guests, licensees, invitees, and the like, ought not to control. Id. at 362 U. S. 266;see
Mancusi v. DeForte,392 U. S. 364 (1968); Warden v. Hayden,387 U. S. 294 (1967); Silverman v.

We are likewise told by the dissent that a person "legitimately on private premises . The dissenters concede that "there comes a point when use of an area is shared with so many that one simply cannot reasonably expect seclusion. S.365 U. S. Where the factual premises for a rule are so generally prevalent that little would be lost and much would be gained by abandoning case-by-case analysis." who may give that consent? Again. 433 U. If "legitimately on premises" were the successful litmus test of Fourth Amendment rights that he assumes it is. 145 at 439 U. though his privacy is not absolute. provides guidance in defining the scope of the interest protected by the Fourth Amendment. S.414 U. Rather. S. but what of the case of a 10-room house. we are not forsaking a time-tested and workable rule.United States. Chadwick. 347 (1967). . the fact that they were "legitimately on [the] premises" in the sense that they were in the car with the permission of its owner is not determinative of whether they had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the particular areas of the automobile searched. We would not wish to be understood as saying that legitimate presence on the premises is irrelevant to one's expectation of privacy. in dissent. S. But the Jones statement that a person need only be "legitimately on premises" in order to challenge the validity of the search of a dwelling place cannot be taken in its full sweep beyond the facts of that case. S. 7 (1977). S. 129 (1942). S." Post at 439 U. S. [Footnote 14] In abandoning "legitimately on premises" for the doctrine that we announce today. or that the questions are necessarily irrelevant in the context of the analysis contained in this opinion. Robinson. S. 1. at most. 505(1961). if police officers had not been guilty of a common law trespass. at 389 U. 148 Page 439 U. is more desirable or more easily resolves Fourth Amendment cases. 144 Our Brother WHITE.316 U. 389 U. 353. whatever it lacked in fidelity to the history and purposes of the Fourth Amendment. we are abandoning a thoroughly workable. [Footnote 12] See Jones v. 261. S. 235 (1973). 401 U. But the phrase "legitimately Page 439 U. S. 362 U. S. This single sentence describing the contours of the supposedly easily applied rule virtually abounds with unanswered questions: what are "private" premises? Indeed. . or of a house with an attached garage that is searched? Also. And as we have previously indicated. But we are not told which of many possible expectations of privacy are embraced within this sentence. But how much "less" protection is available when one does not have such a possessory interest? Our disagreement with the dissent is not that it leaves these questions unanswered. S. they were not prohibited by the Fourth Amendment from eavesdropping. [Footnote 13] Ibid. S. "bright line" test in favor of a less certain analysis of whether the facts of a particular case give rise to a legitimate expectation of privacy.S.433 U. rather than a meaningful exegesis of Fourth Amendment doctrine. 218. 168." and of the dissent itself. United States. 414 U. it is inevitably a point which separates one shade of gray from another. at 362 U. United States. by rejecting the phrase "legitimately on [the] premises" as the appropriate measure of Fourth Amendment rights. solely for the sake of fidelity to the values underlying the Fourth Amendment." on premises" has not been shown to be an easily applicable measure of Fourth Amendment rights so much as it has proved to be simply a label placed by the courts on results which have not been subjected to careful analysis. United States. that. but upon whether the person who claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place. 164.United States v. S."Ibid. S. See United States v. Page 439 U. which has produced consistent results when applied. and that its rubric. the Court in Katz held that capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends not upon a property right in the invaded place. and Goldman v. see United States v. They asserted neither a property nor a possessory interest in the automobile nor an interest in the property seized. But surely the "point" referred to is not one demarcating a line which is black on one side and white on another. S.277 U.401 U.S. Post Page 439 U. what are the "premises?" It may be easy to describe the "premises" when one is confronted with a 1-room apartment. S. is entitled to expect that he is sharing it only with those persons [allowed there]. White. we are told by the dissent that the Fourth Amendment assures that "some expectations of privacy are justified. and which conceals underneath that thin veneer all of the problems of line drawing which must be faced in any conscientious effort to apply the Fourth Amendment. S. 146 The dissent itself shows that the facile consistency it is striving for is illusory.389 U. Our disagreement is rather with the dissent's bland and self-refuting assumption that there will not be fine lines to be drawn in Fourth Amendment cases as in other areas of the law." Post at 439 U. 147 personal freedom from unreasonable governmental intrusion when one does not have a possessory interest in the invaded private place. Viewed in this manner. his approach would have at least the merit of easy application. expresses the view that. 438 (1928). but it cannot be deemed controlling. 745. how is it bounded? If he risks governmental intrusion "with consent. 752 (1971). D Judged by the foregoing analysis. In the course of repudiating the doctrine derived from Olmstead v. the holding in Jones can best be explained by the fact that Jones had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises he was using. United States. And our dissenting Brethren concede that "perhaps the Constitution provides some degree less protection for the Page 439 U. But a reading of lower court cases that have applied the phrase "legitimately on premises. and therefore could claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment with respect to a governmental invasion of those premises even though his "interest" in those premises might not have been a recognized property interest at common law. if one's privacy is not absolute. (emphasis added). has superficial clarity. 166 (emphasis added). we have not hesitated to do so. and that governmental officials will intrude only with consent or by complying with the Fourth Amendment. reveals that this expression is not a shorthand summary for a bright-line rule which somehow encapsulates the "core" of the Fourth Amendment's protections. we are rejecting blind adherence to a phrase which. and will be protected from official intrusion. It is unnecessary for us to decide here whether the same expectations of privacy are warranted in a . petitioners' claims must fail. . Katz v.

one Ramon Gayanilo. S. S. United States. 417 U. It appears from the record that on April 30. there is kept a certain amount of opium.. Sto. Lewis. Upon that application the said judge.417 U. 12. Chadwick. [Footnote 15] But here petitioners' claim is one which would fail even in an analogous situation in a dwelling place. ET AL. respondents.: This is an original petition. 150 III The Illinois courts were therefore correct in concluding that it was unnecessary to decide whether the search of the car might have violated the rights secured to someone else by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 583. S. S. shut the door behind him to exclude all others. and could exclude others from it. United States v. Supra at 439 U. "That in the house of Chino Uy Kheytin. corporal of the Philippine Constabulary. 1920 UY KHEYTIN. S. involved significantly different factual circumstances. Except with respect to his friend. S." Id. 561 (1976). ANTONIO VILLAREAL. M. Jones had complete dominion and control over the apartment." The application was subscribed and sworn to by the said complainant before the Honorable L. vs. the defendant occupied the telephone booth. 1919. United States. S. 142. No. these are areas in which a Page 439 U. 428 U.R. their judgment of conviction is Affirmed. filed in this court. 590 (1974) (plurality opinion). S. Attorney-General Paredes & Assistant Attorney-General Santos for respondents. Jones v.428 U. 20. 257 (1960). 433 U. We have on numerous occasions pointed out that cars are not to be treated identically with houses or apartments for Fourth Amendment purposes. and paid the toll.389 U. No such showing was made by these petitioners with respect to those portions of the automobile which were searched and from which incriminating evidence was seized. [Footnote 17] Page 439 U. but had a key to the apartment with which he admitted himself on the day of the search and kept possessions in the apartment. 362 U. the said Ramon Gayanilo stating in his application. JOHNSON. 16009 September 21. issued a search warrant in the following terms: The United States. judge of the Twenty-third Judicial District. [Footnote 16] Katz and Jones could legitimately expect privacy in the areas which were the subject of the search and seizure each sought to contest. Southworth. G. S. Iloilo.car as would be justified in a dwelling place in analogous circumstances. J. at 433 U. S. Jones not only had permission to use the apartment of his friend. S. presented to the judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo an application for search warrant. Crossfield & O'Brien for petitioners. Like the trunk of an automobile. on the same day. 543. in Katz. Since it did not violate any rights of these petitioners. Likewise.Cardwell v.S. which "entitled [him] to assume that the words he utter[ed] into the mouthpiece [would] not be broadcast to the world. under the writing desk in his store. ET AL. to any officer of the law. 347 (1967). petitioners.. 352. . 149 passenger qua passenger simply would not normally have a legitimate expectation of privacy.. Judge of First Instance for the Twenty-third Judicial District. at 389 U.See United States v. Niño St. since they made no showing that they had any legitimate expectation of privacy in the glove compartment or area under the seat of the car in which they were merely passengers. No. and Katz v. for the writs of injunction and prohibition. Martinez-Fuerte.

4. to bring it forthwith before me in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo. The next morning he learned from the owner of the house. No. and for this reason he placed a guard in the premises to see that nothing was removed therefrom. Judge of the Court of Iloilo. from any further examination of the private papers. No. if you find the same or any part thereof. 2. under the desk for writing in his store there is kept a certain amount of opium. one rag soaked in opium and one thimble with opium. after which he found that there was probable cause for believing that the crime complained of had been committed and that the defendants were the persons responsible therefor. in a very carefully prepared opinion. No. one file. and consequently. Thereupon Lieutenant Torralba and his subordinates resumed the search and then and there found and seized the following articles: No. praying as follows: Wherefore. through their attorney. Sto. one old chisel. the respondent fiscal. Niño St. 7. The cause was duly transmitted to the Court of First Instance. one box of matches. 8. the respondent M. on the same day (April 30th) searched the house of the petitioner Uy Kheytin and found therein 60 small cans of opium. 5 pieces of iron plates. — One wrap of paper containing an opium pipe. complete. They were duly arrested. — One hammer.) L. 5. opium containers. you are hereby commanded during day or night to make an immediate search on the person of Uy Kheytin or in the house. 9. Thereafter and on November 22. 1919. petitioners herein. It was urged (1) that the search warrant of April 30th was illegal because the requisites prescribed by the General Orders No. and (3) that the seizure of the defendants' books and letters was a violation of the provisions of the Jones Law providing that no person shall be compelled to testify against himself. Therefore. — One tin box containing 60 cans of molasses. — One wrap of paper containing a broken bottle of opium liquid. SOUTHWORTH. No. — Twelve small bottles empty. the defendants. S. No. for the following property opium and. accompanied by some of his subordinates. one piece of soldering lead. the said defendants. and other property unlawfully seized as above alleged. but Uy Kheytin positively denied that it was his or that he rented it. No. and his successors from making any cognizance of any action of any kind which has or may be brought against these petitioners which have resulted directly or indirectly from the unlawful searches and seizures above-mentioned. Torralba. 1919. and several other tin plates. No. They wanted to search also the bodega on the ground-floor of the house. that there is probable cause to believe that in the house of Chino Uy Kheytin. No. in view of the foregoing allegations. 14. restraining the respondent judge. Witness my hand this 30th day of April. No. reached the conclusion that the searches and seizures complained of had been legally made. No. from making or using . 11. Armed with that search warrant. First. Thereafter a criminal complaint was filed in the court of the justice of the peace of Iloilo against all the petitioners herein. 6.Whereas on this day proof . 58 had not been complied with in its issuance. 12. Philippine Constabulary. Lieutenant Torralba wanted to be sure. 20. No. having been presented before me by Corporal Ramon Gayanilo. it is respectfully prayed that a preliminary injunction issue. — One roll of 7 ½ sheets of brass. upon the ground that they had been so seized illegally and in violation of the constitutional rights of the defendants. Second. filed the present petition in this court. 10. 20. and then went away to find out who the owner of the bodega was. books. — One bundle of Chinese books of accounts with several personal letter of Chine Uy Kheytin. No. judge. and the successors of any of them. (2) that the searches and seizures made on May 1st had been made without any semblance of authority and hence illegal. — One leather hand bag containing 7 small bottle containing opium. charging them with a violation of the Opium Law. the respondent commandant of the Constabulary. that the Chinaman Uy Kheytin was the one who was renting the bodega. 3. which is kept in a tin box No. 1. — Two bottles containing opium. the Honorable Antonio Villareal. — One cardboard box containing 3 pieces of wood. of the town of Molo. with two cedulas belonging to Tian Liong. filed a petition in the Court of First Instance. with 1 small bottle containing molasses. — One Chinese scale for opium. opium containers. and protecting him against unreasonable searches and seizures. Sto. — Three soldering outfits. Niño St. and the assistants of any of them. M.. and a preliminary investigation was conducted by the justice of the peace. asking for the return of "private papers. 13. (Sgd. with key. denied the defendants' petition. No. — One wooden box containing 75 empty cans. — One tin box containing 23 small empty cans. After a hearing upon said motion. one opium container. one wrap of opium ashes. one Segovia. books and other property" which the Constabulary officers had seized from said defendants. restraining the respondent clerk of the court. petitioners herein. While said cause was in the Court of First Instance. lieutenant of the Philippine Constabulary.. pending the filing of a complaint by the provincial fiscal. 15. by affidavit. No. No.

