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NEG Case

Sufyan and I negate Resolved: United Nation peacekeepers should have the power to engage in
offennsive operations

Contention One: Missing the Boat

Offensive Operations miss the point; Instead of solving the root of the issue, they only stop the
presentation of violence.
East African 2014
the United Nations peacekeeping chief has cautioned against the thinking that a combative
mission will resolve conflicts in Africa, particularly Congo's quagmire. Offensive peacekeeping cannot
be relied upon to resolve the structural causes of the conflicts in Somalia, South Sudan or eastern DRC,
which often have regional dimensions and linkages in neighboring countries. These pundits want the
UN to pursue a solution that will involve willing heads of state from the region. They say that it is "not
a SWAT team that's going to clean up a bad neighborhood. That requires politics."
Jean-Marie Guehenno,

from 2000 to 2008,

It is impossible to solve conflicts using Offensive Operations.

IPI 13
Conflict will not be resolved by military means alone. coherent peacemaking strategy
is required
to address the root causes of conflict through mediation efforts, statebuilding, and judicial settlement.
These non-military solutions should be pursued to address multifaceted disputes including land
ownership, historic ethnic tension, natural resource management, and power disputes. The Intervention
will not achieve their aims by violent means.

outlined in the framework agreement

may be able to complement this political process by acting as a deterrent and by making rebel groups believe they have no alternative but to negotiatethat they

Historically, UN Offensive Operations are complete failures

Boot 2000
When the United Nations does use force, the results are often pathetic. The various national
contingents that make up U.N. peacekeeping operations
are chosen not for martial prowess but
because their governments are willing to send them, often for no better reason than to collect a daily
stipend. The quality of these outfits varies widely:
for instance, the Bulgarians in Cambodia were
"said to be more interested in searching for sex than for ceasefire violations." Trying to coordinate all
these units, with their incompatible training, procedures, and equipment (to say nothing of languages),
makes a mockery of the principle of "unity of command." Little wonder that blue helmets strike no fear
in the hearts of evildoers. It is worth noting that the only interventions that achieved anything
worthwhile in the 1990s were conducted outside the U.N. For example, the Balkans today are
relatively peaceful: mass murder has been halted, refugees returned. All this was achieved through
greatpower action and traditional balance of power calculations
In Bosnia, a Croat onslaught
and NATO bombing and artillery bombardment combined to roll back Serb forces
In Kosovo, a
rebel ground offensive, NATO air power, and the threat of a NATO invasion again bludgeoned
Belgrade into submission. The U.N.'s role was negligible in both cases. Interventions that address
symptoms (famine or repression, for example) instead of their causes (such as bad government) are
doomed to disappoint.
a internationalist mindset fails to fully grasp is
how useless, and counterproductive, U.N. involvement has been.
Bangladeshis, Bulgarians, Brazilians, and the like

Shawcross writes,



not a multicultural paradise, they are

both anathema to the Wilsonians at Turtle Bay.

and to push Slobodan Milosevic to cut a deal.

such as these

This is a lesson the Clinton administration learned belatedly in Kosovo and Bosnia, and perhaps even in Iraq.


Shawcross and his views are reflective of


NATO won a victory in Kosovo but then unwisely turned over management of the province to the world body.

myriad agencies while carrying out a contradictory mandate: to run Kosovo but to do nothing to prevent its eventual return to Serbian rule. As a result, his administration is in a shambles and reconstruction lags behind schedule. Although it may sometimes make sense to seek the U.N.'s imprimatur for a mission, the organization should not be given operational control. Effective empires require strong proconsuls, not bureaucrats

The U.N. viceroy there, Bernard Kouchner, now faces an impossible task, having to coordinate

Contention Two: Increased

The use of offensive operations forces the UN to choose a side, which creates more violence
IPI 13
More military engagements will bring increased risk to those in the vicinity, and there is potential for
the population in areas of operations to become casualties or displaced by the fighting.
Since offensive military
operations undertaken by the Intervention Brigade make the UN a party in the conflict that is subject to
international humanitarian law,
, the force as a whole becomes a party to

In May 2013, fourteen primarily humanitarian international nongovernmental organizations working

in eastern DRC appealed to the special representative of the secretary-general, then Roger Meece, to ensure that planning for operations prioritizes the mitigation of harm to civilians and that protectionrelated activities and comprehensive contingency plans are in place. Practical measures must account for not only first-order effects during fighting but also the aftermath of operations, including unexploded ordnance, material losses, and impact on community dynamics.

it could be argued that because the brigade falls under the command of the MONUSCO force commander

the conflict. In order to guard against legitimizing reprisal attacks against the
regular MONUSCO force and its civilian components by rebel groups, the
Intervention Brigade will be required to distinguish itself from the regular
MONUSCO troops. However, rebel groups cannot be relied upon to respect this
distinction. Previous periods of offensive operations by MONUSCO have
brought threats of reprisals: when MONUSCO used attack helicopters in
Rutshuru in North Kivu province in July 2012, the M23 responded by
threatening to treat the peacekeepers as hostile forces.
offensive operations by the Intervention Brigade could increase the risk
to their personnel if spoilers, unable or unwilling to distinguish between
military and civilian international components, target vulnerable softer"
targets than the Intervention Brigade troops and if NGOs are perceived to be
aligned to a party in the conflict.
Other peacekeeping operations have also experienced threats against their civilian components in the wake of high tempo

military operations. For example, the secretary-general strongly condemned the increasing attacks against UN peacekeeping staff in Darfur in March 2009, which included carjackings, harassment, and armed attacks on civilian staff members as well as peacekeeping troops. Humanitarian organizations are committed to ensuring they can provide assistance to those in need on all sides of the conflict and highlight the vital importance of

maintaining their independence and impartiality. However,

Contention Three: Human Rights

The UN Peacekeeping operation in Haiti, referred to as MINUSTAH, exemplifies peacekeeping troops
committing human rights abuses against the populations they are deployed to protect
Halling and Bookey in 2008 &crawlid=1&doctype=cite&docid=31+Hastings+Int%27l+%26+Comp.+L.+Rev. +461&srctype=smi&srcid=3B15&key=fb769759c6b4a18682114333eaee9d1

MINUSTAH's actions rise to the level of violations of international law

Crimes of murder
(or extrajudicial killing), rape, and arbitrary arrest, are universally recognized as violations of
international law. The systematic nature of MINUSTAH's actions perpetrated against civilians in
Haiti, which have led to the deaths, severe injury, warrantless detention, and persecution of hundreds of
persons known for their political support
bears alarmingly resemblance with the definition of
crimes against humanity stated in the Rome Statute.'
In addition to violating their own official mandate,

in contravention of the SOFA.

for example,

widespread and

of ousted President Aristide