Estrada vs.

Escritor
AM P-02-1651, August 4, 2003

FACTS:
Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. Alejandro Estrada,
the complainant, wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, presiding judge of Branch 253, RTC of Las Pinas
City, requesting for an investigation of rumors that Escritor has been living with Luciano Quilapio
Jr., a man not her husband, and had eventually begotten a son. Escritors husband, who had lived
with another woman, died a year before she entered into the judiciary. On the other hand,
Quilapio is still legally married to another woman. Estrada is not related to either Escritor or
Quilapio and is not a resident of Las Pinas but of Bacoor, Cavite. According to the complainant,
respondent should not be allowed to remain employed in the judiciary for it will appear as if the
court allows such act.
Escritor is a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovahs Witnesses and the Watch Tower
and Bible Tract Society where her conjugal arrangement with Quilapio is in conformity with their
religious beliefs. After ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a Declaration
of Pledging Faithfulness which was approved by the congregation. Such declaration is effective
when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union. Gregorio,
Salazar, a member of the Jehovahs Witnesses since 1985 and has been a presiding minister
since 1991, testified and explained the import of and procedures for executing the declaration
which was completely executed by Escritor and Quilapios in Atimonan, Quezon and was signed
by three witnesses and recorded in Watch Tower Central Office.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of gross and
immoral conduct and be penalized by the State for such conjugal arrangement.

HELD:
A distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind.
The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.
The Court states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives
room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This
benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it
does not offend compelling state interests.
The states interest is the preservation of the integrity of the judiciary by maintaining among its
ranks a high standard of morality and decency. There is nothing in the OCAs (Office of the
Court Administrator) memorandum to the Court that demonstrates how this interest is so
compelling that it should override respondents plea of religious freedom. Indeed, it is
inappropriate for the complainant, a private person, to present evidence on the compelling
interest of the state. The burden of evidence should be discharged by the proper agency of the
government which is the Office of the Solicitor General.

In order to properly settle the case at bar, it is essential that the government be given an
opportunity to demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the
respondents position that her conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it is within
the scope of free exercise protection. The Court could not prohibit and punish her conduct where
the Free Exercise Clause protects it, since this would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her
right to religious freedom. Furthermore, the court cannot simply take a passing look at
respondents claim of religious freedom but must also apply the compelling state interest test.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the case is REMANDED to the Office of the Court Administrator. The Solicitor
General is ordered to intervene in the case where it will be given the opportunity (a) to examine
the sincerity and centrality of respondent's claimed religious belief and practice; (b) to present
evidence on the state's "compelling interest" to override respondent's religious belief and
practice; and (c) to show that the means the state adopts in pursuing its interest is the least
restrictive to respondent's religious freedom. The rehearing should be concluded thirty (30) days
from the Office of the Court Administrator's receipt of this Decision.

Soriano vs. La Guardia

G.R. No. 164785. April 29, 2009
Facts:
On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan,
aired on UNTV 37, made obscene remarks against INC. Two days after, before the MTRCB,
separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven
other private respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against petitioner in
connection with the above broadcast. Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded
to in petitioners remark, was then a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang
Tamang Daan.
Issue:
Whether or not Sorianos statements during the televised Ang Dating Daan part of the religious
discourse and within the protection of Section 5, Art.III.
Held:
No. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, therefore, and considering the adverse effect
of petitioners utterances on the viewers fundamental rights as well as petitioners clear
violation of his duty as a public trustee, the MTRCB properly suspended him from appearing in
Ang Dating Daan for three months. Furthermore, it cannot be properly asserted that petitioners
suspension was an undue curtailment of his right to free speech either as a prior restraint or as a
subsequent punishment. Aside from the reasons given above (re the paramount of viewers
rights, the public trusteeship character of a broadcasters role and the power of the State to
regulate broadcast media), a requirement that indecent language be avoided has its primary
effect on the form, rather than the content, of serious communication. There are few, if any,
thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive language.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE MTRCB IS ENTITLED TO ISSUE PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION
RULING
YES. Administrative agencies have powers and functions which may be administrative,
investigatory, regulatory, quasi-legislative, or quasi-judicial, or a mix of the five, as may be
conferred by the Constitution or by statute. They have in fine only such powers or authority as
are granted or delegated, expressly or impliedly, by law. And in determining whether an agency
has certain powers, the inquiry should be from the law itself. But once ascertained as existing,
the authority given should be liberally construed. The issuance of a preventive suspension comes
well within the scope of the MTRCBs authority and functions expressly set forth in PD 1986,
more particularly under its Sec. 3(d), which empowers the MTRCB to supervise, regulate, and
grant, deny or cancel, permits for the x x x exhibition, and/or television broadcast of all motion
pictures, television programs and publicity materials, to the end that no such pictures, programs
and materials as are determined by the BOARD to be objectionable in accordance with paragraph
(c) hereof shall be x x x exhibited and/or broadcast by television. The power to issue preventive

