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BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE
21st Cent ur y War f ar e I ssues

Bar r y R. Schnei der
Lawr ence E. Gr i nt er

Revi sed Edi t i on
Sept ember 1998

The Ai r War Col l ege St udi es i n Nat i onal Secur i t y was
est abl i shed as a f or um f or r esear ch on t opi cs t hat i nf l uence
t he nat i onal secur i t y of t he Uni t ed St at es . Copi es of No . 3 i n
t hi s ser i es ar e avai l abl e f r om t he Ai r War Col l ege, 325
Chennaul t Ci r cl e, Max wel l Ai r For ce Base, Al abama
36112- 6427 . The f ax number i s ( 334) 953- 7934 ; t he
t el ephone number i s ( 334) 953- 2103/ DSN 493- 2103/ 7074 .

Ai r War Col l ege
St udi es i n Nat i onal Secur i t y No . 3
Ai r Uni ver si t y Pr ess
Maxwel l Ai r For ce Base, Al abama 36112- 6428

Li br ar y of Congr es s Cat al ogi ng- i n- Publ i c at i on Dat a
Bat t l ef i el d of t he f ut ur e : 21 st cent ur y war f ar e i ssues / [ edi t ed] by Bar r y R. Schnei der and Lawr ence
E. Gr i nt er - Rev . ed.
p.

c m. - ( Ai r War Col l ege st udi es i n nat i onal secur i t y : no. 3)

I . Mi l i t ar y ar t and sci ence- For ecast i ng .
I I . Gr i nt er , Lawr ence E.
U104 . 1338

2 . Twent y- f i r st cent ur y .

I.

Schnei der , Bar r y R.

I I I . Ser i es .

1998

355 . 02' 01' 12- dc21

98- 38913
CI P

I SBN 1- 58566- 061- 2
Fi r st Pr i nt i ng Sept ember 1995
Second Pr i nt i ng ( Revi sed Edi t i on) Sept ember 1998
Thi r d Pr i nt i ng Jul y 2001

Di scl ai mer
The vi ews expr essed i n t hi s publ i cat i on ar e t hose of t he aut hor s and ar e not t he of f i cal pol i ci es
or posi t i ons of t he Uni t ed St at es Depar t ment of Def ense or t he Uni t ed St at es Gover nment .

For Sal e by t he Super i nt endent of Doc ument s
US Gov er nment Pr i nt i ng Of f i ce
Was hi ngt on, D. C. 20402

To Keegi e ( eSchnei der )
who so f ul l y suppor t ed one of t he edi t or s i n
t he pr epar at i on of Ll m book, and t o Ger t r ude E.
and Geor ge H. ( Schnei der and ConsLance L . and
Li nt on E. Gr l nt er who l ovi ngl y and unsel f i shl y
gave us a t went i et h- cent ur y vant age poi nt
t o peer i nt o t he t went y- f i r st cent ur y

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Mayer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Gen Char l es A. 149 6 I nf or mat i on W ar . . . Geor ge Kr aus. 43 2 New. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . J ames Bl ackwel l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( Ret . Jef f r ey McKi t r i ck. . ) 47 3 The Revol ut i on i n Mi l i t ar y Af f ai r s . . Col J ames W . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . USAF 205 4 8 . . . . 201 The Bi ol ogi cal Weapon : APoor Nat i on' s Weapon of Mas s Dest r uct i on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . USAF 171 Over vi ew: Bi ol ogi cal War f ar e I ssues . . . . 1 Pr i nci pl es of W ar f or t he Bat t l ef i el d of t he Fut ur e . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mc Lendon. . . . . . . . Bar r y R. . . . . . . . . . Geor ge St ei n 153 7 I nf or mat i on War f ar e : I mpact s and Concer ns . . . Fr ed Li t t l epage. . . . . . . . . USAF 103 Par al l el War and Hy per wan I s Ever y Want a Weak nes s ? . . . . . Schnei der 5 Over vi ew: NewEr a War f ar e? ARevol ut i on i n Mi l i t ar y Af f ai r s? . . . . . . 99 Ai r Theor y f or t he Twent y. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ri char d Bl anchf i el d and Dal e Hi l l 65 Over vi ew: Fut ur e Ai r power and St r at egy I ssues . . . . . . . . Lt Col Ter r y N. . . . . . . . . . . . . .Fi r st Cent ur y . . . . . . . . . ff ACKNOW LEDGMENTS . War den I I I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . USAF 125 Over vi ew: I nf or mat i on War f ar e I ssues . . . . uf i I nt r oduct i on . . . . . . . . . . . . USAF. . . . . . . . . . . . Homer . . . . Col Ri char d Szaf r anski . . . .Bat t l ef i el d of t he Fut ur e 21st Cent ur y War f ar e I ssues Cont ent s Chapt er 1 Page DI SCLAI MER . . . . . . . . Col J ohn A. . . . . . . .Cy ber war . . . . . . . .Net war . . . . . .Er a War f ar e . . . . .

. 233 Est i mat ed Cumul at i ve Losses t o t he US f r om Sel ect ed NonI ndi genous Speci es. . . . USAF 251 11 On Twent y. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138 1 Sy s t emAt t r i but es . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275 I I l us t r at i ons Fi gur es 1 El ement s of t he Pr esent RMA.Compar at i ve Si zes . . . . . . . . 107 2 US Of f ensi ve Bi ol ogi cal Weapons Agent s Pr oduced Bet ween 1954. . .Fi r st Cent ur y Ger mWar f ar e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . MD. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1969 . 2 Sy s t em Model . . . . . . Kadl ec. .1991 . . Lt Col Rober t P. Gr i nt er and Dr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108 3 Chi na and I r aq. . . . . . . MD. . . . . USAF 227 10 Bi ol ogi cal Weapons f or Wagi ng Ec onomi c War f ar e . . . . . . . Lawr ence E. . 1906. . . . . . . Lt Col Rober t P. . . . . . . . Schnei der 267 About t he Cont r i but or s . . . .9 Twent y. . Bar r y R. . . . . . .Fi r st Cent ur y War f ar e . . 257 95 Tabl es 3 . . . . . . . . . Kadl ec. . . . . . . . . . . .

we wi sh t o t hank Dean Ronal d Kur t h and Col Theodor e Hai l es. associ at e dean f or t hei r c hampi oni ng of t he Ai r War Col l ege St udi es i n Nat i onal Secur i t y ser i es . we wi s h t o t hank Dr El i zabet h Br adl ey. Lac ombe. di r ect or of t he NDU Count er pr ol i f er at i on Cent er .Ac k nowl edgment s We. W e al so appr eci at e Maj Gen Pet er D. Thank s al so ar e due t o Col Rober t Hi nds. r et i r ed ( SAI C) . Bar r y R. r et i r ed ( SAI C) . Dr Dan Hughes . Hel p was al so pr ovi ded by t he I nst i t ut e f or Nat i onal Secur i t y St udi es. and ot her AU Pr ess edi t or s t hat gave us val uabl e suggest i ons f or i mpr ovi ng t he manuscr i pt i n a t i mel y f ashi on . t hat suppor t ed par t of Dr Schnei der ' s r esear ch on t hi s pr oj ect . and Phi l l i p E. Out si de r evi ewer s who al so cont r i but ed val uabl e suggest i ons i ncl ude : Mr Dav i d Kay ( SAI C) . Rebec c a Mc Leod . Col J os eph Engl ebr ec ht . At t he Ai r Uni ver si t y Pr ess. Dr Rober t Wendzel . Col J ohn El l en. who hav e t aken t hei r t i me t o r evi ew chapt er s wr i t t en by ot her s . Dr Davi d Sor enson. Thomas Lobenst ei n . wi sh t o t hank t he aut hor s f or t hei r t i mel y r esponses t o our r equest s f or qual i t y wor k and f or meet i ng deadl i nes . USAF. W e ar e al so gr at ef ul t o MSgt Mi l t on Tur ner f or r unni ng i nt er f er ence on t he budget ar y paper wor k. and t o Modeyi t her Jones and Li nda Jenki ns f or t hei r admi ni st r at i ve assi st ance t hat hel ped us t ur n t hi s book out i n a t i mel y f ashi on . and Dr Geor ge St ei n. Dr Bi l l Mar t el . Cochr an. Robi nson. managi ng di r ect or of t he Aer os pac e Educat i on Foundat i on . Schnei der & Lawr ence E. Col Phi l l i p Gar di ner . USAFA. Tom Mac k i n . Dr Rober t Joseph. USAF. al l Ai r W ar Col l ege f acul t y. t he edi t or s. our depar t ment c hai r man. St even Gar st . di r ect or . At t he Ai r W ar Col l ege. who gav e us hi s s uppor t and enc our agement when we began wor k on t hi s pr oj ect . Dr Al ex ander S. Gr i nt er .

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I nt r oduct i on
Thi s i s a book about st r at egy and war f i ght i ng i n t he mi dst
of a r evol ut i on i n mi l i t ar y af f ai r s as t he wor l d mov es i nt o t he
t went y- f i r st cent ur y . I t s 11 essays exami ne t opi cs s uc h as
mi l i t ar y oper at i ons agai nst a wel l - ar med r ogue st at e or NASTI
( NBC- ar mi ng sponsor of t er r or i sm and i nt er vent i on) st at e ; t he
pot ent i al of par al l el war f ar e st r at egy f or di f f er ent ki nds of
st at es ; t he r evol ut i onar y pot ent i al of i nf or mat i on war f ar e ; t he
l et hal possi bi l i t i es of bi ol ogi cal war f ar e ; and t he el ement s of
an ongoi ng r evol ut i on i n mi l i t ar y af f ai r s ( RMA) .
The book' s pur pose i s t o f ocus at t ent i on on t he oper at i onal
pr obl ems, enemy st r at egi es, and t hr eat s t hat wi l l conf r ont US
nat i onal secur i t y deci si on mak er s i n t he t went y- f i r st cent ur y .
The par t i ci pat i ng aut hor s ar e ei t her pr of essi onal mi l i t ar y
of f i cer s or ci vi l i an pr of essi onal s who speci al i ze i n nat i onal
secur i t y i ssues . Two of t he ar chi t ect s of t he US ai r c ampai gn
i n t he 1991 Gul f War have cont r i but ed essays t hat di scuss t he
evol vi ng ut i l i t y of ai r power t o achi eve deci si ve r esul t s and t he
l essons t hat mi ght por t end f or t he f ut ur e of war f ar e .
I n " Pr i nci pl es of W
ar on t he Bat t l ef i el d of t he Fut ur e, " whi c h
set s t he t one f or t he book, Dr . Bar r y Schnei der exami nes how
t r adi t i onal pr i nci pl es of war may have t o be r eassessed i n l i ght
of a pr ol i f er at i on of weapons of mas s dest r uct i on ( WMD) among
t hi r d wor l d st at es . Regar di ng t he pr i nci pl e of " mass, " t r adi t i onal
t heor y di ct at ed t hat f or ces be mas s ed f or an of f ensi ve
br eakt hr ough . But Schnei der ar gues t hat , agai nst an enemy
ar med wi t h W
MD, di sper sal of one' s f or ces may, i n f act , be
mor e pr udent , and f i ght i ng by means of " di sengaged combat "
pr i or t o a deci si ve st r i ke may be necessar y . Thi s r equi r es hi gh
coor di nat i on and " super i or t ar get i ng and damage as s es s ment
i nt el l i gence, c ombi ned wi t h super i or hi gh- t ech weapons . "
St i l l , t he Uni t ed St at es and i t s al l i es woul d not l i kel y be abl e
t o domi nat e a f ut ur e bat t l ef i el d ev en wi t h adv anc ed
convent i onal ar ms i f t hey di d not hav e cl ose- i n ai r bases t o
oper at e f r om and t her eby t o achi eve ai r domi nanc e over t he
bat t l e space . Ther ef or e, whi l e i t sounds good, st r i ki ng f r om
out si de t he enemy' s r ange i s not a r eal opt i on f or l ong i f t he
enemy i s mount i ng a gr ound c ampai gn t hat i s cl osi ng i n on
vi t al ar eas . Local ai r , sea, and gr ound power wi l l be needed t o

cont ai n t he adver sar y f or ces and r ol l t hem bac k . Thi s means
l ocal ai r bases and seapor t s mus t be avai l abl e and pr ot ect ed .
Yet , t he US and al l i ed ar med f or ces, i n conf r ont i ng a
Saddam Hussei n wi t h nucl ear , bi ol ogi cal , or chemi cal ( NBC)
war f ar e capabi l i t i es mi ght be wel l advi sed t o f or ego mas s i ng
MD) i n
f or ces ( whi ch pr esent l ucr at i ve t ar get s t o t he enemy' s W
f avor of maneuver , di sper si on, speed, mobi l i t y, r ange, and
decept i on . How t o pr ot ect f i xed i nst al l at i ons s uc h as por t s and
ai r f i el ds i s a di l emma . Fur t her mor e, Schnei der t el l s us, t he
pr i nci pl e of mai nt ai ni ng t he " of f ensi ve" may hav e t o be
suppl ement ed " wi t h a combi nat i on of pot ent def enses t o avoi d
l et hal enemy " DI count er st r i kes . "
I n t went y- f i r st - cent ur y war f ar e, t heat er mi ssi l e def enses
( TMD) ar e l i kel y t o be essent i al , especi al l y agai nst f ut ur e r ogue
r egi mes possessi ng nucl ear , bi ol ogi cal , or chemi cal war heads
and bal l i st i c mi ssi l e del i ver y syst ems . These coul d pose a
t hr eat agai nst US and al l i ed f or ces, por t s, ai r f i el ds, naval
convoys, and ci t i es wi t hi n r ange t hat onl y ef f ect i ve mul t i l ayer ed
TMD may be abl e t o handl e .
W
hen f aci ng a W
MD- ar med adver sar y, i t wi l l be even mor e
i mpor t ant t han i n t he past t o pr eser ve " uni t y of c ommand" vi a
ef f ect i ve c ommand, cont r ol , and c ommuni c at i ons dur i ng a
conf l i ct . Mor eover , i t i s hi ghl y l i kel y t hat , i n an er a of " i nf or mat i on war f ar e, " bot h si des wi l l at t empt and may be abl e t o
di sr upt and dest r oy each ot her ' s c ommand and cont r ol syst ems .
Regar di ng t he pr i nci pl e of cl ear , obt ai nabl e " obj ect i ves, "
Schnei der ar gues t hat war wi t h a nucl ear - ar med t er r or i st
st at e " mus t ei t her be a shor t vi ct or i ous war t hat st ar t s wi t h
t he neut r al i zat i on or dest r uct i on of t he enemy' s W
MD, or one
f ought f or l i mi t ed obj ect i ves and pr osecut ed wi t h deep r espect
f or t he power of t he adver sar y' s mas s dest r uct i on capabi l i t i es . "
Thi s woul d r equi r e a r evol ut i on i n t he way US r egi onal
" war - f i ght i ng" c ommander s i n chi ef pr epar e f or maj or r egi onal
conf l i ct s ( MRC) . I t mi ght be di f f i cul t f or US deci si on mak er s t o
" sel l " s uc h a st r at egy t o an Amer i c an publ i c, gi ven our
penc hant f or qui ck, deci si ve vi ct or i es .
Fi nal l y, " secur i t y" as a pr i nci pl e of war demands except i onal l y
good i nt el l i gence . I n t he f ut ur e, i t wi l l be especi al l y i mpor t ant
t o i dent i f y t hos e st at es ac qui r i ng W
MD and mi ssi l e
capabi l i t i es and t o gauge t hei r l ocat i ons and number s f r om

t he out set of a conf l i ct . Thi s wi l l be di f f i cul t bec aus e r ogue
pr ol i f er at or st at es gr eat l y compl i cat e accur at e i nt el l i gence on
MD by pur s ui ng mul t i pl e
t hei r pat hs t o ac qui r i ng W
cl andest i ne pat hs t o s uc h capabi l i t i es . These pat hs i ncl ude
t he us e of under gr ound secr et f aci l i t i es, c amouf l age,
di si nf or mat i on, di sper sal , cheat i ng on Non- Pr ol i f er at i on Tr eat y
r equi r ement s, pur chasi ng " dual use" t echnol ogi es, and ot her
means t o di sgui se t hei r pr ogr ams and hi de t hei r f aci l i t i es . The
di scover y af t er t he Gul f War of how f ar I r aq had pr ogr essed i n
acqui r i ng nucl ear , bi ol ogi cal , chemi cal , and bal l i st i c mi ssi l e
capabi l i t i es was a wak e- up cal l t o t he wor l d c ommuni t y .
I n s ummar y , t he danger s of conf r ont i ng an adver sar y wi t h
weapons of mas s dest r uct i on or t he capaci t y f or st r at egi c
i nf or mat i on war f ar e may pr ompt a ver y di f f er ent t hi nki ng
about t he t r adi t i onal " pr i nci pl es of war . " Pr epar i ng f or s uc h an
event ual i t y wi l l r equi r e s ome maj or changes i n C3I ( c ommand,
cont r ol , communi cat i ons, and i nt el l i gence) , mi l i t ar y doct r i ne,
oper at i onal st r at egy, acqui si t i on, equi pment , l ogi st i cs,
coal i t i on bui l di ng, coal i t i on war f ar e, and war t er mi nat i on .
Some c hanges may ev en be necessar y i n f or ei gn pol i cy
r egar di ng t he ki nds of c ommi t ment s t hat US vul ner abi l i t i es,
capabi l i t i es, and i nt er est s wi l l per mi t i n a mor e pr ol i f er at ed
wor l d or one wher e t he enemy has ut i l i zed t he t echnol ogi es
and met hods of i nf or mat i on war f ar e .

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Chapt er 1

Pr i nci pl es of War f or t he
Bat t l ef i el d of t he Fut ur e
Bar r y R. Schnei der

The Uni t ed St at es woul d hav e f ought i t s war s of t he past
hal f cent ur y f ar di f f er ent l y had Hi t l er , Mussol i ni , Toj o, Ki m I l
Sung, Mao Tse- t ung, Ho Chi Mi nh, Manuel Nor i ega, and
SaddamHus s ei n possessed nucl ear weapons at t he t i me .
A wor l d of nucl ear - ar med st at es wi l l r equi r e t he Uni t ed
St at es and i t s al l i es t o r evi se f or ce st r uct ur es, st r at egy and
doct r i ne, i nt el l i gence capabi l i t i es, c ommand and cont r ol
pr oc edur es , and l ogi st i cs f or maj or r egi onal conf l i ct
scenar i os . A pr ol i f er at ed wor l d of pot ent i al adver sar i es
equi pped wi t h weapons of mas s dest r uct i on and t he means
of del i ver i ng t hem wi l l r equi r e t he US mi l i t ar y t o i mpl ement
a " r evol ut i on i n mi l i t ar y af f ai r s, " one t hat may r equi r e
si gni f i cant depar t ur es f r om cur r ent US st r at egy, oper at i onal
pol i ci es, and mi l i t ar y capabi l i t i es . )
Cl ear l y, US f or ce pl anni ng and conf l i ct pr epar at i on hav e
not yet t aken i nt o account a " Saddam Hus s ei n wi t h nukes"
t o us e Les Aspi n' s phr as e when he announc ed t he US
Def ens e Count er pr ol i f er at i on I ni t i at i ve . The Bot t om Up
Revi ew, c onduc t ed by t he Cl i nt on Admi ni st r at i on under
t hen- Secr et ar y of Def ense Aspi n, di d not as s ume t he Uni t ed
St at es woul d conf r ont an adver sar y ar med wi t h weapons of
mas s dest r uct i on i n ei t her of t he t wo near l y si mul t aneous
maj or r egi onal conf l i ct s ( MRCs) t hat US f or ces ar e s uppos ed
t o be abl e t o f i ght and wi n . Yet , i t i s cl ear t hat r adi cal and
host i l e st at es s uc h as I r aq and I r an ar e pr obabl y j ust a f ew
shor t year s away f r om havi ng a nucl ear weapons capabi l i t y
and Nor t h Kor ea may al r eady possess one . Al l t hr ee ar e
pr esent l y cr edi t ed wi t h bi ol ogi cal and chemi cal weapons
capabi l i t i es .

and end. t her e ar e s ome addi t i onal pr i nci pl es of war t hat Ful l er di d not addr ess t hat deser ve at t ent i on i n an er a mar k ed .BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE I mpl i cat i ons f or Mi l i t ar y St r at egy So how do y ou f i ght a NBC. s ummed up by t he ac r ony m MOSSCOMES: MOS - Mas s Of f ensi ve Sur pr i se S C OME S - Secur i t y Command Uni t y Obj ect i ve Maneuv er Ec onomy of For ce Si mpl i ci t y Sev en of t hese pr i nci pl es wer e ext r act ed f r om t he wor k s of Br i t i sh maj or gener al J . W MD i n enemy hands suggest s t hat f ut ur e c ommander s modi f y t he way t hey appl y t he war f i ght i ng pr i nci pl es of mass.ar med sponsor of t er r or i sm and i nt er vent i on ( NASTI ) on t he bat t l ef i el d. 2 They wer e t hen r epubl i shed i n a 1921 US Ar my t r ai ni ng r egul at i on and have been passed on i n Ai r For ce. maneuver . 3 Some of Gener al Ful l er ' s i deas may be appl i ed wi t hout modi f i cat i on t o f ut ur e war agai nst host i l e r adi cal adver sar i es ar med wi t h weapons of mas s dest r uct i on . Ful l er .of . Ot her pr i nci pl es of war hav e t o be modi f i ed t o r ef l ect changes i n t echnol ogy or si t uat i on . i f war br eaks out ? Do t he ol d pr i nci pl es of war wor k i n t hi s ki nd of conf l i ct ? And j ust what ar e t hose pr i nci pl es whi c h have gui ded US and al l i ed f or ces i n past war s? I n t he Uni t ed St at es. Fur t her . F. who pr ovi ded t hem f or t he i nst r uct i on of t he Br i t i sh Ar my i n Wor l d War 1 . Ar my. even y oung ROTC st udent s ar e t aught t he el ement s of war . c ommand uni t y. For exampl e. C. New t echnol ogy pr ovi des new_st eal t hy means of achi evi ng sur pr i se. and t aki ng t he of f ensi ve i ni t i at i ve i n c ombat .war r esi dual enemy W MD capabi l i t y may ver y wel l al t er al l i ed appr oaches t o secur i t y and war t er mi nat i on ends and means . and Joi nt doct r i ne and pr of essi onal mi l i t ar y educat i on publ i cat i ons si nce .

t oget her wi t h t he pr oper appl i cat i on of ot her pr i nci pl es of war . What i s The Pr i nci pl e of Mas s i n War f ar e The pr i nci pl e of mas s suggest s t he wi s dom of concent r at i ng super i or c ombat power at t he deci si ve pl ace and t i me i n mi l i t ar y oper at i ons i n or der t o achi eve deci si ve r esul t s . even i f out number ed t en t o one at t he st r at egi c l evel . or super guns . campai gn. C. US f or ces c an cat ch r egi onal opponent s i n a par adi gm shi f t .but . wher e t he adver sar i es may adher e t o t he ol der . Hi s t act i cs when engagi ng t he enemy cal l ed f or t en agai nst one. new and what i s const ant i n t hi s br ave new pr ol i f er at ed wor l d? Let us l ook f i r st at t he pr i nci pl e of " mass" i n war f ar e .PRI NCI PLES OF W AR i f er at i on of weapons of mas s dest r uct i on . ai r cr af t . by t he pr ol i ncl ude t he of at t ack. mas s was st r ongl y cor r el at ed wi t h number s of gr ound t r oops concent r at ed i n a gi ven l ocat i on agai nst enemy gr ound f or ces i n cl ose pr oxi mi t y . Today.mor e hi ghl y concent r at ed f or ces t hat achi eved gr eat er mas s at t he poi nt s of cont act . and bat t l e r esul t s . 5 W hen J . pl ace.t ung i n hi s guer r i l l a war st r at egy emphasi zed t he i mpor t ance of achi evi ng l ocal super i or i t y i n bat t l e even t hough one' s own f or ces wer e gr eat l y out number ed over al l i n t he conf l i ct acr oss al l maj or t heat er s . Ful l er wr ot e hi s t r eat i se on t he pr i nci pl es of war i n Wor l d W ar I . f or out number ed f or ces t o achi eve br eakt hr oughs and deci si ve war . Mao Tse. These advant ages t o be gai ned by si mul t anei t y and dept h ef f ect i ve f or ce. domi nance. t o t hose of l ess numer ous . 6 Thi s gi ves a new meani ng t o " l ocal super i or i t y . s uc h mas s ed uni t s woul d be vul ner abl e t o a di f f er ent t ype of mas s der i ved f r om weapons of mas s dest r uct i on and pr eci si on gui ded muni t i ons del i ver ed by mi ssi l es. 4 Thi s mas s i ng of r esour ces di r ect ed at key enemy vul ner abi l i t i es hel ps one' s own f or ces t o r et ai n t he i ni t i at i ve and mak es i t possi bl e. pr oper choi ce of t he t i me. and r at i o of engaged f or ces coul d shi f t vi ct or y f r om t he hands of l ar ger . For exampl e.mor e di f f used enemy f or ces.but .pr oj ect i on l ogi st i cs. F. I n Mao' s st r at egy. i nf or mat i on and pr eci si on t ar get i ng . " I deal l y.

9 I f i t l ooks l i ke di sabl i ng ear l y st r i kes cannot neut r al i ze enemy W MD i n a pr oj ect ed conf l i ct .t er mi nat i on phas e of t he conf l i ct . mas s ed al l i ed f i r epower coul d put t o f l i ght or dest r oy mas s ed enemy uni t s . I nst ead. and advanced c ommand and cont r ol syst ems wi l l al l ow wi del y di sper sed f or ces t o f ocus t hei r f i r e on speci f i c poi nt s . per haps s uc h an adver sar y . one cor ol l ar y t o Ful l er ' s di ct um on " mass" i s t hat di sper si ng one' s own f or ces can mak e enemy W MD l ess cost . I ncr easi ngl y. t he combi nat i on of r api dl y f i r i ng syst ems. t he densi t y of t r oops depl oyed i n t he bat t l e zone has decr eased f r om an aver age of 4.t hat i s mas s i ng of t hei r ar mi es . Just as i n t he Amer i c an Ci vi l War and Wor l d War I . As mi l i t ar y t echnol ogy has i mpr oved over t i me.BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE not i ons of mas s . As one anal yst obser ves : The l ogi cal end poi nt of s uc h devel opment s ( advanced convent i onal ar ms and WMD) i s t he r epl acement of t he not i on of concent r at i on of mass wi t h one emphasi zi ng concent r at i on of f i r e .ef f ect i ve . when mas s ed of f enses wer e sl aught er ed by heavi l y concent r at ed def ensi ve f i r epower . For exampl e. I n s uc h a compet i t i on. US f or ces can subst i t ut e t he appl i cat i on of mas s ed f i r epower f or mas s ed t r oops . f i r epower has i ncr eased and t he si ze of uni t s di r ect i ng i t and t r yi ng t o avoi d i t has decr eased . pr eci si on weapons of l ong r ange. i n c ombat wi t h an adver sar y ar med wi t h W MD. t he f ut ur e possessi on of W MD i n enemy hands shoul d di scour age t he use mas s i ng of al l i ed t r oops unt i l af t er t he opponent s W MD ar e si l enced or neut r al i zed . The i ncr eased l et hal i t y of convent i onal weapons has l ed t o pr ogr essi vel y gr eat er di sper si on of f or ces i n t he f i el d wi t h each passi ng er a . moder n ar mi es of t he f ut ur e shoul d achi eve br eakt hr oughs and vi ct or y wi t hout r esor t i ng t o l ar ge masses of t r oops di r ect ed at vul ner abl e poi nt s . 790 t r oops per squar e ki l omet er i n t he Napol eoni c War s t o j ust 2 . A second cor ol l ar y i s t hat mas s ed al l i ed f i r epower needs t o be di r ect ed f i r st t o dest r oyi ng or degr adi ng enemy W MD at t he i ncept i on of c ombat t o per mi t t he l at er mas s i ng of one' s own gener al pur pose f or ces f or c ombat i n t he war . W MD t hr eat s wi l l accel er at e a hi st or i cal t r end t owar d a pr ogr essi vel y empt i er bat t l ef i el d . 34 t r oops per squar e ki l omet er i n t he 1991 Per si an Gul f War . $ I ndeed.

and Sc ud asset s i n t he 1991 Gul f W ar . const ant mobi l i t y. except t o r el y upon escal at i on domi nanc e t o det er t he adver sar y f r om escal at i ng t o W MD use i n t he conf l i ct . at l east t empor ar i l y. he mi ght achi eve vi ct or y. e .PRI NCI PLES OF W AR shoul d not be engaged i n t he f i r st pl ace. t he al l i es us ed count er f or ce st r i kes and act i ve and passi ve def enses t o pr ot ect agai nst I r aqi ai r and Sc ud at t acks and us ed escal at i on . and act i ve def enses whi l e st i l l engagi ng i n t r adi t i onal f or ms of war f ar e. " Remot e Engagement : Adopt a mode of " di sengaged combat . t o The f i r st appr oach i s t he s ame appr oach t hat t he Uni t ed St at es and i t s coal i t i on t ook wi t h r egar d t o possi bl e I r aqi use of i t s bi ol ogi cal war f ar e ( BM. ext ended di sper sal of uni t s. one of t hr ee cour ses of act i on may be adopt ed by t he al l i ed c ommander when f aced wi t h a NASTI ar med f or ce : zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA " Deser t St or m I I : Pr oceed as i f t he t hr eat di d not exi st . " mak i ng t he mas s i ng of t r oops i mpr act i cal and danger ous . despi t e t he vul ner abi l i t y of al l i ed f or ces and capi t al s. " Di sper sed St or m: Adopt many meas ur es t o pr ot ect t he al l i ed f or ce. " wher e al l i ed f or ces conduct t hei r mi l i t ar y oper at i ons at a subst ant i al r emove f r om t hei r enemi es . especi al l y i n a cr i si s or escal at i ng conf l i ct . Suc h a per cei ved " use or l ose" . r el yi ng al so on escal at i on domi nanc e t o pr eser ve i nt r awar det er r ence of enemy W MD use . I f t he adver sar y i s vul ner abl e t o an al l i ed pr eempt i ve st r i ke. chemi cal war f ar e ( CW) . c an be a " r evol ut i on i n mi l i t ar y af f ai r s. i n s ome i nher ent l y unst abl e si t uat i ons. Some anal yst s even suggest t hat t he devel opment of ver y adv anc ed convent i onal ar mament s . si t uat i on i s i nher ent l y unst abl e and unpr edi ct abl e. he woul d have an i ncent i ve t o use hi s W MD f i r st . . Unf or t unat el y. pr ovi ded t hat i s an opt i on ( i . downsi zi ng of uni t s. I n t hi s conf l i ct . i f t he adv er s ar y wer e t o st r i ke f i r st wi t h weapons of mas s dest r uct i on. i n a r egi onal conf l i ct . passi ve def enses. s uc h as di si nf or mat i on. i f t he war has not yet begun and i f one' s homel and and f or ces ar e not al r eady engaged) . Thus. c ombi ned wi t h new st r at egy and or gani zat i on of f or ces.

t hey l i kel y shoul d adopt t he Di sper sed St or m or Remot e Engagement pos t ur es as a mode of oper at i ons out of r espect f or t he possi bl e consequences of an enemy W MD st r i ke. and passi ve def enses . Never t hel ess. Mor eover . t he al l i ed f or ce woul d at t empt t o out r ange t he adver sar y and degr ade hi s capabi l i t y bef or e cl osi ng and at t empt i ng t o f i ni sh t he conf l i ct on al l i ed t er ms .BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE domi nanc e t o det er t he possi bl e I r aqi use of avai l abl e BWand CWasset s . I n r emot e engagement s. has r ecei ved l ess di scussi on. On t he one hand. f r i endl y f or ces may be wel l advi sed t o avoi d. mi ssi l e. and speci al f or ces at t acks bef or e sendi ng t he bul k of t he expedi t i onar y f or ce t o engage hi m i n t he endgame . wher e possi bl e. cl ose mas s ed engagement s wi t h heavi l y ar med enemy f or ces . by muc h i mpr oved ai r def enses. The r egi onal CI NC woul d al so r educe t he number of l ucr at i ve t heat er t ar get s avai l abl e t o t he enemy by an ext ensi ve di sper sal of hi s own f or ces and l ogi st i cal uni t s and by ver y pr onounc ed use of mobi l i t y t o i ncr ease enemy uncer t ai nt y concer ni ng t he l ocat i on of key al l i ed f or ces . i t woul d be di f f i cul t t o conduct nor mal convent i onal oper at i ons i n a di sper sed mode . i t i s a r i sky st r at egy t hat mi ght backf i r e wi t h huge downsi de r esul t s . 10 . I nst ead. The t r adeof f s of adopt i ng t he Remot e Engagement mode of oper at i ons. Thi s combi nat i on mi ght wor k agai n i n t he f ut ur e i f t he adver sar y i s si mi l ar l y out cl assed i n t he ai r .t ech weapons i s hel d by t he al l i es . I n t he f ut ur e. mi ssi l e def enses. On t he ot her hand. when f aci ng an enemy wi t h W MD. Ther e ar e t r ade.of f s i n adopt i ng t he Di sper sed St or m mode of oper at i ons . one woul d r un l ess r i sk of havi ng mai n f or ce uni t s obl i t er at ed by enemy W MD st r i kes i n t hi s mode . The second appr oach i s wher e f or ces si mi l ar t o t hose sent t o t he Gul f War ar e gi ven f ar mor e pr ot ect i on. and deser ves t o be consi der ed f i r st . and wher e t he pr eponder ance of hi gh. f ai l ur e t o mas s one' s own t r oops c an mak e t hem mor e vul ner abl e t o enemy convent i onal at t acks . par t i cul ar l y i f t he adver sar y devel ops a capabi l i t y wel l bey ond t hat achi eved by I r aq i n 1991 . The t hi r d appr oach i s wher e t he mai n al l i ed f or ce st ays MD and out si de of enemy r ange and at t empt s t o pi ck of f hi s W dest r oy hi s mas s ed f or ces by ai r .

i n s uc h r emot e engagement war f ar e.t o.PRI NCI PLES OF W AR Some woul d ar gue t hat i f t he Uni t ed St at es i s f aced wi t h s uc h a f or mi dabl e opponent . deal i ng puni s hment f r om a di st ance whi l e st ayi ng out of har m' s way . i s a r out e t o heavy casual t i es and possi bl e def eat . woul d an at t empt be made t o cl ose and f or ce a capi t ul at i on . i t may not exi st . at t r i t i on of enemy advanced capabi l i t i es. t he al l i es pr obabl y shoul d f i r st at t empt t o out r ange t hem. I f mi l i t ar y f or ces f ol l ow t he st r at egy of di sengaged combat . t hi s war . i nt ensi ve i nt el l i gence.t ech weapons .t er mi nat i on phas e of conf l i ct mi ght r esembl e mor e t r adi t i onal f or ms of c ombat . t he spr eadi ng and hi di ng of f or ces.t ar get c ommand post s . US f or ces may be : . Regi onal CI NCs woul d need compl et e connect i vi t y t o t heat er f or ces under t hei r c ommand whi l e l i kel y havi ng t o oper at e f r om hi ghl y mobi l e l and har d. I n t he wor ds of f or mer heavywei ght boxi ng champi on. and ext ensi ve coor di nat i on of f i r e f r om many di ver se poi nt s t o t he hi ghest pr i or i t y t ar get s on t he ot her si de . I ndeed. " On t he ot her hand. I f t he adver sar y' s weapons of mas s dest r uct i on have been el i mi nat ed wi t h hi gh conf i dence. eac h at t empt i ng t o secur e an advant age by l ocat i ng and st r i ki ng t he ot her ' s key uni t s and asset s. bot h di sper sed. whi l e si mul t aneousl y t r yi ng t o st ay out of har m' s way f r om t he massi ve and pr eci se capabi l i t i es of t he ot her . I f r emot e engagement wer e adopt ed as a st r at egy. st r i ki ng at eac h ot her f r om a di st ance. t hen onl y af t er suf f i ci ent damage has been i nf l i ct ed on t he adver sar y vi a di sengaged combat . " Usi ng t he accur acy of advanced sensor s and pr eci si on weapons. The i ni t i al st ages of c ombat mi ght f i nd t wo heavi l y ar med r i val f or ces. The openi ng scenar i os of r emot e c ombat woul d r equi r e gr eat st andof f capabi l i t i es. ef f ect i ve act i ve and passi ve def ensi ve measur es. pr ovi di ng mas s t ar get s t o enemy adv anc ed weapons. t he bat t l e f r ont may be har d t o f i nd . Thi s suggest s t he need f or super i or gener al shi p. get t i ng bogged down i n mas s ed ar mor and ar t i l l er y duel s. super i or t ar get i ng and bat t l e damage assessment i nt el l i gence. US and al l i ed f or ces shoul d " f l oat l i ke a but t er f l y. c ombi ned wi t h super i or hi gh. st i ng l i ke a bee . I n s uc h conf l i ct s. Muhammed Al i . each of t he ar med ser vi ces woul d need t o be t i ght l y coor di nat ed wi t h t he ot her s .

ai r . " ' i Thi s ki nd of r emot e engagement conf l i ct woul d r equi r e changes i n US st r at egy. por t s of ent r y.74 Vi et nam War . 000. l i kewi se. 000 t o 6. The US Nav y i n f ut ur e c ombat agai nst a " Saddam Hus s ei n wi t h nukes" may be f or ced t o oper at e f r om mor e numer ous . and bat t l ef i el d mi ssi l es. may be f or ced t o mov e away f r om st r ong r el i ance on heavy t anks and ar mor ed per sonnel car r i er s t hat f i ght cl ose t o enemy f or ces . Regi onal CI NCs. t anks.BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE abl e t o j ockey j ust out of t he r ange of enemy ar t i l l er y. naval f i ght er . Rat her . woul d have t o be school ed i n a di f f er ent ki nd of war f i ght i ng f r om t hat pur sued i n t he 1991 Gul f War . smal l er . and or gani zat i on . i n. " s uc h ar mor ed f or ces ar e 12 . Thes e f l oat i ng ai r f i el ds. The US Ar my . pi cki ng t hemof f i n t ur n . t he 1950. i n char ge of f i ght i ng maj or r egi onal conf l i ct s.t he. l ess ex pens i v e and mor e di sper sed pl at f or ms. ai r cr af t car r i er s and t hei r sur r oundi ng t ask f or ces mi ght be ver y vul ner abl e t o an adver sar y ar med wi t h nucl ear or bi ol ogi cal weapons .bomber s l aunched f r om car r i er s out si de t he r ange of enemy ai r cr af t or mi ssi l es t hat car r i ed t he t hr eat of W MD bombar dment and obl i t er at i on . Ar my uni t s may be r equi r ed t o hi t and l ocat e t he enemy at muc h gr eat er r anges.53 Kor ean War . Pr el i mi nar y ext ensi ve war gami ng. r epr esent hi ghl y l ucr at i ve t ar get s and may be i nappr opr i at e i n t he f ut ur e f or conf r ont i ng s uc h a ver y heavi l y ar med r egi onal f oe capabl e of obl i t er at i ng or si nki ng t hem. For exampl e.r ef uel ed. at l east i n t he ear l i er phases of bat t l e. capabl e of car r yi ng up t o 100 ai r cr af t and hol di ng a mi l i t ar y popul at i on of 5. and naval convoys . or Wor l d W ar 11 .r ange. and oper at i onal pl anni ng f or t he new t ype of war f ar e woul d be mandat or y f or l at er success i n t he r egi on of c ombat . An enemy wi t h W MD or ver y adv anc ed convent i onal capabi l i t i es obvi ousl y poses sever e danger s t o c hok e poi nt s. t r ai ni ng.f i el d exer ci ses. emphasi zi ng bal l i st i c and cr ui se mi ssi l es r at her t han naval ai r cr af t as t heat er st r i ke weapons . Thes e mi ght be augment ed by l onger . r egi onal ai r bases. t he 1964. How f ar t he US Nav y needs t o go i n t hese di r ect i ons wi l l be det er mi ned par t l y by how successf ul i t i s i n devel opi ng f l eet def enses agai nst bal l i st i c and cr ui se mi ssi l es . As one def ense anal yst obser ves. r at her t han cl ose and at t empt t o dest r oy t he NASTI enemy wi t h heav y mec hani z ed f or ces bef or e hi s W MD capabi l i t i es hav e been neut r al i zed . doct r i ne.

how di f f er ent t he out c omes of war f ar e mi ght have been i n t he past hal f cent ur y i f US f or ces and t hose of t he Al l i es had t o consi der Ger man nucl ear st r i kes agai nst t he Nor mandy beachhead. cont r ol . " 13 A t hi r d el ement of " mass" t o be consi der ed i n c ombat wi t h ver y heavi l y ar med opponent s i s t he need f or whol e. Consi der . f or exampl e. gr eat er damage t han whol e ai r ar madas pr evi ousl y coul d i nf l i ct usi ng l ess accur at e bombs and mi ssi l es .PRI NCI PLES OF W AR desi gned t o f i ght a war t hat US c ommander s shoul d at t empt t o avoi d. vi a i ncr eased accur acy. " i t no l onger t ook hundr eds of bomber s dr oppi ng t housands of bombs or even t ens of bomber s dr oppi ng scor es of bombs t o dest r oy a si ngl e t ar get . I n s uc h hor r i f i c ci r cumst ances. naval t ask f or ces. one ai r cr af t of t en del i ver i ng onl y one weapon. or even a host i l e st at e possessi ng ver y advanced convent i onal ar ms. l et hal ner ve gas at t acks. Nucl ear det onat i ons. di vi si ons. Faced wi t h W MD bombar dment . As one Ai r For ce anal yst not es. i t appear s wi se t o r et hi nk t he advi sabi l i t y of mas s i ng one' s own t r oops . " 12 US Ai r For ce of f i ci al s have bec ome convi nced t hat mas s ed bomber at t acks ar e l ess pr oduct i ve t han a f ew st eal t hy bomber s f i r i ng or dr oppi ng pr eci si on muni t i ons at t ar get s f r om a st andof f mode . or J apanes e ner ve gas bl anket i ng US i nvasi on f or ces at I wo J i ma.obser vabl e ai r cr af t ar e now abl e t o penet r at e enemy def enses wi t h ver y f ew l osses and i nf l i ct . I t al i an bi ol ogi cal weapons at Anzi o.uni t r ei nf or cement s . wi t h t he r evol ut i on i n accur acy. Thus.l i ne uni t s may need t o be r epl aced by ent i r e uni t s of si mi l ar capabi l i t y and number s . f r ont . or ai r bases br ought under NBC mi ssi l e at t ack may suf f er s uc h whol esal e l osses i n s uc h shor t t i me per i ods t hat t hey may ent i r el y cease t o f unct i on as cohesi ve mi l i t ar y uni t s . and communi cat i ons l i nkages . coul d dest r oy one t ar get . when conf r ont i ng a NASTI . per haps under new c ommander s due t o t he massi ve and t r aumat i c nat ur e of t he l osses suf f er ed f r om W MD bombar dment . woul d t he al l i es have been abl e t o hol d t he Pus an beac hhead or successf ul l y mount t he 13 . Now. Ar mi es. or cl ouds of deadl y bi ol ogi cal agent s coul d anni hi l at e ent i r e def ense sect or s and open l ar ge gaps i n f r i endl y f or ces t hat coul d be f i l l ed onl y wi t h f r esh uni t s t hat r et ai ned t hei r cohesi on and c ommand. not br i ng about . A f ew l ow.

