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FRANCISCO G. JOAQUIN, JR. and BJ PRODUCTIONS, INC. vs.

HONORABLE
RANKLIN M. DRILON, GABRIEL ZOSA, WILLIAM ESPOSO, FELIPE MEDINA, JR.,
and CASEY FRANCISCO
FACTS:
Petitioner BJ Productions, Inc. (BJPI) is the holder / grantee of Certificate of
Copyright No. M922, dated January 28, 1971, of Rhoda and Me, a dating game show
aired from 1970 to 1977.
On June 28, 1973, petitioner BJPI submitted to the National Library an
addendum to its certificate of copyright specifying the shows format and style of
presentation.
Upon complaint of petitioners, information for violation of PD No. 49 was filed
against private respondent Zosa together with certain officers of RPN 9 for airing Its a
Date. It was assigned to Branch 104 of RTC Quezon City.
Zosa sought review of the resolution of the Assistant City Prosecutor before the
Department of Justice.
On August 12, 1992, respondent Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon
reversed the Assistant City Prosecutors findings and directed him to move for the
dismissal of the case against private respondents.
Petitioner Joaquin filed motion for reconsideration but such was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether the format or mechanics or petitioners television show is entitled to
copyright protection.
HELD:
The Court ruled that the format of the show is not copyrightable. Sec. 2 of PD
No. 49, otherwise known as the Decree on Intellectual Property, enumerates the
classes of work entitled to copyright protection. The provision is substantially the same
as Sec. 172 of the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines (RA 8293). The format
or mechanics of a television show is not included in the list of protected works in Sec. 2
of PD No. 49. For this reason, the protection afforded by the law cannot be extended to
cover them.
Copyright, in the strict sense of the term, is purely a statutory right. It is a new
independent right granted by the statute and not simply a pre-existing right regulated by
the statute. Being a statutory grant, the rights are only such as the statute confers, and

may be obtained and enjoyed only with respect to the subjects and by the person and
on terms and conditions specified in the statute.
The Court is of the opinion that petitioner BJPIs copyright covers audio-visual
recordings of each episode of Rhoda and Me, as falling within the class of works
mentioned in PD 49.
The copyright does not extend to the general concept or format of its dating game show.
Mere description by words of the general format of the two dating game shows is
insufficient; the presentation of the master videotape in evidence was indispensable to
the determination of the existence of a probable cause.
A television show includes more than mere words can describe because it involves a
whole spectrum of visuals and effects, video and audio, such that no similarity or
dissimilarity may be found by merely describing the general copyright / format of both
dating game shows.

Elidad C. Kho vs. Court of Appeals, Summerville General Merchandising


Company and Ang Tiam Chay (G.R. No. 115758, March 19, 2002, 379 SCRA
410)
FACTS:
Petitioners allegations are that they are doing business under the name and style of KEC
Cosmetics Laboratory, registered owner of Chin Chun Su and oval facial cream container/case,
and alleges that she also has patent rights on Chin Chun Su and Device and Chin Chun Su
Medicated Cream after purchasing the same from Quintin Cheng, the registered owner thereof in
the supplemental register of the Philippine Patent Office and that Summerville advertised and
sold petitioners cream products under the brand name Chin Chun Su, in similar containers that
petitioner uses, thereby misleading the public, and resulting in the decline in the petitioners
business sales and income; and, that the respondents should be enjoined from allegedly
infringing on the copyrights and patents of the petitioner.
The respondents, on the other hand, alleged as their defense that (1) Summerville is the exclusive
and authorized importer, re-packer and distributor of Chin Chun Su products manufactured by
Shun Yi factory of Taiwan, (2) that the said Taiwanese manufacturing company authorized
Summerville to register its trade name Chin Chun Cu Medicated Cream with the Philippine
Patent office and Other appropriate governmental agencies; (3) that KEC Cosmetics Laboratory
of the petitioner obtained the copyrights through misrepresentation and falsification; and, (4) that
the authority of Quintin Cheng, assignee of the patent registration certificate, to distribute and
market Chin Chun Su products in the Philippines had already terminated by the said Taiwanese
manufacturing company.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Kho has the sole right using the package of Chin Chun Su products