supported by oath or affirmation. S. notes. whether the omission of the judge to comply with the requirements of section 98 would. we believe it would be the height of absurdity to hold. we do not think he is entitled to say that he should not be tried at all for the crime with which he is charged in a regular indictment. 58. 4 Phil. nor had it been used or intended to be used as the means of committing a felony. Section 96 of General Orders No. It (a search warrant) may be issued upon either of the following grounds: 1. from making or using any copies. for obscene books and paper kept for sale or circulation. the Supreme Court of the United States. furthermore enjoining all of the respondents and their assistants from divulging any of the secrets or information which they have thus unlawfully obtained from these petitioners. — should he be released upon the ground that he had not been legally arrested? In the case of Ker vs. Grant and Kennedy. Wilson. 317. memorandum. But suppose he happened to be arrested without any warrant.) In support of their second contention. When the property was stolen or embezzled. upon technical grounds. and directing such judge or his successor to order the immediate return to these petitioners of all of the papers and other property thus unlawfully obtained. In that application the complainant swore positively: "That in the house of Chino Uy Kheytin. he could plead that he was first arrested "without due process of law. 3) which is as follows: That no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause. Passing upon the question of the constitutionality of the arrest of Ker. the petitioners invoke section 98 of General Orders No.the same for the purpose or in such a manner that the character or reputation of these petitioners might be injured. for implements of A person. vs. is protected from unreasonable arrests just as much as he is protected from unreasonable searches. said: We do not intend to say that there may not be proceedings previous to the trial in regard to which the prisoner could invoke in some manner the provisions of this clause of the Constitution. and especially ordering the respondent judge to dismiss all actions or prosecutions already filed before him or which may hereafter come before him as a result of the unlawful acts herein alleged.. however. 20. U. that a search warrant is illegal which is issued to search for and seize property the very possession of which is forbidden by law and constitutes a crime. for lottery tickets or prohibited liquors kept for sale contrary to law.. No. The issuance of both is restricted by the same provision of the Jones Law (sec." (Followed in U. He was kidnapped in Peru and brought back to the State of Illinois without any pretense of authority. He may be arrested for a very heinous offense by persons without any warrant. or evidence obtained by reason of such searches and seizures whereby the reputation and character of petitioners may be further damaged. memorandum. under the said search warrant. p. that the word "felony" is applicable only to a serious crime which is malum per seand not to one which is merely malum prohibitum. or upon a warrant which had been issued by a judge without first properly determining whether there was probable cause. together with all copies. I gaming or counterfeiting. Illinois (119 U. but for mere irregularities in the manner in which he may be brought into the custody of the law. under the circumstances." This statement was found to be true by the subsequent finding and seizure of a considerable quantity of opium in the place mentioned. a required by section 98 of said General Orders No. was illegal. 122. then.. and upon investigation it should be found. papers. S. In the present case. Section 97 provides that "a search warrant shall not issue except for probable cause" and section 98 above quoted provides the manner in which that probable cause shall be determined by the judge issuing the warrant. and for powder or other explosive and dangerous material so kept as to endanger the public safety. under the writing desk in his store. justify the court in declaring that the search warrant in question was illegal and ordering the return of the opium found and seized under said warrant.. had not been stolen or embezzled. 1919. 58. or from making any other use of the property and papers so obtained until orders are received from this court regarding the disposition of the same. which provides a follow: SEC. When it was used or when the intent exists to use it as the means of committing a felony. etc. vs. S.. such as the possession of opium. Iloilo. For the purpose of this decision we deem it unnecessary to draw the distinction between the words "felony" and "misdemeanor" a used in the common law. for goods supposed to have been smuggled into the country in violation of the revenue laws. "Search-warrants have heretofore been allowed to search for stolen goods. from making any examinations of any of the property thus obtained or from using any reports or from publishing in any manner any reports already prepared as a result of the examination of such property. THE SEARCH WARRANT OF APRIL 30TH The petitioners contend that the search warrant of April 30. examine on oath the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing. 432. It is further requested. In support of their first contention the petitioners argue that the property ordered to be seized. namely. 58 is as follows: SEC. before issuing the warrant. from his own admission. 98. reports. or without any previous complaint. restraining the respondent judge from at any time taking cognizance of any action or prosecution growing out of the unlawful searches and seizures above-mentioned. and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized." (Cooley on Constitutional Limitations. or extracts obtained from the books." which is used in paragraph 2 of section 96 above quoted. whatever may be the technical common-law meaning of the word "felony. samples. the judge did not examine any witness under oath but relied solely upon the sworn application of the Constabulary officer in determining whether there was probable cause. 58. escaped and went to Peru. A search warrant may be likened to a warrant of arrest. 436) Ker having committed the crime of larceny. (1) because it was not issued upon either of the grounds mentioned in section 96 of General Orders No. notes. and (2) because the judge who issued it did not determine the probable cause by examining witnesses under oath.) . The judge or justice must. Opium is such property. and brought before a proper officer. extracts. speaking through Mr. Justice Miller. 7th ed. 18 Phil. 146. photographs. 96. that he was the author of the crime. 2. there is kept a certain amount of opium. and this may be in some sense said to be "without due process of law.. Suffice it to say that. The question now is." But it would hardly be claimed that after the case had been investigated. that a writ of prohibition issue. and the defendant held by the proper authorities to answer for the crime. Niño St. Sto. so seized. opium.

7th ed. it was interrupted by the necessity to ascertain who the owner of the bodega on the ground-floor was. that if a warrant was issued to search for a certain article and it was not found after the first search. under a legally issued warrant. In other words. St. G. he may break open outer or inner doors.In the present case there was an irregularity in the issuance of the search warrant in question in that the judge did not first examine the complainant or any witnesses under oath. and only those. for a search warrant cannot be used for the purpose of obtaining evidence. It may be said that — The important question that remains to be decided is whether. S. In support of this contention counsel for the petitioners. We agree with counsel that a search warrant cannot be used every day for ten days. ETC. Obeying strictly the command of his warrant. he is not protected by the warrant. . personal letters. It is not believed that the stature (subsection 2 of section 96. and this is so even when the complaint proves to have been unfounded.) We have said that if the officer follows the command of his warrant. 87 Am. reasoning by analogy from the case of an improper arrest. he is protected. The goods to be seized must be described with such certainty as to identify them. It is admitted. this cannot be interpreted to mean that a search warrant can be used every day for 10 days." and that after the articles for which the warrant was issued have been seized the same warrant cannot be used as authority to make another search. because the petitioner Uy Kheytin falsely disclaimed ownership thereof. under a search warrant for opium." but was really a continuation of the search begun on April 30th. because they were not "particularly described" or even mentioned in the search warrant. private documents. while searching one's person under a search warrant for stolen goods. LETTERS. against the party's will. .. he thought that they might be used Books of account. to use this same warrant as authority to make another search. That this is the correct interpretation of this constitutional provision is borne out by American authorities. Also. O. and the petitioners were made to understand on April 30th that the authorities were not yet through with the search and would continue the same as soon as they found out that the bodega was also occupied by the petitioner Uy Kheytin. (Cooley on Constitutional Limitations. testified that he seized these articles because he believed or suspected that they had some relation with the opium in question. argued that: While it is true that a warrant is good for 10 days after the date of issuance. 58 (sec. of the opinion that the search made on May 1st was authorized under the search warrant of April 30th as evidence against the petitioners when they are prosecuted for a violation of the Opium Law. they could not be legally seized. (24 R. THE SEIZURE OF BOOKS. it might possibly be true. second. particularly described in the search warrant — to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they shall seize. Torralba. the property to be seized under a warrant must be particularly described therein and no other property can be taken thereunder. and other property having a remote or no connection with opium. and private papers are property which men may lawfully possess. 58. and third. the officer cannot lawfully take from the person a letter..) It is a violation of the declaration of rights respecting searches and seizures for an officer. But the property sought to be searched for and seized having been actually found in the place described by the complainant. as required by section 98 of General Orders No. II THE SEARCH MADE ON MAY 1ST Petitioners content that this was made without any search warrant and without any authority of law. these articles might be seized. that the search warrant of April 30th could not be used on May 1st because that warrant had been executed on the day of its issuance. 714. for sake of argument.. 711. and the description must be so particular that the officer charged with the execution of the warrant will be left with no discretion respecting the property to be taken. to the end that "unreasonable searches and seizures" may not be made. is no reason or justification under the law for the seizure: First. 3) and General Orders No. the property mentioned in the warrant. was not completed on April 30th. But if he exceed the command by searching in places not described therein. We are. . that another search could be made sometime within the 10 days. The respondents contend that this was a sufficient justification under the law for the seizure of such articles under the same warrant for opium. But this is certainly the furthest possible extreme the doctrine could be carried. L. This is shown by the fact that during the interval between the two searches the premises in question were guarded by Constabulary soldiers. Granting that property of which men may lawfully possess themselves has been used in the commission of a crime and not . because. in the lower court. that if upon a search. C. "and for a different purpose each day. But this argument is not applicable to the facts in this case. and exonerating the latter. p. It appears from the oral evidence adduced during the hearing of the petitioners' motion in the court below that the search for opium. and for a different purpose each day. to the petitioners. the officers of the law were authorized to seize books. we are of the opinion that that irregularity is not sufficient cause for ordering the return of the opium found and seized under said warrant. even if they had been mentioned in the search warrant. 58) was intended to cover property of this class. or by seizing persons or articles not commanded. etc. 434) That the officers of the law believed that the books. and can only justify himself as in other cases where he assumes to act without process. lieutenant of the Constabulary. It certainly could not be interpreted to allow a search to be made. Rep. We are of the opinion that the respondent's contention in untenable. and after the articles for which the warrant was issued had been seized. (State vs.. and his justification does not depend upon his discovering that for which he is to make search. In order to comply with the constitutional provisions regulating the issuance of search warrants. such letter not being particularly described in the warrant as property to be searched for. — that abuses may not be committed. 715." nor could it be considered "another search. 97) specifically require that a search warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized. to take from it. The authorities for the first proposition have already been given above. 2. Both the Jones Law (sec. some other prohibited articles than those named in the warrant should be found. Slamon. Under a warrant to search a person for stolen goods. which they seized might be used as evidence against the petitioners herein a criminal action against them for a violation of the Opium Law. the search of May 1st was not made "for a different purpose. therefore. III 1. a letter written to him. The evident purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those. This would be absurd. The respondent M. papers. in other words. because to compel a person to produce his private papers to be used in evidence against him would be equivalent to compelling him to be a witness against himself.

penalty or forfeiture. 7. and they hereby are. Rep. to be used in evidence against him. Search and seizure of a man's private papers to be used in evidence for the purpose of convicting him of a crime. United States. (Se also Silverthorne Lumber Co. ONOFRE A.) From all of the foregoing our conclusions are: 1.) The seizure of a person's private papers. and CESAR T. L-34038 June 18. says: The warrant is not allowed for the purpose of obtaining evidence of an intended crime.R. S. decided Jan. Pasay City. 431.. 1976 NICANOR MARCELO. or of forfeiting his property. JJ. forbidden from examining or making any use of said books.. 1920. 955.. did not require another search warrant. S. The finding of evidence can not be the immediate reason for issuing the search warrant. That although in the issuance of the search warrant in question the judge did not comply with the requirements of section 98 of General Orders No.possessed nor created purely for the purpose of committing a crime. dutiable articles on which the duties have not been paid. District. G. Araullo. Slamon. In the case of Boyd vs. 7th Judicial District stationed at Pasig. L-36376 June 18. letters. and the like. 711. and much less are they entitled to be exonerated because of such omission of the judge.. is the object of a search and seizure of his private papers. To use a search warrant for the purpose of obtaining possession of property for this purpose would be an "unreasonable" use of the remedy by search warrant. 87 Am.. No. 3. recovering a penalty. 14. 212. it is an "unreasonable search and seizure" within the Fourth Amendment. 12. 9. St. . and other articles which have no inherent relation with opium and the possession of which is not forbidden by law. namely. De los Reyes and Esguerra. compelling a man to be a witness against himself.. petitioner. which rightfully belong to the custody of the law. 26. Gaz. telegrams. So ordered. 5 Off. reproduced at the top of page 3 of this decision 1) and they are hereby ordered to immediately return the said articles to the petitioners. HON. letters. 7th ed. MASCARDO. No. was illegal and in violation of the petitioners' constitutional rights. respondents. therefore. 8.) 3. 20 Phil. and SALVADOR T.. is equivalent to compelling him to be a witness against himself. except in a few special cases where that which is the subject of the crime is supposed to be concealed. vs. petitioner. vs. 962. (State vs.J. 616). 58. Both amendments (fourth and fifth) relate to the personal security of the citizen. concur. Justice Bradley. and 15 of the sheriff's return (Exhibit 3. concurs in the result. VILLALUZ. is totally different from the search and seizure of stolen goods. then certainly its seizure can only be for the purpose of using the same as evidence to prove the commission of the crime already committed. but only after the lawful evidence of an offense actually committed. 961. (Regidor vs. which is prohibited by law. as Collector of Customs stationed at the MIA Airport Customhouse. is equally within the prohibition of the Fifth Amendment. Rizal. That the search made on May 1st was a continuation of the search begun on the previous day. U. Mapa. said: The seizure or compulsory production of a man's private papers to be used in evidence against him is equivalent to compelling him to be a witness against himself.. When the thing forbidden in the Fifth Amendment. vs. C. United States (116 U. L-34243 June 18. and. stationed at Pasig. Araullo and Villamor. Judge Cooley in his work on Constitutional Limitations. 73 Vt. their assistants or successors. the Supreme Court of the United States. p.. Rizal. speaking through Mr. namely. No. and the public or the complainant has an interest in it on its destruction. it is hereby ordered and decreed that each and all of the respondents herein. Nor even then is it allowable to invade one's privacy for the sole purpose of obtaining evidence against him. 467. be. and. in a prosecution for a crime. MAKAPUGAY. as Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court. This purpose is not contemplated by the provision of the law. That the seizure of the petitioner's books. vs.R. Therefore. 1976 Customhouse. etc. respondents. the articles described in items Nos. G. G. by the Supreme Court of the United States.R. 1976 2. They nearly run into and mutually throw light upon each other. and not likely to be used again. telegrams. 10. the petitioners are not entitled to the return of the opium and its paraphernalia which were found and seized under said warrant.

