You are on page 1of 45

Justice Network blog http://nosueorg.blogspot.

com/
by Neil J. Gillespie - NoSue.org

Nina Simone - Mississippi Goddam Polston CJ, Isom, J, Young, TFB (Florida Goddam)
Mississippi Goddam (Florida Goddam), originally posted Saturday, September 13, 2014
http://nosueorg.blogspot.com/2014/09/mississippi-goddam-florida-goddam.html
UPDATE February 18, 2015
Supreme Court records obtained show certain pleadings, letters and other documents filed in
Petition No. 12-7747 were received by the Supreme Court January 24, 2013 (date stamped
Received, Jan 24 2013 Office of the Clerk, Supreme Court, U.S.). But those pleadings, letters
and other documents do not appear on the Supreme Courts docket for Petition No. 12-7747.
http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/12-7747.htm
Supreme Court records were provided by the National Archives and Records Administration,
https://www.scribd.com/doc/256161046/National-Archives-SCOTUS-12-7747
and researcher Mark Leutbecker, Nicklason Research Associates.
https://www.scribd.com/doc/256159327/National-Archive-SCOTUS-12-7747-Mark-Leutbecker
Therefore a reasonable person could conclude that U.S. Supreme Court Petition No. 12-7747
was compromised. A reasonable person might also conclude that the compromise of Petition No.
12-7747 was due to a special relationship with the Chief Justice of the Untied States with
former Florida Chief Justice Ricky Polston, Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Judge Claudia Rickert
Isom, and former Florida Bar President Gwynne Alice Young.
UPDATE January 21, 2015
On information and belief, the foregoing is evidence of misconduct by former Chief Justice
Ricky Polston, Judge Claudia Rickert Isom, and Florida Bar President Gwynne Alice Young.
Presenting Claudia Isom the Distinguished Judicial Service Award while Isom was a Respondent
in Petition No. 12-7747 for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States, along
with the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, is conduct unbecoming a member of the bar that is
prohibited by Rule 46 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure because it implied "a special
relationship with the Chief Justice of the Untied States".

Mississippi Goddam (Florida Goddam), originally posted Saturday, September 13, 2014
http://nosueorg.blogspot.com/2014/09/mississippi-goddam-florida-goddam.html

In determining what conduct violates Rule 46, an earlier Supreme Court [In re Snyder 472 U.S.
634, 645 (1985)] found tribunals should consider "case law, applicable court rules, and the lore
of the profession, as embodied in codes of professional conduct," such as the ABA Model Rules
of Professional Conduct.
Judge Isoms appearance January 31, 2013 in the Florida Supreme Court Chamber violated, inter
alia, Rule 8.4(e) of the Model Rules, which says it is professional misconduct for an attorney to
"state or imply an ability to influence improperly a government agency or official or to achieve
results by means that violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law."
The Distinguished Judicial Service Award itself appears to be a sham anyway. Officially the
award "honors outstanding and sustained service to the public especially as it relates to support
of pro bono legal services". But for the past three years the award was given to judges or a
spouse who in my Hillsborough case denied me basic due process.
In 2012 Judge James M. Barton, II, got the Distinguished Judicial Service Award, presented by
the Chief Justice Polston in the Supreme Court. Barton presided over my case in Hillsborough
County (05-CA-7205) from February 13, 2007 through May 25, 2010. The record shows Barton
collaborated with Mr. Rodems and my lawyer Robert W. Bauer (a Bar referral) to undermine my
case. On January 13, 2006 I established by Order of Judge Nielson a cause of action against
Rodems and his firm in the theft of $6,224.78 ($7,143) through a closing statement fraud. My
motion and affidavit for summary judgment were filed April 25, 2006 and noticed for hearing.
Tellingly Bauer did not argue my summary judgment. Instead he assisted Rodems & Barton.
In 2013 Judge Claudia R. Isom got the Distinguished Judicial Service Award, presented by the
Chief Justice Polston, see attached. Isom presided over my case in Hillsborough County (05-CA7205) from November 22, 2006 through February 13, 2007.
In 2014 Judge Emily Peacock got the Distinguished Judicial Service Award, presented by the
Chief Justice Polston at a Jan. 30 ceremony at the Supreme Court of Florida. Emily Peacock is
married to Mike Peacock, the Public Defender who failed to represent me June 1, 2011 after he
was appointed to do so. Judge Arnold relieved the public defender from the counsel
appointment claiming no basis. But Arnold had other basis to appoint counsel, including the
ADA, and under Fla. Stat. 29.007 (2011) "This section applies in any situation in which the
court appoints counsel to protect a litigants due process rights.", according to the ABA.

http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/12-7747.htm

No. 12-7747
Title:

Neil J. Gillespie, Petitioner


v.
Thirteenth Judicial Circuit of Florida, et al.
Docketed:
December 14, 2012
Linked with 12A215
Lower Ct:
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Case Nos.:
(12-11028-B)
Decision Date: July 13, 2012
Rule 12.4
~~~Date~~~ ~~~~~~~Proceedings and Orders~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Aug 13 2012 Application (12A215) to extend the time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari
from October 11, 2012 to December 10, 2012, submitted to Justice Thomas.
Sep 13 2012 Application (12A215) granted by Justice Thomas extending the time to file until
December 10, 2012.
Dec 10 2012 Petition for a writ of certiorari and motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis filed. (Response due January 14, 2013)
Dec 20 2012 Waiver of right of respondents Rayan Christopher Rodems; and Barker,
Rodems & Cook, P.A. to respond filed.
Jan 24 2013 DISTRIBUTED for Conference of February 15, 2013.
Feb 13 2013 Supplemental brief of petitioner Neil J. Gillespie filed. (Distributed)
Feb 19 2013 Petition DENIED.
Mar 18 2013 Petition for Rehearing filed.
Mar 27 2013 DISTRIBUTED for Conference of April 12, 2013.
Apr 15 2013 Rehearing DENIED.

~~Name~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Attorneys for Petitioner:
Neil J. Gillespie

Party name: Neil J. Gillespie


Attorneys for Respondents:
Ryan Christopher Rodems

~~~~~~~Address~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~Phone~~~
8092 SW 115th Loop
Ocala, FL 34481
neilgillespie@mfi.net

(352) 854-7807

Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A.

(813)-489-1001

http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/12-7747.htm

Counsel of Record

501 East Kennedy Blvd., Suite 790


Tampa, FL 33602
Party name: Rayan Christopher Rodems; and Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A.

http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct/rule_8_4_misconduct.html

Home > ABA Groups > Center for Professional Responsibility > Publications > Model Rules of
Professional Conduct > Rule 8.4: Misconduct

Rule 8.4: Misconduct


Maintaining The Integrity Of The Profession
Rule 8.4 Misconduct
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct,
knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the
acts of another;
(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation;
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice;
(e) state or imply an ability to influence improperly a government
agency or official or to achieve results by means that violate the
Rules of Professional Conduct or other law; or
(f) knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a
violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct or other law.

Comment | Table of Contents | Next Rule

http://www.floridabar.org/divexe/rrtfb.nsf/FV/0B6C8E5CDCA464D685257172004B0FBD

ABOUT THE BAR

NEWS & EVENTS

FOR THE PUBLIC

MEMBER SERVICES

LOG IN

FIND A LAWYER

Search The Florida Bar

THE FLORIDA BAR / Rules

The Florida Bar

www.floridabar.org

RULE 4-8.4 MISCONDUCT


4 RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
4-8 MAINTAINING THE INTEGRITY OF THE PROFESSION

RULE 4-8.4 MISCONDUCT


A lawyer shall not:
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through
the acts of another;
(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, except that it shall not be professional misconduct
for a lawyer for a criminal law enforcement agency or regulatory agency to advise others about or to supervise another in an
undercover investigation, unless prohibited by law or rule, and it shall not be professional misconduct for a lawyer employed in a
capacity other than as a lawyer by a criminal law enforcement agency or regulatory agency to participate in an undercover
investigation, unless prohibited by law or rule;
(d) engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial to the administration of justice, including to
knowingly, or through callous indifference, disparage, humiliate, or discriminate against litigants, jurors, witnesses, court personnel,
or other lawyers on any basis, including, but not limited to, on account of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, national origin, disability,
marital status, sexual orientation, age, socioeconomic status, employment, or physical characteristic;
(e) state or imply an ability to influence improperly a government agency or official or to achieve results by means that violate the
Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;
(f) knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct or other law;
(g) fail to respond, in writing, to any official inquiry by bar counsel or a disciplinary agency, as defined elsewhere in these rules,
when bar counsel or the agency is conducting an investigation into the lawyer's conduct. A written response shall be made:
(1) within 15 days of the date of the initial written investigative inquiry by bar counsel, grievance committee, or board of
governors;
(2) within 10 days of the date of any follow-up written investigative inquiries by bar counsel, grievance committee, or board of
governors;
(3) within the time stated in any subpoena issued under these Rules Regulating The Florida Bar (without additional time
allowed for mailing);
(4) as provided in the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure or order of the referee in matters assigned to a referee; and
(5) as provided in the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure or order of the Supreme Court of Florida for matters pending action
by that court.

http://www.floridabar.org/divexe/rrtfb.nsf/FV/0B6C8E5CDCA464D685257172004B0FBD

Except as stated otherwise herein or in the applicable rules, all times for response shall be calculated as provided elsewhere in these
Rules Regulating The Florida Bar and may be extended or shortened by bar counsel or the disciplinary agency making the official
inquiry upon good cause shown.
Failure to respond to an official inquiry with no good cause shown may be a matter of contempt and processed in accordance with
rule 3-7.11(f) of these Rules Regulating The Florida Bar.
(h) willfully refuse, as determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, to timely pay a child support obligation; or
(i) engage in sexual conduct with a client or a representative of a client that exploits or adversely affects the interests of the client or
the lawyer-client relationship.
If the sexual conduct commenced after the lawyer-client relationship was formed it shall be presumed that the sexual conduct
exploits or adversely affects the interests of the client or the lawyer-client relationship. A lawyer may rebut this presumption by
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the sexual conduct did not exploit or adversely affect the interests of the client or
the lawyer-client relationship.
The prohibition and presumption stated in this rule do not apply to a lawyer in the same firm as another lawyer representing the
client if the lawyer involved in the sexual conduct does not personally provide legal services to the client and is screened from
access to the file concerning the legal representation.
Comment
Lawyers are subject to discipline when they violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or
induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another, as when they request or instruct an agent to do so on the lawyer's
behalf. Subdivision (a), however, does not prohibit a lawyer from advising a client concerning action the client is legally entitled to
take, provided that the client is not used to indirectly violate the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Many kinds of illegal conduct reflect adversely on fitness to practice law, such as offenses involving fraud and the offense of willful
failure to file an income tax return. However, some kinds of offense carry no such implication. Traditionally, the distinction was
drawn in terms of offenses involving "moral turpitude." That concept can be construed to include offenses concerning some matters
of personal morality, such as adultery and comparable offenses, that have no specific connection to fitness for the practice of law.
Although a lawyer is personally answerable to the entire criminal law, a lawyer should be professionally answerable only for
offenses that indicate lack of those characteristics relevant to law practice. Offenses involving violence, dishonesty, breach of trust,
or serious interference with the administration of justice are in that category. A pattern of repeated offenses, even ones of minor
significance when considered separately, can indicate indifference to legal obligation.
A lawyer may refuse to comply with an obligation imposed by law upon a good faith belief that no valid obligation exists. The
provisions of rule 4-1.2(d) concerning a good faith challenge to the validity, scope, meaning, or application of the law apply to
challenges of legal regulation of the practice of law.
Subdivision (c) recognizes instances where lawyers in criminal law enforcement agencies or regulatory agencies advise others about
or supervise others in undercover investigations, and provides an exception to allow the activity without the lawyer engaging in
professional misconduct. The exception acknowledges current, acceptable practice of these agencies. Although the exception
appears in this rule, it is also applicable to rules 4-4.1 and 4-4.3. However, nothing in the rule allows the lawyer to engage in such
conduct if otherwise prohibited by law or rule.
Subdivision (d) of this rule proscribes conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. Such proscription includes the
prohibition against discriminatory conduct committed by a lawyer while performing duties in connection with the practice of law.
The proscription extends to any characteristic or status that is not relevant to the proof of any legal or factual issue in dispute. Such
conduct, when directed towards litigants, jurors, witnesses, court personnel, or other lawyers, whether based on race, ethnicity,