I nst ead. An ar my di sper sed wi l l hav e l ess capabi l i t y f or achi evi ng l ocal super i or i t y and br eakt hr oughs agai nst i t s opponent s ar med f or ces and l ess oppor t uni t y f or bat t l e and war t er mi nat i on unt i l t he mai n weapons of t he enemy ar e si l enced . F. Coupl ed wi t h t he need f or maneuv er i s t he concept of di sper si on . On t he ot her hand.BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE I nchon i nvasi on dur i ng t he Kor ean War ? I ndeed. Ar mi es i n moder n t i mes ar e i ncr easi ngl y mobi l e and di sper sed due t o i ncr eases i n bat t l ef i el d l et hal i t y and ot her t echni cal changes .r ange ai r cr af t i n 1953? I n t he 1990. how woul d t hi ngs hav e been di f f er ent i f I r aq had possessed even a f ew nucl ear weapons and had been pr epar ed t o use t hem pr i or t o t he al l i ed gr ound of f ensi ve whi l e coal i t i on t r oops wer e massi ng i n Saudi Ar abi a? The Pr i nci pl e of Maneuv er i n War f ar e Per haps f ar maneuver . " mas s .91 Gul f War . The need t o si mul t aneousl y guar d agai nst vul ner abi l i t y t o W MD at t ack and t o conduct a convent i onal c ampai gn wi l l i mpose cont r adi ct or y pr essur es on r egi onal CI NCs pl anni ng f ut ur e campai gns . f ut ur e ar mi es may be f or ced t o f i ght mor e at t he l ow. deci si ve engagement s i n t he f ut ur e t hat ar e based on t he 1991 Gul f W ar model . C. Suc h dual concer ns mi ght pr event qui ck. t he f i r st " M. I nher ent i n maneuv er i s t he l i t y enhanc es bot h of f ensi ve and def ensi ve capabi l i t i es as wel l as one' s abi l i t y t o achi eve a vi abl e det er r ent and escal at i on super i or i t y i n bot h peace and war . woul d t he US nucl ear t hr eat c ommuni c at ed t o Bei j i ng vi a t he I ndi an gover nment have been cr edi bl e i f t he Peopl e' s Republ i c of Chi na al so had possessed nucl ear war heads and l ong. Pr udence woul d advi se spr eadi ng f r i endl y f or ces even mor e i n t he f ut ur e t o expose f ewer of t hem t o any si ngl e W MD at t ack . t hi s need t o di sper se f or ces c an gr eat l y hi nder convent i onal c ombat capabi l i t y . Mov i ng and spr eadi ng out gi ves t he adver sar y l ess pr obabi l i t y of t ar get i ng success and l ess of a t ar get t o hi t . Ful l er ' s pr i nci pl es of war . t he r at her t han on i dea t hat mobi gr eat er emphas i s wi l l have t o be pl aced on second " M" i n J .i nt ensi t y war f ar e l evel or t o engage i n pr ol onged convent i onal war s of at t r i t i on whi l e avoi di ng 14 .

14 Mai nt ai ni ng t he of f ensi ve i ni t i at i ve i n war f ar e i s i mpor t ant t o vi ct or y. and expl oi t t he i ni t i at i ve" i n c ombat . Unf or t unat el y. Vi ct or i ous ar mi es f aci ng NASTI s may be mor e pr eoccupi ed wi t h act i ve def ense. " f r i endl y f or ces suf f er ed mor e casual t i es . An enemy on hi s heel s i s sel dom an enemy at your t hr oat . " f r at r i ci de i ncr eased . Ther e i s st i l l s ome t r ut h t o t he ol d adage t hat t he best def ense i s a good of f ense . or t he t hr eat of s uc h an at t ack. r et ai n. di sper si on. A good of f ense t hat k eeps t he adv er s ar y bus y def endi ng hi s own f or ces and homel and r obs hi m of s ome of t he pot ent i al t o car r y t he f i ght t o your s . i t was not ed t hat : zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA " at t acks and engagement s l ast ed l onger . mobi l i t y. " f r i endl y f or ces f i r ed f ewer r ounds at t he enemy .PRI NCI PLES OF W AR pr esent i ng t he enemy wi t h t he oppor t uni t y f or a k noc k out bl ow del i ver ed by t hei r W MD. The Pr i nci pl e of Of f ensi ve I ni t i at i ve i n War f ar e One of t he pr i nci pl es of war f ound i n US mi l i t ar y doct r i ne i s t he necessi t y t o " sei ze. " us ed l ess ef f ect i vel y 15 15 f or c ov er and . and al so hel ps avoi d def eat . and conceal ment t han wi t h convent i onal of f ensi ve act i ons t hat coul d get t hem anni hi l at ed . US Ar my oper at i ons dur i ng i t s Combi ned Ar ms i n a Nucl ear / Chemi cal Envi r onment ( CANE) exer ci ses hav e s hown t hat enemy W MD ver y muc h hi nder ed " Bl ue" f or ces' of f ensi ve s uc c es s . passi ve def enses. " f ewer enemy f or ces wer e ki l l ed . t he l et hal i t y of t he f ut ur e bat t l e ar ea may be so gr eat t hat a newvi si on of def ensi ve depl oyment i s r equi r ed whi l e si mul t aneousl y addi ng new ur gency t o t he l ocat i ng. and dest r oyi ng of enemy l auncher s and st or age c ompounds f or enemy weapons of mas s dest r uct i on and t he adver sar y' s ver y adv anc ed convent i onal weapons . " t er r ai n was conceal ment . of f ensi ve oper at i ons under at t ack by enemy W MD. t ar get i ng. " dur i ng of f ensi ve oper at i ons. c an be di f f i cul t t o execut e . I ndeed. As one r epor t s ummar i z ed.

he woul d l i ke t o neut r al i ze bot h t he enemy l eader s hi p and hi s W MD pot ent i al . si nce al l i ed c ommander s and uni t s ar e f or ced t o t ake f ewer r i sks i n exposi ng t hemsel ves t o s uc h l et hal i t y . i t wi l l be i mpor t ant t o s uppl ement of f ensi ve st r i kes t o di s ar m t he adver sar y' s W MD wi t h a c ombi nat i on of pot ent def ens es t o avoi d l et hal enemy pr eempt i ons or count er st r i kes t o degr ade t he t hr eat . exhaust i ve decont ami nat i on pr ocedur es. and pr oj ect power i nt o cer t ai n hi ghl y danger ous and cont ami nat ed ar eas . synchr oni ze f or ces. al l i ed f or ces f aced wi t h W MD t hr eat s wi l l need t o oper at e under a def ensi ve shi el d t o sur vi ve and succeed . US Ar my war games suggest t hat enemy W MD can negat i vel y i mpact al l i ed ef f or t s t o mai nt ai n t he i ni t i at i ve. days. as t wo Ar my anal yst s poi nt out . hi nder i ng al l i ed abi l i t y t o act f or hour s. maneuv er t hr ough t he bat t l ef i el d. " t he i nt r oduct i on of NBC weapons on t he bat t l ef i el d by an opponent gi ves hi m t he i ni t i at i ve . or even week s af t er t hei r use . Thus. 16 . Maneuv er may al so be l i mi t ed i n bat t l e space so cont ami nat ed .set of al l i ed f or ces subj ect t o W MD bombar dment . " 16 Suc h act i ons. or even t he t hr eat of W MD st r i kes. Fi r st . Thi s means t he pr osecut i on of count er . or t ake enor mous r i sks t hat whol e sect or s of t he al l i ed f or ces mi ght be dest r oyed i f not di sper sed i nt o a def ensi ve mode . chemi cal . or r adi oact i ve envi r onment c an easi l y degr ade t he of f ensi ve per f or mance and mi nd.BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE Unf or t unat el y.out bombar dment of l i kel y enemy W MD capabi l i t i es and pr oduct i on f aci l i t i es . or bi ol ogi cal cont ami nat i on of t he bat t l e ar ea. Pr ot ect i ve cl ot hi ng.l eader t ar get i ng coupl ed wi t h an al l . when deal i ng wi t h a Saddam Hussei n wi t h W MD. i n cont r ast t o Gener al Ful l er ' s day. I f t hi s openi ng phas e of t he conf l i ct i s not t ot al l y successf ul . admi ni st r at i on of ant i dot es. pl ace al l i ed f or ces s omewhat on t he def ensi ve and gi ve t he i ni t i at i ve t o t he opponent . t he US mi l i t ar y c ommander i s f aced wi t h a dual need . I n t he cl assi c case. Enemy use of W MD can cr eat e r esi dual r adi oact i ve. i n f ut ur e war s agai nst enemi es ar med wi t h weapons of mas s dest r uct i on. hi ghl y t oxi c chemi cal . whi l e conduct i ng of f ensi ve oper at i ons. and t he caut i on bor ne of f ear i n an ant hr ax. ext ensi ve vacci nat i on pr ogr ams. t he al l i ed oper at i ons shoul d be pr epar ed t o shi f t dr amat i cal l y f r om t he of f ensi ve t o t he def ensi ve mode. 17 Mor eover .

Aer ospace power c an expl oi t t he pr i nci pl es of mas s and maneuv er 20 si mul t aneousl y t o a f ar gr eat er ext ent t han sur f ace f or ces . Si mul t aneous.PRI NCI PLES OF W AR Col J ohn War den. " Suc h si mul t aneous. 19 I ndeed. i s t he i nst r ument of choi ce f or s uc h " par al l el war . 18 Si mi l ar l y. " aer ospace power c an qui ckl y concent r at e on or above any poi nt on t he ear t h' s sur f ace . post ul at es t hat f ut ur e war wi l l f eat ur e par al l el st r i kes ai med at al l t he k ey f acet s of an adver sar y' s st at e and f or ce. zyxwvut srqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIH However . and t he par al ysi s s uc h st r i kes i nf l i ct ed on I r aq i n 1991 s hows t hei r val ue i n keepi ng an adver sar y f r om t aki ng t he of f ensi ve hi msel f . t he endgame of a conf l i ct wi l l be ext r emel y r i sky . par al l el st r i kes ar e a f i ne exampl e of t he val ue of r et ai ni ng t he of f ensi ve i ni t i at i ve i n war f ar e. t hen t he conf l i ct may f eat ur e a par al l el war ai r bl i t zkr i eg coupl ed wi t h t he pul l back and di sper sal of al l i ed gr ound and naval f or ces t o pr ovi de l ess i nvi t i ng t ar get s t o possi bl e mas s i v e enemy count er at t acks spear headed by W MD t ar get ed on US and al l i ed power pr oj ect i on f or ces i n t he r egi on. i f st r uck near l y si mul t aneousl y. I f t ot al al l i ed domi nanc e of weapons of mas s dest r uct i on i s not achi eved.dept h at t acks t hr oughout t he bat t l e space i s l i kel y t o r emai n as par t of US mi l i t ar y doct r i ne i nt o t he f or eseeabl e f ut ur e . For exampl e. t hat . unl ess t he i ni t i al of f ensi ve i n s uc h hy per war and par al l el war r ender s i noper abl e t he enemy' s abi l i t y t o st r i ke bac k wi t h weapons of mas s dest r uct i on or wi t h hi s mos t capabl e advanced convent i onal weaponr y. st eal t hy cr ui se mi ssi l es. US ai r doct r i ne emphas i z es t he us e of new t echnol ogi es s uc h as st eal t h ai r cr af t . 17 . wi l l i nf l i ct st r at egi c par al ysi s and qui c k def eat on t he adver sar y . he ar gues. Thes e oper at i ons wi l l be meant t o f or ce t he l oss or deny t he enemy any oppor t uni t y t o t ake t he i ni t i at i ve . and pr eci si on gui dance t o gi ve t he advant ages of sur pr i se and of f ensi ve i ni t i at i ve t o t hei r possessor si nce t hese weapons ar e di f f i cul t t o det ect and al l ow ai r power t o go wher e i t wi shes wi t hout maj or l osses i n pur sui t of st r at egi c or t act i cal t ar get s . par al l el . Ai r power . i n. t he US Ar my' s " For ce XXI Oper at i ons" st udy st at es : Fut ur e Amer i c an oper at i ons wi l l i nduce massi ve syst emi c s hoc k t o an enemy . one of t he ai r ar chi t ect s of t he al l i ed vi ct or y i n t he 1991 Gul f War .

How do y ou achi eve vi ct or y or a meas ur e of vi ct or y i n r egi onal combat wi t h s uc h an enemy. bef or e vi ct or y coul d be achi eved agai nst a r egi onal f oe so heavi l y ar med . and how do you.BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE Wi l l t he enemy escal at e at t he end or wi l l he be det er r ed f r om l aunchi ng NBC f usi l l ades as hi s r egi me goes under ? Wi l l he use s ome W MD and t hr eat en mor e use st i l l i n an at t empt t o achi eve a bet t er end. and dest r oy t he f or ce of a host i l e r adi cal st at e on t he ver ge of usi ng W MD agai nst t he Amer i c an homel and. t he al l i ed si de r i sks massi ve casual t i es. at t he s ame t i me. l ocat e. how do y ou l i mi t damage t o t he cont i nent al Uni t ed St at es and al l i ed count r i es dur i ng s uc h r egi onal conf l i ct s? Unt i l ef f ect i ve US and al l i ed t heat er or st r at egi c def enses ar e devel oped and depl oyed i n t he r egi ons wher e f oes devel opi ng or depl oyi ng W MD ar e l ocat ed. what t hen? I t i s possi bl e t hat t he bet t er par t of val or mi ght be t o accept a c ompr omi s e peace t hat l eaves t he adver sar y r egi me and hi s mi l i t ar y i n pl ace r at her t han demandi ng t ot al sur r ender as r equi r ed of Nazi Ger many or Toj o' s J apan i n 1945 . t ar get . bi ol ogi cal . t he cl oses. As i n t he 1991 Gul f War . Ther e wi l l be a t empt at i on at t he i ncept i on of any s uc h conf l i ct t o t ar get t he enemy l eader or l eader s t o cr eat e di sor gani zat i on and a r egi me change .l eader st r i ke at t empt s c ome t o success wi t hout accompl i shi ng t he t ask. However . Whi l e i t woul d be t he ver y r ar e cont i ngency when t he Uni t ed St at es or al l i ed st at es coul d successf ul l y i dent i f y. ef f or t s t o count er s uc h t hr eat s wi l l hav e t o r el y upon det er r ence of t he adver sar y or on al l i ed convent i onal of f ensi ve capabi l i t i es . t he l ocat i on of t he enemy l eader shi p and hi s weapons of mas s dest r uct i on may be unk nown . t he gr eat er t he possi bi l i t y t hat t he enemy r egi me wi l l count er wi t h desper at e meas ur es t hat mi ght i ncl ude l aunchi ng a nucl ear . I f t hi s opt i on i s r ej ect ed. per haps number i ng i n t he mi l l i ons. even i f t hey f ace a cl ear l y super i or al l i ed nucl ear f or ce t hat enj oys escal at i on domi nanc e .s uc h count er . l i mi t t he damage i nf l i ct ed on al l i ed f or ces and al l i es i n t he r egi on of oper at i ons? Fur t her .war set t l ement ? Or shoul d al l i ed f or ces keep out of r ange unt i l s uc h enemy W MD can be dest r oyed or unt i l t he enemy l eader shi p i s ki l l ed or r epl aced? I f t hi s i s not possi bl e. or chemi cal weapons at t ack. US and 18 .

PRI NCI PLES OF W AR al l i ed f or ces i n t he r egi on. enough so t hat i t i s possi bl e f or an al l i ed of f ense. or popul at i on cent er . What makes t he damage l i mi t at i on ent er pr i se even t hi nkabl e. For t hese and a number of ot her r easons. l egal . wher e even a si ngl e enemy war head " l eaker " t hr ough t he def enses coul d devast at e a por t . or chemi cal war head mi ght be l et hal acr oss a wi de ar ea . di pl omat i c. 21 I n s ome cases. ai r f i el d. 19 . Onl y t he combi nat i on of of f ensi ve suppr essi on st r i kes coupl ed wi t h def ensi ve i nt er cept i on capabi l i t i es coul d pr ovi de any possi bi l i t y of t he r egi onal " ast r odome" pr ot ect i on needed agai nst such unf or gi vi ng weapons. zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA " dest r oyi ng deepl y bur i ed and har dened bunk er s cont ai ni ng W MD asset s . mas s ed ar my. f ew. si nce t he use of US nucl ear ar ms t o st r i ke t he enemy W MD t ar get s woul d l i kel y ent ai l t oo many pol i t i cal . economi c. " ar ea t ar get i ng of wi del y di sper sed but enemy W MDasset s . or al l i ed count r i es. t hi s i mper at i ve t o use convent i onal weapons onl y. bi ol ogi cal . Theat er mi ssi l e def enses ar e al so needed . base. naval convoy. and mor al negat i ves .def ense combi nat i on t o neut r al i ze t he t hr eat . " sof t " mobi l e " bur ni ng enemy bi ol ogi cal weapons i ngr edi ent s t hat wer e ot her wi se l i kel y t o be spr ead acr oss t he r egi on i f i mpact ed by convent i onal bombi ng . because t he penet r at i on of al l i ed def ense by even a si ngl e enemy nucl ear . woul d mak e i t i mpossi bl e t o di sar m an adver sar y ar mi ng i t sel f wi t h W MD si nce convent i onal weapons may not be capabl e of . Nor i s i t wi se t o use al l t he mi l i t ar y pot ent i al t he Uni t ed St at es possesses. once war has begun. i s t hat t he enemy may possess onl y a hal f dozen or so of such weapons at t he t i me of a conf l i ct . t her e may be a f ew oppor t uni t i es wher e al l i ed i nt el l i gence can pi npoi nt such pr epar at i ons and st r i ke a bl ow t o di sar m such an adver sar y wi t h hi gh conf i dence . r el i ance on convent i onal of f enses al one t o end t he W MD t hr eat woul d be unwi se.

The US Ar my' s " For ce = Oper at i ons" r epor t st at es t hat adv anc es i n i nf or mat i on management and di st r i but i on wi l l f aci l i t at e t he hor i zont al i nt egr at i on of t he bat t l ef i el d f unct i ons and ai d c ommander s i n t ai l or i ng f or ces and ar r angi ng t hem on l and . l ocat i ons. t anks. and l eader s wi l l be mor e wi del y di sper sed l eadi ng t o t he cont i nuat i on of t he empt y bat t l ef i el d phenomenon . navi gat i on. Mai nt ai ni ng good c ommand. cont r ol . k ey nodes. Thi s wi l l enhanc e t he cont r ol of cent r al c ommander s whi l e. i t coul d dest r oy t he uni t y of c ommand of t he al l i ed f or ces i n t he r egi on .BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE The Pr i nci pl e of Uni t y of Command i n War f ar e Anot her pr i nci pl e of war l ai d out by Gen J . communi cat i ons. . he mi ght st i l l mak e ef f ect i ve use of hi s l i mi t ed capabi l i t y by at mospher i c nucl ear bur st s of EMP t hat coul d pl ay havoc wi t h al l i ed t el ecommuni cat i ons. and i n f ar gr eat er det ai l about t he opponent ' s capabi l i t i es. 22 The chal l enge t o ef f ect i ve c ommand. . and i nt el l i gence ( C3 1) coul d bec ome muc h easi er i n f ut ur e MRCs as a r esul t of t he ongoi ng r evol ut i on i n i nf or mat i on t echnol ogy avai l abl e t o al l i ed c ommander s . aut omat ed guns. at t he s ame t i me. C. of decapi t at i ng r egi onal al l i ed gover nment s. F.al t i t ude nucl ear expl osi on emi t t i ng a dest r uct i ve el ect r omagnet i c pul se ( EMP) . t r ucks. mi ssi l es. and act i vi t i es t han k nown i n pr evi ous war s . and any mi cr ochi ps or el ect r i cal ci r cui t s t hat ar e not pr ot ect ed agai nst EMP. APCs. I f t he r egi onal adver sar y was at a sever e di sadvant age i n NBC weapons. I f t he adver sar y has t he capabi l i t y of decapi t at i ng t he US or al l i ed mi l i t ar y c ommands . 20 . per mi t t i ng wi der di sper sal of f r i endl y f or ces . of t ar get i ng t he US Nat i onal Command Aut hor i t y. r adar . Ful l er i s t hat of t he r equi r ement f or uni t y of c ommand . and c ommuni c at i ons i n a maj or r egi onal conf l i ct coul d be i mmens e . cont r ol . Mor eover . Thi s i nf or mat i on r evol ut i on wi l l pr ovi de mor e i nf or mat i on ear l i er .wi de awar eness of al l i ed and enemy di sposi t i ons i n r eal t i me . ai r cr af t . . or of " l evel i ng t he pl ayi ng f i el d" by k noc k i ng out mos t al l i ed c ommuni c at i ons wi t h a hi gh. s uc h a c ommuni c at i ons r evol ut i on wi l l l ead t o f l at t er or gani zat i on st r uct ur es and t o gr eat er f or ce. Uni t s.

For exampl e. " Uni t c ommander s wi l l need si mpl er . has l ong been a vul ner abl e t ar get and wi l l r emai n so i n t he f or eseeabl e f ut ur e . Washi ngt on. t he Joi nt Chi ef s of St af f .PRI NCI PLES OF W AR The enemy W MD t hr eat mi ght even ext end bey ond t he t heat er of war t o t he capi t al s of al l i ed count r i es. The chaos t hat s uc h an at t ack woul d cause woul d be di f f i cul t t o over st at e . " Mi l i t ar y uni t s may need t o be mor e aut onomous and dependent on pr ewar pl anni ng of oper at i ons . l ess f r equent " Al t er nat i ve c ommander s i n mobi l e and har dened command post s wi l l be needed f or al l r egi onal and suppor t i ng CI NCs. Unf or t unat el y. I t i s possi bl e t hat t he nat i onal l eader shi p and t he r egi onal mi l i t ar y f or ces of t he Uni t ed St at es woul d be pl unged i nt o chaos f or s omet i me . mos t al l i ed capi t al s ar e hi ghl y vul ner abl e t o W MD t hr eat s . ki l l ed. C. i t i s concei vabl e t hat nucl ear . . D. and member s of Congr ess who wer e t her e at t he t i me . Cabi net member s . 23 A cl andest i ne nucl ear det onat i on i n t he ci t y woul d l i kel y doom t he US pr esi dent . bi ol ogi cal . or i sol at ed f r om t hei r f or ces . updat es f r om cent r al headquar t er s . The t hr eat of communi cat i on di sr upt i on and c ommand di sabl ement i n conf l i ct s wi t h NASTI s l eads t o sever al concl usi ons r egar di ng t he pr eser vat i on of uni t y of c ommand i n s uc h conf l i ct s : zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSR " Command uni t y may hav e t o gi ve way t o s ubc ommand di sper sal under a pr eset uni f i ed cont i ngency pl an . wi t h t r ai ned backups i n r eser ve sever al l ayer s deep. or chemi cal weapons coul d be del i ver ed agai nst such ci t i es by unconvent i onal means vi a sabot eur s smuggl i ng t hemi n t he al l i ed count r i es and det onat i ng t hemor t hr eat eni ng t o do so t o ac hi ev e f avor abl e di pl omat i c concessi ons at t he end of t he conf l i ct . i ncl udi ng even Washi ngt on. D. t he vi ce pr esi dent . One of t he mor e di f f i cul t quest i ons t o ans wer i n t he hour s af t er s uc h a NASTI decapi t at i on at t ack woul d be " who i s i n char ge her e?" Thi s chaos woul d be c ompounded i f t he headquar t er s housi ng t he US r egi onal CI NC and hi s st af f al so wer e t o suf f er a si mi l ar decapi t at i on st r i ke at t he s ame t i me . 21 . Ev en i f t hi s was not t echni cal l y possi bl e. r eady t o as s ume c ommand i f and when t he CI NCs ar e t ar get ed. C. I t may be possi bl e t hat t he adver sar y has ai r cr af t or mi ssi l es capabl e of r eachi ng s uc h capi t al s .

and at t ai nabl e obj ect i ve . Onc e beat en i n t he f i el d of bat t l e. and by a deci si ve endgame .5 st at es t hat c ommander s ought t o " di r ect ever y mi l i t ar y oper at i on t owar ds a cl ear l y def i ned. wi t h each phas e desi gned t o mov e t he si t uat i on f or war d t owar d t he goal . Pr esi dent Bus h def i ned t he US and al l i ed obj ect i ve si mpl y as t he f r eei ng of Kuwai t f r om I r aqi occupat i on and t he est abl i shment of agr eed bor der s bet ween I r aq and Kuwai t . cont i nui ng t he conf l i ct so l ong as Saddam Hussei n and hi s cabi net cont r ol l ed t he I r aqi gover nment and mi l i t ar y f or ces . by a mi ddl e game exchange. I r aq was pr ohi bi t ed f r om mos t i nt er nat i onal t r ade or expor t s. i ndependenc e of act i on.BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTUREzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPO " Mi l i t ar y f or ces may have t o be gui ded and or gani zed si mi l ar l y t o di st r i but ed c omput er net wor ks. UN i nspect or s wer e sent i nt o I r aq t o l ocat e i t s nucl ear . Pr esi dent Bush' s deci si on t o st op t he f i ght i ng when he di d was cont r over si al . and was especi al l y l i mi t ed f r om pr of i t i ng f r om oi l expor t s unt i l i t was deemed t o be i n f ul l c ompl i ance wi t h peace t er ms negot i at ed at t he end of t he Gul f War . and chemi cal weapons as wel l as i t s bal l i st i c mi ssi l es f or t he pur pose of dest r oyi ng t hem. deci si ve. l i ke chess mat ches. 24 Cent r al and t heat er c ommander s shoul d begi n each phase of t he conf l i ct wi t h t he desi r ed end i n mi nd. The Uni t ed St at es Ar my Fi el d Manual FM 100. " I n t he Per si an Gul f . and abi l i t y t o oper at e i ndependent of cent r al c ommand whi l e st i l l f ol l owi ng c ommand gui del i nes . I t has been ar gued t hat Pr esi dent Bush' s deci si on was made i n l i ne wi t h t he pr i nci pl e of war t hat says t o di r ect ever y 22 . bot h of f ensi ve and def ensi ve. al t hough r est r i ct i ons wer e pl aced upon I r aqi mi l i t ar y uni t s. Many t hought he shoul d have di r ect ed US and al l i ed f or ces t o pr oceed on t o Baghdad when he had t he I r aqi mi l i t ar y on t he r un and i n chaos. wi t h gr eat er aut onomy . ar e gener al l y char act er i zed by openi ng moves. t he r egi me of Saddam Hussei n was al l owed t o r emai n i n power . bi ol ogi cal . The Pr i nci pl e of Cl ear Obt ai nabl e Obj ect i ves i n War f ar e War s.

Thi r d. Pr esi dent Bus h compl i ed wi t h t he Uni t ed Nat i ons r esol ut i ons aut hor i zi ng t he col l ect i ve secur i t y act i on and t he l i mi t ed goal s embr ac ed by t he whol e US. t he deci si on t o end t he conf l i ct once I r aqi t r oops wer e expel l ed f r om Kuwai t was a cl ear l y def i ned obj ect i ve . as agr eed at t he Uni t ed Nat i ons when t he al l i ed coal i t i on was f or med. Pr esi dent Bush' s deci si on t o keep t o s uc h cl ear l y def i ned. l eader s. despi t e t he US deci si on t o hal t Deser t St or m oper at i ons shor t of a gr ound occupat i on of I r aq. but . i t was t hought . af t er t hr ee year s. Fi r st . and at t ai nabl e obj ect i ves was det er mi ned by t he cal cul at i on t hat t o go f ur t her and i nvade I r aq woul d have gone beyond t he UN r esol ut i ons aut hor i zi ng t he col l ect i ve act i on . and gover ni ng a host i l e popul at i on of al most 20 mi l l i on whi l e seeki ng t o set up a f r i endl y r egi me . Suc h act i on. l ocat i ng and capt ur i ng Saddam Hussei n and hi s subor di nat e. Second. To go f ur t her mi ght have l ed t o a spl i t i n t he coal i t i on and woul d have been on uncer t ai n l egal gr ounds . The war ai m. woul d endanger t he suppor t of coal i t i on par t ner s needed t o l egi t i mi ze t he subsequent peace ar r angement s and whos e suppor t t he Uni t ed St at es woul d need t o guar d i t s i nt er est s i n f ut ur e deal i ngs i n t he Mi ddl e East and t he Per si an Gul f . was not t o occupy I r aq. deci si ve i n secur i ng t he l i ber at i on of Kuwai t and i n i nf l i ct i ng a deci si ve def eat and sur r ender of al l I r aqi f or ces st at i oned out si de of I r aq' s bor der s . t he c ampai gn was. never t hel ess. and at t ai nabl e obj ect i ve . havi ng j ust won t he vi ct or y i n Kuwai t at a human cost wel l bel ow what had been pr edi ct ed f or t he gr ound 23 . s ubdui ng t he r emnant s of t he I r aqi mi l i t ar y t hr oughout a count r y l ar ger t han Ger many .l ed coal i t i on . r epl ace t he pr esent I r aqi gov er nment . Pr esi dent Bus h and hi s advi ser s under s t ood t he di f f i cul t i es of c onquer i ng I r aq. Fur t her . Pr esi dent Bush' s obj ect i ve i n t he Gul f conf l i ct was qui t e at t ai nabl e .PRI NCI PLES OF W AR mi l i t ar y oper at i on t owar ds a cl ear l y def i ned. deci si ve. t he I r aqi par l i ament has f i nal l y agr eed t o dr op cl ai ms t o Kuwai t i t er r i t or y and r ecogni ze t he bor der s of Kuwai t as l egi t i mat e . Not onl y was Kuwai t l i ber at ed. The Bus h admi ni st r at i on was al so eager t o avoi d f ur t her bl oodshed. or gov er n I r aq dur i ng a t r ansi t i on per i od t o anot her r egi me . deci si ve.

Fi nal l y. Ti me has s hown t hat he has a r emar kabl e abi l i t y t o sur vi ve 24 . Pr esi dent Bus h r ecei ved an unpr ecedent ed 93 per cent appr oval r at i ng i n pol l s of t he Amer i c an publ i c i n t he af t er mat h of t he war . i t i s l i kel y t hat Pr esi dent Bus h and hi s pol i t i cal advi sor s al so wi shed t o r eap t he pol i t i cal f r ui t s of an al most t ot al vi ct or y i n Kuwai t as opposed t o ent er i ng t he pol i t i cal mi nef i el d of an i nvasi on. 000) . US cr edi bi l i t y had never been hi gher si nce t he end of Wor l d War I I .be aggr essor s i n pl aces l i ke Nor t h Kor ea. and el sewher e . and who was seen as t he chi ef expor t er of ant i . al so sent an unchal l enged mes s age ar ound t he wor l d about US mi l i t ar y pr owess and Amer i c an wi l l i ngness t o act deci si vel y agai nst aggr essi on when i t f el t i t s vi t al i nt er est s wer e at st ake . Some bel i eve t hat t he al l i es shoul d have f i ni shed t he r egi me of Saddam Hussei n when t hey had t he oppor t uni t y t o act deci si vel y agai nst hi m. The f act t hat I r aq. and who was seen as t he chi ef expor t er s of t er r or wor l dwi de . Real pol i t i k may al so have been a f act or i n t he Uni t ed St at es' s deci si on t o st op when i t di d . Gi v en t hese ar gument s i n suppor t of Pr esi dent Bush' s deci si on t o f ol l ow l i mi t ed war ai ms i n 1991. Thi s enhanced US r eput at i on i n t he wor l d coul d be used t o det er ot her woul d. Pr i or t o t he 1990 i nvasi on of Kuwai t .Amer i can sent i ment s. By st oppi ng when he di d. Af t er al l .si ght edness . Pr esi dent Bus h and Secr et ar y of Def ense Di ck Cheney s aw ent r y i nt o I r aq as a quagmi r e t o be avoi ded and ended t he f i ght i ng whi l e t he al l i es wer e wel l ahead and had at t ai ned t hei r i mmedi at e st at ed goal s . i f t ot al l y di sar med by t he al l i ed coal i t i on. coul d not of f set t he expansi oni st ambi t i ons of I r an was st i l l anot her ar gument f or not ent er i ng I r aq and t ot al l y di smant l i ng i t s mi l i t ar y power i n 1991 . st opped at i t s apex. t her e i s st i l l cont r over sy over whet her st oppi ng shor t of Baghdad was an act of wi s dom or shor t . and occupat i on of I r aq . ext ended mi l i t ar y campai gn. The deci si ve vi ct or y. i t was I r an under t he ayat ol l ahs who sei zed Amer i c an host ages at t he US embas s y i n Tehr an i n 1979. t he Uni t ed St at es had been mor e concer ned wi t h cont ai ni ng I r ani an power r at her t han I r aqi power i n t he r egi on . a r ecover y f r om t he year s f ol l owi ng t he Vi et nam War .BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE c ampai gn ( 150 US dead as opposed t o pr edi ct i ons t hat r anged up t o 15. t he Per si an Gul f .

and of Saddam Hussei n. The s y mpt oms wer e t r eat ed and t hei r ef f ect s mi t i gat ed.PRI NCI PLES OF W AR pol i t i cal l y i n I r aq. i s anal ogous t o havi ng al l owed Adol ph Hi t l er t o r emai n i n cont r ol of Ger many i n 1945 because t he Al l i es deci ded t o st op at Ger many' s bor der s once Ger man ar mi es had been expel l ed f r om t he l ands t hat t hey occupi ed f r om 1939. many bel i eve t hat count r y wi l l be bac k i n t he W MD busi ness f ul l . Per mi t t i ng Saddam Hussei n t o r emai n i n power t o cont i nue t o t hr eat en hi s nei ghbor s and US i nt er est s i n t he r egi on. even t hough y ou k now i t wi l l i nevi t abl y pr oduce mor e i n t i me .Kuwai t bor der . I ndeed. I r aq r et ai ns t he sci ent i f i c base. and l ess t han a decade af t er t hat bef or e i t coul d j oi n t he nucl ear weapons cl ub . r esur r ect i on of i t s bi ol ogi cal weapons st ockpi l e shoul d be si mpl e si nce t he al l i es never f ound i t and t her ef or e di d not dest r oy i t . I r aq i s gi ven t wo year s of f ul l scal e ef f or t bef or e i t coul d be at 1991 l evel s agai n i n i t s nucl ear weapons r esear ch. and I r aq has been abl e t o r econst i t ut e muc h of i t s convent i onal mi l i t ar y capabi l i t y even under t he t er ms of t he t r uce . One evi dence of Saddam' s per si st ent mal evol ence was t he I r aqi . a st at e t hat has been at war wi t h i t s nei ghbor s si nce i t s i ncept i on. and ambi t i ons f or f ut ur e gr eat .scal e .sponsor ed at t empt t o ki l l f or mer Pr esi dent Bus h on hi s vi si t t o Kuwai t i n 1993 . f or ei gn suppl i er cont act s. Gi ven t he t r ack r ecor d of I r aq. may be t o have def i ned t he US and UN obj ect i ve t oo nar r owl y at t he onset of t he Gul f conf l i ct si nce i t i s ar guabl e whet her t he US and al l i ed l i mi t ed act i ons achi eved a l ast i ng end t o t he I r aqi t hr eat or mer el y post poned t he conf r ont at i on wi t h an I r aq ar med wi t h NBC weapons and t he mi ssi l es t o del i ver t hemon t ar get . Onc e UN sanct i ons ar e l i f t ed on I r aq. I ndeed. not t o hav e deposed Saddam Hussei n. because y ou have t empor ar i l y mi l ked i t of i t s venom.power st at us .1945 . pot ent i al weal t h f r om i t s oi l r eser ves. whos e r egi me has const ant l y used mur der ous vi ol ence agai nst 25 . Mor eover . Leavi ng s uc h an opponent al i ve and i n power i s l i ke al l owi ng a r at t l esnake t o cont i nue t o l i ve i n y our hous e af t er i t has at t empt ed t o ki l l y ou once. but t he di sease per si st s t hat coul d be l et hal next t i me t o US i nt er est s and al l i es i n t he Gul f r egi on . by st oppi ng at t he I r aq. when t he chance pr esent ed i t sel f .

nor mi l i t ar y i nt er est s t o adver t i se t hei r pr ogr ess or capabi l i t i es . " 25 Thi s i s a usef ul gui del i ne. Decl ar ed pr ol i f er at or s may al so suf f er uni l at er al cut of f s and sanct i ons by t r i gger i ng nat i onal l egi sl at i on on t he books i n t he Uni t ed St at es and among ot her st at es . t her e i s a hi gh l i kel i hood t hat t he Gul f War wi l l have t o be r epeat ed i n t he f ut ur e. These l aws enf or ci ng i nt er nat i onal nor ms pr ohi bi t i ng pr ol i f er at i on al so pr escr i be var i ous penal t i es f or st at es t hat br eak f r om t he r anks . The Pr i nci pl e of Secur i t y i n War f ar e Good secur i t y means t he enemy cannot achi eve st r at egi c sur pr i se . we shoul d have cl ear l y def i ned pol i t i cal and mi l i t ar y obj ect i ves . 26 . Suc h good secur i t y i ncr easi ngl y depends on accur at e and t i mel y i nt el l i gence i nf or mat i on t o assess t he t hr eat and gi ve t i mel y war ni ng of i t i n an er a when host i l e and r adi cal opponent s ar e about t o acqui r e t he most dest r uct i ve of weapons . " i f we do deci de t o c ommi t f or ces t o c ombat over seas. par t i cul ar l y i f t he evi dence of t hei r devel opi ng W MD i s ambi guous . I t has bec ome i ncr easi ngl y di f f i cul t t o pr edi ct t he pr ogr ess of nonnucl ear st at es as t hey appr oach obt ai ni ng an oper at i onal W MD capabi l i t y . as f or mer Secr et ar y of Def ens e Cas par Wei nber ger once advi sed. To concl ude.BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE i t s opponent s i nsi de I r aq and aggr essi ve war agai nst i t s nei ghbor s si nce he t ook power . Aspi r i ng pr ol i f er at or s mi ght hi de behi nd t hei r si gnat ur es on t he NPT t o gai n l egal pr ot ect i on agai nst i nt er vent i on. Wi t ness t he Pr essl er Amendment and t he t r ade penal t i es i nf l i ct ed on Paki st an as a r esul t of i t s nucl ear weapons pr ogr am. per haps agai nst an even mor e danger ous enemy . economi c. The i nt er nat i onal l egal nor m est abl i shed by t he NPT car r i es pl edges by t he nucl ear weapon st at es t hat t hey wi l l not at t ack nonnuc l ear si gnat or i es of t he pact and t hat t hey wi l l be subj ect t o sanct i ons i f t hey vi ol at e t hat pl edge . And we shoul d k now pr eci sel y how our f or ces can accompl i sh t hose cl ear l y def i ned obj ect i ves . Mos t of t hese r egi mes f i nd i t nei t her i n t hei r pol i t i cal . even i f i t does not pr eci sel y t el l y ou what t o do and wher e t o dr aw t he l i ne on your pr ewar and post war aspi r at i ons .

