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Republic of the Philippines

After respondents filed their respective answers to petitioners Complaint, petitioner


deposited PhP 5,788.50 to cover the provisional value of the land in accordance with Section


2, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.5 Then, on February 25, 1999, petitioner filed an Urgent ExParte Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession, which the trial court granted in its
March 9, 1999 Order. The trial court issued a Writ of Possession over the lots owned by

G.R. No. 156093

respondents spouses de la Cruz and respondent Ferrer on March 10, 1999 and April 12,
1999, respectively.

February 2, 2007

However, the trial court dropped the Dela Cruz spouses and their mortgagee, Metrobank, as


parties-defendants in its May 11, 1999 Order,6 in view of the Motion to Intervene filed by


respondent/intervenor Virgilio M. Saulog, who claimed ownership of the land sought to be


expropriated from respondents spouses Dela Cruz.


CORP., Respondents.

On June 24, 1999, the trial court terminated the pre-trial in so far as respondent Ferrer was
concerned, considering that the sole issue was the amount of just compensation, and issued
an Order directing the constitution of a Board of Commissioners with respect to the property


of respondent S.K. Dynamics. The trial court designated Mr. Lamberto C. Parra, Cavite
Provincial Assessor, as chairman, while petitioner nominated the Municipal Assessor of


Dasmarias, Mr. Regalado T. Andaya, as member. Respondent S.K. Dynamics did not
nominate any commissioner.
The Case
As to the just compensation for the property of Saulog, successor-in-interest of the Dela Cruz

In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner National Power

spouses, the trial court ordered the latter and petitioner to submit their compromise

Corporation (NAPOCOR) seeks to annul and set aside the November 18, 2002 Decision1 of


the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 67446, which affirmed the December 28, 1999
Order2 of the Imus, Cavite Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch XX in Civil Case No. 1816-98,
which fixed the fair market value of the expropriated lots at PhP 10,000.00 per square meter.

The commissioners conducted an ocular inspection of S.K. Dynamics property, and on

October 8, 1999, they submitted a report to the trial court, with the following pertinent

The Facts
In arriving our [sic] estimate of values our studies and analysis include the following:
Petitioner NAPOCOR is a government-owned and controlled corporation created under
Republic Act No. 6395, as amended, with the mandate of developing hydroelectric power,
producing transmission lines, and developing hydroelectric power throughout the
Philippines. NAPOCOR decided to acquire an easement of right-of-way over portions of land
within the areas of Dasmarias and Imus, Cavite for the construction and maintenance of
the proposed Dasmarias-Zapote 230 kV Transmission Line Project.

On November 27, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for eminent domain and expropriation

of an easement of right-of-way against respondents as registered owners of the parcels of

land sought to be expropriated, which were covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT)
Nos. T-313327, T-671864, and T-454278. The affected areas were 51.55, 18.25, and 14.625
square meters, respectively, or a total of 84.425 square meters.

As shown to us on-site during our ocular inspection, the appraised
property is land only, identified as the area affected by the construction
of the National Power Corporation (NPC) Dasmarias-Zapote 230KV
Transmission Lines Project, located within Barangay Salitran,
Dasmarias, Cavite registered in the name of S.K. Dynamic[s]
Manufacture[r], Corp., under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-454278.

The neighborhood particularly in the immediate vicinity is within a


mixed residential and commercial area, situated in the northern section

of the Municipality of Dasmarias which was transversed [sic] by Gen.
Emilio Aguinaldo Highway [where] several residential subdivisions and
commercial establishment[s] are located.

The subject property is situated within the residential/commercial zone and

considering the area affected and taking into consideration, their location, shape,
lot topography, accessibility and the predominant uses of properties in the
neighborhood, as well as the trend of land developments in the vicinity, we are on

Considered as some of the important improvements [on] the vicinity are

the opinion that the highest and most profitable use of the property is good for

(within 1.5 radius)

residential and commercial purposes.

Orchard Golf and Country Club


Golden City Subdivision

Southfield Subdivisions

Based on the analysis of data gathered and making the proper adjustments with respect to
the location, area, shape, accessibility, and the highest and best use of the subject

Arcontica Sports Complex

Maxs Restaurant
Waltermart Shopping Mall
UMC Medical Center

properties, it is the opinion of the herein commissioners that the fair market value of the
subject real properties is P10,000.00 per square meter, as of this date, October 05, 1999.7
Thus, both commissioners recommended that the property of S.K. Dynamics to be
expropriated by petitioner be valued at PhP 10,000.00 per square meter.
The records show that the commissioners did not afford the parties the opportunity to
introduce evidence in their favor, nor did they conduct hearings before them. In fact, the
commissioners did not issue notices to the parties to attend hearings nor provide the

Several savings and Commercial Banks as well as several

concerned parties the opportunity to argue their respective causes.

Gasoline stations.
Upon the submission of the commissioners report, petitioner was not notified of the
Community centers such as, [sic] churches, public markets, shopping

completion or filing of it nor given any opportunity to file its objections to it.

malls, banks and gasoline stations are easily accessible from the
subject real properties.

On December 1, 1999, respondent Ferrer filed a motion adopting in toto the commissioners
report with respect to the valuation of his property.8 On December 28, 1999, the trial court

Convenience facilities such as electricity, telephone service as well as

consequently issued the Order approving the commissioners report, and granted respondent

pipe potable water supply system are all available along Gen. Emilio

Ferrers motion to adopt the subject report. Subsequently, the just compensation for the

Aguinaldo Highway.

disparate properties to be expropriated by petitioner for its project was uniformly pegged at
PhP 10,000.00 per square meter.

Public transportation consisting of passenger jeepneys and buses as

well taxicabs are [sic] regularly available along Gen. E. Emilio Aguinaldo
Highway [sic].

