You are on page 1of 30

Modernization: Theories and Facts

Author(s): Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi
Source: World Politics, Vol. 49, No. 2 (Jan., 1997), pp. 155-183
Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25053996
Accessed: 30/07/2009 01:38
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.
Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=jhup.
Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the
scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that
promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

The Johns Hopkins University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
World Politics.

http://www.jstor.org

MODERNIZATION
Theories

and Facts

By ADAM PRZEWORSKI andFERNANDO LIMONGI*

Introduction
T

JL

THAT makes political regimes rise, endure, and fall?Do democ

V V

racies

as a consequence
of economic
development?
destabilize
democracies?
Is there some
growth

emerge

rapid economic

Does
level of

development beyond which democracies aremore likely to fall? Is Eu
ropean
veloped
Our

history unique
countries?

or is it
repeating

itself

in contemporary

less de

two theories
is to distinguish
that relate economic
de
purpose
some facts in
to examine
and
and
these
of
velopment
democracy
light
concern
theories. While
the interesting
the mech
ultimately
questions
anisms that mediate
between
economic
and
the
dynamics
development
we must nevertheless
of political
the facts to be ex
regimes,
identify
we
before
into
stick as close as
Hence,
plained
plunging
explanations.
nar
to
pose the question
patterns. We
possible
elementary
descriptive
the impact of development,
rather than
rowly, examining
exclusively
seeking

to

broadly

deliberately
the world

explain
ignore factors
income
system,

to influence

by others
that our question
answers,
vergent
well understood.
found

In Section

we
the dynamic
of political
regimes. Hence,
such as religion,
in
colonial
legacy, position
or diffusion,
which
have been
distribution,

the incidence
of democracy
We
believe
to di
in its own
is important
it
that
lends
itself
right,
are
not
and that it raises methodological
issues that

I, we

reconstruct

two alternative

views

of the relation

be

tween development and democracy, both put forth by Lipset,1 and we
count

the cases

that fit them.

In Section

II we

examine

the vulnerabil

*
We
Cheibub, Fernando Cort?s, Larry Dia
appreciate comments by Mike Alvarez, Jos? Antonio
mond, John H. Kautsky, Seymour Martin
Lipset, Alejandro
Lopez, Jos? Maria Maravall, Guillermo
and Susan Stokes. This work was supported in part by a grant from the National
Science
O'Donnell,
no. SES-9022605.
Foundation
1
of Democracy:
Economic Development
and Po
Seymour Martin
Lipset, "Some Social Requisites
litical Legitimacy,'' American Political Science Review 53 (March 1959); and idem, Political Man:
Social Bases of Politics (Baltimore: Johns
Press, 1981).
Hopkins University

WorldPolitics 49 (January1997), 155-83

The

WORLD POLITICS

156

to economic
crises. In Section
the
III we consider
ity of democracies
most
in
criticisms
and
Section
substantive
of
's
views,
important
Lipset

IV we study methodological
reflections

close

criticisms. Methodological

the paper.
Appendix

1 explains

and political

our classification

of

regimes, while Appendix 2 spells out the analytics of regime dynamics.
I. Economic

Development

and Democracy

observation
that democracy
is related to economic
develop
Lipset's
in 1959, has generated
the largest body of research
ment, first advanced
on any
and con
It has been supported
topic in comparative
politics.
while
several
revised
and
buried
and
And
resuscitated.
tested,
extended,
to
in the recent Festschrift
neither
conclusions,
Lipset proclaim
the theory nor the facts are clear.2
Even a glance at the aggregate
such as Figure
1, shows that
patterns,
the relation between
levels of development
and the incidence of demo

articles

a
of regimes
is strong.3 Indeed,
condi
regimes
probit analysis
as
on the per
we
to
refer
which
throughout
only
capita income,
77
of
annual
the level of development,
4,126
percent
correctly classifies

cratic

tional

observations.4

The probability
is
chance
greater than 0.99.
by
Yet there are two distinct
democracies
nomically,

may
or

that

this classification

is not generated

reasons

this relation may hold: either
eco
as countries
to emerge
develop
likely
de
be established
of economic
independently

be more

they may

2
in Gary Marks
and
"Economic Development
and Democracy
Reconsidered,"
Larry Diamond,
eds., Reexamining
Larry Diamond,
Lipset (Newbury
Democracy: Essays inHonor of Seymour Martin
Park, Calif: Sage Publications,
1992).
3
lead to somewhat divergent results, the
While
different data sets and different estimation methods
most

finds that
careful statistical study of the aggregate patterns thus far, by Burkhart and Lewis-Beck,
causes democracy. Ross E. Burkhart and Michael
economic
S. Lewis-Beck,
Granger
development
Thesis," American Political Science Review 88
"Comparative Democracy: The Economic Development
(December
1994), 903-10.
4
and democ
the relation between development
A fair amount of ink has been spilled over whether
to Democratic
of Economic Development
racy is linear. See Robert W. Jackman, "On the Relation
and Zehra F. Arat,
Science 17 (August 1973), 611-21;
American Journal of Political
Performance,"
Modernization
Theory Revisited," Comparative Politics 21
"Democracy and Economic Development:
is a qualitative or a lim
however measured,
(October 1988), 21-36. We now know better. Democracy,
it ranges from 2 to 14 on the Freedom
ited variable: it assumes values of 0 or 1 under our measurement;
House Scale created by R. D. Gastil, Freedom in theWorld: Political Rights and Civil Liberties, 1987-88
(New York: Freedom House,
1988); from 0 to 100 on the scale of Kenneth A. Bollen, "Issues in the
American Sociological Review 45 (June 1980),
of Political Democracy,"
Measurement
Comparative
can become negative as the level of de
no
and so on. Hence,
index of democracy
370-90,
predicted
can exceed whatever
is the maximum
index of democracy
tends to zero, and no predicted
velopment
value of a particular scale as the level gets very large. Only a nonlinear function, such as the normal or
as
can satisfy these constraints. See Dahl, Polyarchy (New Haven:
logistic,
suggested by Robert A. Dahl
iswhy we use probit or logit models
Yale University
Press, 1971). This
throughout.

. cooperation a result. A story told about country after country is that as they develop.25263 0.37895 0. velopment likely developed We call the first explanation and the second "endogenous" "exogenous. emerge dictatorships as a result of economic is the same as to say that dictator development as countries ruled by them become ships die economically developed. workers.00000 0. PPP USD* by Per Capita Income dollars.82105 0. to social structure becomes labor processes require the begin complex. the can no run system longer be effectively by command: too the society is the direct pro complex.88421 0.18947 0.000 GNP/cap in 1985 1 Figure is Democratic.44211 * * * 0.31579 0." rise against the dictatorial and it falls.0000 4. whether or the bourgeoisie. active As 5 is not quite true of our data set. to survive in but may be more countries.MODERNIZATION: THEORIES & FACTS 157 1.50526 0. inU. out of is then secreted Democracy by economic develop dictatorships ment. and control dictatorial of forms lose their effectiveness.69474 0.63158 0.000 8. Vari emerges. and new groups emerge and organize.94737 0. since different countries enter and exit the sample at differ This ent moments.S. technological change endows some autonomy ducers with and private civil society information. a "modernization" The is endogenous theory.75789 0. but see Section IV.06315 * * 2. The basic explanation of in this its is of that there is one gen versions. just the amorphous "civil society. For now.5 Hence.56842 0. we consider the population of countries as fixed. ous groups. of employees. any assumption theory.12632 0.000 Level: Probability that a Regime a1985 PPP USD-purchasing-power * * parities 6. regime. to assert that democracies whenever die." two Since we are dealing with democracies emerge only regimes.

