FRANCISCO VS.

PORTUGAL
Facts:
Atty was counsel for complainants in a criminal case. Atty was retained After judgment was rendered convicting
appellants. Atty filed an MR and another Motion and Petition for review of the judgment of conviction. But after the filing,
Atty disappeared and was nowhere to be found.
Later, the complainants found out that their petitions were denied for being filed out of time and for failure to pay
the docket fees. The decision became final and warrants of arrest were issued.
Atty argues that he had decided to withdraw as counsel. He wrote a letter to one of the complainants giving them
instructinos to sign and file with the Court the Notice to Withdraw. But the complainant didnt file it with the court because
they were aware that it would be difficult to find another counsel.
Issue:
Is Atty guilty of negligence in handling the case?
Held:
Yes! 3 month suspension. Atty should have filed the notice of withdrawal himself if he truly wanted to withdraw. At
the very least, he should have informed the court. For failure to do so, Atty was negligent. Atty was also negligent in filing
the petition out of time. eventually he would have known that the petition was denied but still he failed to informe the
convicts and return their calls.
One of the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an action
impliedly stipulates to carry it to its conclusion. He is not at liberty to abandon it without reasonable cause. A lawyers right
to withdraw from a case before its final adjudication arises only from the clients written consent or from a good cause.
After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to both cause and client, even if the client
never paid any fee for the attorney-client relationship. Lawyering is not a business; it is a profession in which duty of public
service, not money, is the primary consideration.

Public Attorneys Office vs. Sandiganbayan [G.R. Nos. 154297-300. February 15, 2008]
Ponente: AZCUNA, J.
FACTS:
Chief Public Attorney filed an Urgent and Ex-Parte Motion to be Relieved as Court-Appointed Counsel with the Special
Division of the Sandiganbayan, praying that she be relieved of her duties and responsibilities as counsel de oficio for the
said accused on the ground that she had a swelling workload consisting of administrative matters and that the accused
are not indigent persons; hence, they are not qualified to avail themselves of the services of PAO. Respondent Court
found the reasons of the Chief Public Attorney to be plausible and relieved the Chief Public Attorney as counsel de
oficio of former President Joseph Estrada and Mayor Jose Estrada. The remaining eight PAO lawyers filed an ExParte Motion To Be Relieved As Court-Appointed Counsels with respondent Court on the ground that the accused are not
indigents; therefore, they are not qualified to avail themselves of the services of PAO. Respondent Court issued a
Resolution denying the motion, but retaining two of the eight PAO lawyers, namely, the petitioners Atty. Usita, Jr. and
Atty. Andres.
Later, PAO filed a Manifestation and Compliance which informed the Court that petitioners Atty. Usita and Atty. Andres
were appointed as Assistant City Prosecutors of the Quezon City Prosecutors Office sometime in August 2002, and that
PAO is left as the lone petitioner in this case. PAO asserts that while its lawyers are also aware of their duties under Rule
14.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, PAO lawyers are limited by their mandate as government
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
subject Resolutions retaining two PAO lawyers to act as counsels de oficio for the accused who are not indigent persons.

HELD:
NO. Petition dismissed for being moot.
RATIO:
The Court holds that respondent did not gravely abuse its discretion in issuing the subject Resolutions as the issuance is
not characterized by caprice or arbitrariness. At the time of PAOs appointment, the accused did not want to avail
themselves of any counsel; hence, respondent exercised a judgment call to protect the constitutional right of the accused
to be heard by themselves and counsel during the trial of the cases.
Subsequently, respondent reduced the number of PAO lawyers directed to represent the accused, in view of the
engagement of new counsels de parte, but retained two of the eight PAO lawyers obviously to meet such possible
exigency as the accused again relieving some or all of their private counsels.
In any event, since these cases of the accused in the Sandiganbayan have been finally resolved, this petition seeking that
PAO, the only remaining petitioner, be relieved as counsel de oficio therein has become moot.

GORETTI ONG, complainant, vs.ATTY. JOEL M. GRIJALDO, respondent.