Incidentally, on February 11, 2000, respondent S.K. Dynamics filed a motion informing the

By way of opposition, [respondent] Dynamics countered that the valuation of a lot under

trial court that in addition to the portion of its property covered by TCT No. T-454278 sought

expropriation is reckoned at the time of its taking by the government. And since in the case

to be expropriated by petitioner, the latter also took possession of an 8.55-square meter

at bar, the writ of possession was issued on March 10, 1999, the price or value for 1999

portion of S.K. Dynamics property covered by TCT No. 503484 for the same purposeto

must be the one to be considered.

acquire an easement of right-of-way for the construction and maintenance of the proposed
Dasmarias-Zapote 230 kV Transmission Line Project. Respondent S.K. Dynamics prayed
that said portion be included in the computation of the just compensation to be paid by

We find for the defendant.

The PAR Resolution alluded to by [petitioner] was passed in 1995 or four (4) years [before] the

On the same date, the Imus, Cavite RTC granted S.K. Dynamics motion to have the 8.55square meter portion of its property included in the computation of just

lot in question was taken over by the government. This explains why the price or cost of the
land has considerably increased. Besides, the valuation of P10,000.00 per sq.m. was the one
recommended by the commissioner designated by [petitioner] itself and concurred in by the
Provincial Assessor of Cavite.

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

As previously stated, in its December 28, 1999 Order, the trial court fixed the just
compensation to be paid by petitioner at PhP 10,000.00 per square meter. The relevant

Be that as it may, the Motion for Reconsideration is denied.


portion of the said Order reads as follows:

On October 8, 1999, a Commissioners Valuation Report was submitted in Court by the
Provincial Assessor of Cavite and by the Municipal Assessor of Dasmarias, Cavite. Quoting
from said Report, thus:
"Based on the analysis of data gathered and making the proper adjustments with respect to
location, area, shape, accessibility, and the highest and best use of the subject properties, it

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Unsatisfied with the amount of just compensation, petitioner filed an appeal before the CA.
In resolving the appeal, the CA made the following findings:
We find nothing on record which would warrant the reversal of the Order dated December
28, 1999 of the court a quo.

is the opinion of herein commissioners that the fair market value of the subject real
properties is 10,000.00 per square meter, as of this date, October 05, 1999."

[Petitioner] submits that the order of the court a quo adopting the Commissioners [sic]
Valuation Report, fixing the just compensation for the subject lots in the amount of

Finding the opinion of the Commissioners to be in order, this Court approves the same.
Accordingly, the Motion filed by [respondent] Reynaldo Ferrer adopting said valuation report
is granted.

P10,000.00 per square meter is exhorbitant [sic], highly speculative and without any basis.
In support thereto, [petitioner] presented before the court a quo the Provincial Appraisal
Committee of Cavite Resolution No. 08-95 x x x which fixed the fair market value of lots
located along Gen. Aguinaldo Highway, Dasmarias, Cavite, which incidentally includes the

On January 20, 2000, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the abovementioned
Order, but said motion was denied in the trial courts March 23, 2000 Order, which states
The basis of [petitioner] in seeking to set aside the Order dated December 28, 1999 is its
claim that the Commissioners Report fixing the just compensation at P10,000.00 per square
meter is exorbitant, unjust and unreasonable. To support its contention, [petitioner] invoked
Provincial Appraisal Committee Report No. 08-95 dated October 25, 1995 which set the just
compensation of lots along Gen. Aguinaldo Highway at P3,000.00 per sq.m. only.

lots subject of this proceedings [sic], in the amount of P3,000.00 per square meter.
We do not agree.
"The nature and character of the land at the time of its taking is the principal criterion to
determine just compensation to the land owner." (National Power Corporation vs. Henson,
300 SCRA 751-756).
The CA then cited Section 4, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure 11 to explain why
Resolution No. 08-95 could not "be used as [a] basis for determining the just compensation
of the subject lots, which by reason of the changed commercial conditions in the vicinity,

could have increased its value greater than its value three (3) years ago." The said resolution,

It is beyond question that petitions for review may only raise questions of law which must be

which fixed the fair market value of the lots, including that of the disputed lots along Gen.

distinctly set forth;14thus, this Court is mandated to only consider purely legal questions in

Aguinaldo Highway, was approved on October 25, 1995, while petitioner filed the Complaint

this petition, unless called for by extraordinary circumstances.

for the expropriation of the disputed lots on November 27, 1998, or more than three (3) years
had elapsed after said resolution was approved. Reflecting on the commissioners report, the
CA noted that since the property underwent important changes and improvements, "the
highest and most profitable use of the property is good for residential and commercial

In this case, petitioner raises the issue of denial of due process because it was allegedly
deprived of the opportunity to present its evidence on the just compensation of properties it
wanted to expropriate, and the sufficiency of the legal basis or bases for the trial courts
Order on the matter of just compensation. Unquestionably, a petition for review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court is the proper vehicle to raise the issues in question before this

As regards the commissioners failure to conduct a hearing "to give the parties the


opportunity to present their respective evidence," as alleged by petitioner, the CA opined that
"[t]he filing by [petitioner] of a motion for reconsideration accorded it ample opportunity to
dispute the findings of the commissioners, so that [petitioner] was as fully heard as there
might have been hearing actually taken place x x x."

In view of the significance of the issues raised in this petition, because this case involves the
expenditure of public funds for a clear public purpose, this Court will overlook the fact that
petitioner did not file a Motion for Reconsideration of the CA November 18, 2002 Decision,
and brush aside this technicality in favor of resolving this case on the merits.

The CA ultimately rendered its judgment, as follows:

First Issue: Petitioner was deprived of due process when it was not given the opportunity to
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of

present evidence before the commissioners

merit. The Order dated December 28, 1999 and March 23, 2000 of the court a quo are
hereby AFFIRMED by this Court.