to a commen and this is the reading most most influential critic. (fh. and political mobilization. Stephens.Modern ization consists of a gradual differentiation structures in a separation that culminates other structures consist chains and makes a society ready Modernization lated impute paraphrases urbanization. because of economic to die and democracies If dictatorships emerge randomly with regard more be democracies is it still possible that there would development. plays privileged not because of of countries because democratized wars. 2). Dietrich Rueschemeyer. one one to this events is the of would sequence expect theory. 103 (May-June 9 Lipset 1977). "The Rule of Capital and the Rise of Democracy.6 s thesis Lipset rich as the economically advanced nations. 56.WORLD POLITICS 158 eral process of which democratization is but the final stage. it is highly probable that democracies. proceed is re of democracy may be one reason the incidence to economic tators democracy of industrialization. many European a in the Malv defeat the "modernization. is endoge Democracy. cording democratic countries and of poor authoritarian becoming developing a "threshold." story repeated by Argentine of the fell in the aftermath inas and elsewhere.1959). as well as Evelyne Huber. O'Donnell. communication. Modernization of California. the chance that 6 and John D. quences. 7 Studies in South American and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Guillermo O'Donnell. nous. . are to die and democra that dictatorships equally likely so many cies to emerge at any level of development. 45. others: innumerable of social and specialization structures from of political causal The specific possible. Some because of foreign pressures. of sequences tion. Some dictatorial of the collapsed maintaining capable uniquely crises. no." New Left Review. different as no Therborn role. Politics (Berkeley: Institute of International 1973). on "The Impact of Economic Development Democracy.8 Some dictatorships Yet suppose for instance?who had been dictator?a of a founding Franco. educa among incorporation. 3. Studies. Diamond (fn. University 8 Goran Therborn."7 then. one is to take ones? If countries than among poor among wealthy a nation." some level of once they reach development. as as countries become other that "if saying development. 71-86. they will become political Ac since it results from development under authoritarianism. democratization. They may die for conse reasons with all its modernizing that development. After all. more well-to-do at his own word?"The the greater Lipset even if the emergence of the chances itwill sustain democracy"9?then death democracy is independent of the level of development." Journal ofEconomic Perspectives 7 (Summer 1993). His Lipset. that of social changes accumulation progressive to to its culmination. 1. order. emphasized.

opment democracy likely when In levels of authoritarian reach fact. "Classifying Political Regimes.126 country years. Dictator become stable ships 10 1 and in in Appendix and the resulting list of regimes are described Our regime classification Alvarex et al. tran development. are and "exit" year refers to data available. of democracy Rather. is there to stay (see democracy Appendix emer is therefore no longer a modernization 2). year the data are available. "Entry" year refers to or to the first country became independent.S. which here and use throughout does not include six countries that derive at least half of their income from oil are available for 4.730 country years. rates are power The a expressed and expressed parities to levels of and growth development at dollars computed purchasing in 1985 prices. dictator more as countries become more affluent. Above that. to 1985 PPPUSD. survives if a It appears exogenously democracy a not it is is of "modernization.MODERNIZATION: THEORIES & FACTS 159 such a regime will survive is greater if it has been established in an af fluent country. history gradually a since every time cumulates democracies." country product countries in the wealthier and survive Are we splitting hairs? Examine first some descriptive patterns. While political data in most analyses. The sample comparable economic data. refer (Thus all $ numbers references in constant U.6.000. data for economic growth are avail revenues.973. Spain $9.) The lowest level we observed in the entire sample is $226 (Burma in 1950). Mike . The facts we report concern 135 countries between roughly 1950 and 1990.073. gence brought as a deus ex machina.576. 1950. We thus expect would to observe democracies to appear randomly with regard to levels of development. Thus.10 Altogether. It may be useful for future reference numbers describe: by 1990.095 (United States in 1989). Indonesia had $1. or to the year when economic for which 123 authoritarian. Czecho slovakia $4. since the not is about by development. is the number of observations able for only 4. and regimes"). All the regimes that 1990 or to the last year when or dictator as democracies occurred during this period were classified use term with "authoritarian latter the (we interchangeably ships we observed 101 democratic 224 regimes. and the United States $18.094. Nigeria had a per capita income of $995. This theory. but to die in the poorer ac ones.. dictatorship happens wealthy to die in an affluent country. the highest is $18." Studies in International Comparative Development reason for selecting this period and the sample is the availability of internationally (forthcoming). The we describe we took from the Penn World Tables 5.11 as a result of economic devel If the theory that democracy emerges more to be is transitions would true. regimes higher as per rises income of sitions are increasingly likely capita dictatorships but only until it reaches a level of about $6." but "modern. which 11 Readers used to the UN or theWorld Bank GNP figures should be aware that counting incomes at to increase significantly the levels for poor countries and to decrease purchasing-power parities tends to know what different slighdy the numbers for rich countries.

000. the transition conditional given probabilities test whether estimate the nonlinearity The results are of the observed its square (see Appendix 2). The hypoth over a esis implied by this theory is that ifa country develops longer pe so that all the have riod under dictatorship. p^.000." remind. dictatorships wealthy. Singapore. consequences modernizing most dic But for time to accumulate. Whatever They increase survived until for years the $5. Indeed.12 in the invariably are somewhat less stable almost those under $1. Belgium. Italy. 1968). for those dictatorships with incomes over $1. Table 3 lists the dictatorships that survived even though the probability that the was above regime is democratic predicted by the level of development to income of which $4. was Huntington. Huntington. over $6. $7.000.000 in countries range that were the threshold at which development is supposed to it is clear that many dictator regimes. this premise is vacuous: only 19 dictatorships?to tatorships over out of 123?did of time and longer periods develop us more these examine thus countries.50. and Norway did not have by 1950. Spain. Taiwan.000 it is 0.000 $1.000.0206. Press. that those countries Even disregarding ships passed good revenues more from than one-half derive of their oil. in and Mexico for many years after these countries enjoyed Argentina. that we do not distinguish Note Videla or even if ayatollahs succeed a shah. which Austria. comes above $5. correct with regard to dictatorships: they exhibit a "bell shaped pattern of instability"13 To we these patterns can be predicted by per capita income. per capita corresponds Yet this may not be a fair test of modernization theory. on level and. this prob over ability is 0. transitions to democracy become less likely. it seems.115. ships or at least succeed one another. the probabilities inTable presented tatorships falling. in countries with incomes between and $4.000 it is 0.0294. land. we treat it as one continuous spell of dictatorship. Germany.001 and even less so above $4.0641.0333. Bulgaria. They very poor countries.Netherlands. Ice France. Germany. of dic 2.0484. over $5.WORLD POLITICS 160 survive. As we see. ." Let that developed under authoritarianism and became "modern. predicted by the level of development correspond to those observed. closely "modernity. 0.000 it is 0. dig the grave for authoritarian it in health. 13 Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Samuel P. patterns. 43.000. then itwill embrace democracy. dictatorships in East flourished USSR. reached the ones which 12 If President Viola succeeds President successive dictatorships. closely and then decline.As the lower panel of Table 1 (PADcol umn 4) shows. But if they reach the level of $6.001-$6. the probability of any dictatorship dying during any year is 0.

having experi dictatorships.0196 0.0349 0.0492 0.) Gabon.0534 0.0101 0.0081 0.0316 0.0314 0.0242 39 1611 3004 2032 1558 1222 993 802 649 0. mained In East until USSR.0000 30 16 9 1539 1294 1110 960 853 740 619 PJK TTR TOT PAD -1000 1001-2000 2001-3000 3001-4000 4001-5000 5001-6000 6001-7000 7001 0.0050 0. Syria.0202 0. we "Since per capita income are used: abbreviations lose 135 observations.0625 0.0380 0.0042 0.991. more and eighteen are the three countries and Yugoslavia that experi increase in income over. Taiwan. twelve.0379 0. and.0333 43 25 17 14 8 3 1 1465 738 448 262 140 62 30 0.0339 0.115. Spain.0571 0. and re long period. and but fell. a series of economic are the two crises.0294 0.0329 0.0206 49 2380 0.1250 0. dictatorships Germany. enced a sustained teen.0023 0.0641 0.0195 0. and Malaysia Singapore over a countries that became wealthy.0221 88 0. dictatorships eventually only many Hungary enced .0276 0.0147 0. Bulgaria.0124 0.0088 0.0015 73 41 26 18 10 4 1 Low-High 161 122 78 32 30 Above 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 is lagged.0484 0.0014 0.0161 0.0000 9 14 7 5 2 1 1 0 72 245 184 150 107 113 121 619 3991 0.0066 0. developed now.0015 15 32 15 987 972 474 336 229 191 153 649 AU 0.0152 0. The particular following year level of years under authoritarianism of transition to authoritarianism of years under democracy take arbitrarily to mean that at some time a per they had capita income of $4.0083 0.0333 0. (SeeTable 4.0571 0.MODERNIZATION: THEORIES & FACTS Regime 1 Table by Lagged Transitions Per Capita (annual Income (Level)" data) TRD TA PDA TRA TD 0. seven was the at which years.0248 0.0167 0.0243 0. that either regime dies during PJK is the probability TTR is the number of transitions TOT is the total number of regime years at a particular of transition to democracy PAD is the probability TRD is their number TA is the total number PDA is the probability TRA is their number TD is the total number we will a for the total of 3.0238 0. reached the level democracy remained under likely regime.0187 0.0333 6 18 8 3 6 5 2 1 915 727 290 186 0. respectively.