http://www.floridabar.org/divexe/rrtfb.nsf/FV/0B6C8E5CDCA464D685257172004B0FBD

gender, religion, national origin, disability, marital status, sexual orientation, age, socioeconomic status, employment, physical
characteristic, or any other basis, subverts the administration of justice and undermines the public's confidence in our system of
justice, as well as notions of equality. This subdivision does not prohibit a lawyer from representing a client as may be permitted by
applicable law, such as, by way of example, representing a client accused of committing discriminatory conduct.
Lawyers holding public office assume legal responsibilities going beyond those of other citizens. A lawyer's abuse of public office
can suggest an inability to fulfill the professional role of attorney. The same is true of abuse of positions of private trust such as
trustee, executor, administrator, guardian, or agent and officer, director, or manager of a corporation or other organization.
A lawyer's obligation to respond to an inquiry by a disciplinary agency is stated in subdivision (g) of this rule and subdivision (h)(2)
of rule 3-7.6. While response is mandatory, the lawyer may deny the charges or assert any available privilege or immunity or
interpose any disability that prevents disclosure of a certain matter. A response containing a proper invocation thereof is sufficient
under the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar. This obligation is necessary to ensure the proper and efficient operation of the
disciplinary system.
Subdivision (h) of this rule was added to make consistent the treatment of attorneys who fail to pay child support with the treatment
of other professionals who fail to pay child support, in accordance with the provisions of section 61.13015, Florida Statutes. That
section provides for the suspension or denial of a professional license due to delinquent child support payments after all other
available remedies for the collection of child support have been exhausted. Likewise, subdivision (h) of this rule should not be used
as the primary means for collecting child support, but should be used only after all other available remedies for the collection of
child support have been exhausted. Before a grievance may be filed or a grievance procedure initiated under this subdivision, the
court that entered the child support order must first make a finding of willful refusal to pay. The child support obligation at issue
under this rule includes both domestic (Florida) and out-of-state (URESA) child support obligations, as well as arrearages.
Subdivision (i) proscribes exploitation of the client or the lawyer-client relationship by means of commencement of sexual conduct.
The lawyer-client relationship is grounded on mutual trust. A sexual relationship that exploits that trust compromises the lawyerclient relationship. Attorneys have a duty to exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of clients. Engaging in sexual
relationships with clients has the capacity to impair the exercise of that judgment.
Sexual conduct between a lawyer and client violates this rule, regardless of when the sexual conduct began when compared to the
commencement of the lawyer-client relationship, if the sexual conduct exploits the lawyer-client relationship, negatively affects the
client's interest, creates a conflict of interest between the lawyer and client, or negatively affects the exercise of the lawyer's
independent professional judgment in representing the client.
Subdivision (i) creates a presumption that sexual conduct between a lawyer and client exploits or adversely affects the interests of
the client or the lawyer-client relationship if the sexual conduct is entered into after the lawyer-client relationship begins. A lawyer
charged with a violation of this rule may rebut this presumption by a preponderance of the evidence that the sexual conduct did not
exploit the lawyer-client relationship, negatively affect the client's interest, create a conflict of interest between the lawyer and
client, or negatively affect the exercise of the lawyer's independent professional judgment in representing the client.
For purposes of this rule, a "representative of a client" is an agent of the client who supervises, directs, or regularly consults with the
organization's lawyer concerning a client matter or has authority to obligate the organization with respect to the matter, or whose act
or omission in connection with the matter may be imputed to the organization for purposes of civil or criminal liability.
[Revised: 02/01/2010]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/In_re_Snyder

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634 (1985), was a United States


Supreme Court case in which the Court held that an
attorney's curt letter to a court employee, followed by the
attorney's refusal to apologize for sending the letter, did not
justify suspending the attorney from practicing law in federal
court.

In re Snyder

Supreme Court of the United States


Argued April 16, 1985
Decided June 24, 1985

1 Background and facts


2 Eighth Circuit proceedings
3 Opinion of the Court

Full case
name

In re Snyder

Citations

472 U.S. 634


(https://supreme.justia.com/us/472
/634/case.html) (more)

Prior
history

734 F.2d 334 (8th Cir. 1984)

4 References

Holding

Robert J. Snyder was an attorney in Bismarck, North Dakota.


His practice included serving as a criminal defense lawyer for
indigent defendants in federal cases, with his compensation
provided by government funds under the Criminal Justice Act
(CJA). In 1983, Snyder submitted an application for CJA
compensation for a case he had handled before Judge Bruce
Van Sickle in the District Court. Because the request
exceeded $1,000, it was subject to review by the Chief Judge
of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, Donald P. Lay. Judge
Lay's secretary returned Snyder's application, advising Snyder
that his documentation was insufficient. Snyder discussed the
situation with Judge Van Sickle's secretary, who suggested
that Snyder write her a letter expressing his views.

Attorney's allegedly rude letter to a court employee,


followed by his refusal to apologize when requested
by the court, did not support suspending the attorney
from practicing law
Court membership
Chief Justice
Warren E. Burger
Associate Justices
William J. Brennan, Jr. Byron White
Thurgood Marshall Harry Blackmun
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. William Rehnquist
John P. Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor
Case opinions
Majority

Burger, joined by Brennan, White,


Marshall, Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens,
O'Connor

Snyder wrote to Judge Van Sickle's secretary as she had


Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of the
suggested. In this letter, Snyder complained that the
case.
compensation provided under the CJA was inadequate, and
protested that "[n]ow, however, not only are we paid an
Laws applied
amount of money which does not even cover our overhead,
Fed. R. App. P. 46
but we have to go through extreme gymnastics even to
receive the puny amounts which the federal courts authorize for this work." He said that he would not provide
any additional paperwork to support his compensation request, and that "[y]ou can take it or leave it." Snyder
closed his letter by stating: "Further, I am extremely disgusted by the treatment of us by the Eighth Circuit in
this case, and you are instructed to remove my name from the list of attorneys who will accept criminal indigent
defense work. I have simply had it. Thank you for your time and attention."

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/In_re_Snyder

District Judge Van Sickle viewed Snyder's letter as seeking changes in the court system's procedures for
awarding fees under the CJA, and forwarded it to Chief Judge Lay. Lay, however, opined that Snyder's letter
was "totally disrespectful to the federal courts and to the judicial system. It demonstrates a total lack of respect
for the legal process and the courts." Lay expressed displeasure about Snyder's failure to follow the procedures
for fee requests, and opined that this cast doubt on whether Snyder should be allowed to continue practicing law
in federal court.
Judge Van Sickle responded that Snyder viewed the letter "an expression of an honest opinion, and an exercise
of his right of freedom of speech." The judge himself described it as "a youthful and exuberant expression of
annoyance which has now risen to the level of a cause." Snyder declined to apologize for the letter, although he
"assured [Judge Van Sickle] he did not intend the letter as [Judge Lay] interpreted it."

Judge Lay then issued an order to show cause directing Snyder to explain why he should not be suspended from
practicing law in the Eighth Circuit. The stated basis for the order to show cause was Snyder's statement that he
would no longer accept case assignments under the CJA. However, at a hearing before the court, the Eighth
Circuit judges focused on whether Snyder would apologize for the contents of his letter to the District Court's
secretary. Both at the hearing and in writing afterwards, Snyder stated that he would be glad to accept CJA
assignments under a revised CJA plan for the District of North Dakota. However, in response to the request for
an apology, Snyder wrote:
"I cannot, and will never, in justice to my conscience, apologize for what I consider to be telling the truth,
albeit in harsh terms....
"It is unfortunate that the respective positions in the proceeding have so hardened. However, I consider
this to be a matter of principle, and if one stands on a principle, one must be willing to accept the
consequences."[1]
A three-judge panel of the Eighth Circuit then issued an opinion and order suspending Snyder from practicing
law both in the Eighth Circuit and in the District of North Dakota for at least six months.[2] The full Eighth
Circuit denied Snyder's request for rehearing en banc with two judges dissenting, but voted to cancel the
suspension if Snyder submitted an apology within ten days.[3] Snyder did not apologize, and the suspension took
effect.
Snyder asked the Supreme Court to review the suspension order, contending that the order violated his First
Amendment and due process rights and was unjustified. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.[4]

Chief Justice Warren E. Burger delivered the opinion of the Court, which spoke for a unanimous Court, except
that Justice Harry A. Blackmun did not participate in the case.[5] Burger's opinion held that Snyder's conduct did
not constitute cause for suspending him under Rule 46 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Because the
case could be resolved on non-constitutional grounds, Burger wrote, the Court need not address Snyder's
arguments under the First Amendment or the Due Process Clause.
Burger stated that courts have the power to suspend or disbar lawyers from practicing before them for "conduct
unbecoming a member of the bar of the court." This authority is inherent in the nature of a court, and in the case

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/In_re_Snyder

of the United States Courts of Appeals, is codified in Rule 46.


Here, the Eighth Circuit had concluded that Snyder had engaged in "contumacious conduct" and demonstrated
unfitness to practice law in federal court when he submitted his letter to a court employee and refused to
apologize for it. However, the Supreme Court did "not consider a lawyer's criticism of the administration of the
[Criminal Justice] Act or criticism of inequities in assignments under the Act as cause for discipline or
suspension."
The Court's opinion concluded:
"The record indicates the Court of Appeals was concerned about the tone of the letter; petitioner
concedes that the tone of his letter was 'harsh,' and, indeed it can be read as ill-mannered. All persons
involved in the judicial processjudges, litigants, witnesses, and court officersowe a duty of courtesy
to all other participants. The necessity for civility in the inherently contentious setting of the adversary
process suggests that members of the bar cast criticisms of the system in a professional and civil tone.
However, even assuming that the letter exhibited an unlawyerlike rudeness, a single incident of rudeness
or lack of professional courtesyin this contextdoes not support a finding of contemptuous or
contumacious conduct, or a finding that a lawyer is 'not presently fit to practice law in the federal courts.'
Nor does it rise to the level of 'conduct unbecoming a member of the bar' warranting suspension from
practice."
Accordingly, Snyder's suspension was reversed.

1. ^ Quoted in In re Snyder, 472 U.S. at 638.


2. ^ In re Snyder, 734 F.2d 334 (8th Cir. 1984).
3. ^ Id.
4. ^ 469 U.S. 1156 (1985).
5. ^ Supreme Court Justices do not ordinarily provide the reasons for their recusal in a given case, but Blackmun
served as Circuit Justice for the Eighth Circuit (of which he had been a member before being appointed to the
Supreme Court), and worked closely with the judges of the Eighth Circuit in that capacity.

Linda Greenhouse, "Court Reinstates Angry Lawyer, 33", New York Times, June 25, 1985.
Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=In_re_Snyder&oldid=645406802"
Categories: 1985 in United States case law United States Supreme Court cases
United States Supreme Court cases of the Burger Court

This page was last modified on 3 February 2015, at 04:16.


Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License; additional terms may
apply. By using this site, you agree to the Terms of Use and Privacy Policy. Wikipedia is a registered

http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=US&vol=472&invol=634

FindLaw

SUPREME COURT

View enhanced case on Westlaw


KeyCite this case on Westlaw

http://laws.findlaw.com/us/472/634.html

Cases citing this case: Supreme Court


Cases citing this case: Circuit Courts

U.S. Supreme Court


IN RE SNYDER, 472 U.S. 634 (1985)
472 U.S. 634
IN RE SNYDER
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH
CIRCUIT
No. 84-310.
Argued April 16, 1985
Decided June 24, 1985
Petitioner, who was appointed by the Federal District Court for the District of North Dakota to
represent a defendant under the Criminal Justice Act (Act), was awarded almost $1,800 by the court
for services and expenses in handling the assignment. As required by the Act with regard to
expenditures for compensation in excess of $1,000, the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit reviewed the claim, found it to be insufficiently documented, and returned it with a
request for additional documentation. Because of computer problems, petitioner could not readily
provide the information in the requested form, but filed a supplemental application. The Chief Judge's
secretary again returned the application, stating that petitioner's documentation was unacceptable;
petitioner then discussed the matter with the District Judge's secretary, who suggested that he write a
letter expressing his views. In October 1983, petitioner wrote a letter to the District Judge's secretary
in which (in an admittedly "harsh" tone) he declined to submit further documentation, refused to
accept further assignments under the Act, and criticized the administration of the Act. Viewing the
letter as seeking changes in the process for providing fees, the District Judge discussed those concerns
with petitioner and then forwarded the letter to the Chief Judge. In subsequent correspondence with
the District Judge, the Chief Judge of the Circuit stated, inter alia, that he considered petitioner's
October letter to be "totally disrespectful to the federal courts and to the judicial system," and that
unless petitioner apologized an order would be issued directing petitioner to show cause why he
should not be suspended from practice in the Circuit. After petitioner declined to apologize, an order
was issued directing petitioner to show cause why he should not be suspended for his "refusal to carry
out his obligations as a practicing lawyer and officer of [the] court" because of his refusal to accept
assignments under the Act; however, at the subsequent hearing the Court of Appeals focused on
whether petitioner's October letter was disrespectful, and petitioner again refused to apologize for the
letter. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals suspended petitioner from the practice of law in the federal
courts in the Circuit for six months, indicating that its action was based on petitioner's "refusal to
show continuing respect for the court," and specifically finding that petitioner's "disrespectful
statements" in his October letter as to the court's [472 U.S. 634, 635] administration of the Act
constituted "contumacious conduct" rendering him "not presently fit to practice law in the federal
courts."
Held:
Petitioner's conduct and expressions did not warrant his suspension from practice. Pp. 642-647.
(a) Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 46, which sets forth the standard for disciplining
attorneys practicing before the courts of appeals, an attorney may be suspended or disbarred if found
guilty of "conduct unbecoming a member of the bar of the court." The quoted phrase must be read in
light of the complex code of behavior to which attorneys are subject, reflecting the burdens inherent in
the attorney's dual obligations to clients and to the system of justice. In this light, "conduct
unbecoming a member of the bar" is conduct contrary to professional standards that shows an
unfitness to discharge continuing obligations to clients or the courts, or conduct inimical to the
administration of justice. Pp. 642-645.
(b) Petitioner's refusal to submit further documentation in support of his fee request could afford a

http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=US&vol=472&invol=634

basis for declining to award a fee, but the record does not support the Court of Appeals' action
suspending petitioner from practice; the submission of adequate documentation was only a
prerequisite to the collection of his fee, not an affirmative obligation required by his duties to a client
or the court. Nor, as the Court of Appeals ultimately concluded, was petitioner legally obligated under
the terms of the local plan to accept cases under the Act. A lawyer's criticism of the administration of
the Act or of inequities in assignments under the Act does not constitute cause for suspension; as
officers of the court, members of the bar may appropriately express criticism on such matters. Even
assuming that petitioner's October letter exhibited an unlawyerlike rudeness, a single incident of
rudeness or lack of professional courtesy - in the context here - does not support a finding of
contemptuous or contumacious conduct, or a finding that a lawyer is not presently fit to practice law
in the federal courts; nor does it rise to the level of "conduct unbecoming a member of the bar"
warranting suspension from practice. Pp. 645-647.
734 F.2d 334, reversed.
BURGER, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined except
BLACKMUN, J., who took no part in the decision of the case.
David L. Peterson argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Robert P. Bennett,
John C. Kapsner, Charles L. Chapman, and Irvin B. Nodland. [472 U.S. 634, 636]
John J. Greer argued the cause for respondent United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
With him on the brief was Ross H. Sidney. *
[ Footnote * ] Charles S. Sims filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union as amicus curiae
urging reversal.
Frank E. Bazler and Albert L. Bell filed a brief for the Ohio State Bar Association as amicus curiae.
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals suspending petitioner from
practice in all courts of the Eighth Circuit for six months.