It is undisputed that the commissioners failed to afford the parties the opportunity to
introduce evidence in their favor, conduct hearings before them, issue notices to the parties


to attend hearings, and provide the opportunity for the parties to argue their respective
causes. It is also undisputed that petitioner was not notified of the completion or filing of the

Significantly, petitioner did not file a Motion for Reconsideration of the CA November 18,
2002 Decision, but it directly filed a petition for review before us.
The Issues
In this petition for review, the issues are the following:

commissioners report, and that petitioner was also not given any opportunity to file its
objections to the said report.
A re-examination of the pertinent provisions on expropriation, under Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court, reveals the following:
SEC. 6. Proceedings by commissioners.Before entering upon the performance of their
duties, the commissioners shall take and subscribe an oath that they will faithfully perform
their duties as commissioners, which oath shall be filed in court with the other proceedings
in the case. Evidence may be introduced by either party before the commissioners who are
authorized to administer oaths on hearings before them, and the commissioners shall,
unless the parties consent to the contrary, after due notice to the parties to attend, view and


examine the property sought to be expropriated and its surroundings, and may measure the


same, after which either party may, by himself or counsel, argue the case. The
commissioners shall assess the consequential damages to the property not taken and deduct

The Courts Ruling

We find this petition meritorious.

from such consequential damages the consequential benefits to be derived by the owner from
the public use or purpose of the property taken, the operation of its franchise by the
corporation or the carrying on of the business of the corporation or person taking the
property. But in no case shall the consequential benefits assessed exceed the consequential
damages assessed, or the owner be deprived of the actual value of his property so taken.

SEC. 7. Report by commissioners and judgment thereupon.The court may order the

In this case, the fact that no trial or hearing was conducted to afford the parties the

commissioners to report when any particular portion of the real estate shall have been

opportunity to present their own evidence should have impelled the trial court to disregard

passed upon by them, and may render judgment upon such partial report, and direct the

the commissioners findings. The absence of such trial or hearing constitutes reversible error

commissioners to proceed with their work as to subsequent portions of the property sought

on the part of the trial court because the parties (in particular, petitioners) right to due

to be expropriated, and may from time to time so deal with such property. The

process was violated.

commissioners shall make a full and accurate report to the court of all their proceedings,
and such proceedings shall not be effectual until the court shall have accepted their report
and rendered judgment in accordance with their recommendations. Except as otherwise
expressly ordered by the court, such report shall be filed within sixty (60) days from the date
the commissioners were notified of their appointment, which time may be extended in the
discretion of the court. Upon the filing of such report, the clerk of the court shall serve
copies thereof on all interested parties, with notice that they are allowed ten (10) days within

The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the petitioner was not deprived of due process
when it was able to file a motion for reconsideration
In ruling that petitioner was not deprived of due process because it was able to file a Motion
for Reconsideration, the CA had this to say:

which to file objections to the findings of the report, if they so desire.

[Petitioner], further, asserts that "the appointed commissioners failed to conduct a hearing to
SEC. 8. Action upon commissioners report.Upon the expiration of the period of ten (10)
days referred to in the preceding section, or even before the expiration of such period but
after all the interested parties have filed their objections to the report or their statement of
agreement therewith, the court may, after hearing, accept the report and render judgment in

give the parties the opportunity to present their respective evidence. According to [petitioner],
the Commissioners Valuation Report was submitted on October 8, 1999 in violation of the
appellants right to due process as it was deprived of the opportunity to present evidence on
the determination of the just compensation."

accordance therewith; or, for cause shown, it may recommit the same to the commissioners
for further report of facts; or it may set aside the report and appoint new commissioners; or

We are not persuaded.

it may accept the report in part and reject it in part; and it may make such order or render
such judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of his
right of expropriation, and to the defendant just compensation for the property so taken.

The filing by [petitioner] of a motion for reconsideration accorded it ample opportunity to

dispute the findings of the commissioners, so that [petitioner] was as fully heard as there
might have been hearing actually taken place. "Denial of due process cannot be successfully

Based on these provisions, it is clear that in addition to the ocular inspection performed by

invoked by a party who has had the opportunity to be heard on his motion for

the two (2) appointed commissioners in this case, they are also required to conduct a hearing

reconsideration." (Vda. De Chua vs. Court of Appeals, 287 SCRA 33, 50).16

or hearings to determine just compensation; and to provide the parties the following: (1)
notice of the said hearings and the opportunity to attend them; (2) the opportunity to
introduce evidence in their favor during the said hearings; and (3) the opportunity for the
parties to argue their respective causes during the said hearings.
The appointment of commissioners to ascertain just compensation for the property sought to
be taken is a mandatory requirement in expropriation cases. In the instant expropriation
case, where the principal issue is the determination of just compensation, a hearing before
the commissioners is indispensable to allow the parties to present evidence on the issue of
just compensation. While it is true that the findings of commissioners may be disregarded
and the trial court may substitute its own estimate of the value, the latter may only do so for
valid reasons, that is, where the commissioners have applied illegal principles to the
evidence submitted to them, where they have disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence,
or where the amount allowed is either grossly inadequate or excessive. Thus, "trial with the
aid of the commissioners is a substantial right that may not be done away with capriciously
or for no reason at all."15

In this respect, we are constrained to disagree with the CA ruling, and therefore, set it aside.
While it is true that there is jurisprudence supporting the rule that the filing of a Motion for
Reconsideration negates allegations of denial of due process, it is equally true that there are
very specific rules for expropriation cases that require the strict observance of procedural
and substantive due process,17 because expropriation cases involve the admittedly painful
deprivation of private property for public purposes and the disbursement of public funds as
just compensation for the private property taken. Therefore, it is insufficient to hold that a
Motion for Reconsideration in an expropriation case cures the defect in due process.
As a corollary, the CAs ruling that "denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked by
a party who has had the opportunity to be heard on his motion for reconsideration," citing
Vda. de Chua v. Court of Appeals, is not applicable to the instant case considering that the
cited case involved a lack of notice of the orders of the trial court in granting letters of
administration. It was essentially a private dispute and therefore, no public funds were
involved. It is distinct from this expropriation case where grave consequences attached to the
orders of the trial court when it determined the just compensation.