D.009) 0.0006 (0. collapsed to $3.044 0.049) 0. cases of a modernization that developed under a dictatorship. In turn.985 (0. These are wealthy. But and became income sometimes emerge they be .961 (0. levels.008 (0.016) 0.951) 0. k=A.928 (0.921 153 7001- (0.057) (0.304) 2001-3000 0.WORLD POLITICS 162 Table Regime Transition _Per Level 2 Probabilities Capita Income by Lagged Predicted and Its Square3_ PM N PD* PDA 0. The probabilities pv j=A. Observed transition p*D Table 1) are in parentheses.875) 0.092 987 (0.155 in 1989.862 191 6001-7000 (0.007) 0. it reached history of Poland an economic in 1974. Greece Czechoslovakia.887) 0.024) (0.008) 0. countries This is not to say that democracies did not even South Korea and theorist.028 0.010 PDD 0.993) 0.876) 0.354 (0.028) 0. off more or less at the same threw dictatorships are few.028 0.962) 0.902 0.053) 0.125) 0.199 by 1983.051 0.950 (0. are the dream and perhaps Portugal. and became a democracy in 1989.072 (0.992) 0.038) 0. Brazil.984) 0. Uruguay should never have been a dictatorship.975) (0. The eco nomic history of the Chilean dictatorship is convoluted: its income in 1974 was $3. is the equilibrium proportion of democracies. See Appendix 2.999 (0. exactly the year of transition.981) 0.025) (0. it experienced of democracy crisis in 1979 and a mass movement for democracy in 1980.974 (0.720) 0.130 by 1981. recovered to surpass the 1974 level only by 1986.953 (0. and passed the threshold of $4. Given its 1974 income level.979) (0.388 474 3001-4000 (0.039 (0.021) (0.004 (0.191 972 (0.000) <1000 1001-2000 All 0.050 (0.937) 0.063) 0.965 649 (0.967) (1.972) 0.000) (0.033) (1.990 0.424) 0.033) 0.977 0.943) (0.991) 0.064) 0.466) 3991 * Based on a dynamic probit model.019) 0.992 (0.983 (0.326) 0.015 (0. passed the threshold again in 1985.561.026 (0. it climbed with downs and ups to $4.956 0.972 0. The the threshold is similar: by our criteria.047 (0.976) (0.936) 0.047 (0. are of tran rates (from years after they had reached the critical level of income.996 (0.098 PAD 0.953 (0.967) 0.D sitions and survival.983 (0.600 336 4001-5000 (0.017 (0.000) (0.017 (0.758 229 5001-6000 (0.959 0.

705 0. One is hard put to find this level.630 0.569 0.690 0.818 0.637 0.772 0. cause do not modern. Thus moderniza countries necessarily tion may became "explain" why democracy was established in countries that de even it these countries had waited for its veloped over a long period But ifmoderniza of time that cannot be predicted.MODERNIZATION: Highest 163 3 Table of Per Capita Income (Level) under Which in different dictatorships survived countries Highest Level 11698 10433 8598 8067 7744 7390 6969 6939 6866 6505 6463 6434 5815 5674 Year 1990 1988 1979 1990 1989 1976 1976 1957 1988 1980 1981 1976 1972 1979 1987 1973 1981 1990 1978 1987 1981 1974 1962 1957 1981 Singapore East Germany Iraq Taiwan USSR Spain Gabon Venezuela Bulgaria Argentina Mexico Iran Argentina Yugoslavia Hungary Greece Uruguay Malaysia Poland Korea Syria Portugal Argentina Argentina Suriname * The & FACTS Levels Country South THEORIES prob(reg=dem)? 0.809 0. theory sure can one at the that be relatively income which country will throw advent for tion off the dictatorship.815 0. It is calculated as PROB(reg=DEM) where the parameters are estimated by the probit model and F(.923 0.875 0. mal distribution. put otherwise.623 0.553 0.977 0.625 0.992 0.851 0.620 0. however: among the countries that satisfy the premise of the modernization theory.) is the cdf of the nor l-F(a+?*LEVEL).530 0.687 0. .776 0.513 5650 5218 5162 5117 5102 5080 4668 4657 4541 4355 4220 is the probability that a regime is democratic given the level.769 0. periods must be some level of there is to have any predictive power. the range of levels atwhich dictatorships survived is very wide (see the list inTable 4).568 0. dictatorships fall for the same reasons in all countries.895 0.

69 0.68 1988 0. even if to predict is not by per capita income. passing by 1979 our threshold of $4.51 0. It thus had about a 50 percent chance of not being around by 1995 even if it had not developed at all.82 never 0. Sup pose that every year during all this time.50 at PROB Year 0.52 0. andwhich in 1995 elected its president in contested elections for the first time.57 0.62 0.115.WORLD POLITICS 164 Countries That 4 Table over Long Developed and Reached Incomes Entry Country Gabon Brazil Chile Uruguay South Korea Malaysia Singapore Syria Taiwan Bulgaria Czechoslovakia East Germany Greece Hungary Poland Portugal Spain USSR Yugoslavia under Periods above $4.52 0. racy at that time.We may therefore attribute to development what may have been just a culmination of random haz .115. that itwould be a fell.47 0.68 0.55 0.57 never 0. as predicted dictatorship transition gives the year the dictatorship democracy.90 post 1990 1989 1989 1990 1974 1989 no 1989 0. "explain ing" can easily entail an ex post fallacy.68 0.88 0. Finally.53 1978 no 1989 0. which on the basis of its income level had a probability of 0.99 never 0. if ever.80 0.80 0.61 0.10 of being a dictatorship in 1990.53 0. the particular Moreover. Passes PROB=0.55 0. which developed rapidly.51 } 0.02 of dying for reasons not related to develop ment.69 1975 0. the Taiwanese dictatorship faced a probability of 0. which in 1961 had a per capita income of $968. and the probability of democ the same as to explain.63 never 0.85 0.50 is the year when the country reached per capita income of $4.50 1973 1980 1981 1989 1974 1985 1982 1972 1978 1979 ? 1989 ? 1970 1974 1974 1985 1973 1964 1971 1974 Transition Year PROB 1976 1980 1981 1989 1981 1988 1990 1990 1981 1990 1989 1989 1988 1974 1987 1978 1988 1974 1976 1989 1979 0.115a Peak Passes Year Level 1961 1965 1974 1969 1864 3561 1974 1961 1957 1965 1961 1952 1981 1964 1971 1967 1971 1971 4148 911 1282 1845 1607 968 4216 1654 4995 3308 3657 3109 1951 1951 1961 1961 1314 2205 2536 2073 Dictatorship PROB=0.115.61 0.48 0.63 1985 0. Peak gives the time when the country reached the highest income level under aThis table lists countries and the probability. per capita Entry is 1951 or the year after the country became independent or the year after economic data became available.Consider Taiwan.85 1976 collapsed collapsed that grew over the period of at least seven years and at some time reached income of $4.98 0.