Rule 112 of the New Rules of Court. JOSE ARELLANO. simultaneously in the manner provided for by Section 13. VILLALUZ and FELIX C. rec. Mascardo filed against Cesar T. and one (1) box of air-conditioning evaporator only. REYNALDO REYES AND LUCILA ENRIQUEZ. 1971 issued the following order: WHEREFORE. 1937. in his capacity as Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court.. claiming that Cesar T.complaint with respondent Judge against petitioner Nicanor Marcelo for an alleged violation of Section 3602 in relation to Section 2505 of Republic Act 1937. 19. 1971. Armed with said order. No. 7th Judicial District. willfully and feloniously brought into the country FORTY (40) cartons of "untaxed blue seal" Salem cigarettes and FIVE (5) bottles of Johny Walker Scotch Whiskey. 1971 on the ground that respondent Judge has no power to conduct a preliminary investigation of criminal complaints directly filed with him. issued the challenged order. No.CALIXTO D. The criminal complaint having been docketed as Case No. without the necessary permit from the proper authorities. as amended by Republic Act No. Flight 307. 1971. the respondent brought into the country various Philippine Money in the amount of Two Thousand Two Hundred Eighty (P2. HON.. his passport On June 22. Makapugay "with malicious intention to defraud the government criminally.280. the respondent Judge assumed jurisdiction over the objection of petitioners counsel.. respondents. The respondent is hereby ordered to post a bond in the amount of P5. and with intention to defraud the government did not declare the contents of his pieces of baggage in the Baggage declaration Entry nor with the assigned Customs Examiner. otherwise known as the Tariff and Customs Code. In due time. J. . cannot legally order the dismissal "with prejudice" of a criminal case after conducting a preliminary investigation thereon. Marcelo who is an arriving passenger from Hongkong on board a Philippine Air Lines plane. G. ENRIQUEZ.). Respondent Judge assumed jurisdiction to conduct and did conduct the preliminary investigation.:p G. 1976 FRANCISCO P. G. R.00 for his provisional release.00. Hence. The act of passenger Marcelo in intentionally refusing to declare the said articles in the Baggage Declaration Entry. and thereafter on October 6. and before the Customs Examiner despite inquiries made. (b) Central Bank Circular No.00) Pesos cleverly hidden in one of the pieces of baggage examined by the assigned customs examiner. Circular 265. constitute a criminal offense within the meaning of Section 3602 of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines. . . No. 1971. as well as the forfeiture of forty (40) cartons of untaxed blue seal Salem cigarettes and five (5) bottles of Johnny Walker Scotch Whiskey" (p. rec. When his pieces of baggage were examined.. L-34243 PEDRO E. respondent Collector of Customs filed a letter. HON. before the City Fiscal of Pasay City.B. dismissing "the case with prejudice and ordering the return to private respondent the amount of P2. 4713. Salvador T. 1976 PEDRO E. VILLALUZ. FELIX. petitioner Collector of Customs. (p.. what were found were various assorted Watches. NIEVA.. Makapugay.R. feloniously. vs. 265. conducted the preliminary examination and investigation. G. in relation to Sections 2505 and 2530 (m) 1 of the same Act. The respondent submitted a Baggage Declaration Entry which did not declare the said articles. ONOFRE A. L-34038 On July 1. 1976 G.. THE HON. rec. The Customs Examiner assigned further asked him if he has something more to declare but the answer was in the negative. also "untaxed". Petitioner Collector of Customs refused to obey the order due to the "prior institution of seizure proceedings thereon. Bags. and is without authority to order the return of articles subject of seizure proceedings before Customs authorities. JR. HALMAO.R. CCC-VII-854-P. 7th Judicial District. private respondent Makapugay demanded that petitioner release the articles so stated. petitioners. 13. No.. vs. and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. as amended. Montagut shirts and Dress materials which are highly taxable. vs.C. L-39525 June 18. instead of personal effects as declared in the Baggage Declaration Entry. ONOFRE A. No.. L-40031 June 18.R. this petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction. petitioner. VILLALUZ. in his capacity as Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court. vs. on June 22. 11. HON.).000. criminally. VILLALUZ. No. respondents.R. And in utter disregard of existing Central Bank Circulars particularly C.. 265.No. L-38688 June 18. B103813. 1971.). " (p. GREGORIO CONDE AND ANASTACIA TORILLO. ONOFRE A. JUDGE ONOFRE A. MAKASIAR. otherwise known as The Central Bank Act. respondents filed their respective answers to the petition and subsequently both parties submitted their respective memoranda in lieu of oral argument. respondents. NIEVA. a letter complaint with respondent Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court for violation of: (a) Section 174 of the National Internal Revenue Code." The refusal prompted respondent Makapugay to file a complaint for "Open Disobedience" under Article 231 of the Revised Penal Code. . Mr. in relation to Section 34 of Republic Act No.280. without any prior permit from the Central Bank authorities. supposed to have been committed in the following manner: . and (c) Section 3601 and 3602 of Republic Act No. petitioner. JOSE ARELLANO and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. petitioner. seeking to annul and set aside the order dated July 6. and on July 6. Ag-2456 FA . there being a preliminary investigation and examination conducted by the Court and considering that the respondent was given a chance to defend himself let a Warrant of Arrest be issued for his apprehension. respondents.

39. On October 30. the Court required the respondents to file their answer within ten (10) days from notice thereof and issued.) based on the ground that respondent Judge has no authority to conduct the same. L-39625 On October 24. the same having been filed in accordance with Section 13. the City Fiscal of Pasay is hereby ordered to file the corresponding information against the respondent before this court of competent jurisdiction within FORTY EIGHT (48) HOURS from receipt hereof (p. On October 20. rec. etc.. " (p. No. invoking the same arguments in G. 1971. versus Hon. his representatives.. 22. rec. if any. 94. it appearing that the case involved in the petition is criminal in nature.. On March 2. place or stead. 1973. etc. respondent Judge filed a petition for admission of answer on November 29. 49-50. indicting petitioners with violations of the AntiGraft Law. Villaluz. 62. 3019. rec. rec. adopting as his answer to the petition. 1971. "restraining respondent Judge. held on to the view that the Circuit Criminal Courts are vested with the power and authority to conduct preliminary investigations. which respondent Judge granted by giving petitioners a period of just one (1) day to seek relief from this Tribunal. as well as the warrant. No. the Supreme Court by resolution resolved to consider the case submitted for decision after noting the failure of petitioner to file his memorandum (p. 23. frontally met the averments of petitioner. representatives. respondent Collector of Customs.. Counsel for petitioners then asked for time to raise the issue before this Court.) Petitioner Nicanor Marcelo filed this action for certiorari with preliminary injunction. rec. 1974. 1971 . and pursuant to the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of "Mateo vs. on the same ground as the petition in G. 43-44. petitioner through counsel. "(p.). private respondent Felix Halimao filed a criminal complaint directly with the Circuit Criminal Court presided over by respondent Judge charging herein petitioner with alleged violations of Republic Act No. 1973. Prel. 14-15. Onofre A. Collector of Customs. In his answer filed on March 14. this Court required respondents to answer the petition and issued a temporary restraining order "enjoining respondent Judge from . 72. rec. 1974. rec. that may be issued for the arrest and imprisonment of petitioner" and to enjoin permanently respondent Judge from conducting preliminary investigations and from ordering petitioner's arrest. Hence. rec. G. respondent Judge forthwith issued an order of the following tenor: Considering that the complaint filed . 1973 at 8:00 o'clock in the morning (p. 1973. The same was reset on February 26. herein petitioners filed this petition. which was granted by this Court in its December 13. through the Solicitor General. 1971 (pp. rec.. causing and effecting the arrest of petitioners herein" (p. No. 1973). Immediately before the hearing of February 26. Accordingly. petitioners. 26.). filed an "Urgent Motion to Suspend Preliminary Investigation" contesting the power of the respondent Judge to conduct the preliminary examination and investigation (p. rec. this petition. which complaint was docketed as Criminal Case No. R. 72-Rizal. 116-Rizal. No. 1972. "enjoining respondent Judge. 1971 resolution (p. filed an "Urgent Motion to Suspend Preliminary Investigation" (p. 1973. No. effective immediately. his agents.). 32. 9. Circuit Criminal Court.. The complaint was ultimately docketed and on the same day (February 22. respondent Judge. and/or any person or persons acting upon his orders or in his place or stead from proceeding further with the preliminary investigation . Rule 135 of the New Rules of Court. et al (p. G. private respondents Gregorio Conde and Anastacia Torillo. Villaluz. On the day set. otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. After arguments by counsels for both parties. through counsel.R. assigns or persons acting upon his orders. Rule 112 of the New Rules of Court. L-38688 On May 23. the respondent Judge denied petitioner's motion.. from executing. 23. On June 13. R. the Supreme Court adopted resolution requiring respondents to rile an answer and likewise issued a writ of preliminary injunction.). 1973 (p. petitioner filed this instant petition seeking to annul "any preliminary investigation conducted by respondent Judge in Preliminary Inv.). enforcing and implementing his order of October 6. 1974. At the hearing of May 27.R. 1972. L-34243. No.). petitioner..). in relation to Section 13. 1974. . Except for the Solicitor General who appeared for The People of the Philippines. rec. 24. L-34038. G. On May 31. rec.). 1974.). L-36376 On February 22. petitioners appeared at the sala of respondent Judge who proceeded to conduct a preliminary investigation of the case. filed a manifestation on February 1. respondents in answer. An oral motion for reconsideration was likewise denied (pp. through counsel. 1974 an amended petition impleading The People (pp.). the legal grounds averred in the original petition in G. 31.Pursuant to Section 6.).. rec. a temporary restraining order against respondent Judge (p. the Court required herein petitioner to IMPLEAD the People of the Philippines as party-respondent (p. 7th Judicial District.) On June 17. filed on June 28. 64. ." let the preliminary investigation of this case be set on February 24. rec. No. In conformity thereto. filed a complaint directly with the Circuit Criminal Court. 1973. Rule 113 thereto. R. impugning the validity of the order of respondent Judge dated October 6.). sufficient in form and substance. Inv. rec. this Court by resolution gave due course to the petition and issued a restraining order. On the other hand.) In compliance therewith. which was denied by respondent Judge in his order dated February 27. 1974. rec.R.

Seventh Judicial District. Said motion was granted in the resolution of February 10. Hon. where herein petitioner holds the Position of Auditor. 7. 122-124. Hence. Rizal. (T)he facts and circumstances which has (sic) been the basis of this instant suit is the same set of first and circumstances and involving the G. herein private respondent prayed that the endorsement of Fiscal Santos be given due course and that the preliminary investigation be conducted by the respondent Judge (pp. Villaluz. Assistant City Fiscal Teodoro B. In an urgent ex-parte motion dated May 24. No. 3. Assistant City Fiscal Teodoro B. respondent Judge proceeded to conduct the preliminary investigation in question.. G. 40-49 [Annex "F"]. G. rec. respondent Judge issued on May 31. Santos endorsed the records of the case back to respondent Judge. No. and Francisco Felix v. 14. which was amplified in another pleading dated September 24. 92. 129. In his pleading dated February 5. Villaluz. on January 22. On the same day the aforesaid complaint was filed in court.000. Villaluz. Onofre A. No. 1973. 50-59 [Annex "G"].). 1974.). L34038. rec. with the Circuit Criminal Court. 1974.). 5179 (p.). 1974. she is hereby ordered to post a bond in the amount of P20. Inv. private respondent (pp. same parties in a case of ESTAFA THRU FALSIFICATION now pending preliminary investigation and also before this Honorable Court.00. Nos. rec. 1975. 1974 the challenged resolution which reads: Wherefore. Jr..). 1974 (pp. Hence. On May 22. L-38688) which involve the same legal issue. rec. On the same day. together with his wife Pacita and daughter Patricia N. from the Development Bank of the Philippines. -65-Rizal. 1975 (p. 12. p. rec.On November 13. On January 11. 21-22. rec. Hon. Said complaint was subsequently docketed as CCC Case No. rec. allegedly committed under the circumstances provided for in paragraph 4 1(b) Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (p. rec. (pp. petitioner's counsel filed an urgent motion to declare the preliminary investigation proceedings null and void ab initio due to lack of jurisdiction on the part of the court.). L-36376 and L-38688 (p. Thereupon.). rec. 91 [Annex "B"]. Prel.R. and that this case be submitted for decision together with the aforementioned cases (p. rec. After the termination of the proceedings. pp. 3. L-34243. rec. a complaint charging herein petitioner with estafa. Nieva. On July 26. respondent Judge issued an order that reads: Pursuant to Section 14. 1-2. pp.). filed a motion praying that the instant case be consolidated and decided jointly with G. pursuant to Section 13. filed with the Circuit Criminal Court at Pasig. Santos is hereby ordered to file the necessary information for the crime of Estafa against respondent Pacita Nieva. rec. 1974 (p. R. rec.. 1975. Pasig.R. Onofre A. for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA No. Onofre A. On September 24.. L-34038. G. 1974.). private respondent herein. Let a warrant of arrest be issued for the immediate apprehension of respondent Mrs. 3. and for her provisional liberty.00 industrial loan obtained by the Areson Woodtech Manufacturing Company headed by the complainant. because .R. private respondent filed his answer (pp. herein private respondent Jose Arellano filed a complaint against Pedro E. rec. pp. and that the memoranda filed for petitioners in said four cases be reproduced and adopted as the memorandum for petitioner in this case. this petition. 1974. On November 20. (p. he denied said opposition of herein petitioner (Annex "H". Hon. CCC-VII-72 Rizal (pp. L34243.). 90-91. 14-16 [Annex "A"] rec. 2. Herein petitioner opposed the same in a pleading dated June 1. Rule 113 of the New Rules of Court. 104 [Annex "I"]. this endorsement in order to avoid duplication of effort and time in' the resolution and disposition of the same incident. 1974 filed with the Circuit Criminal Court pursuant to paragraph 1 of the Joint Circular of the Department of Justice and the Department of National Defense dated April 29. 55-59 [Annex "G"]. 3019) in connection with the P230. L-34038. Nicanor Marcelo v. the Solicitor General filed a manifestation requesting to be excused from filing an answer considering that in three other cases (The Collector of Customs v. . investigating Fiscal Teodoro B. 93. Jose Arellano. 81. to conduct the same. re-echoing the arguments invoked by petitioners in G. R. L-34243. Under date of June 18. in addition to the affirmative defenses and arguments contained in private respondent's answer to the petition. private respondent filed a motion to strike out herein petitioner's opposition to complainant's ex parte urgent motion for preliminary investigation in view of the failure of herein petitioner's counsel to comply with the order of the Court to furnish a copy of his opposition to complainant Jose Arellano (pp. Nos. Rizal.).) stated that he joins the petitioner in his plea for the consolidation of the instant case with cases Nos.000.).R. in a court of competent jurisdiction. pp.. Petitioner. 1974.). 93. rec. L-34038. . The cm was docketed therein as Criminal Case Prel. 87-104. herein petitioner filed his opposition to the motion to strike out herein respondent's opposition (pp. a hearing was conducted by the respondent Judge on the urgent motion for preliminary investigation and immediately thereafter. The records disclosed the following antecedent facts.). Jose Arellano. which should be deemed submitted for decision together with the aforementioned cases (pp. 24.). Inv. within forty-eight (48) hours from receipt hereof. No. 1974. L-40031 On November 2. 1974. Rule 112 of the New Rules of Court in relation to the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court in the mu of "Mateo versus Villaluz". 62. 3. 130-132. 105-106 [Annex "2"]. 137. Pacita Nieva. rec. L-36376 and L-38688 as they involve the same issue. herein petitioner.). Santos is hereby ordered to conduct the preliminary investigation of the above-entitled case within five (5) days from receipt hereof and to file the necessary information in a court of competent jurisdiction if the evidence so warrants. L-36376 and L-38688 and prayed that the memorandum filed by respondent in L-38688 be considered reproduced and adopted as the memorandum for private respondent in this case. his office maintains that respondent Judge has no authority to conduct a preliminary investigation of criminal cases which he may try and decide under Republic Act No.