The Court takes this opportunity to elucidate the ruling that the opportunity to present

The market value of the property is the price that may be agreed upon by parties willing but

evidence incidental to a Motion for Reconsideration will suffice if there was no chance to do

not compelled to enter into the contract of sale. Not unlikely, a buyer desperate to acquire a

so during the trial. We find such situation to be the exception and not the general rule. The

piece of property would agree to pay more, and a seller in urgent need of funds would agree

opportunity to present evidence during the trial remains a vital requirement in the

to accept less, than what it is actually worth. x x x

observance of due process. The trial is materially and substantially different from a hearing
on a Motion for Reconsideration. At the trial stage, the party is usually allowed several
hearing dates depending on the number of witnesses who will be presented. At the hearing of
said motion, the trial court may not be more accommodating with the grant of hearing dates
even if the movant has many available witnesses. Before the decision is rendered, a trial
court has an open mind on the merits of the parties positions. After the decision has been
issued, the trial courts view of these positions might be inclined to the side of the winning
party and might treat the Motion for Reconsideration and the evidence adduced during the
hearing of said motion perfunctorily and in a cavalier fashion. The incident might not receive
the evaluation and judgment of an impartial or neutral judge. In sum, the constitutional

Among the factors to be considered in arriving at the fair market value of the property are
the cost of acquisition, the current value of like properties, its actual or potential uses, and
in the particular case of lands, their size, shape, location, and the tax declarations thereon.
It is settled that just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking, which
usually coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. Where the
institution of the action precedes entry into the property, the just compensation is to be
ascertained as of the time of the filing of the complaint. 18

guarantee of due process still requires that a party should be given the fullest and widest
opportunity to adduce evidence during trial, and the availment of a motion for

We note that in this case, the filing of the complaint for expropriation preceded the

reconsideration will not satisfy a partys right to procedural due process, unless his/her

petitioners entry into the property.

inability to adduce evidence during trial was due to his/her own fault or negligence.
Therefore, it is clear that in this case, the sole basis for the determination of just
Second Issue: The legal basis for the determination of just compensation was insufficient

compensation was the commissioners ocular inspection of the properties in question, as

gleaned from the commissioners October 5, 1999 report. The trial courts reliance on the

In this case, it is not disputed that the commissioners recommended that the just
compensation be pegged at PhP 10,000.00 per square meter. The commissioners arrived at
the figure in question after their ocular inspection of the property, wherein they considered
the surrounding structures, the propertys location and, allegedly, the prices of the other,
contiguous real properties in the area. Furthermore, based on the commissioners report,
the recommended just compensation was determined as of the time of the preparation of

said report is a serious error considering that the recommended compensation was highly
speculative and had no strong factual moorings. For one, the report did not indicate the fair
market value of the lots occupied by the Orchard Golf and Country Club, Golden City
Subdivision, Arcontica Sports Complex, and other business establishments cited. Also, the
report did not show how convenience facilities, public transportation, and the residential and
commercial zoning could have added value to the lots being expropriated.

said report on October 5, 1999.

Moreover, the trial court did not amply explain the nature and application of the "highest
In B.H. Berkenkotter & Co. v. Court of Appeals, we held, thus:
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property sought to be
expropriated. The measure is not the takers gain but the owners loss. The compensation, to
be just, must be fair not only to the owner but also to the taker. Even as undervaluation
would deprive the owner of his property without due process, so too would its overvaluation
unduly favor him to the prejudice of the public.
To determine just compensation, the trial court should first ascertain the market value of the
property, to which should be added the consequential damages after deducting therefrom the
consequential benefits which may arise from the expropriation. If the consequential benefits
exceed the consequential damages, these items should be disregarded altogether as the basic
value of the property should be paid in every case.

and best use" method to determine the just compensation in expropriation cases. No attempt
was made to justify the recommended "just price" in the subject report through other
sufficient and reliable means such as the holding of a trial or hearing at which the parties
could have had adequate opportunity to adduce their own evidence, the testimony of realtors
in the area concerned, the fair market value and tax declaration, actual sales of lots in the
vicinity of the lot being expropriated on or about the date of the filing of the complaint for
expropriation, the pertinent zonal valuation derived from the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
among others.
More so, the commissioners did not take into account that the Asian financial crisis in the
second semester of 1997 affected the fair market value of the subject lots. Judicial notice can
be taken of the fact that after the crisis hit the real estate market, there was a downward
trend in the prices of real estate in the country.

Furthermore, the commissioners report itself is flawed considering that its recommended
just compensation was pegged as of October 5, 1999, or the date when the said report was
issued, and not the just compensation as of the date of the filing of the complaint for

made to wait until protracted litigation; standards set by the board enough not required to
prove immediate danger to life, health et. al

expropriation, or as of November 27, 1998. The period between the time of the filing of the
complaint (when just compensation should have been determined), and the time when the
commissioners report recommending the just compensation was issued (or almost one [1]
year after the filing of the complaint), may have distorted the correct amount of just

Fabella v. CA public school teachers striking DUE PROCESS IN ADMINISTRATIVE

requisites: 1) actual or constructive notice of the institution of the proceedings which may

Clearly, the legal basis for the determination of just compensation in this case is insufficient

affect ones legal rights; 2) real opportunity to be heard personally or with counsel; 3) to

as earlier enunciated. This being so, the trial courts ruling in this respect should be set

present witnesses and

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The December 28, 1999 and March 23, 2000
Orders of the Imus, Cavite RTC and the November 18, 2002 Decision of the CA are hereby
SET ASIDE. This case is remanded to the said trial court for the proper determination of just

evidence is ones favor and to defend his rights; 4) tribunal vested with competent
jurisdiction reasonable guarantee of honesty and impartiality; 5) finding is supported by
substantial evidence
contained and made known to the parties

compensation in conformity with this Decision. No costs.