Thi s model i s t he mor e l i kel y one f or aspi r ant st at es t o f ol l ow. and assembl i ng t hem i nsi de t hei r count r y t o r educe t he audi t t r ai l . namel y : zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA " Pur sui ng mul t i pl e t echni cal pat hs t o NBCweapons . and t hey pr obabl y i ndi cat e a muc h l ar ger cl andest i ne pr ogr am oper at i ng out of si ght . " Us i ng t hi r d par t i es t o pur c has e W MD pr oduct i on t echnol ogy. " Pr ovi di ng di si nf or mat i on about W MD act i vi t i es/ l ocat i ons . " Buyi ng as muc h W MD t echnol ogy and r esour ces on t he open mar ket as possi bl e f r om cont r act or s al l t oo r eady t o hel p i n r et ur n f or subst ant i al pr of i t s .pr of i l e. The r at e of pr ogr ess may be accel er at ed by t he possi bi l i t y of t r ansf er s of sci ent i f i c knowl edge. easi l y t ar get ed f aci l i t i es . weapons desi gns. " Get t i ng pr ospect i ve cont r act or s t o f i l l gaps i n W MD k nowl edge t hr ough t he bi d and pr oposal pr ocess. ar med wi t h gr eat weal t h f r om hi s oi l r evenues. mi ssi l es. r at her t han component s. " Joi ni ng t he NPT as a r use whi l e cl andest i nel y cheat i ng . Saddam f r om 1981. hi ghl y enr i ched ur ani um ( HEU) or pl ut oni um ( PL) . " Hi r i ng f or ei gn NBC/ mi s s i l e exper t i se wher e l ocal exper t i se i s l acki ng .use t echnol ogi es al l egedl y f or anot her pur pose . " Pr oduci ng i ndi genousl y as many c omponent s of W MD as possi bl e . " Di sgui si ng and hi di ng W MD f aci l i t i es. and " Pur chasi ng W MD t echnol ogy s ubc omponent s . s ome under gr ound .PRI NCI PLES OF W AR Mor eover .1991 was abl e t o mov e ver y cl ose t o a nucl ear weapons capabi l i t y f ol l owi ng a cl andest i ne appr oach . i t does not pay t o devel op W MD i n hi gh. " Pur chasi ng dual . j ust t he t i ps of t he Nor t h Kor ean and I r ani an nucl ear weapons pr ogr ams ar e vi si bl e. Li ke t he pr over bi al i ceber g. and nucl ear 27 . somet i mes not l et t i ng t he cont r act af t er war ds . as Saddam Hussei n l ear ned i n J une 1981 when hi s Osi r ak r eact or was dest r oyed by I sr ael i war pl anes. I nst ead.

zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA enemy " Al l i ed count er f or ce st r i kes t o dest r oy or r educe enemy W MD asset s . Any ot her meas ur es desi gned t o pr esent l ess l ucr at i ve t ar get s t o enemy W MD s uc h as di sper si on. whi c h have a sur pl us of under pai d nucl ear sci ent i st s and t echni ci ans. 26 Vul ner abi l i t y t o sur pr i se and at t ack c an be r educed by a combi nat i on of of f ensi ve and def ensi ve meas ur es . Secur i t y enhanc es f r eedom of act i on by r educi ng f r i endl y vul ner abi l i t y t o host i l e act s. " Al l i ed act i ve def enses t o i nt er cept ai r cr af t at t acks . t he Uni t ed St at es shoul d never per mi t t he enemy t o acqui r e an unexpect ed advant age . Thor ough knowl edge and under st andi ng of enemy st r at egy. bi ol ogi cal . " enemy mi ssi l e or Use of passi ve def enses t o pr ot ect f r i endl y f or ces f r om t he ef f ect s of nucl ear . I mpr oved al l i ed capabi l i t i es t o r emot el y det ect adver sar y nucl ear . t act i cs. and an expandi ng cr i mi nal el ement wi t h s ome access t o t he wi despr ead nucl ear f aci l i t i es of t he f or mer super power . bi ol ogi cal . 28 . mai nt ai ni ng f or ces out si de of enemy mi ssi l e or ai r cr af t r anges. a need f or har d cur r ency. but t aken i n c ombi nat i on. . Accor di ng t o US mi l i t ar y doct r i ne. or chemi cal weapon at t acks . and i nt r oduci ng suppl y and r ei nf or cement means t hat ar e l ess vul ner abl e t o NBC st r i kes . woul d al so enhanc e secur i t y and hel p avoi d r ude and devast at i ng sur pr i ses by t he enemy . t ens of t housands of nucl ear weapons.BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE t echnol ogy f r om t he newl y i ndependent st at es of t he f or mer Sovi et Uni on. mobi l i t y. . No si ngl e appr oach may neut r al i ze t he W MD t hr eat . and doct r i ne and det ai l ed st af f pl anni ng c an i mpr ove secur i t y and r educe vul ner abi l i t y t o sur pr i se . i nf l uence or sur pr i se . t hese meas ur es may gr eat l y r educ e t he vul ner abi l i t y of f r i endl y f or ces t o NASTI sur pr i ses . chemi cal and mi ssi l e asset s on t he gr ound or en r out e t o t ar get . . Secur i t y can be mai nt ai ned by a mi x t hat i ncl udes : Keepi ng al l i ed escal at i on domi nanc e t o det er escal at i on t o f i r st use of W MD. hundr eds of t ons of HEU and PL.

The mai n gr ound t hr ust agai nst enemy f or ces mus t be adequat el y pr ot ect ed by concent r at i ng act i ve and passi ve def ense asset s on behal f of t he mai n ef f or t . wi l l hel p 29 . whi l e r esour ces mus t be f ocused on t he deci si ve weak poi nt s i n adver sar y f or ces and pl ans. Cl ear l y. al l done wi t h di spat ch. ut i l i zi ng t he pr i nci pl e of ec onomy of f or ce. Thi s pr i nci pl e of war i s based on t he pr emi se t hat t he CI NC wi l l not hav e unl i mi t ed r esour ces and mus t accept s ome cal cul at ed r i sks i n secondar y ar eas of i mpor t ance i n or der t o achi eve super i or i t y i n t he pr i or i t y ar ea wher e t he bat t l e or conf l i ct may be deci ded . The pr i nci pl e of " ec onomy of f or ce" al so woul d ser ve as a gui de t o cut t i ng bac k on secondar y US mi l i t ar y par t i ci pat i on s uc h as i n on. and secur e and cl andest i ne mov ement s of t r oops. Ther ef or e. " 27 I n ot her wor ds. equi pment . and suppl i es. The pr i nci pl e of ec onomy of f or ce mus t be appl i ed wi t h a caveat when an enemy i s equi pped wi t h W MD. On t he gr and st r at egi c l evel . and t hei r empl oy ment pr ef aced by an ai r c ampai gn desi gned t o subst ant i al l y el i mi nat e an enemy W DMcapabi l i t y . t hey mus t si mul t aneousl y be adequat el y pr ot ect ed by mai nt ai ni ng i nt r awar escal at i on domi nance.so l ong as US f or ces ar e engaged i n one or mor e maj or r egi onal conf l i ct s. c ombi ned wi t h r api d suppl y and r ei nf or cement s f r om di ver se l ogi st i cs pat hways.goi ng UN peace oper at i ons i n ot her r egi ons. ai r cover . or l ack t he mi l i t ar y power t o pr edomi nat e i n bot h .PRI NCI PLES OF W AR The Pr i nci pl e of Ec onomy of For ce i n War f ar e Anot her pr i nci pl e of war set out i n US mi l i t ar y doct r i ne i s t o " al l ocat e mi ni mum essent i al c ombat power t o s ec ondar y ef f or t s . The al l i ed c ommander mus t avoi d havi ng hi s mai n t hr ust t r umped by t he empl oy ment of enemy mas s dest r uct i on weapons . i t i s r ec ommended t hat t he US c ommander shoul d concent r at e t he maj or i t y of hi s mi l i t ar y power t owar d a cl ear l y def i ned pr i mar y t hr eat r at her t han c ompr omi s e t he ef f or t agai nst secondar y pr i or i t i es . Di sper si on and cont i nued mobi l i t y of k ey f or ce el ement s. t he Uni t ed St at es has adopt ed a st r at egy of pr epar i ng t o f i ght t wo near l y si mul t aneous maj or r egi onal conf l i ct s at t he s ame t i me . t he Uni t ed St at es woul d need t o hol d i n r eser ve enough f or ce f or a second MRC once t he f i r st one begi ns .

BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE

pr eser ve t he el ement of t act i cal sur pr i se and di sgui se wher e
t he mai n ef f or t wi l l be made .
As US Ar my and Ai r For ce doct r i ne st at es, " ec onomy of f or ce
mi ssi ons may r equi r e t he f or ces empl oyed t o at t ack, t o def end,
t o del ay, or t o conduct decept i on oper at i ons . " 28

The Pr i nci pl e of Sur pr i se i n War f ar e
US mi l i t ar y doct r i ne t eaches t hat c ommander s mus t
at t empt t o " st r i ke t he enemy i n a t i me or pl ace, or i n a
manner , f or whi c h he i s unpr epar ed . " 29 Sur pr i se c an af f ect t he
out c ome of bat t l es, campai gns, or even ent i r e war s . Sur pr i se
can be achi eved by speed of at t ack and maneuv er , t aki ng
unant i ci pat ed act i ons, usi ng decept i on, var yi ng t he t act i cs
us ed f r om t hose pr evi ousl y empl oyed, mai nt ai ni ng oper at i ons
secur i t y, gai ni ng good i nt el l i gence and i nsi ght s i nt o enemy
t hi nki ng and doct r i ne, and appl yi ng new t echnol ogi es i n way s
t hat r educe enemy war ni ng t i me, pr ovi de capabi l i t i es he does
not ant i ci pat e, or cont r i but e t o hi s conf usi on .
I n t he r eal m of new t echnol ogi es t o achi eve sur pr i se, not e
t he i mpor t ance of st eal t h F- 117 f i ght er - bomber s i n st r i ki ng
key t ar get s i n t he 1991 Gul f War and t he use of pr eci si ongui ded cr ui se mi ssi l es wi t h ver y smal l r adar cr oss- sect i ons .
One of t he ar chi t ect s of t he US ai r c ampai gn i n t he 1991
Per si an Gul f War has wr i t t en t hat
f or t he f i r st t i me i n t he hi st or y of war f ar e, a si ngl e ent i t y c an
pr oduce i t s own mas s and sur pr i se . . . . Sur pr i se has al ways
been one of t he mos t i mpor t ant f act or s i n war - per haps even t he
si ngl e mos t i mpor t ant bec aus e i t coul d mak e up f or t he
def i ci enci es i n number s . Sur pr i se was al ways di f f i cul t t o achi eve
bec aus e i t conf l i ct ed wi t h t he c onc ept s of mas s and
concent r at i on. I n or der t o have enough f or ces avai l abl e t o hur l
enough pr oj ect i l es t o wi n t he pr obabi l i t y cont est , t he c ommander
had t o assembl e and mov e l ar ge number s . Of cour se . assembl i ng
and mov i ng l ar ge f or ces i n secr et was qui t e di f f i cul t , even i n t he
days bef or e aer i al r econnai ssance, so t he odds of sur pr i si ng t he
enemy wer e smal l i ndeed . St eal t h and pr eci si on hav e sol ved bot h
si des of t he pr obl em; by def i ni t i on, st eal t h achi eves sur pr i se, and
pr eci si on means t hat a si ngl e weapon accompl i shes what
t housands wer e unl i kel y t o accompl i sh i n t he past . 3o

30

PRI NCI PLES OF W
AR

Unt i l t he NASTI r egi mes acqui r e r adar s or ot her sensor s
capabl e of det ect i ng and t ar get i ng i ncomi ng st eal t h ai r cr af t and
cr ui se mi ssi l es, t he Uni t ed St at es and i t s al l i es have a means
of achi evi ng t act i cal sur pr i se i n any ai r st r i ke or any cr ui se
mi ssi l e l aunch . The abi l i t y t o st r i ke " out of t he bl ue" wi t hout
war ni ng, pr ovi ded by t he B- 2, F- 117s, f ut ur e F- 22s, and
st eal t hy cr ui se mi ssi l es i s l i mi t ed onl y by how successf ul l y US
and al l i ed i nt el l i gence c an i dent i f y and l ocat e si gni f i cant
enemy t ar get s, and by t he avai l abi l i t y of st eal t h ai r cr af t or
cr ui se mi ssi l es .
Technol ogi cal sur pr i se c an al so deci de bat t l es when one si de
f i r st empl oys a deci si ve new mi l i t ar y t echnol ogy whi c h put s
t he adver sar y at an unant i ci pat ed di sadvant age . One of t he
mos t dr amat i c i l l ust r at i ons of t hi s was t he deci si ve r ol e of
Br i t i sh r adar s i n hel pi ng t he Royal Ai r For ce wi n t he Bat t l e of
Br i t ai n agai nst t he Ger man Luf f waf f e . Al t hough gr eat l y
out number ed i n ai r cr af t , t he Br i t i sh wer e abl e t o pi npoi nt t he
di r ect i ons and number s of Ger man ai r cr af t as t hey t ook of f i n
Fr ance and f l ew acr oss t he Engl i sh Channel t owar d Br i t ai n .
Ar med wi t h t hi s knowl edge, Br i t i sh Spi t f i r es wai t ed hi gh i n t he
cl ouds i n ambus h and concent r at ed super i or f or ces i n t he ai r
bat t l es t hey chose t o f i ght . The r esul t was a Br i t i sh vi ct or y
wher e bean count er s woul d have pr edi ct ed def eat . Radar was
t he bi ggest di f f er ence i n t he t wo si des . 31

The Pr i nci pl e of Si mpl i ci t y i n War f ar e
US Ar my c ommander s ar e t aught t o pr epar e " cl ear , unc ompl i cat ed pl ans and cl ear , conci se or der s t o ensur e t hor ough
under st andi ng . " 32 Si mpl i ci t y of oper at i onal concept s and goal s
shoul d r educe mi sunder st andi ngs of or der s, r educe conf usi on,
and enhanc e t he under st andi ng of k ey audi ences whos e
suppor t i s necessar y t o conduct t he war .
Thi s si mpl i ci t y of oper at i on shoul d be appl i ed t o al l phases
of c ombat ; dur i ng t he openi ng phase of oper at i ons, i n t he
mai n campai gn, and i n t he war - t er mi nat i on phas e . The war
pl an shoul d be a cont i nuat i on of pol i t i cs by ot her means,
keepi ng i n mi nd t he nat i onal ends f or whi c h t he conf l i ct was
begun, const ant l y r el at i ng nat i onal ends t o ongoi ng mi l i t ar y

31

BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE

means, and under st andi ng t he uni que l i mi t s on war t er mi nat i on
i mposed by t he st ar k f act t hat t he adver sar y possesses weapons
whos e dest r uct i ve magni t ude exceeds anyt hi ng pr evi ousl y
f aced by ot her US c ommander s i n pr evi ous conf l i ct s .
Of cour se, si mpl i ci t y and cl ar i t y of goal s, pl ans, and or der s
al one do not guar ant ee a cor r ect st r at egy or successf ul oper at i on
agai nst a heavi l y ar med r egi onal enemy . A CI NC coul d choose a
cl ear , si mpl e pl an based on t r i ed- and- t r ue pr i nci pl es, but f i nd
t hat i t woul d not wor k i n a f ut ur e MRC wher e t he adver sar y
was equi pped wi t h r adi cal l y di f f er ent capabi l i t i es wel l beyond
t hose possessed by enemi es i n t he past .
Ar med wi t h W
MD, s uc h adver sar i es mi ght f ol l ow an
escal at or y st r at egy t hat coul d shat t er t he cohesi veness of an
al l i ed coal i t i on, coul d scar e of f pot ent i al al l i es, mi ght i nf l i ct a
pol i t i cal def eat on t he coal i t i on by di ssol vi ng al l i ed domest i c
suppor t f or t he war , or even cr i ppl e an al l i ed expedi t i onar y
f or ce by t ur ni ng NBC and mi ssi l e asset s agai nst al l i ed
f or ces, por t s, ai r bases, l ogi st i cal t ai l , or al l i ed capi t al s i n t he
r egi on . I n s uc h a campai gn, a NASTI at t ack mi ght concei vabl y
i nf l i ct i n a si ngl e day al l i ed war deat hs i n excess of what t he
Uni t ed St at es suf f er ed i n Kor ea, Vi et nam, or even i n Wor l d
War 11 . 33
The r i ght oper at i onal pl an wi l l be essent i al agai nst NASTI s
on t he f i el d of bat t l e . Cl ar i t y and si mpl i ci t y added t o a s ound
appr oac h cont r i but e t o success . Of cour se, i f added t o a
f l awed concept of oper at i ons, cl ar i t y and si mpl i ci t y cannot
aver t def eat .

Addi t i onal Pr i nci pl es of W
ar
agai nst Enemi es wi t h W1VI D
Mi l i t ar y exper i ence and r ecent t echni cal i nnovat i ons have
s pawned s ome addi t i onal pr i nci pl es of war f ar e t o add t o t he
l i st suppl i ed by Gener al Ful l er i n Wor l d War I . Thes e new
oper at i ng pr i nci pl es, when c ombi ned wi t h t he or i gi nal
MOSSCOMES pr i nci pl es of war may suppl y t he deci si ve edge
agai nst r adi cal host i l e r egi mes ar med wi t h W
MD.
These new pr i nci pl es can be s ummar i z ed by t he ac r ony m SLI P:

32

PRI NCI PLES OF W
AR

S L -

Si mul t anei t y and Dept h of At t ack
Logi st i cs

I

I nf or mat i on Domi nanc e

-

P -

Pr eci si on Tar get i ng

Si mul t anei t y and Dept h of At t ack
W
hen bat t l i ng a NAST[ , i t i s best t o st r i ke f ast and si mul t aneousl y at al l key enemy asset s t o st un and par al yze hi s f or ces
t o def eat t hem i n t he shor t est t i me possi bl e . Si mul t aneous
st r i kes t hr oughout t he ent i r e bat t l espace may be enough t o r ob
hi m of muc h or al l of hi s W
MD capabi l i t y, and r educe hi s
of f ensi ve pot ent i al .
As t he US Ar my Tr ai ni ng and Doct r i ne Command st at es i n
i t s concept of oper at i ons f or t he ear l y t went y- f i r st cent ur y,
" The r el at i onshi p bet ween f i r e and maneuv er may under go a
t r ansf or mat i on as ar mi es wi t h hi gh t echnol ogy pl ace i ncr easi ng
emphasi s on si mul t aneous st r i kes t hr oughout t he bat t l e space .
Maneuv er f or ces may be mas s ed f or shor t er per i ods of t i me . " 34
Ar my doct r i ne al so not es t hat " dept h and si mul t aneous
at t ack may be a key char act er i st i c of f ut ur e Amer i c an mi l i t ar y
oper at i ons . These oper at i ons wi l l r edef i ne t he cur r ent i deas of
deep, cl ose, and r ear . " 35 I ndeed, s uc h par al l el war or hy per war
st r i kes bl ur t he di st i nct i on bet ween t he st r at egi c, oper at i onal ,
and t act i cal l evel s of oper at i ons and t end t o bl end t hemi nt o one .
Recent ef f ect i veness of si mul t aneous oper at i ons conduct ed
acr oss t he f ul l l engt h, br eadt h, and hei ght of t he bat t l e space
have l ed t o qui ck vi ct or i es i n Gr enada, Panama, and t he Gul f .
Deser t St or m, f or exampl e, s howed t hat " deep bat t l e has
advanced beyond t he concept of at t acki ng t he enemy' s f ol l ow- on
f or ces i n a sequent i al appr oach t o s hape t he cl ose bat t l e t o one
of si mul t aneous at t ack t o st un, t hen r api dl y def eat t he enemy . " 3s
Col onel J ohn War den I I I , one of t he ar chi t ect s of t he ai r
c ampai gn t hat def eat ed I r aq i n t he 1991 Gul f War , suggest s
t hat near - si mul t aneous par al l el war f ar e st r i kes agai nst key
enemy l eader shi p, syst em essent i al s, i nf r ast r uct ur e, popul at i on
cent er s, and f i el ded mi l i t ar y f or ces may i mpose st r at egi c or
oper at i onal par al ysi s on hi m, l eadi ng t o hi s r api d def eat - 37
War den not es t he i mpact of t he f ast - paced US par al l el ai r st r i kes
on t he 1991 def eat of I r aq:

33

BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE

I n I r aq, a count r y about t he s ame si ze as pr ewar Ger many , so
many key f aci l i t i es suf f er ed so muc h damage so qui ckl y t hat i t
was si mpl y not possi bl e t o mak e st r at egi cal l y meani ngf ul
r epai r . Nor was i t possi bl e or ver y usef ul t o concent r at e
def enses ; successf ul def ense of one t ar get mer el y meant t hat
one out of over a hundr ed di dn' t get hi t at t hat par t i cul ar t i me .
Li ke t he t hous and cut s anal ogy, i t j ust doesn' t mat t er ver y
muc h i f s ome of t he cut s ar e def l ect ed . I t i s i mpor t ant t o not e
t hat I r aq was a ver y t ough count r y st r at egi cal l y . I r aq had spent
an enor mous amount of money and ener gy on gi vi ng i t sel f l ot s
of pr ot ect i on and r edundanc y and i t s ef f or t s woul d have pai d
of f wel l i f i t had been at t acked ser i al l y as i t had ever y r i ght t o
ant i ci pat e i t woul d . I n ot her wor ds, t he par al l el at t ack agai nst
I r aq was agai nst what may wel l hav e been t he count r y best
pr epar ed i n al l t he wor l d f or at t ack. I f i t wor k ed t her e, i t wi l l
pr obabl y wor k el sewher e . 38

Thus, t he exper i ence of t he 1991 Gul f War i s t hat par al l el
war f ar e can be deci si ve si nce r egi onal adver sar i es ar e l i kel y t o
hav e a r el at i vel y smal l number of vi t al st r at egi c t ar get s,
est i mat ed by Col onel War den at " i n t he nei ghbor hood of a f ew
hundr ed wi t h t he aver age of per haps 10 ai mpoi nt s per vi t al
t ar get . " 39 These enemy asset s " t end t o be smal l ( i n number ) , ver y
expensi ve, have f ew backups, and ar e har d t o r epai r . I f a
si gni f i cant per cent age of t hem ar e st r uck i n par al l el , t he damage
bec omes i nsuper abl e . " 40
Of cour se, t her e may be count er measur es t hat an adver sar y
mi ght t ake t o of f set t he possi bi l i t i es of si mul t aneous al l i ed ai r
st r i kes acr oss t he bat t l espace of a maj or r egi onal conf l i ct . 41
Ef f or t s mi ght be t ak en t o ( 1) di sgui se, di ver si f y and
" demassi f y" t he key pol i t i cal - mi l i t ar y- economi c asset s t o mak e
t hem l ess l ucr at i ve t ar get s, ( 2) hi de, har den, or put on mobi l e
l auncher s, W
MD asset s t o r educe t hei r vul ner abi l i t y, ( 3)
empl oy AND agai nst al l i ed bases f r om whi c h par al l el at t acks
ar e bei ng l aunched, ( 4) at t ack al l i ed C4 I and empl oy var i ous
f or ms of " i nf o war " t o conf use, di sor gani ze, and mi sl ead al l i ed
c ommander s and " psychol ogi cal war f ar e" t o r educe al l i ed
mor al e and i nf l uence t he publ i cs of t he Uni t ed St at es and i t s
al l i es t o under mi ne pol i t i cal suppor t f or t he war .
Logi st i cs
W
hen dr af t i ng t he or i gi nal l i st of pr i nci pl es of war , Gener al
Ful l er f ai l ed t o i dent i f y t he ov er whel mi ng i mpor t anc e of

34

I ncr easi ngl y. I ndeed. super i or l ogi st i cs bec omes t he engi ne t hat al l ows Amer i c an mi l i t ar y f or ces t o r each an enemy f r om al l poi nt s of t he gl obe and ar r i ve r eady t o f i ght . I n t he new st yl e of war . r econst i t ut e. i n t ur n. or ai r man and t hei r equi pment as t hey ent er and f i ght maj or r egi onal conf l i ct s . MRCs and MOOTW s bot h r equi r e a f or ce. or sust ai n t he sol di er .si mul t aneous maj or r egi onal conf l i ct s ( MRCs) and par t i ci pat i ng i n a number of mi l i t ar y oper at i ons ot her t han war ( MOOTWas wel l . f i x. mobi l i ze. " 43 As a r ecent anal ysi s of t he US Ar my i n t he Gul f War not es. and get s t hemhome agai n . maneuv er . move. " For get l ogi st i cs and you l ose . The act of bui l di ng t he l ogi st i cs i nf r ast r uct ur e dur i ng Des er t Shi el d cr eat ed an at mospher e of domi nat i on and a sense of i nevi t abl e def eat among t he I r aqi s l ong bef or e t he shoot i ng war began . Wi t hout pr oper l ogi st i cs i t woul d be i mpossi bl e t o man. " 44 One st udent of t hat conf l i ct has obser ved : The I r aqi Ar my st ood by and wat c hed on t el evi si on as t he Amer i c an Ar my assembl ed a sophi st i cat ed c ombat f or ce i n f r ont of t hem wi t h ef f i ci ency and di spat ch . 45 A successf ul bui l dup of US and al l i ed f or ces and suppl i es at t he i ncept i on of a maj or r egi onal conf l i ct coul d. US f or ces have been sent t o ot her count r i es and r egi ons of t he wor l d i n t he t went i et h cent ur y al one .pr oj ect i on l ogi st i cal syst em t hat has " t he demonst r at ed abi l i t y t o r api dl y al er t .AR PRI NCI PLES OF W ef f ect i ve l ogi st i cs t o t he suppor t of f i ght i ng f or ces as t hey mobi l i ze. depend upon t he ear l y depl oyment of an ef f ect i ve mul t i l ayer ed 35 . ar m. and demobi l i ze . " 42 On mor e t han 230 occasi ons. l ogi st i cs wi l l pl ay an i mpor t ant par t i n whet her US and al l i ed f or ces get t o t he bat t l e i n t i me and whet her t hey wi l l pr edomi nat e when t hey ar r i ve . f uel . As one US Ar my gener al has put i t . sai l or . l ogi st i cs uni t s do mor e t han sust ai n f or ces i n t he f i el d . depl oy and oper at e anywher e i n t he wor l d . I n cont r ast . depl oy. " t he st r engt h of t he l ogi st i cs engi ne det er mi nes t he pace at whi c h an i nt er veni ng f or ce mak es i t sel f secur e . Thi s i s especi al l y t r ue now t hat f ewer US t r oops ar e st at i oned abr oad whi l e st i l l r esponsi bl e f or st andi ng r eady t o wi n t wo near . sust ai ns t hem. Logi st i cs get s t hem t her e. dr i bbl i ng f or ces i nt o a t heat er by ai r or sea r ai ses t he r i sk of def eat i n det ai l . Speed of cl osur e and bui l dup nat ur al l y i ncr eases t he psychol ogi cal st at ur e of t he depl oyi ng f or ce and r educes t he r i sk of dest r uct i on t o t hose f or ces t hat depl oy f i r st . wi t hdr aw.

depl oy ment out si de of enemy r ange. or di ver si t y of suppl y pat hs i n or der t o avoi d def eat . ef f i ci ent di st r i but i on depends on an i nver t ed pyr ami d of di st r i but i on . Thi s al so means f l at t eni ng 36 . One of t he ai r c ommander s of t he Gul f W ar al so emphasi zes t he i mpor t ance of i nf or mat i on at t he st r at egi c and oper at i onal l evel s . or sea) i s a t ough admi ni st r at i ve pr obl em ev en i n peac et i me . He not es t hat I n t he Gul f War . whi l e t he Uni t ed St at es and i t s al l i es may be abl e t o handl e a NASTI r egi me s uc h as I r aq i n 1991. Cl ear f or t he f ut ur e i s t he r equi r ement t o r edesi gn our or gani zat i ons so t hey ar e bui l t t o expl oi t moder n i nf or mat i on. Suppl i es of al l oper at i onal commodi t i es mus t be accumul at ed i n one or t wo l ocat i ons. chemi cal l y ar med r eent r y vehi cl es. const ant mobi l i t y. sur f ace f or ces and l ogi st i cal suppor t uni t s ar e f r agi l e at t he oper at i onal l evel of war . As Col War den has war ned. 4s I n shor t . A US Ar my st udy pr edi ct s t hat " ef f ect i ve i nf or mat i on oper at i ons wi l l mak e bat t l espace 47srqponmlSuch. f ood. t he coal i t i on depr i ved I r aq of mos t of i t s abi l i t y t o gat her and us e i nf or mat i on . ev en t hough i t was or gani zed i n t he s ame way Fr eder i ck t he Gr eat had or gani zed hi msel f . At t hat poi nt .handl i ng equi pment . har d. especi al l y agai nst hi ghl y ar med chal l enger s . and ammuni t i on . i s t he goal . di sper si on of uni t s. pr eempt i v e st r i kes. and r el at i vel y cheap.det ect cr ui se mi ssi l es . t hen par sed out t o t wo or f our l ocat i ons. Suppor t i ng si gni f i cant number s of sur f ace f or ces ( ai r . The nodes i n t he s y s t emar e except i onal l y vul ner abl e t o pr eci si on at t ack. t he coal i t i on managed i t s own i nf or mat i on r equi r ement s accept abl y.t o. f uel . By necessi t y.BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE ai r and mi ssi l e def ense and ai r super i or i t y over t he bat t l e zone . i n t he f ut ur e i t may be deal i ng wi t h adver sar i es t hat hav e mas t er ed t he bui l di ng of accur at e bal l i st i c mi ssi l es. def enses. and so on unt i l t hey event ual l y r each t he user . MRC f or ces and t hei r l ogi st i cs t ai l s had bet t er r educe t hei r vul ner abi l i t i es by appl i cat i on of det er r ence. t r anspar ent t o us and opaque t o our opponent s . zyxwvut kjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJI at HGFEDCBA l east . l and. At t he s ame t i me. nucl ear war heads . Success depends upon ef f i ci ent di st r i but i on of i nf or mat i on. I nf or mat i on Domi nanc e The i mpor t ance of wi nni ng t he i nf or mat i on war shoul d be a gui di ng pr i nci pl e of war s of t he f ut ur e .

Suddenl y. pushi ng deci si on mak i ng t o ver y l ow l evel s. Now " one bomb.117 st eal t h f i ght er . wi t h a st eal t hy pr eci si on at t ack t wo days l at er . j ust a f ew wi l l do t he j ob t oday wi t h muc h gr eat er cer t ai nt y t han t he i mpr eci se mas s ed at t acks of yest er day . The c ombi ned adv ant ages of st eal t h t ec hnol ogy and pr eci si on gui ded mi ssi l es c an be s een by c ompar i ng a convent i onal bombi ng at t ack i n t he 1991 Gul f War . Capt ur i ng and expl oi t i ng t he dat aspher e may wel l be t he mos t i mpor t ant ef f or t i n many f ut ur e war s . and f or mi ng wor l dwi de neur al net wor ks t o capi t al i ze on t he abi l i t y of uni t s i n and out of t he di r ect conf l i ct ar ea .PRI NCI PLES OF W AR or gani zat i ons. t he Baghdad Nucl ear Resear ch Cent er .bomber s suppor t ed by j ust t wo t anker s . Fai l ur e t o do so made Saddam' s j ob muc h easi er and gr eat l y r educed t he chance of hi s over t hr ow. MRC l ogi st i cs ar e si mpl i f i ed si nce a f i ni t e number of pr eci si on weapons c an now be us ed t o dest r oy a set of t ar get s r at her t han t he massi ve quant i t i es of " dumb" weapons t hat woul d ot her wi s e be needed t o accompl i sh t he s ame mi ssi on . 48 The i nf or mat i on l esson f r om t he Gul f was negat i ve . el i mi nat i ng mos t mi ddl e management . 5 o 37 . t hi s t ar get was successf ul l y dest r oyed usi ng j ust ei ght F. per haps f ew or no t ar get s dest r oyed . wi t h gr eat pr eci si on. Two days l at er . 49 Pr eci si on Tar get i ng Anot her pr i nci pl e of war f l owi ng f r om t echni cal i nnovat i ons i s t he domi nance i mpar t ed by usi ng pr eci si on gui ded weapons . agai nst t he s ame t ar get . but t he coal i t i on f ai l ed t o f i l l t he voi d by pr ovi di ng I r aqi s wi t h an al t er nat i ve sour ce of i nf or mat i on . near l y al l i mpor t ant f i xed t ar get s c an be dest r oyed i n a c ampai gn . one t ar get dest r oyed" i s mor e t he nor m i nst ead of " hundr eds of bombs . I nst ead of havi ng t o f i r e t housands of bombs and mi ssi l es at t ar get s. 16 f i ght er escor t s. The convent i onal ai r at t ack f ai l ed t o dest r oy t he t ar get even t hough i t used 32 bomb. and 15 t anker ai r cr af t . t he coal i t i on succeeded i n br eaki ng I r aq' s abi l i t y t o pr ocess i nf or mat i on. 12 ai r cr af t f or suppr essi on of I r aqi ai r def enses. " Thi s hel ps i n pl anni ng a successf ul c ampai gn and i n execut i ng i t .dr oppi ng ai r cr af t .

t hese pr i nci pl es of war c an be usef ul way s t o t hi nk about how t o sol ve t he pr obl em f aci ng a c ommander whos e f or ce i s opposed by a NASTI . l ow. 5 I I ndeed. 38 .i nt ensi t y count er guer r i l l a war f ar e i s pr osecut ed di f f er ent l y t han mor e convent i onal bat t l e. as f ought i n t he 1991 Gul f War . or i ni t i at i ve . and bot h mi ght be f ought di f f er ent l y i n f ut ur e war s . I n t he end. t empo. However . They cannot subst i t ut e f or j udgment . concr et e mast er y of det ai l s. .BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE Conc l us i ons Ther e ar e many ot her pr i nci pl es of war t hat mi ght be f or mul at ed t o appl y t o di f f er ent ki nds of engagement s . Under st andi ng of t hese pr i nci pl es can add t o t he commander ' s under st andi ng of how t o conduct war f ar e. war agai ns t a NASTI i s f ar di f f er ent f r om par t i ci pat i ng i n mi l i t ar y oper at i ons ot her t han war s uc h as UN peac e oper at i ons . i nsi ght s i nt o t he enemy. Nor c an t hey be appl i ed by r ot e or as par t of a checkl i st . and cohesi on) i n addi t i on t o Ful l er ' s or i gi nal l i st of ni ne pr i nci pl es of war . t he c ommander and hi s subor di nat es st i l l mus t br i ng a dept h of exper i ence. Fur t her . One schol ar has l i st ed over one hundr ed pr i nci pl es of war t hat have been advocat ed by mi l i t ar y t hi nker s si nce t he t i me of Sun Tz u . such a set of pr i nci pl es ar e not i nf al l i bl e gui des t o act i on . and an under st andi ng of mi l i t ar y af f ai r s t hat r eaches wel l bey ond s uc h gener al pr i nci pl es . For ex ampl e. l ogi st i cs. 52 A r evi ew of t he pr i nci pl es of war t hat per t ai n t o a f ut ur e conf l i ct wi t h an enemy equi pped wi t h advanced convent i onal ar ms and mas s dest r uct i on weapons c an pr ovi de a bet t er under st andi ng of how t o oper at e on t he f ut ur e bat t l ef i el d . and a r evi ew of t hem c an r emi nd hi m of f undament al s t o obser ve. Never t hel ess. i mpr ovi sat i on. For one t hi ng t hey ar e s omewhat abst r act and r equi r e j udgment i n appl i cat i on t o speci f i c cases . i n 1984 US Ai r For ce doct r i ne r ec ommended f our gui del i nes ( t i mi ng. Some i n t he r ecent past have ar gued f or t he i ncl usi on of t he concept of det er r ence as a separ at e pr i nci pl e of conf l i ct management . but s uc h appl i cat i on of t hese pr i nci pl es by t hemsel ves i s not suf f i ci ent f or vi ct or y .

