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NEG Case

We negate Resolved: United Nation peacekeepers should have the power to engage in offennsive

Contention One: Missing the

Offensive Operations miss the point; Instead of solving the root of the issue, they only stop the
presentation of violence.
East African 2014
the United Nations peacekeeping chief has cautioned against the thinking that a combative
mission will resolve conflicts in Africa, particularly Congo's quagmire. Offensive peacekeeping
cannot be relied upon to resolve the structural causes of the conflicts in Somalia, South Sudan or
eastern DRC, which often have regional dimensions and linkages in neighboring countries. These
pundits want the UN to pursue a solution that will involve willing heads of state from the region. They
say that it is "not a SWAT team that's going to clean up a bad neighborhood. That requires politics."
Jean-Marie Guehenno,

from 2000 to 2008,

It is impossible to solve conflicts using Offensive Operations.

IPI 13
Conflict will not be resolved by military means alone. coherent peacemaking strategy
required to address the root causes of conflict through mediation efforts, statebuilding, and judicial
settlement. These non-military solutions should be pursued to address multifaceted disputes including
land ownership, historic ethnic tension, natural resource management, and power disputes. The
Intervention Brigade
will not achieve their aims by violent means.

outlined in the framework agreement

may be able to complement this political process by acting as a deterrent and by making rebel groups believe they have no alternative but to negotiatethat they

Historically, UN Offensive Operations are complete failures

Boot 2000
When the United Nations does use force, the results are often pathetic. The various national
contingents that make up U.N. peacekeeping operations
are chosen not for martial prowess but
because their governments are willing to send them, often for no better reason than to collect a daily
stipend. The quality of these outfits varies widely: Shawcross writes, for instance, that the Bulgarians in Cambodia were "said to be more interested in searching for sex than for ceasefire violations." Trying to coordinate all these units,
with their incompatible training, procedures, and equipment (to say nothing of languages), makes a mockery of the principle of "unity of command." Little wonder that blue helmets strike no fear in
the hearts of evildoers. It is worth noting that the only interventions that achieved anything
worthwhile in the 1990s were conducted outside the U.N. For example, the Balkans today are
relatively peaceful: mass murder has been halted, refugees returned. All this was achieved through
greatpower action and traditional balance of power calculations both anathema to the Wilsonians at
Turtle Bay. In Bosnia, a Croat onslaught and NATO bombing and artillery bombardment combined to
roll back Serb forces and to push Slobodan Milosevic to cut a deal. In Kosovo, a rebel ground
offensive, NATO air power, and the threat of a NATO invasion again bludgeoned Belgrade into
submission. The U.N.'s role was negligible in both cases. Interventions that address symptoms
(famine or repression, for example) instead of their causes (such as bad government) are doomed to
a certain internationalist mindset fails to fully grasp is how
useless, and sometimes counterproductive, U.N. involvement has been. NATO won a victory in
Kosovo but then unwisely turned over management of the province to the world body.
Effective empires require strong
proconsuls, not bureaucrats
Bangladeshis, Bulgarians, Brazilians, and the like


not a multicultural paradise, they are

such as these

This is a lesson the Clinton administration learned belatedly in Kosovo and Bosnia, and perhaps even in Iraq.

Shawcross and his views are reflective of

The U.N. viceroy there, Bernard Kouchner, now faces an impossible task, having to coordinate

myriad agencies while carrying out a contradictory mandate: to run Kosovo but to do nothing to prevent its eventual return to Serbian rule. As a result, his administration is in a shambles and reconstruction lags behind schedule. Although it may sometimes make sense to seek the U.N.'s imprimatur for a mission, the organization should not be given operational control.

Contention Two: Increased

The use of offensive operations forces the UN to choose a side, which creates more violence
IPI 13
More military engagements will bring increased risk to those in the vicinity, and there is potential for
the population in areas of operations to become casualties or displaced by the fighting.
Since offensive
military operations undertaken by the Intervention Brigade make the UN a party in the conflict that is
subject to international humanitarian law,
, the force as a whole becomes a
In May 2013, fourteen primarily humanitarian international nongovernmental organizations

working in eastern DRC appealed to the special representative of the secretary-general, then Roger Meece, to ensure that planning for operations prioritizes the mitigation of harm to civilians and that protectionrelated activities and comprehensive contingency plans are in place. Practical measures must account for not only first-order effects during fighting but also the aftermath of operations, including unexploded ordnance, material losses, and impact on community dynamics.

it could be argued that because the brigade falls under the command of the MONUSCO force commander

party to the conflict. In order to guard against legitimizing reprisal attacks

against the regular MONUSCO force and its civilian components by rebel
groups, the Intervention Brigade will be required to distinguish itself from the
regular MONUSCO troops. However, rebel groups cannot be relied upon to
respect this distinction. Previous periods of offensive operations by MONUSCO
have brought threats of reprisals: when MONUSCO used attack helicopters in
Rutshuru in North Kivu province in July 2012, the M23 responded by
threatening to treat the peacekeepers as hostile forces.
offensive operations by the Intervention Brigade could increase the
risk to their personnel if spoilers, unable or unwilling to distinguish between
military and civilian international components, target vulnerable softer"
targets than the Intervention Brigade troops and if NGOs are perceived to be
aligned to a party in the conflict.

Other peacekeeping operations have also experienced threats against their civilian components in the wake of high tempo

military operations. For example, the secretary-general strongly condemned the increasing attacks against UN peacekeeping staff in Darfur in March 2009, which included carjackings, harassment, and armed attacks on civilian staff members as well as peacekeeping troops. Humanitarian organizations are committed to ensuring they can provide assistance to those in need on all sides of the conflict and highlight the vital

importance of maintaining their independence and impartiality. However,

Contention Three: Human Rights

The UN Peacekeeping operation in Haiti, referred to as MINUSTAH, exemplifies peacekeeping troops
committing human rights abuses against the populations they are deployed to protect
Halling and Bookey in 2008 &crawlid=1&doctype=cite&docid=31+Hastings+Int%27l+%26+Comp.+L.+Rev. +461&srctype=smi&srcid=3B15&key=fb769759c6b4a18682114333eaee9d1

In addition to violating their own official mandate, MINUSTAH's actions rise to the level of violations
of international law in contravention of the SOFA. Crimes of murder (or extrajudicial killing), rape, and
arbitrary arrest, for example, are universally recognized as violations of international law. The
widespread and systematic nature of MINUSTAH's actions perpetrated against civilians in Haiti, which
have led to the deaths, severe injury, warrantless detention, and persecution of hundreds of persons
known for their political support of ousted President Aristide bears alarmingly resemblance with the
definition of crimes against humanity stated in the Rome Statute.'