I
In March 1983, petitioner Robert Snyder was appointed by the Federal District Court for the District of
North Dakota to represent a defendant under the Criminal Justice Act. After petitioner completed the
assignment, he submitted a claim for $1,898.55 for services and expenses. The claim was reduced by
the District Court of $1,796.05.
Under the Criminal Justice Act, the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals was required to review and
approve expenditures for compensation in excess of $1,000. 1 18 U.S.C. 3006A(d)(3). Chief Judge Lay
found the claim insufficiently documented, and he returned it with a request for additional
information. Because of technical problems with his computer software, petitioner could not readily
provide the information in the form requested by the Chief Judge. He did, however, file a
supplemental application.
The secretary of the Chief Judge of the Circuit again returned the application, stating that the
proffered documentation was unacceptable. Petitioner then discussed the matter with Helen
Monteith, the District Court Judge's secretary, who suggested he write a letter expressing his view.
Petitioner [472 U.S. 634, 637] then wrote the letter that led to this case. The letter, addressed to Ms.
Monteith, read in part:
"In the first place, I am appalled by the amount of money which the federal court pays for indigent
criminal defense work. The reason that so few attorneys in Bismarck accept this work is for that exact
reason. We have, up to this point, still accepted the indigent appointments, because of a duty to our
profession, and the fact that nobody else will do it.
"Now, however, not only are we paid an amount of money which does not even cover our overhead,
but we have to go through extreme gymnastics even to receive the puny amounts which the federal
courts authorize for this work. We have sent you everything we have concerning our representation,
and I am not sending you anything else. You can take it or leave it.
"Further, I am extremely disgusted by the treatment of us by the Eighth Circuit in this case, and you
are instructed to remove my name from the list of attorneys who will accept criminal indigent defense
work. I have simply had it.
"Thank you for your time and attention." App. 14-15.
The District Court Judge viewed this letter as one seeking changes in the process for providing fees,

http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=US&vol=472&invol=634

and discussed these concerns with petitioner. The District Court Judge then forwarded the letter to
the Chief Judge of the Circuit. The Chief Judge in turn wrote to the District Judge, stating that he
considered petitioner's letter.
"totally disrespectful to the federal courts and to the judicial system. It demonstrates a total lack of
respect for the legal process and the courts." Id., at 16.
The Chief Judge expressed concern both about petitioner's failure to "follow the guidelines and
[refusal] to cooperate with the court," and questioned whether, "in view of the letter" [472 U.S. 634,
638] petitioner was "worthy of practicing law in the federal courts on any matter." He stated his
intention to issue an order to show cause why petitioner should not be suspended from practicing in
any federal court in the Circuit for a period of one year. Id., at 17-18. Subsequently, the Chief Judge
wrote to the District Court again, stating that if petitioner apologized the matter would be dropped. At
this time, the Chief Judge approved a reduced fee for petitioner's work of $1,000 plus expenses of
$23.25.
After talking with petitioner, the District Court Judge responded to the Chief Judge as follows:
"He [petitioner] sees his letter as an expression of an honest opinion, and an exercise of his right of
freedom of speech. I, of course, see it as a youthful and exuberant expression of annoyance which has
now risen to the level of a cause. . . .
"He has decided not to apologize, although he assured me he did not intend the letter as you
interpreted it." Id., at 20.
The Chief Judge then issued an order for petitioner to show cause why he should not be suspended for
his "refusal to carry out his obligations as a practicing lawyer and officer of [the] court" because of his
refusal to accept assignments under the Criminal Justice Act. Id., at 22. Nowhere in the order was
there any reference to any disrespect in petitioner's letter of October 6, 1983.
Petitioner requested a hearing on the show cause order. In his response to the order, petitioner
focused exclusively on whether he was required to represent indigents under the Criminal Justice Act.
He contended that the Act did not compel lawyers to represent indigents, and he noted that many of
the lawyers in his District had declined to serve. 2 [472 U.S. 634, 639] He also informed the court
that prior to his withdrawal from the Criminal Justice Act panel, he and his two partners had taken 15
percent of all the Criminal Justice Act cases in their district.
At the hearing, the Court of Appeals focused on whether petitioner's letter of October 6, 1983, was
disrespectful, an issue not mentioned in the show cause order. At one point, Judge Arnold asked: "I
am asking you, sir, if you are prepared to apologize to the court for the tone of your letter?" Id., at 40.
Petitioner answered: "That is not the basis that I am being brought forth before the court today." Ibid.
When the issue again arose, petitioner protested: "But, it seems to me we're getting far afield here.
The question is, can I be suspended from this court for my request to be removed from the panel of
attorneys." Id., at 42.
Petitioner was again offered an opportunity to apologize for his letter, but he declined. At the
conclusion of the hearing, the Chief Judge stated:
"I want to make it clear to Mr. Snyder what it is the court is allowing you ten days lapse here, a period
for you to consider. One is, that, assuming there is a general requirement for all competent lawyers to
do pro bono work that you stand willing and ready to perform such work and will comply with the
guidelines of the statute. And secondly, to reconsider your position as Judge Arnold has requested,
concerning the tone of your letter of October 6." Id., at 50.
Following the hearing, petitioner wrote a letter to the court, agreeing to "enthusiastically obey [the]
mandates" of any new plan for the implementation of the Criminal Justice Act in North Dakota, and to
"make every good faith effort possible" to comply with the court's guidelines regarding compensation
[472 U.S. 634, 640] under the Act. Petitioner's letter, however, made no mention of the October 6,
1983, letter. Id., at 51-52.
The Chief Judge then wrote to Snyder, stating among other things:
"The court expressed its opinion at the time of the oral hearing that interrelated with our concern and
the issuance of the order to show cause was the disrespect that you displayed to the court by way of
your letter addressed to Helen Montieth [sic], Judge Van Sickle's secretary, of October 6, 1983. The
court expressly asked if you would be willing to apologize for the tone of the letter and the disrespect
displayed. You serve as an officer of the court and, as such, the Canons of Ethics require every lawyer
to maintain a respect for the court as an institution.
"Before circulating your letter of February 23, I would appreciate your response to Judge Arnold's
specific request, and the court's request, for you to apologize for the letter that you wrote.
"Please let me hear from you by return mail. I am confident that if such a letter is forthcoming that

http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=US&vol=472&invol=634

the court will dissolve the order." Id., at 52-53. (Emphasis added.)
Petitioner responded to the Chief Judge:
"I cannot, and will never, in justice to my conscience, apologize for what I consider to be telling the
truth, albeit in harsh terms. . . .
"It is unfortunate that the respective positions in the proceeding have so hardened. However, I
consider this to be a matter of principle, and if one stands on a principle, one must be willing to accept
the consequences." Id., at 54.
After receipt of this letter, petitioner was suspended from the practice of law in the federal courts in
the Eighth Circuit for six months. 734 F.2d 334 (1984). The opinion stated [472 U.S. 634, 641] that
petitioner "contumaciously refused to retract his previous remarks or apologize to the court." Id., at
336. It continued:
"[Petitioner's] refusal to show continuing respect for the court and his refusal to demonstrate a
sincere retraction of his admittedly `harsh' statements are sufficient to demonstrate to this court that
he is not presently fit to practice law in the federal courts. All courts depend on the highest level of
integrity and respect not only from the judiciary but from the lawyers who serve in the court as well.
Without public display of respect for the judicial branch of government as an institution by lawyers,
the law cannot survive. . . . Without hesitation we find Snyder's disrespectful statements as to this
court's administration of CJA contumacious conduct. We deem this unfortunate.
"We find that Robert Snyder shall be suspended from the practice of law in the federal courts of the
Eighth Circuit for a period of six months; thereafter, Snyder should make application to both this
court and the federal district court of North Dakota to be readmitted." Id., at 337. (Emphasis added.)
The opinion specifically stated that petitioner's offer to serve in Criminal Justice Act cases in the
future if the panel was equitably structured had "considerable merit." Id., at 339.
Petitioner moved for rehearing en banc. In support of his motion, he presented an affidavit from the
District Judge's secretary - the addressee of the October 6 letter - stating that she had encouraged him
to send the letter. He also submitted an affidavit from the District Judge, which read in part:
"I did not view the letter as one of disrespect for the Court, but rather one of somewhat frustrated
lawyer hoping that his comments might be viewed as a basis for some changes in the process. [472
U.S. 634, 642]
". . . Mr. Snyder has appeared before me on a number of occasions and has always competently
represented his client, and has shown the highest respect to the court system and to me." App. 83-84.
(Emphasis added.)
The petition for rehearing en banc was denied. 3 An opinion for the en banc court stated:
"The gravamen of the situation is that Snyder in his letter [of October 6, 1983] became harsh and
disrespectful to the Court. It is one thing for a lawyer to complain factually to the Court, it is another
for counsel to be disrespectful in doing so.
.....
". . . Snyder states that his letter is not disrespectful. We disagree. In our view, the letter speaks for
itself." 734 F.2d, at 343. (Emphasis added.)
The en banc court opinion stayed the order of suspension for 10 days, but provided that the stay would
be lifted if petitioner failed to apologize. He did not apologize, and the order of suspension took effect.
We granted certiorari, 469 U.S. 1156 (1985). We reverse.

II
A
Petitioner challenges his suspension from practice on the grounds (a) that his October 6, 1983, letter
to the District Judge's secretary was protected by the First Amendment, (b) that he was denied due
process with respect to the notice of the charge on which he was suspended, and (c) that his
challenged letter was not disrespectful or contemptuous. We avoid constitutional issues when
resolution of such issues is not necessary for disposition of a case. Accordingly, we consider first
whether petitioner's conduct and expressions [472 U.S. 634, 643] warranted his suspension from
practice; if they did not, there is no occasion to reach petitioner's constitutional claims.
Courts have long recognized an inherent authority to suspend or disbar lawyers. Ex parte Garland, 4
Wall. 333, 378-379 (1867); Ex parte Burr, 9 Wheat. 529, 531 (1824). This inherent power derives from

http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=US&vol=472&invol=634

the lawyer's role as an officer of the court which granted admission. Theard v. United States, 354 U.S.
278, 281 (1957). The standard for disciplining attorneys practicing before the courts of appeals 4 is set
forth in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 46: 5
"(b) Suspension or Disbarment. When it is shown to the court that any member of its bar has been
suspended or disbarred from practice in any other court of record, or has been guilty of conduct
unbecoming a member of [472 U.S. 634, 644] the bar of the court, he will be subject to suspension or
disbarment by the court. The member shall be afforded an opportunity to show good cause, within
such time as the court shall prescribe, why he should not be suspended or disbarred. Upon his
response to the rule to show cause, and after hearing, if requested, or upon expiration of the time
prescribed for a response if no response is made, the court shall enter an appropriate order."
(Emphasis added.)
The phrase "conduct unbecoming a member of the bar" must be read in light of the "complex code of
behavior" to which attorneys are subject. In re Bithoney, 486 F.2d 319, 324 (CA1 1973). Essentially,
this reflects the burdens inherent in the attorney's dual obligations to clients and to the system of
justice. Justice Cardozo once observed:
"`Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions.' [An attorney is] received into that
ancient fellowship for something more than private gain. He [becomes] an officer of the court, and,
like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice." People ex rel. Karlin v.
Culkin, 248 N. Y. 465, 470-471, 162 N. E. 487, 489 (1928) (citation omitted).
As an officer of the court, a member of the bar enjoys singular powers that others do not possess; by
virtue of admission, members of the bar share a kind of monopoly granted only to lawyers. Admission
creates a license not only to advise and counsel clients but also to appear in court and try cases; as an
officer of the court, a lawyer can cause persons to drop their private affairs and be called as witnesses
in court, and for depositions and other pretrial processes that, while subject to the ultimate control of
the court, may be conducted outside courtrooms. The license granted by the court requires members
of the bar to conduct themselves in a manner [472 U.S. 634, 645] compatible with the role of courts
in the administration of justice.
Read in light of the traditional duties imposed on an attorney, it is clear that "conduct unbecoming a
member of the bar" is conduct contrary to professional standards that shows an unfitness to discharge
continuing obligations to clients or the courts, or conduct inimical to the administration of justice.
More specific guidance is provided by case law, applicable court rules, and "the lore of the profession,"
as embodied in codes of professional conduct. 6