See al so.5. Of f ensi ve. t hi s pr i nci pl e suggest s t hat t he nat i on shoul d commi t . i nt er f er e wi t h space. Samuel B.t i me capabi l i t y t o del i ver s uc h weapons acr oss i nt er cont i nent al di st ances by ai r cr af t and mi ssi l es .15 . 4 . The s ame poi nt was made sever al t hous and year s ago by Sun Tz u . The advant ages of achi evi ng l ocal super i or i t y. The Ar t of War . or be pr epar ed t o commi t . Sept ember 1993. 1 . Wor l d W ar I .PRI NCI PLES OF W AR Not es 1 .1. The ear l i er wor k done on war s of ant i qui t y. wi t h Ref er ence t o t he Campai gns of 1914. a hi gh. 2 . 1963) . Rogue st at es whos e mi l i t ar y f or ces ar e equi pped wi t h W MD and means of del i ver i ng t hem on t ar get s may i nt er f er e wi t h hi ghl y sophi st i cat ed new st r at egi es and t echnol ogi es devel oped by t he Uni t ed St at es and i t s al l i es . I bi d . t he Amer i c an ci vi l war . wi dt h of t he bat t l ef r ont . vol . " Jour nal of t he Royal Uni t ed Ser vi ce I nst i t ut i on. USA.1915. Mar c h 1992. Thei r char t on " The Ex panded Bat t l ef i el d" t r aces t he densi t y of t r oop depl oyment . t r ans . 1 and 2. Es s ay B. See Sun Tzu. 98 . F. and Dal e Hi l l i n t hi s vol ume . " I n t he st r at egi c cont ext . Wor l d W ar I I . Sur pr i se. Ec onomy of For ce. and dept h of t he bat t l e space i n war s f r omant i qui t y t o t he 1991 Gul f W ar . " See al so AFM 1. Ri char d Bl anchf i el d. C. Ful l er ci t ed seven pr i nci pl es of war : Obj ect i ve. 1990 edi t i on. " Land War f ar e i n t he 21st Cent ur y. Basi c Aer ospace Doct r i ne of t he Uni t ed St at es Ai r For ce. 3 . 6 . . Thi s mi l l i onf ol d i ncr ease i n expl osi ve capabi l i t y bet ween 1945 and 1950 was augment ed by t he f i r st . 7 . a pr eponder ance of nat i onal power t o t hose r egi ons or ar eas of t he wor l d wher e t he t hr eat t o nat i onal secur i t y i nt er est s i s gr eat est . 5 .bombs .77 . The H. 1. See Ai r For ce Manual ( AFM) 1. Oper at i ons. t he US mi l i t ar y dr opped Cooper at i on as a pr i nci pl e of war and subst i t ut ed Si mpl i ci t y and Command Uni t y . 22 . Febr uar y 1916 . Sul l i van and Col J ames M. W MD may l evel t he pl ayi ng f i el d . Napol eoni c war s. " Mi l i t ar y Revi ew. Cooper at i on . " The Pr i nci pl es of War . 173. Mas s ed l ocal f or ces wer e nowt ar get abl e by W MD del i ver ed acr oss i nt er cont i nent al r anges . " Pr i nci pl es of War .al t i t ude nucl ear EMP bur st may dest r oy al l i ed communi cat i ons. J . i mpede t he di gi t al i zat i on of t he bat t l ef i el d. " Pr i nci pl es of War . Ful l er . For a di f f er ent vi ew see t he chapt er on " The Revol ut i on i n Mi l i t ar y Af f ai r s" by Jef f r ey McKi t t r i ck. 61. Gr i f f i t h ( London : Oxf or d Uni ver si t y Pr ess. even i f out number ed over al l . For exampl e. Secur i t y.bomb f usi on weapons t hat f ol l owed car r i ed an expl osi ve yi el d a t hous and t i mes mor e power f ul t han t he ear l i er A. and ser ve as a f or m of i nf or mat i on war f ar e i n i t s cr udest f or m. vol . Geor ge Kr aus. and t he 39 . The pr i nci pl e of mas s can al so be appl i ed at t he gr and st r at egi c l evel . bl i nd al l i ed pr eci si on st r i ke f or ces t o new t ar get s. Appendi x A. " Ar my Fi el d Manual ( FM) 100. " 9. J ames Bl ackwel l . Lat er . Dubi k.1. Fr ed Li t t l epage. i s not a new i dea . Gen Gor don R. Mass. The RMA br ought about by t he i nt r oduct i on of NBC and mi ssi l e syst ems i nt o a t heat er of war may pr edomi nat e over t he ef f ect s of ot her st r at egi es and t echnol ogi es .based r econnai ssance. 174 . The Manhat t an Pr oj ect pr ovi ded a f i ssi on weapon i n 1945 t hat was over a t housand t i mes mor e power f ul per uni t wei ght t han a TNT war head of equi val ent wei ght .

9 . mor e br oadl y.21 . and Maj Rober t C.41 . FM100.1. 20 . Vi r gi ni a : Her o Books. " Mi l i t ar y Revi ew. . and Doct r i ne Command ( TRADOC) . 173 . US Ar my W ar Col l ege.Di mensi on Oper at i ons f or Ear l y ' t went y. " One Tar get . shi ps. bi ol ogi cal or chemi cal weapons i n ot her r egi ons of t he wor l d . t hat " devel opment s i n war f ar e ar e r educi ng t he r ol e of maj or pl at f or ms. no . For one t hi ng. J une 10. I ndeed t hi s has hi st or i cal l y been a US posi t i on at t he Uni t ed Nat i ons t o puni sh nucl ear f i r st use agai nst NPT member s . 14 . 37 . so s uc h an act i on woul d be a f l agr ant vi ol at i on of i nt er nat i onal l aw. 10 . . Fur t her . Dec ember 16 . Mor eover . Tr ai ni ng Oper at i ons : A Concept f or t he St r at egi c Ar my of t he 1993. 1980) . 1990. Or t on. US Ar my. AFM1. woul d undoubt edl y ar ouse wor l d opi ni on agai nst US pol i cy. Mazaar not es. 20 . The wor l dwi de r eact i on t o t he Uni t ed St at es usi ng nucl ear weapons on a r egi onal enemy.71 . " What ' s f or t he Ar med For ces.Fi r st Cent ur y. Ar my Chemi cal School . 5 . mak i ng t he Uni t ed St at es a par i ah st at e i n many mor e quar t er s . USA. For a number of r easons. USAF. woul d be negat i ve i n t he ext r eme and coul d unhi nge al l ot her US di pl omat i c and mul t i l at er al ef f or t s t o count er t he spr ead of nucl ear . USA. Sept ember 1993. " Summar y Eval uat i on : Repor t f or Combi ned Ar ms i n a Nucl ear / Chemi cal Envi r onment ( CANE) For ce Devel opment Test and Exper i ment at i on. 66 . " For ce XXI t he Evol ut i on of Ful l . The Evol ut i on of Weapons and War f ar e ( Fai r f ax. t he pr ef er r ed i nst r ument f or di sar mi ng t he adver sar y ver y l i kel y shoul d be adv anc ed convent i onal weapons . woul d shat t er t he nonnucl ear i nt er nat i onal t aboo t hat t he Uni t ed St at es has 40 . I bi d . " TRADOC Pamphl et 525. Augus t 1994. Mar c h 1986 . Dupuy . I bi d . " The I mpact of Weapons of Mas s Dest r uct i on on Bat t l ef i el d Oper at i ons. Ar my . 3.heavy gr ound vehi cl es. . 11 . 32 . I bi d . 18 . I bi d . any st at e t hat vi ol at es t hi s code woul d be t aki ng a cour se di amet r i cal l y opposed t o UN Secur i t y Counci l pl edges t o puni sh s uc h vi ol at or s . Jer emi ah. Pennsyl vani a. 16 . 21 . I t woul d not be unexpect ed t o see Amer i cans and US pr oper t y assaul t ed al l ar ound t he gl obe i n r et al i at i on . 33. I bi d . N. " Joi nt For ce Quar t er l y. I t woul d be i nadvi sabl e i n al most al l cont i ngenci es t o use US nucl ear weapons i n count er f or ce st r i kes agai nst enemy weapons of mas s dest r uct i on . " See al so Adm. 19 . 15 . US nucl ear f i r st use i n a r egi onal war . even agai nst a NASTI . . vol . 17 . Appendi x A. Mi chael Mazaar . Neumann. 18 . I bi d . 68 . l ar ge capi t al Ahead 13 . Davi d E. 1 . par t i cul ar l y i f us ed f i r st . 8 .5. " The Revol ut i on i n Mi l i t ar y Af f ai r s : A Fr amewor k f or Def ense Pl anni ng. US nucl ear f i r st use. Thi s sour ce was ci t ed i n an ar t i cl e by Maj Gen Rober t D. " St r at egi c St udi es I nst i t ut e. and advanced ai r cr af t .BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE Oct ober W ar was f ound i n Col T. Lt Col Edwar d Mann. Mann.5. One Bomb : I s t he Pr i nci pl e of Mas s Dead?" Mi l i t ar y Revi ew. 21 . I ndeed. 68. nucl ear st r i kes agai nst a st at e t hat had si gned t he NPT ar e i l l egal under t he t r eat y. 1994. I ndeed. Car l i sl e Bar r acks. . 12 . . Phase 1. 1 ( Summer 1993) . even agai nst a NASTI .

41 . . " chapt er 2. I bi d . 000 . I bi d .6 . and i n Wor l d W ar I I . J ohn A. t hey may have won t he ai r bat t l e over Engl and .8 . 2. I bi d . as quot ed i n Col Mi chael S. i n Vi et nam t he number was 53. 31 . . . Wi l l i ams and Lt Col Her man T. I bi d . Edi t or i n Chi ef . 32 . " 2. 30. t he Ger man hi gh c ommand mi st akenl y abandoned t hei r ear l y bombar dment of t hem i n t he Bat t l e of Br i t ai n because t hey bel i eved t hat t he Br i t i sh woul d be abl e t o r epai r t hem and put t hem bac k i nt o oper at i on ver y qui ckl y . USA. 41 . I bi d . FM 100.6 .l aunched bal l i st i c or cr ui se mi ssi l e . 40 . f or exampl e. " Appendi x A: Pr i nci pl es of War . " 2. s uc h a pol i cy of nucl ear f i r st use coul d al so cause a col l apse of US domest i c suppor t f or t he r egi onal war ef f or t t hat woul d pr obabl y r i val or exceed t he ant i war act i vi t i es i nsi de t he Uni t ed St at es dur i ng t he Vi et nam War per i od . 35 . FM 100. I n Kor ea. 29 . See Chest er Wi l mot . . 43 .55 .9 . Had t he Ger mans per si st ed. " The Uses of Mi l i t ar y Power . see t he J une 1993 edi t i on of FM 100. 34 . 20. 26 . one f ear of US st r at egi st s was t he nucl ear decapi t at i on st r i ke f r om t he Sovi et Uni on. 1984 . " I nvi t at i on t o a Nucl ear Beheadi ng. " Davi d and Gol i at h. Fr anks. For a si mi l ar comment ar y. " Mi l i t ar y Revi ew. " Ai r Power f or t he Twent y.Fi r st Cent ur y. " t ext of r emar ks by t he secr et ar y of def ense t o t he Nat i onal Pr ess Cl ub. Wei nber ger . t he Uni t ed St at es was r epor t ed t o have l ost 35. Al abama : Ai r Uni ver si t y Pr ess.75 . Gen Fr eder i ck M.Pr oj ect i on Logi st i cs. 28 . 24 . 175 . 39 . 37 . " For ce XXI Oper at i ons. 177 . War den I I I . 174. Fi nal l y. 36 . 42 . " 176 . ) 33. Fi ght i ng f or Peace : Seven Cr i t i cal Year s i n t he Pent agon ( New Yor k : War ner Books. 311. Thi s i s i ncl uded i n t he appendi x t o Wei nber ger ' s book.5. J une 1993. 000 . 23 . 1990) 441 . 1952. I bi d . " For ce XXI Oper at i ons. 3.shor e sea. no . Nov ember 28. " i n Kar l P.32 .PRI NCI PLES OF W AR at t empt ed t o f ost er wi t h t r eat i es and di pl omacy f or decades . Chal l enge and Res pons e: Ant i ci pat i ng US Mi l i t ar y Secur i t y Concer ns ( Maxwel l AFB. " Par al l el War and Hy per war : I s Ever y Want a Weak nes s ?" See el sewher e i n t hi s v ol ume . " Acr oss The Boar d. 3. 33 . 38 . Col Ri char d Szaf r anski . 29.4 t o 2. 000 t r oops ki l l ed i n c ombat . per haps by an of f . Not r eal i zi ng t he pot ency and i mpor t anc e of Br i t i sh r adar st at i ons.11 . . I bi d . . Augus t 1994) 328.5.9 . Thi s was t r ue. War den. FM 100. 27 .5.29 . 2. I f t he f i r st engagement i s deci si ve enough. 325 . USAF. 327 . Pal mer . Jr . . of t he Uni t ed St at es' s i nt er vent i on agai nst t he Nor i ega r egi me i n Panama . 22 . Dur i ng t he col d war . 7 ( Jul y/ August 1983) : 9. See Bar r y R Schnei der . I bi d . t he conf l i ct may be over al most bef or e i t has begun . Magyar . . J une 1994.5. 330. 176 . 25 . The St r uggl e f or Eur ope ( New Yor k : Har per Col ophon Books. Caspar W .16 . " For ce.

50 . 45 . 46 .26 . S. 47 . Col l i ns. Al ger . 1994) . Nov ember . " For ce XXI Oper at i ons. Cer t ai n Vi ct or y : The U.BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE 44 . . " Ai r Uni ver si t y Revi ew. Mann. 48 . 378 .17. Li ddel l Har t . USA. . and t he mor al hi gh gr ound . 2. Ger man ar my. r econnai ssance.Dec ember 1979. vol . shock. Conn .30 . Scal es. si mul t anei t y. 376 . f i r e super i or i t y. f l exi bi l i t y. Fr ench ar my. . Thes e gui del i nes i ncl uded. Es s ay B : " Pr i nci pl es of W ar . f avor abl e gr ound cover . " 14 . 329. di ver se max i ms on t he need f or cooper at i on. Reed et al . Mao Ts e. Gen Rober t H. Machi avel l i . For a s ummar y di scussi on see AFM 1. 38 . Al ger dr ew on t he mi l i t ar y wr i t i ngs of t hi nker s s uc h as Sun Tzu. Jomi ni . vi t al i t y. Ar my i n t he Gul f War ( For t Leavenwor t h. 328 . J ohn I . 52 . War den. 1982) . Mont gomer y. 49 . : Gr eenwood Pr ess. " Ai r Uni ver si t y Revi ew. Mahan. The or i gi nal sour ces ar e Col Rober t H.. and US Ar my and Ai r For ce i n compi l i ng hi s l i st of pr i nci pl es of war . War den. Mac Dougal l . 2.1. l ocal super i or i t y. pur sui t . as wel l as t he Br i t i sh ar my. " Pr i nci pl es of Det er r ence. God' s bl essi ng. and J ohn M. " On Det er r ence : A Br oadened Per spect i ve. " 3. f or ex ampl e.June 1975. Kans as : US Ar my Command and Gener al St af f Col l ege Pr ess. 17.21 . I bi d . I bi d . 51 . a wi l l t o wi n. St eel e. Roc quanc our t .t ung. The Ques t f or Vi ct or y : The Hi st or y of t he Pr i nci pl es of War ( West por t . May. r eadi ness. ai r super i or i t y. an i ndi r ect appr oach.

an RMA i s def i ned as a f undament al change. At ot her t i mes. and sea. and t echni cal capabi l i t i es acr oss al l oper at i ng medi ums.economi c devel opment s . Somet i mes oper at i onal i nnovat i ons c hange war f ar e. i nf l i ct i ng st r at egi c par al ysi s on t he enemy . t he r ei nf or cement and i nt egr at i on of mi l i t ar y oper at i onal . t her e have been dr amat i c i ncr eases i n t he abi l i t y t o st r i ke st r at egi c t ar get s . J ames Bl ackwel l . i nf or mat i on war f ar e. and even soci o. t he combi ned [ coal i t i on] ai r f or ces pr osecut ed 150 st r at egi c t ar get s. " t he US 8t h Ai r For ce pr osecut ed onl y 50 st r at egi c t ar get s dur i ng t he cour se of t he ent i r e year .ai r .Over vi ew: New Er a War f ar e? A Revol ut i on i n Mi l i t ar y Af f ai r s? Ar e we cur r ent l y l i vi ng t hr ough a " r evol ut i on i n mi l i t ar y af f ai r s?" Sever al of our aut hor s i n t hi s book ar gue t hat t hi s i s t he case . and space war f ar e. " s uc h as l ong. ar e al so emer gi ng . Soci et al changes s uc h as Napol eon' s Levee en Mas s e al so can cont r i but e t o RMAs .qui ckl y di sr upt i ng or dest r oyi ng 43 . Somet i mes an RMA i s dr i ven by t echnol ogi cal i nnovat i on. " I n 25 mor e year s.i ndeed. " I n 1943. or di scont i nui t y. I n t he f i r st 24 hour s of Deser t St or m. Fr ed Li t t l epage. s uc h as t he i nt r oduct i on of nucl ear weapons at t he end of Wor l d War I I . domi nat i ng maneuver . an RMA may be cr eat ed by a combi nat i on of devel opment s. ar gues t hat we hav e been i n t he mi dst of an i nt egr at ed RMA si nce t he st ar t of t he Gul f W ar and t hat i t i s accel er at i ng . or gani zat i on.r ange pr eci si on st r i kes. Fur t her mor e. t he Ger man bl i t zkr i eg . " wr i t es t he SAI C t eam. The essay by Jef f r ey McKi t r i ck. Ri char d Bl anchf i el d and Dal e Hi l l . I nf or mat i on war f ar e const i t ut es anot her r evol ut i onar y aspect of t he new er a war f ar e. l and. anal yst s at t he Sci ence Appl i cat i ons I nt er nat i onal Cor por at i on ( SAI C) . i t may be possi bl e t o st r i ke as many as 500 t o 1000 t ar get s i n t he f i r st f ew mi nut es of a campai gn. i n t he way mi l i t ar y st r at egy and oper at i ons hav e been pl anned and conduct ed . What i s a r evol ut i on i n mi l i t ar y af f ai r s ( RMA) ? For our pur poses.f ol d i ncr ease over 1943 capabi l i t i es . Geor ge Kr aus.a t housand. t hey ar gue t hat " new war f ar e ar eas.f or exampl e. t echni cal . Regar di ng deep pr eci si on st r i ke. The SAI C anal yst s c ont end t hat t he c ur r ent RMA i s char act er i zed by an i nt egr at i on of oper at i onal .

Spac e war f ar e i ncl udes aspect s of t he ot her t hr ee emer gi ng war f ar e ar eas. 500 year s ago . we mus t pr epar e f or war s i n whi ch bal l i st i c mi ssi l es ar e us ed agai nst our own t r oops and as t er r or weapons . Gen Char l es Homer al so bel i eves we have ent er ed a per i od wher e new t echnol ogi es c an change t he manner i n whi c h we f i ght war s and c an downgr ade t he val ue of possessi on of nucl ear ar ms . war ni ng. navi gat i on. Speci f i cal l y. we shoul d ai m t o r educe our nucl ear ar senal s t o zer o as we subst i t ut e mi ssi l e def enses f or nucl ear weapons . . we wi l l need t o conduct oper at i ons i n way s t hat i nf l i ct t he mi ni mum number of casual t i es on bot h si des . but has t he pot ent i al t o bec ome a di st i nct war f ar e ar ea of i t s own . I n t he end. i nf or mat i on pr opaganda abi l i t i es. i nt el l i gence. Homer ' s essay concent r at es on t he need f or ef f ect i ve t heat er mi ssi l e def enses ( TMD) and st r ong st r at egi c bal l i st i c mi ssi l e def enses ( BMD) . Homer ar gues t hat mul t i l ayer ed bal l i st i c mi ssi l e def enses wi l l wor k bet t er t han si ngl e t er mi nal . ai r def ense. " Domi nat i ng maneuv er " r ef er s t o t he posi t i oni ng and empl oy ment of f or ces any wher e i n a t heat er so t hat . The SAI C anal yst s concl ude t hat t r ul y r evol ut i onar y ef f ect s i n war f ar e wi l l occur when t wo or mor e of t he new war f ar e ar eas c ombi ne . and have f al l en i nt o t he hands of r ogue st at es .BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE an adver sar y' s c ommand and cont r ol syst em. . and weat her f or ecast i ng . an adver sar y' s cent er of gr avi t y c an be dest r oyed . Thi s of f i cer .phase syst ems s uc h as 44 . r econnai ssance. The aut hor not es how bal l i st i c mi ssi l es and t hei r t echnol ogy ar e pr ol i f er at i ng acr oss t he t hi r d wor l d. mi ssi l e def ense. somet hi ng Sun Tz u advocat ed near l y 2. communi cat i ons. The ef f ect may be t o so domi nat e an adver sar y bef or e conf l i ct st ar t s as t o mak e t he conf l i ct unnecessar y. Spac e war f ar e i nvol ves domi nat i ng t he " hi gh gr ound" of space t o deny i t s advant ages t o t he adver sar y and t o use i t t o i mpl ement one' s own c ommand. cont r ol . i n combi nat i on wi t h pr eci si on st r i ke and i nf or mat i on war f ar e. . Spac e asset s can bec ome a key t o t he f ut ur e di gi t al i zat i on of t he bat t l ef i el d wher e s ome of t he f og and f r i ct i on of war i s r emov ed f or t he si de domi nat i ng space . Addi t i onal l y. and gener al si t uat i onal awar eness . wr i t es t hat Deser t St or mr epr esent s a r evol ut i on i n war f ar e. who l ed t he US and al l i ed ai r oper at i ons i n t he 1991 Per si an Gul f War .

phase def enses . as we bui l d t r ust . s uc h def enses wi l l i nt er di ct t he at t ack at sever al key poi nt s : zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQP " Boost phas e and post . whi c h was t he onl y TMD syst em avai l abl e i n t he Gul f War . For exampl e.phase i nt er cept . and c an t ar get t he r eent r y vehi cl es t hat escaped t he boost . i t ' s at i t s sl owest speed. Howev er cont ends t hat t he Uni t ed St at es coul d begi n mor e ext ensi ve cooper at i on wi t h t he Russi ans by shar i ng i nf or mat i on on war ni ng syst ems.boost phase i nt er cept s.ener gy def ensi ve weapons. cur r ent l y r egi onal ude Ar ea i mpr oved US and Gener al Homer advocat es a st r ong. whi c h i s s ur r ounded by woul d. a si ngl e i nt er cept of a MI RVed syst em ki l l s al l t he weapons wi t h a si ngl e shot . i t f al l s on t he enemy . our al l i es. However . Thi s l ast l i ne of def ense has l ess t i me t o r eact t o t he i ncomi ng r eent r y vehi cl es and i s pr esent l y r est r i ct ed t o ki net i c ki l l or expl osi ve t echni ques f or i nt er cept s si nce t he ear t h' s at mos pher e i nt er f er es wi t h l aser and par t i cl e beam pr oj ect i on .be pr ol i f er at or s . and Russi a. bec aus e t he debr i s c an f al l on t he def ender . " Ter mi nal . 45 . and i f y ou get i t t hen. " Fur t her mor e. Mul t i l ayer ed def enses ar e desi gned t o i nt er cept bal l i st i c mi ssi l e at t acks al l al ong t hei r f l i ght t r aj ect or i es . bef or e t he r eent r y vehi cl es car r yi ng t he war heads c an separ at e and ar e en r out e t o i ndi vi dual t ar get s .mor e danger ous. i t ' s vul ner abl e. A t wo. f i el ded bal l i st i c mi ssi l e def ense syst em f or t he Uni t ed St at es.l ayer ed t heat er mi ssi l e def ense syst em i s pl anned by t he Uni t ed St at es f or f ut ur e maj or conf l i ct s ( MRCs) .based BMD i nt er cept or s . Thi s cont r over si al vi ew of one of t he nat i on' s f or emost mi l i t ar y l eader s has at t r act ed muc h debat e . and. i f t he f i r st t wo l ayer s of def ense do t hei r j ob wel l .Al t i t Def ense ( THAAD) syst em i n combi nat i on wi t h an Pat r i ot t er mi nal def ensi ve syst em. per haps t he Theat er Hi gh. " Mi dcour se i nt er c ept al so desi r abl e because one c an shoot at t he mi ssi l e i n a space envi r onment t hat i nt er f er es l ess wi t h hi gh. t o hel p pr ot ect al l i ed f or ces i n f ut ur e MRCs . mi ght cooper at e i n const r uct i ng shar ed mi ssi l e def enses .NEWERAW ARFARE? Pat r i ot .t he best t i me t o hi t a mi ssi l e because " i t ' s si gnat ur e i s hi gh. t he at t ack wi l l be gr eat l y di l ut ed and wi l l pr esent f ewer t ar get s f or gr ound.

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f or exampl e. i n t he cont ext of US/ Sovi et r el at i ons . Ther e i s al so no doubt about t he f act t hat t he capabi l i t i es of bal l i st i c mi ssi l es ar e i ncr easi ng . ar e not appr eci at ed by muc h of t he wor l d t oday . Edi t ed r emar ks or i gi nal l y del i ver ed by Gen Char l es A. USAF ( Ret . The mi l i t ar y mi ssed t he whol e poi nt i n Deser t St or m. Washi ngt on. c ouc hed i n t he obsol et e t er ms of t he col d war bi pol ar wor l d. f or exampl e. Mar shal l I nst i t ut e.Er a War f ar e Gen Char l es A. Homer . and I sr ael . For mer CI A Di r ect or Wool sey. The t hr eat s posed by bal l i st i c mi ssi l es ar e obvi ous .Chapt er 2 New. sponsor ed by The Mar shal l I nst i t ut e . Al l of us her e t oday have l i ved t he maj or i t y of our adul t l i ves dur i ng t he col d war .f i r st cent ur y we ar e goi ng t o conf r ont i ncr easi ngl y t he t hr eat of bal l i st i c mi ssi l es and t he need f or bal l i st i c. Par t of t he r eason f or t hi s mi sunder st andi ng i s si mpl y our her i t age . But our r eal pr obl em i s not so muc h t he t hr eat i t sel f . W e st i l l ar gue. not ed t hat Nor t h Kor ea has devel oped t hr ee new bal l i st i c mi ssi l es . ) I n t he t went y. Many nat i ons now have t hem. t hat i s. W e us ed t o l ook upon bal l i st i c mi ssi l es i n t er ms of war head si ze and ac c ur ac y ci r cul ar er r or pr obabi l i t y and t he l i k e.mi ssi l e def enses .and cal cul at e t he war head' s i mpac t on t he enemy. but we mi s s ed t he r eal i mpact of t he bal l i st i c mi ssi l e . Bahr ai n. But many of our vi ews on bal l i st i c mi ssi l es. and not al l t hose nat i ons ar e hi ght ech . 47 . but a l ack of under st andi ng about what i s t he t hr eat . C. Hi s speech i s r epr i nt ed her e wi t h t he per mi ssi on of t he Geor ge C. D. whi c h caused us t o l ook at t hi ngs i n st r at egi c t er ms . about t he f ut i l i t y of havi ng bal l i st i c mi ssi l e def enses because i t ' s bad t o def end agai nst mut ual assur ed dest r uct i on . Homer on 19 Jul y 1994 at t he Washi ngt on Roundt abl e on Sci ence and Publ i c Pol i cy. That i s par t i cul ar l y t r ue of Saudi Ar abi a.

i t i s not even i n our best i nt er est s t o spend money on a def ense agai nst t hem. Bal l i st i c mi ssi l es wer e us ed agai nst Rot t er dam and London i n Wor l d War I I . For exampl e. I was wat chi ng a st or y about our st eal t h f i ght er .mi ssi l e def ense car r y heav y pol i t i cal i mpl i cat i ons . s uc h as our Gl obal Posi t i oni ng Sy s t em ( GPS) . i nt o a bal l i st i c mi ssi l e of i nt er cont i nent al r ange . and on our under s t andi ng of t he bal l i st i c mi ssi l e' s own ut i l i t y . The per son l ar gel y r esponsi bl e f or t he st eal t h t echnol ogy on t he F. and t hat si nce def enses agai nst mi ssi l es ar e dest abi l i zi ng. " So t he l esson was t her e t hat bal l i st i c mi ssi l es c an have a l ar ge psychol ogi cal i mpact as wel l as a mi l i t ar y i mpact on a war .2 at t acks . whi c h gi ves nat i ons t he abi l i t y t o t ar get wi t h s ome degr ee of accur acy wi t hout havi ng t o go t hr ough t he s ame cost l y and i nt ense devel opment t hat we had t o go t hr ough t o get t hat syst em oper at i onal . on our f or ces.117 i s an Engl i s hman who had gr own up i n London dur i ng WWI I . but we had f ai l ed t o l ear n t hat l esson . Af t er t he Gul f War . i f we have no money t o s pend on convent i onal def ense. and I was puzzl ed dur i ng Deser t St or m t hat we di dn' t s eem t o be awar e of t hat hi st or y . But i n r eal i t y bal l i st i c mi ssi l es ar e wi t h us. I n t oday' s wor l d t her e i s no r eason why any nat i on can' t put a c ommuni c at i ons sat el l i t e i nt o s pac e .BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE Ther e i s al so a hi st or y we c an r ef er t o r egar di ng t he use of bal l i st i c mi ssi l es. ar e t hi ngs we need t o be concer ned about i n t hi s r egar d .117 . The bal l i st i c mi ssi l e had a pr of ound i mpact on t he coal i t i on nat i ons i n Des er t St or m. Tec hnol ogy t r ansf er s. " I r ecal l t he t er r or i zi ng i mpact of t he V. He sai d. because we have bal l i st i c mi ssi l es. They wer e f ar mor e f ear some t han bomber at t acks . The bal l i st i c mi ssi l e was t he onl y advant age t hat Saddam Hus s ei n had i n t hat war . Bal l i st i c mi ssi l es and bal l i st i c. Ot her t echnol ogi es enhanc e t hi s del i ver y capabi l i t y. we t el l our peopl e t hat i t doesn' t mat t er . t hat bal l i st i c mi ssi l es may have l i t t l e mi l i t ar y val ue but do have gr eat t er r or pot ent i al . and t he capabi l i t y f or l aunc hi ng t hem i s gr owi ng . Ther e ar e al so 48 . wi t h pr oper gui dance. t he F. That s ame capabi l i t y f or l aunc hi ng sat el l i t es can be t r ansf or med. as wel l as l egi t i mat e space l aunches. That ' s t he l esson t hat Saddamt aught us. a t echnol ogy r evol ut i on occur r i ng ever y 18 mont hs t o t wo year s.

and t hey ar e seen as necessar y f or def ense by count r i es s uc h as Saudi Ar abi a and I sr ael . l ook at t hi s exampl e . The wor l d has changed. and new st r esses s uc h as i nt er nat i onal mi gr at i on and envi r onment al degr adat i on. I r aq. I t hought he was r ef er r i ng t o US casual t i es. Thi s i s t he war t hat i s r epl aci ng t he col d war . That i s par t of new. Cer t ai nl y. We' ve seen t est i ng on t he par t of Vi et nam. Ther e i s no doubt . but as he cont i nued t o s peak I r eal i zed he was t al ki ng about t he I r aqi s .er a war f ar e . I f y ou put t hese f act s t oget her wi t h ot her bi g shi f t s. y ou c an wi n t he war on t he bat t l ef i el d yet l ose i t at home bec aus e y ou i nf l i ct ed l ar ge number s of casual t i es on t he enemy or i f t hey i nf l i ct ed l ar ge number s of casual t i es on y ou . Yemen. Cer t ai nl y t her e ar e new st r at egi es bei ng pur sued . Bot h ar e unpopul ar wi t h t he US publ i c . At a Camp Davi d meet i ng i n Sept ember 1990. f or exampl e. bef or e t he Gul f W ar began. I f t he casual t y count i s t oo hi gh. and Af ghani st an ar e al l exampl es . and Syr i a. Kor ea. and t hey ar e t he cor ner st one of def ense f or t he Uni t ed St at es and Russi a. we mus t under st and t hat t he wor l d i s changi ng .ERA WARFARE many nat i ons t hat ar e wi l l i ng t o use bal l i st i c mi ssi l es . and t he capabi l i t y exi st s f or many count r i es t o us e bal l i st i c mi ssi l es . and al so f or count r i es s uc h as I ndi a and Paki st an . Ther e' s no doubt t hat casual t i es i n moder n war f ar e. s uc h as t he decl i ne i n nat i onst at e st at us.at l east f r om our poi nt of v i ew. and t hen I t hought he meant casual t i es of al l t he possi bl e al l i es. 49 . Fi r st . t hat many st at es ar e pur sui ng a st r at egy of acqui r i ng weapons of mas s dest r uct i on and t he means t o del i ver t hem. Pr esi dent Bus h asked : " How do we avoi d casual t i es?" At f i r st . He was aski ng how we coul d conduct t hi s mi l i t ar y oper at i on wi t h mi ni mum casual t i es on bot h si des . Lessons of Deser t St or m So l et me t ur n t o Deser t St or m because i t i l l ust r at ed t hi s r evol ut i on i n war f ar e .ar e qui t e unaccept abl e . t her e ar e oppor t uni t i es we c an f or esee f or count r i es s uc h as Li bya and Nor t h Kor ea t o us e bal l i st i c mi ssi l es .NEW.

Ever y t i me I ' d mas s my f or ce. and I t ol d hi m t hat I want ed t o use t he Pat r i ot s t o def end agai nst bal l i st i c mi ssi l es . he woul d send a coupl e of bal l i st i c mi ssi l es at us . I sai d. Pat r i ot was bel i eved t o have t he capabi l i t y t o i nt er cept bal l i st i c mi ssi l es. He was s uppos ed t o chal l enge us . c ommander .a. " So I went down t o see Lt Gen J ohn Yeosock. I t ' s a war game.BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE. At t hat t i me.hal f bet ween t hem and t hei r oper at i onal ar ea . W hen we pl ot t ed t hose ci r cl es. t he scenar i o was t hat Count r y Or ange was goi ng t o at t ack Kuwai t and Saudi Ar abi a f r om t he nor t h. The scenar i o was t hat t he Russi ans at t acked t hr ough I r an and we had t o def end . I c an onl y t el l y ou t hat I had t o mak e a deci si on about whet her or not t o mov e t he E. pr et t y s oon y ou get a l i t t l e t i r ed because y ou want t o be a her o i n f r ont of y our boss. I deci ded t o l eave t hem at Ri yadh and. Ar my Br i g Gen J i m El l i s was gi ven f r ee pl ay as a Red For ce c ommander . " We' r e not goi ng t o be unpr epar ed agai n .and. because of t he Pat r i ot mi ssi l es. I n anot her exer ci se i n Jul y.3 AW ACS ( Ai r bor ne War ni ng and Cont r ol Syst em) ai r cr af t out of Sc ud r ange . so I t ook t he Pat r i ot ai r def ense ci r cl e and put i t on my maps . Of cour se. t hey j ust about cover ed t he map . we di dn' t l ose a si ngl e AW ACS. I had t o deci de whet her t o l eave t hem t her e or mov e t hem t o anot her hour or Thumr ai t . but I ' l l t el l you. They wer e posi t i oned at Ri yadh Ai r Base and Saddamwas shoot i ng Sc uds at t hem. W e have al l hear d a l ot of ver y s mar t peopl e t al k about whet her t he Pat r i ot mi ssi l es wer e or wer e not a success i n Deser t St or m. and t hi s br i gadi er gener al was not cooper at i ng at al l . and we k new Count r y Or ange pr obabl y had bal l i st i c mi ssi l es . I n 1988 i n an exer ci se under Gen Geor ge Cr i st ( commander . That was ei t her a 50 . we wer e i l l . t hough we di d pr epar e t o s ome ext ent .pr epar ed.chi ef of Cent r al Command) . But he di d us a gr eat ser vi ce by mak i ng us awar e of t he mi l i t ar y ut i l i t y of t hese weapons . we l ear ned i n Saudi Ar abi a t hat t he Pat r i ot bal l i st i c mi ssi l e def ense ci r cl e l ooks mor e l i ke t he head of a pi n . 1990. Thi r d US Ar my. whi c h woul d hav e put hour . W hat J i m El l i s di d was t o k eep f i r i ng bal l i st i c mi ssi l es i nt o my ar ea . who was t he gr ound f or ce c ommander .i n. How di d we car r y out bal l i st i c mi ssi l e def ense ( BMD) i n Deser t St or m? The ans wer i s.

what i f we wer e i nvol ved i n a si t uat i on l i ke Deser t St or m. nat i onal . but we' r e not i nt er est ed i n occupyi ng y our count r y. Thi s coul d pr ove t o be a l esson not l ost on ot her nat i ons i n t er ms of t he t er r or caused by bal l i st i c mi ssi l es and t he pol i t i cal l ever age t hey pr ovi de . wher e an al l y l i ke I t al y. The ABMTr eat y made sense i n a col d war cont ext . They say t o t he Saudi s. whi c h i s t he mos t si gni f i cant el ement at t he pol i cy l evel . war ni ng of l ong. al so wi t hi n r ange. f or exampl e. For exampl e.ERAW ARFARE br i l l i ant deci si on or a ver y l ucky one. and suppose t hey deci ded t hat t hey want ed t o r ai se t he pr i ce of oi l . Suppos e I r an.r ange mi ssi l es i s 51 . and we hav e t he ABM Tr eat y. So f ar as our cur r ent capabi l i t y i s concer ned. Ther e c an be no doubt about t he val ue of t hese ant i weapon i nt er cept or s . we j ust want t o get t he pr i ce of oi l bac k t o wher e we can mak e s ome money .NEW . But I do k now t hat f r omwher e I st ood. " What woul d be t he r eact i on of t he Saudi s? And f i nal l y. Consi der t hat t he gr eat est number of casual t i es c ame f r om one Sc ud at t ack on t he Dhahr an bar r acks . was t hr eat ened wi t h s uc h a mi ssi l e at t ack? W oul d ot her nei ghbor i ng count r i es. i t ' s r easonabl e t o bel i eve t hat t he devel opment and pr ol i f er at i on of bal l i st i c mi ssi l es i n t he hands of pot ent i al adver sar i es has r eached a st age wher e t hey c an af f ect s uc h t hi ngs as t he bui l di ng and mai nt ai ni ng of coal i t i ons . and t hey t el l t hei r nei ghbor s t hat t hey ar e goi ng t o deny t hem and ever y ot her nat i on access t o t he Red Sea . f or exampl e. t he Pat r i ot s wor k ed . but y ou wonder i f i t has mer i t i n t he new wor l d . I don' t k now. " You k now we have t hese weapons. nor ar e we i nt er est ed i n cr ossi ng i nt o i t . and t echnol ogy demonst r at i ons. dar e t o al l y t hemsel ves wi t h I t al y or t he Uni t ed St at es? How di f f i cul t woul d i t be t o hol d t oget her a coal i t i on as di ver se as t he one we had i n Deser t St or m i f t he member nat i ons wer e t hr eat ened wi t h di r ect mi ssi l e at t ack? St at us of Bal l i st i c Mi ssi l e Def ens e Pr ogr ams Wher e ar e we t oday wi t h r espect t o bal l i st i c mi ssi l e def ense? W e hav e t he def ense gui dance on t heat er . Af t er t he i ni t i al Sc ud l aunchi ngs. we s aw t he val ue of t he Pat r i ot s and of def ense agai nst bal l i st i c mi ssi l es i n gener al . had nucl ear weapons and bal l i st i c mi ssi l es.

t he Ukr ai ni ans ar e t r yi ng t o get cl ose t o t he Uni t ed St at es t o pr ecl ude bei ng over power ed by t he Russi ans . l ef t over f r om t he col d war ?" But we l ooked at i t s l ocat i on and deci ded we wer e not i nt er est ed because i t r eal l y had no pot ent i al mi l i t ar y benef i t .mi ssi l e r adar gear . t he head of t he Ukr ai ni an Ai r For ces asked me. and wi t h t he smal l er i nf r ar ed si gnat ur e of mi ssi l es l i ke t he Scud . Al t hough we can change t hat f act . W e c an t ake t wo or mor e sat el l i t es and i nt er weave t hei r cover age t o i mpr ove accur acy and t he l i kel i hood of det ect i on . Among t hose most i nt er est ed i n our bal l i st i c mi ssi l e war ni ng capabi l i t i es. They have di f f i cul t y wi t h l and masses f ar away f r om t he equat or . " How woul d y ou l i ke t o have some of our bal l i st i c.based sensor s. For exampl e. i t can t ake up t o t wo year s t o r epl ace a war ni ng sat el l i t e .t er mpr ogr amt hat I t hi nk woul d be most ef f ect i ve i n t hi s r espect i s cal l ed ALARM. Fi nal l y.based i nf r ar ed sensor s and r adar s . For exampl e. f or exampl e. wi t h weat her . But we shoul d keep i n mi nd t hat our r adar s ar e conf i gur ed f or t he col d war . i n t hat i t wi l l be on a smal l er l aunch vehi cl e and may be on ot her sat el l i t es .BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE pr ovi ded by space. however . and i t i s t he one I keep hi t t i ng over and over and over . W e need t o be concer ned about keepi ng our war ni ng capabi l i t i es ef f ect i ve . a DSP sat el l i t e went bad l ast year . That was one l esson I br ought back f r om Deser t St or m. We have made some pr ogr ess si nce t hen . Of cour se. 52 . W e have modi f i ed t he sof t war e associ at ed wi t h t he Def ense Suppor t Pr ogr am ( DSP) si gnal . i s t hat t hey do not al l ow us t o t ar get and at t ack mobi l e l auncher s . and how t hey can be shar ed. as of now our i nf r ar ed syst ems f or t heat er def ense have l i mi t ed det ect i on capabi l i t y . ar e our al l i es . The l ong. I n some cases. The bi ggest pr obl em wi t h our cur r ent r adar s and space. I t hought i t mi ght t ake 90 days t o do t hi s . ALARM gi ves us r esponsi veness. I t t ur ns out t hat i t t akes consi der abl y l onger . I t gi ves us t he abi l i t y t o see l ower si gnat ur e mi ssi l es and i t gi ves us t he abi l i t y t o see mi ssi l es t hat ar e coast i ng. But t hey st i l l do not of f er t he degr ee of cer t ai nt y t hat I t hi nk i s needed and want ed . so I sai d l aunch t he spar es . Ot her count r i es have of f er ed us t he use of t hei r some of t hei r war ni ng asset s .