predicts when of the level of development. 736 did fall in survives increases 1 shows. This The intu rigorously. our measure is The has a strong impact on the survival of democracies.14 reasons. $1. findings is that wealth survive in affluent countries that the reason democracies income moderates is a plausible in various ways explanation the intensity but not easy of distributional to prove conflicts. 16 and Keith T. and the Seizure of Executive John B.16 As Table monotonically income under $1. no democracy ever fell. Londregan times more 1950 and 1982 coups were twenty-one coups. the Coup Trap. few developed long pe riod. Londregan and Poole found a similar pattern with regard to Power. Few authoritarian torships for of modernization premise theory. in bringing dicta regimes satisfy the over a that is.000. years. democracies analysis. the probability that democracy In countries with per capita with per capita income. in a country with a per capita in regardless of everything come higher than that of Argentina democracies collapsed.055. confirms that per is a good predictor of the stability of democracies.000. theTaiwanese dictatorship most likely democratized ones.055.055 years with spent out of democracies while sixty-nine thirty-nine that were poorer. than the the among among poorest likely 17 life in any state is the inverse of the probability of transition away from this state. but the levels at which democracies in 1933.And. Statistical $6. In turn. else. not for economic geopolitical of economic the causal Thus. the probability that a democracy would die dur ing was a life year was 0. And even ifmost of those that did develop eventually became no level of income occur. (Paper presented "Why Democracies annual meeting 1996).474 inGermany it to have been $1. San Francisco. To during each year of her life and that is to conclude that she died of old age. that would democracies. $1. In their sample of 121 countries between to occur wealthiest countries.814 in Italy in 1922. Above eighteen could expect to last forever. of the American Political Science Association. Poole. August 28-September 1. attribute this death to development 15 The claim about the prewar period is based on rather heroic backward extrapolation of 1950 in lower: we guess fell in Europe were an order of magnitude comes. power development down appears paltry. and in 1930.001 probability years." World Politics 42 (January 1990).0571. per capita income. $1. "Poverty.15 Thirty-two and not one incomes above $6.974 in Finland $1. which implies that their expected was this Between and $2. capita an out himself for These cry thought Lipset explanation. the results of which are shown inTable 2 (column 1). .18 itive story is this: Suppose that the political forces competing over the 14 An analogy may be useful. indeed. 18Expected at the Survive in Affluent Countries?" Adam Przeworski. simple fact that during the period under our scrutiny or ever before. Suppose that someone runs the risk of 0. countries in 1975: $6.MODERNIZATION: THEORIES & FACTS 165 ards.17 particular eight of about duration for an expected 0.125.01 of dying from accidental at the age of seventy-eight causes she gets hit by a falling brick.825 inAustria in 1934.

In wealthy a income the from rather than of total all contrast. dictator they are less stable when ships But what version exogenous the more they reach the pattern we generates is terribly fragile in poor the per capita income of $4. But while likely people an cumulated of of the labor years of education average member measure stocks we have?does increase the force?the of educational probability of income stronger. gain winning struggle dictatorship smaller. Hence. Obviously. that is.7 torships died at a double. or the verdicts of with complying some case each can to expect get a over is which fight dictatorship. See Appendix ("authoritarianism"). destroying capital stock is lower. and the recuperation from destruction is more attractive in poorer countries. the "catch-up" from destroying war for at lower levels of wealth. And zero: is practically $4. A for dictatorship and D for democracy. the in is faster ing dictatorship a accu countries is the value of dictator and the poor greater becoming returns cost of countries. 1 is that while observe in Figure countries. total income. are more to embrace democratic the ac values. interpretations. The sition probabilities. part by gain getting is smaller is slower. These of survival of democracies survives when education of level. rich True.000 die at levels dictatorships that independently of the one would percent. numbers in the text are derived from Table 1. the effect independently is controlled. and indeed it ismuch the confirm strongly is Once established. democracy the more likely that itwill survive. if the production function has diminishing marginal a part of it dur in capital stock. struggle for dictatorship mulated for ex there are always alternative One. a proxy for education more educated is is income that and just ample. The probability that a democracy will die during any partic an income above ular year in a country with two in a thousand since at such years.000.1 dicta rate. * 19 where p stands for tran In the long run the proportion of democracies equals p^/ PDA)> (p^ 2. . in such wealthy countries. Hence.19 percent of regimes the rate of 5. The and the incidence to survive once democracy of a well-to-do levels of development are almost certain is that democracies of democracy are established in countries. it is impregnable in the rich ones. triple. reason we observe the relation between observations s Lipset nation. between risking costly but which gives the victor all of the income. Now suppose that the marginal is lower at higher levels of con utility of consumption is the Thus the from for sumption.WORLD POLITICS 166 of income distribution democratic share of choose in which competition. theory. or whatever would Even times constitute if wealthy higher 96. expect in the long run democracies initial distribution. In turn.

23 s view. torship). (SeeTable 5. of economic poor democracies those with per are in the face capita income under $2. . 1.7). 22 as aDestabilizing Mancur Olson Jr. Even among 20O. Nelson. could make to believe that economic develop if development made transitions all the difference endogenous theory there are no grounds To conclude. When rate of 0.0523 democracies the in life the rate of less than 5 percent per annum. 1976) 19. once random directions."24 wrong. this threat to countries grew rapidly.0132. and certain die in poor countries in to II. is 3. product occurred "Wherever industrialization velopment. while those that grow at a rate faster than 5 percent die at the rate of 0. Huntington Countries (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 25Lipset and Poole (fn. democracies that of sixty-four grow slowly.4. an comes are at the rate of 0.0173. at years. of the 107 years during which a decline of incomes oc curred. with die expected they growing.9 percent. No Easy Choice: Political Participation Samuel P.000. 16) with regard to coups. 24Huntington 54. twelve democracy democracies under such fell the following is about conditions life of year: the expected nine years. 21 inDeveloping and Joan M. 23 (fn. rapidly.0160. This finding parallels again the results of Londregan which they found to be less likely when the economy grows. 13).Donnell(fn. extremism of rapid de munism?because. introducing There is yet another to between the pre-industrial sharp discontinuities more rather than less extremist working-class Here and company Lipset could not have and industrial movements been more situation. face a decline they die can to when but be expected last nineteen and years.1981).21 has few countries running In turn. In when destabilized Lipset and com democracy originated with "extremist movements"?fascism was a as he saw it.MODERNIZATION: THEORIES & FACTS even to much more democracy likely. "Rapid Growth Voice? Journal ofEconomic History 23 (De cember 1963).25 Moreover." as O'Donnell dubs it. wealthy son.20 the "benign line" in the language of Huntington and Nel it and those that do scatter along are democracies established. anticipating explain were more to be he that democracies likely thought Huntington. likely to survive in ones.) ismost What striking is how fragile crises.. While Lipset and factors Olson22 survive. die at the rate of 0.Ups or Downs? to irony Lipset why democracies s cited several theory. emerged. ment breeds democracies: Lipset's 167 "optimistic equation. In poor countries. Rapid growth is not destabilizing for democracy (and neither is it for dicta at in incomes. (fn.

16 49 2.96 G<=0 8.61 1.42 39 19 20 lose 135 observations.48 3.68 14 G> 0 2.75 PDA is the probability TRA is their number TD is the total number 7.76 6 G> 0 2.92 6.49 G<=0 5. The particular level 3.25 34 40.75 5 2 3 150 41 109 1. we 3.56 G> 0 2.00 0 0 619 107 0.25 4.88 0.88 2 134 4.70 a Since per capita income are used: abbreviations 88 40 48 is lagged.16 474 121 2.60 for the total of 3991.06 Total 3.52 2.23 1.71 8 3 5 290 80 210 3 186 3.39 972 299 673 Total 1.00 0.21 G<=0 3.96 G> 0 TD PDA Total 3.29 32 G<=0 Total 4.00 1.15 18 7 11 727 215 512 5.01 0.66 1.41 10.06 2.00 Total 0.08 78 19 59 0.Observed Rates Table 5 of Transitions.35 3.14 G<=0 5.44 122 32 90 191 35 156 6.19 Total 2.50 21.56 Total 1.38 Total 2.87 2 107 22 85 4. a of regime years at a particular of transition to democracy TOT is the total number TA is the total number 3.80 1.15 G<=0 0.82 G> 0 0.33 4.26 2.61 1.03 2 32 2 5 0 27 0.49 229 54 175 4.55 9 353 2.23 TRA TA G<=0 G<=0 and Democracies Dictatorships TTR G<=0 Income Per Capita Growth3 of years under authoritarianism of transition to authoritarianism of years under democracy 5.33 0.78 49 21 28 2380 803 1577 2.14 9 G> 0 1.86 Total 3.38 8 3 5 336 93 243 1.06 6 3.00 G> 0 0.92 1.00 0 121 29 92 649 110 539 3.00 that either regime dies during PJK is the probability TTR is the number of transitions PAD is the probability TRD is their number 72 14 7 7 8.32 2.00 0 512 3991 1166 2825 2.00 119 0.74 23 8.44 year 1611 363 1248 following .70 1 0 1 30 3 27 0.33 1 52 4.80 153 6.83 2. by Lagged Rate of Economic Lagged All Growth Level 0-1000 1001-2000 2001-3000 3001-4000 4001-5000 5001-6000 6001-7000 7001 Total PJK TOT PAD 15 987 420 567 0.18 113 16 97 0.53 5.55 245 84 161 7 3 4 184 41 143 2.67 18 15 TRD 6 4 2 915 397 518 12.43 G>0 1.00 3.71 G> 0 2.