B
Apparently relying on an attorney's obligation to avoid conduct that is "prejudicial to the
administration of justice," 7 the Court of Appeals held that the letter of October 6, 1983, [472 U.S. 634,
646] and an unspecified "refusal to show continuing respect for the court" demonstrated that
petitioner was "not presently fit to practice law in the federal courts." 734 F.2d, at 337. Its holding was
predicated on a specific finding that petitioner's "disrespectful statements [in his letter of October 6,
1983] as to this court's administration of the CJA [constituted] contumacious conduct." Ibid.
We must examine the record in light of Rule 46 to determine whether the Court of Appeals' action is
supported by the evidence. In the letter, petitioner declined to submit further documentation in
support of his fee request, refused to accept further assignments under the Criminal Justice Act, and
criticized the administration of the Act. Petitioner's refusal to submit further documentation in
support of his fee request could afford a basis for declining to award a fee; however, the submission of
adequate documentation was only a prerequisite to the collection of his fee, not an affirmative
obligation required by his duties to a client or the court. Nor, as the Court of Appeals ultimately
concluded, was petitioner legally obligated under the terms of the local plan to accept Criminal Justice
Act cases.
We do not consider a lawyer's criticism of the administration of the Act or criticism of inequities in
assignments under the Act as cause for discipline or suspension. The letter was addressed to a court
employee charged with administrative responsibilities, and concerned a practical matter in the
administration of the Act. The Court of Appeals acknowledged that petitioner brought to light
concerns about the administration of the plan that had "merit," 734 F.2d, at 339, and the court
instituted a study of the administration of the Criminal Justice Act as a result of petitioner's
complaint. Officers of the court may appropriately express criticism on such matters.
The record indicates the Court of Appeals was concerned about the tone of the letter; petitioner
concedes that the tone of his letter was "harsh," and, indeed it can be read as illmannered. [472 U.S.
634, 647] All persons involved in the judicial process - judges, litigants, witnesses, and court officers owe a duty of courtesy to all other participants. The necessity for civility in the inherently contentious
setting of the adversary process suggests that members of the bar cast criticisms of the system in a

the lore of the profession

http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=US&vol=472&invol=634

professional and civil tone. However, even assuming that the letter exhibited an unlawyerlike
rudeness, a single incident of rudeness or lack of professional courtesy - in this context - does not
support a finding of contemptuous or contumacious conduct, or a finding that a lawyer is "not
presently fit to practice law in the federal courts." Nor does it rise to the level of "conduct unbecoming
a member of the bar" warranting suspension from practice.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN took no part in the decision of this case.

Footnotes
[ Footnote 1 ] The statutory limit has since been raised to $2,000. 18 U.S.C. 3006A(d)(2) (1982 ed.,
Supp. III).
[ Footnote 2 ] A resolution presented by the Burleigh County Bar Association to the Court of Appeals
on petitioner's behalf stated that of the 276 practitioners eligible to serve on the Criminal Justice Act
panel in the Southwestern [472 U.S. 634, 639] Division of the District of North Dakota, only 87 were
on the panel. App. 85.
[ Footnote 3 ] 734 F.2d, at 341. Circuit Judges Bright and McMillian voted to grant the petition for
rehearing en banc.
[ Footnote 4 ] The panel opinion made explicit that Snyder was suspended from the District Court as
well as the Court of Appeals by stating: "[T]hereafter Snyder should make application to both this
court and the federal district court of North Dakota to be readmitted." 734 F.2d, at 337.
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 46 does not appear to give authority to the Court of Appeals to
suspend attorneys from practicing in the District Court. As the panel opinion itself indicates, the
admission of attorneys to practice before the District Court is placed, as an initial matter, before the
District Court itself. The applicable Rule of the District Court indicates that a suspension from practice
before the Court of Appeals creates only a rebuttable presumption that suspension from the District
Court is in order. The Rule appears to entitle the attorney to a show cause hearing before the District
Court. Rule 2(e)(2), United States District Court for the District of North Dakota, reprinted in Federal
Local Rules for Civil and Admiralty Proceedings (1984). A District Court decision would be subject to
review by the Court of Appeals.
[ Footnote 5 ] The Court of Appeals relied on Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 46(c) for its action.
While the language of Rule 46(c) is not without some ambiguity, the accompanying note of the
Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules, 28 U.S.C. App., p. 496, states that this provision "is to make
explicit the power of a court of appeals to impose sanctions less serious than suspension or
disbarment for the breach of rules." The appropriate provision under which to consider the sanction of
suspension would have been Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 46(b), which by its terms deals with
"suspension or disbarment."
[ Footnote 6 ] The Court of Appeals stated that the standard of professional conduct expected of an
attorney is defined by the ethical code adopted by the licensing authority of an attorney's home state,
734 F.2d, at 336, n. 4, and cited the North Dakota Code of Professional Responsibility as the
controlling expression of the conduct expected of petitioner. The state code of professional
responsibility does not by its own terms apply to sanctions in the federal courts. Federal courts admit
and suspend attorneys as an exercise of their inherent power; the standards imposed are a matter of
federal law. Hertz v. United States, 18 F.2d 52, 54-55 (CA8 1927).
The Court of Appeals was entitled, however, to charge petitioner with the knowledge of and the duty to
conform to the state code of professional responsibility. The uniform first step for admission to any
federal court is admission to a state court. The federal court is entitled to rely on the attorney's
knowledge of the state code of professional conduct applicable in that state court; the provision that
suspension in any other court of record creates a basis for a show cause hearing indicates that Rule 46
anticipates continued compliance with the state code of conduct.
[ Footnote 7 ] 734 F.2d, at 336-337. This duty is almost universally recognized in American
jurisdictions. See, e. g., Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(5), North Dakota Code of Professional
Responsibility; Rule 8.4(d), American Bar Association, Model Rules of Professional Conduct (1983);
Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(5), American Bar Association, Model Code of Professional Responsibility
(1980). [472 U.S. 634, 648]

RESEARCH THE LAW

Cases & Codes / Opinion Summaries / Sample Business Contracts / Research an Attorney or Law Firm

FRAP 46. Attorneys


(a) Admission to the Bar.
(1) Eligibility. An attorney is eligible for admission to the bar of a court of appeals if that
attorney is of good moral and professional character and is admitted to practice before
the Supreme Court of the United States, the highest court of a state, another United
States court of appeals, or a United States district court (including the district courts
for Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the Virgin Islands).
(2) Application. An applicant must file an application for admission, on a form approved
by the court that contains the applicants personal statement showing eligibility for
membership. The applicant must subscribe to the following oath or affirmation:
I, _____, do solemnly swear [or affirm] that I will conduct
myself as an attorney and counselor of this court, uprightly and
according to law; and that I will support the Constitution of the
United States.
(3) Admission Procedures. On written or oral motion of a member of the courts bar, the
court will act on the application. An applicant may be admitted by oral motion in open
court. But, unless the court orders otherwise, an applicant need not appear before the
court to be admitted. Upon admission, an applicant must pay the clerk the fee
prescribed by local rule or court order.
(b) Suspension or Disbarment.
(1) Standard. A member of the courts bar is subject to suspension or disbarment by the
court if the member:
(A) has been suspended or disbarred from practice in any other court; or
(B) is guilty of conduct unbecoming a member of the courts bar.
(2) Procedure. The member must be given an opportunity to show good cause, within the
time prescribed by the court, why the member should not be suspended or disbarred.
(3) Order. The court must enter an appropriate order after the member responds and a
hearing is held, if requested, or after the time prescribed for a response expires, if no
response is made.
(c) Discipline. A court of appeals may discipline an attorney who practices before it for
conduct unbecoming a member of the bar or for failure to comply with any court rule.
First, however, the court must afford the attorney reasonable notice, an opportunity to
show cause to the contrary, and, if requested, a hearing.

Rev.: 12/10

170

FRAP 46

(As amended Mar. 10, 1986, eff. July 1, 1986; Apr. 24, 1998, eff. Dec. 1, 1998.)
****
11th Cir. R. 46-1 Bar Admission and Fees. Only attorneys admitted to the bar of this court may
practice before the court, except as otherwise provided in these rules. Admission is governed by
FRAP 46 and this Eleventh Circuit Rule. To request admission to the bar, an attorney must complete
an application form, available on the Internet at www.ca11.uscourts.gov, and submit the form to the
clerks principal office in Atlanta. The application form must be accompanied by:

a certificate of good standing issued within the previous six months from a court described
in FRAP 46(a)(1); and
the non-refundable fee set by the court and posted on the courts website, payable to Clerk,
U.S. Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Each member of the bar has a continuing obligation to keep this court informed of any
changes to addresses, phone numbers, fax numbers, and e-mail addresses.
11th Cir. R. 46-2 Renewal of Bar Membership; Inactive Status. Each attorney admitted to the bar
of this court shall pay a bar membership renewal fee of $10.00 every five years. A new certificate
of admission will not issue upon payment of this fee. An attorney admitted after April 1, 1989, must
pay this renewal fee to the clerk every five years from the date of admission. An attorney admitted
before April 1, 1989, must pay this renewal fee to the clerk during the month indicated in the
following schedule, and then during that same month each five years thereafter:
Last Name (Initial)

Payment Due

A-D
E-K
L-R
S-Z

April, 1994
May, 1994
June, 1994
July, 1994

During the first week of the month in which an attorneys renewal fee is due, the clerk shall send
a notice to the attorney at the address on the roll of attorneys admitted to practice before this court
(attorney roll), and advise the attorney that payment of the renewal fee is due by the last day of that
month. If the notice is returned undelivered due to an incorrect address, no further notice will be
sent. If the renewal fee is not paid by the last day of the month in which the notice is sent, the
attorneys membership in the bar of this court will be placed in inactive status for a period of 12
months, beginning on the first day of the next month. An attorney whose bar membership is in
inactive status may not practice before the court. To renew a bar membership, including one in
inactive status, an attorney must complete a bar membership renewal form, available on the Internet
at www.ca11.uscourts.gov, and submit the form to the clerks principal office in Atlanta. The
renewal form must be accompanied by a non-refundable bar membership renewal fee of $10.00
payable to U.S. Court of Appeals, Non-Appropriated Fund, 11th Circuit.

Rev.: 8/12

171

FRAP 46

After 12 months in inactive status, if an attorney has not paid the bar membership renewal fee,
the clerk shall strike the attorneys name from the attorney roll. An attorney whose name is stricken
from the attorney roll due to nonpayment of the renewal fee who thereafter wishes to practice before
the court must apply for admission to the bar pursuant to 11th Cir. R. 46-1, unless the attorney is
eligible to be admitted for a particular proceeding pursuant to 11th Cir. R. 46-3.
11th Cir. R. 46-3 Admission for Particular Proceeding. The following attorneys shall be admitted
for the particular proceeding in which they are appearing without the necessity of formal application
or payment of the admission fee: an attorney appearing on behalf of the United States, a federal
public defender, an attorney appointed by a federal court under the Criminal Justice Act or appointed
to represent a party in forma pauperis. Attorneys in these categories who desire to receive an
admission certificate from the Eleventh Circuit must pay the admission fee.
11th Cir. R. 46-4 Pro Hac Vice Admission. An attorney who does not reside in the circuit but is
otherwise eligible for admission to the bar pursuant to FRAP 46 and these rules may apply to appear
pro hac vice in a particular proceeding. The following items must be provided:

a completed Application to Appear Pro Hac Vice form, available on the Internet at
www.ca11.uscourts.gov, with proof of service;
a certificate of good standing issued within the previous six months from a court described
in FRAP 46(a)(1); and
a non-refundable pro hac vice application fee of $50.00, payable to U.S. Court of Appeals,
Non-Appropriated Fund, 11th Circuit.

An attorney may apply to appear before this court pro hac vice only two times.
To practice before the court, an attorney who resides in the circuit or who has two times
previously applied to appear before this court pro hac vice, must apply for admission to the bar
pursuant to 11th Cir. R. 46-1, unless the attorney is eligible to be admitted for a particular proceeding
pursuant to 11th Cir. R. 46-3.
The clerk is authorized to grant an application to appear pro hac vice in an appeal not yet
assigned or under submission, in such circumstances as determined by the court, when an attorney
meets the requirements of the rules.
11th Cir. R. 46-5 Entry of Appearance. Every attorney, except one appointed by the court for a
specific case, must file an Appearance of Counsel Form in order to participate in a case before the
court. The form must be filed within 14 days after the date on the notice from the clerk that the
Appearance of Counsel Form must be filed. With a court-appointed attorney, the order of
appointment will be treated as the appearance form.
Except for those who are court-appointed, an attorney who has not previously filed an
Appearance of Counsel Form in a case will not be permitted to participate in oral argument of the
case until the appearance form is filed.

Rev.: 12/13

172

FRAP 46

11th Cir. R. 46-6 Clerks Authority to Accept Filings.