The Court further' resolved to consolidate the case with Cases Nos. the same not being embraced and contemplated within its given function to "try and decide" specific criminal cases. No.for preliminary examination and investigation. on the other hand. 5179. and thereafter refer the case to the fiscal for the filing of the corresponding information. March 28. without first giving the accused a chance to be heard in a preliminary investigation conducted by him or by his assistant by issuing a corresponding subpoena. only because they cannot try and decide all criminal cases falling under the jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance as courts of general jurisdiction. xxx xxx xxx Section 6. The one common legal issue posed by these six cases is whether a Circuit Criminal Court possesses the power to conduct preliminary investigations. in maintaining that respondent Judge has no such power. They can only take cognizance of cages expressly specified in Section 1 of Republic Act No. . L-34038. 41-45. Judges of the regular Courts of First Instance are expressly conferred the authority to conduct preliminary examination and investigation by Sections 13 and 14 of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court: Section 13.In an order dated August 8. the counsel for the People has taken the position that respondent Judge has no authority or jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary investigation of criminal cases which he may try and decide under Republic Act No. 9801 (now R.. they have the same powers and functions as those conferred upon regular Courts of First Instance necessary to effectively exercise such special and limited jurisdiction. 1975. which provides: In each of the sixteen judicial districts for the Court of First Instance as presently constituted. 5179. without previous preliminary examination and investigation conducted by the fiscal.). as amended by Presidential Decree No. 3 and 6 of Republic Act No. Neither the explanatory note to House Bill No. Preliminary examination and investigation by provincial or city fiscal or by state attorney in cases cognizable by the Court of First Instance.. May 15. 5179. maintaining that respondent Judge has jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation invoking particularly Section 13.. against property as defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code. crimes against persons and crimes. On January 28. L-38688. 22. 1967). or himself conduct both preliminary examination and investigation simultaneously in the manner provided in the preceding sections. Preliminary examination and investigation by the judge of the Court of First Instance. or state attorney. c. prescribing a uniform system of preliminary investigation by all government prosecutors. 26. otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. 1975. WE therefore examine the law. Moreover. 5179. Section 14. through the Citizens Legal Assistance Office of the Department of Justice. Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation to Sections 1. which may be exercised by judges of the Circuit Criminal Courts. whether simple or complex with other crimes. . In a manifestation filed on February 10. (emphasis supplied). Republic Act No.R. rec. 3602 and 3604 of the Tariff and Customs Code and Sections 174. 3019. 5180. Private respondent. the Circuit Criminal Courts shall have the same powers as those conferred by the Judiciary Act and the Rules of Court upon regular Courts of First Instance. hereof . 1967 Republic Act No. respondent Judge denied the same (p. there is hereby created a Circuit Criminal Court with limited jurisdiction. and should he find reasonable ground to believe that the defendant has committed the offense charged. This is plain and evident from Sections 3 and 6 of their organic law. Nevertheless. b. and disposition and appeal of criminal cases therein shall be applicable to the circuit judge and the cases cognizable by them insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this act.. which involve the same legal issue. having been conferred limited jurisdiction. . Crimes committed by public officers. rest their claim on Section I of Republic Act No.). "not inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Act No. The power of preliminary examination and investigation. concurrent with the regular Court of First Instance. he shall issue a warrant for his arrest." and likewise. 5179. and L-36376 (p. 1975. L-34243. 1974. Violations of Sections 3601. — Upon complaint filed directly with the Court of First Instance. . filed his answer on February 20. 5179 is the scope of the cases that may be tried by Circuit Criminal Courts. cannot exercise such power of preliminary investigation. Congress further confirmed that the Court of First Instance has the power to conduct preliminary investigation by approving on September 8. (emphasis supplied). the Solicitor General requested that he be excused from filing an answer on the ground that in three cases (G..) nor the available Congressional debates intimate that Circuit Criminal Courts are clothed with the authority to conduct preliminary examinations and investigations (Congressional Records of House. "necessary to carry their jurisdiction into effect. Petitioners. the judge thereof shall either refer the complaint to the justice of the peace referred to in the second paragraph of Section 2. Nos. 5179: Section 3. L-34243 and L-38688). is without doubt. Violations of Republic Act No. insofar as may be necessary to carry their jurisdiction into effect. Unless inconsistent with the provisions of this Act. Petitioners argue that said courts. L-34038. Circuit Criminal Courts are of limited jurisdiction. to try and decide the following criminal cases falling under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the latter: a. 5179." What is limited by Republic Act No. which provides: . rec.. justice of the peace or other officer in accordance with the provisions of the preceding sections no information for an offense cognizable by the Court of First Instance shall be filed by the provincial or city fiscal. — Except where an investigation has been conducted by a judge of first instance. 175 and 345 of the National Internal Revenue Code.A. this Court by resolution required respondents to file an answer to the petition and not to move for the dismissal of the same. pp. 1967. 126. The provisions of all laws and the Rules of Court relative to the judges of the Courts of First Instance and the trial.

Circuit Criminal Court and Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court shall have concurrent original jurisdiction over all cases involving offenses punishable under this Act: Provided.Sec. cited in the main opinion of Justice Villamor. of which the corresponding Circuit Criminal Court is one. Otherwise. 36 SCRA 172. — The Court of First Instance. 5180 likewise continues the procedure prescribed in the Revised Rules of court of 1964. supra. I took this view in my concurring opinion in the case of People v. 3. 6425. thus: My principal reason for my vote in favor of the judgment in this case is that I cannot find any justification for allowing the Secretary of Justice to have any part at all in the distribution or assignment of cases among the different branches of any Court of First Instance.. If the preliminary investigation is conducted by a judge and a prima facie case is found to exist. 1973 Constitution). Republic Act No. etc. jurisdiction with the Court of First Instance and Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts under the Dangerous Drugs Act. 77 and 911 issued respectively on December 6. Rule 112. 2. it is only logical that such authority vested in the judges of the Courts of First Instance is likewise conferred on Circuit Criminal Courts. the corresponding information should be filed by the proper prosecuting officer . Circuit Criminal Court Judges no longer possess the authority to conduct preliminary examination and investigation. The determination of "Probable cause" is the sole object of preliminary examinations. 187. . Section 39 of which confers on Circuit Criminal Courts. or by a state attorney or his assistants. See.." . the 1935 as well as 1973 Constitution vests this essential power in all courts to first determineprobable cause before ordering the arrest of those charged with a criminal offense (Section 1[3]." Before the amendment. . That Congress. other special laws specifically vest such authority exclusively in the Court of First Instance in case of violation of the Revised Election Code (Sec. to clothe the Circuit Criminal Court with all the powers vested in regular Courts of First Instance including the authority to conduct preliminary examinations and investigations. 6425 affirms the power of the Circuit Criminal Courts to conduct preliminary examination and investigation in all the cases falling under their jurisdiction and additionally fixes the period for preliminary investigation. 1947 . 44... by Sections 3 and 6 thereof. The aforequoted portion of Section 1 of Republic Act No. More decisively. to conduct preliminary examination. is confirmed by the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. the said courts shall take exclusive cognizance of cases where the offenders are under sixteen years of age. remains intact and undiminished. Under the amendment. congress could not have possibly intended to deny the Circuit Criminal Courts such constitutional prerogative. reads: Sec. shall be observed in the investigations of persons in custody. WE enunciated that the creation of the Circuit Criminal Courts is for the purpose of alleviating the burden of the regular Courts of first Instance and to accelarate the disposition of criminal cases pending to be filed therein(People vs. Gutierrez. and I cannot see why I must opine differently now. Art. as amended by Presidential Decree No.. G. Sec. 5180 was not modified by the amendatory Presidential Decrees Nos. 199) or to contribute to the speedy resolution of criminal cases and help curb the progress of criminality in the country (Paraguya vs. 1972 and March 23. which he reiterated in his concurring opinion in the Osmeña case. The provisions of Section fifteen. Sec. 1. without first giving the amused a chance to be heard in a preliminary investigation conducted by him by issuing a corresponding subpoena. The preliminary investigation of cases filed under this Act shall be terminated within a period of thirty (30) days from the date of their filing. the Courts of First Instance would still be carrying the burden of conducting preliminary. the law required only seven (7) days from the date of the commencement of the preliminary investigation.R. Surely.. but still retains concurrent. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary and except when an investigation has been conducted by a Judge of First Instance. 1971. Recognizing the constitutional power of the courts.. which is part of the basic constitutional right of an individual whose person cannot be legally seized without prior preliminary examination by a judge. investigations in those cases where Circuit Criminal Courts have jurisdiction and consequently delaying the trial and disposition of criminal cases pending before such Courts of First Instance. because the amendatory decree expressly directs that "If the preliminary investigation is conducted by a judge and a prima facie case is found to exist. Tiro. the corresponding information shall be filed by the proper prosecuting officer within forty-eight (48) hours from the date of receipt of the records of the case.. " There is nothing in the amendatory decree from which it can be reasonably inferred that since the jurisdiction of the Circuit Criminal Court over violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act is no longer exclusive. 5179. no information for an offense cognizable by the Court of First Instance shall be filed by the provincial or city fiscal or any of his assistants. Osmeña vs. Decision on said cases shall be rendered within a period of fifteen (15) days from the date of submission of the case. city or municipal judge or other officer in accordance with law and the Rules of Court of the Philippines. It is patent that the aforequoted provision of Section 39 of Republic Act No. Trial of the cases under this section shall be finished by the court not later than ninety (90) days from the date of the filing of the information. otherwise known as Republic Act No. of the New Rules of Court Of the Philippines. of Justice. that in cities or provinces where there are Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts. the Circuit Criminal Court no longer has exclusive. Sept 30. III. 1976. 1935 Constitution. From the abovequoted Provisions. IV. Where the preliminary investigation is conducted by a prosecuting officer and a prima facie case is established.. 41 SCRA 13s). ".. Courts of First Instance and Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts concurrent original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable thereunder and expressly directs that the "preliminary investigation of cases filed under this Act shall be terminated within a period of thirty (30) days from the date-of their filing. in enacting Republic Act No. the filing of the information and the rendition of decisions in all offenses penalized by the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. the corresponding information shall be filed in court within twenty-four (24) hours from the termination of the investigation. Justice Barredo in his concurring opinion in the Gutierrez case. Gutierrez. If the main purposes then in creating Circuit Criminal Courts are to alleviate the burden of the regular Courts of First Instance and to accelerate the disposition of the cases therein as well as stem the tide of criminality. Circuit Criminal Courts are nothing but additional branches of the regular Courts of First Instance in their respective districts .. et al.. L-32033. Particularly Rule 112 thereof. 5179 clearly intended. including the Courts of First Instance. Section 39. Its authority to conduct preliminary examination and investigation granted under Section 6 of Republic Act No. As opined by Mr. as amended. 39. (41 SCRA 211). Jurisdiction. Art. No.

or fiscal and that being a justice of the peace. practice and procedure and to amend the existing laws thereon. Furthermore. Mangila vs. Since indirect bribery is penalized under the Revised Penal Code with imprisonment for a period not exceeding six months. Sec. Lantin. . 5 SCRA 684).. It is urged that the word "judge" in the above-quoted section of Presidential Decree No. . speaking for the Supreme Court in ruling that the Circuit Criminal Court was without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case. 1971 Rev. practice.00 (or P6. In the aforesaid cases. April 16. even if it involves a violation of section 174 of the Tax Code. Tapayan . 23 SCRA 93). substantive rights. 30 SCRA 529. arrogate jurisdiction unto itself or grant any to the lower courts. by command of the specific provisions of its charter. which is the sole prerogative of the law-making authority. The same ruling was substantially reiterated in the more recent Tiro case. 44[f] in relation to Sec. 1968. In short. 1935 and 1973 Constitutions) contemplates not the Court of First Instance Judge nor the Circuit Criminal Court Judge but the municipal judge. is determined not only by nature of the offense charged in the information. 30 SCRA 81. Chief Justice Castro. suspension and public censure (Art. is intended to comprehend all kinds of judges. Justice Jose B. 1969. and the penalty provided under Republic Act 4713 is a fine of not less than P50. 1 SCRA 267). 5179. accuse of violating Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.Revised Election Code. Election Code) and of the Antisubversion Act when the penalty imposable for the offense is prision mayor to death (Sec. be taken cognizance of by circuit criminal courts. only where they are falling within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the court of first instance. Act No. the case is clearly removed from the competence of the circuit criminal court to pass upon. L-36885. not modified by any word or phrase. .. Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court. The law or rule of preliminary investigation is undoubtedly a rule of procedure. it is an elementary precept in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish.. the jurisdiction of which is concurrent with that of courts of first instance where the latter's jurisdiction is original and exclusive. . Jurisdiction of the court. Inc.00 and imprisonment of not less than 5 nor more than 30 days because the value of the cigarettes does not exceed P500. Mr. for which the penalty prescribed by law is imprisonment for more than 3 year (or 6 years in proper cases). including justices of the peace. the Circuit Criminal Court was clearly without jurisdiction to hear and decide the offenses involved.00 nor more than P200. but its jurisdiction to try and decide certain They do not at all reveal an iota of any further restriction on the limited jurisdiction of the Circuit Criminal Court other than those delineated in existing laws.00 as the case may be). The existing laws on . a justice of the peace. it was made clear that for the Circuit Criminal Court to acquire jurisdiction. Gimenez. June 30. 1967. the Supreme Court. held that there was no need of including justices of the peace in the enumeration in said section because the legislature had availed itself of the more generic term "judge". RPC). As heretofore stated. The Supreme Court in denying such contention. 1967. But equally true is the fact that both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions expressly delegated to the Supreme Court the rule-making authority — the power to promulgate rules of pleading.00. The term "judge".. [T]he charge is for unlawful possession of untaxed "blue seal cigarettes" of an appraised value of less than P500. and not by a directive of the Supreme Court.. 234. involving a violation of Section 174 of the Tax Code. 20 SCRA 596.. and substantive rights. 16. as amended. 1961. the same should be rendered inoperative by reason of the fact that the Supreme Court cannot. (emphasis supplied). it should also be within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the regular Courts of First Instance. which merely applied in said cited cases the statutory prescriptions. being a rule of procedure. In passing upon the issue of the Circuit Criminal Court's limited jurisdiction. however. or fine of more than 3 years (or 6 years in proper cases). It is not denied that the crime of indirect bribery is essentially one committed by public officers. which took effect on September 8. 5179) confined the jurisdiction of the circuit criminal courts (which is even made concurrent with the courts of first instance) to crimes committed by public officers. Reyes. this case falls within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the city court. 1969. It is of course basic that only the Constitution and the law can confer jurisdiction to hear and decide certain cases. 1962. Thus. October 31.. judge. The contrary view appears to entertain the mistaken notion that Section 13. in People versus Manantan (L-14129. and procedure in all courts. People vs. L-24735. involving indirect bribery committed by a public officer. Jan.. practice. The Statute cannot give a restricted meaning to the generic term "judge". 211. 1700). supra. Said rules shall be inform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish. The Supreme Court cannot legally define additional restrictions.. vs. 28. The 1935 Constitution states: The Supreme court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading.00 . or both such fine and imprisonment (sec. 44 (and also in the. November 28. In these two cases. and the admission to the practice of law. but also by the penalty imposable thereto. through Mr. Inasmuch as the case at bar falls within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the City Court. L-26563. Avila.. The cases of People versus Paderna (22 SCRA 273) and Paraguya versus Tiro (41 SCRA 137) involved not the power of the Circuit Criminal Court to conduct preliminary investigation.. it cannot. Section 1 of Republic Act 5179. July 31. The law (R. provides in part that circuit criminal courts shall have limited jurisdiction concurrent with the regular court of first instance. he is beyond the coverage of the said Code. the Judiciary Act and the Revised Penal code..00. to try and decide the following criminal cases falling under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the latter. stated: . Judiciary Act of 1948. 87[c]. held: . supra. Esperat vs.000... as amended. moved to dismiss the information on the ground that the law refers merely to a justice. increase or modify. L-25922. circuit criminal courts' jurisdiction was limited merely to cases involving crimes specifically enumerated in Section 1 of Republic Act 5179. The existing laws on pleading. L-14787. in the Paderna case. then Associate Justice. Rep. used in the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. Andico vs.A. xxx xxx xxx The jurisdiction of the circuit criminal courts is thus dependent not only on the type of cases but also on the penalties provided for those cases. by promulgating a rule of procedure. the offense must not only be one of those enumerated under Section 1 of Republic Act No. or fine of more than P3. L. WE should not distinguish (Colgate Palmolive Philippines. Roan.