Colo. J." the cabinet. Huntington contended democracy occurs a country come unstable when which modernization. "Introduction: Politics. and Democracy Larry Diamond Countries: Latin Amer ica.We tried to they over a account into 5 longer period and taking growth reproduce more we did statistical than one year. 13).000." Indeed. And could expect this happened: these democracies a occurs: in miracle above the 252 $6. 1. none ever fell. little. Democracy inDeveloping ica (Boulder. undergoes at some in levels of development." was concerned Huntington were whether they distinction political form of government democratic at some intermediate level."27 United States. both Revisited sharper political differ a argued that there is level beyond which further development decreases the probability that that both regimes be will survive. crisis common one of the most to democratic threats represents stability. eds. we were told. "concerns of government.055 then.. O'Donnell. and S. "The most important countries. years during which economic democracies crises. Society. Linz. par regimes false." in L. and democracies. a decline of in comes resulted in the fall of six democracies in 120 years during which to last 20 years. III.M. the told us. "The primary problem is not liberty but the creation of a legiti 26 in Latin Amer and Juan J.: Lynne Rienner. Lipset. to cite Diamond and Linz. Huntington . "The problem.001 and $6. Kinks: Modernization While ences there are important between theoretical Huntington Theory and even and O'Donnell. a country exhausts "the easy tend to die when claimed that democracies stage of import substitution. vulnerable extremely to bad economic performance. he insisted."26 are economic What destabilizes crises. 1989). wealthy experienced is that the political effects Another striking feature of these patterns crises are immediate: occur one year later. (survival) analyses lagging growth one year of Both show that past does not matter: procedures growth to economic crisis is enough effects.MODERNIZATION: THEORIES & FACTS 169 countries with incomes between $2. or the president matters "was not to hold elections but to create organizations. 27 (fn. the produce political of economic Table Thus the hypothesis that rapid growth destabilizes regimes is simply it is true that "economic In turn. Linz. 17." Whether politburo. J. Diamond. again with stability of regimes and did not care or authoritarian. intermediate turn. and the Soviet Union were all sys tems in which it is the "the government governs. ticularly poor are democracies." among but their degree he not their Hence. theUnited Kingdom.

000. and 72. . the higher asserted.WORLD POLITICS 170 never to While public order. O'Donnell for various in retrospect.31 O'Donnell a tant outlier: is the only country where fell at an democracy Argentina income above $6. methodological he observed nant?testimony of a debate that in 1971 had recently begun and today it is no is finished: series on his criticisms transgressions. 7." Hence. Reflecting rem that "Chapter I is now an archeological of data longer necessary to demonstrate that not foster to lead the reader 'socio-economic and/or through tedious development' "30 What the data does show. Instead a trend toward of and modernizing' competitiveness was an erosion of a to auto there and democracy.000.000.001 and $4.. we should observe fall as that democracies observed by O'Donnell."29 mate raked Lipset through the coals Anticipating Huntington. only in the concept of the modernization' characterized political passed areas. 35-36. 2d and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: O'Donnell. 'democracy stability.4 percent between $2. who treated it as applicable almost everywhere.32. rather than that democracies are exception are less stable. one-party regimes regimes. But this kink is due to the fact that dictatorships ally stable in this range. column 5) the equilibrium proportion to of democracies per capita income has a kink at levels between $3. democracy' tendency cratic military and of Instead . But his theory of "bureaucratic authoritarianism" captured the imagination of scholars around the world.000."28 explicitly referring Lipset..0 percent between $4. 30 Studies in South American Politics. Ibid.000.001 and $3. Modernization ed. is not a com studied a country that turns out to be a dis peting theory.000 lapsed 28 29 Ibid. While his account of the rise of bureaucratic authoritarianism against Lipset.' political is that in contemporary South America. political at least within the range mediate levels of modernization. Hunt some of the tendencies encom "in that observed ington actuality.001 and $5. University 31 was careful about not was to O'Donnell making general claims: his purpose explain the downfall of democracies in the Southern Cone. The probability of a democracy dying declines monotonically with per did find a countercase O'Donnell capita income. stability there were repeated coups and revolts. 1979). (Berkeley: Institute of International of California. Only $5. Argentina is also the only country where one col at an income between two democra and $6. 204. some level of development more likely to die than before? Note that the function relating beyond which democracies are (returning toTable 2. are associated with non-demo and the lower levels of modernization are found at inter democracies cratic political while systems.001 and $4.6 per cent between $3. O'Donnell economies Is there develop.000: the observed values are 42. Studies.

6 percent) in 1978. only five democracies outside Argentina. back to thirty-nine in 1984 and to forty our count to the "old" countries. considered 74 countries while our sample cov of Oklahoma Press. (2) the "second reversewave" started in 1958 and ended in 1975. Hence. But the story of the countries that became independent after 1950 is entirely different.176. Thus. Repeat except inArgentina.Does History democracy. Fiji in 1987 at $3. eleven out of fifty-five (16. and the other inUruguay. when regimes. Lipset was right in thinking that the richer the the more country likely it is to sustain IV.000: one of them inArgentina.0 percent) newly independent countries seven were democracies out of forty-two (14. . in 1968. percent) the numbers were subsequently. according Huntingtons32 roughly agrees eight (1) the "secondwave" of democratization began in 1943 and ended in 1962. 16. Since our observations begin as a result of either 1978. hence. sample. It thirty-one by only thirty-one thirty-nine. from cross-sectional of "modernization" torical process 32 in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: The Third Wave: Democratization Samuel P.000 and $5. 1991).398.034. and twelve out of sixty-eight in 1990 (17. the question whether repeats itself is history tradition assume it does: they infer the his in the versial. the data are not exacdy comparable. Chile in 1973 at $3. the regimes we observed or the en of two effects: their dynamic into being or at least into our trance of new countries into the world. Huntington University ers 135 countries. and (3) the "thirdwave" of democratization began in 1974. with regard by 1990. or up.000: in Uruguay in 1973 at $4. and Greece in 1967 at $3. inde in our sample that were countries the seventy-three Consider of them had democratic in 1950. to which oceanic with analysis. Hence. Huntington.3 in 1960. Itself? came in 1950.000: again one of them inArgentina.957.000 and $4. Three out of twenty-five (12. Studies Lipset observations. Suriname in 1980 at $3. the no waves tries grew slightly with rolling down in the world during of democracies of the aggregate decline proportion new rather than countries of the 1960s is largely due to the emergence to transformations of old ones.923. Indeed.MODERNIZATION: THEORIES & FACTS 171 cies fell in countries with incomes between $4. In turn. Since observations of any limited period of time combine dynamic contro and entry effects.6 per of democracies the proportion among these "new" coun cent). fell in countries with incomes above $3. afterwhich it climbed. By thirty-five pendent to increased these countries of democracies 1960 the number among was still in to fall to 1968. Five democracies fell between $3.