RULING:
Petitioner has no right to support her claim for the exclusive use of the subject trade name and its
container. The name and container of a beauty cream product are proper subjects of a trademark
in as much as the same falls squarely within its definition. In order to be entitled to exclusively
use the same in the sale of the beauty cream product, the user must sufficiently prove that she
registered or used it before anybody else did. The petitioners copyright and patent registration
of the name and container would not guarantee her the right to exclusive use of the same for
the reason that they are not appropriate subjects of the said intellectual rights. Consequently, a
preliminary injunction order cannot be issued for the reason that the petitioner has not proven
that she has a clear right over the said name and container to the exclusion of others, not having
proven that she has registered a trademark thereto or used the same before anyone did.
NOTE:
Trademark, copyright, and patents are different intellectual property rights that cannot be
interchanged with one another. A trademark is any visible sign capable of distinguishing the
goods (trademark) or services (service mark) of an enterprise and shall include a stamped or
marked container goods. In relation thereto, a trade name means the name or designation
identifying or distinguishing an enterprise. Meanwhile, the scope of copyright is confined to
literary and artistic works which are original intellectual creations in the literary and artistic
domain protected from the moment of their creation. Patentable inventions, on the other hand,
refer to any technical solution of a problem in any field of human activity which is new, involves
an inventive step and is industrial applicable.
Pearl & Dean v. Shoemart
GR 148222, 15 August 2003; Third division, Corona (J)
Facts: Pearl & Dean is a corporation engaged in the manufacture of advertising display units
(Poster Ads)
referred as light boxes. It acquired a Certificate of Copyright Registration over the illuminated
display units,
and acquired trademark for Poster Ads. Pearl & Dean negotiated with Shoemart for the lease
and
installation of the light boxes in Shoemart Malls. After Pearl & Beans contract was rescinded,
exact copies
of its light b oxes were installed in various SM malls (fabricated by Metro Industrial Services,
and later EYD
Rainbow Advertising Corp.) Pearl & Dean sent a letter to Shoemart and it sister company. North
EDSA
Marketing, to cease using the light boxes and to remove them from the malls, and demanded
the discontinued
use of the trade mark Poster Ads. Unsatisfied with the compliance of its demands, Pearl &
Dean sued. The
trial court ruled in favor of Pearl & Dean, while the appellate court reversed the decision of the
trial court.
Issue: Whether pearl & Deans copyright registration for its light boxes and the trademark
registration of
Poster Ads preclude Shoemart and North Edsa Marketing from using the same.

Held: No. Pearl & Dean secured its copyright under the classification class o work. This being
so, its
protection extended only to the technical drawings and not to the light box itself. Pearl & Dean
cannot
exclude others from the manufacture, sale and/or commercial use over the light boxes on the
sole basis of its
copyright, certificate over the technical drawings. It cannot be the intention of the law that the
right of
exclusivity would be granted for a longer time (so years in copyright, and 17 years in patent)
through the
simplified procedure of copyright registration with the National Library, without the rigor of
defending the
patentability of its invention before the IPO and the public.
On the other hand, there has been no evidence that Pearl & Deans use of Poster Ads was
distinctive or
well known. Poster Ads was too generic a name to identify it to a specific company or entity.
Poster Ads
was generic and incapable of being used as a trademark because it was used in the field of
poster advertising,
the very business engaged by earl & Dean. Furthermore, Pearl & Deans exclusive right to the
use of Poster
Ads is limited to what is written in its certificate of registration. Shoemart, et. al. cannot be held
liable for
the infringement of the trademark.