III." Hence. which was ratified and took effect on January 17. Lucero. the Constitutional guarantee on arrest and search warrant reads: (3) The rights of the people to be secure in their persons. practice and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes. lies in the fact that while the authority of municipal courts and city courts to conduct preliminary investigation was reiterated in said Judiciary Act. Section 13 of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court was not an innovation as it merely restated Section 13 of General Order No. this Court said in the same case: xxx xxx xxx Under the express terms of our Constitution it is. 1967. the 1973 Constitution. 1947. it is claimed. promulgated on September 30. houses. the term seizures or seized comprehends arrest. L-38688. No law or presidential decree has been enacted or promulgated vesting the same authority in a particular "responsible officer. houses. to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. and the integration of the Bar. Reyes: Nevertheless. subject to the power of the Supreme court to alter and modify the same. IV. Section 37 of Act No. 81 Phil. Rule 112 does not modify substantive rights but continues the procedure already operative prior to the 1935 Constitution. emphasis supplied). but did not authorize his arrest. Discussing the implications of the provision of our Bill of Rights on the issuance of administrative warrants of arrest." For a clearer appreciation. et al. 1973 Constitution). and the persons or things to be seized. and Sections 2 and 4 of Rule 108 of the 1940 Rules of Court. there was no mention therein whether Courts of First Instance Judges are still possessed of such authority. And in Qua Chee Gan. 30. 69. Sec. and particularly describing the place to be searched. 3. 13. WE ruled unanimously through Mr. only required the filing of a bond by an alien under investigation. 1773 Constitution. Justice J. et al. and procedure. Sept. 640). The right of the people to be secure in their persons. 1968. Nos. therefore. While admitting that Court of First Instance were previously clothed with the power of preliminary investigation by virtue of Section 37 of Act 1627. which is the predecessor of Rule 112 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court. June 30. or supplemented by the National Assembly. conflicts with paragraph 3. practice. we are of the opinion that the issuance of warrants of arrest by the Commissioners of Immigration. papers. and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of It will be noted that the power to determine probable cause for warrants of arrest is limited by the Philippine Constitution to judges exclusively. (Art. But even under the 1935 Constitution. for the constitutional guarantee on arrest or search warrant is not qualified by some such phrase as "unless otherwise provided by law. increase or modify substantive rights (Sec. 1973. If such repeal was intended. may be repeated. after examination under oath or affirmation of the complaint and the witness he may produce. the admission to the practice of law. providing: WE have ruled that Rule 108 of the 1940 Rules of Court. alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading. nevertheless. of Article III (Bill of Rights) of our Constitution. and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause. is an adjective or procedural rule (Bustos vs. 58. which arose after January 17. and procedure in all courts. it is unconstitutional. unlike in previous organic laws and the Federal Constitution of the United States that left undetermined which public officials could determine the existence of probable cause. Art. The Congress shall have the power to repeal. 1935 Constitution).and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge. Congress could not divest the court of such authority as the Constitution does not permit it. papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated. Sections 13 and 14 of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court merely implement Section 3 of Article Ill of the 1935 Constitution (now Section 3 of Article IV of the 1973 Constitution). L-39525 and L40031. and shall not diminish. VIII. 24 SCRA 155). Vivo (L-22196. Deportation Board. "All laws and rules inconsistent with the provisions of this Act' were repealed. solely for purposes of investigation and before a final order of deportation is issued. altered. in obedience to its rule-making authority under Section 13. because the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973 vest in the Judge the power to issue a warrant of arrest or search warrant after conducting a preliminary investigation or examination. and the persons or things to be seized (Art. or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law. Deportation Board (L-20280. and the persons or things to be seized (Art. and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines (Sec. shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade. emphasis supplied). X. Section 1. L20280. the inconsistency. issued by President Roxas. 1973 Constitution. 1973. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases. 3. reiterating the doctrines in the cases of Qua Chee Gan. practice. vs. namely. III. to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. this Court pointed out that Executive Order No. L-36376. and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause. Article VIII of the 1935 Constitution. The right of the people to be secure in their persons. andparticularly describing the place to be searched. 20 SCRA 162). even doubtful whether the arrest of an . Art. which. 5[5]. papers. houses. whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated. in Vivo versus Montesa (July 29. 1963. emphasis supplied). It is clear from the aforequoted provisions of the 1973 Constitution that until now only the judge can determine the existence of probable cause and can issue the warrant of arrest. and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated. however. 1627. 1935 Constitution. it is argued that this same section was amended when the Judiciary Act of 1948 was enacted since under Section 99 of said Judiciary Act. vs. Thus. 1963) and Morano vs.B. of July 29.L. and particularly describing the place to be searched. The 1973 Constitution similarly authorizes the Supreme Court to Promulgate rules concerning pleading. in prescribing the procedure for deportation of aliens. and are declared Rules of Courts.pleading. should govern the last four cases.

in order to make the principle more sacred to the judges and to prosecuting pointed out in the debates. does not require judicial intervention in the execution of a final order of deportation issued in accordance with law. It was the prevailing opinion among many delegate that one courts had been rather easy in the issuance of order of arrest or search warrants.Y. that a bond be required to insure the appearance of the alien during the investigation. p. as was authorized in the executive order of President Roxas. causes by the issuance of search warrants. But. It is enough. 530.E. etc. Emphasis supplied). leading to an administrative investigation. To carry out the order of deportation. Vol. he has "seized" that person (392 U. would be a warrant of arrest to carry out a final order of deportation. WE are not justified to create a distinction where the Constitution does not make any. 30 June 1967. Such. The term "judge" employed in both Constitutions cannot be so limited to "municipal judge" as to exclude the judge of the Court of First Instance and Circuit Criminal Court (People vs. Delegate Miguel Cuaderno categorically recounted: An amendment affecting the issuance of an order of arrest and search warrant. Phil. Vivo (L22196. — School Dist. page 741). or to effect compliance of an order of contempt. 75 Mo.H. Delegate Francisco proposed an amendment being the insertion of the words. 20 L. O'Gorman. during the investigation. 766. 16 88 S. in Morano vs. Grubbs Special School Dist. 20 SCRA. either by an executive or legislative officer or agency duly authorized for the purpose. versus Galang. People v.556). 1868. by a judge. Oct. In general. The Court remarked in said case: Section 1 (3). The Idea in the Francisco amendment was not new in the Philippines. 65.) That the aforesaid terms seizures and seized signify arrest was deliberately intended by the founding fathers of the 1935 Constitution. Young.Y. 690-695). 184 Ark. not as a measure indispensable to carry out a valid decision by a competent official.. Article Ill of the Constitution. 48 CJS 946). According to intent or context. It must be recognized that whenever a police officer accounts an individual and restrain his freedom to walk away. 161-1621). were approved upon the initiative of Delegates Francisco. which words are likewise employed in the 1973 Constitution. as already stated. as was true before the executive order of President Quirino. 18 vs. as then the warrant is not that mentioned in the Constitution which is issuable only on probable cause. 1967-B. which were generally found afterwards to be false (Aruego. it is not indispensable that the alien be arrested. to the effect that in each case the order must be supported by the testimony of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. distinguished between administrative arrest in the execution of a final deportation order and arrest as preliminary to further administrative proceedings. there is already an order of deportation. 1975). 370). The constitutional limitation contemplates an order of arrest in the exercise of judicial power as a step preliminary or incidental to prosecution or proceedings for a given offense or administrative action. 1. et al.D. 22. Delegate Jose Aruego added: During the debates on the draft. State v. such as a legal order of deportation issued Commissioner of Immigration. a country or court justice (Mo. In the 1968 case of Terry versus Ohio. 903 [1968]. a justice of the peace (N. and also an amendment providing that prisoners charged with capital offenses shall be bailable before conviction unless the evidence of guilt is strong.. And if one suspected of having committed a crime is entitled to a determination of the probable cause against him. The(n) contention of the Solicitor General that the arrest of a foreigner is necessary to carry into effect the power of deportation is valid only when. for it was provided for in the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Philippines. 863. 2d 889.. The foregoing doctrine was last reiterate in Ang. R. 43 S. . the president obviously has the power to order the arrest of the deportee. I. pp. No. (L-21426. The Constitution does not distinguish between warrants in a criminal case and administrative warrants in administrative proceedings.W.T. 5 SCRA 684. Mann 97 N. Following the same trend of thought. certainly. The signification of the Idea into a constitutional provision was zealously insisted upon. made before the judge. It is quite plain that the Fourth Amendment governs "seizures" of the person which do not eventuate in a trip to the station house and prosecution for crime — "arrests" in traditional terminology. the aforesaid terms include not only arrest but also invitations for police interview or interrogation as well as stop-and-frisk measures. the United States Supreme Court enunciated: .individual may be ordered by any authority other than the judge if the purpose is merely to determine the existence of probable cause. in circumstance of legislation (L-24576. Under the American Constitution. Manantan. this Court. Framing of the Philippine Constitution. 43 N. for example. p. 457). 2d 765. 562.H.S.160).C.and charged with capital offenses (Cuaderno. we perceive. the term "judge" may include an assistant judge (N. 49 Am. to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. the Framing of the Philippine Constitution. why should one suspected of a violation of an administrative nature deserve less guarantee? Of course it is different if the order of arrest is issued to carry out a final finding of a violation. — City Bank v. "judge" is a term employed to designate a public officer selected to preside and to administer the law in a court of justice (Ark.

and cannot. On the other hand. C. 13 of Rule 112 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court contains an innovation. 123. Even when the fiscal or prosecutor conducts the preliminary investigation. Subido. No less than the Constitution confers upon the judge the power to conduct such examination and investigation. 1 & 22. Rather." Thus. which. Ferrer. 3rd Edition. adding that the Charter of Manila and other cities confer upon the respective fiscals of said cities the power to conduct preliminary investigations.. Vol.E. Watzel. providing that "a judge" may cause any house or building to be searched for the protection of gambling tables. Section 99 of the Judiciary Act contains a repealing clause which provides: "All laws and rulesinconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed. 739. the power to conduct preliminary investigation is exclusively lodged in the city prosecutor (Sayo vs. . The opposite view likewise denies that the jurisdiction of our courts to conduct preliminary investigation could be traced to the Constitution. and Balite vs. 2 SCRA 182). It is patent that under the 1935 Constitution. 741-42). Espiritu vs. the two laws. 1948. . Thus. adopt the theory of implied repeal except upon a clear and unequivocal expression of the will of Congress. Statutory Construction... Sept. 30. Jones Law of 1916. 1960)." The question may now be asked: What is the nature of this repealing clause? It is certainly not an express repealing clause because it fails to Identify or designate the Act or Acts that are intended to be repealed (Sutherland. which is an essential element of the cardinal right of an individual against unreasonable searches and seizures. Unless the Constitution is amended. it must not only conduct the preliminary examination proper but the preliminary investigation as well since Section 13 commands the Court of First Instance to conduct both the preliminary examination and investigation simultaneously (523-524).The term "a judge". June 23. But the power thus granted to the Manila City Fiscals (and later to City Fiscals and City Attorneys of other chartered cities) to conduct preliminary investigations did not and does not include the authority to issue warrants of arrest and search warrants. 2 S. the judge derives his authority not only from the Rules of Court. p. which cannot be deprived of such authority to conduct preliminary examination because said prerogative of the courts emanates from the Constitution itself. etc. shall not exclude the proper judge of the Court of First Instance . Neither the judge nor . De la Rosa. 8 F[2d] 439. 1974. v. although as ruled in one case. the proper step is to so express it with specificity (Continental Insurance Co. If an objection must be raised. 2188. 51 P[2d] 832. 199 S. 41 SCRA 190. 868-869. The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law (Crawford. 1. 45 OG 196. Feliciano. is merely statutory." WE should not. refer to different persons and different methods applicable under different circumstances. examination conducted by him or by the investigating officer (referring to the fiscal or the municipal mayor under Sec. . [1934]. apart from the fact that Congress by itself alone had no power to amend the Constitution. Chief of Police. Construction of Statute. . Bacolod and Cebu. it should be against the authority of the fiscal to exercise such power of preliminary investigation. Bailey. 1955. from exercising such jurisdiction. 228. 1966). seems to violate the 1935 Constitution. L-23894.W. Section 37 of Act 1627 reads in part that such power of "every justice of the peace including the justice of Manila. Inc. 18 SCRA 280. The case of Albano versus Alvarez (December 22. Bacolod and Cebu do not contain any provision making such grant of power to city prosecutors exclusive of the courts (Kapunan. This is confirmed by Section 6 of Rule 112 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court. Villegas vs. is equivalent to "any judge" and comprehends an entire class. 151 Ore. and cannot. p. 876).. But the 1973 Constitution empowers the National Assembly to grant the power to issue search warrants or warrants of arrest after conducting the necessary preliminary examination to "other responsible officer. Such being the case. Simpson. 80 Phil. as has been stated. while Section 87 of the Judiciary Act provides that municipal judges and judges of city courts may also conduct preliminary investigation for arty offense alleged to have been committed within their respective municipalities and cities . 1971. the presumption against implied repeals and the rule against strict construction regarding implied repeals apply ex propio vigore. 1965. 24. 125. the present practice or rule of court authorizing the judge to issue warrants of arrest based on the preliminary investigation conducted by the city fiscal. Abbas. vs. Jackson. The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures under the 1935 Constitution provides that only a judge can issue a search warrant or warrant of arrest after he has by himself personally determined the existence of probable cause upon his examination under oath of the complainant and his witnesses. but also — and originally — from the fundamental law to which all other laws are subordinate. and the Revised Administrative Code of 1917). As heretofore intimated. Sept. there is no such inconsistency. the power of the city prosecutors to conduct preliminary examination and investigation (minus the authority to issue warrants of arrest or search warrant) is purely statutory." Until such a law is enacted by the National Assembly. 631). State vs. Art. Va. he may rely on the investigation conducted by the fiscal or prosecutor (Amarga vs. which directs the judge to issue the warrant of arrest when he is "satisfied from the preliminary. it is a clause which predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial and an irreconcilable conflict must be found in existing and prior Acts. if a repeal is intended. 84 KY 537). 55 SCRA 261. city and police courts and therefore the judge of the Louisville Law and equity court has authority to issue a warrant for such a research (Com. be restricted in its applications to judges of county. Montelibano vs.. vs. Quimseng vs. the judge cannot be divested of such a power. If the present city charters conferred on city fiscals or city prosecutors the power to issue warrants of arrest it would be an unconstitutional grant of power under the 1935 Constitution. the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws. People. Admittedly. May 12. Jan. 120 W. 285-286. Said Albano case does not negate but recognizes the authority of the judge of the Court of First Instance to conduct such preliminary investigation.. which requires that. which is not manifest from the language of Section 99 of the Judiciary Act. 521. L-31711. But the charters of the cities of Manila. although with a common objective. which requires the judge himself to conduct the preliminary examination. 13 SCRA 377).. without disturbing its meaning. for repeals and amendments by implication are not favored (Jalandoni vs. only the "judge" is directed to conduct a preliminary examination for the issuance of the warrant of arrest by express constitutional conferment. in Gen.. which warrants the courts alone can issue then as now. To begin with. 97 Phil. 265-6. 30. when the Court of First Instance itself conducts the preliminary investigation.. only the judge can validly conduct a preliminary examination for the issuance of a warrant of arrest or search warrant. 467). It is true that this COURT held expressly and impliedly that under the charters of the cities of Manila. Andaya. the Philippine Bill of 1902. Lachica. only the judge can validly issue the warrant of arrest. 47. St. 15 SCRA 518) is authority for the proposition that Sec. 1940 ed. Here. 98 Phil. 859. unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist between the terms of the new and of the old statutes (Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association. Criminal Procedure. Webb vs. 5) that the offense complained of has been committed and that there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused has committed it. Indeed.. so that. The organic acts prior to the 1935 Constitution did not prohibit the conferment of such a power to conduct preliminary examination or investigation on quasi-judicial officers like the city fiscals of chartered cities (see the instructions of President McKinley to First Philippine Commission.