and cratic regime (3) as a result. then. Social Origins ofDictatorship Barrington Moore 34 in office between parties occurred is Czechoslovakia. Cross-sectional the validity of such inferences. (2) the probability that a democracy dies declines monotonically with per capita the probability that a country has a demo these level. most of the democratic regimes that emerged Europe in the aftermath ofWorld War I collapsed after the first election.. Southern well before World several Latin European American while countries in Eastern experienced relatively long spells of democracy. only as as War II. variables. however. The results of these calculations presented are not that these the democracies that existed however. rising at low levels and declining at high levels. Note. The question. The exception but note that no alternation in the history of Eastern Eu during this period. Although riod those with after the prewar period are not comparable those at our disposal we to guess the made heroic assumptions levels at 1950. increases with (1)Were these probabilities different beforeWorld War II inWestern Europe and elsewhere? (2)Were they different during the postwar pe countries and that existed before 1950 ("old" countries) among later that became ("new" countries)? independent we can a full set of data for the prewar Without period. 1965).WORLD POLITICS 172 Followers claiming not to be of Moore33 that contest theWestern repeated. European observations can be used to infer historical processes on some ex that regimes survive or die conditional are the same across (in our case per capita income) cross sections. Indeed. countries. probabilities periods about the validity of inferences The based on cross-sec controversy can be formulated in a number tional observations of alternative ways: income. . so that the a country has a par different that probability on the realized values of these ticular regime at any time depends only or the time when the rather than the period. if the probabilities variables ogenous country became independent. And we know that (1) the probability that a democracy is born iswidely scattered with regard to the level of development. iswhether were the same in different or conditional regions. while the average income in Eastern Europe was only 33 and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press. the first alternation resulting from elections rope occurred in Poland in 1991. approximate which democracies were established and fell in some of the present OECD are inTable 6. the region. only make to economic with the first data for guesses regard question. Jr. was route to democracy unique. beginning in 1913 ica was about one-half of that of the present OECD countries while and in 1950.34And must have been at the and Uruguay relatively wealthy Argentina in income Latin Amer of the the average per capita century.

Stephens. we date it early.C. refers to the period 1875-84 refers to the Vichy regime. and Stephens dBothTherborn electoral register was established. The World Economy is dated by (1) the presence of contested elections or OECD. while John D. does Since we do not take participation not provide a figure for 1830. 1992). Democratization on a partisan basis and (2) legislative sovereignty of the house elected by broadest suffrage ganized came later. Appendixes I. we interpolated the numbers using 1820 and 1840. D. They are calculated by extrapolating backward the 1951 for per capita GDP expressed in 1985 PPP USD. eRobert Dahl male slightly higher. Bank. from 1828 by Huntington The dating of democracy (fn. World Bank Development Report 1991 (Washington. Europe were more to fall in the poorer countries.35All this is not much to stand on. when the first national uses 1911 to date democracy in the United Kingdom.Maddison to 1970 by Therborn. 1870-1939: A Test of theMoore Thesis. and other parts of the world.: World Bank." American Journal of Sociol tion and Breakdown as one of consolidation. by the extent of franchise are for the year of independence. but not to the crown or a nonelective (rather than responsibility upper chamber). in France to 1884.MODERNIZATION: Approximate THEORIES 6 Table at the Per Capita Income Time of Democratization in Some of the Present oecd Countries3 First Democratization Date Australia (1901) Austria Belgium Canada (1920) Denmark Finland (1917) France Germany Italy Norway (1905) Sweden Switzerland United Kingdom United States 173 & FACTS 1901 1918b 1919b 1920 1901 1919 1875c 1919 1919 1884 1918 1870d 1911e 1830f Reversal Level Date Level 3733 1545 2960 3838 2213 1184 1748 1072 1920 1228 1919 2226 3016 1119 Present none 1934 1825 none none none 1930 none 1933 1922 1974 (?) 1474 1814 none none none none none Democracy Date 1901 1951 1919 1920 1901 1944 1875 1949 1946 1884 1918 1870 1911 1830 Level 3733 2535 2960 3838 2213 2636 1748 2567 1708 1228 1919 2226 3016 1119 "Levels are GDP/cap expressed in 1985 USD. dates in participation. (2) they did not differ between and (3) once established. University f in the United States ranges widely. democracies likely Western 35 World Table 1. "Democratic Transi cTherborn (fn. date democracy in Switzerland to circa 1880. but scholars who use universal as the criterion date it to 1918.1. parentheses b1920 figures were used. 8) dates democracy in Europe. 1989). . whichever numbers or For countries that became independent after 1871. 32). 16. 1991). but perhaps enough to believe that (1) the levels at which democracies emerged before World War IIwere highly scattered. using the index numbers for GDP and the pop in the Twentieth Century (Paris: ulation figures provided by Angus Maddison. The question mark for France ogy 94 (1989). as a criterion. See Dahl. II. suffrage Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven: Yale Press.

war indicates at the levels at which democracies emerged before and after the rough guess comparing that levels at which democracy was established before the war must have been on the average lower. and only one more. The level among the above to increases with of a transition democracy probability after But among the countries that became old countries. only one fell during their 185 years until 1990.000. coun the effect of levels at which We may be confusing. 37 to level is Pr[R?GIME(t)=DEMOC relates regimes that the function which Suppose where F stands for a normal or logistic distribution." see Rustow. pointed out that the levels of develop atwhich different countries permanendy institutions vary widely.613?when they 1988 of the tran 8 the derivatives these effects. between since the time of entry differ greatly effects of development increases much the two groups of countries. in Suriname in at $2.37 The effects of the entry level are about the development are more same for the two groups of countries. And. Democracies stable and more brittle in countries either when that were wealthier. The stability of democracy 36 A third question has also been posed: when D. tries were first observed and the effect of development they experienced the the new countries were much under scrutiny. Lipset s established democratic was that the thresholds at which democracy was established were lower for the (fn. The probabilities of a democracy falling decline dra matically with level in both groups of countries: indeed. Hence. however. Defining LEVEL(O) as INI andLEVEL(t)-LEVEL(0) asDEV(t). dictatorships But the in 1950 or whenever first observed they became independent. we show inTable distinguish to the entry levels and to the with sition regard separately probabilities since then.000. Rustow. ment ?[LEVEL(t)-LEVEL(0)]}. this probabil ity is the same once countries reach an income $2. asTable 7 shows.000. by dynamic probit. 1.103?than poorer?their were an first observed. we do not know how long the coun democracies. Now sub RACY]=REG(t)=F[a+?LEVEL(t)]. To had average income of $2. At most. A "Transitions Comparative Politics 2 (April 1970). But that is too many guesses to take seriously. to get REG(t)=F{cc+?LEVEL(0)+ tract and add ?LEVEL(O) within the square brackets.000 before the war.36 Compar ground answering are more "new" countries shows that democracies the and the "old" ing are more to die in brittle in the new countries while dictatorships likely We the old ones. of incomes during the two periods was not the same: it is doubtful that many But the distribution countries enjoyed incomes above $4. after 1990. If in addition to the guesses presented the two distribu also assume that incomes were lower in Eastern Europe and most of Latin America.WORLD POLITICS 174 are on firmer the second question. INI+?DDEV(t)]. And during period the old ones?which average income was $1. we can tries that were poor at the time would have waited before becoming occurred before the war with the distrib of levels at which democratization compare the distribution inTable 6 we ution in the postwar period truncated at $4.888.1981) rejoinder to Democracy. early democracies. dictatorships they they wealthy in new countries with incomes above fifteen dictatorships poor. Among $2. A. the level of development again has powerful effects. tions will be highly similar. in the Seychelles. and allowing the (cross-sectional) ment yields REG(t)= F[a+?c effect of the initial level to differ from the (dynamic) effect of develop is the model we estimated.This . independent are as are are as when when stable 1950.