PER CURIAM:
The fiduciary duty of a lawyer and advocate is what places the law profession in a unique position of trust and confidence,
and distinguishes it from any other calling. Once this trust and confidence is betrayed, the faith of the people not only in
the individual lawyer but also in the legal profession as a whole is eroded. To this end, all members of the bar are strictly
required to at all times maintain the highest degree of public confidence in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of their
profession.1 In this administrative case for disbarment, respondent Atty. Joel M. Grijaldo failed to perform his sworn duty to
preserve the dignity of the legal profession.
Complainant Goretti Ong is a widow residing in Talayan Village, Quezon City. Sometime in the early part of 1996, she
engaged the services of respondent, a practicing lawyer in Bacolod City, as private prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 52843
before the Metropolitan Trial Court in Cities of Bacolod City, Branch 5, against Lemuel Sembrano and Arlene Villamil for
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.2 During one of the hearings of the case, the accused offered to amicably settle
their civil obligation to complainant by paying the amount of P180,000.00. Complainant accepted the offer on the condition
that payment shall be made in cash.
At the hearing held on July 17, 1996, respondent advised complainant to wait outside the courtroom. When he came out,
he handed to complainant cash in the amount of P100,000.00 and Metrobank Check No. 0701263862 for P80,000.00,
postdated August 16, 1996, drawn by Atty. Roger Reyes, counsel for the accused. Complainant objected to the check
payment and refused to settle the case, but he assured her that the check was drawn by a reputable lawyer. Complainant
was prevailed upon by respondent into signing an affidavit of desistance, but she instructed him not to file it in court until
the check is cleared.
Upon presentment on its maturity date, the check was dishonored due to a stop-payment order from the drawer.
Complainant immediately informed respondent of the dishonor, and the latter told her that he will talk to Atty. Reyes about
it. Later, when complainant met with respondent in Manila, he relayed to her Atty. Reyes' offer to replace the check with
cash. Several weeks passed without any payment of the proceeds of the check, despite complainant's repeated telephone
calls to respondent. Sometime in December 1996, she suggested that respondent move for a hearing of the case, but he
told her that courts are not inclined to set hearings near the Christmas season.
On December 17, 1996, complainant personally went to Bacolod City to inquire about her case. She was surprised to
learn that the same was dismissed as early as September 26, 1996. 3 Apparently, respondent submitted her Affidavit of
Desistance4 and, on the basis thereof, the public prosecutor moved for the dismissal of the case which was granted by the

court. When complainant confronted respondent, he admitted to her that he had already received the amount of
P80,000.00 from Atty. Reyes but he used the same to pay for his financial obligations.
Thus, on April 2, 1997, complainant filed an Administrative Complaint against respondent for disbarment. 5
Complainant further alleged in her complaint that respondent represented her in another case, entitled "People of the
Philippines versus Norma Mondia," also for violation of B.P. 22, where she was the offended party. Respondent
approached the accused, Norma Mondia, and offered to delay the hearing of the case in consideration of the amount of
P10,000.00. However, Mondia did not have that amount of money. Attached to the complaint is the affidavit of Norma
Mondia attesting to this fact.6
Furthermore, Henry Tiu, a former client of respondent, executed an affidavit, which is attached to the complaint, alleging
that he gave respondent the amount of P3,000.00 for the purpose of posting his bail bond, but respondent did not post his
bail which resulted in Tiu's arrest.7
Likewise, a certain Luz Dimailig, whose affidavit is also attached to the complaint, averred that respondent represented
her as counsel for plaintiff in a civil case before the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 52; that the case was
dismissed by the trial court; that the appeal filed by respondent to the Court of Appeals was dismissed due to his failure to
file the appellant's brief; and that the petition for review before the Supreme Court was denied for lack of proof of service
on the Court of Appeals, late filing and late payment of docket fees. Moreover, Dimailig alleged that she gave respondent
the amount of P10,000.00 for settling the said civil case, but she later learned that he did not remit the money to the
defendants or their counsel.8
On June 25, 1997, respondent was required to file his comment within ten days from notice. 9 Respondent filed a Motion
for Extension of Time, alleging that he has not received a copy of the complaint. 10 On February 5, 1998,11 complainant
furnished respondent a copy of the complaint. However, despite receipt of a copy of the complaint, respondent still failed
to file his comment.
On October 19, 1998, respondent was required to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in
contempt for failing to file his comment. 12 Respondent filed a Compliance, stating that the copy of the complaint he
received from complainant was not legible. Complainant again furnished respondent with a clearer and more legible copy
of the complaint including its annexes; but respondent still did not file his comment. Consequently, on June 14, 2000,
another show cause order was issued against respondent. 13 Respondent replied by stating that the quality of the copy
furnished him by complainant was worse than the first one he received.

Dissatisfied with respondent's explanation, respondent was ordered to pay a fine of P1,000.00, which he complied with on
November 27, 2000.14 However, he again failed to file his comment and, instead, moved for additional time to file said
comment.
On August 13, 2001, this case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.15 The records of the IBP show that respondent has not filed his comment to the complaint. On January
18, 2002, the Investigating Commissioner, Manuel A. Tiuseco, submitted his report recommending the disbarment of
respondent.16 However, in its Resolution No. XV-2002-553 dated October 19, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors modified
the penalty of disbarment and recommended instead respondent's indefinite suspension from the practice of law for
grossly immoral conduct and deceit.17
After a careful review of the records of this case, we find the recommendation of Commissioner Manuel A. Tiuseco welltaken.
It is clear that respondent gravely abused the trust and confidence reposed in him by his client, the complainant. Were it
not for complainant's vigilance in inquiring into the status of her case, she would not have known that the same had
already been dismissed on September 26, 1996. Respondent deliberately withheld this fact from her, notwithstanding that
she talked to him sometime in December 1996.
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and

diligence. More specifically, Rule 18.03 and Rule 18.04 state:

Respondent breached his duty to his client when he failed to inform complainant of the status of the criminal case. His
negligence shows a glaring lack of the competence and diligence required of every lawyer. 18 His infraction is rendered all
the more deplorable by the fact that complainant is a resident of Quezon City and the case was filed in Bacolod City. It
was precisely for this reason that complainant engaged the services of respondent, a Bacolod-based lawyer, so that her
interests in the case may be amply protected in her absence. Respondent's failure to look after his client's welfare in the
case was a gross betrayal of his fiduciary duty and a breach of the trust and confident which was reposed in him. In a
similar case, we held:
It is settled that a lawyer is not obliged to act as counsel for every person who may wish to become his client. He has the
right to decline employment subject however, to the provision of Canon 14 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, he owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed to him. Respondent Meneses, as counsel, had the obligation to inform his client of the status of
the case and to respond within a reasonable time to his client's request for information. Respondent's failure to
communicate with his client by deliberately disregarding its request for an audience or conference is an unjustifiable
denial of its right to be fully informed of the developments in and the status of its case. 19
Worse, when respondent used the money which he received from Atty. Reyes to pay for his own obligations, he violated
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that "[a] lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and
properties of his client that may come into his possession." Furthermore:
Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.
Rule 16.02. A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of others kept by him.
Rule 16.03. A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. However, he shall have
a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements,
giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions
he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.
Respondent's misappropriation of the money entrusted to him and his refusal to account for it to his client despite
repeated demands were competent proof of his unfitness for the confidence and trust reposed on him. His acts showed a
lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render him unworthy of public confidence. He held the money in
trust for his client as settlement of the case he was handling. Upon receipt thereof, he was under obligation to immediately
turn it over, in the absence of a showing that he had a lien over it. As a lawyer, he should have been scrupulously careful
in handling money entrusted to him in his professional capacity, because a high degree of fidelity and good faith on his
part is exacted.20
A lawyer, under his oath, pledges himself not to delay any man for money or malice and is bound to conduct himself with
all good fidelity to his clients. He is obligated to report promptly the money of his client that has come into his possession.
He should not commingle it with his private property or use it for his personal purposes without his client's consent.
Respondent, by converting the money of his client to his own personal use without her consent, was guilty of deceit,
malpractice and gross misconduct. Not only did he degrade himself but as an unfaithful lawyer he besmirched the fair
name of an honorable profession.21
Aside from violating the Code of Professional Responsibility, respondent's failure to promptly turn over the money to his
client and his conversion of the same for his personal use rendered him liable for contempt under Rule 138, Section 25 of
the Rules of Court, to wit:
Unlawful retention of client's funds; contempt. When an attorney unjustly retains in his hands money of his client after it
has been demanded he may be punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official
transactions; but proceedings under this section shall not be a bar to a criminal prosecution.
Furthermore, respondent violated his oath of office and duties as counsel when he approached his client's opponent and
offered to delay the case in exchange for money. His offer to delay the case would have frustrated the interests of his
client which he had sworn to protect. As a lawyer, respondent should avoid any unethical or improper practices that

impede, obstruct or prevent the speedy, efficient and impartial adjudication of cases. 22
Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the
trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the latter's
cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client,
warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the
end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. This simply means that his
client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may
expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the
entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar,
and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he
also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal
profession.23
Respondent's act of propositioning his client's opponent and offering to delay the case against her was intended to benefit
the latter. Hence, such act amounted to double-dealing and conflict of interest, and was unethical practice of law.
Attorneys, like Caesar's wife, must not only keep inviolate their client's confidence, but must also avoid the appearance of
treachery and double-dealing, for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is
of paramount importance in the administration of justice. 24
Finally, respondent's cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the directives of this Court to file his comment constitutes utter
disrespect to the judicial institution. His conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. A resolution of this Court is not
to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately or selectively. 25 Respondent's
obstinate refusal to comply therewith not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in his character; it also underscores his
disrespect of our lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof.
Any departure from the path which a lawyer must follow as demanded by the virtues of his profession shall not be
tolerated by this Court as the disciplining authority. This is especially so, as in the instant case, where respondent even
deliberately defied the lawful orders of the Court for him to file his comment on the complaint, thereby transgressing
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which requires a lawyer to observe and maintain the respect due the
courts.26
All told, respondent's transgressions manifested dishonesty and amounted to grave misconduct and grossly unethical
behavior which caused dishonor, not only to complainant, but to the noble profession to which he belongs, for it cannot be
denied that the respect of litigants for the profession is inexorably diminished whenever a member of the Bar betrays their
trust and confidence.27 He has proved himself unworthy of membership in the legal profession and must, therefore, be
disbarred.
WHEREFORE, for dishonesty, grave misconduct, and grossly unethical behavior, respondent ATTY. JOEL GRIJALDO is
DISBARRED from the practice of law. His name is ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. He is further directed to
PAY complainant Goretti Ong the amount of P80,000.00 within ten (10) days from notice of this Decision.
This Decision shall take effect immediately. Copies thereof shall be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be
appended to respondent's personal record; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; the Office of the President; the
Department of Justice; the Court of Appeals; the Sandiganbayan; the Philippines Judges Association; and all courts of the
land for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

GAMALIEL ABAQUETA, complainant, vs. ATTY. BERNARDITO A. FLORIDO, respondent.

RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is an administrative complaint[1] against Atty. Bernardito A. Florido filed with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline, praying that appropriate sanctions be imposed on respondent for
representing conflicting interests.
Complainant is a Filipino by birth who had acquired American citizenship. He resides at 15856 N. 15th Way,
Phoenix, Arizona 85022, U.S.A. Respondent is a practicing lawyer based in Cebu City.
On November 28, 1983, complainant engaged the professional services of respondent through his attorney-in-fact,
Mrs. Charito Y. Baclig, to represent him in Special Proceedings No. 3971-R, entitled, In the Matter of the Intestate Estate
of Deceased Bonifacia Abaqueta,[2] Susana Uy Trazo, petitioner before the Regional Trial court of Cebu.[3]
Accordingly, respondent entered his appearance in Special Proceedings No. 3971-R as counsel for herein
complainant.[4] Subsequently, he filed complainants Objections and Comments to Inventory and Accounting,
registering complainants objection
...totheinclusionofthepropertiesunderItems1to5containedintheinventoryoftheadministratrixdatedNovember9,1983.
ThesepropertiesarethesoleandexclusivepropertiesoftheoppositorperthelatesttaxdeclarationsalreadymarkedasExhibits2,
3,4,5and6intheFormalOfferofExhibitsbyoppositorinwritingdatedAugust17,1983xxx.[5]
Several years later, Milagros Yap Abaqueta filed an action for sum of money against complainant, docketed as Civil
Case No. CEB-11453 and entitled, Milagros Yap Abaqueta vs. Gamaliel Abaqueta and Casiano Gerona.[6] Respondent
signed the Complaint as counsel for plaintiff Milagros Yap Abaqueta, averring, inter alia, that:
PlaintiffanddefendantGamalielAbaquetaaretheconjugalownersofthosecertainparcelsofland,moreparticularlyasfollows
The parcels of land referred to as conjugal property of complainant and Milagros Yap-Abaqueta are the very same
parcels of land in Special Proceedings No. 3971-R which respondent, as lawyer of complainant, alleged as the sole and
exclusive properties of complainant. In short, respondent lawyer made allegations in Civil Case No. CEB-11453 which
were contrary to and in direct conflict with his averments as counsel for complainant in Special Proceedings No. 3971-R.
Complainant further averred that respondent admitted he was never authorized by the former to appear as counsel
for complainants ex-wife in Civil Case No. CEB-11453; that respondent failed to indicate in the Complaint the true and
correct address of herein complainant, which respondent knew as far back as August 2, 1990, when he wrote a letter to
the complainant at the said address.[7] Consequently, complainant failed to receive summons and was declared in
default in Civil Case No. CEB-11453. While the order of default was eventually set aside, complainant incurred expenses
to travel to the Philippines, which were conservatively estimated at $10,000.00. He argues that respondents conduct
constitute professional misconduct and malpractice as well as trifling with court processes.
In his defense, respondent claims in his Answer[8] that he always acted in good faith in his professional relationship
with complainant in spite of the fact that they have not personally met. He based the matters he wrote in the Complaint on
information and documents supplied by Mrs. Charito Y. Baclig, complainants sister-in-law and attorney-in-fact, indicating
that he was sole and exclusive owner of the properties. This was sometime in November 1983. No affidavit of
adjudication was ever furnished respondent by complainant and this was apparently suppressed because it would show
that the properties formed part of the estate.
Eight years later, in November 1991, long after Special Proceedings No. 3971-R was settled and the attorney-client
relationship between complainant and respondent was terminated, Mrs. Milagros Abaqueta through Mrs. Baclig, engaged
his services to file Civil Case No. CEB-11453. Mrs. Baclig presented to him a deed of absolute sale dated July 7, 1975,[9]
showing that the properties subject hereof were not complainants exclusive property but his conjugal property with his
wife, the same having been acquired during the subsistence of their marriage. Thus, in all good faith, respondent alleged
in the complaint that said properties were conjugal assets of the spouses.
Respondent further pointed out that his law firm handles on the average eighty new court cases annually and
personally interviews four or five clients, prospective clients and/or witnesses daily except Saturdays and Sundays. It