PACITA I. HABANA, ALICIA L. CINCO and JOVITA N. FERNANDO vs. FELICIDAD


C. ROBLES and GOODWILL TRADING CO., INC.
G.R. No. 131522, July 19, 1999
FACTS: Pacita Habana et al., are authors and copyright owners of duly issued of the
book, College English For Today (CET). Respondent Felicidad Robles was the author
of the book Developing English Proficiency (DEP). Petitioners found that several pages
of the respondent's book are similar, if not all together a copy of petitioners' book.
Habana et al. filed an action for damages and injunction, alleging respondents
infringement of copyrights, in violation of P.D. 49. They allege respondent Felicidad C.
Robles being substantially familiar with the contents of petitioners' works, and without
securing their permission, lifted, copied, plagiarized and/or transposed certain portions
of their book CET.
On the other hand, Robles contends that the book DEP is the product of her own
intellectual creation, and was not a copy of any existing valid copyrighted book and that
the similarities may be due to the authors' exercise of the "right to fair use of
copyrighted materials, as guides."
The trial court ruled in favor of the respondents, absolving them of any liability. Later,
the Court of Appeals rendered judgment in favor of respondents Robles and Goodwill
Trading Co., Inc. In this appeal, petitioners submit that the appellate court erred in
affirming the trial court's decision.

ISSUE: Whether Robles committed infringement in the production of DEP.


HELD: A perusal of the records yields several pages of the book DEP that are similar if
not identical with the text of CET. The court finds that respondent Robles' act of lifting
from the book of petitioners substantial portions of discussions and examples, and her
failure to acknowledge the same in her book is an infringement of petitioners'
copyrights.
In the case at bar, the least that respondent Robles could have done was to
acknowledge petitioners Habana et. al. as the source of the portions of DEP. The final
product of an author's toil is her book. To allow another to copy the book without
appropriate acknowledgment is injury enough.

G.R. No. 111267 September 20, 1996


COLUMBIA PICTURES ENTERTAINMENT, INC., MGM ENTERTAINMENT CO., ORION PICTURES
CORPORATION, PARAMOUNT PICTURES CORP., UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC., THE WALT
DISNEY COMPANY and WARNER BROTHERS, INC., petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, 14TH DIVISION and JOSE B. JINGCO of SHOWTIME
ENTERPRISES, INC., respondents.

ROMERO, J.:
Petitioners Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., MGM Entertainment Co., Orion Pictures Corporation, Paramount Pictures Corp., Universal
City Studios, Inc. The Walt Disney Company and Warner Brothers, Inc. question the
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decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch

168, the dispositive portion of which states:


WHEREFORE, finding that the issuance of the questioned warrants was not supported
by probable cause, the "Urgent Motion (to Lift Search Warrant [No. 23] and for the Return
of Seized Articles) is hereby GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Videogram Regulatory Board (VRB) and/or any Police Agency or other
representatives of the VRB are hereby directed to return to the defendant/movant or his
representative all articles/items in their possession seized under and by virtue of Search
Warrant No. 23.
SO ORDERED.
The antecedent facts leading to the disputed Order are:
Alfredo G. Ramos, intelligence officer of the Videogram Regulatory Board (VRB), received information
that private respondent Jose B. Jinco had in his possession pirated videotapes, posters, advertising
materials and other items used or intended to be used for the purpose of sale, lease, distribution,
circulation or public exhibition of the said pirated videotapes. Ramos ascertained the information to be
true and filed a verified Application for Search Warrant dated July 28, 1986 with prayer for the seizure of
the properties described in the search warrant.