(a) Filings from an Attorney Who Is Not a Member of the Eleventh Circuit Bar.
(1) Subject to the provisions of this rule, the clerk may conditionally file the following papers
received from an attorney who is not a member of the circuit bar and who is not admitted for the
particular proceeding pursuant to 11th Cir. R. 46-3:

a petition or application that initiates a proceeding in this court;

an emergency motion as described in 11th Cir. R. 27-1(b);

a motion or petition that is treated by the clerk as time sensitive as that term is used
in 11th Cir. R. 27-1(b).

(2) Upon filing the petition, application, or motion, the clerk will mail a notice to the
attorney, stating that in order to participate in the appeal the attorney must be properly admitted
either to the bar of this court or for the particular proceeding pursuant to 11th Cir. R. 46-4, and that
the attorney must submit an appropriate application for admission within fourteen (14) days from
the date of such notice.
(3) Within the 14-day notice period, the clerk may conditionally file motions and other papers
received from the attorney, subject to receipt of an appropriate application for admission within that
period. At the expiration of the 14-day notice period, if an appropriate application for admission has
not been received, the clerk will return any such motions and other papers to the attorney and enter
that action on the docket, and the motions and other papers will be treated as though they were never
filed.
(4) When an appropriate application for admission is received within the 14-day notice
period, the clerk may continue to conditionally file motions and other papers received from the
attorney, subject to the courts approval of the attorneys application for admission. If the attorneys
application is denied, the clerk will return any such motions and other papers to the attorney and
enter that action on the docket, and the motions and other papers will be treated as though they were
never filed. Before taking that action, the clerk may stay further proceedings in the appeal for 30
days, if necessary, to allow the attorneys client to seek new counsel.
(b) Filings from an Attorney Who Has Not Filed an Appearance of Counsel Form Within 14
Days After Notice is Mailed by the Clerk. When an attorney fails to file a required Appearance of
Counsel Form within 14 days after notice of that requirement is mailed by the clerk, the clerk may
not accept any further filings (except for a brief) from the attorney until the attorney files an
Appearance of Counsel Form. When an attorney who has not filed an Appearance of Counsel Form
tenders a brief for filing, the clerk will treat the failure to file an Appearance of Counsel Form as a
deficiency in the form of the brief. An Appearance of Counsel Form need not be accompanied by
a motion to file out of time.

Rev.: 12/10

173

FRAP 46

11th Cir. R. 46-7 Active Membership in Good Standing with State Bar Required to Practice;
Changes in Status of Bar Membership Must Be Reported. In addition to the requirements of FRAP
46 and the corresponding circuit rules, and Addendum Eight, an attorney may not practice before this
court if the attorney is not an active member in good standing with a state bar or the bar of the
highest court of a state, or the District of Columbia (hereinafter, state bar). When an attorneys
active membership in good standing with a state bar lapses for any reason, including but not limited
to retirement, placement in inactive status, failure to pay bar membership fees, or failure to complete
continuing education requirements, the attorney must notify the clerk of this court within 14 days.
That notification must also list every other state bar and federal bar of which the attorney is a
member, including state bar numbers and the attorneys status with that bar (e.g., active, inactive,
retired, etc.). Upon receipt of that notification, the court may take any action it deems appropriate,
including placing the attorneys bar membership in inactive status until the attorney provides
documentation of active membership in good standing with a state bar.
11th Cir. R. 46-8 Certificate of Admission. Upon admission to the bar of this court, the clerk will
send the attorney a certificate of admission. A duplicate certificate of admission is available for
purchase upon payment of the fee prescribed by the Judicial Conference of the United States in the
Court of Appeals Miscellaneous Fee Schedule issued pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1913, payable to Clerk,
U.S. Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
11th Cir. R. 46-9 Attorney Discipline. This court has adopted rules governing attorney conduct and
discipline. See Addendum Eight.
11th Cir. R. 46-10 Appointment or Withdrawal of Counsel.
(a) Appellate Obligations of Retained Counsel. Retained counsel for a criminal defendant has
an obligation to continue to represent that defendant until successor counsel either enters an
appearance or is appointed under the Criminal Justice Act, and may not abandon or cease
representation of a defendant except upon order of the court.
(b) Habeas Corpus or 28 U.S.C. 2255 Pauper Appeals. When any pro se appeal for either
habeas corpus or 2255 relief is classified for oral argument, counsel will normally be appointed
under the Criminal Justice Act before the appeal is calendared. The non-argument panel that
classifies the appeal for oral argument will advise the clerk who will then obtain counsel under the
regular procedure.
(c) Relieving Court Appointed Counsel on Appeal. Counsel appointed by the trial court shall
not be relieved on appeal except in the event of incompatibility between attorney and client or other
serious circumstances.
(d) Criminal Justice Act Appointments. The Judicial Council of this circuit has adopted the
Eleventh Circuit Plan under the Criminal Justice Act and Guidelines for Counsel Supplementing the
Eleventh Circuit Plan under the Criminal Justice Act. See Addendum Four.
(e) Non-Criminal Justice Act Appointments. This court has adopted rules governing
Non-Criminal Justice Act Appointments. See Addendum Five.
Rev.: 8/13

174

FRAP 46

11th Cir. R. 46-11 Appearance and Argument by Eligible Law Students.


(a) Scope of Legal Assistance.
(1) Notice of Appearance. An eligible law student, as described below, acting under a
supervising attorney of record, may enter an appearance in this court on behalf of any
indigent person, the United States, or a governmental agency in any civil or criminal case,
provided that the party on whose behalf the student appears and the supervising attorney of
record has consented thereto in writing. The written consent of the party (or the partys
representative) and the supervising attorney of record must be filed with this court.
(2) Briefs. An eligible law student may assist in the preparation of briefs and other
documents to be filed in this court, but such briefs or documents must be reviewed, approved
entirely, and signed by the supervising attorney of record. Names of students participating
in the preparation of briefs may, however, be added to the briefs.
(3) Oral Argument. Except, on behalf of the accused, in a direct appeal from a criminal
prosecution, an eligible law student may also participate in oral argument, but only in the
presence of the supervising attorney of record.
(b) Law Student Eligibility Requirements.
In order to appear before this court, the law student must:
(1) Be enrolled in a law school approved by the American Bar Association;
(2) Have completed legal studies for which the student has received at least 48 semester
hours or 72 quarter hours of academic credit or the equivalent if the school is on some other
basis;
(3) Be certified by the dean of the law students law school as qualified to provide the legal
representation permitted by this rule. This certification, which shall be filed with the clerk,
may be withdrawn by the dean at any time by mailing a notice to the clerk or by termination
by this court without notice or hearing and without any showing of cause;
(4) Neither ask for nor receive any compensation or remuneration of any kind for the
students services from the person on whose behalf the student renders services, but this shall
not prevent an attorney, legal aid bureau, law school, public defender agency, a State, or the
United States from paying compensation to the eligible law student, nor shall it prevent these
entities from making proper charges for its services;
(5) Certify in writing that the student has read and is familiar with the Code of Professional
Responsibility of the American Bar Association, the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure,
and the rules of this court; and

Rev.: 12/10

175

FRAP 46

(6) File all of the certifications and consents necessary under this rule with the clerk of this
court prior to the submission of any briefs or documents containing the law students name
and the law students appearance at oral argument.
(c) Supervising Attorney of Record Requirements.
(1) The supervising attorney of record must be a member in good standing of the bar of this
court.
(2) With respect to the law students appearance, the supervising attorney of record shall
certify in writing to this court that he or she:
(A) consents to the participation of the law student and agrees to supervise the law
student;
(B) assumes full, personal professional responsibility for the case and for the quality
of the law students work;
(C) will assist the student to the extent necessary; and
(D) will appear with the student in all written and oral proceedings before this court
and be prepared to supplement any written or oral statement made by the student
to this court or opposing counsel.
****
I.O.P. 1. Admissions. There is no formal swearing-in ceremony.
2. Payment Returned or Denied for Insufficient Funds. When a payment of a fee is returned unpaid
or denied by a financial institution due to insufficient funds, counsel must thereafter pay the fee by
money order or cashiers check made payable to the same entity or account as the returned check
or denied payment. In addition, counsel must also remit by separate money order or cashiers check
the returned-or-denied-payment fee prescribed by the Judicial Conference of the United States in
the Court of Appeals Miscellaneous Fee Schedule issued pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1913, payable to
Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
3. Components of Attorney Admission Fee. The attorney admission fee is composed of two separate
fees. A national admission fee has been prescribed by the Judicial Conference of the United States
in the Court of Appeals Miscellaneous Fee Schedule issued pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1913. This fee
is remitted to the federal judiciary. A local admission fee has been prescribed by this court pursuant
to FRAP 46(a)(3), and is posted on the courts website. This fee is deposited in the courts
non-appropriated fund account to be used for the benefit of the bench and bar in the administration
of justice.

Rev.: 8/14

176

FRAP 46

http://www.floridabar.org/TFB/TFBPublic.nsf/WNewsReleases/415228889EE7CD0F8525798800522FAD?OpenDocument

ABOUT THE BAR

NEWS & EVENTS

FOR THE PUBLIC

MEMBER SERVICES

LOG IN

FIND A LAWYER

Search The Florida Bar

THE FLORIDA BAR / News & Events

The Florida Bar

www.floridabar.org

JUDGE JAMES M. BARTON II TO RECEIVE DISTINGUISHED JUDICIAL SERVICE AWARD

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE


January 17, 2012
CONTACT: Dorohn A. Frazier,
The Florida Bar
TELEPHONE: (850) 561-5764
E-MAIL: dfrazier@flabar.org
The Honorable James M. Barton II, of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, in Tampa, will receive the 2012 Distinguished Judicial Service Award.
The award, which honors outstanding and sustained service to the public especially as it relates to support of pro bono legal services, will be
presented by Chief Justice Charles T. Canady at a Jan. 26 ceremony at the Supreme Court of Florida.
Judge Barton is a circuit judge in the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit. He has contributed more than 1,000 hours to pro bono efforts since joining
the bench in 1991. Judge Barton served as chair of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Pro Bono Committee from 1993 2010. He is also past
chair and a current member of The Florida Bar's Standing Committee on Pro Bono Legal Services.
In 2010, Judge Barton helped to launch the ONE campaign, to recruit new pro bono attorneys and support local pro bono projects. Judge Barton
assisted in securing office space in the Hillsborough County Courthouse for Bay Area Legal Services. He also implemented the Pro Se Forms
Assistance Project, which provides help to pro se litigants.
Judge Barton graduated from Tulane University in 1971 and from Vanderbilt University College of Law in 1974. He began his legal career in
1974 as a law clerk at the Florida First District Court of Appeal. He served from 1981 to1985 as assistant attorney general, Department of
Legal Affairs, Tallahassee; and from 1985 to 1990 as assistant state attorney, Hillsborough County. He also formerly served as a county and
administrative judge.
Judge Barton is past president of the J. Clifford Cheatwood Inn of Court and past chair of the Supreme Court Pro Bono Committee. He chairs
the Supreme Court Civil Jury Instruction Committee and the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Judicial Automated Data System Committee, Security
Committee and Jury Management Committee. He is an active member of the Brandon 86 Rotary Club.
Judge Barton is the recipient of numerous awards, including: Jimmy Kynes Pro Bono Award 1993; James M. "Red" McEwen Memorial Award
1991 to 1992; 1995 and 2010 Robert W. Patton Outstanding Jurist Award; and the 1996 William Reece Smith Jr. Award for Public Service
from Stetson College of Law.
This year's awards ceremony, which also honors individual, circuit, law firm, young lawyer and voluntary bar pro bono efforts, is scheduled for
Thursday, Jan. 26, at 3:30 p.m. at the Supreme Court of Florida at the Supreme Court of Florida and will be webcast live from
http://wfsu.org/gavel2gavel. The program will be rebroadcast taped-delayed on the Florida Channel at a later date. Check local cable listings
for details.
###

EDITORS: Please note The Florida Bar is not an association and "Association" is not part of our name. Proper reference is "The Florida Bar." Local bar organizations are properly termed
"associations."