regularly closes to the public at 7:00 p.m., but work continues sometimes until 8:30 p.m. This has been going on for the
last twenty-five years out of respondents thirty-three years of private practice. The absence of personal contact with
complainant and the lapse of eight years resulted in the oversight and/or lapse of respondents memory that complainant
was a former client. Furthermore, the caption of the Special Proceeding was not in the name of complainant but was
entitled, In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Bonifacia Payahay Abaqueta.
Respondent expressed regret over the oversight and averred that immediately after discovering that he formerly
represented complainant in Special Proceeding No. 3971-R, he filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for plaintiff, which
was granted by the trial court.[10] He denied any malice in his acts and alleged that it is not in his character to do malice
or falsehood particularly in the exercise of his profession.
In his Comments/Observations on Respondents Answer,[11] complainant averred that respondents conduct was
geared towards insuring a court victory for Milagros Yap in Civil Case No. CEB-11453, wherein he deliberately stated that
complainants address was 9203 Riverside Lodge Drive, Houston, Texas, 77083, U.S.A., when he knew fully well that
complainants true and correct address was c/o V.A. Hospital, 7 th Street & Italian School Road, Phoenix, Arizona, 85013,
U.S.A. By falsely stating and concealing his true and correct address, respondent eventually succeeded in obtaining a
default judgment in favor of his client.
During the pendency of these proceedings before the IBP, it appeared that respondents son got married to the
daughter of IBP National President Arthur D. Lim. Thus, Atty. Lim inhibited himself from participating in the resolution of
the case.[12] Subsequently, a Resolution was issued requiring the IBP to elevate the entire records of the case within
thirty (30) days from notice.[13]
The main issue to be resolved in the case at bar is whether or not respondent violated Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The investigating commissioner found that respondent clearly violated the prohibition against
representing conflicting interests and recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three (3)
months.
We find the recommendation well-taken.
Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that
RULE15.03.Alawyershallnotrepresentconflictinginterestsexceptbywrittenconsentofallconcernedgivenafterafull
disclosureofthefacts.
There is a conflict of interest if there is an inconsistency in the interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is
whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyers duty to fight for an issue or claim but it is his duty to oppose it for
the other client.[14] In short, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the
other client.[15]
There is a representation of conflicting interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to do
anything which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be
called upon in his new relation, to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection.[16]
As pointed out by the investigating commissioner, respondent does not deny that he represented complainant in
Special Proceedings No. 3971-R. He also does not deny that he is the lawyer of Milagros Yap Abaqueta in Civil Case No.
CEB-11453, filed against complainant and involving the same properties which were litigated in Special Proceedings No.
3971-R. Respondent also admitted that he did not secure the consent of complainant before he agreed to act as Milagros
Yap Abaquetas lawyer in Civil Case No. CEB-11453.
The reasons proffered by respondent are hardly persuasive to excuse his clear representation of conflicting
interests in this case. First, the investigating commissioner observed that the name Gamaliel Abaqueta is not a common
name. Once heard, it will surely ring a bell in ones mind if he came across the name again. In this case, respondent
actively prosecuted the cause of complainant in Special Proceedings No. 3971-R, such that it would be impossible for
respondent not to have recalled his name.
Second, assuming arguendo that respondents memory was indeed faulty, still it is incredible that he could not
recall that complainant was his client, considering that Mrs. Charito Baclig, who was complainants attorney-in-fact and the
go-between of complainant and respondent in Special Proceedings No. 3971-R, was the same person who brought
Milagros Yap Abaqueta to him. Even a person of average intelligence would have made the connection between Mrs.
Baclig and complainant under such circumstances.

Lastly, the fact that the subject matter of Civil Case No. CEB-11453 and Special Proceedings No. 3971-R are the
same properties could not have escaped the attention of respondent. With such an abundance of circumstances to aid
respondents memory, it simply strains credulity for him to have conveniently forgotten his past engagement as
complainants lawyer. What rather appears, given the prevailing facts of this case, is that he chose to ignore them on the
assumption that the long period of time spanning his past and present engagement would effectively blur the memories of
the parties to such a discrepancy.
It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to
become his client. He has the right to decline such employment,[17] subject, however, to Canon 14 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.[18] Once he agrees to take up the cause of the client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause
and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.[19] He must serve the client with competence
and diligence[20] and champion the latters cause with wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion.[21]
A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest
conflicts with that of his former client.[22] The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client
which is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree.[23] Indeed, as we stated in Sibulo v. Cabrera,[24] The
relation of attorney and client is based on trust, so that double dealing, which could sometimes lead to treachery, should
be avoided.[25]
Credence cannot, however, be given to the charge that respondent fraudulently and maliciously falsified the true
and correct address of the complainant notwithstanding respondents knowledge thereof. Lawyers normally do not have
knowledge of the personal circumstances of a party in a case and usually rely on the information supplied by their clients.
The fact that respondent sent a letter to complainant at the latters correct address[26] sixteen months before the filing of
Civil Case No. CEB-11453 does not by itself prove malice on the part of respondent. A new address was furnished by
Milagros Yap Abaqueta days before the complaint was filed. Respondent had no reason to doubt the correctness of the
address of the complainant given to him by Milagros Yap Abaqueta considering that she was complainants wife.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Bernardito A. Florido is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for Three (3) months. He is
further ADMONISHED to exercise greater care and diligence in the performance of his duties towards his clients and the
court. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Artezuela v Maderazo (Barrientos)
Facts: Echavia crashed the car he is driving which is owned by Kiyami, but was registered in the name of Villapez. The
car rammed into a small carinderia owned by Artezuela. The destruction of the carinderia caused the cessation its
operation, resulting to her financial dislocation. Artezuela incurred debts from her relatives and due to financial constraints,
stopped sending her two children to college. Artezuela hired Maderazo in filing a damage suit against Echavia, Villapez
and Kiyami. For his services, Artezuela paid Maderazo 10,000 as attorneys fees and 2,000 as filing fee. However, the
case was dismissed, allegedly upon the instance of the Artezuela and her husband. Because of the dismissal of the case,
Artezuela filed a civil case for damages against the Maderazo. The case was dismissed.
Artezuela filed for disbarment against the Maderazo. Artezuela argues that Maderazo engaged in activities inimical to her
interests. While acting as her counsel, Maderazo prepared Echavias Answer to the Amended Complaint. The said
document was even printed in Maderazos office. Artezuela further averred that it was Maderazo who sought the dismissal
of the case, misleading the trial court into thinking that the dismissal was with her consent. Maderazo denied Artezuelas
allegations. However, he admitted that Echavias Answer to the Amended Complaint was printed in his office but denied
having prepared the document and having acted as counsel of Echavia.
Case was referred to IBP. IBP investigated the case. IBP found Maderazo guilty of representing conflicting interests, in
violation of Canon 15 and Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as, of Canon 6 of the Code of
Professional Ethics.
Issues:
(1) Whether Maderazo violated Canon 15 and Rule 15.03 (conflict of interest) of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(2) Whether Maderazo had a direct hand in the preparation of Echavias Answer to the Amended Complaint.