we want ed t o at t ack I r aq' s mi ssi l es wher e t hey wer e bui l t . i t ' s at i t s sl owest speed. He t hen r eal i zed t hat t her e was no r adar war ni ng and t hat t he mi ssi l e was ver y br i ght and l ar ge f or a SAM. i t f al l s on t he enemy . so he made a mov e away f r om i t . The t i mel i ne on a boost . Boost .phase i nt er cept i s ver y.16 was over I r aq suppr essi ng Scuds. W hen he r eal i zed i t was a Scud. W e mus t t hi nk not i n t er ms of t he si ngl e sol ut i on but i n a var i et y of sol ut i ons . but we di d not do a ver y good j ob at f i ndi ng and dest r oyi ng I r aq' s mi ssi l es i n Deser t St or mbecause we r eal l y had not t hought suf f i ci ent l y about t he pr obl ems bef or ehand . so t her e wer e vul ner abi l i t i es t hat coul d have been expl oi t ed . we need t o consi der t he t hr ee ar eas of mi ssi l e def ense : boost .phase. For i nst ance. but we have t o t hi nk i n dept h. 53 . and t he pi l ot s aw a mi ssi l e c omi ng of f t he pad .a beaut i f ul t hi ng .9 heat . and mul t i t ar get det ect i on. he at t empt ed t o shoot i t down wi t h an AI M. An F. and i f y ou get i t t hen. l aunch or der s i n I r aq t ended t o c ome f r om a ver y hi gh l evel . Too of t en t he nat ur e of our acqui si t i on syst em f or ces us i nt o bei ng t oo pr ogr ammi ng or i ent ed . ver y t i ght . s uc h as J OI NT STARS. i t ' s vul ner abl e.phase i s a good t i me t o i nt er cept a mi ssi l e because i t s si gnat ur e i s hi gh. not a SAM. I n gener al .16 . mi dcour se and t er mi nal . W e have t he capabi l i t y t o do t hat . Af t er t he war . bef or e t hey wer e on t he l aunch pads .Phase I nt er cept Dur i ng t he Gul f War . W e have ot her capabi l i t i es.ERAW ARFARE The Uni t ed St at es can count on our of f ensi ve mi ssi l es. but I t hi nk mos t of us want t o t al k about what happens af t er mi ssi l es ar e l aunched . The pr obl em i s havi ng t he t i me t o det ect and l aunch on i t . we had t he pot ent i al f or an i nt er cept of a Sc ud j ust af t er l aunch . I asked sever al quest i ons about t he c ommand and cont r ol of I r aq' s syst ems. For exampl e. Boost . He t hought i t was a SAM bei ng shot at hi m. and we f ound out t hat we coul d hav e done s ome t hi ngs t o i mpr ov e our mi ssi l e def ense ef f i ci ency . But t he hi gh r at e of accel er at i on of t he Sc ud was t oo muc h f or t he F.seeki ng mi ssi l e .NEW . GPS. That woul d have been t he mos t pr oduct i ve appr oac h .

as we di d dur i ng t he Gul f War . al l on ai r pl anes : HARM. you can cover l ar ger por t i ons of t he l andmass dependi ng on how many of t hese i nt er cept or pl at f or ms and sensor sat el l i t es you want t o put i n or bi t . t he bi g down. and t hat i nvol ves sensor s i n space whi ch t r ack col d bodi es and r el ay t hat dat a t o t he i nt er cept mi ssi l e. That we have been t aki ng f unds f r om t hese pr ogr ams t el l s us mor e about our own l ack of per cept i on of t he ser i ousness of t he t hr eat t han i t does about t he t hr eat i t sel f . We need t o wor k on t he boost . W e have t hr ee boost . Al so. AMRAAM. I f we depl oyed t hi s syst em y ou coul d have a nat i onal mi ssi l e def ense by st at i oni ng t hem as f ar away as Huds on Bay . Ther e ar e st i l l ot her opt i ons f or mi dcour se def ense agai nst bal l i st i c mi ssi l es .BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE St i l l .ar ea pr ot ect i on .cour se. you get wi de.phase def ense. Of cour se. You can get ai r pl anes t o cap an at t ack. and t hat i s pr ohi bi t ed by t he ABMTr eat y . f or exampl e. Par ent het i cal l y. The Navy Upper Ti er i s one. Ther ef or e I don' t have t he s ame phi l osophi cal pr obl ems . but r i ght now i t has been hamper ed . Mi dcour se I nt er cept The advant age of a mi dcour se i nt er cept i s t hat dur i ng t hi s per i od t he mi ssi l e has a good si gnat ur e because i t ' s out t her e i n a st er i l e. space envi r onment and y ou have mul t i pl e oppor t uni t i es t o shoot at i t . Ther e ar e al so opt i ons f or put t i ng unmanned ai r pl anes up f or l ong per i ods of t i me . 54 .phase pr ogr ams t hat I k now of .phase i nt er cept i ssue.based syst ems f or i nt er cept i n mi d. I ' mnot i n f avor of weapons i n space . t her e ar e many opt i ons f or boost . My answer t o t hat i s t hat t he weapon i n space i s t he war head on a mi ssi l e . mi dc our s e i nt er cept r equi r es mi dcour se gui dance. i f you go t o space. But agai n. and t he wi del y hel d at t i t ude t hat we shoul d not have weapons i n space. The i nt er cept or i s an ant i weapon . But I t hi nk t hat t he cur r ent budget cr i si s wi l l pr obabl y keep t hese pr ogr ams f r om bei ng acqui r ed and depl oyed . because i t gi ves y ou a gr eat deal of f l exi bi l i t y .dr aw on anyt hi ng i n space i s t he ABMTr eat y. You can par k t hese shi ps anywher e . You can have pr ot ect i on f r om l ar ge ai r pl anes i f y ou want t o use an ai r bor ne l aser . and t he ai r bor ne l aser .

I bel i eve t he ABMTr eat y i s a col d war hang. Thos e concer ns have t o be voi ced. t o depl oy t hat t r acker r equi r es ABMTr eat y changes . So war ni ng i s not enoughwe need t o have accur at e i nf or mat i on about wher e t he mi ssi l e i s . But agai n. Let ' s t al k about t he ABMTr eat y . I f t hat means we need t o wor k wi t h t he Russi ans t o change t he ABMTr eat y. t hat ' s what we need t o do . we have t er mi nal def ense. t hen we need t o seek t hat . t he Sc ud wasn' t ev en good enough f or Saddam. I st i l l need ver y def i ni t e dat a as t o wher e t hat mi ssi l e i s so t hat I c an l aunch my THAAD bef or e k nowi ng wher e i t ' s ai med .mi ssi l e def enses we' r e al l owed t o bui l d .l i ke t hr eat . t hey ar e t al ki ng about bui l di ng a mi ssi l e def ense agai nst a beni gn nont hr eat . Wi l l t hese gr ound.based syst em by t he Ar my . when peopl e appr ove bui l di ng a t heat er mi ssi l e def ense. or el se we wi l l wi nd up wi t h a nonef f ect i ve syst em agai nst f ai r . Theat er Hi gh Al t i t ude Ar ea Def ense ( THAAD) . and/ or Nav y Lower Ti er .phase I nt er cept Fi nal l y. I f I ' m si t t i ng her e wi t h my THAAD mi ssi l e and s omebody l aunches a bal l i st i c mi ssi l e at me. The dol l ar s have been spent .bas ed syst ems addr ess t he f ut ur e t hr eat ? Too of t en. a gr ound. and count r i es ar e cl amor i ng f or bal l i st i c mi ssi l e def enses . Howev er . I wor r y about t hi s .r easonabl e t hr eat s . i s t he col d war over ? I f y ou l ook at t he 55 . Need f or a Robust TMD The t echnol ogy f or bui l di ng ef f ect i ve bal l i st i c mi ssi l e def enses i s avai l abl e t oday .over . The mos t l ogi cal el ement s woul d be devel opment of an i mpr ov ed Pat r i ot .ARFARE NEW . Ev en i f we depl oy one of t hese s y s t ems s uc h as THAADwe st i l l need a col d.body t r acker doubl es t he r ange of your gr oundbas ed or shi p.body t r acker i n space . l et al one def end t he Uni t ed St at es.t o. I f space syst ems c an gi ve us t he capabi l i t y we need t o def end our men and women when t hey ar e over seas. I bel i eve t hat we mus t be concer ned about what ki nd of bal l i st i c. wher e mos t of our wor k i s now done . a Scud.based syst ems . Remember . A col d.ERA W Ter mi nal .

I t hi nk t he ABM Tr eat y has out l i ved i t s usef ul ness . Gi ven al l t hi s. You coul d see t hat Gener al I vanov. and we wer e br i ef ed by peopl e f r om our Bal l i st i c Mi ssi l e Def ense Or gani zat i on . To what end? W e ar e not goi ng t o f i ght each ot her . That r equi r es bui l di ng t r ust wi t h t he Russi ans . W e need t o shar e t hese t echnol ogi es . Yet we st i l l have bal l i st i c mi ssi l es poi nt ed at each ot her .our t echnol ogy i n bal l i st i c mi ssi l es and your access t o space t o put t hi ngs i n or bi t . " I k new we wer e goi ng t o r each t hi s poi nt . Ther e' s a mar r i age r i ght t her e. who i s a ver y t hought f ul . W e 56 . I ' ve had vi si t s f r om t he head of t he KGB. " What we need t o do. What ' s mor e. You have t hi ngs t hat we can' t mat ch. one ar ea we mus t i nvest i gat e i s shar ed bal l i st i c mi ssi l e def enses wi t h t he Russi ans . I di dn' t k now t hey wer e t hi s good . whi c h i s an i mpr essi ve oper at i on. I t hi nk i t ' s r easonabl e t o as s ume t hat t he col d war i s ov er and. i nt el l i gent . was t hr eat ened . conf l i ct .l i f t access t o space . head of Russi a' s r ocket f or ces . and t ough guy. " i s wor k t oget her on t hi s . I n wal ki ng away f r om t he col d war . and t he ABM Tr eat y gi ves t hem t he l ever age t o do t hat .BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE def ense budget . i t ' s now a quest i on of how we wal k away f r om t he col d war . so I had spoken wi t h hi mal l mor ni ng about how coul d we cooper at e wi t h hi m. l i ke heavy. not do we wal k away f r om t he col d war . That does not mean t hat we and t he Russi ans ar e not goi ng t o have t ensi ons. t her ef or e. Nor i s i t an easy t hi ng t o do si nce t hey ar e st i l l c omi ng f r om a bi pol ar wor l d vi ew. " My God. W e wer e at t he nat i onal t est f aci l i t y. We' r e t al ki ng wi t h t hem about shar ed exer ci ses . and compet i t i on . I ' ve been i nvi t ed t o Mos c ow. So. ot her t han t he f act t hat t her e ar e t hose i n bot h of our capi t al s who ar e st i l l ver y cl ose t o t he col d war . I t hi nk t hat t hi ngs hav e f undament al l y c hanged bet ween our t wo count r i es . i t ' s t he budget . t he col d war i s over . and Col Gener al I vanov. " And he sai d. and I t hi nk t hat t hey ar e genui nel y concer ned about our abi l i t y t o out st r i p t hem i n t echnol ogy. " What i s y our pr obl em i n achi evi ng t hi s t echnol ogy?" I sai d. I r an i nt o t hi s pr obl em wi t h I vanov . " I sai d. di sagr eement s. Ther e' s no r eason our t wo count r i es can' t wor k t oget her . They want t o be i n t he dr i ver ' s seat i n det er mi ni ng how we mar c h f or war d on bal l i st i c mi ssi l e def enses. He l ooked as i f he wer e t hi nki ng. But . " Wel l .

f i nal l y. Shar ed Def ens e Agai nst Bal l i st i c Mi ssi l es What do we need t o do? Fi r st . gi ven t i me . not over t he pol e .NEW . and we can' t t hank you enough . So. " They have got t o be t he f i nest i n t he wor l d. I t hi nk t hat . " When he went t o get on t he ai r pl ane t o l eave. and t hat t her e i s a pot ent i al f or t hem at some poi nt i n t he f ut ur e t o be at t acked . Thi nk about t hi s : t he nat i on most t hr eat ened by t he pr ol i f er at i on of mi ssi l es and 57 . The bi ggest pr obl em we have i s our own l ack of under st andi ng of t he t hr eat . i t i s ver y i mpor t ant t hat we do t hi ngs. and. r ecogni ze t hat t he wor l d has changed. " I n bot h Washi ngt on and Mos c ow t her e ar e peopl e who ar e st i l l oper at i ng i n a col d war cont ext . t he Amer i can peopl e ar e goi ng t o f eel bet r ayed . At t hat poi nt . So. second. di scussi on. I ' m amazed by t hat .mi ssi l e def enses . and t hen become i nvol ved i n shar ed bal l i st i c. But I t hi nk t o appr oach i t f r om t he col d war st andpoi nt i s t he wr ong t ack . That i s a scar y t hi ng. The danger her e i s t hat i f we ar e t hr eat ened by bal l i st i c mi ssi l es someday. whi l e we have no t hr eat f or now. r ecogni ze t hat t he col d war i s over . such as shar e bal l i st i c. " But t he t r ut h i s we have none . he t ur ned and sai d. " Good l uck wi t h your Congr ess . " What do you t hi nk of our bal l i st i c mi ssi l e def enses?" I woul d est i mat e t hat 60 per cent of t he peopl e say. we must communi cat e t o t he Amer i can peopl e t hat t hey do not i n f act have bal l i st i c mi ssi l e def enses.ERAW ARFARE have t o f i ght f or t hese pr ogr ams bef or e our Congr ess . Howyou bui l d t r ust wi t h t he Russi ans i s a mat t er of a l ot of ef f or t .t hey don' t k now. and di al ogue . I have no doubt s t hat t he Russi ans ar e qui t e wi l l i ng t o do t hat .mi ssi l e war ni ng as an ent r ee. t he ABMTr eat y i s moot . I t hi nk we mus t appr oach i t l ooki ng at t hi ngs t hr ough t hei r eyes as t hey l ook t o t he sout h. Then we ask t hem. I t hi nk t he Russi ans ar e t er r i f i ed t hat we ar e goi ng t o get ahead of t hem i n bal l i st i c mi ssi l e def enses . Many peopl e come t o Cheyenne Mount ai n wher e we show t hem t he bal l i st i c mi ssi l e war ni ng syst ems . r ecogni ze t hat we and t he Russi ans have muc h t o gai n f r om get t i ng r i d of our nucl ear ar senal s .

and par t i cul ar l y wi t h a coal i t i on as i n t he Gul f War .weapons pr ogr ams. Ar e we goi ng t o bomb t he capi t al of s ome count r y i n or der t o det er t hem f r om usi ng nucl ear weapons ? They k now we ar e not goi ng t o do t hat . and al l have bal l i st i c mi ssi l es or bal l i st i c. Syr i a. I ndi a. But t her e ar e det er mi ned adver sar i es out t her e who ar e not det er r abl e by count er f or ce because. f or exampl e? I t means we gi ve up t he oppor t uni t y t o at t ack t hem on a sur pr i se basi s . but I t hi nk t hei r ar gument s ar e based on col d war f ear s. we c an be ef f ect i ve on t he bat t l ef i el d . I n Deser t St or m. Di pl omac y i s best . t hen i t ' s i n s ome nat i on' s i nt er est t o bui l d t hese weapons of mas s dest r uct i on and t hr eat en peopl e . They ar e s ur r ounded by Nor t h Kor ea. and as we bui l d t r ust . Af ghani st an. W not st ar t t he pr ocess by shar i ng war ni ng.t her e ar e j ust not enough sor t i es i n t he day . and Ukr ai ne. Saddam Hussei n had mor e chemi cal weapons e had t o mak e a deci si on t o go af t er t he t han I coul d bomb . I r an. not on t he wor l d we f i nd t oday . t hey k now t hat we ar e not goi ng t o us e nucl ear weapons . I r aq. whi c h we need t o pur sue . Russi a needs bal l i st i c hy do we mi ssi l e def enses mor e t han does t he Uni t ed St at es .mi ssi l e pr ogr ams . What ar e nucl ear weapons good agai nst ? They ar e good agai nst ci t i es . W e mus t be cr edi bl e on t he basi s of convent i onal def ense . W e have peopl e who ar e f i ght i ng shar ed war ni ng. W pr oduct i on ar eas and t hose st or age ar eas t hat wer e i n t he i mmedi at e ar ea of t he bat t l ef i el d . I coul d not hav e even begun t o t ake out al l of hi s chemi cal st or age.BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE weapons of mas s dest r uct i on i s Russi a . Chi na. and t hat pr ol i f er at i on of weapons of mas s dest r uct i on and t he means t o del i ver t hem ar e t he t r ue t hr eat t hat we need t o be addr essi ng . I t hought per haps i t was a concer n t hat we 58 . W t o why t hi s was so . Al t hough I r aqi had abundant chemi cal weapons. I t hi nk t hat we have t o r ecogni ze t hi s wor l d i s a danger ous pl ace i n many ar eas. and al l t hese st at es have nucl ear weapons or nucl ear . we do have suf f i ci ent convent i onal mi l i t ar y st r engt h. i f t hey ar e s mar t at al l . Paki st an. But i f t her e i s a quest i on about our nat i onal wi l l . t hey di d e i nt er r ogat ed t hei r peopl e as not use t hem i n Deser t St or m. and we have nonpr ol i f er at i on r egi mes. Now. t hen shar i ng def enses? What ' s t he cost of shar i ng war ni ng.

" I t hi nk t hat use of act i ve def enses can be as i mpor t ant as usi ng bal l i st i c mi ssi l e def enses i n t he di r ect def ense of our own nat i on .mi ssi l e def ense . and i n f act . suppose we had t he capabi l i t y t o shar e bal l i st i c mi ssi l e def enses on a gl obal basi s.ERAW ARFARE mi ght r et al i at e wi t h nucl ear weapons. I f y ou have bal l i st i c mi ssi l e def enses. we l i ve downwi nd. So. Gener al I shi zuka. " Look. t hey woul d suf f er many mor e casual t i es t han we woul d . They f el t t hat i f t hey us ed chemi cal weapons. because i t i s a subj ect of ver y hi gh concer n i n J apan . and t hat i f y ou have a war . we under s t and t hat y ou don' t l i ke each ot her . But t he I r aqi gener al s r epor t ed t he r eason t hey di dn' t use chemi cal weapons was because i f t hey us ed t hem.ar ea bal l i st i c. The pr obl emi s. we' l l shar e bal l i st i c mi ssi l e def enses wi t h y ou . t hey k new our t r oops wer e bet t er pr ot ect ed t han t hei r t r oops . and I hav e t al ked f or hour s about t he chal l enges i n def endi ng agai nst possi bl e mi ssi l e at t acks. t hen t hat mak es anot her count r y' s acqui r i ng bal l i st i c mi ssi l es l ess i mpor t ant . Our al l i es and neut r al nat i ons woul d benef i t gr eat l y i f we had wi de. by usi ng our bal l i st i c mi ssi l e def enses t o i nt er f er e wi t h any mi ssi l e at t ack t hat t akes pl ace . or el ement s of t hei r popul at i on. at l east t o t he ext ent we can. " I f y ou get r i d of your nucl ear weapons. " Or s uppos e we went t o I ndi a and Paki st an and sai d. we under st and t hat y ou ar e bot h r el yi ng on bal l i st i c mi ssi l es and nucl ear weapons t o det er one anot her . wi l l l ose conf i dence i n 59 . I t hi nk t hat t hey wer e r i ght i n t hei r assessment . and I t hi nk t hat i t hi ghl i ght s t he i mpor t ance of def enses bei ng a key el ement i n det er r ence .mi ssi l e def enses .based syst em. For exampl e. and we don' t l i ke i t . Consi der t hi s : The f or mer head of t he J apanes e Ai r For ce. The mi l i t ar y l eader shi p i n J apan i s ver y c onc er ned about bal l i st i c.whi ch I bel i eve has nucl ear weapons and say. W doi ng t hat . e ar e goi ng t o pr ecl ude y ou f r om we' r e not goi ng t o l et y ou . and cer t ai nl y we made t hi ngs ambi guous i n t hat r egar d . whi l e you may want t o use t hese syst ems. You coul d go t o a count r y s uc h as I sr ael . t her e i s l i abl e t o be a nonr at i onal deci si on whi c h causes one or t he ot her or bot h t o use t hese weapons . may det er t hem f r om spendi ng l ar ge amount s of money t o bui l d t hem.NEW . say a space. One of t hei r concer ns i s t hat t hei r peopl e.

I n f act . I don' t t hi nk so . and t hey ar e appr ehensi ve about what ef f ect t hat mi ght have . i n t he cur r ent budget envi r onment . and ot her s wi l l al so af f ect t he Chi nese . t he Japanese and count r i es l i ke t hat . Ther e i s a si gni f i cant domest i c val ue her e as wel l . i t ' s i mpor t ant t hat we have t he abi l i t y t o shar e bal l i st i c mi ssi l e def enses wi t h a count r y l i ke J apan . s uc h as cont r ol of t he Chi nese bor der . i f y ou i gnor e t hem i n t hi s r egar d and wor k wi t h t he Russi ans. " By t he way. y ou c an t hen say t o t he Chi nese.ar ea def ens es i s i n r educi ng t he val ue of nucl ear bal l i st i c mi ssi l es .mi ssi l e def enses?" I t hi nk t hat t hi s i s t he choi ce. so y ou c an wor k wi t h t hemi f y ou under st and what t hei r i nt er nal concer ns ar e. we' r e goi ng t o neut r al i ze your bal l i st i c mi ssi l es . I t hi nk y ou have t o ask your sel f t hi s one quest i on : " Woul d i t be a bet t er wor l d i f we had bal l i st i c mi ssi l e def enses and no nucl ear weapons . or nuc l ear weapons and no bal l i st i c. but t he cost s of devel opi ng. but i n t er ms of at t acki ng Russi a or t he Uni t ed St at es. 60 . and oper at i ng s uc h def enses ar e not t r i vi al . I f t he J apanes e deci de t hey mus t go t hei r own way. t he Japanese. depl oyi ng. or t o t he count r i es t hat wel l r emember WWI I ? So. Reduc i ng Nuc l ear Ar s enal s One of t he gr eat est pot ent i al benef i t s of bal l i st i c mi ssi l e def ense speci al l y shar ed war ni ng and wi de. The Chi nese ar e pr agmat i c. y ou can' t expect t he mi l i t ar y t o t ake t he l ead . and r enounce t hei r const i t ut i on and devel op a ver y aggr essi ve out r each i n mi l i t ar y capabi l i t y.BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE t he Uni t ed St at es as t he pr ot ect or of t hei r secur i t y.er a war f ar e . The number of war heads t he Chi nese have i s si gni f i cant i n t er ms of i nf l i ct i ng pai n. par t i cul ar l y i f y ou t r ade t hem of f agai nst t he cost of mai nt ai ni ng nucl ear weapons f or ces . So I t hi nk t hat over t he l ong t er m. what woul d t hat do t o t he whol e Paci f i c Ri m. and I t hi nk t hat i s wher e we need t o have t he vi si on and t he cour age t o t ake on t hi s mi ssi on of bal l i st i c mi ssi l e def ense i n new. But I t hi nk bal l i st i c mi ssi l e def enses woul d compet e ver y wel l . t hey ar e pr obabl y not deci si ve . Wor k i ng wi t h t he Russi ans. " Does i t mean we' l l have peace? No.

and t hat i s t hat we need t o mai nt ai n our nucl ear weapons t o det er ot her nat i ons . Nonet hel ess.of f one agai nst t he ot her y ou coul d pr obabl y f r ee up a gr eat deal of money . y ou have t wo pr obl ems : det er r ence. What ar e we goi ng t o have t o do when we have t o r epl ace t he t r i t i um? Ar e we goi ng t o r est ar t t he Sav annah Ri ver Pr oj ect ? So. The oper at i ng t he Tr i dent submar i nes i s cer t ai nl y i n t er ms of cost . we ought t o have t he convent i onal mi l i t ar y power t o be abl e t o i nf l uence t hem on a det er r abl e basi s . Thes e peopl e poi nt t o t he pr ol i f er at i on of t he t echnol ogi es f or weapons of mas s dest r uct i on.NEW . we woul d pr obabl y not be abl e t o use a nucl ear weapon agai nst t hem. i n many ways. Ther ef or e. Thos e at t empt i ng t o smuggl e nucl ear weapons i nt o t he Uni t ed St at es mi ght do so i n a manner t hat i s not t r aceabl e . s omet i mes I wonder i f he r eal l y was not l ooki ng f or I sr ael t o t hr ow a nucl ear weapon at hi m. at a mi l l i on dol l ar s a box . I bel i eve Saddam Hussei n. as we cut our mi l i t ar y f or ces down. because t hey ar e not oper at i ng on our s ame l ogi c t r ai n .ser ved i f . I n f act . and what do y ou do i f det er r ence f ai l s . W e j ust put t hr ee bl ack boxes on Mi nut emen. was i ndi f f er ent t o nucl ear weapons . t he quest i on i s. But even i f we i dent i f i ed t he cul pr i t s. par t i cul ar l y nucl ear weapons. Ai r cr af t and mi ssi l es car r yi ng such weapons mi ght not be t he onl y t hr eat .and st r ong convent i onal f or ces pr ovi de t hose opt i ons . But does our nucl ear det er r ent f or ce r eal l y l i mi t t he t hr eat posed by t he pr ol i f er at i on of s uc h weapons ? Suc h weapons mi ght be del i ver ed by a var i et y of means . I n ot her wor ds. as opposed t o acqur i ng mor e ver y capabl e convent i onal f or ces? I f a nat i on uses a nucl ear weapon or poi son gas agai nst us. So.ERAW ARFARE Our nucl ear . I t hi nk t hat s ome pot ent i al aggr essor s t hat ar e i ndi f f er ent t o whet her we have nucl ear weapons or not . Any body who woul d poi son Chi cago i s nondet er r abl e. t hen we mus t have mi l i t ar y opt i ons t o t ak e. and wor r y t hat wi t hout our own nucl ear ar senal s we wi l l be r i pe f or at t ack . I t hi nk i f y ou wor k ed a t r ade.weapons f or ces ar e not t r i vi al The Ai r For ce has got t o c ome t o gr i ps wi t h I CBMs . r el i nqui shi ng t he each one of t he cost t o t he Nav y not t r i vi al . 61 . we r eser ve l ar ge amount s of money t o pr eser ve weapons we pr obabl y cannot empl oy. Ther e i s anot her ar gument made by t hose who cl i ng t o col d war i deas. ar e we bei ng wel l .

t er m pl anni ng . I see so l i t t l e val ue i n war f ar e . my economy. but on t he ot her hand.BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE So. He i s a gangst er and an evi l per son . I woul d not suggest t hat we c an wal k away f r om nucl ear det er r ence ot her t han ar m. we bec ame ver y i nvol ved i n t he i nt er nal af f ai r s of Sout h Vi et nam 62 . I woul d hat e t he I r aqi s f or what t hey di d t o my chi l dr en and my count r y. I per sonal l y am not t hr eat ened by Engl and and Fr anc e hav i ng nucl ear weapons. I f I wer e a Kuwai t i . Nucl ear di s ar mament has t o be wor k ed i n t er ms of t he Rus s i a/ US r el at i onshi p . I amnot sur e t hat we mi ssed t he boat i n not det hr oni ng hi m. whi c h demoni zed Saddam Hussei n .i n. an I r aqi mi ght bel i eve t hat he i s t he one per son who was keepi ng me al i ve . I t hi nk Chi na al so t ends t o f al l i n t hat cat egor y . Ther e i s an oppor t uni t y t o l et ot her nat i ons have nucl ear ar senal s and yet wor k wi t h t hem on a busi ness. what t hr eat ens me mos t ar e t he Kur ds and t he Shi i t es . What we mean by l ong. whi c h pr ecl udes l ong. The t hi ng t hat scar es me. t he i dea of usi ng US nucl ear weapons t o det er an adver sar y i s pr obabl y onl y usef ul wi t h r ef er ence t o t he Russi ans . Mai nt ai ni ng Conv ent i onal St r engt h I t i s absol ut el y essent i al t hat we mai nt ai n US convent i onal mi l i t ar y st r engt h. That ' s what I bel i eve . l et me be cl ear on t hi s . You mus t do i t i n concer t wi t h t he Russi ans. of cour se.ar m wi t h t he Russi ans .t er m i s r eal l y a f unct i on of per cept i on of t hr eat . i n Saddam Hussei n' s case. For exampl e. and t o be i n a r eact i ve mode. whi l e I mi ght hat e Saddam Hussei n f or what he does t o my f ami l y. So. W uni l at er al l y di s ar m. or even I sr ael .l i ke basi s . e c annot we mus t not However . and my nat i on.t he t ype of convent i onal st r engt h t hat we exhi bi t ed i n Deser t St or m. Pr obabl y t he mi st ake we made was i n our publ i ci t y dur i ng t he Gul f War . of bui l di ng t r ust wi t h Russi a . But i n t he Vi et nam War . and y ou mus t have a vi si on . I f I wer e s omebody l i vi ng i n Baghdad. But we s eem t o l ack vi si on. I ' m not sur e I woul d want I r an on my nor t her n bor der ei t her . I t hi nk t hat we ar e appr oachi ng what I cal l t he domi nanc e of def ense . i s t he Fr ench r eached t hat concl usi on i n 1930 .

I t hi nk t he poi nt i s t hat you' ve got t o be abl e t o f i ght t he Deser t St or ms successf ul l y. Concl usi ons The f undament al poi nt i s cl ear : t he Uni t ed St at es and i t s al l i es mus t pur sue bal l i st i c mi ssi l e def enses . i t i s si mpl y t i me t o get on wi t h i t . i f t he I r aqi s want Saddam. and I t hi nk t he t hi ng we wer e al l concer ned about was get t i ng i nvol ved i n sol vi ng t he pr obl ems of I r aq. 63 . As f ar as I am concer ned. W e f i ght a Deser t St or m onl y ever y 10 or 15 year s . and I do bel i eve we di d have an i mpact . W e went af t er l eader shi p. i n my opi ni on. a def ense. Bal l i st i c mi ssi l e def enses ar e t he key t o new er a war f ar e. W e ar e i l l . Si nce Saddam was t he t op I r aqi mi l i t ar y l eader . not i n a pol i t i cal cont ext .pr epar ed f or t hi ngs l i ke Bosni a or Somal i a. not because he was t hei r pr esi dent . W e al so s houl d hav e a ver y cr edi bl e convent i onal mi l i t ar y capabi l i t y . and t her e ar e t hose who want t o bui l d f or ces f or t hat . But . So.t o oppor t uni t i es f or r educ i ng nucl ear ar senal s and t o ens ur i ng t he t ype of convent i onal st r engt h t hat enabl es t he Uni t ed St at es t o secur e i t s i nt er est s i n t he f ut ur e . but onl y because he was t hei r t op mi l i t ar y f i gur e. t hey c an el ect hi m. when I r aq' s pr obl ems ar e not sol vabl e . but Saddamand I r aq woul d be ver y wi se not t o st ep over t he boundar y l i nes agai n . and obvi ousl y count er f or ce i s necessar y . But i f y ou ar e f aced wi t h a di ct at or who i n f act r uns r i sks. Of cour se t hat ' s f i ne. our goal was t o ej ect I r aq f r om Kuwai t and cr i ppl e I r aq' s nucl ear / bi ol ogi cal / chemi cal capabi l i t i es. I t hi nk we al so have t o r emember t hat each war i s di f f er ent . l et hi m t r y t o r un I r aq.onl y capabi l i t y may not be an adequat e US mi l i t ar y pos t ur e . i f Saddam Hussei n i s j ust a modes t r i sk t aker . But basi cal l y.ERAW ARFARE t o our di sadvant age.NEW . I ' m not sur e what t he c ampai gn agai nst I r aq' s ec onomy achi eved . i t woul d have been ni ce i f we had got t en hi m. and we went af t er i t i n a mi l i t ar y cont ext .

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Mar k Jacobson.ni net eent h cent ur y. J ohn Moyl e. " a Revol ut i on i n Mi l i t ar y Af f ai r s ( RMA) i s a maj or c hange i n t he nat ur e of war f ar e br ought about by t he i nnovat i ve appl i cat i on of new t echnol ogi es whi ch. t he s umof whi c h pr ovi de a l ar ge par t of over al l mi l i t ar y capabi l i t i es .t echni cal r evol ut i ons . J ames Bl ackwel l . Fr ed Li t t l epage. and i r oncl ad shi ps . The nat ur e of t hese di scont i nui t i es i s s uc h t hat war f ar e af t er t he " r evol ut i on" i s unl i ke what went on bef or e i n pr of ound and si gni f i cant way s . " Recent l y. r i f l ed guns. t he s t eam engi ne. Geor ge Kr aus. 65 and St even Kenney al so assi st ed i n t he . anal yst s i n t he Uni t ed St at es have st ar t ed cal l i ng t hem RMAs . Thr oughout hi st or y. t her e hav e been a number of s uc h r evol ut i ons .Chapt er 3 The Revol ut i on i n Mi l i t ar y Af f ai r s Jef f r ey McKi t r i ck. " Suc h an RMA i s now occur r i ng. i ndust r i al i zat i on r evol ut i oni zed war f ar e t hr ough r ai l r oads. The Sovi et s cal l ed t hese di scont i nui t i es " mi l i t ar y. and t hose who under st and i t and t ake advant age of i t wi l l enj oy a deci si ve advant age on f ut ur e bat t l ef i el ds . f undament al l y al t er s t he char act er and conduct of mi l i t ar y oper at i ons . Mi l i t ar y t heor i st s ar ound t he wor l d hav e l ong not ed t he hi st or i cal di scont i nui t i es i n t he conduct of war f ar e caused by t he advent of new t echnol ogi es and weapon syst ems . Ri char d Bl anchf i el d and Dal e Hi l l * Accor di ng t o Andr ew Mar shal l . t he t el egr aph. di r ect or of t he Of f i ce of Net As s es s ment s i n t he Of f i ce of t he Secr et ar y of Def ense. Dur i ng t he mi d. Thi s change i n t er mi nol ogy was meant t o capt ur e t he nont echni cal di mensi ons of mi l i t ar y. Mor e r ecent l y. t he mec hani z at i on of war f ar e dur i ng t he * Rober t Ki m. t r ansf or mi ng bot h l and and naval war f ar e . pr epar at i on of t hi s chapt er . or gani zat i ons and oper at i ons. c ombi ned wi t h dr amat i c changes i n mi l i t ar y doct r i ne and oper at i onal and or gani zat i onal concept s. Gunpowder pr oduced an ear l y mi l i t ar y r evol ut i on i n t he West er n Wor l d.

Al t hough we t hi nk t hat we now st and at t he st ar t of a l ong per i od i n whi c h we may f ace a RMA. we cannot be cer t ai n about when t he t r ansi t i on per i od mi ght st ar t . when t hey wi l l ar i se. I n shor t . car r i er avi at i on. or what new war f ar e ar eas mi ght be devel oped. we mus t i ssue a wor d of caut i on .t hi nki ng mi l i t ar y of f i cer s s uc h as Col J . Bef or e pr oceedi ng. Dur i ng t he t r anspor t at i on r evol ut i on. not t o ment i on a host of ot her key quest i ons . t hese soci et al c hanges cr eat ed new set s of oper at i onal and st r at egi c t ar get s . we need t o st ar t wi t h an appr eci at i on of t he hi st or i cal and geost r at egi c cont ext s i n whi c h t he RMA may unf ol d .mi l i t ar y r evol ut i ons . W e c an mak e usef ul obser vat i ons even at t hi s ear l y st age . What mot i vat ed past changes i n t he conduct of war f ar e? W ho mi ght our f ut ur e compet i t or s be? W hat wi l l be t hei r pol i t i cal and mi l i t ar y obj ect i ves? How mi ght t hey choose t o or gani ze and equi p mi l i t ar i l y t o achi eve t hose obj ect i ves? How mi ght t he conduct of war f ar e change? The answer s t o t hese quest i ons wi l l assi st us i n i dent i f yi ng new RMA war f ar e ar eas and. we do not have an absol ut e gr asp of t he scope.BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE i nt er war per i od l ed t o t he devel opment of bl i t zkr i eg. t he changes i n t echnol ogy associ at ed wi t h t hes e r evol ut i ons c hanged not onl y t r anspor t at i on. I n s ome cases. r ai l r oads al t er ed t he economi es of nat i ons and al l owed t hem t o mov e mi l i t ar y f or ces f ar t her and f ast er and sust ai ned t hem l onger . however . t he bul k of t he i nt el l ect ual and physi cal devel opment associ at ed wi t h t he cur r ent RMA has f ocused on new syst ems and t echnol ogi es . Dur i ng and i mmedi at el y af t er t he Fi r st Wor l d War . amphi bi ous war f ar e. f or exampl e. " To dat e. how l ong i t mi ght l ast . Mor eov er . and i mpl i cat i ons of t hi s possi bl e RMA. Ful l er of t he Br i t i sh ar my and Maj Ear l El l i s of t he US Mar i ne Cor ps 66 . F. and war f ar e but al so ent i r e soci et i es as wel l . f or war d. what new compet i t or s mi ght ar i se. hel p i dent i f y what new mi l i t ar y capabi l i t i es t he Uni t ed St at es wi l l need . pace. communi cat i on. C. and st r at egi c bombi ng . W e cur r ent l y char act er i ze t hese ki nds of r evol ut i ons as " soci al . What i s needed now i s a mor e car ef ul anal y s i s of t he new oper at i onal c onc ept s and new or gani zat i ons t hat mi ght best hel p us r eal i ze t he f ul l pot ent i al of t hese new syst ems and t echnol ogi es . i n t ur n. To r each t hat l evel of anal ysi s.