Guzman v. CA kicked out from school DUE PROCESS IN STUDENT DISCPLINE

PROCEEDINGS requisites: 1) student must be informed in writing the nature and cause of
the accusation against him; 2) right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance

Banco Espanol-Filipino v. Palanca mortgage foreclosure due process implies that: 1)

of counsel if desired; 3) they shall

there must be a court or tribunal clothed with the power to hear or determine the matter

be informed of the evidence against them; 4) right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; 5)

before it; 2) that jurisdiction has been lawfully acquired; 3) defendant shall have to

evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or officials hearing the case

opputunity to be heard; 4) judgment shall be rendered upon lawful hearing. | NOTICE must
be given
Lao Gi v. CA DUE PROCESS IN DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS same requisites as those
required in criminal proceedings (Rules of Court) Secretary of Justice v. Lantion extradition
Bautista v. CA land dispute When a party was afforded the opportunity to participate in

case of Jimenez - DUE PROCESS IN QUASIJUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS requisites: 1) taking

the proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot complain of deprivation of due process

and evaluation of evidence; 2)

determining facts based upon the evidence presented; 3) rendering an order based upon the
facts proved Chavez v. COMELEC billboard of Chavez as endorser A statute or regulation

Rural Bank of Buhi v. CA bank receivership; insolvency there is no requirement whether

is considered void for overbreadth when it offends the constitutionality principle that a

express or implied that a hearing must first be conducted before a banking institution may

governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state

be placed in receivership

regulations may nor be achieved by means

that sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade protected freedoms

Pollution Adjudication Board v. CA untreated wastewater discharged to sewer Ex parte

proceedings - permitted by law in situations like these because stopping the discharged of
the wastewater cannot be

Pollution Adjudication Board vs. CA et al.

G.R. No. 93891, 11 March 1991
Third Division, Feliciano (J), 4 concur

FACTS: Respondent, Solar Textile Finishing Corporation was involved in bleaching, rinsing
and dyeing textiles with wastewater being directly discharged into a canal leading to the
adjacent Tullahan- Tinerejos River. Petitioner Board, an agency of the Government charged
with the task of determining whether the effluents of a particular industrial establishment
comply with or violate applicable anti-pollution statutory and regulatory provisions, have
been remarkably forbearing in its efforts to enforce the applicable standards vis-a-vis Solar.
Solar, on the other hand, seemed very casual about its continued discharge of untreated,
pollutive effluents into the river. Petitioner Board issued an ex parte Order directing Solar
immediately to cease and desist from utilizing its wastewater pollution source installations.
Solar, however, with preliminary injunction against the Board, went to the Regional Trial
Court on petition for certiorari, but it was dismissed upon two (2) grounds, i.e., that appeal
and not certiorari from the questioned Order of the Board as well as the Writ of Execution
was the proper remedy, and that the Board's subsequent Order allowing Solar to operate
temporarily had rendered Solar's petition moot and academic. Dissatisfied, Solar went on
appeal to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the Order of dismissal of the trial court and
remanded the case to that court for further proceedings. In addition, the Court of Appeals
declared the Writ of Execution null and void. At the same time, the CA said that certiorari
was a proper remedy since the Orders of petitioner Board may result in great and irreparable
injury to Solar; and that while the case might be moot and academic, "larger issues"
demanded that the question of due process be settled. Petitioner Board moved for
reconsideration, without success.

exercise of police power. Hence, the trial court did not err when it dismissed Solar's petition
for certiorari. It follows that the proper remedy was an appeal from the trial court to the
Court of Appeals, as Solar did in fact appeal. The Court gave due course on the Petition for
Review and the Decision of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution were set aside. The Order
of petitioner Board and the Writ of Execution, as well as the decision of the trial court were
reinstated, without prejudice to the right of Solar to contest the correctness of the basis of
the Board's Order and Writ of Execution at a public hearing before the Board.

Arguing that that the ex parte Order and the Writ of Execution were issued in accordance
with law and were not violative of the requirements of due process; and the ex parte Order
and the Writ of Execution are not the proper subjects of a petition for certiorari, Oscar A.
Pascua and Charemon Clio L. Borre for petitioner asked the Supreme Court to review the
Decision and Resolution promulgated by the Court of Appeals entitled "Solar Textile
Finishing Corporation v. Pollution Adjudication Board," which reversed an order of the
Regional Trial Court. In addition, petitioner Board claims that under P.D. No. 984, Section
7(a), it has legal authority to issue ex parte orders to suspend the operations of an
establishment when there is prima facie evidence that such establishment is discharging
effluents or wastewater, the pollution level of which exceeds the maximum permissible
standards set by the NPCC (now, the Board). Petitioner Board contends that the reports
before it concerning the effluent discharges of Solar into the River provided prima facie
evidence of violation by Solar of Section 5 of the 1982 Effluent Code. Solar, on the other
hand, contends that under the Board's own rules and regulations, an ex parte order may
issue only if the effluents discharged pose an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety
or welfare, or to animal and plant life." In the instant case, according to Solar, the inspection
reports before the Board made no finding that Solar's wastewater discharged posed such a


ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court on the ground
that Solar had been denied due process by the Board.
HELD: The Court found that the Order and Writ of Execution were entirely within the lawful
authority of petitioner Board. Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and
regulations in situations like here. The relevant pollution control statute and implementing
regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power
to protect the safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the
protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated as the police power. It is a
constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield
to the necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here involved, through the

Republic of the Philippines


G.R. Nos. L-39516-17 January 28, 1975

Castillo and Morales Law Offices for petitioners.
Respondent Judge in his own behalf.