Held: YES to both

Maderazo was actually giving advice to Echavias but he was not the counsel of record. Maderazo does not have to
publicly hold himself as the counsel of the adverse party, nor make his efforts to advance the adverse partys conflicting
interests of record. It is enough that the counsel of one party had a hand in the preparation of the pleading of the other
party, claiming adverse and conflicting interests with that of his original client. To require that he also be counsel-of-record
of the adverse party would punish only the most obvious form of deceit and reward, with impunity, the highest form of
disloyalty.
An attorney owes his client undivided allegiance. Because of the highly fiduciary nature of the attorney-client relationship,
sound public policy dictates that a lawyer be prohibited from representing conflicting interests or discharging inconsistent
duties. Good faith and honest intention on the part of the erring lawyer does not make this rule inoperative. The lawyer is
an officer of the court and his actions are governed by the uncompromising rules of professional ethics.

DOMINGO C. GAMALINDA, complainant, vs.AYTYS. FERNANDO ALCANTARA and JOSELITO LIM, respondents.
R E SO L U T I O N

NARVASA, C.J.:
In his verified letter-complaint dated June 19, 1991, 1 complainant Domingo Gamalinda charges retired Judge Fernando
Alcantara and Atty. Joselito Lim with grave abuse of their profession ("labis nilang pag-abuso sa kanilang propesyon"),
deception, threats, dishonoring and injuring the reputation of said complainant and bringing about the loss of his land.
The Court finds the charges to be without basis and accordingly dismisses them.
The administrative complaint against retired Judge Fernando Alcantara is a futile attempt to resurrect the charges filed
against him in Adm. Matter No. MTJ-90-494, which were dismissed by this Court in its resolution of September 8, 1988 for
having become moot and academic. Adm. Matter No. MTJ-90-494 was filed only on July 22, 1987, or five (5) months after
the respondent judge's retirement from the service on February 3, 1987. No motion for reconsideration having been
seasonably filed by complainant, that resolution has become final and executory. It serves as a bar to a relitigation of the
same charges against respondent judge. 2 That those charges are now being brought against respondent judge in his
capacity as an attorney does not help the cause of complainant, for the change in the form of action or remedy pursued
does not bar the application of the rule of res judicata. 3
On the other hand, the record establishes that Atty. Lim was merely performing his duty as counsel for the plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 3827 when he did what is now complained of. 4
In Civil Case No. 3827 of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac, Branch LXIII, Salud Balot and Felicidad Balot had sued the
heirs of Apolinario Gamalinda 5 for reconveyance, with damages, of the eastern half of Lot No. 3217 of the cadastral
survey of Victoria, Tarlac, which was allegedly inadvertently included in the original certificate of title of Apolinario
Gamalinda. In the course of the trial, plaintiffs were able to secure a writ of preliminary injunction against the "defendants,
their agents, representatives or other persons acting in their behalf, ordering them to desist from threshing and carting
away the palay harvest on Lot No. 3217 of the Cadastral Survey of Victoria, . . . until further order of this Court. . . ." 6 This
injunction was made permanent in the decision of the lower court rendered on July 26, 1977 in favor of the plaintiffs.