1480) 0.0191 0.0054 1695 (0.0058) 0.0135 New Old 15 0.1183) 0.0123 2 162 563 (0.1200 9 75 606 (0.0058 2543 (0.0377 32 1111 0.0112 0.0275 7 42 (0.0190 that did not exist in 1950.0383 Pad Development Old New -0. Old are based on a dynamic probit model.0156) a particular of regime years at a particular of transition to democracy TOT is the total number PAD is the probability TRD is their number TA is the total number level of years under authoritarianism of transition to authoritarianism PDA is the probability TRA is their number TD is the total number New year of years under democracy that did not exist in 1950 stands for countries Old stands for countries Numbers in parentheses that existed in 1950 are values predicted by the dynamic probit model.0204 28 1374 TA All New Old 70 0.0124 18 1448 0.0544) (0.0464 11 237 1169 (0.0203) 0.7 Table and Predicted Observed Regime Lagged Per Capita Income (level) by Transition Probabilities.0578 14 242 (0.0552 0.0058) 0. and by Groups of Countries51 PAD PJK TJK TOT 0.0086 New Old 3 38 0.0966 -0.0058) 0.0707) 2000 0. New that existed stands for countries -0.0359 Low-High TRD PDA TRA TD 1211 0.0554 Pda aLevel ismeasured for countries in thousands.0058 848 (0. .0124 14 1132 (0.0277 in 1950.0676) are used: aThe following abbreviations that either regime dies during PJK is the probability TTR is the number of transitions (0.0225 347 0. Derivatives New -0. 8 Table of Transition with to the Probabilities Regard the and Initial Level Development Accumulated ("Entry") at the Means by Groups of Countries51 Evaluated Derivatives with Regard to Initial Level Derivative Old of -0.0279) (0.0297 6 18 1036 0.0427 1 24 185 0. see stands Appendix 2.0340) -2000 0.

develop the promise that development would breed democracy Hence. Hence.90 percent among the new in the right direction in worked where most countries. They maintained was an outcome the O'Don of actions. including long-standing dictatorships. couched the historical terministic. Most of the new countries. that the fate of their countries would racy could not and did not believe tries settle determines on be determined either by current levels of development or by the distant democratization constraints. 1986).40 38 and Stevens (fn.38 As years this made both deterministic served. In turn. corollary s Moore theory. project rather than in terms of deterministic conditions. while development decreases slightly the probability of survival of dic to in old countries. was terms actors in of and couched nell-Schmitter strategies.12 percent it by 1. Development during the postwar period just did not have much of an impact on the collapse of an increase dictatorships: of per capita income raised the probability of dictatorship among countries. and those few that did develop remained authoritarian. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule (Baltimore: Guillermo O'Donnell Press. but they operate class structure of the seventeenth or perspective were de of the origins of democracy no one does to bring theory anything and the by economic development of the modernization Class actors at a distance do move of centuries: in history the agrarian the regimes coun century two or three hundred ob Przeworski39 later. of them poor when the great majority just they became independent. did in the end fall. in the 1920s cause events in the 1960s. 1991). appear emphasis approaches on the the issue of democratization irrelevant when political appeared in the struggles for democ The protagonists agenda in the mid-1970s. that. not earlier or later? conditions would found why 39 Adam Przeworski. not just of conditions. In the modernization democracy it is secreted about. Democracy and theMarket: Political and Economic Reforms inEastern Europe and Latin America (New York: Cambridge University Press. the old remained poor.176 more WORLD POLITICS with development in the old in the new than countries. albeit within past. V. 40 and Philippe C Schmitter. Rueschemeyer. Conclusion Whether in the language theories perspective. the old countries and lowered at least "modernization" But of one thousand dollars falling by only 1. the probability of transitions democracy tatorships as new countries declines under authoritarian rule. 6) go back just a few decades but the question remains: Huber. those in Eastern Europe. Johns Hopkins University . social transformations. proved to be particularly futile precisely with regard to thoseThirdWorld coun tries towhich itwas supposed to offer hope.

greater government ment to De Schweinitz argued that if the less devel consumption. generally expansion itwould the of per in receive of percentage GDP devoted to consumption was driven down from 65 percent in 1928 to 52 percent tained in 1937. Dictatorships tem at must least be held Nelson "Political down. by-product or actors is not established their goals. . 3 (Reading. 60. findings of a role: the chances for the survival play of democracy is richer. Yet common sense would indicate that in order to to Galenson. 23. de the vision of the relation between Viewed from this perspective. N. 43 in F. while devel in this view dictatorships Since generate development was to to to be a said the best leads way democracy opment democracy. eds. "Introduction" (New York: ed." Economic Development Karl de Schweinitzjr. they oped countries participation in political affairs/'42And thiswas also the belief of Hunt ington The and Dominguez: interest of the voters a sonal consumption a nondemocratic higher system.000 lished do economic constraints are democ If they succeed in generating development. foreign policy during as exogenous. Mass. to leads parties the give vis-?-vis investment than priority In the Soviet Union. While Lipset were is the inevitable his contemporaries that dictatorship persuaded a more democratic "the of claimed that Galenson price development.S.. put it. Yet even the cur the country greater when to sur rent wealth ismore of a country is not decisive: democracy likely vive in a income with than less $1. Huntington .. Handbook 1975).000 economy per capita growing an income between that de than in a country with $1.: Addison-Wesley. circuitous 41 Walter one. 1959).. clines that dominated mood and the intellectual and democracy velopment war years appears the cold served to orient U.. 21). Industrialization. 3. participation economic in order to promote development. Samuel P."41 must limit democratic "are to grow economically. Dominguez.44 porarily. Huntington Political Science.000 and $2. for instance. a revolution It is unlikely from above that like a competitive this. Polsby. Greenstein and "Political Development. the resources invest of from the diversion is. . . vol. I.. Wiley. treated development strangely convoluted. and Cultural Change 7 (July 1959). 42 Labor Controls and Democracy.THEORIES MODERNIZATION: Our & FACTS 177 this latter approach. W. economically.43 party system would have sus are needed to generate and As Huntington development. of 44 and Nelson (fn. Labor and Economic Development Galenson." and Jorge I. The emergence strongly validate is not a of economic Democ democracy development. racies can survive even in the poorest nations. and racy is pursuing by political once it is estab at any level of it can be initiated Only development.

torship if 1. only or of a nonparty one-party current rule. came even to at if it vailed the end of the year. this rule applies if (1) there were tenure in office or no parties. Rule 3. This definition fices" support sense is offices are filled as has two parts: "of and "contestation. bent parties office office a was classified as a if none of the democracy regime Operationally. 31. Contestation chance executive and the seats in the effective legisla that has some there exists an opposition as a consequence in of elections. whether directly or in the chief directly: tive body. B. did lose actually occurs when of winning we classify doubt. Shaw warned And. see Alvarez et al. Legislative selection: the legislature is not elected. Executive Rule the chief selection: is not executive elected. Party: there is no more than one party.WORLD POLITICS 178 we should not democracy. the incumbents held office in the immediate past by virtue of elections for more than two terms or without they have and until elected. strengthen that it is the best time this in poor flourish is flat. Alternation where a in office today overrides at one or the time when they were overthrown the party rule. Rule 2. 10). dictatorships." In no regime elections. are the We code the regime that pre rules Our timing following. or closed the legislature and rewrote the favor. regime at least one of these conditions held. countries. being not lost an election. Whenever as democracies in incum which only those systems them. . ended up (2) there (4) the incumbents unconstitutionally in their rules 4. With can democracy development. Hence. democracy strengthen even that "common if G. What as a consequence as democratic a regime are all offices governmental to is essential considering filled of is that two kinds of offices are filled by elections." the lesson of our analysis is tells us that the world that which guide. 1:Classifying Appendix Political Regimes45 some is a regime inwhich governmental Democracy a consequence of contested elections. Specifically. (fn. Jamaica? of the seats in the 100 percent time held party lost an election?was office having yet yielded subsequently legislature as democratic classified during the entire period. power on December single 45 For a full explanation and historical details. as a dicta was classified a four rules listed below applied. II error: a passes regime the previous three rules. Thus. Rule Type was in the establishment one or (3) the party.