[Revised: 07-08-2012]

http://www.floridabar.org/TFB/TFBPublic.nsf/WNewsReleases/495A38BE3B5153FB85257AF0006FFD1E?OpenDocument

ABOUT THE BAR

NEWS & EVENTS

FOR THE PUBLIC

MEMBER SERVICES

LOG IN

FIND A LAWYER

Search The Florida Bar

THE FLORIDA BAR / News & Events

The Florida Bar

www.floridabar.org

JUDGE CLAUDiA RICKERT ISOM TO RECEIVE DISTINGUISHED JUDICIAL SERVICE AWARD

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE


January 14, 2013
CONTACT: Dorohn A. Frazier; dfrazier@flabar.org,
The Florida Bar
TELEPHONE: (850)561-5764

The Honorable Claudia Rickert Isom, of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, in Tampa, will receive the 2013 Distinguished Judicial Service Award.
The award, which honors outstanding and sustained service to the public especially as it relates to support of pro bono legal services, will be
presented by Chief Justice Ricky Polston at a Jan. 31 ceremony at the Supreme Court of Florida.
Judge Isom has been a circuit judge in the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit since 1991. She is currently assigned to the Probate, Guardianship and
Trust Division. As a jurist, Judge Isom is not permitted to participate in direct pro bono legal services; however, she is still committed to pro
bono work and giving back to the community.
Judge Isom currently co-chairs the Hillsborough County Bar Associations 5K Pro Bono River Run. It is an event she has chaired or co-chaired
for the past three years. Judge Isom estimates her volunteer hours organizing, promoting and coordinating the race since 2010 exceed 250.
The run raises money for Bay Area Legal Services' pro bono services.
In addition to volunteering in the judicial mentorship program, Judge Isom has participated in The Florida Bars E-Mentoring Project for law
students and the Hillsborough Association for Women Lawyers Mentorship Project with Stetson University College of Law. She previously
chaired The Florida Bars Standing Committee on Professionalism and the Rules of Judicial Administration Committee and currently serves on
the Rules of Civil Procedure Committee. Judge Isom is also a member of the Supreme Courts Standing Committee on Fairness and Diversity
and is a certified diversity trainer.
Judge Isom graduated from the University of Iowa in 1972 with an education degree. She is a 1975 graduate of Florida State University
School of Law, where she married her classmate, Woody Isom, in 1973. She has four children (including two attorneys) and two
grandchildren.
Judge Isom grew up on a farm in Southeast Iowa and has lived in Florida since 1972.
This year's awards ceremony, which also honors individual, circuit, young lawyer, law firm and voluntary bar pro bono efforts, is scheduled for
Thursday, Jan. 31, at 3:30 p.m. at the Supreme Court of Florida. The program will be broadcast taped-delayed at a later date. Check local
cable listings for details and on the Internet at http://wfsu.org/gavel2gavel.
###

EDITORS: Please note The Florida Bar is not an association and "Association" is not part of our name. Proper reference is "The Florida Bar." Local bar organizations are properly termed
"associations."

[Revised: 01-21-2013]

http://www.floridabar.org/TFB/TFBPublic.nsf/WNewsReleases/DF3DF37FAD70B08A85257C69005C418C?OpenDocument

ABOUT THE BAR

NEWS & EVENTS

FOR THE PUBLIC

MEMBER SERVICES

LOG IN

FIND A LAWYER

Search The Florida Bar

THE FLORIDA BAR / News & Events

The Florida Bar

www.floridabar.org

JUDGE EMILY A. PEACOCK TO RECEIVE DISTINGUISHED JUDICIAL SERVICE AWARD

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE


January 23, 2014
CONTACT: Francine A. Walker; fwalker@flabar.org,
The Florida Bar
TELEPHONE: (850) 561-5666

The Honorable Emily A. Peacock, of the 13th Judicial Circuit, Tampa, will receive the 2014 Distinguished Judicial Service Award. The award,
which honors outstanding and sustained service to the public, especially as it relates to support of pro bono legal services, will be presented
by Chief Justice Ricky Polston at a Jan. 30 ceremony at the Supreme Court of Florida.
Judge Peacock was elected to the bench in November 2006 and has been assigned to the Family Law and Juvenile Dependency divisions.
Immediately before her election, she was a partner at Peacock Law Firm, P. A., with her husband, Mike Peacock, practicing general litigation,
class action and other complex litigation. Judge Peacock began her career as an assistant state attorney for the 18th Judicial Circuit and
continued as an assistant state attorney for the 13th Judicial Circuit. Thereafter, Judge Peacock served as a senior attorney for the Florida
Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, where she worked with child protective investigators seeking dependency status of abused,
neglected or abandoned children.
Judge Peacock spends considerable time mentoring attorneys and judges, speaking to voluntary bar groups and volunteering in the classroom
or mock trial practices at law schools.
Judge Peacock is actively involved with the Hillsborough County Bar Association. She chaired a past Law Day luncheon and has co-chaired
several Bench-Bar conferences for the organization. Judge Peacock has been a member of the board of directors of the Hillsborough
Association for Women Lawyers since 2007. She helped HAWL secure a grant to fund a CLE presentation to teach attorneys how to volunteer
their time to Florida Kinship Care, a program that assists relative caregivers of minor children.
Her other affiliations include: The George Edgecomb Bar Association; J. Clifford Cheatwood Inn of Court; and Family Law Inn of Court. Judge
Peacock has served as a member of the 13th Judicial Circuit Professionalism Committee since 2007. Shes a member of the Tampa Oratorio
Singers and her church choir.
In 2012, Judge Peacock was the recipient of the Leaders in the Law Award from the Florida Association for Women Lawyers and the Making a
Difference Award from the Family Law Section of The Florida Bar.
Judge Peacock received a B.A. from Vanderbilt University in 1978 and a J.D. from Stetson University College of Law in 1980.
This year's awards ceremony, which also honors individual, circuit, young lawyer, law firm and voluntary bar pro bono efforts, is scheduled for
Thursday, Jan. 30, at 3:30 p.m. at the Supreme Court of Florida. The program will be broadcast taped-delayed at a later date. Check local
cable listings for details and the Florida Supreme Court Gavel to Gavel Video Portal at http://wfsu.org/gavel2gavel.
###

EDITORS: Please note The Florida Bar is not an association and "Association" is not part of our name. Proper reference is "The Florida Bar." Local bar organizations are properly termed
"associations."

[Revised: 12-23-2014]

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

IN AND FOR HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA

GENERAL CIVIL DIVISION

NEIL J. GILLESPIE,

CASE NUMBER: 05-CA-7205


Plaintiff,
DIVISION: J
VS.
BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, P.A.,
a Florida corporation; WILLIAM 1. COOK
Defendants.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _---e

OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER'S MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION

COMES NOW, the undersigned on behalf of the Office of the Public Defender, to seek
clarification of a Clerk's Detennination dated May 27, 2011, attached hereto as Exhibit A, allegedly
appointing the Office of the Public Defender on behalf of the plaintiff, Neil Gillespie, in this cause
based upon the following:
I.

An Application for Criminal Indigent Status and Clerk's Detennination attached

hereto as Exhibit A purports to appoint the Office of the Public Defender to represent the
plaintiff in this cause.
2.

It appears from the docket in this cause that Neil Gillespie is the plaintiff in this

cause and that he is before the Court based upon an Order to Show Cause.
3.

Section 27.51, Florida Statutes, sets forth the duties of the Public Defender. The

duties of the Public Defender under Section 27.5 I (b)(3), Florida Statutes, provide that the Public

belief that the plaintiff in this cause, Neil Gillespie, is facing an action for criminal contempt.

WHEREFORE. the undersigned seeks to clarify with the Court the applicability of the
Application for Criminal Indigent Status and Clerk's Detennination as evidenced in Exhibit A,
attached hereto.
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing motion has been furnished to Neil
Gillespie, 8092 SW 115th Loop, Ocala, FL 34481, Ryan C. Rodems, Esq. of Barker, Rodems &
Cook, P.A., 400 North AsWey Drive, Suite 2100, Tampa, FL 33602, and to Richard L. Coleman,
Esq., P.O. Box 5437, Valdosta, GA 31603, by hand or U.S. mail delivery, this 1st day of June,
2011.

Mi
acock
Florida Bar # 0303682
Post Office Box 172910
Tampa, Florida 33672-0910
(813) 272-5980
(813) 272-5588 (fax)
peacock@pdI3.state.f1.us

Ikm

IN THE CIRCUIT/COUNTY COURT OF THE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

IN AND FOR HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA

STATE OF FLORIDA vs.

t1-e.. \ LQJ I\~'I t

Defendant/Minor Child

CASE NO.

/"

APPLICATION FOR CRIMINAL INDIGENT STATUS

_~_I AA ~M' SEEKING THE APPOINTMENT OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER

.
OR
I HAVE A PRIVATE ATIORNEY OR AM SELF-REPRESENTED AND SEEK DETERMINATION OF INDIGENCE STATUS FOR COSTS

Notice to Applicant: The provision of a public defenderlcourt appointed lawyer and costs/due process services are not free. AjUdgment and lien may be imposed agains.t all real or
personal property you own to pay for legal and other services provided on your behalf or on behalf of the person for whom you are making this application. There is a $50.00 fee fQr each
application filed. If the application fee is not paid to the Clerli of the Court within 7 days, it will be added to any oosts that may be assessed against you at the oonclusion of this case. If
you are a parent/guardian making this affidavit on behalf of a minor or tax-dependent adult, the information contained in this application must include your income and assets.
1. I have Udependents. (Do not incl!,hildren not living at home and do not include a working spouse or yourself.)
.
2. 1have a take home income of $
~
paid () weekly () bi-weekly ( ) semi-monthly () monthly ( ) yearly
(Take home inoome equals salary, wages, bon;;ies, commissions, allowances, overtime, tips and similar payments, minus deductions required by law and other court-ordered
support payments)
~
3. I have other inco.me paid ( ) weekly ( ) bi-WeekJY~semi-mpQ1l1~~thIY ( ) yearly: (Circle "Yes" and fill in the amount if you have this kind of inoome, otherwise circl~o?
Social 5ecurilybenefits
es $
No
Veterans' benefit...............................
Yes $,------I(!9i.

Unemployment oompensation................. s $
Child suppor! or other regular support
~..

Union Funds
Yes $
.
0
from family members/spouse......
.
Yes $
.
.
Workers oompensation
:
Yes $
I
Rental incOme.................................
Yes $
.
.Retirement/pensions
Yes $
. Dividends or interest..
:.............
Yes $
Trusts or gifts
Yes $
0
Other kinds of inoome not on the lis!......
Yes.$

-1-1----

""""""

I h,w ~,,~~~~'~::'~~~~~,"'s'"~

~:~~c:~}(~~~~ft~;

I
0 No'

Yes $

money market accounts


Yes $
~
"Equity in Motor VehiclesIBoatsi
~/""
Other tangible property.................. ~eI ~ ~V ~ No
Us! the year/make/model and tag#: I~iJ?~~.~
.
r
"L~~ Y;cf

"lgtb-

I ....' :

5. I have atotal amount of liabilities and debts in the amount of ~


6. I receive: (Circle "Yes" or "No?

. ..

'"

lf7; O~ c.~

~:~... ~to~"""""'~1:=l
=~
~~~~k~~~i'~~~'i~~d~di~'~~~i~~)'~: ~'~~---~~~'

'No' U"

"Equity means value minus loans. Also Iist:anyexpe~cy


In an interest in such property.
Ust the address of this property:
.
'.
~
Address
City, State, Zip
.."
County of Residence
Z

---,_

W
Ul

TemP9rary Assistance for Needy Families-Cash Assistance


:... "Als
Poverty-related veterans' benefits.................................................................................................................................................... Yes
Supplemental security Inoome (551)
:............................
Yes
7. I have been released on bail in the amount of $ ~.
Cash _ _ Surety __
Posted by: Self __ Family __ Other

.~
CJ'I"""

A persen who knowingly provides false information to the clerk or the oourt in seeking a determination of indigent status under s. 27.52, F.5., oommits a misdemeanor of the first degree,
punishable as provided in s. 775.082, F.S., or s. 775.083, F.S. I attest that the information I have provided on this Application is true and accurate to the best of my

knowledge.

A7

Signed this

day of .

Mil!

,2olL

./

~.#:

~ -r',,?/.

_//------..:...

_/"

Sig

17~G
Print Full L al Name
Date of Birth S
.
. /? 1-;'} J / <) A . r"/
Address '
Driver's license or ID numberU -/0C'-bCXJ~~VII ~ity, State, Zip'
Phone l1umber

pIC; ,-

.r.ao.

CLERK'S DETERMINATION

V-;;::ed n the inf rmation 'in this Application, I have determined the applicant to be

~ent

=-_V;;:_Th~ P blic Def nder is hereby appointed to the case listed above until relieved by the Court.
M'

-D1te

, .

( ) Not Indigent

PATFRA'NK--------~----------

... ------ ... -_ ..

Clerk of the Circuit Court


This fonn was completed with the assistance of
_ _Clerk/Deputy Clerk/Other authorized person

APPLICANTS FOUND NOT INDIGENT MAY"SEEK REVIEW BY ASKING fOR A HEARING TIME, Sign here if you want the judge
to review the clerk's decision of not indigent

06/18/10

EXHIBIT "A"

IN TI-IE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRTEENTH ruDICIAL CIRCUIT

IN AND FOR HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, STATE OF FLORIDA

GENERAL CIVIL DIVISION

NEIL J. GILLESPIE,
Plaintiff,

CASE NUMBER.: 05-CA-7205


DIVISION: J

v.

BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, P.A.,

a Florida corporation; WILLIAM


COOK

Defendants.

J.

- - - - - - - - - - - - -/
ORDER RELIEVING THE OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER Oli THE~?
THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCIDT FROM REPRESENTATION :.~. r~~
OF PLAINTIFF NEIL GILLESPIE
~;~~ N
~
THIS CAUSE having come to be heard on the Motion of the Office of the Public Defender
for Clarification and the Court being fully advised in the premises does hereby relieve the Office of
the Public Defender of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit from representation of the plaintiff in this cause
as there is no lawful basis for the appointment of the Office of the Public Defender to represent the
plaintiff in the cause currently before the Court.
__
/_ day of

DONE AND ORDERED at Tampa, Hillsborough County, Florida on


June, 2011.

~~A~~LEJAMESD.ARNOLD
~..a.....a....;~~

T COURT ruDGE
THIRTEENTH ruDICIAL CIRCUIT
HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA

Copies furnished to:

._------Neil-Gillespi~09z" SW 1- 15 th. Loop;-0calat Fk-3-44-g-}-- ._---_._-_._---_.------- ---------.---------------.---- -..


Ryan C. Rodems, Barker, Rodems & Cook, 400 North Ashley Dr., Ste. 2100, Tampa, FL 33602
Richard L. Coleman, Esq., P.O. Box 5437, Valdosta, GA 31603
.
.
STATE OF FLORIDA
)
MIke Peacock, Office of the PublIC Defender
COUNTY OF HILLSBOROU(]~)
/km

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING IS A TRUE


AND CORRECT COpy OF THE DOCUMENT ON FILE IN

~s~f!tb~
. . ~~~~~~~~~.~:.:.~~.I:~ ~:
-_.. . .". 1'c\\,,

. ..

.:-~~~. ..'?VJ.',
f~a ~~

PAT FRANK

\~1; _~W

Il\:~~~,~'!f.-""

CLERK OF CIRCUIT COURT

BY

~..........................D.C.

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

IN AND FOR HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA

GENERAL CIVIL DIVISION

NEIL J. GILLESPIE,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No.:
Division:

05CA7205
J

BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, P.A.,


a Florida corporation; and WILLIAM
J. COOK,
Defendants.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - -/
WRIT OF BODILY ATTACHMENT
THE STATE OF FLORIDA:
....

To Each Sheriff of the State:

.- ,0'''':

_.
...

~_: r-
.._ t .:

It appearing to the Court that NEIL J. GILLESPIE, of 8092 SW 115 th Loopj-OcqJ~, ~3


Florida 34481, although properly served witl1 the Order to Show Cause entered May-Ll', 2011, - i
failed to appear on June 1, 2011 and show cause, if any, why he should not be held in contempt
for failure to appear for deposition and produce documents pursuant to the Notice Of Deposition
Duces Tecum as ordered by this Court.
This Writ, therefore, is to command you to take NEIL J. GILLESPIE into custody and
bring him before the Honorable James D. Arnold, at Courtroom 501,800 East Twiggs Street,
Tampa, Florida 33602, immediately, and within 72 hours after he is taken into custody, for a
hearing to determine whether he shall be held in custody until the deposition ordered by the
Court is completed.
Service and execution of this Writ may be made on any day of the week and any time of
the day or night.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Tan1pa, Hillsborough County, Florida, this 1st
day of June, 2011.

STATE OF FLORIDA
)
COUNTY OF HILLSBOROUGH)
THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING IS A TRUE

AND CORRECT COpy OF THE DOCUMENT ON FILE IN

~~IS~~~~~;.~~~~~:':'~~.I:~ . ~:
_..' ,..\ t e"'1
f~~~~~f;I't.

~/~. ;:~