Pending appeal to the Court of Appeals, complainant herein entered a portion of the area in dispute, in the belief that the
whole of Lot No. 3217 belonged to him by virtue of a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Quitclaim 7 executed in his
favor by the heirs of Apolinario Gamalinda on May 6, 1985. It must be noted that at that time title to Lot No. 3217 was still
in the name of Apolinario Gamalinda. Thus, when Maximiano Tiburcio, Protacio Cabatino and Maximo Mateo, tenants of
Salud Balot, entered the portion being cultivated by complainant, the latter reported the incident to the police.
From Salud Balot's viewpoint, it was complainant who intruded into her land. Relying therefore on the injunction issued by
the lower court, she filed through counsel, Atty. Lim, a motion to declare complainant Gamalinda in contempt of court.
Complainant interposed the defense that the area in dispute in Civil Case No. 3827 was different from the area occupied
by him. To resolve the issue, the lower court with his agreement, ordered a resurvey of Lot No. 3217. The result of the
resurvey showed that contrary to complainant's claim, the lot occupied by him was the very same land involved in Civil
Case No. 3827. Accordingly, the lower court declared complainant in contempt in an order dated July 24, 1986 which was
affirmed on appeal by the Court of Appeals in a decision rendered on March 21, 1998. 8
Considering that Tiburcio, Cabatino and Mateo are tenants of Salud Balot and complainant is the successor-in-interest of
the heirs of Apolinario Gamalinda, the defendants in Civil Case No. 3827, it is clearly erroneous for complainant to claim
that neither he nor Tiburcio, Cabatino and Mateo had anything to do with said civil case. Being privies to the parties, they
are necessarily bound by the orders rendered in said case.
On October 12, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, affirming in toto the judgment of the lower court in Civil
Case No. 3827. 9 After the appellate court's decision had become final, Atty. Lim moved for the execution of the affirmed
judgment, 10 and when the writ of execution was returned unsatisfied, filed an "Urgent Motion to Require Domingo
Gamalinda to Surrender TCT 186299 to the Clerk of Court and to Authorize the Latter to Execute Reconveyance of Lot
3217-A in Favor of Plaintiffs." 11 That motion was granted by the lower court, but complainant refused to surrender the
Owner's Copy of TCT No. 186299, prompting Atty. Lim to file the questioned "Motion to Declare Owner's Copy of TCT
186299 Null and Void," 12 which the lower court granted on July 31, 1989.
It is clear from the foregoing that the questioned acts of Atty. Lim were all done in line with his duty to prosecute his clients'
cause in Civil Case No. 3827. The first motion was filed to protect his clients' possessory rights over the property in
dispute while the second motion was made to procure execution of the decision in Civil Case No. 3827.
A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and must be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. 13 He shall
serve his client with competence and diligence, 14 and his duty of entire devotion to his client's cause not only requires, but
entitles him to employ every honorable means to secure for the client what is justly due him or to present every defense
provided by law to enable the latter's cause to succeed. 15 An attorney's duty to safeguard the client's interests
commences from his retainer until the effective release from the case 16 or the final disposition of the whole subject matter
of the litigation. 17 During that period, he is expected to take such reasonable steps and such ordinary care as his client's
interests may require.
This is precisely what Atty. Lim was doing when he filed the motions complained of. He should be commended, not
condemned, for diligently and competently performing his duties as an attorney;
With respect to the complainant's contention that the Deed of Sale of Unregistered Land relied upon by the lower and
appellate courts in Civil Case No. 3827 is a forged or fake instrument, suffice it to say that this is a matter that should have
been litigated in said case instead of being raised for the first time in these proceedings. In any case, there being no
showing that Atty. Lim was aware of any defect in that deed, the charge of deception against him will not lie. Absent, too,
is any showing that Atty. Lim had anything to do with the preparation of the criminal information, and for the same reason
he cannot be called to account for it.
ACCORDINGLY, the administrative charges against retired Judge Fernando Alcantara and Atty. Joselito Lim are
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

NICANOR GONZALES and SALUD B. PANTANOSAS, complainants, vs.ATTY. MIGUEL SABACAJAN, respondent.