In this certiorari proceedings, petitioners, two young maidens who are the offended parties in
two rape cases, assail the actuation of respondent Judge and seek his disqualification on the
ground of bias and prejudice. What was done by him, according to their strongly-worded
petition, was in disregard of the highly-prized ideal in adjudication, likewise a due process
requirement, that a litigant "is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge." 1 Briefly, on two separate occasions on August 15 and 27, 1974, in the
secrecy of his chambers he informed petitioners of the weakness of their cases, the likelihood
of a verdict of acquittal in favor of the accused, and impressed upon them that it would be to
their advantage to settle, as the most he could do on their behalf was to have such accused
indemnify them. This move, according to him, would assure their being spared from the
embarrassment occasioned by suits of this character, clearly prejudicial to their future.
These conversations took place even before the prosecution had finished presenting its

evidence, one of the petitioners not having testified as yet. Respondent Judge could not very

sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above."

well deny that he did invite them to confer with him, but he would impress on this Court

from the Villaluz opinion is again relevant: "Thereby, it is made clear to the occupants of the

that their version should not be let credence and that he was prompted to act thus from the

bench that outside of pecuniary interest, relationship or previous participation in the matter

best of motives, "as an act of charity" and as a "clear attempt to humanize justice." 2 With the

that calls for adjudication, there may be other causes that could conceivably erode the trait

problem thus laid bare and the essentials exposed to view, it is obvious that the petitions are

of objectivity, thus calling for inhibition. That is to betray a sense of realism, for the factors

impressed with merit. Respect for a number of decisions, most of them recent in character,

that lead to preferences or predilections are many and varied. It is well, therefore, that if any

yields no other conclusion.

such should make its appearance and prove difficult to resist, the better course for a judge is


An excerpt

to disqualify himself. That way, he avoids being misunderstood. His reputation for probity
Petitioners are entitled to the remedy sought. Respondent Judge must be disqualified from
further hearing the cases.

and objectivity is preserved. What is even more important, the ideal of an impartial
administration of justice is lived up to. Thus is due process vindicated."


What is more, in

the event that a judge may be unable to discern for himself his inability to meet the test of

1. In every litigation, perhaps much more so in criminal cases, the manner and attitude of a
trial judge are crucial to everyone concerned, the offended party, no less than the accused. It

the cold neutrality required of him, this Court has seen to it that he should disqualify


From what has been set forth, this certainly is another one of such cases.

is not for him to indulge or even to give the appearance of catering to the at times human
failing of yielding to first impressions. He is to refrain from reaching hasty conclusions or

2. This is not to discount in its entirety the submission of respondent Judge, who argued on

prejudging matters. It would be deplorable if he lays himself open to the suspicion of reacting

his own behalf, that his final decision would be dependent on the evidence that could be

to feelings rather than to facts, of being imprisoned in the net of his own sympathies and

presented by petitioners. What cannot be denied, however, is that after such conferences,

predilections. It must be obvious to the parties as well as the public that he follows the

they could no longer be expected to have faith in his impartiality. Even before they had been

traditional mode of adjudication requiring that he hear both sides with patience and

fully heard, they were told that their cases were weak. They could very well conclude then

understanding to keep the risk of reaching an unjust decision at a minimum. It is not

that there was a prejudgment. Under the circumstances, the fact that he acted as he did

necessary that he should possess marked proficiency in law, but it is essential that he is to

because any monetary settlement would benefit petitioners, considering their straitened

hold the balance true. What is equally important is that he should avoid any conduct that

financial circumstances, was of no moment. Even if it be admitted that, according to his best

casts doubt on his impartially. What has been said is not merely a matter of judicial ethics. It

lights, respondent Judge acted from a sense of sympathy or "charity", his conduct cannot be

is impressed with constitutional significance. As set forth in Mateo Jr. v. Villaluz: "It is now
beyond dispute that due process cannot be satisfied in the absence of that degree of
objectivity on the part of a judge sufficient to reassure litigants of his being fair and being

said to be consonant with the exacting standard of the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
The administration of justice would thus be subject to a reproach if there be a rejection of
the plea for disqualification.

just. Thereby there is the legitimate expectation that the decision arrived at would be the
application of the law to the facts as found by a judge who does not play favorites. For him,

3. It is to be made clear, moreover, that nothing said in this opinion has reference to the

the parties stand on equal footing. In the language of Justice Dizon: "It has been said, in

merits of the two prosecutions for rape. That is not a matter before us. The controversy

fact, that due process of law requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested

passed upon is whether respondent Judge should continue to preside at such trial. The

tribunal, and that every litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an

decision reached goes no further than that he should not. That accomplished, the hearings

impartial Judge."" 4 The above excerpt is from the leading case ofGutierrez v. Santos. 5 The

should continue, with the outcome dependent on an appraisal, according to law, of the

Villaluz decision is only one of a number of cases where Gutierrez was cited with

evidence submitted by the prosecution and the defense. .

approval. 6 InGeotina v. Gonzales, 7 a judge, according to Justice Castro, the ponente, should
strive to be at all times "wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent. Elementary
due process requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal. A judge has
both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely
free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity." 8

WHEREFORE, this Court grants the petitions for certiorari, and respondent Judge is ordered
to desist from further conducting the trial of the two prosecutions for rape, Criminal Cases
Nos. 733 and 734 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Ninth Judicial District,
respectively entitled People of the Philippines v. Ernesto de Villa and People of the Philippines
v. Ernesto de Villa. No costs.

It is in line with the above due process requirement that the Rules of Court provide for
disqualification of judge 9outside of the instances referring to their pecuniary interest,
relationship, previous connection, or his having presided in an inferior court when his ruling
or decision is the subject of review.


The 1964 amendment contains this additional

paragraph: "A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from


under receivership.
Buhi Bank was a rural bank. Its books were examined by the Rural Banks' Division of the
Central Bank. However, it refused to be examined. As a consequence, its financial assistance
was suspended. Later, a general examination of the banks affairs and operations were again
conducted. The rural banks division found out massive irregularities in the operations,
giving out loans to unknown and fictitious borrowers, and sums amounting to millions past
due to the Central Bank. There were also promissory notes rediscounted with the Central
Bank for cash.
As a result, the Buhi Bank became insolvent. The division chief, Odra, recommended that
Buhi be placed under receivership. Thus, the Monetary Board adopted a Resolution # 583,
placing the bank under receivership. Odra, the division chief, was made the receiver. Odra
thus implemented the resolution, authorizing deputies to take control and possession of
Buhis assets and liabilities.
Del Rosario, the Buhi Bank Manager, filed an injunction against the receiver, arguing that
the resolution violated the Rural Banks Act and constitutes gadalej. The bank claims that
there was a violation of due process. They claim that the bank was not given the chance to
deny and disprove the claim of insolvency or the other grounds and that it was hastily put
IMMEDIATELY appoint a receiver when: 1) there has been an examination by CB, b) a report

Later on, the Central Bank Monetary Board ordered the liquidation of the Bank. The
judge ruled in favor of the Bank and issued a writ of execution.
The CA however restrained the enforcement of execution, citing that the Judge did not follow
the orders, and thus required the Bank to yield to the CB.
Whether or not due process was observed
Under Sec 29 of the RA 265, on proceedings regarding insolvency, there is NO
REQUIREMENT that a hearing be first conducted before a bank may be placed under
receivership. The law explicitly provides that the Monetary Board can IMMEDIATELY forbid a
banking institution from doing business and
Republic of the Philippines

to the CB, and c) prima facie showing that the bank is insolvent.