On the same date, a hearing was conducted by Judge Florentino A. Flor of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig, Branch 168, wherein Ramos and his two witnesses, Analie Jimenez and Rebecca Benitez-Cruz
testified on the need for the issuance of search warrant.
On July 28, 1986, the prayer for the issuance of the search warrant was granted and, on the same date,
Search Warrant No. 23 was issued.
On July 2, 1987, private respondent filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant No. 23 on the grounds that
the Search Warrant did not state a specific offense and that, even assuming it stated a specific offense, it
covered more than one specific offense. The VRB opposed the Motion to Quash stating that Search
Warrant No. 23 was issued for a single specific offense namely, violation of Section 56 and other related
sections of Presidential Decree No. 49 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1988.
On September 30, 1987, the trial court denied the Motion to Quash finding that the Search Warrant was
issued for one specific offense. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed but the same was likewise denied.
Private respondent then filed an Urgent Motion To Lift the Search Warrant and For the Return of the
Seized Articles alleging that Search Warrant No. 23 is a general warrant, and that it was issued without
probable cause.
On May 22, 1989, the assailed order was issued by Judge Benjamin V. Pelayo, now presiding over
Branch 168 of the Pasig RTC, granting the Motion to Quash and ordering the return of all seized articles
to private respondent.
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the said Order in toto.
Hence, this petition.
In granting the Motion to Quash, the trial court relied on the Court's ruling in 20th Century Fox Film
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Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et al. which involved violation of Presidential Decree No. 49, (otherwise
known as the Decree on the Protection of Intellectual Property). In said case, video outlets were raided
pursuant to search warrants issued by the Regional Trial Court of Makati. However, the search warrants
were later lifted by the same court on the ground of lack of probable cause because the master tapes of
the alleged pirated tapes were never shown to the lower court. The Court affirmed the lifting of the search
warrants holdings that the presentation of the master tapes was necessary for the validity of the search
warrants against those who have the pirated films in their possession.
When the trial court granted the Motion to Quash Search Warrant No. 23 on May 22, 1989, it used as its
justification the fact that, as the master copies were not presented to the court in its hearing of July 28,
1986, there was no probable cause to issue the said warrant, based on the pronouncements in 20th
Century Fox.
Petitioners now question the retroactive application of the 20th Century Fox decision which had not yet
been promulgated in 1986 when the search warrant was issued. Petitioners further argue that, contrary to
the trial court's finding, the search warrant was not a general warrant since the description of the items to
be seized was specific enough. It removed from the serving officer any discretions as to which items to
seize inasmuch as it described only those items which had a direct relation to the offense for which the
search warrant was issued.
The threshold issued that must first be determined is whether or not petitioners have the legal personality
and standing to file the appeal.

Private respondent asserts that the proceedings for the issuance and/or quashal of a search warrant are
criminal in nature. Thus, the parties in such a case are the "People" as offended party and the accused. A
private complainant is relegated to the role of a witness who does not have the right to appeal except
where the civil aspect is deemed instituted with the criminal case.
Petitioners, on the other hand, argue that as the offended parties in the criminal case, they have the right
to institute an appeal from the questioned order.
From the records it is clear that, as complainants, petitioners were involved in the proceedings which led
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to the issuance of Search Warrant No. 23. In People v. Nano, the Court declared that while the general
rule is that it is only the Solicitor General who is authorized to bring or defend actions on behalf of the
People or the Republic of the Philippines once the case is brought before this Court or the Court of
Appeals, if there appears to be grave error committed by the judge or a lack of due process the petition
will be deemed filed by the private complainants therein as if were filed by the Solicitor General. In line
with this ruling, the Court gives this petition due course and will allow petitioners to argue their case
against the questioned order in lieu of the Solicitor General.
As regards the issue of the validity of Search Warrant No. 23, there are two questions to be resolved:
first, whether the 20th Century Fox decision promulgated on August 19, 1988 is applicable to the Motion
to Quash Search Warrant No. 23 (issued on July 28, 1986).
We hold in the negative.
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In the recent Columbia Pictures, et al., v. Court of Appeals, et al. case which resolved the same issue
involving the same petitioners but with different respondents, the Court en banc held:
Mindful as we are of the ramifications of the doctrine of stare decisis and the rudiments of
fair play, it its our considered view that the 20th Century Fox ruling cannot be
retroactively applied to the instant case to justify the quashal of Search case to justify the
quashal of Search Warrant No. 87-053. Herein petitioners' consistent position that the
order of the lower court of September 5, 1988 denying therein defendants' motion to lift
the order of search warrant was properly issued, there having been satisfactory
compliance with the then prevailing standards under the law for determination of probable
cause, is indeed well taken. The lower court could not possibly have expected more
evidence from petitioners in their application for a search warrant other than what the law
and jurisprudence, then existing and judicially accepted, required with respect to the
finding of probable cause.
xxx xxx xxx
It is consequently clear that judicial interpretation becomes a part of the law as of the
date that law was originally passed, subject only to the qualification that when a doctrine
of this Court is over-ruled and a different view is adopted, and more so when there is a
reversal thereof, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and should not apply
to parties who relied on the old doctrine and acted in good faith. (People v. Jabinal, L30061, February 27, 1974, 55 SCRA 607; Unciano Paramedical College, Inc., et al. v.
Court of Appeals, et al. G.R. No. 100335, April 7, 1993, 221 SCRA 285; Tanada, et al. v.
Guingona, Jr., etc., et al., G.R. No. 113888, August 19, 1994, 235 SCRA 507). To hold
otherwise would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there if
no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication. (De Agbayani v.
Philippine National Bank, et al. L-23127, April 29, 1971, 38 SCRA 429).
Likewise, the Court ruled therein that presentation of the master tapes in such cases is not an absolute
requirement for as search warrant to issue:

More to the point, it is felt that the reasonableness of the added requirement in 20th Century Fox calling
for the production of the master tapes of the copyrighted films for determination of probable cause in
copyright infringement cases needs revisiting and clarification.
xxx xxx xxx
In fine, the supposed pronunciamento in said case regarding the necessity for the presentation of the
master tapes of the copy-righted films for the validity of search warrants should at most be understood to
merely serve as a guidepost in determining the existence of probable cause in copy-right infringement
cases where there is doubt as to the true nexus between the master tape and the pirated copies. An
objective and careful reading of the decision in said case could lead to no other conclusion than that said
directive was hardly intended to be a sweeping and inflexible requirement in all or similar copyright
infringement cases. Judicial dicta should always be construed within the factual matrix of their parturition,
otherwise a careless interpretation thereof could unfairly fault the writer with the vice of over statement
and the reader with the fallacy of undue generalization.
xxx xxx xxx
It is evidently incorrect to suggest, as the ruling in 20th Century Fox may appear to do,
that in copyright infringement cases, the presentation of master tapes of the copyright
films is always necessary to meet the requirement of probable cause for the issuance of
a search warrant. It is true that such master tapes are object evidence, with the merit that
in this class of evidence the ascertainment of the controverted fact is made through
demonstration involving the direct use of the senses of the presiding magistrate. (City of
Manila v. Cabangis, 10 Phil. 151 [1908]; Kabase v. State, 31 Ala, App. 77, 12 So. 2nd,
758, 764). Such auxiliary procedure, however, does not rule out the use of testimonial or
documentary evidence, depositions, admissions or other classes of evidence tending to
prove the factum probandum, (See Phil. Movie Workers Association v. Premiere
Productions, Inc. 92 Phil. 843 [1953]) especially where the production in court of object
evidence would result in delay, inconvenience or expenses out of proportion to is
evidentiary value. (See 3 Jones on Evidence, Sec. 1400).
The instant case also differs from 20th Century Fox in that what herein private respondent put in issue
was the application of the ruling in that case, not the conduct of Judge Flor in the issuance of Search
Warrant No. 23. From the records, it is clear that Judge Flor observed all the requirement necessary
before the search warrant was issued: he heard the testimonies and studied the dispositions of the
witnesses for the petitioners, namely, Ms. Rebecca Benitez-Cruz, Ms. Analie I. Jimenez and the VRB's
Intelligence Officer, Alfredo G. Ramos on the existence of probable cause before issuing the warrant.
Under Sec. 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, the requirements for the issuance of valid search
warrant are:
Sec. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant.
A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offense to be determined by the judge or such other responsible officer authorized by law
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the thing to be seized.
Sec. 4. Examination of complainant; record.
The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching
questions and answers, in writing and under oath the complainant and any witnesses he

