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You are on page 1of 5

12/4/2000

Prof. Muhamet Yildiz

Instructions. This is an open book exam; you can use any written material. You have

one hour and 20 minutes. Please answer only three of the following four questions. Each

question is 35 points. Good luck!

1. Ashok and Beatrice would like to go on a date. They have two options: a quick dinner

at Wendys, or dancing at Pravda. Ashok first chooses where to go, and knowing where

Ashok went Beatrice also decide where to go. Ashok prefers Wendys, and Beatrice

prefers Pravda. A player gets 3 out his/her preferred date, 1 out of his/her unpreferred

date, and 0 if they end up at dierent places. All these are common knowledge.

(a) Find a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. Find also a non-subgame-perfect Nash

equilibrium with a dierent outcome.

ANSWER: SPE: Beatrice goes wherever Ashok goes, and Ashok goes Wendys.

The outcome is both go to Wendys. Non-subgame-perfect Nash Equilibrium:

Beatrice goes to Pravda at any history, so Ashok goes to Pravda. The outcome

is each goes to Pravda. This is not subgame-perfect because it is not a Nash

equilibrium in the subgame after Ashok goes to Wendys.

(b) Modify the game a little bit: Beatrice does not automatically know where Ashok

went, but she can learn without any cost. (That is, now, without knowing where

Ashok went, Beatrice first chooses between Learn and Not-Learn; if she chooses

Learn, then she knows where Ashok went and then decides where to go; otherwise

she chooses where to go without learning where Ashok went. The payos depend

only on where each player goes as before.) Find a subgame-perfect equilibrium

of this new game in which the outcome is the same as the outcome of the nonsubgame-perfect equilibrium in part (a). (That is, for each player, he/she goes to

the same place in these two equilibria.)

ANSWER: The following is a SPE, whose outcome is that each goes to Pravda.

Ashok

Wendys

Pravda

Beatrice

Learn

Beatrice

Beatrice

Wendys

3,1

Dont

Dont

Learn

Beatrice

Pravda

Wendys

0,0

3,1

Beatrice

Wendys

Pravda

0,0

0,0

Wendys

Pravda

Pravda

1,3 0,0

1,3

2. We have two partners who simultaneously invest in a project, where the level of investment can be any non-negative real number. If partner i invests xi and the other

partner j invests xj , then the payo of partners i will be

i xi xj x3i .

Here, i is privately known by partner i, and the other partner believes that i is

uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. All these are common knowledge. Find a symmetric

Bayesian Nash

equilibrium in which the investment of partner i is in the form of

xi = a + b i .

ANSWER: We construct

a Bayesian Nash equilibrium (x1 , x2 ), which will be in the

Of course, xi (i ) satisfies the first order condition

0 = U (xi ; i ) /xi |x (i ) = i E xj 3 (xi (i ))2 ,

i

i.e.,

q

xi (i ) = i E xj /3 =

E xj p

i .

3

s

E xj

.

b=

3

p

But xj = b j , hence

h p i

hp i

j = 2b/3.

E xj = E b j = bE

E xj

2b/3

2b

2

=

= ,

b =

3

3

9

i.e.,

b = 2/9.

In summary,

xi (i ) =

2p

i .

9

2

.5

.1

.4

2,1,0

0,1,0

0,0,1

0,0,1

0,0,1

0,2,0

1,0,0

0,0,0

1,1,3

0,2,2

3,3,3

ANSWER: There is a unique perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium in this game. Clearly,

1 must exit at the beginning and 2 has to go in on the right branch as he does not

have any choice. The behavior at the nodes in the bottom layer is given by sequential

rationality as in the figure below. Write for the probability that 2 goes in in the

center branch, for the probability that 3 goes right, and for the probability 3

assigns to the center branch. In equilibrium, 3 must mix (i.e., (0, 1)). [Because if

3 goes left, then 2 must exit at the center branch, hence 3 must assign probability 1 to

the node at the right (i.e., = 0), and hence she should play right a contradiction.

Similarly, if 3 plays right, then 2 must go in at the center branch. Given his prior

beliefs (.4 and .1), = 4/5, hence 3 must play left a contradiction again.] In order

3 to mix, she must be indierent, i.e.,

1 = 0 + 3 (1 ) ,

hence

= 2/3.

By the Bayes rule, we must have

=

.4

= 2/3,

.4 + .1

i.e.,

= 1/2.

That is player 2 must mix on the center branch, and hence she must be indierent,

i.e.,

1 = 2.

That is,

= 1/2.

The equilibrium is depicted in the following figure.

.5

.1

.4

2

= 1/2

2,1,0

0,1,0

=2/3

0

0,0,1

= 1/2

1

0,0,1

2

0,0,1

0,2,0

1,0,0

0,0,0

1,1,3

0,2,2

3,3,3

4. We have a Judge and a Plainti. The Plainti has been injured. Severity of the injury,

denoted by v, is the Plaintis private information. The Judge does not know v and

believes that v is uniformly distributed on {0, 1, 2, . . . , 99} (so that the probability that

v = i is 1/100 for any i {0, 1, . . . , 99}). The Plainti can verifiably reveal v to the

Judge without any cost, in which case the Judge will know v. The order of the events

is as follows. First, the Plainti decides whether to reveal v or not. Then, the Judge

rewards a compensation R. The payo of the Plainti is R v, and the payo of the

Judge is (v R)2 . Everything described so far is common knowledge. Find a perfect

Bayesian Nash equilibrium.

ANSWER: We consider a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium (s , R ), where

s (v) {v, NR} determines whether the Plainti of type v reveals v or does Not

Reveal, and R determines the reward, which is a function from {NR, 0, 1, . . . , 99}.

Given the Judges preferences, if the Plainti reveals her type v, the Judge will choose

the reward as

R (v) = v

and

R (NR) = E [v|NR] .

In equilibrium, the Plainti gives her best response to R at each v. Hence, she must

reveal her type whenever v > R (NR), and she must not reveal her type whenever

v < R (NR). Suppose that R (NR) > 0. Then, s (0) = NR, and hence NR is

reached with positive probability. Thus,

R (NR) = E [v|s (v) = NR] E [v|v R (NR)] R (NR) /2,

which could be true only when R (NR) = 0, a contradiction. Therefore, we must have

R (NR) = 0,

4

and thus

s (v) = v

at each v > 0. There are two equilibria (more or less equivalent).

s (v) = v for all v; R (v) = v; R (NR) = 0, and the Judge puts probability 1

to v = 0 whenever the Plainti does not reveal her type.

s (0) = NR; s (v) = v for all v > 0; R (v) = v; R (NR) = 0, and the Judge

puts probability 1 to v = 0 whenever the Plainti does not reveal her type.

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