As to the claim that the RA 265 violates due process, the claim is untenable. The law could
not have intended to disregard the constitutional requirement of due process when it
conferred power to place rural banks under receivership.


The closure and liquidation of the bank is considered an exercise of POLICE POWER. It
maybe subject to judicial inquiry and could be set aside if found to be capricious,
discriminatory, whimsical, arbitrary, etc. The appointment of a receiver may be made by the
Monetary Board, WITHOUT NOTICE AND HEARING, but subject to the JUDICIAL INQUIRY,
to insure protection of the banking institution.

G.R. No. 176127

Due process does NOT necessarily require a PRIOR HEARING. A hearing or an

OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD may be made SUBSEQUENT to the closure. One could just
imagine the dire consequences of a prior hearing: bank runs would happen, resulting in
panic and hysteria. In that way, fortunes will be wiped out, and disillusionment will run the
gamut of the entire banking industry.

and NEIL PATRICK H. CELIS, Respondents.

There is no question that the action of the MB may be subject to judicial review. Courts may
interfere with the MBs exercise of discretion. Here, the RTC has jurisdiction to adjudicate
the question of whether the MB acted in bad faith when it directed the dissolution of Buhi



Tinga, J.:
Assailed in this petition is the Decision1 dated 20 September 2006 as well as the
resolution2 dated 5 January 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 92597,
affirming in toto the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman3 (OMB) in OMB-C-A-05-0007A, finding Rodomiel J. Domingo (petitioner) guilty of violation of Section 4(b) of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 67134 and imposing upon him the penalty of suspension for a period of six (6)

The antecedent facts follow.

Let the charge for Dishonesty based on the alleged misappropriation of public funds against
both respondents be DISMISSED without prejudice to its [refilling] upon finding of

A complaint-affidavit was filed before the Office of the Ombudsman by Sangguniang

Kabataan (SK) officials Kathryn Joy Paguio, Allan Jay Esguerra and Neil Patrick Celis

irregularities by the Office of the City Auditor of Manila in the barangay transactions after
the completion of the audit.13

(respondents) against petitioner as Barangay Chairman and Barangay Treasurer Fe T. Lao

(Lao), both of Barangay 686, Zone 75, District V, Manila, for malversation, falsification of

The charge of misappropriation was dismissed for being premature since the audit of the

public document, dishonesty and grave misconduct.5

subject barangaytransaction had not been concluded by the Office of the City Auditor. The
OMB also dismissed the charge of falsification of public document on the ground

Respondents alleged that petitioner and Lao misappropriated the cash advance taken by
respondents from the SK funds amounting to P16,784.00 in the year 2002. They added that

that questions pertaining to the authenticity of a signature in a

petitioner gave a false statement in his Justification supporting the 2003 Barangay Budget
and Expenditures by declaring that his barangay had no incumbent SK officials at that time
contrary to the fact that respondents are duly elected and incumbent SK officials of
the barangay.6
In support of their claims, respondents presented as evidence: (1) the Audit Observation
Memorandum dated 9 February 2004 issued by the Office of the City Auditor of Manila; 7 (2)
the photocopy of the certified true copy of the allegedly falsified Justification; 8 (3) the
certificate of canvass of voters and proclamation of the winning candidates for SK Chairman
and Council members during the SK election on 15 July 2002; 9 and (4) the affidavit of
Esguerra, Danilo Baldivia and Paolo Tagabe attesting to the fact that their services were
hired by respondent Paguio to paint the barangay sidewalk.10
Petitioner denied the allegations in his counter-affidavit and asserted that all financial
transactions of the barangay, particularly the expenditures, were supported by pertinent
documents and properly liquidated. He explained that the check covering the sum
of P16,784.00, the object of the alleged misappropriation, had been properly liquidated with
the submission of pertinent documents as of 26 June 2003. 11
In his reply-affidavit, petitioner questioned the authenticity of the Justification in that his
signature therein was forged.12
The OMB rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty of violation of Section 4(b) of R.A. No.
6713, the dispositive portion of which reads:

document necessitate judicial determination.14 Respondents did not appeal from the
dismissal of these charges.
However, petitioner was held administratively liable for the irregular submission of a falsified
instrument to the Manila Barangay Bureau (MBB) in connection with his barangays 2003
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which the OMB denied on 11 October
2005.15 The OMB reiterated that petitioner was not made administratively liable for
falsification of the contested document but for the submission of the same. It explained that
being the Chief Executive Officer of the barangay, petitioner assumes full responsibility on
the propriety of all documents submitted in support of the proposed budget and thereafter
made part of the records of the proper agency. Moreover, petitioner did not contest the
certification appearing thereon as to the existence of the assailed document in the records of
the barangay bureau.16
After denial of his motion for reconsideration, petitioner filed a petition for review with the
Court of Appeals. The appellate court denied the petition and affirmed the OMBs decision in
Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant petition seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals
decision on two grounds: first, that he cannot be held administratively liable for any act
beyond his control and knowledge under R.A. No. 6713; and second, that the imposition of
the penalty of six (6)-month suspension is excessive.