xxx xxx xxx

4. That sometime in October, 1994, complainants were informed by the Register of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City that the
complainants' owner's duplicate of title covering their lands, Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-91736 and T-91735 were
entrusted to the office secretary of the respondent who in torn entrusted the same to respondent;
5. That respondent admitted and confirmed to the complainants that their titles are in his custody and has even shown the
same (to) the complainant Salud B. Pantanosas but when demanded (sic) to deliver the said titles to the complainant in a
formal demand letter, marked as ANNEX "A," respondent refused and continues to refuse without any justification to give
their titles (and) when confronted, respondent challenged the complainants to file any case in any court even in the
Honorable Supreme Court;
6. That respondent's dare or challeng(e) is a manifestation of his arrogance taking undue advantage of his legal
profession over the simplicity, innocence and ignorance of the complainants, one of whom is his blood relative, his aunt,
for which complainants shudder with mental anguish;
7. That due to his challeng(e), the complainants sent a letter to the Honorable Supreme Court for enlightenment, copy of
which is attached as ANNEX "B", for which the Honorable Supreme Court required 19 legible copies of a verified
complaint;
8. That in spite of repeated demands, request(s) and pleas towards (sic) respondent, respondent still fail(ed) and
stubbornly refused without justification to surrender the said titles to the rightful owners, the complainants here(in), which
act is tantamount to willful and malicious defiance of legal and moral obligations emanating from his professional capacity
as a lawyer who had sworn to uphold law and justice, to the prejudice and damage of the complainants; 2
xxx xxx xxx
On March 22, 1995, the Court required respondent to comment on the foregoing complaint. In his unverified "Answer"
thereto, respondent admitted having met Salud Pantanosas but claims that, to his recollection, "Nicanor
Gonzales/Serdan" has never been to his office. Respondent likewise denied that he challenged anyone to file a case in
any court, much less the Supreme Court. He also claims that he referred complainant Pantanosas to his client, Mr. Samto
M. Uy of Iponan, Cagayan de Oro City, for whom he worked out the segregation of the titles, two of which are the subject
of the instant case. 3
Respondent likewise denies complainants' allegation that he is arrogant, in contrast to the innocence, simplicity and
ignorance of said complainants. He contends that the truth of the matter is that complainants have been charged with a
number of criminal and civil complaints before different courts. He also asserts that he was holding the certificates of title
in behalf of his client, Samto M. Uy. 4
Atty. Sabacajan stresses, by way of defense, that "the instant action was chosen precisely to browbeat him into delivering
the Certificates of Title to them without said certificates passing the hands of Mr. Samto Uy with whom the complainants
have some monetary obligations." 5
In its resolution dated June 26, 1995, 6 for internal administrative purposes the Court referred this case to the Office of the
Bar Confidant for the corresponding evaluation, report and recommendation.
From the foregoing proceedings taken on this matter, the Court finds that respondent admitted having taken possession of
the certificates of title of complainants but refused to surrender the same despite demands made by the latter. It follows,
therefore, that it was incumbent upon him to show that he was legally justified in doing so. Instead, all he did was to inform
this Court that "his obligation to deliver the certificates to Mr. Samto Uy excludes the delivery of said certificates to anyone
else." 7
Respondent attached some certifications to his "Answer" to support his contention that complainants are notorious
characters. However, the certifications indicate that most of the cases stated therein, especially those involving fraud,
have been dismissed. With respect to those still pending, there is no indication as to the identity of the party who instituted
the same, aside from the consideration that the remedy thereon is judicial in nature. At any rate, these aspersions on the
character of complainants have no bearing on the misconduct of respondent charged in the present case.

Respondent likewise submitted xerox copies of certain certificates of title in an effort to explain why he kept the certificates
of title of complainants, that is, supposedly for the purpose of subdividing the property. However, an examination of the
same does not show any connection thereof to respondent's claim. In fact, the two sets of certificates of title appear to be
entirely different from each other.
As a lawyer, respondent should know that there are lawful remedies provided by law to protect the interests of his client.
The records do not show that he or his client have availed of said remedies, instead of merely resorting to unexplained, if
not curt, refusals to accommodate the requests of complainants. Also, he cannot be unaware of the imposable sanctions
on a counsel who resorts to unlawful means that would cause injustice to the adversaries of his client.

The Court accordingly finds that respondent has not exercised the good faith and diligence required of lawyers in handling
the legal affairs of their clients. If complainants did have the alleged monetary obligations to his client, that does not
warrant his summarily confiscating their certificates of title since there is no showing in the records that the same were
given as collaterals to secure the payment of a debt. Neither is there any intimation that there is a court order authorizing
him to take and retain custody of said certificates of title.
Apparently, respondent has disregarded Canon 15, Rule 15.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides
that a lawyer shall impress upon his client the need for compliance with the laws and principles of fairness. Instead, he
unjustly refused to give to complainants their certificates of titles supposedly to enforce payment of their alleged financial
obligations to his client and presumably to impress the latter of his power to do so.
Canon 19, Rule 19.01 ordains that a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his
client and shall not present, participate in presenting, or threaten to present unfounded charges to obtain an improper
advantage in any case or proceeding. Respondent has closely skirted this proscription, if he has not in fact transgressed
the same.
On the foregoing considerations, the Court desires and directs that respondent should forthwith return the certificates of
title of complainants. To ensure the same, he should be placed under suspension until he presents to the Court proof of
receipt by complainants of their respective copies of Certificates of Title Nos. T-91735 and T-91736 or a judicial order or
document authorizing or justifying the retention of possession thereof by respondent or his aforenamed client.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Miguel Sabacajan is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law until he can duly show to this
Court that the disputed certificates of title have been returned to and the receipt thereof duly acknowledged by
complainants, or can present a judicial order or appropriate legal authority justifying the possession by him or his client of
said certificates. He is further WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar or any other administrative misconduct will
be punished more severely.
Let a copy of this resolution be spread on the personal records of respondent and have copies thereof furnished to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and duly circularized to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.