Thes e f ut ur e syst ems appear ed t o be pur e f ant asy at t he t i me.THE REVOLUTI ON I N MI LI TARY AFFAI RS out l i ned t he basi c f eat ur es of ar mor ed war f ar e and amphi bi ous war f ar e .but not al l . i n whi c h t he l evee en mas s e al l owed f or t he cr eat i on of l ar ger . Les s ons of Past RMAs RMAs have r i sen f r om var i ous sour ces. chemi st r y and ear l y physi cs dr ove many of t he cr i t i cal advances dur i ng Wor l d War I . but yest er day' s f i ct i on has. nat i onal ar mi es . Mor e r ecent l y. t her eby. i n many i nst ances.f i ght i ng capabi l i t i es . sci ence f i ct i on wr i t er s have been expl or i ng f ut ur e war .f i r st cent ur y t hat mi l i t ar y of f i cer s and aut hor s wer e abl e t o l ook i nt o t he f ut ur e and pi ct ur e t ypes of war f ar e t hat bec ame r eal or t oday ar e bec omi ng r eal . t he r at e at whi c h weapons f i r ed and t he r anges t hat t he pr oj ect i l es t r avel ed deci ded t he f at e of many bat t l es .of t hem t echnol ogi cal . They def i ned t hese concept s decades bef or e t he necessar y syst ems exi st ed and at a t i me when t he pol i t i cal ci r cumst ances of t he next war wer e uncer t ai n . di f f er ent sci ent i f i c f i el ds hav e pr ovi ded t he enabl i ng f act or . The novel s St ar shi p Tr ooper s by Rober t Hei nl ei n ( 1957) and Ender ' s Game by Or s on Scot t Car d ( 1977) al l uded t o mi l i t ar y syst ems t hat t oday equat e t o ar t i f i ci al i nt el l i gence and vi r t ual r eal i t y . I t shoul d be i nst r uct i ve t o t hose of us engaged i n l ooki ng t o t he t went y. For exampl e. I t i s i n t hi s spi r i t of di scover y t hat we of f er t he f ol l owi ng por t r ayal of t he unf ol di ng r evol ut i on i n mi l i t ar y af f ai r s . wi t h many . I n t hi s war of gunpowder . I t i s our hope t hat s uc h di scussi on wi l l f aci l i t at e i dent i f yi ng new i deas and ani mat e a di scover y pr ocess t hat i ncl udes war games and si mul at i ons over t he cour se of t he next t hr ee t o f i ve year s . 67 . i mpr ove . Achi evi ng anal yt i c pr ogr ess r equi r es di scussi on of t hese i ssues wi t h as muc h def i ni t i on and cer t ai nt y as possi bl e i n or der t o gi ve anal yst s somet hi ng concr et e t o cr i t i que and. bec ome t oday' s r eal i t y . Soci et al change cont r i but ed t o a mi l i t ar y r evol ut i on dur i ng t he war s of t he Fr ench Revol ut i on and t he Napol eoni c er a. I n t he t echnol ogi cal l y bas ed mi l i t ar y r evol ut i ons of t hi s cent ur y.

syst em RMA but an i nt egr at ed. Thes e syst ems. 68 . The cur r ent RMA has as i t s sour ce what has been cal l ed new physi cal pr i nci pl es .syst em nor a si ngl e. I n cont r ast t o devel opment s dur i ng t he i nt er war per i od. " An exampl e i s t he nucl ear r evol ut i on of t he 1940s and 1950s. dr ove t he r evol ut i on . amphi bi ous war f ar e by t he US Mar i ne Cor ps. when j oi ned wi t h t hei r ac c ompany i ng oper at i onal and or gani zat i onal concept s. f i el d ar t i l l er y. The out l ook i s f or t he r api d evol ut i on of new t echnol ogi es event ual l y l eadi ng t o t he devel opment of sever al advanced mi l i t ar y syst ems . and st r at egi c bombi ng by t he US Ar my Ai r For ces have been char act er i zed as " combi neds y s t em RMAs . i n whi c h gunpowder t r ansf or med l and and naval war f ar e t hr ough t he use of si ege guns. These pr i nci pl es f ocus on t echnol ogi es s uc h as l aser s and par t i cl e beams . " Thei r r evol ut i onar y nat ur e der i ved f r om a col l ect i on of mi l i t ar y syst ems put t oget her i n new way s t o achi eve a r evol ut i onar y ef f ect .syst em RMA. neur al net wor ks.BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE Adv anc ed physi cs dr ove t he next RMA. di st r i but ed syst ems. and naval ar t i l l er y . Anot her exampl e of a si ngl e. Cur r ent t r ends i ndi cat e t hat t he next r evol ut i on i n mi l i t ar y af f ai r s may hav e a bi ol ogi cal sour ce .syst em RMA. bi oel ect r oni cs.syst em RMA i s t he gunpowder r evol ut i on. and per f or mance.syst ems appr oach wi l l ai m t o t ake advant age of t he cumul at i ve ef f ect of empl oyi ng each of t he new capabi l i t i es at t he s ame t i me . i nf ant r y f i r ear ms. wi l l bec ome i nt egr at ed syst ems . Evi dence suggest s t hat t he r evol ut i on unf ol di ng t oday i s nei t her a combi ned.enhanci ng dr ugs . i n whi c h a si ngl e t echnol ogy. nanot echnol ogi es. t hi s syst em. whi c h ext ended f r om t he mast er y of f l i ght t o i mpr oved r adi os and t he i nt r oduct i on of r adar t hr ough t he cr eat i on of nucl ear weapons at t he end of Wor l d War I I . nucl ear f i ssi on/ f usi on. The i nt er war i nnovat i ons of ar mor ed war f ar e by t he Ger man ar my. A di f f er ent t ype of RMA i s t he " si ngl e. car r i er war f ar e by t he US Navy. Some mani f est at i ons of t hese bi ol ogi cal adv anc es may i nc l ude bi osensor s. New t echnol ogi es and syst ems si gni f i cant l y i nf l uence t he RMA.of . al t hough t he r esul t i ng RMA coul d t ake one of a number of f or ms .

oper at i onal .mi l i t ar y r evol ut i on . si ege war f ar e.on account of t he const ant compet i t i on bet ween r i val st at es of r oughl y equal mi l i t ar y power . but s omewhat di f f er ent . bi ogenet i cs. Suc h a r evol ut i on hol ds pr of ound. I t i s i mpor t ant t o r emember t hat t echnol ogi es and syst ems enabl e but do not cause mi l i t ar y r evol ut i ons . The s ame hol ds t r ue f or a c ombi ned s y s t em RMA. An exampl e of t hi s pr i nci pl e i s t he gunpowder r evol ut i on of t he si xt eent h and s ev ent eent h cent ur i es . put t i ng us on t he pat h of a soci al . Fur t her mor e. I n t he cur r ent RMA.r eachi ng soci et al changes.ar mor ed war f ar e on l and bat t l ef i el ds. and ot her s . but st agnat ed i n al l ar eas . 69 . I mper i al Chi na devel oped gunpowder and f i r ear ms a cent ur y bef or e Eur ope possessed t hem. and sol el y owned mi l i t ar y advant age t o t he count r y t hat achi eves a br eakt hr ough . i mpl i cat i ons f or t he changi ng nat ur e of war f ar e . si gni f i cant . gunpowder weapons f undament al l y c hanged t he conduct of al l ar eas of war f ar e. Suc h st r at egi c.maneuv er war f ar e. st r at egi c bombi ng i n t he ai r over homel ands. Chi na f el l behi nd i n t he gunpowder r evol ut i on l ar gel y bec aus e of i t s vast popul at i on. Wi t hout t hem. we mus t cont i nue t o t hi nk about br eakt hr oughs i n cr i t i cal ar eas s uc h as i nf or mat i on t echnol ogy. and amphi bi ous war f ar e at t he i nt er sect i on of l and and s ea.THE REVOLUTI ON I N MI LI TARY AFFAI RS I n Wor l d War I I . s t agnat i on c an pr evai l . and t act i cal r equi r ement s det er mi ned whet her t echnol ogi es wer e adopt ed and how t hey wer e empl oy ed . whi c h al l owed i t t o over come any l and or sea t hr eat s t hr ough sheer wei ght of number s . Unf or eseen advances i n t hese ar eas coul d br i ng about a sudden. t he i nt egr at ed empl oy ment of al l t he new syst ems wi l l be essent i al t o t ake advant age of t hei r t r ue val ue . and naval war f ar e. Never t hel ess.and onl y occasi onal l y i nt er act ed wi t h t he ot her s . ev en i n st at es possessi ng t echnol ogi es wi t h r evol ut i onar y i mpl i cat i ons . t hi s f or ecast does not excl ude t he possi bi l i t y of a si ngl e. each new f or m of war f ar e t ook pl ace i n i t s own oper at i ng medi um.syst em RMA. car r i er war f ar e at sea. I n Eur ope. Past mi l i t ar y r evol ut i ons hav e been dr i ven by r equi r ement s t hat hav e mot i vat ed mi l i t ar y or gani zat i ons t o i nnovat e i n or der t o over come t he l i mi t at i ons of exi st i ng pr act i ce . To avoi d st r at egi c sur pr i se. t her e i s al so t he possi bi l i t y t hat t he i nf or mat i on r evol ut i on may r esul t i n f ar .

f i r epower . onl y t he Ger mans empl oyed t anks. and ai r pl anes i n new way s i n 1940 even t hough al l of t he essent i al t echnol ogi es had been avai l abl e si nce Wor l d War I . i n whi c h al l of t he maj or power s possessed t he s ame t echnol ogi es but onl y a f ew count r i es cr eat ed new oper at i ons concept s and or gani zat i ons . us ed t hem t o f aci l i t at e i nt r i cat e mobi l i zat i on pl ans t hat conf er r ed a si gni f i cant oper at i onal advant age at t he st ar t of a c ampai gn . For exampl e. I n t he case of ar mor ed war f ar e.ar med gal l eys t hat pr ovi ded a t echnol ogi cal advant age t hat pr oved essent i al t o def eat i ng t hr ee successi ve Japanese i nvasi ons . c annon. r ai l r oads began car r yi ng c ommer c e i n t he 1830s. 70 . and ar t i l l er y i n t he Panz er di vi si on and s uppl ement ed t hem wi t h cl ose ai r s uppor t . and pr ot ect i on . t he r i se of f i r ear m. Car r i er avi at i on wi t her ed i n Br i t ai n' s Royal Navy. const r ai ned by def ensi ve st r at egi c and oper at i onal concept s on l and. i nf ant r y.equi pped i nf ant r y and t he use of vol l ey f i r e mi r r or ed devel opment s i n Eur ope . wher e r i val war l or ds st r ove f or domi nance. t he smal l er st at es of Asi a made si gni f i cant i nnovat i ons i n r esponse t o pr essi ng mi l i t ar y r equi r ement s . " i r oncl ad. Ger many t hus i nt egr at ed t anks. For exampl e. Past RMAs hol d anot her si gni f i cant l esson f or t he cur r ent RMA. Fr anc e and Br i t ai n. t he el der . Thi s pr obl em l ed t o an oper at i onal r equi r ement f or r api d of f ensi ves t o def eat enemy st at es qui ckl y. r adi o. Anot her exampl e i s t he i nt er war per i od. di d not i nnovat e and pai d t he pr i ce i n May of 1940 .BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE I n cont r ast . I n si xt eent h cent ur y Japan. I n past RMAs many of t he key syst ems wer e al r eady us ed i n c ombat or i n ci vi l i an appl i cat i ons decades bef or e si gni f i cant changes occur r ed i n mi l i t ar y or gani zat i ons . but i n t he 1860s onl y t he Pr ussi an ar my under Hel mut h v on Mol t ke. t he devel opment of car r i er avi at i on t ook pl ace i n t he Uni t ed St at es and J apan f or t he pur pose of f i ght i ng maj or naval engagement s i n t he Paci f i c . and t he emphasi s on of f ense di ct at ed t act i cal r equi r ement s f or mobi l i t y. whos e mai n t asks wer e f i ght i ng i n conf i ned wat er s s uc h as t he Medi t er r anean Sea and combat i ng Ger man c ommer c e r ai der s on t he hi gh seas . Thi s si t uat i on was due i n par t t o Ger many' s uni que st r at egi c pr obl em of bei ng sur r ounded by enemi es . Kor ea i n t he 1590s r es ponded t o t he t hr eat f r om r euni f i ed J apan by devel opi ng i t s " t ur t l e shi ps.

Fut ur e Compet i t or s I f we hope t o under st and t he scope and pot ent i al i mpact of t he RMA. Whi l e i t i s di f f i cul t . r adi os. J apan and Ger many pr i or t o Wor l d War I I ar e exampl es of t he abi l i t y of nat i ons t o evol ve r api dl y up t he compet i t or scal e t hr ough wi l l power and sacr i f i ce . i f not i mpossi bl e. Gi ven t hat a peer compet i t or i s l i kel y t o emer ge. Li kewi se.i s f ar f r om an exact sci ence . and cl ose suppor t ai r cr af t wer e us ed i n quant i t y i n Wor l d War I . t o assess accur at el y whi c h nat i ons wi l l bec ome peer compet i t or s i n 25 year s. t he mos t i mpor t ant quest i on i s not who t he compet i t or i s but t he l i kel y 71 .al t hough pol i t i cs and economi cs ar e r el at ed f act or s . W e need t o st ar t t hi nki ng i mmedi at el y about t he s hape of war f ar e i n 2020 i n or der t o capi t al i ze on t he RMA i n a t i mel y f ashi on . i t i s possi bl e t o i magi ne one nat i on. t hei r f or ce st r uct ur es. Devel opi ng and assessi ng al t er nat i ve f ut ur es. Hi st or y pr ovi des many ex ampl es of pot ent i al compet i t or s r api dl y el evat i ng t hems el v es f i r st t o r egi onal and t hen t o peer compet i t or st at us . I ndeed. To as s ume t hat we ar e unl i kel y t o see a peer compet i t or i n t he next 25 year s i s t o i gnor e hi st or y . and modes of oper at i on. W e mus t st r ess t hat we ar e t al ki ng about pot ent i al mi l i t ar y compet i t or s.. cur r ent appr oaches at pr edi ct i ng t he f ut ur e wi l l cont i nue t o meet wi t h onl y mar gi nal success . t anks.THE REVOLUTI ON I N MI LI TARY AFFAI RS Si mi l ar l y.pr oj ect i ng t he nat ur e of f ut ur e compet i t or s. The t hr eat s and t he vul ner abi l i t i es of t hese compet i t or s wi l l cl ear l y i nf l uence how t he Uni t ed St at es shoul d expl oi t t he RMA. r i si ng t o chal l enge US nat i onal secur i t y i nt er est s .not pol i t i cal and economi c compet i t or s. or a combi nat i on of nat i ons. we f i r st mus t under s t and our pot ent i al f ut ur e compet i t or s . t he i mpl ement at i on of r evol ut i onar y oper at i onal and or gani zat i onal concept s i n t hi s RMA may r equi r e a l ong t i me even t hough mos t of t he k ey syst ems pr obabl y ar e al r eady i n devel opment or have even been used i n c ombat . i f t he event s of t he l ast f i ve year s ar e any i ndi cat or . but t hey di d not r eal i ze t hei r t r ue pot ent i al unt i l t he Ger mans devi sed new or gani zat i onal and oper at i onal concept s f or t hem i n t he 1930s .

To under st and t he nat ur e of f ut ur e compet i t or s and. Dr Paul Br acken of Yal e Uni ver si t y. char act er i zes nat i ons as Ty pe A. B. or bet ween t hemand count r i es i n t he zone of peace . and onl y acr oss a l i mi t ed set of mi l i t ar y capabi l i t i es . " 2 Hi s f undament al di vi si on of t he gr eat power s pl aces t he i ndust r i al i zed democr aci es i n t he zone of peace wi t h al l ot her count r i es i n t he zone of t ur moi l . Type A compet i t or s ar e peer compet i t or s. pl an f or t hei r pot ent i al emer genc e r equi r es an 72 . mor e i mpor t ant l y. Fur t her mor e. cul t ur al nor ms. and t he l i ke . abl e t o c ompet e r egi onal l y. st at es may s wi ng bet ween peace and t ur moi l . mak i ng our st r at egi c pl anni ng even mor e di f f i cul t . dr amat i cal l y change goal s and di r ect i ons. or gai n or l ose mi l i t ar y capabi l i t i es. Thi s t ype of char act er i zat i on s eems usef ul i n boundi ng t he r ange of possi bl e compet i t i veness i n a mi l i t ar y sense . Dr St ephen Ros en of Har var d Uni ver si t y has f r amed t he debat e on f ut ur e compet i t or s by di vi di ng t he wor l d i nt o " zones of peace" and " zones of t ur moi l . A ni che compet i t or woul d be a count r y t hat has c hos en t o speci al i ze i n a speci f i c mi l i t ar y capabi l i t y t hat appear s t o have hi gh l ever age agai nst US f or ces . economi c st r engt h. and C compet i t or s . and many ot her f act or s as we t hi nk about t he evol ut i on of compet i t i on bet ween st at es . Dr Ros en cannot envi si on a war bet ween t he Uni t ed St at es and. W e f eel t hi s t ype of compet i t or i s not r eal l y a nat i onal secur i t y compet i t or but a pol i t i cal compet i t or . Conf l i ct s wi l l mos t l i kel y ar i se among nat i ons i n t he zone of t ur moi l . abl e t o compet e wi t h t he Uni t ed St at es on a gl obal basi s acr oss a f ul l r ange of mi l i t ar y capabi l i t i es . f or exampl e. I t i s mor e usef ul t o t hi nk of Ty pe C compet i t or s as bei ng ni che compet i t or s .i nt ensi t y conf l i ct count r i es. i n hi s ar t i cl e on " The Mi l i t ar y Af t er Next . al l i ances. Ty pe B compet i t or s ar e r egi onal compet i t or s. l ow. Dr Rosen' s anal ysi s r emi nds us t hat i t i s i mpor t ant t o consi der pol i t i cal t r adi t i ons. " 1 . dr ug l or ds. I t i s di f f i cul t t o devel op scenar i os t hat l ead t o war s among nat i ons i n t he zone of peace .BATTLEFI ELDOF THE FUTURE char act er i st i cs of t hat compet i t or . So l ong as t he count r i es r emai n democr at i c. Br acken' s Ty pe C compet i t or s ar e t er r or i st s. a democr at i c J apan or Ger many . Leadi ng exper t s i n t he f i el d of assessi ng t he nat ur e of f ut ur e compet i t i on have pr ovi ded si gni f i cant i nsi ght s i nt o how we vi ew and t hi nk about pot ent i al compet i t or s .

st abi l i t y) " Access t o f or ei gn mar ket s and t echnol ogi es ( sunr i se/ " " sunset syst ems. age of popul at i on) " Geogr aphy ( l andl ocked. t o r egi onal . i t i s essent i al t hat we under st and what a nat i on or r egi on i s t o mor e accur at el y r ef l ect what i t may bec ome .what f act or s ( cur r ent and f ut ur e) woul d pus h t hemal ong t he pat h f r om ni che. Whi l e s ome anal yst s may vi ew t he bi r t h of compet i t or st at es ( Chi na or J apan f or i nst ance) . et c . aut ocr at i c. Tr ends may c aus e nat i ons t o t r ansf or m i n unant i ci pat ed ways. Under st andi ng t he nat i onal char act er and pr ocl i vi t i es of a nat i on i s onl y par t of t he equat i on . as bei ng qui t e pr edi ct abl e. Suc h consi der at i ons mi ght i ncl ude. t her eby gi vi ng r i se t o a number of sur pr i se compet i t or s . 73 . eval uat i ng t r ends i n t he cont ext of nat i onal char act er may hel p t o nar r ow t he f i el d of who t hese compet i t or st at es may be . and t he pr ol i f er at i on and di f f usi on of mi l i t ar y syst ems and t echnol ogi es wi l l al l i nt er act wi t h t he nat i onal char act er and dai l y event s of vi r t ual l y ever y nat i on i n t he wor l d . Equal l y i mpor t ant i s an appr eci at i on of nat i onal . and/ or gl obal t r ends t hat may act i n syner gy wi t h nat i onal char act er t o pr opel a nat i on t o compet i t i ve st at us . t he devel opment of mi l i t ar y weapon syst ems. By " nat i onal char act er " we mean what mak es t hem t i ck. ) Demogr aphi cs ( r at e of change. t he gr owt h of new oper at i onal and or gani zat i onal appr oaches. t r ai ni ng) " Nat ur e of al l i ances ( cooper at i ve agr eement s. access t o por t s. t he f ol l owi ng : zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA " Hi st or i cal cont ext Cul t ur al and soci al bel i ef s ( mor es. t o peer compet i t or . Never t hel ess. we shoul d be caut i ous i n ascr i bi ng t oo muc h cer t ai nt y t o such pr edi ct i ons . i ndust r i al bas ei ndi genous/ ot her ) " Pol i t i cal syst em ( democr at i c. but ar e not l i mi t ed t o. Tr ends associ at ed wi t h economi cs. t he pace of t echnol ogi cal i nnovat i on. i nf or mat i on t echnol ogi es and capabi l i t y) " Mi l i t ar y f or ce st r uct ur e ( di sposi t i on. t r adi t i onal / nont r adi t i onal adver sar i es) I n ot her wor ds.THE REVOLUTI ON I N MI LI TARY AFFAI RS under st andi ng of t he hear t and soul ( or nat i onal char act er ) of t he count r i es under consi der at i on . r egi onal . agr i cul t ur e) " Ec onomi c dev el opment ( t r ade.

Ger many. ) . t o adapt t echnol ogi es i n way s t hat br i ng i nt o bei ng t he f ul l mi l i t ar y pot ent i al of an RMA.f i r st cent ur y . I n t he anal ysi s of t he cur r ent RMA. t he Ger mans . Judgi ng f r om t he exampl e of past RMAs . Dur i ng t he i nt er war per i od. a uni f i ed Kor ea. anal ysi s of l i kel y compet i t or s wi l l be a l ong. or gani zat i onal l y and oper at i onal l y. si mi l ar l y. Fi r st i s t he consci ous deci si on on t he par t of a st at e t o acqui r e al l or por t i ons of what mi ght be t er med an RMA c ompl ex . t he Uni t ed St at es wi l l be f aced wi t h a number of r egi onal compet i t or s whi l e not bei ng f or ced t o deal wi t h a t r ue peer compet i t or . Br i t i sh. t he US and Br i t i sh navi es di f f er ed i n t hei r devel opment of car r i er avi at i on . Last . and Fr ench f ol l owed di f f er ent di r ect i ons i n t he usage of t anks .new candi dat es. I t wi l l be cr i t i cal f or t he Uni t ed St at es t o under st and t he nat ur e of t he chal l enges posed by s uc h a peer l ong bef or e t he compet i t or achi eves r ough par i t y acr oss i mpor t ant mi l i t ar y ar eas . and ongoi ng pr ocess . However . The mos t successf ul appr oaches wi l l not necessar i l y c ome f r om t he count r i es mos t exper i enced wi t h t he r el evant 74 .t y pe t echnol ogi es . ar duous. an Asi an coal i t i on. i t i s l i kel y t hat f or a per i od of t i me i n t he f ut ur e. di st i nct appr oaches t o har nessi ng new t echnol ogi es wi l l sur f ace i n t hose st at es seeki ng t o expl oi t t hem. i s t he abi l i t y. Japan. Today. we coul d i dent i f y a number of pot ent i al candi dat es as peer compet i t or s ( Russi a. our subsequent anal ysi s shoul d f ocus on t he t hr ee di mensi ons of t he RMA r equi r ed f or a nat i on t o achi eve compet i t or st at us . I n ei t her of t hese event ual i t i es. not unl i ke J apan i n 1940.BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE Taki ng i nt o account our under st andi ng of t he nat i onal char act er of pot ent i al compet i t or st at es/ r egi ons. Sec ond i s t he abi l i t y t o acqui r e or devel op t he syst ems t hat const i t ut e RMA. hi st or i cal pr ecedent l eads us t o bel i eve i n t he i nevi t abi l i t y t hat a l ar ge peer compet i t or wi l l emer ge over t i me . An even mor e i nt er est i ng r esul t of t he anal ysi s may be t he sur pr i ses. Under s t andi ng t he nat ur es of compet i t or s i s especi al l y i mpor t ant because of t hei r i nf l uence on emer gi ng f or ms of war f ar e . Chi na. et c . whi c h may t ake decades t o emer ge. whi ch have t he pot ent i al t o r i se f r om ni che t o r egi onal or peer c ompet i t or st at us i n t he ear l y decades of t he t went y. but whet her t hey achi eve t hat st at us r emai ns i n quest i on . and per haps mos t i mpor t ant .

and st r at egi c bombi ng. Suc c es s wi l l mos t l i kel y c ome t hr ough f avor abl e mat c hups bet ween compet i ng doct r i nes . A war f ar e ar ea i s a f or m of war f ar e wi t h uni que mi l i t ar y obj ect i ves and i s char act er i zed by associ at i on wi t h par t i cul ar f or ces or syst ems . domi nat i ng maneuver .r ange pr eci si on st r i ke. W e have cur r ent l y i dent i f i ed f our pot ent i al new war f ar e ar eas. I n t he l at e ni net eent h cent ur y. amphi bi ous war f ar e. l i ke t he i nt er war per i od. Ot her ar eas t hat we have yet t o i dent i f y coul d al so devel op . Muc h wor k has been done i n t he ar ea of i nf or mat i on war f ar e. t o cont est Br i t i sh sea cont r ol wi t h smal l . and mi l i t ar y hi st or y of f er s numer ous exampl es of unexpl oi t ed war f ar e ar eas. pr eci si on st r i ke i s t he mos t devel oped concept ual l y. Thei r at t empt t o cr eat e a new war f ar e ar ea l ed t o a decade of doct r i nal uncer t ai nt y i n 75 . Doct r i nal devel opment i s a l ong and uncer t ai n pr ocess. The war f ar e ar eas t hat we hav e i dent i f i ed ar e l i kel y t o emer ge i n t he l ong r un but wi l l not necessar i l y be devel oped f ul l y i n t he near f ut ur e . New War f ar e Ar eas W e t hi nk t he cur r ent RMA. al t hough even her e muc h anal yt i c wor k r emai ns t o be done . car r i er war f ar e. Of t he f our pot ent i al new war f ar e ar eas.concept s i nt ended t o r evol ut i oni ze war f ar e t hat di d not c ome t o f r ui t i on .l ong. as ev i denc ed by Br i t ai n' s l aggi ng i n t he dev el opment of t anks and car r i er avi at i on despi t e havi ng i nvent ed t hem. or l ack of st r at egi c pur pose der ai l ed t hese devel opment s .THE REVOLUTI ON I N MI LI TARY AFFAI RS t echnol ogi es. i nf or mat i on war f ar e. yet i t r emai ns a poor l y under st ood concept . Technol ogi cal l i mi t at i ons. Anal ysi s of domi nat i ng maneuv er and space war f ar e has j ust begun . Ex ampl es of war f ar e ar eas t hat emer ged i n t he i nt er war per i od ar e ar mor ed war f ar e. c heap t or pedo boat s f or c ommer c e r ai di ng and coast al def ense . t he J eune Ecol e i n Fr ance sought t o expl oi t an emer gi ng weapon. t he t or pedo. and space war f ar e . Obt ai ni ng an advant age over a peer compet i t or t hr ough t he RMA wi l l r equi r e under st andi ng l i kel y opponent s' t endenci es i n or der t o det er mi ne t he opt i mum appr oach . wi l l i nvol ve t he emer gence of mul t i pl e new war f ar e ar eas . conf l i ct s wi t h pr evai l i ng doct r i ne.

Af t er t he Kor ean War . but t he Ar my devel oped t he hel i copt er as par t of a c ombi ned. Si mi l ar l y. Seeki ng gr eat er st r at egi c mobi l i t y bet ween t heat er s and a " mobi l i t y di f f er ent i al " over t he bat t l ef i el d. Ful l er and t he Sal i sbur y maneuv er s went undevel oped i n Br i t ai n but r eemer ged i n t he Ger man ar my . C . when pr act i cal s ubmar i nes wer e t he enabl i ng t echnol ogy and t he need t o st r angl e Br i t i sh c ommer c e pr ovi ded t he doct r i nal pr essur e . t he r i si ng i nf l uence of Adm Al f r ed Thayer Mahan. Pr eci si on St r i ke Pr eci si on st r i ke may wel l be t he mos t t hor oughl y under st ood new war f ar e ar ea of t he next r evol ut i on i n mi l i t ar y af f ai r s .BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE naval war f ar e but f ai l ed by t he t ur n of t he cent ur y owi ng t o t he i nef f ect i veness of t he pr i mi t i ve t or pedoes and t or pedo boat s. Gen J ames Gavi n and ot her s i n t he US Ar my sought t o cr eat e a new f or m of l and war f ar e usi ng t he hel i copt er .ar ea concept s t hat wer e abor t i ve i n one cont ext but r esur f aced i n ot her set t i ngs wi t h t he emer genc e of t he r i ght enabl i ng t echnol ogi es or doct r i nal pr essur es .Fr ench ent ent e . Thi s i s t r ue because t he Uni t ed St at es has been a l eader i n t he 76 . t he nascent ar mor ed war f ar e concept s of J . The i deas of t he J eune Ecol e appear ed agai n i n Ger many dur i ng t he Fi r st Wor l d War .i f not by t he Uni t ed St at es.boat war f ar e and t he Panzer di vi si ons i l l ust r at es t hat f undament al l y s ound concept s wi l l event ual l y be expl oi t ed. The f act t hat concept s di scar ded by Br i t ai n and Fr ance pr ovi ded t he basi s f or U. pur sui t . F. t hen by i t s compet i t or s .ar ms t eamr at her t han as t he basi s f or aut onomous uni t s. The vul ner abi l i t y of hel i copt er s t o ai r def enses and t he pr edomi nanc e of ar mor and i nf ant r y i n exi st i ng doct r i ne each cont r i but ed t o t hi s r esul t .equi pped uni t s t hat coul d r api dl y depl oy i n a cr i si s and woul d use t hei r super i or mobi l i t y t o t hei r advant age i n t he caval r y r ol es of scout i ng. and t he emer gence of t he Angl o. Ther e ar e past exampl es of war f ar e. t hey envi si oned hel i copt er . They succeeded i n mak i ng hel i copt er avi at i on a si gni f i cant par t of t he Ar my .t er m t echnol ogi cal and doct r i nal bar r i er s wi l l not di mi ni sh t he ul t i mat e i mpor t ance of a new war f ar e ar ea. f i el di ng onl y one ai r assaul t di vi si on dur i ng and si nce t he Vi et nam W ar . Shor t . and del ayi ng act i ons .

echel on War s aw Pact ar mor ed f or ces bef or e t hey coul d ov er whel m t he out number ed and out gunned NATO def ender s . f r i endl y f i r e casual t i es. The Gul f W ar demonst r at ed t he pot ent i al f or s uc h deep st r i ke syst ems not onl y t o cr eat e a maneuv er di f f er ent i al . t i me. Thi s was pl anned t o al l ow f or t he cr eat i on of a convent i onal count er of f ensi ve f or ce t o t ur n bac k t he at t acki ng War s aw Pact ar mor ed advance . I t pr obabl y s aw t est s of par t s of syst ems. Pr eci si on st r i ke i n t he cont ext of t he comi ng RMA i s wel l beyond i t s pr edecessor s of f ol l ow. t hey woul d del ay i n t i me t he advance of t he conf l i ct t o t he nucl ear t hr eshol d . At t he t i me of t he devel opment of s uc h pr eci si on st r i ke syst ems as t he Joi nt Sur vei l l ance Tar get At t ack Radar Syst em ( JSTARS) and t he Ar my Tact i cal Mi ssi l e Sy s t em ( ATACMS) . i n t he cont ext of t he unf ol di ng RMA. t he i dea was t o cr eat e a maneuv er di f f er ent i al f or NATOgr ound f or ces . The Red Ar my gave us f ar mor e cr edi t t han we deser ved f or devel opi ng t he r econnai ssance st r i ke compl ex . but at l east pot ent i al l y t o be deci si ve i n t hemsel ves .sensi t i ve f i xed and mobi l e t ar get s . The cr eat i on of pr eci si on st r i ke capabi l i t i es dur i ng t he l at t er st ages of t he Col d War i n f act cast a l ong t echnol ogy s hadow and deepl y af f ect ed Sovi et mi l i t ar y t hought . Suc h deep st r i kes woul d ext end t he bat t l ef i el d .val ue. Somewhat i r oni cal l y.1970s.on f or ces at t ack ( FOFA) and j oi nt pr eci si on i nt er di ct i on. i s t he abi l i t y t o l ocat e hi gh. t hat woul d per mi t r ei nf or ci ng f or ces t o ar r i ve f r om t he cont i nent al Uni t ed St at es ( CONUS) . Pr eci si on st r i ke. and t o ac c ompl i s h t hi s wi t hi n oper at i onal l y and st r at egi cal l y si gni f i cant t i me l i nes whi l e mi ni mi zi ng col l at er al damage. NATO pl anned t o del ay and di sr upt t he ar r i val of secondechel on and t hi r d. and enemy count er st r i kes .THE REVOLUTI ON I N MI LI TARY AFFAI RS dev el opment and depl oy ment of s uc h s y s t ems si nce t he 1970s . t o dest r oy t hem wi t h a hi gh degr ee of conf i dence . as i ndi cat i ve of i mmi nent depl oy ment . I n 2020. pr eci si on st r i ke t echnol ogi es wi l l cr eat e t he pot ent i al t o achi eve st r at egi c ef f ect s at i nt er cont i nent al di st ances . whi ch ar e i t s concept ual f or ebear s . s uc h as t he Def ense Adv anc ed Resear ch Pr oj ect s Agenc y ( DARPA) " assaul t br eaker " mi ssi l es i n t he mi d. t he Sovi et mi l i t ar y may hav e mor e f ul l y compr ehended t he r evol ut i onar y i mpact t hat such syst ems woul d have on f ut ur e bat t l e t han di d t he US mi l i t ar y est abl i shment . 77 .

whi c h ar e j eal ousl y guar ded by t he i ndi vi dual mi l i t ar y ser vi ces and even by s ome DOD. Ther e i s a f ur t her pot ent i al pr obl em i n t hat even shoul d we manage t o or chest r at e a successf ul j oi nt pr ogr am management scheme. For i t t o do so. By t he year 2020. as was done dur i ng Deser t St or m. however .wi de agenci es . Not wi t hst andi ng t he pot ent i al benef i t s t o be der i ved f r om havi ng t he ser vi ces compet e f or t he pr eci si on st r i ke mi ssi on ar ea. t her e i s a pot ent i al danger t hat i n t he cur r ent budget ar y cl i mat e s uc h compet i t i on may pr ove t o be count er pr oduct i ve .f ol d i ncr ease over 1943 capabi l i t i es . Thi s ar r angement t ends t o l ead t o t he acqui si t i on of s y s t ems t hat ar e dupl i cat i ve r at her t han compl ement ar y . Thi s coul d r esul t i n sever al separ at e 78 . r equi r es a muc h cl ear er under st andi ng t han we have had i n past war s about what const i t ut es t he enemy' s cent er of gr avi t y and what i t t akes t o af f ect i t . W hen di r ect ed agai nst t ar get s compr i si ng t he enemy cent er of gr avi t y.BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE The pot ent i al ef f ect of pr eci si on st r i ke can be seen i n t he dr amat i c i ncr ease of capabi l i t i es t o st r i ke st r at egi c t ar get s . Thes e s y s t ems achi eve deci si ve i mpac t onl y i f t hey ar e i nt egr at ed at t he oper at i onal or st r at egi c l evel of war .f ol d i ncr ease over Deser t St or m capabi l i t i es . I t i s envi si oned t hat pr eci si on st r i ke wi l l be abl e t o achi eve ef f ect s si mi l ar t o t hose of nucl ear weapons but wi t hout t he at t endant r i sk of escal at i on t o i nt ol er abl e l evel s of dest r uct i on . The pr eci si on st r i ke ar ea of war f ar e pr esent s a si gni f i cant chal l enge t o t he or gani zat i onal adapt at i on of t he US mi l i t ar y . pr eci si on st r i ke mi ght i t sel f pr ove deci si ve . t he c ombi ned ai r f or ces pr osecut ed 150 st r at egi c t ar get s. i t i s not out of t he r eal m of possi bi l i t y t hat as many as 500 st r at egi cal l y i mpor t ant t ar get s coul d be st r uck i n t he f i r st mi nut e of t he c ampai gn. I n t he f i r st 24 hour s of Deser t St or m. I n 1943 t he US Ei ght h Ai r For ce pr osecut ed onl y 50 st r at egi c t ar get s dur i ng t he cour se of t he ent i r e year .a t housand. Thi s means t hat a si ngl e t heat er or gl obal c ommander mus t have cont r ol over t he empl oy ment of pr eci si on st r i ke syst ems. A pot ent i al pr obl em does ar i se however i n t he devel opment of cur r ent pr eci si on st r i ke syst ems. t he ar chi t ect ur e t hat f r ames t he devel opment of di spar at e pr eci si on st r i ke t echnol ogi es and syst ems may not be st r uct ur al l y coher ent .r epr es ent i ng a f i ve t housand.

r eal . new or gani zat i onal uni t s may have t o be cut out of whol e cl ot h . al l owi ng us t o el i mi nat e one or mor e l evel s of c ommand and t o consequent l y accel er at e t he deci si on. The r evol ut i onar y pot ent i al of pr eci si on st r i ke der i ves f r om t he t echnol ogi es t hat pr ovi ded a gl i mpse of t hei r own pot ent i al dur i ng Oper at i on Deser t St or m.chi ef s j oi nt t ask f or ce f or pr eci si on st r i ke oper at i ons . none of whi c h have muc h mi l i t ar y ut i l i t y by t hemsel ves .speci f i c appr oac h t o t he empl oy ment of pr eci si on st r i ke and exper i ment wi t h new or gani zat i onal appr oaches t o empl oyi ng t hese syst ems on t he bat t l ef i el ds of 2020 . Suc h t echnol ogi es by t hemsel ves have t he pot ent i al t o change dr amat i cal l y t he way war s ar e waged .THE REVOLUTI ON I N MI LI TARY AFFAI RS and per haps i nher ent l y i ncompat i bl e component s. as wel l as a need f or an ar chi t ect ur e whi c h woul d dr i ve t he devel opment of adv anc ed t echnol ogi es and syst ems appl i cabl e t o pr eci si on st r i ke . 79 . and t her e wi l l be no si ngl e ser vi ce abl e t o pr ovi de a ser vi ce.ar ea sur vei l l ance and t ar get acqui si t i on.maki ng and c ommand and cont r ol cycl e . Ther ef or e. Thi s does not i mpl y t hat massi ve new c ommands or new or gani zat i ons mus t be cr eat ed . W e mus t begi n now t o mov e bey ond t he ser vi ce. To be mos t ef f ect i ve t hose at t acks pr obabl y shoul d be synchr oni zed i n t i me and space . Al l of t hi s i s i nt ended t o achi eve deci si ve i mpact on t he out c ome of t he c ampai gn . r ecogni ze hi s oper at i onal c onc ept and st r at egi c pl an. Ther e i s a gr owi ng need f or a syst em.wi de or even gl obal . and sel ect and pr i or i t i ze at t acks on enemy t ar get s of val ue . I nt egr at i ng pr eci si on st r i ke capabi l i t i es wi t h domi nat i ng maneuv er and i nf or mat i on war may cr eat e an especi al l y pot ent RMA.i n.speci f i c cor e or gani zat i onal uni t t o ser ve as t he basi s f or t he commander . Thes e syst ems wi l l l i kel y be t heat er . The essence of pr eci si on st r i ke i s t he abi l i t y t o sense t he enemy at oper at i onal and st r at egi c dept h. and hi ghl y accur at e. I n f act . l ong.t i me r esponsi veness. These and r el at ed t echnol ogi es enabl e c ommander s t o hav e cont i nuous wi de.syst ems f r amewor k t o def i ne pr eci si on st r i ke r equi r ement s. near .of .r ange weapons at t hei r di sposal . we may need t o consi der j ust t he opposi t e appr oach . W e may need t o consi der t he power i nher ent i n t he new i nf or mat i on t echnol ogi es t hat coul d gr eat l y ex pand a c ommander ' s s pan of cont r ol .