and other courts of equivalent rank. App. 443 441 [1925]. Tamparong. Red. 58 by empowering "every justice of the peace .. While the Provisional Law on Criminal Procedure provided or governadorcillo. 77 Phil. 892. General Order No. the theory tolerates an unthinkable — because anomalous — situation wherein the Court of First Instance and the Circuit Criminal Court must wait for prosecutors and courts inferior to them to conduct the preliminary examination and/or to issue the needed warrants of arrest before they could effectively exercise their power to try and decide the cases falling under their respective jurisdiction. 270). 194 of August 10. 226 [1947].. through Justice Imperial. 58 vested the authority in a magistrate. Act No. 90 P. 194 is less categorical by employing the clause "jurisdiction to hear and determine which is by law now vested in the judges of the Courts of First Instance. which alone can conduct such preliminary investigation of a crime under its original jurisdiction pursuant to General Order No.. versus Cruz. pp. 1973 Constitution). Art III. 13) for the issuance of the warrant of arrest" and authorized "a judge or a justice of the peace" to issue a search warrant upon his determination of the existence of probable cause therefor "particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized" (Secs. 706. 1960 ed. Solon.S. Section 2474 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917. 79 Phil. 1934. Moreover. Yatco. People vs. People vs. 1901. The two laws were published in the Official Gazette in Manila on March 13 and 14. p. a generic term which includes judges of the Courts of First Instance and justices of the peace.S. supra. supra. 33 (26 Words and Phrases. Cruz. 44. pp. 78 P. General Order No. the Circuit Criminal Courts. S807. Act No. pp. Such being the admitted purpose. Criminal Procedure. During the Spanish regime. 4178 of December 5. Oakes. (3) the county judges and justices of the peace. 95 and 97). Criminal Procedure. 1887 and became effective four (4) months thereafter(U. 46 Or. the justice of the peace had no power to conduct preliminary investigation of any offense triable by the Court of First Instance. p. 58 amended (Sec. Swain. People vs. 720. 3. ed. the Jones Law of 1916. 1965 ed. Navarro Criminal Procedure.. 8)..1) the Criminal Code of Procedure enforced during the Spanish regime and vested in the magistrate "the authority to conduct preliminary investigation (Sec. The two-fold purpose for which the Circuit Criminal Courts were created was to alleviate the burden of the regular Courts of First Instance and accelerate the disposition of criminal cases filed therein (Osmeña vs. The possibility that the administration of criminal justice might stand still will not be very remote. 1930 ed. et al. is germane to and serves to promote the accomplishment of the principal purpose (Lo Cham vs. 58 (68 Phil. IV. Criminal Procedure. 1900. Navarro. vs. even if regarded as incidental and collateral. obviously collides with the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. 3042 of March 10.. A "magistrate" is an officer having power to issue a warrant for the arrest of a person charged with the commission of a crime. and Act No. 590 of January 9. 68 Phil. 722 5 Cal. 58 was amended by Act No. the Supreme Court. including Judges of the Court of First Instance. the Philippine Bill of 1902. 1901 amended General Order No. Military Governor in the exercise of his legislative powers as commander-in-chief of the occupation army and took effect on April 13. People vs. The obvious inference from the aforequoted provision of Act No. When the Philippine came under American sovereignty General Order No. (2) the judges of the Circuit Court. 635). 194 of August 10. the power to conduct preliminary examination must necessarily attach to the duties of a Circuit Criminal Court Judge. et al. Article III of the 1935 Constitution provide the source of the power of all Judges. Gutierrez. Marcos vs. Tamparong. The sumario was abolished by General Order No. and that as a necessary consequence. for aside from being one of the instruments by which a case may be accelerated and disposed of. 58. 104-107 [1939]. supra. 421 citing Pen. 1907. Revilla. 32-33. Art. Act No. 2. While General Order No.S. Ocampo. 1922. it did not require any preliminary examination or investigation before trial. they cannot also issue warrants of arrest. 710 [1931]. Section 1 of Act No. In the 1939 case of Marcos. 1134-35). Secretary of Justice. The following persons are magistrates: (1) the justices of the Supreme Court. The arrest of a person charge with the commission of a crime. (4) all municipal officers authorized to exercise the power and perform the duties of a justice of the peace. which was impliedly followed in the 1947 case of Temporosa versus Yatco. sustained the power of the Court of First Instance to conduct preliminary investigations under Sections 13 and 14 of General Order No. 1903. the rules of criminal procedure were found in the Provisional Law on Criminal Procedure which accompanied the Spanish Penal Code. WE RULE that both Section 1(3). The term "magistrate" comprehended the court of First Instance (Temporosa vs. But its enactment did not divest the Court of First Instance of such authority. Padilla. it is a duty which trully lies within the scope of the office. 194 is that before its passage. 1973. vs." The Philippine Bill of 1902 in a similar ambiguous vein contained such authority when it merely provided that the "Supreme Court and the Courts of First Instance of the Philippine Islands shall . to conduct the examination to determine probable cause before the issuance of the warrant of arrest and therefore sustain the proceedings conducted by respondent Judge leading to the issuance of the warrants of arrest and his referral of the cases to the fiscal or other government prosecutor for the filing of the corresponding information. The theory that Courts of First Instance and Circuit Criminal Courts Judges cannot exercise the power of preliminary examination and investigation. 31 Phil. 58 was promulgated by the U. This situation would make the Courts of First Instance and Circuit Criminal Courts totally dependent upon state prosecutors and municipal courts. for their proper functioning. Francisco. Philippine Penal Code and Procedure. jurisdiction to hear and determine which is by law now vested in the judges of the Courts of First Instance" (emphasis supplied). 174. 55 Phil. Code. 96.. 45). 1627 of July 1. II It may be well to trace briefly the historical background of our law on criminal procedure. Vol. supra).the law can delegate such an authority to another public officer without trenching upon this constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. 106-107). Act No. 960 ed. 1969.. 47 Phil. 58 (U. essential to the accomplishment of the main purpose for which the office was created (Sec. Wallowa County v. to make preliminary investigation of any crime allege to have been committed within his municipality. 225. A "magistrate" is an officer having power to issue a warrant for the arrest of a person charged with a public offense. which are inferior to them. Sec 3. 96. 1935 Constitution. 171.

555 [1946]). however.possess and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided and such additional jurisdiction as shall hereafter be prescribed by the Government of said Islands. 590 of January 9.. including the justice of the peace of Manila. through then Chief Justice Ricardo Paras. may rely on the facts stated in the prosecuting attorney" (Amarga vs. Cruz. — Preliminary examination in municipal court and Court of First Instance. Act 590.... as amended. merely provides "that the Supreme Court and the Courts of First Instance of the Philippine Islands shall possess and exercise jurisidiction as heretofore provided and such additional jurisdiction as shall hereafter be prescribed by law" (Sec. Persons arrested to be promptly brought before a court. " (Sec. — Every person arrested shall. 4178 of December 5. or any other person whose statement or affidavit is entitled to credit in the opinion of the judge . Act No. shall have presented an information against him in proper form... dispense with the latter's duty to exercise his judicial power of determining. 58.. Act No. seizures . The basic source of the power of the Courts of First Instance to conduct preliminary examination or investigation from May 14. People vs. issuing the warrant. that is. is paragraph 3 of Section 1 of Article III of the 1935 Constitution. . but this shall not exclude the proper judge of the Court of First Instance of a municipal court from or of a municipality in which the provincial jail is located. after a due investigating of the facts. the Supreme Court. As herefofore stated. 741-742). (Sec. His conclusion as to whether "probable cause" existed or not is final and conclusive. or trial. to be followed by the actual trial (Marcos. ceases to "be entitled as of right" to a preliminary examination by the Judge of the Court of Firs Instance who.. 26.. because it provides that in "cases triable only in the Court of First Instance the defendant shall not be entitled as of right to a preliminary examination in any case where the fiscal of the city. which the defendant can demand as a matter of right. only the judge can issue the warrant of arrest under the 1935 Constitution and prior thereto (Sayo. re-states the power of the magistrate to conduct the preliminary examination for the issuance of the warrant of arrest. It is clear that both the Manila Court of First Instance and municipal court can conduct a preliminary hearing or examination. after a due investigation of the facts.. Abbas. subject in all matters to such alteration and amendment as maybe hereafter enacted by law. (Sec. 739. . the persons . except a summary one to enable the court to fix the bail. 106-107). 37. emphasis supplied). (emphasis supplied).. shall have presented an information against him in proper form. while amending Section 13 of General Order No. to be determined by the judge after an examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. preliminary examination for the issuance of the warrant of arrest where only the complainant and his witnesses are heard by the justice of the peace. and particularly describing . Fugoso.. however. versus Cruz (68 Phil. be brought before the municipal court. The Judge of the Court of First Instance conducts only the first stage.. like the Philippine Bill of 1902. 98 Phil. supra. when directed by an order from the judge of First Instance. Lino vs. . however. when the City Fiscal has not conducted any preliminary examination. The preliminary investigation conducted by the petitioner (Provincial Fiscal) under Republic Act No.. 216). pronounced that the determination of the existence of "probable cause must depend upon the judgment and discretion of the judge . 80 Phil. namely. 1973. not including Sundays. adds. 195l. Act No. The municipal courts of said Islands shall possess and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided by the Philippine Commission. after the request for an examination is presented. whether or not probable cause exists therefor. If he is satisfied that "probable cause" exists from the facts stated in the complaint.. .release on bail. 1935 to January 17. Section 2474 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 re-affirms the power of the Court of First Instance of Manila to conduct preliminary examination — Sec.. against unreasonable . et al. But. Under the jurisprudence then or prior to the 1935 Constitution.." Construing the foregoing constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Moreno. 548. 1922. 1934 further amended Section 13 of General Order No.. shall have jurisdiction to conduct investigation at the expense of the municipality wherein the crime or offense was committed although alleged to have been committed anywhere within the province. to "conduct preliminary investigation of all crimes and offenses alleged to have been comitted within his municipality and cognizable by Court of First Instance. 194 by extending the power to conduct preliminary investigation to the justice of the peace of the provincial capital or of the town wherein the provincial jail is situated of crimes committed anywhere within the province but again utilized the equivocal clause "jurisdiction to hear and determine which is by law now vested in the Court's of First Instance. however.. to issue orders of arrest. Hashim vs. 1627 of July 1 1907 had the virtue of greater clarity when if authorized expressly every justice of the peace. 732 . however... 58. were applied by the Supreme Court in Marcos. if he is not satisfied. retains inferentially the discretion to conduct another preliminary investigation because the Court of First Instance Judge is not foreclosed by the preliminary examination conducted by the City Fiscal. then his conclusion is sufficient upon which to issue a warrant of arrest. 933.. emphasis supplied). 2474. in any case where the prosecution announces itself and is ready for trial within three days. and the second stage where the accused and his witnesses are heard. Boncan. before issuing the corresponding warrant of arrest. 3042 of March 10. The Constitution vests such power in the respondent judge who. does not. 1903 further amended Act No. 71 Phil. which guarantees "the right of the people to be secure in their persons . subject to the power of said Government to change the practice and method of procedure. and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause. to be seized. There is no law which prohibits him from reaching the conclusion that "probable cause" exists from the statement of the prosecuting attorney alone.. Section 2474 aforequoted. et al. In cases triable in the municipal court the defendant shall not be entitled as of right to a preliminary examination. 58 but still retained the authority of the magistrate to conduct the preliminary examination. emphasis supplied). made upon the investigation by the prosecuting attorney. While the power to conduct preliminary examination may be delegated by law to government prosecutors. 1627. 7. et al. He may.. the preliminary investigation before the justice of the peace or muncipal court consisted of two stages. call such witnesses as he may deem necessary before issuing the warrant. . . But the Court of Firs Instance may make such summary investigation into the case as it may necessary to enable it to fix the bail or to determine whether the offense is bailable. 77 Phil. without unnecessary delay.. Jones Law). March 28. In cases triable only in the Court of First Instance the defendant shall not be entitled as of right to a preliminary examination in any case where the fiscal of the city. 859. Chief of Police. Act No. 9. Sections 13 and 14 of General Order No. that the City Fiscal impliedly may conduct such preliminary examination. It will be noted. that it is only after the City Fiscal has conducted a preliminary examination that the accused Act No. 77 Phil. preliminary examination for purposes of the issuance of the warrant of arrest. as correctly contended by the respondent Judge. The Jones Law of 1916.. the Court of First Instance Judge himself certainly can proceed with such preliminary examination. or the Court of First Instance for preliminary hearing. vs. 96. vs.