~~~~. ~~(ij
II,~~~~~,~~~---

PAT FRANK

CLERK OF CIRCUIT COURT

J),.-1--r"

B y ~ ~......................D.C.

......................................................

DESCRIPTION OF SU'BJECT
Race: Caucasian
Gender: Male
Date of Birth: 03/19/195
Social Security Number:
Hair: Grey
Height: 5' 10"
Weight: 240 pounds
Other:

~-- ~'----m

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, IN AND FOR HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY

CIVIL DIVISION
NEIL J. GILLESPIE,
Plaintiff,
CASE NO:

05-CA-7205

vs.
DIVISION:

IIJII

BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, P.A.,


a Florida corporation; WILLIAM
J. COOK,
Defendants.

-----------_/

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
THE HONORABLE JAMES D. ARNOLD

BEFORE:

Circuit Court Judge


Hillsborough County Courthouse

TAKEN AT:

Tampa, Florida
DATE AND TIME:

June 1, 2011
11:00 a.m.

REPORTED BY:

Penny M. Appleton

ORIGINAL

Berryhill & Associates, Inc.


501 E. Kennedy Boulevard, Suite 775
Tampa, Florida 33602

(813) 229-8225

A P PEA RAN C E S

Ryan C. Rodems
Attorney at Law

Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A.


400 North Ashley Drive, Suite 2100

Tampa, Florida 33602


Representing the Defendants

Mike Peacock
6

Administrative Counsel
Law Office of Julianne M. Holt

Public Defender
Thirteenth Judicial Circuit

700 E. Twiggs Street, Fifth Floor


PO Box 172910

Tampa, Florida 33672-0910


Representing the Public Defender's Office

10
11

12
13

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Berryhill & Associates, Inc.


501 East Kennedy Boulevard, Suite 775

1
2

THE COURT:

MR. RODEMS:

THE COURT:

5
6

cause.

Good morning.
Good morning, Your Honor.
Okay.

We're here on an order to show

Is that correct?

MR. RODEMS:

Yes, sir, Your Honor, and I'm

Christopher Rodems on behalf of Barker, Rodems & Cook,

P.A., and William J. Cook.

Thereupon, the following proceedings commenced:

THE COURT:

Okay.

I believe Mr. Gillespie was

10

personally served with my order ordering him to appear

11

to show cause why he should not be held in contempt for

12

his failure to give a deposition and to produce

13

documentation.

14

MR. RODEMS:

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. RODEMS:

Is that correct?
Yes, sir.
Okay.
The Marion County Sheriff's Office

17

sent me a return of service indicating that he was

18

served on May 11th of 2011.

19

court on May 25th.

20

fax from Mr. Gillespie, which he faxed to me an e-mail

21

that he send to David A. Roland and several others, and

22

he states in the letter to Mr. Roland, quote, I am not

23

attending the hearing today for the reasons stated in

24

the application to Justice Thomas, period, close quote.

25

I have a copy of this, if the Court would like it.

I did file that with the

I've also received, this morning, a

Berryhill & Associates, Inc.

501 East Kennedy Boulevard, Suite 775

THE COURT:

MR. RODEMS:

To Justice Thomas?
Apparently, he's filed something with

the United States Supreme Court.

that here as well.

THE COURT:

MR. RODEMS:

THE COURT:

MR. PEACOCK:

There's a copy of

Like I said, I'll be happy to -

Sure.
hand it to you.
Mr. Peacock, good morning.
Good morning, Your Honor.

How are

you, sir?

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. PEACOCK:

Fine.

Thank you.

Fine.

How are you?

I'm here -

if I may just

12

interject, I have a motion.

13

counsel.

14

of the Office of the Public Defender.

15

attached to that motion an order that was entered by

16

the Clerk of Court appointing Ms. Holt's office to

17

represent who I believe to be the Plaintiff in this

18

cause.

19

for that appointment.

20

made on what would be a criminal affidavit of

21

indigency.

22

I've provided a copy to

This is a motion for clarification on behalf


You'll find

I don't believe there's any statutory authority


The appointment was actually

I cite the particular statutes of 27 -

Chapter 27

23

of Florida Statutes which limit the authority of the

24

Public Defender, and from all information that I am

25

aware of, I have no reason to believe that -

Berryhill & Associates, Inc.

501 East Kennedy Boulevard, Suite 775

that

there's a basis for the appointment of the Office of

the Public Defender.

Based upon the interim order of the Court, though,

which is attached as Exhibit A to the motion, I appear

before you today because the clerk's determination

pursuant to statute says that the Officer of the Public

Defender is appointed until relieved by the Court.

would presume the Court would find it was appropriate

to relieve us, and I have prepared an order directing

10

that we be relieved because of the lack of a legal

11

basis for the appointment of Ms. Holt's office.

12
13

THE COURT:

Well, we are here on an order to show

cause in a civil contempt proceeding.

14

MR. PEACOCK:

15

THE COURT:

16

I understand.
We're not even here on a criminal

matter.

17

MR. PEACOCK:

18

THE COURT:

I understand that, Your Honor.


And I am not appointing a public

19

defender, and I am going to sign an order relieving the

20

public defender because this is not a criminal

21

proceeding.

22

MR. PEACOCK:

23

THE COURT:

24

pleasure to see you.

25

MR. PEACOCK:

Thank you, Your Honor.


Thank you, Mr. Peacock.

Thank you, Your Honor.

Berryhill & Associates, Inc.

501 East Kennedy Boulevard, Suite 775

Always a

THE COURT:

Take care.

All right.

Let the record reflect that

Mr. Gillespie was personally served with my order

ordering him to appear this morning to show cause why

he should not be held in civil contempt of court for

his failure to give a deposition, appear at a

deposition, give a deposition and produce documents

requested pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum.

correct, counselor?

10
11
12

As a party of notice of deposition

duces tecum, Your Honor.


THE COURT:

Therefore, I'm going to issue a

13

warrant for his arrest and order that he be picked up

14

and brought before the Court to show cause why I

15

shouldn't hold him in civil contempt of court.

16

order is immediate arrest.

17
18
19

The

Is there anything else we need to take up this


morning?
MR. RODEMS:

20

referring to -

21

prepare?

Your Honor, is that writ that you're


is that something Your Honor will

I have prepared a proposed one.

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. RODEMS:

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. RODEMS:

Is that

I'll take a look at your proposed.


Yes, sir.
This just says for failure to appear

for deposition as ordered by the Court.

Berryhill & Associates, Inc.

501 East Kennedy Boulevard, Suite 775

It should be

for failure to appear at deposition and produce

documents pursuant to the subpoena duces tecum.

MR. RODEMS:

THE COURT:

Yes, sir.
The only problem is it says for

immediate -- immediately within 48 hours; however, if

for some reason the gentleman is picked up in another

county, they would have to bring him back, and also the

fact that if he was picked up on a Friday evening, say,

at seven o'clock on a Friday evening, the 48 hours

10

would run on a Sunday evening, so I'm going to change

11

that to 72 hours.

12

hours.

13

MR. RODEMS:

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. RODEMS:

17

THE COURT:

19
20

Yes, sir, I will.

And also, for -- also, failure to

appear at deposition and to produce documents.

16

18

So if we make that change to 72

be correct.

Yes, sir, I will.

And also, your second page appears to

Okay.

MR. RODEMS:

Can you get me that this afternoon?

I'll have it to you before noon, Your

Honor.

21

THE COURT:

Thank you so much.

22

(The hearing concluded at 11:16 a.m.)

23

24

25

~
Berryhill & Associates, Inc.

501 East Kennedy Boulevard, Suite 775

C E R T I F I CAT E

STATE OF FLORIDA

COUNTY OF HILLSBOROUGH

4
5

I, penny M. Appleton, Court Reporter for the

Circuit Court of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit of the

State of Florida, in and for Hillsborough County,

8
9

DO HEREBY CERTIFY, that I was authorized to and


did, report in shorthand the proceedings and evidence in the

10

above-styled cause, as stated in the caption hereto, and

11

that the foregoing pages constitute a true and correct

12

transcription of my shorthand report of said proceedings and

13

evidence.

14

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand in

15

the City of Tampa, County of Hillsborough, State of Florida

16

this 2nd day of June, 2011.

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

~
nny

25

. Appleton

Berryhill & Associates, Inc.


501 East Kennedy Boulevard, Suite 775

9
A
a 1:62:1,1,13:12,17,19
p21,254:3,12,12,13
~
:205:1,4,10,13,15,18
:20,23 6:6,6,7,8,10,12
6:21,227:8,9,108:1,11
above-styled 8: 10
actually 4: 19
Administrative 2:6
affidavit 4:20
afternoon 7:18
all 4:24 6:2
also 3:197:7,14,14,17
Always 5:23
am 3:22 4:24 5:18,19
an 3:4,20 4:155:9,12,19
and 1:1,173:6,8,12,21,21
4:245:9,18,196:7,13
6:147:1,7,14,15,178:7
8:8,9,10,11,12
another 7:6
any4:18
anything 6: 17
Apparently 4:2
appear3:10 5:4 6:4,6,24
7: 1,15
appears 7: 17
Appleton 1: 19 8:5,24
application 3:24
appointed 5:7
r:x~inting4:16 5:18
ointment4:19,195:1
5:11
appropriate 5:8
are4:8,10 5:12
ARNOLD 1:13
arrest 6: 13,16
as4:4 5:4 6:10,258:10
Ashley 2:3
Associates 1:23
at 1:15 2:2 6:6,22 7:1,9
7:15,22
attached 4:155:4
attending 3:23
Attorney 2:2
authority 4: 18,23
authorized 8:8
aware 4:25
a.m1:177:22

back 7:7
Barker 1:62:33:7
Based 5:3
basis 5: I,ll
be3:114:4,17,20 5:10
6:5,13,257:18
~.use 5:5,10,20
ore 1:13 5:5 6:14 7:19
ehalf3:74:13
believe 3:9 4: 17,18,25
Berryhill 1:23
Boulevard 1:24