sures of dimensions similar results. regimes began and ended within our is and the alternatives The main difference between approach rather than a polychotomous that we use a dichotomous classification. Keith Jaggers. State: "The Transformation of theWestern since 1800. International Development 48 American Sociologi of Development.T.MODERNIZATION: THEORIES & FACTS 179 to in 1983.. that it has a demo and the probability A stands for "authoritarian. The generate highly democracy or to what extent a is demo used to assess whether regime particular no measure seem to make the is cratic little difference. be pA(it). 1990. 572-87. See Factors in Cross-National Kenneth A. for example. "Introduction. Let the probability a t= the subscript 1.2 per cent of our there is no reason to think that our results regimes. that different measures appear to be biased in somewhat different directions. where regime during particular year. Alex Inkeless. and exogenous endogenous has an authoritarian i= 1." Some algebra may tween 46 25 (Spring 1990). 49 Ted Robert Gurr." Studies in Comparative International Development 3-6. authoritarianism regime lasted sixmonths (for example. "Political Democracy cal Review 44 (August 1979). they should mea mocratic. are more some than democratic that while scale. and State Power The Growth of Democracy.46 Our exception: Coppedge-Reinicke47 the Bollen48 1965 scale for 1978 predicts 92 percent of our regimes.. Autocracy. unless offices are contested.5 percent. 47 and Wolfgang H. are to the classification of regimes.. Note. the Gurr49 scales of Au tocracy and Democracy for 1950-86 jointly predict 91 percent. Hence. 4). 1990).." Validity and Method American Journal of Political Science 37 (November 1993). as. predicts ties predicts 91. that a country. The Gastil50 scale of political liberties. and the two scales jointly predict 94. scale predicts 85 percent. alternative Nonetheless. to democ Transitions coup d signaled by are of the time elected of dated the the gov racy inauguration newly by a democratic not of the election. In the few cases where ernment. tional Development 25 (Spring 50 Gastil (fn... Transitions arrived in Nigeria dictatorship a are etat. andWill H. We believe regimes mation the situation about not be considered de others." Studies in Comparative Interna . Moore. Bollen.2 percent of our classification. from a practical point of view. Bollen. however.N. Michael "Measuring Polyarchy. the infor changed that the same year is lost. theDominican Republic in 1963) or where several times (Bolivia in 1979).. "Liberal Democracy: Measures. idiosyncratic particular Appendix 2: Dynamics of Regimes in the distinction be is entailed help elucidate what mechanisms." Studies in Comparative Coppedge 25 (Spring 1990). Reinicke.. covering the period from 1972 to his scale of civil liber 93. 51-72." and the Timing Kenneth A.

same holds for The pAD. since the values. probabilities/' over time and the same for all countries. and the proportion came democracies. If pDA(it) 180 = are k = A. then. that is.k.WORLD POLITICS cratic regime be pD(it) = 1 the probability that a dictator pA(it). will remain stable in the absence of exogenous These equilibrium probabilities are = Pd Pad + Pda Pad and Pda Pa Pda Moreover. constant then we can describe the evolution of regimes by pD(t+D Pdd Pad Po(t) pA(t+D Pda Paa PaW The of regimes proportion therefore on the that are democracies of democracies next that survived year depends from the cur proportion rent year. only As 51 is monotonie Convergence around the equilibrium. that these "transition being p. And equilibrium distribution to these are likely to be probabilities that regimes die during any particular year fact they are low?this convergence of one type of regime will the proportion the other to decline. the long-run on not on the relative rates at which their initial distrib they die. tions will + Pad whatever the over tend time initial their propor of regimes. Given the transition rates.D. and of of regimes depends distribution time passes. if reached. of regimes that. let the probability that = 1a democracy dies be we assume for the time pDD(it).51 low?in will be monotonie. so that the probability that it survives is p^iit) = 1 pAD(it). Similarly. the proportions of regimes will oscillate . that died. be of dictatorships pDD. to increase continue that is. Let ship dies from one year to another be pAD(it).D. j A. if Pad + pDA < 1. otherwise. there exists a distribution disturbances. dictatorships.

The transition are thus Pad Paa the long-run Level =High LOO Pdd 0. the proportion of democracies will be be pD*(L) = are more at the because democracies high level of development as a result of to emerge is the This likely development. Thus.00 Paa . The of the which this process depends speed is inexorable. democracy on rate at vives forever. then be more 181 democracies than dictatorships in the world and if at the beginning the proportion was of democracies crease over lower than this proportion pD*. endogenous? of the explanation. At the low level. < 1. that these transition imagine but depend on the level of development. pAD(H) are established so that in affluent countries. and high (H). pD*(L) pD*(H). so that p^H) 1. they are certain to die.MODERNIZATION: THEORIES & FACTS ution. once it is established. to the are not probabilities To keep matters at stake.00. both regimes have some probability of dying that ismore than zero and less than one. once One is that while p^L) dictatorships pass the threshold = that defines the high level. dictatorships to return Now. now that while die at some constant annual dictatorships Suppose = 0. Now consider two pos sibilities. die. will continually in time. immediately pDA run a time the long all countries will be democracies. are two levels: low (L) suppose that there only issue constant simple. and.00 Pda proportion of democracies at the low level will = + at the high ievel itwill be pD*(H) 1/(1 Pm/?Pad'PdaX < pDA). You see never so democracies that that in rate. > If Pad in the long run there will pDA. while democracies probabilities ~ die Level = Low Pdd Pda and while at the same rate at either level. the of democracies but accumulation die. dictator Every a it sur is established. are then probabilities Level = Low Level =High Pdd Pad LOO Pad Pda Paa 0. developed p^L) = = never die once in turn democratic while they regimes pAD. ship dies. transition The pDA=0. modernization?version higher at But suppose alternatively that authoritarian exactly the regimes die same rate whether or so in poor countries that ones.

Hence. R = P(t) R. Advanced Econometrics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. j=0. To esti we and democracy. of both expectations sides yields P(R=D Paa Pda p(R. at the high level all countries will we will observe an in the long run.. Amemyia. 52 Takeshi chap..Rt_2.rl)] = Now Pda? + = ?. a first-order data Our Markov processes.A the and is matrix of transition with ele P(t) dictatorship.1. development transition change probabilities we mate the impact of level on transition probabilities.l. . the level of development relation and the incidence aggregate are even to emerge at democracies of democracies though equally likely even if under that authoritarianism does not is. Assume that = pDA(t) F(XA ?). the the previous year. = P(t)Rt.p. development a increase the that is democratic. Hence of the transition matrix. have a democratic to decide Thus. Hence. Taking + u. regime between which mechanism the relation between generates to need determine how the respective with the level of development. Such processes by: on Ame rely that is. = [PAA^-PDA^?-rD let X be the vector of the exogenous variables. ments p k(t).1. = PAA(t) F[XJcc+?)].rD p(R=0) Pad Pdd p(Rt-rO) sum of columns where the k=0. R=D and R=A for D.l. 1985). obey myia.WORLD 182 and we already that while know POLITICS the long-run of democra proportion cies at the low levelwin be pD*(L) < 1.52 on the present regime depends regimes during only are defined but not beyond. any level.k 1. = + p(R=l Rtl) p^top?R^-l) p^WR^O) | = = + PAAttpdVrD PDA(t)[l-p(R..) = where R for democracy stands for regimes. This country will become probability then the exogenous version. 11. probabilities. E(R=l|R.

. and thus pDD = 1 pDA and pAD = 1 -p^. dX dX .k(t) is the probability of transition from being in state j at time (t-1) to being in state k at time regime t. to estimate a and /?. The derivatives used inTable 8 are dPpA = dpAD =-f + fQC^?)? and [XJa ?)](a+?).?).R. Given as the one that whenever a transition installed that became during occurred this year. we lag the X p(R=l |RJ s. one can calculate all we need pDA and pAA.^ FQit_? {FtX^a+j^-FQi^pCR^l) = + FQ^aMR^l) ?Q?tJ xt.1=l) = + = + FCX. on to do is probit This is the model we used to generate results inTables 2 and 8.) is the CDF of normal distribution. Note that p.with R(0) as observed.MODERNIZATION: THEORIES & FACTS 183 where F(. we code the the probabil ity of transition between (t-1) and t depends on the conditions at (t-1). Then = pDA(t) + [pAA(t)-pDA(t)]p(Rt. Hence. from which Hence.