and Republic Act No. 1967. It will also likewise be noted that the 1973 Constitution also authorizes the law-making authority to empower other responsible officers to conduct such preliminary examination for purposes of the issuance of a warrant of arrest. February 15. the City Final and the Judge of the Court of First Instance the power to conduct preliminary examination or investigation. the order nullified the power of seizure of the customs official. or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another (Sec. L-27257." There has been no deviation from such established jurisprudence exemplified in People vs. Republic Act 5180 was approved on September 8.. and committing thereby a grave abuse of discretion. 1964 Revised Rules of Court). The proviso of Section 5 thereof expressly provides that the preliminary investigation of offenses defined and penalized therein by prision mayor to death shall be conducted by the proper Court of First Instance. importance to individual freedom from illegal arrest or arbitrary detention vis-a-vis property rights and right against self-incrimination. vests in the Court of First Instance "exclusive original jurisdiction to make preliminary investigations. is actually committing. and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause. 1957. The respondent Judge seriously erred in so issuing said order. 40 SCRA 579. and he has reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed it. 6. 1. 5179 creating the Circuit Criminal Courts." The purpose of such specification was apparently to clarify the doubt raised by the dissenting opinion of Mr.4 Revised Rules of Court re-state Sections 2 and 4 of Rule 108 of the 1940 Rules of Court. Rule 117. the persons . August 31. 3 of Art. the dismissal of a case. the government prosecutors may be authorized to conduct such preliminary examination and their determination of the existence of probable cause may be relied upon by the . Onofre Villaluz. who may. seizures . Re-filing of the same is allowed if evidence has become sufficient to warrant conviction of private respondent.. expressly specifies "search warrants or warrants of arrest.. was approved. issue the warrant of arrest. Republic Act No. this time the 1973 Constitution. 58 Phil. Ochotorena. instead of employing the generic term warrants to comprehend both search warrants and warrants of arrest. Worse. See. contravening as it does a basic legal principle on double jeopardy.. 1935 Constitution). As enunciated in the Amarga case and in U. 1968. otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Law.. as a consequence. respondent Judge also directed through the same order the return of the articles allegedly seized from the person of respondent Makapugay. and c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending.. although the judge himself is not precluded from conducting his own preliminary examination despite the conclusion of the prosecuting attorney as to the existence or non-existence of probable cause.. Rule 113. to be seized" (Par. Ylagan. 1. As aforestated. or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law.. 23 SCRA judge. or is about to commit an offense in his presence.. Wherein the Court held that "the finding in the preliminary investigation that no prima facie case existed against the accused does not bar subsequent prosecution and conviction. et al. 1582 of 1907. as amended). etc. b) when an offense has in fact been committed. 851). as did the 1935 Constitution. and no search warrant or warrant of arrestshall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge. did not modify the opening clause of Section 1 of said Republic Act 5180 affirming the power of the Court of First Instance to conduct preliminary investigation in accordance with law and the Rules of Court. 180 of 1947. 23 SCRA 1249. issue warrants of arrest and try and decide any criminal case or proceeding for violation of" the Election Law.. .. against unreasonable . seizures for whatever nature and for any purpose . despite the fact that the constitutional guarantee expressly affirms "the right of the people to be secure in their persons . L-24447. This provision was a reiteration of the previous election laws (Act No. June 29. 2. the dissent of Justice Montemayor in the Amarga case seems to deny equal. 6388..) dismissed the criminal complaint filed by petitioners therein against private respondent with prejudice. L-25595. to be seized" (Sec. 1972 and March 23. 1974. Agoncillo. In passing. 1971 issued by the respondent Judge in G. Arrest without a warrant can only be legally effected by a police officer or private individual a) when the person to be arrested has committed. People vs. This portion of the question order is fraught with undesirable consequences. to be determined by the persons . In all other cases. L-34038 (Collector of Customs. 1700. Republic vs. IV.... Section 234 of the 1971 Revised Election Code. there must be a valid warrant of arrest. III. "dismissal at preliminary investigation is never with prejudice. No. Act No. After the ratification of the 1973 Constitution on January 17. aside from the challenged Sections 3 and 6 of Republic Act No. the source of the authority of the judge to conduct preliminary examination for purposes of issuing a warrant of arrest. after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. For the enforcement of such order would virtually deprive herein petitioner Collector of Customs of the evidence indispensable to a successful prosecution of the case against the private respondent. the arrest becomes unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional. Justice Montemayor in the Amarrga case.. 41-42). during the stage of preliminary investigation does not bar subsequent prosecution and conviction if the evidence warrants the re-filing of the same becomes next to impossible. Sections 13 and 14 of the 196. 9. III 1.The valid seizure of a person can only be executed through a lawful warrant of arrest..R. Com. et al.. Aggravating his grave mistake and misapprehension of the law. The constitutional right against double jeopardy exists. supra. obviously meaning that the case may not be refiled without exposing the accused to double jeopardy. — Such finding is not final acquittal as would preclude further proceedings" (Emphasis supplied). People vs. 3. which likewise guarantees "the right of the people to be secure in their persons . Sections 2 and 4 of Rule 108 of the 1940 Rules of Court expressly confer on the municipal or city judge. not after the first preliminary examination or investigation. but only after the first trial which results either in conviction or acquittal or in the dismissal or termination of the case without the express consent of the accused by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid complaint or information and after the accused had pleaded to the charge (Sec. When the seizure of a person is made without a warrant of arrest or with a warrant of arrest which is not based on a determination by the judge of the existence of probable cause. The challenged order of July 6. Obsania. 1973 Constitution). if not greater. Taladua vs. Revised Rules of Court. Presidential Decrees Nos. amending Republic Act No. As stated heretofore. The 1973 Constitution. vs. petitioner's counsel. On June 20. 5180. As correctly stated by the Solicitor General. Art.S. that the 1935 Constitution merely guarantees against unreasonable searches but not against unreasonable arrests. Bagsican(6 SCRA 400). which affirms the prerogative of the Courts of First Instance to conduct preliminary investigation of offenses punishable by said courts. is still the Constitution. 77 and 911 promulgated respectively on December 6. 357 of 1938. otherwise known as Republic Act No. and particularly describing . Hon. 1971. This grant obviously is exclusive of the provincial or city fiscal or other government prosecutors whose power to conduct preliminary investigation in all other cases is affirmed in the first clause of Section 5 thereof. 1976. against unreasonable . 1973. even with prejudice. versus Ocampo (18 Phil.

038. Such exclusive jurisdiction precludes the Court of First Instance as well as the Circuit Criminal Court from assuming cognizance of the subject matter (Enrile. And petitioners' motion for an extension of at least one (1) day was peremptorily brushed aside by respondent Judge with one single word DENIED. 1974. Item 42. should not encumber themselves with the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints. 28-29. is to mitigate the case load of the Courts of First Instance as well as to expedite the disposition of criminal cases involving serious offenses specified in Section I of Republic Act 5179. et al. etc.. 29 SCRA 165). March 15. July 30. et al.. 1969. et al. et al. see also Vierneza vs. Villaluz. Justice Barredo in his Concurring Opinion in People vs. vs. et al. Prudence should have counselled him.). Tariff and Customs Code. January 30. 59 SCRA 110. 3. vs. Papa. 1975 (A. 1968. vs. This significant fact should further dissuade him from actively conducting the preliminary investigation of criminal cases directly filed with him. 23 SCRA 948). Asaali. as of January 31. Broadway. Commissioner.. "It is not enough that a judge trusts himself or can be trusted as capable of acting in good faith. et al. Balanque. 1971. Or the Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court can directly request the Secretary of Justice to assign a state prosecutor for the same purpose (See. Court of Tax Appeals. The records of the case. 1971. 39 SCRA 533). 15. etc. as revealed by his letter dated February 26. Lopez vs. vs.. even if no warrant of seizure had previously been issued by the Collector of Customs in connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings." We have enjoined judges to apply the law as interpreted by the Supreme Court and not to dispose of a case according to their personal views (Albert vs. 53 SCRA. Court of Tax Appeals. Court of First Instance. et al. vs. Sept 30. Auyong Hian vs. 1971. Venuya. 28 SCRA 836. L-36376 (Enriquez. Respondent Judge chose to ignore the presence of the report of seizure dated June 30. Aug.. Geotina vs. and besides. et al. SCRA 1016. the Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over such imported goods for the purpose of enforcing the Customs laws. 1973. supra. September 12.. 56 SCRA 16). vs. Mago. January 31. et al. et al. Onofre Villaluz. rec. . 1971 and on July 9. July 30. 1974. SCRA 410... et al. As aptly expressed by Mr. et al. 1971.. 37 SCRA 327. which is six days prior to his order of dismissal dated July 6. as amended. Court of Tax Appeals. January 30. Pamaran. Kayanan. Lazatin vs. it seems that respondent Judge does not have adequate time to hear and dispose of the 34 criminal cases with detention prisoners pending in his sala. 1973). moreover. 29 SCRA 112. subject to an appeal only to the Court of Tax Appeals and to final review by the Supreme Court (Section 2205 and 2303. who in turn can utilize the assistance of the state prosecutor to conduct such preliminary examination and investigation. Hon.) were made by petitioner Collector of Customs on June 30. 50 SCRA 18. He should have anticipated that a warrant of seizure and detention will logically be issued as in fact it was issued on July 9. August 30.. But more commendable would be for judges to contribute their share in maintaining the unswerving faith of litigants in the courts of justice. 1971 respectively. Art. Republic Act No. Commissioner. But considering the novelty of the issue. X. Circuit Criminal Judges therefore.) and that he could not have foreseen the possibility that petitioner would be instituting seizure proceedings . 5184). WE enjoin the respondent Judge and other Circuit Criminal Court Judges to concentrate on hearing and deciding criminal cases filed before their courts (see Mateo vs. et al. The primary purpose of the creation of the Circuit Criminal Courts in addition to the existing Courts of First Instance. Rizal. August 30. 24 SCRA 394. to assist him. as above intimated. 1968. et al.M. pursuant to OUR constitutional power of administrative supervision over all courts (Sec.. a grant of twenty-four hours to prepare a petition for certiorari is a virtual denial of the motion. 1969. 24 SCRA 905. 1971. six days before his order of dismissal and the filing of the criminal complaint on July 1. 14. Farm Implement & Machinery vs. 1971. vs.R. 22 SCRA 857. 37 SCRA 381) and divests such courts of the prerogative to replevin properties subject to seizure and forfeiture proceedings for violation of the Tariff and Customs Code (Diosamito. it is commendable to see judges hasten the disposition of cases pending before them. Señares vs. Commissioner vs. 230-CCC.Respondent Judge ignored the established principle that from the moment imported goods are actually in the possession or control of the Customs authorities..). 28. July 28. was on a premise that herein petitioner was not holding or withholding the same for some other lawful reason.) and warrant of seizure and detention (p. Commissioner. et al. Geotina." On the contrary.. March 31. 1972. 1968. et al. Agenda of March 13.. because proceedings for the forfeiture of goods illegally imported are not criminal in nature since they do not result in the conviction of wrongdoer nor in the imposition upon him of a penalty (Lazatin vs. Respondent Judge claims that the pendency of a seizure proceeding was never brought to his attention (p. it is equally important that no circumstance attendant to the proceedings should mar that quality of trust worthiness. against ordering the release of the seized articles without first ascertaining from the petitioner Collector of Customs whether the latter intended to institute or had instituted seizure proceedings.. Moreover. Commissioner. More important is the consideration by this Court of the dangers posed by respondent Judge's peremptory denial of a reasonable time. 26 SCRA 382. No. 37. Aquino. The questioned order of respondent Judge is unqualified and contains no intimation that the "release . It is patent that respondent Judge knew actually of the existence at least of the report of seizure of June 30. rec. because it was the petitioner Collector of Customs who filed the criminal complaint directly with him on July 1. 1969. Sare Enterprises vs. 40 SCRA 362. the arbitrary denials displayed by respondent Judge of motions presented before him likewise invite some cautionary reminders from this Court. 24. 28. which they should refer to the municipal judge or provincial or city fiscal. 1971. etc. it is understood that the order of the court commanding the release of the subject articles was on a premise that herein petitioner was not holding or withholding the same for some other lawful reason (p. WE once again stress that "One important judicial norm is that a judge's official conduct should be free from appearance of impropriety" (Luque vs. Virata. Cruz of Mandaluyong. the tenor of the order is so absolute and so emphatic that it really leaves no alternative for petitioner Collector of Customs except to return the articles. et al. June 10. July 30. 1971. 1971. 1971. In this case. vs. and Pacis. December 16. rec. et al. Gutierrez. January 30. 1969. Frias. wherein he requested the Supreme Court to renew the detail in his sala of Municipal Judge Hermenegildo C. petitioners were given an unreasonable period of one (1) day within which to elevate the matter before this Tribunal. 1968. 6. so as not to frustrate the petitioner Collector of Customs in enforcing the tariff and customs laws. IV In G. 36). 1973 Constitution) as a matter of policy.. Indeed. 1975). Feb. The fact that petitioners succeeded in bringing the matter before the Supreme Court within the constricted period of time granted them is beside the point.. No.39. 28 SCRA 1016). rec. 1971. 1975. et al. Commissioner. Commissioner. reveal that a report of seizure (p. et al. Commissioner.. aside from the 479 pending cases of voluntary submission by drug addicts. V But while w sustain the power of the Circuit Criminal to conduct preliminary examination (p.