Thi s war f ar e ar ea i s cur r ent l y bei ng dr i ven by advances i n t echnol ogy . At t he s ame t i me. whi c h we def i ne as t he st r uggl e bet ween t wo or mor e opponent s f or cont r ol of t he i nf or mat i on bat t l espace . and posi t i oni ng/ l ocat i ng devi ces . pr eci si on muni t i ons . At t he nat i onal l evel . As we i ncr easi ngl y assi mi l at e i nf or mat i on capabi l i t i es i nt o our mi l i t ar y s t r uc t ur e and f ocus mor e and mor e on 80 . we need an equal ef f or t i n devel opi ng new oper at i onal concept s and or gani zat i ons f or t he appl i cat i on of pr eci si on st r i ke . At t he mi l i t ar y oper at i onal l evel .economi c syst ems. and al l ow di r ect and si mul t aneous at t ack on many of t he enemy' s cent er s of gr avi t y . r eal . t her ef or e. W t hi s new war f ar e ar ea i nf or mat i on war f ar e. mi ssi on pl anni ng.shoot er syst ems mus t bec ome a r eal i t y . I nf or mat i on War f ar e Anot her r evol ut i on under way i n war f ar e i s t hat associ at ed wi t h i nf or mat i on syst ems.t o.BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE By 2020. The key i mpr ovement s t hat ar e now occur r i ng ar e i n br oadeni ng t he envi r onment al condi t i ons f or wi de ar ea sur vei l l ance and pr eci si on t ar get i ng . secur i t y and count er meas ur es .not f r om syst ems . and t he quest i on i s how t o at t ack t he enemy' s syst em whi l e pr ot ect i ng your s . and i nt el l i gence syst ems. one of t he key i ssues bei ng t he vul ner abi l i t y of soci o. i t may be t hat t he gr eat est mi l i t ar y payof f wi l l c ome f r om oper at i onal appr oaches and or gani zat i onal adapt at i on. and bat t l e damage assessment ( BDA) . and e cal l t hei r ef f ect s on mi l i t ar y or gani zat i ons and oper at i ons . del i ver y pl at f or ms . t hi s r esponsi veness wi l l al l ow t he st r i ki ng f or ce t o maneuv er f i r es r at her t han f or ces over l ong r anges. cont r ol . The advances needed t o expl oi t our l ead i n t hi s war f ar e ar ea i ncl ude cont i nuous si t uat i on awar eness and i mpr ovement s i n dat a f usi on.t i me r esponsi veness of sensor . one of t he k ey i ssues i s t he vul ner abi l i t y of c ommand. As i n ot her new war f ar e ar eas. communi cat i ons. i nf or mat i on war f ar e coul d be vi ewed as a new f or m of st r at egi c war f ar e. i nf or mat i on war f ar e may cont r i but e t o maj or changes i n t he conduct of war f ar e . For t he f i r st t i me i n hi st or y. t hei r associ at ed capabi l i t i es. dat a pr ocessi ng and c ommuni c at i ons . and t he quest i on i s how t o at t ack t he enemy' s syst em whi l e pr ot ect i ng your s .

and r ul es of engagement . The quest i on of how y ou k now y ou ar e at war may be di f f i cul t t o r esol ve i n vi ew of t he pot ent i al ambi gui t y associ at ed wi t h i nf or mat i on war f ar e . t he anal ysi s of i ndi cat i ons and war ni ng t hat mar k t he out set of war f ar e mus t c hange . I n ot her wor ds. i nsuf f i ci ent t hought has been appl i ed t o t hi s aspect of t he char act er of f ut ur e war . t he char act er of war f ar e may change i n way s t hat af f ect our t hi nki ng r egar di ng i nt el l i gence and cr i si s and war t i me deci si on mak i ng . banki ng. t he poi nt i s t hat muc h t hought mus t be gi ven t o t he exami nat i on of t hr eat s. But t he r api d gr owt h of i nt er connect i ons mani f est ed al r eady i n communi cat i ons. Thi s i s bot h good news and bad news . I t i s not cl ear at t hi s t i me whet her i nf or mat i on war f ar e meas ur es t aken by a pot ent i al adver sar y at t he out set of a war woul d be r eadi l y det ect abl e . " Accor di ngl y. wi t h no war ni ng. I n any case. 81 . we al so change t he vul ner abi l i t i es of US f or ces. The i nf or mat i on war f ar e meas ur es t hat t he Uni t ed St at es coul d t ake mi ght r equi r e qui t e di f f er ent pol i ci es wi t h r egar d t o r ul es of engagement t han have pr evi ousl y been cont empl at ed . Some of t he c hanges mi ght i ncl ude t he whol e i ssue of deci di ng t hat a war has begun .wi nni ng st r at egy.THE REVOLUTI ON I N MI LI TARY AFFAI RS est abl i shi ng and mai nt ai ni ng an " i nf or mat i on advant age" as a war . I n addi t i on t o i t s i nher ent ambi gui t y. r equi r ement s f or i nt el l i gence. and. To dat e. ul t i mat el y of t he Uni t ed St at es i t sel f . i nf or mat i on war f ar e i n 2020 al so por t ends a ver y di f f er ent set of pot ent i al r esponses by t he Uni t ed St at es t o an adver sar y det ect ed act i ng i n a host i l e or pot ent i al l y host i l e f ashi on . The f or ce st r uct ur e t hat wi l l i mpl ement i nf or mat i on war f ar e 25 year s f r om now may wel l be di f f er ent f r om t oday' s mi l i t ar y i n mor e way s t han j ust i t s equi pment . shor t of l et hal at t acks avai l abl e t o si gnal an adver sar y t hat war f ar e wi t h t he Uni t ed St at es woul d be a bad i dea . The good news i s t hat t her e may be new t ool s. i t mi ght be har d t o si gnal our i nt ent i ons . and wi t h a mi ni mal " si gnat ur e . and ot her ar eas cr eat es vul ner abi l i t i es and pr esent s oppor t uni t i es t o do gr i evous har mqui ckl y. The bad news i s t he i nher ent ambi gui t y not ed abov e . Mor eover . Ambi gui t y and pl ausi bl e deni al ar e not new phenomena .

t he cont i nent al Uni t ed St at es has been s omewhat i nvul ner abl e t o s uc h meas ur es . t he i nf r ast r uct ur e i s beyond t he cont r ol of t hose who use i t . One pot ent i al vul ner abi l i t y i s t he f act t hat i nf or mat i on war f ar e gener at es pr obl ems at t he nat i onal l evel r at her t han j ust f or t he Depar t ment of Def ense . Ther ef or e. t hat t oday' s mi l i t ar y or gani zat i onal st r uct ur e ( e . g . The Def ense I nf or mat i on Secur i t y Agenc y ( DI SA) has been act i vel y pur sui ng " i nf or mat i on assur ance" as a par t of t he char t er t o t ake r esponsi bi l i t y f or al l DOD i nf or mat i on syst ems . As t he i nt er nat i onal i nf or mat i on i nf r ast r uct ur e gr ows and el abor at es. I t i s not at al l cl ear . Anot her k ey or gani zat i onal def i ci ency i s t he l ack of a coher ent st r at egi c appr oac h t o of f ensi ve and def ensi ve consi der at i ons f or i nf or mat i on war f ar e . However . s uc h pr obl ems wi l l not be sol ved by cr eat i ng new mi l i t ar y or gani zat i ons . The pr obl em goes bey ond t he ar med f or ces t o t he ent i r e nat i onal secur i t y i nf r ast r uct ur e . Par adoxi cal l y.i n. The Uni t ed St at es mus t be pr epar ed f or t hat event ual i t y . Nor i s t her e a si ngl e l ocus f or r equi r ement s gener at i on and st aki ng cl ai ms i n t he acqui si t i on pr ocess f or i nf or mat i on war f ar e . t he Joi nt Chi ef s of St af f . and mi l i t ar y ser vi ce depar t ment s) i s t he best way t o manage t he compl exi t i es of i nf or mat i on war f ar e as i t mi ght unf ol d i n 2020 . and has access poi nt s at a myr i ad of pl aces f or ot her s t o ent er t he syst em. The quest i on i s. as a r esul t . wi l l we be abl e t o pl an f or war i n 2020 wi t h t he vi ew t hat c ommuni c at i ons channel s wi l l be avai l abl e. wi t h l i t t l e concer n f or t he over al l ar chi t ect ur e or t he nat ur e and char act er i st i cs of t hose c hannel s ? I t s eems cl ear t hat i nf or mat i on war f ar e i n 2020 may r equi r e oper at or s t o have 82 . al t hough t he t echnol ogy of i nf or mat i on syst ems i s bec omi ng mor e capabl e and sophi st i cat ed.BATTLEFI ELD OFTHE FUTURE Al t hough count er i ng an adver sar y' s c ommand and cont r ol has al ways been a f eat ur e of war f ar e. i t i s act ual l y har der t o secur e t he US i nf or mat i on i nf r ast r uct ur e f r om at t acks . Thus. i t s r each ex pands bey ond t he cont r ol of any si ngl e ent i t y or any si ngl e nat i on . One cl ear i mpl i cat i on of war f ar e i n 2020 i s t hat al most any enemy wi l l t r y t o degr ade our i nf or mat i on syst em. Nowher e i n our syst em do we br i ng t oget her and i nt egr at e t he of f ensi ve and def ensi ve nat ur e of i nf or mat i on war f ar e . r egi onal and suppor t i ng commander s. DI SA i s not an oper at i onal c ommand . .chi ef .

Thi s i s a f undament al i ssue . " Ther e ar e al r eady many aut onomous syst ems avai l abl e t o t he c ommander t o i ncl ude unmanned ai r vehi cl es ( UAVs) . whi c h ar e bot h el abor at e and cr i t i cal t o successf ul mi l i t ar y oper at i ons . 83 . The shor t comi ng does not i nvol ve j ust cr ypt ol ogi c secur i t y. The c ommander who k nows hi s " human" syst ems but who does not under st and hi s " aut omat ed" syst ems wi l l be vul ner abl e t o sur pr i se. t hey ar e st r i vi ng t o i mpr ove per f or mance el ement s wi t hi n t he cur r ent or gani zat i onal st r uct ur e . s mar t mi nes. That i s. The mi l i t ar y t r adi t i onal l y has vi ewed i nf or mat i on ser vi ces. Ther e ar e exampl es of t he pr obl ems we c an ant i ci pat e i f s uc h " i nf or mat i on awar eness" i s not par t of t he f or ce . I n deal i ng wi t h t he i nf or mat i on r evol ut i on t hat i s af f ect i ng t he mi l i t ar y t oday. maneuver .THE REVOLUTI ON I N MI LI TARY AFFAI RS mor e f ami l i ar i t y wi t h how c ommands i nt er act i n or der f or t hese oper at or s t o execut e ef f ect i vel y st r at egy and oper at i ons . and t he l i ke . W e coul d mak e t he syst em cr ypt ol ogi cal l y secur e but st i l l be qui t e vul ner abl e . A pot ent i al enemy coul d si gni f i cant l y di sr upt our oper at i ons mer el y by deny i ng us i nf or mat i on. These syst ems ar e l i kel y t o be consi der abl y mor e wi despr ead i n 2020 t han t hey ar e t oday . may f ace a si gni f i cant i nf or mat i on war f ar e vul ner abi l i t y i n 2020 . and Tomahawk cr ui se mi ssi l es. al t hough t hat i s an ar ea t hat l ags oper at i onal channel s . The c ommander who does not under st and t he det ai l s of hi s l ogi st i cs i nf or mat i on syst em. They have yet t o addr ess t he i mpl i cat i ons of syst ems and capabi l i t i es t hat do not f i t wi t hi n t he cur r ent st r uct ur e . st r i ke. or t he pr ogr ammi ng of hi s aut onomous syst ems. as suppor t i ng i nput s t o t he act ual war f ar e f unct i ons of f i r e. i ncl udi ng i nt el l i gence and communi cat i ons. Knowi ng t he aut omat ed s y s t ems ent ai l s an under st andi ng of t he sof t war e pr ogr ammi ng " r ul es . The f i r st exampl e concer ns t he l ogi st i cs i nf or mat i on syst ems. unmanned under wat er vehi cl es ( UUVs) . t hese syst ems ar e gener al l y subj ect t o l ess st r i ngent secur i t y meas ur es t han ot her mi l i t ar y syst ems . among ot her s . t he US mi l i t ar y ser vi ces s eemt o be engaged i n i mpr ovi ng t hei r cur r ent c ommuni c at i on channel s .by si mpl y i nt er f er i ng wi t h l ogi st i cs t r ansmi ssi on l i nks . A second exampl e i s t he ant i ci pat ed pr obl ems associ at ed wi t h t he pr esence of aut omat ed syst ems on t he bat t l ef i el d of t he f ut ur e .possi bl y t o def eat . Despi t e t hei r cr i t i cal i t y.

BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE Howev er . I n met eor ol ogy. War i s t ypi cal l y nonl i near . W e def i ne domi nat i ng maneuv er as t he posi t i oni ng of f or cesi nt egr at ed wi t h pr eci si on st r i ke.c ompr es s ed t i me scal e. domi nat i ng maneuv er wi l l st r i ke at t he enemy cent er of gr avi t y t o put hi mi n an unt enabl e posi t i on. By 2020. but t he RMA pot ent i al l y of f er s t he abi l i t y t o c onduc t maneuv er on a gl obal scal e. He wr ot e t hat vi ct or y c omes not t hr ough wi nni ng bat t l es or i nf l i ct i ng at t r i t i on but t hr ough at t acki ng t he enemy 84 . Domi nat i ng Maneuv er One of t he mor e r ecent l y i dent i f i ed pot ent i al new war f ar e ar eas i s domi nat i ng maneuv er . l eavi ng hi mwi t h no choi ce but t o accept def eat or accede t o t he demands pl aced on hi m. space war f ar e.t o at t ack deci si ve poi nt s. def eat t he enemy cent er of gr avi t y. t he r equi r ement s of t he bat t l ef i el d wi l l be s uc h t hat t r adi t i onal hi er ar chi cal c ommand and cont r ol ar r angement s wi l l be obsol et e . The r api d r at e of gr owt h of t hese t ypes of new or gani zat i onal ent i t i es woul d s eem t o suggest st r engt hs t hat t he mi l i t ar y woul d be wi se t o exami ne . I n t he ear l y ni net eent h cent ur y. Maneuv er has al ways been an essent i al el ement i n war f ar e. Thi s mak es i t bot h mor e i mpor t ant and mor e chal l engi ng t o get t he or gani zat i onal i ssue r i ght . Whi l e pr eci si on st r i ke and i nf or mat i on war f ar e ar e dest r oyi ng enemy asset s and di sr upt i ng hi s si t uat i onal awar eness. and " vi r t ual or gani zat i ons" ar e gr owi ng l i ke cul t ur es on a pet r i di sh . Cl ausewi t z made si mi l ar obser vat i ons when di scussi ng t he f or mul at i on of successf ul st r at egy . and wi t h gr eat l y r educed f or ces . at l east i n s ome mi l i t ar i es. I n mos t or gani zat i ons t oday. and i nf or mat i on war oper at i ons. meani ng t hat t he smal l est ef f ect s c an hav e unpr edi ct ed. di spr opor t i onat e c ons equenc es . t he decent r al i zat i on t r end i s al r eady wel l est abl i shed . nonl i near i t y i s i l l ust r at ed t hr ough t he " but t er f l y ef f ect " . i t mi ght t ake a l eadi ng r ol e i n f ut ur e c ampai gns . I nf or mat i on t echnol ogy i s mak i ng di st r i but ed s y s t ems c ommonpl ac e. and accompl i sh c ampai gn or war obj ect i ves .a but t er f l y f l appi ng i t s wi ngs i n t he sout her n hemi spher e c an set of f a st r i ng of r eact i ons t hat event ual l y r esul t i n a vi ol ent st or m i n t he nor t her n hemi spher e . on a muc h. i nf or mat i on war f ar e mi ght not al way s be a suppor t i ng f unct i on .

THE REVOLUTI ON I N MI LI TARY AFFAI RS cent er of gr avi t y. The concept has a number of ot her i mpl i cat i ons f or oper at i ons.dependi ng on t he si t uat i on.coul d be hi s ar my. Under t hese ci r cumst ances. Domi nat i ng maneuv er seeks t o expl oi t t he i ncr easi ng compl exi t y and nonl i near i t y i n war f ar e by st r i ki ng di r ect l y at t he enemy cent er of gr avi t y i n or der t o di sr upt hi s cohesi on and cause hi s swi f t col l apse . we wi l l have t o f i ght usi ng t he cont i nent al Uni t ed St at es as our pr i nci pal base of oper at i ons. and i nf or mat i on war f ar e . space war f ar e. hi s l eader s. not necessar i l y on t he bat t l ef i el d . or hi s pr i nci pal al l y . t hey c an be posi t i oned any wher e i n a t heat er . t he nonl i near nat ur e of war i s l i kel y t o i ncr ease . whi c h. Maneuv er r ef er s t o t he " empl oyment of f or ces on t he bat t l ef i el d t hr ough mov ement i n combi nat i on wi t h f i r es. I t goes beyond " combi nat i on wi t h f i r es" by i nt egr at i ng i t s ef f ect s wi t h t he ef f ect s f r om pr eci si on st r i ke. domi nat i ng maneuv er wi l l r equi r e new oper at i onal concept s t hat t ake i nt o account t he deci si ve i mpor t ance of 85 . t r anscendi ng t he r ol e of or di nar y maneuv er . i t appear s t hat t he compl exi t y of war f ar e has i ncr eased as mi l i t ar y f or ces and t hei r l ogi st i cal and pol i t i cal under pi nni ngs have bec ome mor e compl i cat ed . t o achi eve a posi t i on of advant age wi t h r espect t o t he enemy i n or der t o accompl i sh t he mi ssi on . I n t he cour se of t he t went i et h cent ur y. Fi r st of al l . not necessar i l y t hei r empl oy ment . mak i ng t he maneuv er bat t l espace or der s of magni t ude l ar ger t han i t was i n Deser t St or m. I t s ul t i mat e pur pose i s di r ect l y t o achi eve c ampai gn and war obj ect i ves. and t echnol ogi es as wel l . By 2020 our compet i t or s coul d wel l chal l enge our nat i onal i nt er est s i n r egi ons wher e t hey enj oy t he advant age of cl ose pr oxi mi t y. Domi nat i ng maneuv er does not r equi r e super i or i t y at al l poi nt s i n t he bat t l espace or i mpl y domi nat i on of t he ent i r e maneuv er . and we may hav e nei t her a l engt hy bui l dup per i od t o mar s hal our f or ces nor access t o a cont i nent al i nf r ast r uct ur e t o suppor t our f or ces i n t he t heat er . " 3 Domi nat i ng maneuv er r ef er s t o t he posi t i oni ng of f or ces. Wi t h i ncr easi ng compl exi t y. or gani zat i on. hi s capi t al . Domi nat i ng maneuv er i s di st i nct f r om maneuv er i n sever al way s . Domi nat i ng maneuv er coul d al l ow gr ound f or ces t o oper at e successf ul l y i n si t uat i ons wher e t hey cannot domi nat e t he ent i r e bat t l espace .

The I nchon l andi ng dur i ng t he Kor ean W ar was anot her oper at i on t hat i l l ust r at es t he pr i nci pl es under l yi ng domi nat i ng maneuv er . I t wi l l be essent i al t o at t ai n oper at i onal and st r at egi c obj ect i ves t hr ough si mul t aneous i nf or mat i on war f ar e. I nst ead of gr adual l y r ol l i ng t he Nor t h Kor eans bac k f r om Pusan.BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE t i me. Mor e 86 . al t hough on a smal l er scal e . The l andi ng par al yzed t he al r eady over st r et ched Nor t h Kor ean f or ces. and maneuv er s agai nst t he enemy' s cr i t i cal poi nt s r at her t han t hr ough a ser i es of pi t ched bat t l es agai nst enemy f or ces . Mac Ar t hur pl anned t o cut t hem of f and put t hem i nt o an ext r emel y vul ner abl e posi t i on . pr eci si on st r i ke. The Ger man i nvasi on of Nor way i n Apr i l 1940 was a campai gn waged successf ul l y i n a way anal ogous t o domi nat i ng maneuver . mak i ng f ut ur e maneuv er mor e s i mul t aneous t han sequent i al . ent i r el y new concept s may be r equi r ed . t he sur r ender of t he Osl o gar r i son pr eci pi t at ed t he capi t ul at i on of t he Nor wegi an monar c hy and f or ced t he Al l i ed deci si on not t o bec ome heavi l y engaged on t he Scandi navi an peni nsul a .t hei r dependence on t he t r anspor t at i on bot t l eneck at Seoul . A si ngl e ai r bor ne maneuv er i nt o Osl o on Apr i l 9. 1940. The devel opment of f or ms of mobi l i t y not possessed by t he enemy coul d hel p gener at e maneuv er domi nanc e . space war f ar e. Fur t her evol ut i on of t he Ar my' s ai r l and oper at i ons or t he Mar i ne Cor ps' s oper at i onal maneuv er f r om t he sea coul d l ead t o s uc h a concept . The maneuv er gave t he Ger man c ommander a t i me advant age dur i ng whi c h he coul d r ei nf or ce f ast er t han t he Nor wegi ans c oul d mobi l i ze or t he Al l i es c oul d depl oy . t he Uni t ed St at es wi l l have t o devel op new means f or t he mov ement of gr ound f or ces . i nduced t he sur r ender of t he ci t y' s gar r i son by cr eat i ng t he per cept i on t hat t hei r cause was hopel ess . and t hey br oke i nt o di sor gani zed f r agment s t hat r et r eat ed i n di sar r ay. Gen Dougl as MacAr t hur ' s pl an t o capt ur e Seoul t hr ough an amphi bi ous l andi ng at I nchon st r uck at one of t he cr i t i cal vul ner abi l i t i es of t he Nor t h Kor ean f or ces. Mor eover . To execut e domi nat i ng maneuv er i n 2020. Fi ght i ng cont i nued on t he f r i nges of Nor way f or si x weeks. i ncapabl e of ser i ous r esi st ance . On t he ot her hand. but t he ai r bor ne maneuv er l ed di r ect l y t o deci si ve r esul t s .

Despi t e t hei r maneuv er domi nanc e.ar ms uni t s t hat coul d mas s c ombat power qui ckl y.movi ng ar mor ed c ol umns . and empl oyi ng ai r i nt er di ct i on t o degr ade Al l i ed mobi l i t y .equi val ent f or ce acr oss t he oceans i n seven days or l ess .f l ung advances over t he vast di st ances of t he Sovi et Uni on . and new or gani zat i ons . The danger s of f ai l ur e i n t hi s ar ea ar e exempl i f i ed by t he Ger man c ampai gn i n t he Sovi et Uni on i n 1941 . 87 . The Ger mans gener at ed maneuv er domi nanc e on t he gr ound by empl oyi ng c ombi ned. The dual i mper at i ves of mobi l i t y and l ogi st i cs may cr eat e t he need f or smal l er f or ces and new t r anspor t at i on t echnol ogi es . whi c h wer e i nadequat e t o t he needs of suppor t i ng f ar . whos e deci mat ed ai r f or ce and poor l y or gani zed gr ound f or ces coul d not st op t he Ger mans' f ast . wi t h l i t t l e t i me f or l ogi st i cal bui l dups and wi t h i nsecur e l i nes of c ommuni c at i ons . wi l l c ompel changes i n t he suppl y and suppor t of gr ound f or ces . Al ong wi t h new f or ms of mobi l i t y. The Ger mans i nt ended t o use t hei r maneuv er domi nanc e f i r st t o at t r i t t he Red Ar my and t hen t o sei ze Mos c ow. new oper at i onal concept s. suppor t i ng t hem wi t h f ast mov i ng " aer i al ar t i l l er y" i n t he f or m of cl ose ai r suppor t . t he Uni t ed St at es wi l l r equi r e advances i n l ogi st i cal suppor t t o mai nt ai n t he ef f ect i veness of f or ces engaged i n domi nat i ng maneuv er .l ar gel y bec aus e of t hei r l ogi st i cs. st r essi ng aggr essi veness. whos e capt ur e woul d sever t he Sovi et s' t r anspor t at i on net wor k and par al yze t hei r pol i t i cal appar at us . t he Ger mans f ai l ed. t he Ger mans qui ckl y est abl i shed c ompl et e maneuv er domi nanc e over t he Sovi et s. Fut ur e at t empt s at domi nat i ng maneuv er may si mi l ar l y c ome t o gr i ef as a r esul t of shor t comi ngs i n l ogi st i cs . I n t he f ut ur e. The need t o oper at e f ar f r om exi st i ng bases. t he Uni t ed St at es may r equi r e t he abi l i t y t o mov e a cor ps. The cur r ent St r at egi c Mobi l i t y St udy has as i t s obj ect i ve t he i nt er cont i nent al depl oyment of a heavy br i gade i n 15 days and a heavy cor ps i n 75 days . devel opi ng a f ast er c ommand and cont r ol syst em t o est abl i sh C2 domi nance. as t he Ger mans demonst r at ed i n May 1940 . I n t hi s c ampai gn. The r evol ut i onar y per i od t hat we ar e cur r ent l y ent er i ng wi l l hav e i t s own f or ms of maneuv er t hat wi l l r equi r e new t echnol ogi es.THE REVOLUTI ON I N MI LI TARY AFFAI RS advanced concept s f or compar abl e f or ms of mobi l i t y al so coul d gi ve a deci si ve advant age.

As adv anc ed s ens or s and convent i onal weapons t echnol ogi es pr ol i f er at e and pr ovi de gr eat er st and. r ange. Pr ogr ess i n t hese concept ual and t echnol ogi cal ar eas wi l l enabl e maneuv er t o pl ay a si gni f i cant r ol e i n t he RMA.of f r anges f or enemy f or ces. Suc h t act i cs woul d combi ne decept i on and bombar dment wi t h i nf i l t r at i on and at t acks agai nst st r ong poi nt s .depl oyed on naval pl at f or ms .shoot er net wor k .obser vabi l i t y t echni ques t o maneuv er syst ems . W e need t o devel op advanced pr opul si on t echnol ogi es t o gi ve our maneuv er syst ems gr eat er speed. or speci al oper at i ons f or ces. t hr ough or gani zat i onal changes cr eat i ng smal l er uni t s wi t h usef ul c ombat power t hat coul d depl oy f ast er or be f or war d. W e shoul d begi n now t o appl y l ow.St i ngr ay or i nf est at i on t act i cswoul d be usef ul . Never t hel ess. and agi l i t y . maneuv er wi l l be essent i al agai nst an enemy unwi l l i ng t o concede def eat unl ess t he Uni t ed St at es def eat s cent er s of gr avi t y t hat cannot be at t acked wi t hout maneuv er f or ces . The Uni t ed St at es may need new t echnol ogi es i f i t empl oys s uc h t act i cs and seeks t o mai nt ai n t he l ead t hat i t s f or ces pos s es s i n cl ose c ombat . I t i s possi bl e t hat pr eci si on st r i ke and i nf or mat i on war f ar e wi l l mak e maneuv er unnecessar y i n cer t ai n si t uat i ons or t hat enemy pr ogr ess i n t hese ar eas wi l l mak e maneuv er di f f i cul t . The or gani zat i on and t act i cs of s uc h gr ound f or ces ar e di f f i cul t t o vi sual i ze t oday . mar i nes. The gr ound f or ces may be a smal l number of Ar my i nf ant r ymen. or t hr ough way s not yet concei ved . t he nat i onal aer ospace pl ane. and super soni c t r anspor t s .BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE Thi s capabi l i t y mi ght be achi eved t hr ough t he expl oi t at i on of new t r anspor t at i on t echnol ogy s uc h as f ast sea t r anspor t s capabl e of 100 knot s or mor e. del i ver ed deep i n enemy t er r i t or y by ai r and equi pped wi t h hi gh. Domi nat i ng maneuv er may pr ovi de t he c oup de gr ace i n f ut ur e war s.based or at mospher i c st r i ke syst ems. and i n ot her si t uat i ons may ser ve as t he 88 . Some have suggest ed t hat t went yf i r st cent ur y var i ant s of t he so.cal l ed Hut i er t act i c devel oped by t he Ger mans i n Wor l d War I . t he Uni t ed St at es shoul d concent r at e on achi evi ng capabi l i t i es t hat wi l l al l ow i t t o l eap ahead of t hese devel opment s . i n ef f ect act i ng as par t of a sensor .t echnol ogy l i nkages t o space. W e al so need new means t o enhanc e t he l et hal i t y of our muni t i ons and t he pr ot ect i ve char act er i st i cs of our mat er i al s and syst ems .

l i ke ai r oper at i ons i n t he Fi r st Wor l d War . Ai r cr af t f i l l ed an essent i al r ol e i n suppor t i ng t he gr ound and naval f or ces i n t he Fi r st Wor l d War t hr ough obser vat i on.wi nni ng space war f ar e. and navi gat i on .THE REVOLUTI ON I N MI LI TARY AFFAI RS enabl er f or war .r eal . Sat el l i t es enabl e near . Al t hough t hi s t heor y of st r at egi c bombi ng met wi t h l i mi t ed success i n t he Sec ond Wor l d War . may mak e possi bl e 89 .t i me. sensi ng. space asset s coul d pr ovi de mor e t han suppor t f or t he t er r est r i al war f i ght er i n t he f ut ur e . a capabi l i t y t hat was gr eat l y ex panded dur i ng Wor l d War I I . gr ound at t ack. t he f our t h f ut ur e war f ar e ar ea of i mpor t ance. pr eci si on st r i ke oper at i ons .t i me. or Spac e War f ar e W e def i ne space war f ar e. I t i ncl udes f acet s of t he ot her t hr ee war f ar e ar eas but has t he pot ent i al t o bec ome a qual i t at i vel y di st i nct war f ar e ar ea i n i t s own r i ght . i nf or mat i on war . gl obal mi l i t ar y oper at i ons .based syst ems f or i t s ever yday oper at i ons and especi al l y dur i ng t i mes of conf l i ct has hi ghl i ght ed t he i mpor t ance of space oper at i ons . whi c h si mi l ar l y expl oi t ed i nher ent advant ages i n al t i t ude and speed . Thes e capabi l i t i es. The evol ut i on of space oper at i ons i s c ompar abl e t o t he devel opment of ai r war f ar e. However . t he concept cul mi nat ed i n t he devel opment of t he i nt er cont i nent al nucl ear det er r ent af t er t he Sec ond Wor l d W ar . t i mi ng. ant i obser vat i on.r eal . Mor eover . and communi cat i ons .spect r um. bet ween t he wor l d war s t he Uni t ed St at es and Gr eat Br i t ai n devel oped ai r power as a means of l eapf r oggi ng convent i onal gr ound and naval bat t l es t o enabl e di r ect st r i kes on t he enemy' s abi l i t y t o wage war . near . The US mi l i t ar y' s i ncr easi ng r el i ance on suppor t f r om space. l ar ger ai r cr af t c ame i nt o ser vi ce i n t he f or m of ci vi l and mi l i t ar y t r anspor t . Bet ween t he war s. The s pac e env i r onment of f er s t he possi bi l i t y of c onduc t i ng wor l dwi de mi l i t ar y oper at i ons i n a gr eat l y r educed t i me f r ame . cur r ent l y pr ovi de suppor t essent i al f or t he successf ul oper at i ons of t er r est r i al f or ces . as t he expl oi t at i on of t he space envi r onment t o c onduc t f ul l . wor l d wi de communi cat i ons. Spac e oper at i ons. anal ogous t o t he r ol es of t he obser vat i on bal l oons and ai r cr af t of t he Fi r st Wor l d War .

i f pr oper l y pl aced and empl oyed. as a r esul t .cr i t i cal si t uat i ons .of . space i s not amenabl e t o human l i f e. 000 mi l es per hour ) t hat f ar sur pass t hose cur r ent l y achi evabl e i n t he at mospher e . does hav e l i mi t i ng f act or s t hat coul d const r ai n i t s mi l i t ar y use .t he. Or bi t al mechani cs r equi r e oper at i ng speeds ( 17. However . Fur t her . An ef f ect i ve ant i sat el l i t e ( ASAT) capabi l i t y coul d l ead t o t he abi l i t y t o achi eve aer ospace cont r ol or super i or i t y i n or der t o deny an opponent t he abi l i t y t o oper at e i n or f r om space . t hus l i mi t i ng t he manned pr esence i n f ut ur e space oper at i ons . t he " geogr aphy" of space i s f undament al l y di f f er ent f r om t hat of t he ear t h' s at mospher e . Fi r st . Fi r st . As a r esul t . Al t hough cur r ent l y l i mi t ed. One possi bl e mi ssi on i s t o use space f or ces t o pr oj ect power t o di r ect l y achi eve nat i onal obj ect i ves ( oper at i onal or st r at egi c) i n a par t i cul ar t heat er . Thus.ar t ai r cr af t . however . coul d of f er t he means t o c ommand and cont r ol oper at i ons i n t heat er s wher e di st ance and t er r ai n compl i cat e or conf ound t er r est r i al l y based syst ems . t he speeds associ at ed wi t h space 90 . Thus. space asset s coul d per f or m mi ssi ons i n muc h l ess t i me t han st at e. An ASAT syst em woul d f ol l ow i n t he f oot st eps of t he f i r st f i ght er ai r cr af t t hat duel ed f or cont r ol of t he ai r over t he t r enches of t he Fi r st Wor l d War and i s a l ogi cal ext ensi on of t he cur r ent r ol e of ai r super i or i t y f i ght er s and devel opi ng t heat er ai r def ense syst ems . I n addi t i on. t he al t i t ude advant ages pr ovi ded by space gr eat l y i mpr ove sur vei l l ance and r econnai ssance cover age of t he ear t h and. Spac e st r i ke syst ems based on sat el l i t es or on t r ansat mospher i c vehi cl es coul d enabl e pr eci si on st r i kes whos e quant i t at i ve advant age i n speed woul d r esul t i n a qual i t at i ve di f f er ence i n capabi l i t y . Space. space oper at i ons wi l l al so gr eat l y di f f er f r om ai r oper at i ons . f ut ur e capabi l i t i es i n space t r anspor t may al so mak e possi bl e t he mov ement of cr i t i cal f or ces and equi pment f r om CONUS t o a t heat er i n t i me f r ames an or der of magni t ude f ast er t han wi t h cur r ent sea and ai r t r anspor t .BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE domi nant bat t l ef i el d awar eness and coor di nat i on of a gl obal pr eci si on st r i ke ar chi t ect ur e . mos t of t he i mpr ovement s i n f ut ur e space oper at i ons wi l l mos t l i kel y c ome t hr ough unmanned t echnol ogi es . space oper at i ons may pr ovi de i mpor t ant advant ages i n t i me.

based i ndust r i es. i f t he Uni t ed St at es bec omes dependent on r esour ces uni que t o space ( such as He3 on t he moon) .based st r i ke. and space t r anspor t bec ome mi l i t ar i l y usabl e capabi l i t i es .based di r ect ed.THE REVOLUTI ON I N MI LI TARY AFFAI RS f l i ght and t he amount s of f uel r equi r ed t o maneuv er i n or bi t usi ng cur r ent t echnol ogi es and ener gy sour ces gr eat l y l i mi t t he f l exi bi l i t y of spacecr af t i n or bi t . For exampl e.or bi t ( SSTO) l aunch vehi cl es.based oper at i ons) . and sour ces of ener gy mor e power f ul and ef f i ci ent t han chemi cal r eact i ons may be needed t o mak e t hese syst ems t r ul y ef f ect i ve . However . Spac e war f ar e wi l l l i kel y bec ome i t s own war f ar e ar ea onl y when t her e i s need t o conduct mi l i t ar y oper at i ons i n space t o obt ai n sol el y space.t o. space. new t echnol ogi es s uc h as new mat er i al s t o r educe wei ght .r el at ed goal s ( not mi s s i ons t hat ar e conduct ed t o suppor t ear t h. For exampl e.based di st r i but ed net wor ks t o r educe t he vul ner abi l i t y of space capabi l i t i es .st age.based bal l i st i c mi ssi l e def ense ( BAD) . One of our wor ki ng hypot heses i s t hat t he t r ul y r evol ut i onar y ef f ect s wi l l c ome f r om t he combi nat i on of t wo or mor e newwar f ar e ar eas . s ome combi nat i on of space and i nf or mat i on war f ar e may pr ovi de cer t ai n advant ages her et of or e i mpossi bl e t o gener at e . sat el l i t e def ense syst ems. c ommand and cont r ol nodes. As a r esul t .ener gy weapons ( DEW) or ki net i c ener gy weapons ( KEW) . space. ant i sat el l i t e syst ems.based and gr ound. smal l sat el l i t es. and bot h space.ear t h dependent . sever al possi bl e i mpl i cat i ons hav e begun t o c ome i nt o f ocus . space oper at i ons woul d be al t oget her r emov ed f r om any congr uence wi t h t r adi t i onal ai r oper at i ons and woul d undoubt edl y bec ome a di st i nct war f ar e ar ea .r esi st ant and st r ess. t he Uni t ed St at es may be abl e t o 91 . si ngl e.at mospher i c vehi cl es ( TAVs) . or col oni es t hat ar e ent i r el y non. si zabl e t echni cal hur dl es have t o be over come bef or e space. I mpl i cat i ons : Domi nant Bat t l espace Awar enes s Though our under st andi ng of t he unf ol di ng RMA and i t s pot ent i al l y new war f ar e ar eas i s st i l l evol vi ng. mor e heat . spacel i f t . Ther ef or e. i t may be f or ced t o devel op t echnol ogi es and oper at i onal concept s t o s uppor t / def end space. I n s uc h si t uat i ons.r esi st ant mat er i al s. Syst ems t hat coul d enabl e f ut ur e space oper at i ons mi ght i ncl ude t r ans.

f l yi ng at ver y hi gh al t i t udes.boar d i mpr ovement i n our r econnai ssance. anal ysi s. Thi s i nf or mat i on woul d t r ansl at e i nt o t he abi l i t y t o k now f or ce l ocat i ons and char act er i st i cs ( i ncl udi ng di st i ngui shi ng bet ween t ar get s and decoys and among t ar get t ypes) at al l t i mes .bas ed pl at f or ms . t her eby gai ni ng a pot ent i al st ep. W e may wel l see st eal t hy unmanned aer i al vehi cl es ( UAVs) . The appl i cat i on of such a syst em of syst ems may gener at e si gni f i cant l y gr eat er capabi l i t i es i n t i mes of conf l i ct . and dat a t r ansmi ssi on asset s . One pot ent i al r esul t may be t he abi l i t y t o gener at e domi nant bat t l espace awar eness ( DBA) over a par t i cul ar enemy . As a r esul t . t he const ant moni t or i ng r equi r ed may i ncr easi ngl y emphas i z e ai r bor ne and t er r est r i al sensor s r at her t han s pac e. conduct i ng a gr eat er shar e of t he col l ect i on dut i es t han do manned ai r cr af t . i n a par t i cul ar conf l i ct . Thi s woul d be especi al l y t r ue i f 92 . I n t he col l ect i on ar ena. but woul d al l ow t he Uni t ed St at es t o det ect al l obser vabl e phenomenol ogy whi l e l i mi t i ng t he enemy' s knowl edge .st r i ke ar chi t ect ur e . t o gener at e domi nant bat t l espace awar eness f or a gi ven conf l i ct woul d r equi r e bor r owi ng f r om bot h nat i onal asset s and t hose asset s dedi cat ed t o ot her t heat er s . Ef f i ci ency i n mi l i t ar y st r i ke oper at i ons s houl d be enhanc ed by s uc h an ac r os s .f unct i on i ncr ease i n our i nf or mat i on capabi l i t i es . An advant age such as DBA woul d pr obabl y r equi r e a l ar ge per cent age of t he t ot al US sensi ng. t he DBA ar chi t ect ur e coul d i ncl ude mec hani s ms f or di ssemi nat i ng t hi s dat a di r ect l y t o t he appr opr i at e st r i ke syst ems and conduct i ng const ant bat t l e damage assessment s ( BDA) .t he. what mi ght i t s i mpl i cat i ons be i n a f ut ur e conf l i ct wi t h a r egi onal compet i t or ? The enemy' s goal mi ght be t o achi eve a br eakt hr ough qui ckl y and pus h t he US f or ces out of t he count r y bef or e t hey coul d be r ei nf or ced . Adv anc ement s i n i nf or mat i on pr ocessi ng shoul d enabl e f ast er anal ysi s of t he dat a. whi l e di ssemi nat i on c an be di r ect l y l i nked t o t he shoot er s . Fur t her mor e.BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE achi eve a degr ee of i nf or mat i on domi nanc e over an enemy by bot h si gni f i cant l y degr adi ng hi s i nf or mat i on f l ow and enhanc i ng our s. Havi ng est abl i shed t he possi bi l i t y of gener at i ng DBA. Thi s awar enes s woul d not magi cal l y pr ovi de per f ect i nt el l i gence.