Box2:8
bring 7:7
brought 6: 14
by 1:194:155:76:25
C
C 2: 1,2 8: 1,1
Can 7:18
caption 8:10
care 6:1
CASE 1:4
cause3:5,114:185:13
6:4,148:10
CERTIFY 8:8
change 7: 10,11
Chapter 4:22
Christopher 3:7
Circuit 1:1,1,13 2:7 8:6,6
cite 4:22
City 8:15
civil 1:2 5:136:5,15
clarification 4:13
Clerk4:16
clerk's 5:5
close 3:24
commenced 3: 1
concluded 7:22
constitute 8: 11
contempt3:115:136:5
6:15
Cook 1:6,7 2:33:7,8
copy 3:25 4:3,12
corporation 1:6
correct 3:5,13 6:9 7: 18
8:11
counsel 2:6 4:13
counselor 6:9
county 1:1,15 3:167:7
8:3,7,15
court 1:1,13 3:2,4,9,15
3:19,254:1,3,5,7,10,16
5:3,7,8,12,15,18,236:1
6:5,12,14,15,22,24,25
7:4,14,17,218:5,6
Courthouse 1: 15
criminal 4:20 5: 15,20
D
D 1:13
DATE 1:17
David 3:21
day 8:16
Defendants 1:8 2:4
defender 2:74: 14,245:2
5:7,19,20
Defender's 2:9
deposition 3: 12 6:6,7,7
6:10,257:1,15
determination 5:5
did 3:188:9
directing 5:9
DIVISION 1:2,5
D08:8

documentation 3:13
documents 6:77:2,15
don't4:18
Drive 2:3
duces6:8,117:2
E
E 1:242:1,1,88:1,1
else6:17
entered 4:15
even 5:15
evening 7:8,9,10
evidence 8:9,13
Exhibit 5:4
e-mail 3:20
F
F 8:1
fact 7:8
failure 3: 12 6:6,24 7: 1,14
fax 3:20
faxed 3:20
Fifth 2:8
file 3: 18
filed 4:2
find 4: 145:8
Fine4:10,11
Floor 2:8
Florida 1:1,6,15,252:4,9
4:238:2,7,15
following 3: 1
for 1: 1 3: 11 ,23 4: 13,19
5:1,116:5,13,24,257:1
7:4,6,148:5,7
foregoing 8: 11
Friday 7:8,9
from 3:20 4:24
G
gentleman 7:6
get 7: 18
Gillespie 1:3 3:9,20 6:3
give 3: 126:6,7
going 5:196:127:10
good 3:2,34:7,8
H
hand 4:68:14
happy 4:4
have 3:254:12,255:9
6:217:7,198:14
he 3: 11,17,20,21,226:5
6:137:8
hearing 3:237:22
held 3:11 6:5
here 3:4 4:4,11 5:12,15
HEREBY 8:8
hereto 8: 10
hereunto 8:14
he's 4:2
Hillsborough 1:1,15 8:3
8:7,15
him 3:10 6:4,157:7

his 3:126:6,13
hold 6:15
Holt 2:6
Holt's4:165:11
Honor 3:3,6 4:85:17,22
5:256:11,19,207:20
HONORABLE 1:13
hours 7:5,9,11,12
How 4:8,10
however 7:5
I
13:9,18,22,254:4,11,12
4:17,18,22,24,255:4,7
5:9,14,17,18,196:14
6:21 7:13,168:1,1,5,8
8: 14
if3:254:117:5,8,11
immediate 6:167:5
immediately 7:5
in 1:1,1 3:11,22,234:17
5:136:5,157:68:7,9,9
8:10,14,14
Inc 1:23
indicating 3: 17
indigency 4:21
information 4:24
interim 5:3
interject 4: 12
is 3:5,134:13 5:4,7,20
6:8,16,17,19,207:4,6
issue 6:12
it 3:254:65:86:257:4
7:19
1'114:4 6:22 7: 19
I'm 3:6 4:116:127:10
I've 3:19 4:12
J
J 1:3,5,73:8
JAMES 1:13
Judge 1:13
Judicial 1: 1 2:7 8:6
Julianne 2:6
June 1:17 8:16
just 4: 11 6:24
Justice 3:24 4: 1
K
Kennedy 1:24
L
lack 5: 10
Law 2:2,6
legal 5: 10
Let 6:2
letter 3:22
like 3:254:4
limit 4:23
look 6:22
M
M 1:192:68:5,24

made 4:20
make 7:11
Marion 3:16
matter 5:16
may 3:18,19 4:11
me 3:17,207:18
Mike 2:5
morning 3:2,3,194:7,8
6:4,18
motion 4:12,13,155:4
Mr 3:3,6,9,14,16,20,22
4:2,6,7,8,115:14,17,22
5:23,256:3,10,19,23
7:3,13,16,19
Ms4:165:11
much 7:21
my 3:10 6:38:12,14
N
N2:1
need 6:17
NEIL 1:3
no 1:44:25
noon 7:19
North 2:3
not 3:11,225:15,18,20
6:5
notice 6:10
0
of 1:1,1,1,12 2:6 3:7,17
3:18,254:3,14,14,16
4:20,22,23,23,255:1,1
5:3,6,10,10,116:5,10
6:10,158:2,3,6,6,7,12
8:12,15,15,15,16
office 2:6,9 3:164:14,16
5: I,ll
Officer 5:6
Okay 3:4,9,15 7:18
on 3:4,7,18,194:13,20
5:12,157:8,9,10
one 6:21
only 7:4
order 3:4,10 4:155:3,9
5:12,196:3,13,16
ordered 6:25
ordering 3: 10 6:4
others 3:21
o'clock 7:9
P
P 2:1,1
page 7:17
pages 8:11
particular 4:22
party 6: 10
Peacock 2:54:7,8,11
5: 14, 17,22,23,25
Penny 1: 198:5,24
period 3:24
personally 3: 10 6:3
picked 6:137:6,8

10
Plaintiff 1:4 4: 17
pleasure 5:24
P02:8

~t:x~are 6:21

pared 5:9 6:21


presume 5:8
problem 7:4
proceeding 5:13,21
proceedings 1:123:1 8:9
8:12
produce 3:12 6:7 7:1,15
proposed 6:21,22
provided 4:12
public 2:7,94: 14,245:2,6
5:18,20
pursuant 5:66:8 7:2
P.A 1:62:33:8

Q
quote 3:22,24

R
R2:18:1
reason 4:25 7:6
reasons 3:23
received 3: 19
record 6:2
referring 6:20
reflect 6:2
relieve 5:9

4~tved
5:7,10
ieving 5:19
report 8:9,12
REPORTED 1: 19
Reporter 8:5
represent 4: 17
Representing 2:4,9
requested 6:8
return 3: 17
right 6:2
Rodems 1:62:2,33:3,6,7
3:7,14,164:2,66:10,19
6:237:3,13,16,19
Roland 3:21 ,22
run 7:10
Ryan 2:2
S
S2:1
said 4:48:12
say 7:8
says 5:6 6:24 7:4
second 7:17
see 5:24
send 3:21
sent 3: 17
served 3: 10,18 6:3

~C~ke317
8:14
ven 7:9
several 3:21
Sherifrs3:16
shorthand 8:9,12

should 3:116:5,25
shouldn't 6: 15
show 3:4,11 5: 126:4,14
sign 5:19
sir 3:6,144:96:237:3,13
7:16
so7:10,11,21
some 7:6
something 4:2 6:20
State 1:18:2,7,15
stated 3:23 8: 10
states 3:224:3
statute 5:6
statutes 4:22,23
statutory 4: 18
Street 2:8
subpoena 6:8 7:2
Suite 1:242:3
Sunday 7:10
Supreme 4:3
Sure 4:5
T
T 8:1,1
take 6:1,17,22
TAKEN 1:15
Tampa 1: 15,25 2:4,9
8: 15
tecum6:8,117:2
Thank 4: 105:22,23,25
7:21
that3:5,13,17,18,214:4
4: 15, 15, 19,24,25,25
5:6,10,176:2,8,13,19
6:19,207:8,11,11,18
8:8,11
the 1:1,1,1,13 2:4,93:1,2
3:4,9,15,16,18,22,23,23
3:24,254:1,3,5,7,10,14
4: 14, 16, 17, 19,22,23,23
5:1,1,2,3,3,4,5,6,6,7,8
5:10,11,12,15,18,19,23
6: 1,2, 12, 14, 15,22,24,25
7:2,4,4,6,7,9,14,17,21
7:22 8:5,6,6,9,9,10,11
8: 15
there 6:17
Therefore 6: 12
Thereupon 3: 1
there's 4:3,185:1
they 7:7
Thirteenth 1: 1 2:7 8:6
this3:19,25 4:13,17 5:20
6:4,17,247:188:16
Thomas 3:244: 1
though 5:3
TIME 1:17
to 3:4,10,11,12,12,20,21
3:22,244:1,4,6,12,15
4:16,17,255:4,6,9,12
5:19,246:4,4,6,8,12,14
6:17,20,247:1,2,7,10
7:11,11,14,15,17,19

8:8
today 3:23 5:5
TRANSCRIPT 1: 12
transcription 8:12
true 8:11
Twiggs 2:8
U
understand 5: 14, 17
United 4:3
until 5:7
up6:13,177:6,8
upon 5:3
us 5:9

3: 19
274:22,22
3
33602 1:252:4
33672-09102:9
4
4002:3
487:5,9
5
501 1:24
7

V
vs 1:5
W
warrant 6: 13
was 3:9,17 4:15,19 5:8
6:3 7:8 8:8
we 5:10,126:177:11
well 4:4 5: 12
We're 3:45:15
what 4:20
WHEREOF 8:14
which 3:20 4:235:4
who4:17
why 3: 11 6:4,14
will 6:20 7: 13, 16
William 1:63:8
with 3:10,18 4:2 6:3
within 7:5
WITNESS 8: 14
would 3:25 4:20 5:8,8 7:7
7: 10
writ 6:19
Y
Yes 3:6,146:237:3,13,16
you 4:6,9,10,10 5:5,22,23
5:24,257:18,19,21
your 3:3,64:8 5: 17,22,25
6:11,19,20,227:17,19
You'll 4:14
you're 6: 19
0
05-CA-7205 1:4
1
1 1: 17
11th 3: 18
11:001:17
11:167:22
1729102:8
2
2nd8:16
20111:173:188:16
21002:3
229-8225 1:25
25th

7002:8
727:11,11
775 1:24
8
813 1:25

http://www.leg.state.fl.us/statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=0000-0099/0029/Sections/0029.007.html

Select Year:

The 2014 Florida Statutes


Title V
JUDICIAL BRANCH

Chapter 29
COURT SYSTEM FUNDING

View Entire Chapter

29.007
Court-appointed counsel. For purposes of implementing s. 14, Art. V of the State Constitution,
the elements of court-appointed counsel to be provided from state revenues appropriated by general law are
as follows:
(1) Private attorneys appointed by the court to handle cases where the defendant is indigent and cannot
be represented by the public defender or the office of criminal conflict and civil regional counsel.
(2) When the office of criminal conflict and civil regional counsel has a conflict of interest, private
attorneys appointed by the court to represent indigents or other classes of litigants in civil proceedings
requiring court-appointed counsel in accordance with state and federal constitutional guarantees and federal
and state statutes.
(3) Reasonable court reporting and transcription services necessary to meet constitutional or statutory
requirements, including the cost of transcribing and copying depositions of witnesses and the cost of foreign
language and sign-language interpreters and translators.
(4) Witnesses, including expert witnesses, summoned to appear for an investigation, preliminary hearing,
or trial in a case when the witnesses are summoned on behalf of an indigent, and any other expert witnesses
approved by the court.
(5) Mental health professionals appointed pursuant to s. 394.473 and required in a court hearing involving
an indigent, mental health professionals appointed pursuant to s. 916.115(2) and required in a court hearing
involving an indigent, and any other mental health professionals required by law for the full adjudication of
any civil case involving an indigent person.
(6) Reasonable pretrial consultation fees and costs.
(7) Travel expenses reimbursable under s. 112.061 reasonably necessary in the performance of
constitutional and statutory responsibilities.
Subsections (3), (4), (5), (6), and (7) apply when court-appointed counsel is appointed; when the court
determines that the litigant is indigent for costs; or when the litigant is acting pro se and the court determines
that the litigant is indigent for costs at the trial or appellate level. This section applies in any situation in
which the court appoints counsel to protect a litigants due process rights. The Justice Administrative
Commission shall approve uniform contract forms for use in processing payments for due process services
under this section. In each case in which a private attorney represents a person determined by the court to be
indigent for costs, the attorney shall execute the commissions contract for private attorneys representing
persons determined to be indigent for costs.
History.s. 7, ch. 2000-237; s. 43, ch. 2003-402; s. 16, ch. 2005-236; s. 18, ch. 2007-62.

Copyright 1995-2015 The Florida Legislature Privacy Statement Contact Us

http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/initiatives/civil_right_to_counsel.html

Home > ABA Groups > Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants > Initiatives > Civil
Right to Counsel

Civil Right to Counsel


NEW! Law Governing Appointment of Counsel in State Civil
Proceedings
The map below provides access, by clicking each state, to a
research report detailing existing authority for appointment of
counsel in various types of civil proceedings. Additional prefatory
material and appendices are available through links below.
Introduction
Acknowledgments
Foreword
Appendix: International Law Relating to Appointment
of Counsel in Civil Proceedings

Civil Appt. Authority

Additional Resources
ABA Toolkit for a Right to Counsel in Civil
Proceedings

ABA House of Delegates Policy Resolution Urging


Recognition of a Civil Right to Counsel

The Toolkit includes in one package the "ABA Basic


Principles for a Right to Counsel in Civil Proceedings"

For additional information regarding civil right to

and "The ABA Model Access Act," which provide two

counsel issues, please visit:

important tools for jurisdictions seeking to implement a


civil right to counsel.

National Coalition for a Civil Right to Counsel