suspension forms part of the MTRCBs express regulatory and supervisory statutory mandate and
its investigatory and disciplinary authority subsumed in or implied from such mandate. Any other
construal would render its power to regulate, supervise, or discipline illusory.
Preventive suspension is not a penalty by itself, but merely a preliminary step in an
administrative investigation. And the power to discipline and impose penalties, if granted, carries
with it the power to investigate administrative complaints and, during such investigation, to
preventively suspend the person subject of the complaint. The mere absence of a provision on
preventive suspension in PD 1986 would not work to deprive the MTRCB a basic disciplinary tool,
such as preventive suspension. It is expressly empowered by statute to regulate and supervise
television programs to obviate the exhibition or broadcast of, among others, indecent or immoral
materials and to impose sanctions for violations and, corollary, to prevent further violations as it
investigates. Contrary to petitioners assertion, the afore quoted Sec. 3 of the IRR neither
amended PD 1986 nor extended the effect of the law. Neither did the MTRCB, by imposing the
assailed preventive suspension, outrun its authority under the law. The preventive suspension
was actually done in furtherance of the law, imposed pursuant to the MTRCBs duty of regulating
or supervising television programs, pending a determination of whether or not there has actually
been a violation. In the final analysis, Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the 2004 IRR merely formalized a
power which PD 1986 bestowed, albeit impliedly, on MTRCB.

Austria vs NLRC (August 16,

1999)http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1999/aug1999/gr_124382_1999.html Petitioner: Pastor
Dionisio AustriaRespondents: NLRC 4th Division, CENTRAL PHILIPPINE UNION MISSION
CORPORATION OF THE SEVENTH-DAYADVENTISTS, ELDER HECTOR V. GAYARES, PASTORS REUBEN
MORALDE, OSCAR L. ALOLOR, WILLIAM U. DONATO,JOEL WALES, ELY SACAY, GIDEON BUHAT,
ISACHAR GARSULA, ELISEO DOBLE, PORFIRIO BALACY, DAVID RODRIGO,LORETO MAYPA, MR.
RUFO GASAPO, MR. EUFRONIO IBESATE, MRS. TESSIE BALACY, MR. ZOSIMO KARA-AN, and
MR.ELEUTERIO LOBITANA,
Facts:
Private respondent Central Philippine Union Mission Corporation of the Seventh Day Adventists
(SDA) is a religious corporation under Philippine law and is represented by the other private
respondents. Petitioner was a pastor of SDA until 1991, when his services were terminated.
Austria worked with SDA for 28 years. He started as a literature evangelist in 1963 then got
promoted several times. He became the Assistant Publishing Director in the West Visayan Mission
of the SDA in 1968 and Pastor in the West Visayan Mission in 1972.Finally in 1989, he was
promoted as District Pastor of the Negros Mission of the SDA. On various occasions from August
to October 1991, Austria received several communications from Mr. Ibesate, treasurer of the
Negros Mission, asking the former to admit accountability and responsibility for the church tithes
and offerings collected by his wife, Thelma Austria, in his district and to remit the same to the
Negros Mission. In his answer, petitioner said that he should not be made accountable since it
was private respondent Pastor Buhat and Mr. Ibesate who authorized his wife to collect the tithes
and offerings since he was very sick to do the collecting at that time. Thereafter, petitioner went
to the office of Pastor Buhat, president of the Negros Mission, and asked for a convention to
settle the dispute between petitioner and Pastor Rodrigo. Pastor Buhat denied the request of
petitioner because there was no quorum. The two exchanged heated arguments until petitioner
left the office. However, while on his way out, he heard Pastor Buhat saying, "Pastor daw inisog
na ina iya (Pador you are talking tough) which prompted him to go back and overturn Pastor
Buhats table, scatter books in the office, bang Buhats attach case and throw the phone.
Petitioner received a letter inviting him and his wife to attend the meeting to discuss the nonremittance of church collection and theevents that transpired between him and Pastor Buhat. A
fact-finding committee was created to investigate petitioner. Subsequently, petitioner received a
letter of dismissal citing misappropriation of denominational funds, willful breach of trust, serious
misconduct, gross and habitual neglect of duties, and commission of an offense against the
person of employer's duly authorized representative, as grounds for the termination of his
services 1) Petitioner filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal. = decision
rendered in favor of petitioner 2) SDA appealed to NLRC = decision rendered in favor of
respondent3) Petitioner filed motion for reconsideration = reinstated decision of Labor Arbiter 4)
SDA filed motion for reconsideration = decision rendered in favor of respondent Hence, this
recourse to the court by the petitioner.