may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn
statements together with any affidavits submitted.
Having satisfied these requirements, Judge Flor committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
warrant.
Private respondent contends that Search Warrant No. 23 also violates the constitutional requirements of
particularity of the description of the warrant, being a general warrant and thus, is null and void.
In several cases, this Court had held that:
To be valid, a search warrant must be supported by probable cause to be determined by
the judge or some other authorized officer after examining the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce. No less important, there must be a specific description of the
place to be searched and the things to be seized, to prevent arbitrary and indiscriminate
use of the warrant (Sec. 3, Art. IV, 1974 Constitution, now Sec. 2, Art. III of the 1986
Constitution; Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the New Rules of Court; Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA
383, Lime v. Ponce de Leon, 66 SCRA 299; Uy Kheytin v. Villareal, 42 Phil. 886; People
v. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169; People v. Rubio, 57 Phil. 384; Bache & Co., (Phil.) Inc. v. Ruiz,
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37 SCRA 823; Roan v. Gonzalez, 145 SCRA 687) (emphasis supplied)
When may a search warrant be deemed to satisfy the legal requirements of specificity?
In Bache and Co., (Phil.) Inc. v. Ruiz, we said
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the
description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow (People v.
Rubio, 57 Phil. 384); or when the description expresses a conclusion of fact not of law
by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure (idem.,
dissent of Abad Santos, J.); or when the things described are limited to those which bear
direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued (Sec. 2, Rule 126,
Revised Rules of Court). . . . If the articles desired to be seized have any direct relation to
an offense committed, the applicant must necessarily have some evidence, other than
those articles, to prove the said offense; and the articles subject of search and seizure
should come in handy merely to strengthen such evidence. . . .
An examination of Search Warrant No. 23 shows that it was worded in such a manner that the
enumerated items to be seized bear a direct relation to the offense of violation of Sec. 56 of Presidential
Decree No. 49, as amended, which states:
(1) Transfer or cause to be transferred, directly or indirectly any sound recording or
motion picture, or other audio-visual work that has been recorded on a phonograph
record, disc, wire, tape, film or other article on which sounds, motion pictures, or other
audio-visual works are recorded, with intent to sell, lease, publicly exhibit or cause to be
sold, leased or publicly exhibited, or to use for cause to be used for profit, such article on
which sounds, motion pictures, or other audio visual works are so transferred, WITHOUT
THE WRITTEN CONSENT OF HIS ASSIGNEE; or
(2) Sell, lease, distribute, circulate, exhibit, offer for sale, lease, distribution, circulation or
public exhibit, offer for sale, lease, distribution, or possess for the purpose of sale, lease,
distribution, circulation or public exhibition, any such article to which the sounds, motion
pictures or audio-visual recordings thereon have been so transferred, without the written
consent of the owner or his assignee; or

(3) Offer or make available for a fee, rental or any other form of compensation, directly or
indirectly, any equipment, machinery, paraphernalia or any material with the knowledge
that such equipment, machinery, paraphernalia or material, will be used by another to
reproduce, without the consent of the owners any phonograph record, disc, wire, tape
film or other article on which sound, motion pictures, or other audio-visual recordings may
be transferred.
In other words, it authorized only the seizure of articles used or intended to be used in the unlawful sale,
lease and other acts in violation of the said decree. The search warrant ordered the seizure of the
following properties:
(a) Pirated video tapes of the copyright motion pictures/films the titles of which are
mentioned in the attached list;
(b) Posters, advertising leaflets, brochures, invoices, journals, ledgers, and books of
accounts bearing and/or mentioning the pirated films with titles (as per attached list);
(c) Television sets, video cassettes records, rewinders, tape head cleaners, accessories,
equipment and other machines and paraphernalia or material used in the unlawful sale,
lease, distribution, or possession for purpose of sale, lease, distribution, circulation or
public exhibition of the above-mentioned pirated video tapes which he is keeping and
concealing in the premises above-described.
Clearly, the above items could not be anymore specific as the circumstances will allow since they are all
used or intended to be used in the unlawful sale or lease of pirated tapes. Therefore, the pending of the
appellate court that Search Warrant No. 23 is a "general" warrant of devoid of basis.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision and resolution of respondent Court of Appeals, and necessarily
inclusive of the order of the trial court dated May 22, 1989, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
order of the trial court dated July 28, 1986 upholding the validity of Search Warrant No. 23 is hereby
REINSTATED.
Costs against private respondent.

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