J. may be assigned by the Supreme Court for a period not exceeding 6 months. Esguerra. to assist Judges of regular Courts of First Instance with clogged dockets (Sec. Castro.J.R. 1971 IS HEREBY SET ASIDE AS NULL AND VOID INSOFAR AS THE SAME DISMISSED THE CRIMINAL CASE WITH PREJUDICE AND INSOFAR AS THE SAME DIRECTED THE RETURN TO PRIVATE RESPONDENT THEREIN OF THE ARTICLES SEIZED FROM HIM WHICH ARE NOW SUBJECT OF SEIZURE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE CUSTOMS AUTHORITIES. 1973 Constitution). AND THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ISSUED THEREIN IS HEREBY MADE PERMANENT. Concepcion. concur.Furthermore. Teehankee.. No.. L-34038. JJ. 38688 AND 39525. is on leave. THE PETITIONS ARE HEREBY DISMISSED AND THE WRITS OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND/OR RESTRAINING ORDERS ISSUED THEREIN ARE HEREBY LIFTED.. unless with their consent. IN G.. .R. L-40031. NOS. NO. AND IN G.R. 5[3]. Art. Aquino and Martin. Jr. IN G. THE ORDER OF RESPONDENT JUDGE DATED JULY 6. Muñoz Palma. 36376. THE PETITION IS HEREBY DISMISSED. X. NO COSTS. WHEREFORE. Judges of the Circuit Criminal Courts whose dockets permit. Antonio. L-34243. C.

To pay plaintiffs (respondents) P5. supplies.M. thus: WHEREFORE. The seizure caused a commotion and embarrassed private respondents.R. 3 Private respondents had to go personally to petitioners' place of business to recover their goods. An infringement of this right justifies an award for damages. On February 22. Diliman. J. SO ORDERED.. INC. as modified. for and as exemplary damages. 86720 September 2. its Fifth Division. On February 6. the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal dismissed the complaint against all the private respondents. and P5. AGNES VILLA CRUZ. Without any warrant. Captain Renato M.00. Sikatuna Village. A criminal complaint for unfair competition was then filed against private respondents.000. 1983. petitioner de Guzman exacted from private respondent Lugatiman the sum of THREE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED PESOS (P3. PUNO.00 for the unreturned 26 pieces of girl scouts items with interest at 12% per annum from June 4. 2. To pay plaintiffs the amount of P50. Receipts were issued for the seized items.000. badges. not all the seized items were returned. and Gertrudes Gonzales were selling Boy Scouts items and paraphernalia without any authority. and.00 to plaintiff (respondent) Mirasol Lugatiman and cancel her application for distributor's license. In their Memorandum Agreement.00. 1984. petitioner de Guzman. thus: WHEREFORE. The items were then turned over by Captain Peñafiel to petitioner corporation for safekeeping. 1984 (date the complaint was filed) until it is fully paid.00 to plaintiff Mirasol Lugatiman with interest at 12% per annum from January 12. respondents. was tasked to undertake the necessary surveillance and to make a report to the Philippine Constabulary (PC). 1983. . On October 25. To pay plaintiff Agnes Villa Cruz the sum of P2.000. 1983. the date of the last receipt issued. Peñafiel.: The constitutional protection of our people against unreasonable search and seizure is not merely a pleasing platitude. Quezon City went to the stores of respondents at the Marikina Public Market. ordering the latter jointly and severally: 1. Benjamin M. 5 affirmed the Decision with modification. vs. and 4.000. Petitioner de Guzman. the exclusive franchise to sell and distribute official Boy Scouts uniforms. and suits on display at respondents' stalls. On January 18..000. after a preliminary investigation. Dacanay for petitioners. ordering the latter jointly and severally. The other items returned were of inferior quality.00 each. and 4. It vouchsafes our right to privacy and dignity against undesirable intrusions committed by any public officer or private individual.00 for and as attorney's fees and litigation expenses. the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. the trial court ruled for the private respondents. an employee of petitioner corporation.00 for and as exemplary damages.. or a total of P15. the dispositive portion thereof now reads as follows: Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs (private respondents) and against defendants (petitioners). Tansingco for private respondents. The decision was appealed to the respondent court. or a total of P30. Even then. To return the amount of P3. he also 3.000. petitioners.000. Private respondents then filed Civil Case No. they seized the boy and girl scouts pants. 1987. petitioner MHP Garments.100. and GERTRUDES GONZALES. petitioner corporation received information that private respondents Agnes Villa Cruz. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS. To pay plaintiffs (respondents) the amount of P10.00) in order to be dropped from the complaint." 1 Sometime in October 1983.00 for and as moral damages and P15. Emmanuel O. G.000.100. 2 During its pendency. 1984.00 for the 26 pieces of girl scout items not returned. dresses. and LARRY C. MIRASOL LUGATIMAN. No.00 for and as attorney's fees and litigation expenses. To pay plaintiff (respondent) Agnes Villa Cruz the sum of P2. On December 6. Costs against the defendants. at about 10:30 A. Inc. 2. To return the amount of P3. petitioner corporation was given the authority to "undertake or cause to be undertaken the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scout uniforms and other scouting supplies. and two (2) other constabulary men of the Reaction Force Battalion. P5. DE GUZMAN. 1.100. 3. and insignias. Mirasol Lugatiman. 1989. until fully paid.000. 1994 MHP GARMENTS.ordered the return of the seized items. for and as moral damages. was awarded by the Boy Scouts of the Philippines. The seized items were not immediately returned despite demands. 4 In its Decision dated January 9. 51144 against the petitioners for sums of money and damages. judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against defendants.00 each.000.

after a preliminary investigation. and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. . Probable cause for a search has been defined as "such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. xxx xxx xxx (9) The rights to be secure in one's person. 12. petitioners contend: FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN IMPUTING LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES TO THE PETITIONERS WHO DID NOT EFFECT THE SEIZURE OF THE SUBJECT MERCHANDISE. Any public officer or employee. the seizure was made without any warrant. the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal dismissed their complaint for unfair competition and later ordered the return of the seized goods. or any private individual. 27. houses. violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages. xxx xxx xxx This provision protects not only those who appear to be innocent but also those who appear to be guilty but are nevertheless to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved." 8 These facts and circumstances were not in any way shown by the petitioners to justify their warrantless search and seizure. In doing so. 1983. who directly or indirectly obstructs. Exemplary damages may also be adjudged.A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense. 2219. Under the Rules of Court. Petitioner corporation received information that private respondents were illegally selling Boy Scouts items and paraphernalia in October 1983. While undoubtedly. There was no probable cause for the seizure. Ponce de Leon. SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT MADE A FINDING THAT THE MANNER WITH WHICH THE CONFISCATION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WAS TORTIOUS BUT PENALIZED INSTEAD THE PETITIONERS WHO DID NOT COMMIT THE ACT OF CONFISCATION. the search and seizure were clearly illegal. are not established in the evidence adduced by the parties. papers. In the case at bench. and Larry de Guzman. Petitioners would deflect their liability with the argument that it was the Philippine Constabulary that conducted the raid and their participation was only to report the alleged illegal activity of private respondents. house. The progression of time between the receipt of the information and the raid of the stores of private respondents shows there was sufficient time for petitioners and the PC raiding party to apply for a judicial warrant. It provides: The right of the people to be secure in their persons. 32. they did not apply for a warrant and seized the goods of private respondents. and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Despite the sufficiency of time. 32. 7 a warrantless search can only be undertaken under the following circumstance: The indemnity shall include moral damages. Inc. We hold that the evidence did not justify the warrantless search and seizure of private respondents' goods. papers. Petitioner de Guzman then made a surveillance of the stores of private respondents. Indeed. The specific date and time (1) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21. 28. 6 In the case at bench. THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT FOUND FOR THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AND AGAINST THE PETITIONERS. Sec. Search incident to a lawful arrest. and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature for any purpose shall be inviolable. In this petition for certiorari. xxx xxx xxx Art. of the Constitution protects our people from unreasonable search and seizure. they took the risk of a suit for damages in case the seizure would be proved to violate the right of private respondents against unreasonable search and seizure. 34. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: (6) Illegal search. section 2. . still. 26.Costs of the case a quo and the instant appeal are assessed jointly and severally against defendants-appellants (petitioners) MHP Garments. They reported to the Philippine Constabulary and on October 25. and 35. 29. SO ORDERED. 9 we ruled for the recovery of damages for violation of constitutional rights and liberties from public officer or private individual. the omission will not exculpate petitioners. without a search warrant. defeats. thus: Art. the raid was made on the stores of private respondents and the supposed illicit goods were seized. In the case of Lim vs. the members of the PC raiding team should have been included in the complaint for violation of the private respondents' constitutional rights. 30. We affirm. and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Article III.

as well as indirectly. and wounded feelings due the tortious raid caused by petitioners. cit. Petitioners were indirectly involved in transgressing the right of private respondents against unreasonable search and seizure. it is not the actor alone (i. they did not. These circumstances should answer the trial court's query — posed in its decision now under consideration — as to why the PC soldiers immediately turned over the seized merchandise to appellant (petitioner) corporation. Thus. Ponce de Leon. thus. upon proper application by the Boy Scouts of the Philippines and/or Girl Scouts of the Philippines for warrant of arrest and/or search warrant with a judge. We have consistently ruled that moral damages are not awarded to penalize the defendant but to compensate the plaintiff for the injuries he may have suffered. The law speaks of an officer or employee or person "directly or indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Private respondents' rights are immutable and cannot be sacrificed to transient needs. Such being the case. reasonably fair to infer from those acts that it was upon appellant (petitioner) corporation's instance that the PC soldiers conducted the raid and effected the illegal seizure. All passersby stopped to watch and stared at me with accusing expressions. Article 32 of the Civil Code encompasses within the ambit of its provisions those directly. Precisely.. Ver. as well as indirectly. 10 the Court En Banc explained the liability of persons indirectly responsible. In the United States this remedy is in the nature of a tort. (emphasis supplied) Applying the aforecited provisions and leading cases.Pursuant to the foregoing provisions.viz: [T]he decisive factor in this case. There can be no doubt that petitioners must have suffered sleepless nights. Again. 13 So with the petitioner corporation which even received for safekeeping the goods unreasonably seized by the PC raiding team and de Guzman. To make such a requisite would defeat the main purpose of Article 32 which is the effective protection of individual rights. or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law. there was commotion created by the raiding team and they even stepped on some of the pants and dresses on display for sale. the acts committed by the PC soldiers of unlawfully seizing appellees' (respondents') merchandise and of filing the criminal complaint for unfair competition against appellees (respondents) were for the protection and benefit of appellant (petitioner) corporation. 17 Conformably with our ruling in Lim vs. responsible for its violations. 18 Respondent Lugatiman testified: . In addition. 16 in respect of respondents' claim for Recovery of Sum of Money with Damages. moral damages can be awarded in the case at bench. serious anxiety. Letter of Instruction No. I was trembling and terribly ashamed. xxx xxx xxx The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil or criminal. Secondly.. Orders the immediate and strict compliance with the Instructions. Private respondents' avowals of embarrassment and humiliation during the seizure of their merchandise were supported by their testimonies. it should nonetheless be made clear in no uncertain terms that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are directly. the one directly responsible) who must answer for damages under Article 32. The raid was conducted with the active participation of their employee.e. Larry de Guzman did not lift a finger to stop the seizure of the boy and girl scouts items. in our view. responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors. Public officials in the past have abused their powers on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of their duties. By standing by and apparently assenting thereto. a person whose constitutional rights have been violated or impaired is entitled to actual and moral damages from the public officer or employee responsible therefor. (emphasis supplied) In the subsequent case of Aberca vs. he was liable to the same extent as the officers themselves. to apprehend immediately unauthorized manufacturers and distributors of Scout paraphernalia. the respondent court correctly granted damages to private respondents. it is. they should have filed a third-party complaint against the raiding team for contribution or any other relief. 12 Under the above provision and as aforediscussed. 14 xxx xxx xxx While it would certainly be too naive to expect that violators of human rights would easily be deterred by the prospect of facing damages suits. they instigated the raid pursuant to their covenant in the Memorandum Agreement to undertake the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scouting supplies. exemplary damages may also be awarded. Respondent Cruz declared: I felt very nervous. and to impound the said paraphernalia to be used as evidence in court or other appropriate administrative body. sir. op. 11 As correctly observed by respondent court: Indeed. 1299 was precisely crafted on March 9. the object of the Article is to put an end to official abuse by plea of the good faith. It is not necessary therefore that there should be malice or bad faith. 15 Petitioners did not have the unbridled license to cause the seizure of respondents' goods without any warrant. petitioners miserably failed to report the unlawful peddling of scouting goods to the Boy Scouts of the Philippines for the proper application of a warrant. is the language of Article 32. ABSTRACT: Directs all law enforcement agencies of the Republic of the Philippines. I was crying to loss (sic) my goods and capital because I am doing business with borrowed money only. And thirdly. xxx xxx xxx [N]either can it be said that only those shown to have participated "directly" should be held liable. and refused to surrender them for quite a time despite the dismissal of its complaint for unfair competition. to wit: TITLE: APPREHENSION OF UNAUTHORIZED MANUFACTURERS AND DISTRIBUTORS OF SCOUT PARAPHERNALIA AND IMPOUNDING OF SAID PARAPHERNALIA. the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party. 1983 to safeguard not only the privilege of franchise holder of scouting items but also the citizen's constitutional rights. Firstly. if petitioners did not have a hand in the raid.

Padilla.00) for the unreturned twenty-six (26) pieces of girl scouts items and a TWELVE PERCENT (12%) interest. I was crying and I was very much ashamed because many people have been watching the PC soldiers hauling my items. T-shirts. Needles to state.000. The all encompassing protection extends against intrusions directly done both by government and indirectly by private entities. I was terribly shamed in the presence of market goers that morning. IN VIEW WHEREOF.00 for damages. Regalado. JJ. pants and dresses even those not wrapped dropped to the ground. Many people were around and the more the confiscation was made in a scandalous manner. concur. Narvasa. the appealed decision is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. on the said amount upon finality of this Decision until the payment thereof. the wantonness of the wrongful seizure justifies the award of exemplary damages. SO ORDERED.I felt very nervous.. in lieu of SIX PERCENT (6%). 21 It will also serve as a stern reminder to all and sundry that the constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure is a virile reality and not a mere burst of . 22 Costs against petitioners. 19 While respondent Gonzalez stated thus: I do not like the way the raid was conducted by the team sir because it looked like that what I have been selling were stolen items that they should be confiscated by uniformed soldiers. 1987 on the TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2. and many/I (sic) heard say "nakaw pala ang mga iyan" for which I am claiming P25. 20 rhetoric. We impose a SIX PERCENT (6%) interest from January 9. every clothes. and Mendoza.000.