Issues:
1) WON the Labor Arbiter/NLRC has jurisdiction to try and decide the complaint filed by petitioner
against the SDA;
2) WON the termination of the services of petitioner is an ecclesiastical affair, and, as such,
involves the separation of church and state;

No. The rationale of the principle of the separation of Church and State is
summed up in the familiar saying "Strong fences make good neighbors." The idea
advocated by this principle is to delineate the boundaries between the two
institutions and thus avoid encroachments by one against the other because of a
misunderstanding of the limits of their respective exclusive jurisdictions. The
demarcation line calls on the entities to "render therefore unto Caesar the
things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's". While the
State is prohibited from interfering in purely ecclesiastical affairs, the
church is likewise barred from meddling in purely secular matters.

The case at bar does not concern an ecclesiastical or purely religious affair
as to bar the State from taking cognizance of the case. An ecclesiastical
affair involves the relationship between the Church and its members and relate
to matters of faith, religious doctrines, worship and governance of the
congregation. Examples of this affairs to which the State cannot meddle are
proceedings for excommunication, ordinations of religious ministers,
administration of sacraments and other activities with attached religious
ministers, it does not ipso facto give the case a religious
significance. What is involved here is the relationship of the Church as an
employer and the minister as an employee. It is purely secular and has no
relation whatsoever with the practice of faith, worship or doctrines of the
Church. In this case Antonio was not excommunicated from the membership of the
congregation but was terminated from employment. The grounds invoked for his
termination are all based on Art. 282 of the Labor Code. As such the State,
through the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC has the jurisdiction to take cognizance
of the case and to determine whether the congregation as employer, rightfully
exercised its management prerogative to dismiss an employee. And as found by
the Labor Arbiter, Antonio was terminated from the service without just and
lawful cause (Austria vs. NLRC et. al. G.R. No. 124382 Aug. 16, 1999).

Islamic Dawah Council of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Executive Secretary

G.R. No. 153888. July 9, 2003.
Facts:
Petitioner is a non-governmental organization that extends voluntary services to the
Filipino people, especially to Muslim Communities. Petitioner began to issue, for a fee, halal
certifications to qualified products and food manufacturers on account of the actual need to
certify food products as halal and also due to halal food producers' request. Subsequently,
Executive Order (EO) 46 was issued creating the Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and
designating respondent Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA) to oversee its implementation. In this
petition for prohibition, petitioner alleged, among others, that the subject EO violates the
constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State.
In granting the petition, the Supreme Court ruled that freedom of religion was accorded preferred
status by the framers of the fundamental law and it has consistently affirmed this preferred
status. Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the
standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving the OMA the exclusive
power to classify food products as halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim
organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for
Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal certifications, the State
has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal
food.
The Court further ruled that only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the
security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. In the
case at bar, the Court found no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim
organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on
the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA
the exclusive power to issue halal certificates.
Issue:
Whether or not Eexecutive Order 46 violates the constitutional provision on the
separation of Church and State.
Held:

No. In granting the petition, the Supreme Court ruled that freedom of religion was
accorded preferred status by the framers of the fundamental law and it has consistently affirmed
this preferred status. Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious function
because the standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving the OMA
the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, Executive Order 46 encroached on the
religious freedom of Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims
what food products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing
halal certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the
Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food.
The Court further ruled that only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the
security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. In the
case at bar, the Court found no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim
organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on
the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA
the exclusive power to issue halal certificates.

Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the
community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the
seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable. In a
society with a democratic framework like ours, the State must minimize its interference with the
affairs of its citizens and instead allow them to exercise reasonable freedom of personal and
religious activity. In the case at bar, we find no compelling justification for the government to
deprive Muslim organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as
halal, even on the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by
assigning to OMA the exclusive power to issue halal certifications. The protection and promotion
of the Muslim Filipinos' right to health are already provided for in existing laws and ministered to
by government agencies charged with ensuring that food products released in the market are fit
for human consumption, properly labeled and safe. Unlike EO 46, these laws do not encroach on
the religious freedom of Muslims.

Section 14
Velarde vs. Social Justice Society , GR 159357, April 28, 2004
The Petition prayed for the resolution of the question "whether or not the act of a religious leader
like any of herein respondents, in endorsing the candidacy of a candidate for elective office or in
urging or requiring the members of his flock to vote for a specified candidate, is violative of the
letter or spirit of the constitutional provisions .They alleged that the questioned Decision did not
contain a statement of facts and a dispositive portion.

ISSUE: What is the standard form of a Decision? Did the challenge Decision comply with the
aforesaid form?

RULING:
The decision shall be in writing, personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by the issuing magistrate, and filed
with the clerk of court. In general, the essential parts of a good decision consist of the following:
(1) statement of the case; (2) statement of facts; (3) issues or assignment of errors; (4) court
ruling, in which each issue is, as a rule, separately considered and resolved; and, finally, (5)
dispositive portion. The ponente may also opt to include an introduction or a prologue as well as
an epilogue, especially in cases in which controversial or novel issues are involved.
No. Counsel for SJS has utterly failed to convince the Court that there are enough factual and
legal bases to resolve the paramount issue. On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General
has sided with petitioner insofar as there are no facts supporting the SJS Petition and the assailed
Decision. The Petition failed to state directly the ultimate facts that it relied upon for its claim.
During the Oral Argument, counsel for SJS candidly admitted that there were no factual
allegations in its Petition for Declaratory Relief. Neither were there factual findings in the assailed

Decision. At best, SJS merely asked the trial court to answer a hypothetical question. In effect, it
merely sought an advisory opinion, the rendition of which was beyond the courts constitutional
mandate and jurisdiction.
Indeed, the assailed Decision was rendered in clear violation of the Constitution, because it made
no findings of facts and final disposition.

Taruc vs. Bishop Dela Cruz

G.R. No. 144801. March 10, 2005
Facts:
Petitioners were lay members of the Philippine Independent Church (PIC). On June 28, 1993,
Bishop de la Cruz declared petitioners expelled/excommunicated from the Philippine Independent
Church. Because of the order of expulsion/excommunication, petitioners filed a complaint for
damages with preliminary injunction against Bishop de la Cruz before the Regional Trial
Court.They contended that their expulsion was illegal because it was done without trial thus
violating their right to due process of law.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a violation of religious rights in this case?
Held:
No. The expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution/organization is a matter
best left to the discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons, of said
institution/organization. It is not for the courts to exercise control over church authorities in the
performance of their discretionary and official functions. Rather, it is for the members of religious
institutions/organizations to conform to just church regulations. Civil Courts will not interfere in
the internal affairs of a religious organization except for the protection of civil or property rights.
Those rights may be the subject of litigation in a civil court, and the courts have jurisdiction to
determine controverted claims to the title, use, or possession of church property. Obviously,
there was no violation of a civil right in the present case.