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Barangay Chairman Rodomiel J. Domingo of Barangay

686, Zone 75, District V, Manila, GUILTY of violation of Section 4(b) of R.A. [No.] 6713, he
should be meted the penalty of suspension from office for a period of six (6) months
pursuant to Section 11 of the same Act.

Petitioner argues that the act for which he was indicted is clearly beyond his knowledge and
control. He stresses that he could not have possibly falsified his own signature. Moreover, he
insists that if he indeed was responsible for the insertion of the Justification, he could have
put his genuine signature instead of falsifying it. He also maintains that he has no access or
control over the submission of documents relative to the release of funds for specific projects,
as the responsibility rests either with the Barangay Secretary or Treasurer.17 Finally,
petitioner challenges his suspension from office as excessive in view of the fact that no

undue injury or damage is done to the cause of public service, or to respondents

existence of these SK officials, more so in light of respondents assertion that he did so in


connection with the process for the approval of this barangays 2003

The OMB maintains that its findings are supported by substantial evidence. The submission

The sole evidence relied upon by the OMB in holding petitioner liable is the undated

of a Justification which contains a false declaration runs afoul of the conduct a public

Justification. The handwritten entry "Copy Budget 2004"27 as certified by the Chief of the

servant must exhibit at all times, i.e., highest sense of honesty and integrity.

MBB appears to be a clerical error because the Justification was ostensibly made in
connection with the 2003 budget. The OMB stated that "the fact of whether or not the same

With respect to the penalty imposed, the graft office defends its propriety stressing that it is
in accordance with R.A. No. 6713.


Respondents merely echo the stance of the OMB with the argument that by submitting the
falsified Justification in connection with the 2003 barangay budget, petitioner failed the
mark of professionalism required of a Barangay Chairman.20

(Justification) was intended for 2003 or 2004 budget is immaterial as the irregularity of its
entry in the records of the barangay bureau was the issue." However, its entry into the
barangay records was in itself questionable. In both cases, the submission of the
Justification cannot be logically pinpointed to petitioner. If the Justification was intended for
2003, there would have been a gross inconsistency between the Justification and the
documents relating to the 2003 budget submitted by petitioner. Likewise, if the Justification
was intended for 2004, respondents should have presented the 2004 budget since the
burden is on them to prove the charges against petitioner. But respondents failed to do so.

Petitioners fundamental point is that one can not be indicted for the submission of a
document which he himself has repudiated. The Court of Appeals shared the OMBs view
that petitioner had failed to controvert the existence of the Justification and its entry into the
records of the MBB as certified by the Chief of its Barangay Assistance Unit.

The Justification, if indeed it was officially submitted, was denominated as such and so
submitted to justify the non-inclusion of the SK in the barangay budget. But the 2003
budget contained an appropriation item for the SK. Thus, if at all, the Justification is a stray
and aberrant document which could not have emanated from petitioner.

While generally this Court may not review the factual findings of the Ombudsman, especially
when affirmed by the Court of Appeals,21 we take exception in this case as the findings are
contradicted by the evidence on record.22

The charge of violation of Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 deserves further comment. The
provision commands that "public officials and employees shall perform and discharge their
duties with the highest degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence and skill." Said

At the outset, petitioner had questioned the existence of the Justification, claiming that his

provision merely enunciates "professionalism as an ideal norm of conduct to be observed by

purported signature thereon was forged. The OMB rightfully deferred ruling on the

public servants, in addition to commitment to public interest, justness and sincerity, political

authenticity of the signature on the Justification on the ground that said finding

neutrality, responsiveness to the public, nationalism and patriotism, commitment to

necessitates a judicial determination. However, the OMB held petitioner liable for the

democracy and simple living. Following this perspective, Rule V of the Implementing Rules of

submission of the Justification to the MBB. It explained that the failure of petitioner to

R.A. No. 6713 adopted by the Civil Service Commission mandates the grant of incentives and

contest the certification appearing on the Justification as to its existence in the records of

rewards to officials and employees who demonstrate exemplary service and conduct based on

the barangay bureau should lead to the conclusion that the document came from petitioner,

their observance of the norms of conduct laid down in Section 4. In other words, under the

he being the chief executive officer of the barangay. This conclusion is clearly non sequitur. It

mandated incentives and rewards system, officials and employees who comply with the high

is also illogical. The OMB cannot defer ruling on the issue of falsification and in the same

standard set by law would be rewarded. Those who fail to do so cannot expect the same

breadth not only assume the same document as falsified but on that assumption proceed to

favorable treatment. However, the Implementing Rules does not provide that they will have to

hold petitioner liable.

be sanctioned for failure to observe these norms of conduct. Indeed, Rule X of the
Implementing Rules affirms as grounds for

On the merits, the Court is also unconvinced that there is substantial evidence establishing
petitioners culpability. Petitioner had a hand in the preparation and submission of the

administrative disciplinary action only acts "declared unlawful or prohibited by the Code."

documents in support of the budget, such as the 2003 barangay budget, 23 budget

Rule X specifically mentions at least twenty-three (23) acts or omissions as grounds for

proposal,24 barangay development plan for 2003,25 and statement of income and expenditures

administrative disciplinary action. Failure to abide by the norms of conduct under Section

for 2003.26 In all these documents, the existence of the SK was recognized and corresponding

4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 is not one of them.

allocations were made for it. With these attestations on petitioners part, there is absolutely
no rhyme or reason for him to issue the questioned Justification and attest to the non-

Furthermore, there is obviously a denial of due process in this case. The due process
requirement mandates that every accused or respondent be apprised of the nature and

cause of the charge against him, and the evidence in support thereof be shown or made

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 20

available to him so that he can meet the charge with traversing or exculpatory evidence.28 A

September 2006 affirming the 1 August 2005 Decision of the Office of the Ombudsman is

cursory reading of the complaint-affidavit does not reveal that petitioner was charged with

REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The charge of violation of Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 against

violation of Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713. Likewise, in the OMBs Evaluation Report, the

petitioner is ordered DISMISSED.

charges indicated were for malversation, falsification, dishonesty and grave misconduct.