t he v ol ume of t ar get s made avai l abl e t hr ough DBA coul d si mpl y ov er whel m US st r i ke capabi l i t i es .st ar t at t ack woul d i mpr ove t he pr ospect of t he Uni t ed St at es gener at i ng bat t l espace awar eness . wi t h as f ew l osses as possi bl e . One l i kel y i mpl i cat i on may be t hat a f or ce wi t h a gr eat er number of l ong.THE REVOLUTI ON I N MI LI TARY AFFAI RS t he enemy k new of our abi l i t y t o gener at e DBA and f ear ed t he consequences .of . A capabi l i t y s uc h as DBA coul d af f ect bot h t he syst ems t he Uni t ed St at es f i el ds and t he oper at i onal concept s desi gned t o empl oy t hemi n s uc h a conf l i ct . when t hey ar e on t he move) . Thi s coul d l ead t o muc h i mpr oved l oss/ exchange r at i os and t he oppor t uni t y 93 .r ange st r i ke syst ems. a f or ce desi gned t o maxi mi ze t he i mpact of DBA mi ght exacer bat e s ome di f f i cul t i es f aced by t oday' s f or ces . Bot h of t hese pr obl ems. woul d be f ar mor e l et hal i n at t r i t i ng enemy f or ces t han woul d t r adi t i onal f or ces . anot her f or ce st r uct ur e i mpl i cat i on of DBA may be t he abi l i t y t o t r ul y do mor e wi t h l ess . The Uni t ed St at es woul d pr es umabl y desi r e t o st op t he at t ack as soon as possi bl e. t hen t he ent i r e t i me l i ne of t he conf l i ct f r om l ocat i ng t ar get s.t i me BDAbegi n t o di ssi pat e . I f t he val ue of DBA can be shar ed t hr oughout t he f or ce. g .r eal . Roughl y 24 hour s of war ni ng bef or e t he l aunch of a st andi ng.magni t ude i ncr ease i n t he f or ce' s l et hal i t y . and t he c ommander wi l l have t he abi l i t y t o c ommi t r eser ves pr eci sel y wher e and when t hey ar e needed . As not ed above. we may be abl e t o use smal l er f or ces t o bl unt t he at t ack because t hey wi l l be cover ed mor e ef f ect i vel y by f i r e suppor t . domi nant bat t l espace awar eness may al so pr ovi de benef i t s t hat ext end bey ond si mpl y i ncr easi ng t he ef f ect i veness of l ong. For exampl e. On t he ot her hand. and near . .i nt ensi ve f or ce wi l l r equi r e a ver y l ar ge i nvent or y of muni t i ons .r ange pr eci si on. A f or ce heavi l y wei ght ed t owar d l ong. st r i ki ng t hem. t i ed t o DBA. may not go away . Thus.st r i ke weapons may not compl et el y ov er c ome t hi s pr obl em but may st i l l pr ovi de an or der .r ange st r i kes . t he ef f i ci ency of US pr eci si on st r i ke c ampai gns coul d i ncr ease subst ant i al l y as cur r ent pr obl ems s uc h as pr ompt t ar get i ng. such a f i r e. det er mi ni ng t he best t i me t o st r i ke t hem ( e . Second. r eal l ocat i on of asset s. sel ect i on of t he pr oper muni t i ons. I f DBA can t el l us wher e t he mai n axi s of at t ack i s comi ng. l ast seen i n t he Gul f War . and t hen assessi ng t he success of t he at t ack coul d event ual l y bec ome seaml ess . Fi r st .

c ued st r i kes t o t ar get t hem mor e easi l y on t he mov e .vi s NBC us e . Fi nal l y. t he deep under gr ound t ar get s t hat t ypi cal l y hous e NBC syst ems and i nf r ast r uct ur e woul d be i mpossi bl e f or DBA t o penet r at e . Thes e maneuv er s c an al so be f ar l ess r i sky bec aus e t he pl anner s c an sel ect l andi ng obj ect i ves t hey k now t o be f r ee of enemy f or ces . DBA coul d al l ow t he Uni t ed St at es t o def eat an enemy qui cker and wi t h f ewer l osses t han i s cur r ent l y possi bl e . bi ol ogi cal . wi t h t he goal of di sl odgi ng t he enemy and al l owi ng DBA. DBA wi l l not hel p t he Uni t ed St at es gauge t he enemy' s i nt ent i ons vi s. Never t hel ess. or chemi cal ( NBC) weapons . i f t he above i mpl i cat i ons ar e bor ne out . The di scussi on i s i nt ended pr i mar i l y t o st i mul at e t hi nki ng.val ue t ar get s muc h ear l i er i n a conf l i ct . One ex ampl e may be a count r y wi t h l ar ge i nvent or i es of nucl ear .f i r st 94 . Ev en af t er a hi ghl y successf ul at t r i t i on campai gn.a. Us e of t hese weapons may t ake t he f or m of l i mi t ed chemi cal at t acks on por t s and ai r bases or coul d even i ncl ude nucl ear at t acks agai nst US f or ces . US f or ces may i nevi t abl y r un i nt o r esi dual enemy f or ces on t he gr ound and t he r esul t i ng bat t l e may be t oo conf i ned f or DBA. At t he s ame t i me. f ar l i ght er f or ces coul d al so be used f or domi nat i ng maneuver s. Anot her pot ent i al ar ea i n whi c h DBA' s i mpact may be l i mi t ed i s cl ose bat t l e . ei t her ai r mobi l e or amphi bi ous. Fur t her mor e.c ued f i r es t o be of muc h ut i l i t y .t hi nki ng i n uni que and mor e meani ngf ul way s about how war f ar e i n t he t went y. Si mi l ar l y. Al most cer t ai nl y.BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE t o di r ect cer t ai n asset s agai nst ot her hi gh. we woul d have t o r ecogni ze t hat t her e woul d be sever al cat egor i es of t ar get s wher e DBA woul d not have a l ar ge i mpact . Conc l us i ons Thi s descr i pt i on of t he r evol ut i on i n mi l i t ar y af f ai r s i s nei t her def i ni t i ve nor concl usi ve . a smal l er f or ce may be capabl e of expl oi t i ng a successf ul def ense wi t h a count er of f ensi ve f ar sooner t han t oday because we coul d i dent i f y t he pat h of l east r esi st ance and f ocus our f i r e suppor t and c ommi t our r eser ves mor e pr eci sel y and i n a mor e t i mel y manner .

Fi gur e 1 . and space war f ar e . i nf or mat i on war f ar e. t i me. Spac e war f ar e wi l l enabl e t he Uni t ed St at es t o pr oj ect f or ce at dr amat i cal l y i ncr eased speeds i n r esponse t o cont i ngenci es whi l e denyi ng t he enemy t he abi l i t y t o do t he s ame.ur gent t ar get s .f or ces and t ur n hi s " f og of war " i nt o a wal l of i gnor ance . What we need t o do now i s devel op t he det ai l s of how we can conduct s uc h war f ar e agai nst var i ous cat egor i es of compet i t or s .as wel l as our .THE REVOLUTI ON I N MI LI TARY AFFAI RS cent ur y may be f undament al l y di f f er ent t han i t i s t oday and. At l east t hat i s t he over al l concept . Pr eci si on st r i ke wi l l hol d an enemy at a di st ance and bl i nd and i mmobi l i z e hi m by des t r oy i ng oper at i onal l y and st r at egi cal l y cr uci al . domi nat i ng maneuv er . El ement s of t he Pr esent RMA 95 . W e expect t hat t he t r ue r evol ut i onar y i mpact of f ut ur e changes i n t he conduct of war f ar e wi l l c ome f r om t he i nt er sect i on of pr eci si on st r i ke. Domi nat i ng maneuv er wi l l depl oy t he r i ght f or ces at t he r i ght t i me and pl ace t o c aus e t he enemy' s psychol ogi cal col l apse and compl et e capi t ul at i on .of t he war . I nf or mat i on war f ar e wi l l deny an enemy cr i t i cal knowl edge of hi s own.i f not t he out c ome. eval uat i ng what we shoul d be doi ng now t o pr epar e our sel ves f or t hat event ual i t y . of equal i mpor t ance. Mi l i t ar y oper at i ons i n al l f our war f ar e ar eas wi l l be i nt egr at ed i nt o an over al l oper at i onal pl an t hat wi l l be deci si ve i n t er ms of t he cour se.

and mus t l et go of t he convent i onal modes of oper at i on . W and our appr oaches t o pl anni ng i f we ar e t o be pr epar ed f or ei t her t he emer gence of a l ar ge peer RMA compet i t or or t he sur pr i se of a t r ue ni che compet i t or . mus t t hi nk t he unt hi nkabl e. 96 . but ar e not i nnovat i ve may i n t he l ong r un t hey may s quander pot ent i al advant ages e mus t al t er our t hi nki ng needed agai nst f ut ur e compet i t or s . The i mpet us f or change mus t f l ow t hr ough t he ent i r e or gani zat i on.f r om l eader shi p . But a concer t ed. t hat accept s honest mi st akes. As an or gani zat i on. we need t o devel op a br oad st r at egy.a. t hat encour ages exper i ment at i on. None of t hi s wi l l be easy . Fai l ur e t o t hi nk i magi nat i vel y about t he f ut ur e may r esul t i n a f ai l ur e t o mai nt ai n t he mi l i t ar y advant ages our f or ces so ar . The r equi r ed changes cannot occur wi t hout t he s uppor t and enc our agement of l eader shi p and t he ent hus i as mand cooper at i on of t he ent i r e or gani zat i on . t he c hange mus t c ome f r om t he t op.a st r at egy r obust enough t o enc ompas s and cope wi t h t he massi ve uncer t ai nt y we f ace . W e need t o t hi nk t hr ough what we woul d l i ke t he f ut ur e t o l ook l i ke and devel op a st r at egy f or shapi ng i t t o t hat end . W e need t o be cl ear ( i f not al ways expl i ci t ) about our goal s. and t hat mak es pr ovi si ons f or st ar t i ng over .vi s our al l i es as wel l as our compet i t or s . The mi l i t ar y mus t nur t ur e an at t i t ude t hat suppor t s f r ee t hi nki ng.a change i n t he way we t hi nk about pr epar i ng f or t he f ut ur e . Fi r st .BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE A number of c hanges mus t occur i f t he Uni t ed St at es mi l i t ar y i s goi ng t o compet e successf ul l y on t he bat t l ef i el ds of 2020 . t her e mus t be a change i n out l ook . To be successf ul . To be successf ul and l ast i ng. vi s. Appr oac hes t hat cl ear l y demonst r at ed dur i ng t he Gul f W pr ove adequat e i n t he shor t t er m. especi al l y t hr ough t he educat i on syst em. mus t consi der al t er nat i ve f ut ur es. and f ocused ef f or t by t he Def ense Depar t ment coul d pay di vi dends i n t he decades t o c ome i n way s as yet unf or eseen . f ai l ur e t o change wi l l ensur e t hat we wi l l not gai n t he mos t t hat we possi bl y coul d f r om t he unf ol di ng RMA. W hy ar e t hese changes so i mpor t ant ? What may be t he consequences i f we f ai l t o change? Fi r st . t he mi l i t ar y mus t br eak out of t he box. sust ai ned. t hat r ewar ds r i sk t aker s. Fai l ur e t o c hange wi l l mak e i t di f f i cul t f or our mi l i t ar y t o mak e t he best possi bl e use of t he new emer gi ng t echnol ogi es .

Vi r gi ni a.02 . Br i ef i ng on Fut ur e Compet i t or s. " Washi ngt on Quar t er l y. " The Mi l i t ar y Af t er Next . 218 . For t Monr oe. St ephen Pet er Rosen. Paul Br acken.THE REVOLUTI ON I N MI LI TARY AFFAI RS Not es 1 . See al so. Depar t ment of Def ense Di r ect or y of Mi l i t ar y and Associ at ed Ter ms. no . 4 ( Aut umn 1993) 157. 2 . J CS Pub 1. 1 Dec ember 1989. 3 . HQ US Ar my TRADOC. . 16.174 . 27 Sept ember 1993 . US Ar my Roundt abl e Conf er ence on t he Revol ut i on i n Mi l i t ar y Af f ai r s.

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" However . and t hat we mus t vi ew " t he enemy as a syst em. " War den' s goal i s " t o mak e t he c os t pol i t i cal . not si mpl y i t s ar med f or ces . Si mul t aneousl y at t acki ng t hese essent i al c omponent s r at her t han concent r at i ng sol el y on enemy ar med f or ces i s t he essence of War den' s st r at egy . popul at i on. War den bel i eves t hat t he f i ve. Thi s woul d mak e ai r power t he domi nant i nst r ument of s uc h new er a war f ar e .Ov er v i ew: Fut ur e Ai r power and St r at egy I ssues St r at egy i s t he ar t and sci ence of t r ansl at i ng nat i onal secur i t y obj ect i ves i nt o pr act i cal mi l i t ar y pl ans and oper at i ons . Our t wo st r at egy essays by t wo pr emi er mi l i t ar y t hi nker s. not an i ndependent mas s of t anks. nonl et hal weapons wi l l have wi de appl i cat i on . however . St r at egy wi l l have t o concent r at e on an enemy' s ent i r e syst em of or gani zat i on and act i vi t y. col l at er al damage mus t be mi ni mi zed . " Col War den bel i eves t hat t went y.t o t he enemy hi gher t han he i s wi l l i ng t o pay. I s at t acki ng t he var i ous cent er s 99 . so t hat t he or gani c syst em goes i nt o shock" ar e r eal l y new.r i ng anal ogy.f i r st cent ur y st r at egy wi l l have t o ensur e gr eat pr eci si on : hi gh casual t i es wi l l not be pol i t i cal l y t ol er abl e . i nf r ast r uct ur e. Col Szaf r anski cont ends t hat " t her e may not be r eal l y muc h t hat i s r evol ut i onar y i n cont empor ar y not i ons of par al l el war and hyper war . or t o i mpose st r at egi c or oper at i onal par al ysi s on hi mso t hat he woul d bec ome i ncapabl e of act i ng . St r at egy f or mul at i on i n an age of r evol ut i on i n af f ai r s i s especi al l y chal l engi ng . and ar med f or ces . " Col Szaf r anski . or dope pusher s . quest i ons whet her pr oposal s l i ke Col War den' s ai mi ng at t he " si mul t aneous r educt i on of t he enemy syst ems over al l ener gy l evel . and mani pul at i on of i nf or mat i on wi l l be cr i t i cal . ener gy or r esour ces. Usi ng t he f i ve. Col War den ar gues t hat " war i n t he t went y.f i r st cent ur y wi l l be si gni f i cant l y di f f er ent f or t he Uni t ed St at es f r om anyt hi ng encount er ed bef or e t he Gul f War . Col J ohn War den and Col Ri char d Szaf r anski . debat e t he i ssue of j ust how i nnovat i ve st r at egy f or mul at i on mus t be i n t he mi dst of a mi l i t ar y r evol ut i on . ai r cr af t .r i ng anal ysi s gi ves us a good pi ct ur e of what t o st r i ke. Col War den pr oposes t hat st r at egy shoul d t ar get an adver sar y' s l eader shi p. economi c. and mi l i t ar y.

i nsur gency] muc h t o t he chagr i n of ai r power advocat es . At t acks on t he l eader and l eader shi p ar e not new goal s of war f ar e. The r eader can deci de f or hi msel f or her sel f what i s new or di f f er ent i n Col War den' s " ai r t heor y f or t he t went y.f i r st cent ur y. and t he cent r al r ol e assi gned t o ai r power i n i t . does not appl y t o al l ki nds of conf l i ct s . i nst ead. " Col War den was a key pl anner and or gani zer of t he al l i ed ai r c ampai gn t hat gave t he Coal i t i on ai r super i or i t y over Saddam Hussei n' s ai r f or ce i n t he 1991 Gul f War . Par al l el war and hy per war di d s hoc k and par al yze t he I r aqi st at e and i t s mi l i t ar y f or ces . whet her t he enemy was vi ewed as a syst em.r i ngs st r at egy c an wor k agai nst ver y l ar ge st at es l i ke Chi na. " wr i t es Szaf r anski . However . or not . i n t he past .BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE of gr avi t y i n " par al l el " and wi t h " hyper " speed r eal l y a new t heor y of war ? Szaf r anski ar gues t hat " si mul t aneous and i nt egr at ed at t acks have l ong been t he goal of c ombi ned ar ms . " Wor se. " and whet her t he s ame st r at egy wi l l wor k acr oss t he s pec t r um of conf l i ct s . Col Szaf r anski ar gues t hat t hi s t heor y of f i ght i ng war s. Per haps. " Col Szaf r anski adds t hat t he nucl ear at t ack si ngl e i nt egr at ed oper at i ons pl an ( SI OP) .f i r st cent ur y . l ong used by t he US Ai r For ce St r at egi c Ai r Command. Col Szaf r anski l i mi t s i t s ut i l i t y t o smal l er i ndust r i al i zed st at es and i s dubi ous r egar di ng ut i l i t y agai nst t er r or i st or i nsur gent or gani zat i ons . t hi s l eads t o t he quest i on of whet her or not one ai r doct r i ne and mi l i t ar y st r at egy f or al l cont i ngenci es can be ef f ect i ve acr oss t he ent i r e spect r um of t ypes of conf l i ct s and t ypes of adver sar i es t hat t he Uni t ed St at es and i t s al l i es may conf r ont i n t he f ut ur e . can and shoul d be appl i ed i n f ut ur e conf l i ct s i n t he t went y. " pr omot ed and pl anned f or par al l el war and hyper war l ong bef or e ' t he f i ve r i ngs' c ame i nt o vogue . I ndeed. t her e shoul d be a sear ch f or mul t i pl e ai r doct r i nes f or var i ous al t er nat i ve t ypes of conf l i ct s and enemi es . or ver sus al most any adver sar y. emphasi zi ng ai r power as t he key t o r api d and compl et e vi ct or y. " ai r power cannot mak e t he deci si ve and domi nant cont r i but i on t o [ count er t er r or i sm and count er . " Whi l e Col War den' s essay i mpl i es t hat t he f i ve. What bot h Col War den and Col Szaf r anski do 10 0 . War den' s es s ay suggest s t hat t hi s s ame par al l el war and hy per war appr oach. Szaf r anski cont ends t hat we st i l l have not f ound a t heor y of ai r power and ai r st r at egy t hat appl i es uni ver sal l y .

i s i mpor t ant f or st r at egy success i n t went y.FUTURE AI RPOW ERAND STRATEGY I SSUES agr ee on i s t hat " par al yzi ng" or neut r al i zi ng an enemy' s cr i t i cal war f i ght i ng asset s.f i r st cent ur y war f ar e . . whet her physi cal or psychol ogi cal .whet her mi l i t ar y or ci vi l i an.

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USAF War i n t he t went y. The advent of nonl et hal weapons t echnol ogy wi l l ex pand our opt i ons over t he f ul l spect r um of war . i f we ar e ver y l ucky. Pr eci si on wi l l c ome t o suggest not onl y t hat a weapon st r i ke exact l y wher e i t i s ai med. or unconvent i onal means . I ncr eased use of pr eci si on weapons wi l l mean f ar l ess dependenc e on t he mul t i t udes of peopl e or mac hi nes needed i n t he past t o mak e up f or i naccur acy i n weapons .f i r st Cent ur y Col J ohn A.bas ed or l and.based ai r cr af t cl ose t o a c ombat ar ca pr obl emat i c .f i r st cent ur y wi l l be si gni f i cant l y di f f er ent f or t he Uni t ed St at es f r om anyt hi ng encount er ed bef or e t he Gul f W ar . i n t ur n. st at es and ot her ent i t i es wi l l t ur n t o ot her f or ms of war f ar e. wi l l i ncr ease t he pr emi um on Amer i c an abi l i t y t o mov e wi t hi n hour s t o any poi nt on t he gl obe wi t hout r el i ance on en r out e bases .f i r e pr eci si on weapons wi l l bec ome avai l abl e t o many ot her s. however . Thi s. War den I I I . i mpr eci si on wi l l be t oo expensi ve physi cal l y and pol i t i cal l y t o c ondone . Of at l east equal l i kel i hood. W e mi ght hope t hat mor e accur at e weapons woul d dr i ve pot ent i al enemy l eader s t o be l ess enamor ed of achi evi ng t hei r pol i t i cal obj ect i ves wi t h f or ce .. St andof f and i ndi r ect . whi c h wi l l mak e mas s i ng of l ar ge number s i n t he open sui ci dal and t he saf et y of depl oyi ng s ea. per haps t he wor l d wi l l mov e i n t hi s di r ect i on . Thes e at t acks may be vi a mi ssi l es.. Thes e new weapons wi l l 103 . but al l wi l l r ecogni ze t hat t hey mus t achi eve t hei r obj ect i ve bef or e t he Uni t ed St at es chooses t o i nvol ve i t sel f . space.such as at t acks on enemy st r at egi c cent er s of gr avi t y . Amer i c an war s wi l l be i ncr easi ngl y pr eci se . but al so t hat t he weapons be pr eci se i n dest r oyi ng or af f ect i ng onl y what i s supposed t o be af f ect ed .Chapt er 4 Ai r Theor y f or t he Twent y. Our pol i t i cal l eader s and our ci t i zenr y wi l l i nsi st t hat we hi t onl y what we ar e shoot i ng at and t hat we shoot t he r i ght t hi ng .

soon . Can t hese weapons r epl ace t r adi t i onal l et hal t ool s? I n t heor y t hey can. i t may be i mpor t ant i n some i nst ances t o f ur ni sh t he enemy wi t h accur at e i nf or mat i on . t o name but a f ew pot ent i al t ar get s . wi l l at l east exper i ment wi t h t hem. The chal l enge f or Amer i ca i s t o deci de i f i t want s t o negat e t hese weapons wi t hout r epl yi ng or pr eempt i ng i n ki nd . 1 Fur t her mor e. pr oduct i on. The pace of change i s accel er at i ng and shows no si gn of l et t i ng up . ar t i l l er y. unabl e t o af f or d t he hyper war ar senal now t he excl usi ve pr oper t y of t he Uni t ed St at es. I f we ar e t o succeed i n pr ot ect i ng our i nt er est s i n t hi s envi r onment . Al t hough det er r ence wi l l cer t ai nl y be gr eat l y di f f er ent f r om our col d war concept i on of i t . Ac c ompany i ng t hi s quest i on i s t he quest i on of nucl ear det er r ence i n a si gni f i cant l y changed wor l d .BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE f i nd appl i cat i on agai nst communi cat i ons. br i dges. Thi s concept i s di scussed l at er i n t hi s chapt er . par t of war t o t he ext ent t hat whol e war s may wel l r evol ve ar ound sei zi ng or mani pul at i ng t he enemy' s dat aspher e . Vi ct or y wi l l go t o t hose who t hi nk t hr ough t he pr obl em and capi t al i ze 104 . Conver sel y. ot her st at es. I nf or mat i on wi l l become a pr omi nent . and i nt er nal combust i on engi nes. And of gr eat est i nt er est . t echnol ogy. At t r i t i on war f ar e bel ongs t o anot her age. What we wi l l sur el y f i nd. as l ong as we accept t he i dea t hat war i s f ought t o mak e t he enemy do your wi l l . i s t hat t hese weapons gi ve us oper at i onal concept s and oppor t uni t i es wel l beyond what woul d be possi bl e i f we mer el y subst i t ut e t hemf or convent i onal weapons . however . and mi l i t ar y af f ai r s . t hey wi l l accompl i sh t hei r ends wi t hout dependence on bi g expl osi ons t hat dest r oy mor e pr oper t y t han necessar y and t hat cause unpl anned human casual t i es . does i t l ose i t s ut i l i t y i n al l si t uat i ons? How shoul d US nucl ear f or ces be mai nt ai ned? Thi s ent i r e mat t er deser ves ser i ous t hought . The wor l d i s cur r ent l y exper i enci ng what may be t he most r evol ut i onar y per i od i n al l of human exi st ence wi t h maj or r evol ut i ons t aki ng pl ace si mul t aneousl y i n geopol i t i cs. The Uni t ed St at es can achi eve vi r t ual l y al l mi l i t ar y obj ect i ves wi t hout r ecour se t o weapons of mas s dest r uct i on . we must spend mor e t i me t han ever i n our past t hi nki ng about war and devel opi ng new empl oy ment concept s . and t he days when war s coul d be won by sheer br aver y and per sever ance ar e gone . i f not pr edomi nant .

Thi s i s not t o say. i t i s about get t i ng somet hi ng t hat t he opponent i s not i ncl i ned t o hand over . The r eason may not be ver y good or s eemt o mak e muc h sense. i t mus t be conduct ed f or s ome r eason . Al l mi l i t ar y oper at i ons. I ndeed.FI RST CENTURY on ever y t ool avai l abl e. or f or ci ng a r el i gi ous conver si on . As l at e as t he Vi et nam W ar t he gener al i naccur acy of weapons r equi r ed l ar ge number s of men t o expose t hemsel ves t o host i l e f i r e i n or der t o l aunch enough weapons t o have s ome ef f ect on t he enemy . St i l l anot her way t o expr ess t hi s i dea i s t hi s : war i s al l 10 5 . bef or e one c an devel op or adopt a concept of oper at i ons. a hal t t o of f ensi ve enemy oper at i ons. Mi l i t ar y oper at i ons mus t be c onduc t ed so as t o gi ve r easonabl e pr obabi l i t y of accompl i shi ng desi r ed pol i t i cal goal s at an accept abl e pr i ce . Ver y f ew have gone t o war t o amus e t hemsel ves wi t h no concer n f or t he out come or desi r e f or anyt hi ng ot her t han t he oppor t uni t y t o have a good donny br ook . avengi ng an i nsul t .AI RTHEORY FORTHE TWENTY. an under st andi ng of war and pol i t i cal obj ect i ves i s i mper at i ve . a new pol i t i cal cl i mat e meant t hat a pr oposal t o i mpose si mi l ar damage on I r aq woul d have met over whel mi ng opposi t i on f r om Amer i c an and coal i t i on pol i t i cal l eader s . however . now. Let us begi n l ayi ng t he i nt el l ect ual f r amewor k f or f ut ur e ai r oper at i ons . f ai l ur e t o def i ne ends and means cl ear l y has l ed t o i nnumer abl e di sast er s f or at t acker and at t acked al i ke . mos t r ul er s who have gone t o war have done so wi t h t he obj ect i ve of achi evi ng s omet hi ng. r at her . shoul d be consonant wi t h t he pr evai l i ng pol i t i cal and physi cal envi r onment . Fi r st r ul e : i f y ou ar e goi ng t o war . t he new physi cal r eal i t y of accur at e weapons means t hat f ew men need be or shoul d be exposed . For war t o mak e any sense. Remember : war i s not qui nt essent i al l y about f i ght i ng and ki l l i ng . i ncl udi ng ai r oper at i ons. but wi t h r emar kabl y f ew except i ons.r egar dl ess of i t s sour ce .per haps addi t i onal t er r i t or y. k now why y ou ar e goi ng . t hat al l t hose who have gone t o war hav e done so wi t h a cl ear i dea of t hei r obj ect i ve and what i t woul d t ake t o achi eve i t . I n Wor l d War I I t he Uni t ed St at es and her Al l i es i mpos ed wi despr ead dest r uct i on and ci vi l i an casual t i es on J apan and Ger many . pr i or t o t he Gul f War . Cor ol l ar y t o t he f i r st r ul e : hav e s ome under st andi ng of what y our enemy want s out of t he war and t he pr i ce each of y ou i s wi l l i ng t o pay . I ndeed.

t hi s i s not t he case . One mi ght obj ect t hat under st andi ng how our enemi es ar e or gani zed i s an i mpossi bl e t ask. al l do t he s ame t hi ng . W wi l l pass over i t and concent r at e on t he f i r st t wo . I n si mpl e t er ms. or i ndi vi dual s. W t r i p i f i t cost s mor e money t han we ar e r eady t o pay . whet her t hey be st at es. The di f f i cul t y of def i ni ng or pr edi ct i ng. The l ast of t hese opt i ons i s r ar e i n hi st or y. however . wi t h " expensi ve" under st ood i n pol i t i cal . To do so. Ther e ar e a var i et y of way s t o mak e an enemy do what y ou want hi m t o do . and mi l i t ar y t er ms . W hen we t al k about mak i ng somet hi ng so cost l y f or an enemy t hat he deci des t o accept our posi t i on. we ar e t al ki ng about somet hi ng ver y di f f i cul t t o def i ne or pr edi ct pr eci sel y .and t hen pr event i ng hi m f r om t aki ng an al t er nat i ve appr oac h whi c h y ou woul d al so f i nd unaccept abl e . t her e ar e but t hr ee : mak e i t t oo expensi ve f or t he enemy t o r esi st . Fr om an ai r power st andpoi nt . cr i mi nal or gani zat i ons. W e al l k now f r om our exper i ence t hat we r egul ar l y mak e e don' t go on a deci si ons whet her or not t o do somet hi ng . economi c. hopel ess. especi al l y i f we don' t k now i n advance who t hey ar e . no . physi cal l y pr event an enemy f r om doi ng somet hi ng by i mposi ng st r at egi c or oper at i onal par al ysi s on hi m. The enemy may not assess a si t uat i on t he way we do.based s y s t em i s or gani zed about t he s ame way . we don' t go mount ai n cl i mbi ng i f we f ear t he cost of f al l i ng .BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE about mak i ng your enemy do somet hi ng y ou want hi m t o do when he doesn' t want t o do i t . Enemi es. we need t o under st and how our enemi es ar e or gani zed . but assessment s ar e par t and par cel of ever y deci si on . or dest r oy hi mabsol ut el y . as we shal l see. ever y l i f e. For t unat el y. does not suggest t hat i t i s a hopel ess t ask . however .benef i t r at i o . yes . di f f i cul t t o execut e. I mpr eci se. however . and so on . i t i s our j ob t o det er mi ne what pr i ce ( negat i ve or posi t i ve) i t wi l l t ake t o i nduce an enemy t o accept our condi t i ons . and we don' t dr i ve above t he speed l i mi t i f t he pr obabi l i t y of a t i cket s eems hi gh. and we may di sagr ee wi t h hi s assessment . and nor mal l y not ver y usef ul e because of al l t he uni nt ended consequences i t engender s . Af t er al l . Onl y t he det ai l s var y . human or gani zat i ons t ypi cal l y r eact i n an i nf i ni t e number of way s t o si mi l ar st i mul i . f r aught wi t h mor al concer ns. t hey al most al ways act or don' t act based on s ome ki nd of cost . 106 .

eyes . or an el ect r i c c ompany .secur i t y .AI RTHEORY FORTHE TWENTY.FI RST CENTURY Whet her we ar e t al ki ng about an i ndust r i al i zed st at e. sea l anes Tr ansmi ssi on l i nes Cel l s Peopl e Gr ower s. t hen t hi s s ame under st andi ng of or gani zat i on and cent er s of gr avi t y s hows us how t o i mpos e oper at i onal or st r at egi c par al ysi s on our enemy so. as we under st and how our enemi es ar e or gani zed. a wi de var i et y of syst ems r angi ng f r om an i ndi vi dual t o an el ect r i c c ompany ar e or gani zed wi t h r emar kabl e si mi l ar i t y. money ( el ect r i ci t y) I nf r ast r uct ur e Popul at i on Vessel s. pol i ce.secur i t y Food/ oxygen . Thi s or gani zi ng s c heme i s suf f i ci ent l y wi despr ead t o mak e i t an accept abl e st ar t i ng pl ace f or wor ki ng out mos t mi l i t ar y or busi ness pr obl ems . St r eet sol di er s Repai r men f i r emen As c an be seen f r om t he pr ecedi ng t abl e. Under st andi ng cent er s of gr avi t y t hen al l ows us t o mak e r easonabl e guesses as t o how t o cr eat e cost s whi c h may l ead t he enemy t o accept our demands . ai r ways. Li kewi se. Let ' s st ar t wi t h t he basi cs of or gani zat i on ( t abl e 1) .conver si on vi a vi t al or gans Ener gy ( el ect r i ci t y. ever y or gani zat i on f ol l ows t he s ame or gani zat i onal s c heme .ner ves . I t hel ps us put i nt o ef f ect i nj unct i ons f r om anci ent Gr eek and 10 7 . muscl es Roads. oi l .communi cat i on . a dr ug car t el . hydr o) Out put f ood) . f act or i es Roads. Wor k er s di st r i but or s. we c an easi l y mov e on t o t he concept of cent er s of gr avi t y . Coc a sour ce pl us conver si on El ect r i c Company Cent r al Cont r ol I nput ( heat . Thi s i s ver y i mpor t ant t o us as mi l i t ar y pl anner s bec aus e i t al l ows us t o devel op gener al concept s not dependent on a speci f i c enemy . ai r f i el ds. Tabl e 1 SYSTEMATTRI BUTES Body Leader Or gani c Essent i al Br ai n St at e Gov er nment Dr ug Car t el Leader . he bec omes i ncapabl e of opposi ng us . I f t he enemy does not r espond t o i mpos ed cost s. bones. pr ocessor s Fi ght i ng Mec hani s m Leukocyt es Mi l i t ar y.communi cat i on .

2) . t hi s syst ems appr oach pr ovi des an easy way t o cat egor i ze i nf or mat i on and t o under st and t he r el at i ve i mpor t ance of any par t i cul ar bi t . Our pr i mar y i nt er est i s not i n bui l di ng a t heor y of or gani zai on . each r i ng has a r el at i onshi p wi t h al l of t he ot her s and al l pl ay s ome r ol e . i t s hows us t hat we ar e deal i ng wi t h an i nt er dependent syst em. Fi r st . r at her . Seei ng t he enemy as a syst em gi ves us enor mous advant ages over t hose who see hi mmer el y as an ar my or ai r f or ce. i t hel ps t o r ear r ange our t abl e i n t he f or m of f i ve r i ngs ( f i g . 10 8 . " I n addi t i on t o si mpl i f yi ng t he " knowi ng" pr ocess. To gr asp t he essence of t hi s pr obl em. That i s. or wor se yet . For pr act i cal pur poses. Fi l t er s of s ome sor t ar e a necessi t y . i t i s t o der i ve an under st andi ng of what we mi ght need t o i mpose an i nt ol er abl e cost or st r at egi c or oper at i onal par al ysi s on an enemy . as s ome quant i t y of t anks or ai r pl anes or shi ps or dr ug pusher s wi t hout ever under st andi ng what i t i s t hat al l ows t hese t anks or shi ps t o oper at e and f or what pur pose . Syst em Model . Rear r angi ng t he t abul ar i nf or mat i on i nt o t he f i ve r i ngs di agr am gi ves us sever al key i nsi ght s . t hi s or gani zat i onal s c heme gi ves us an easy way t o cat egor i ze i nf or mat i on. Fi gur e 2. t he wor l d cont ai ns an i nf i ni t e amount of i nf or mat i on whi c h by def i ni t i on cannot be t ot al l y cor r el at ed . whi c h we mus t do i f we ar e t o mak e r eal deci si ons .BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE Chi nese al i ke t o " k now t hysel f " and " t hi ne enemy .

we coul d have cont i nued our anal ysi s down t o t he l evel of an i ndi vi dual 10 9 . and l ast . t he r i ngs gi ve us t he concept of wor ki ng f r om t he i nsi de t o t he out si de as oppos ed t o t he conver se . Four t h. Thus. Cont r ar y t o Cl ausewi t z. i f t he i mmedi at e pr obl em i s r ever si ng t he ef f ect s of an i nvasi on. I n usi ng t he r i ngs t o devel op war i deas. Under st andi ng t hi s concept i s essent i al t o t aki ng a st r at egi c r at her t han a t act i cal appr oach t o wi nni ng war s . Fi f t h. For exampl e.r i ng anal ysi s gave us a good pi ct ur e of what t o st r i ke .r i ng pr i nci pl e and i nsof ar as our obj ect i ve wi t h r espect t o t hat ar my was somet hi ng ot her t han pur e dest r uct i on. al l of our ener gi es i n war shoul d be f ocused on changi ng t he mi nd of t he l eader shi p . f i ve. we want ed t o under s t and det ai l s about I r aq' s ar my i n Kuwai t . That i s.FI RST CENTURY Second. An exampl e : when t he I r aqi s i nvaded Kuwai t . and f i ght i ng hi s mi l i t ar y f or ces i s at best a means t o an end and at wor st a t ot al wast e of t i me and ener gy . di r ect l y or i ndi r ect l y. At s ome poi nt .AI RTHEORY FORTHETWENTY. not t he essence of t he syst em. i t gi ves us s ome i dea of t he r el at i ve i mpor t ance of each ent i t y cont ai ned wi t hi n a gi ven r i ng . Gen Nor man Sc hwar z k opf qui ckl y gr asped t he i dea t hat hi s pr obl emwas f i r st wi t h I r aq as a st at e and onl y secondar i l y wi t h I r aq' s mi l i t ar y f or ces wi t hi n Kuwai t i t sel f . we cer t ai nl y woul dn' t mak e dest r uct i on of our enemy' s shi el d our end game . i t por t r ays r at her gr aphi cal l y an anci ent t r ut h about war : our obj ect i ve i s al ways t o convi nce t he enemy t o do what we want hi m t o do . however . one woul d st ar t t he anal ysi s wi t h t he l ar gest possi bl e l ook at t he syst em descr i pt i on of t he i nvadi ng count r y . i t i s i mper at i ve t o st ar t wi t h t he l ar gest i dent i f i abl e s y s t em. dest r uct i on of t he enemy mi l i t ar y i s not t he essence of war . t he essence of war i s convi nci ng t he enemy t o accept your posi t i on. we f ound t hat i t was or gani zed on t he f i ve. t he head of a dr ug car t el ( t he l eader shi p r i ng) has t he power t o change t he car t el consi der abl y wher eas t he st r eet sol di er ( i n t he f i el ded mi l i t ar y f or ces r i ng) assi gned t he j ob of pr ot ect i ng a pusher i n a back al l ey can have vi r t ual l y no ef f ect on t he car t el as a whol e. Had we so desi r ed. Thi r d. even i n somet hi ng so si mpl e as per sonal combat . The per son or ent i t y wi t h t he power t o agr ee t o change i s t he l eader i n t he mi ddl e . Gi ven a choi ce. Not sur pr i si ngl y. our r i ngs cl ear l y s how t hat t he mi l i t ar y i s a shi el d or spear f or t he whol e syst em.

Fr om a di agr ami ng st andpoi nt . W e may have t o mak e sever al mor e f i ve. Cent er s of gr avi t y ar e pr i mar i l y or gani zat i onal concept s . Not e t hat wi t h t hi s appr oach. i t i s t he l eader shi p of t he enemy t hat deci des t o acc ommodat e y ou . Let us r evi ew key concept s di scussed t o t hi s poi nt .r i ng syst em. 2 W hen we want mor e i nf or mat i on. a syst em. Second. W e cont i nue t he pr ocess unt i l we have suf f i ci ent under st andi ng and i nf or mat i on t o act .down. I mpor t ant t o not e.f or m. Fi r st . a t op. engagement of t he enemy mi l i t ar y may be a means t o an end.based syst em i s or gani zed si mi l ar l y: a l eader shi p f unct i on t o di r ect i t . t he obj ect of war i s t o i nduce t he enemy t o do y our bi ddi ng. t hen. we have not t al ked expl i ci t l y about cent er s of gr avi t y. i s t hat vi r t ual l y al l our mi l i t ar y t r ai ni ng ( and busi ness t r ai ni ng) st ar t s us at t he l owest possi bl e l evel and asks us t o wor k our way up . but we have der i ved t hemby showi ng how we and our enemi es ar e or gani zed .BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE sol di er because he i s or gani zed about t he s ame way as i s hi s count r y . an i nf r ast r uct ur e t o t i e i t al l t oget her . Thi r d. i t wi l l be cl ear t hat we ar e descr i bi ng a pr ocess of di f f er ent i at i on as opposed t o i nt egr at i on . However . I nst ead.essent i al f unct i on t o conver t ener gy f r om one f or m t o anot her . but t he engagement i s never an end i n i t sel f and s houl d be avoi ded under mos t ci r cumst ances . So f ar . we can i dent i f y ver y qui ckl y what we don' t k now and concent r at e our i nf or mat i on sear ch on r el evant dat a .downappr oach i f we ar e t o succeed . a popul at i on t o mak e i t f unct i on.r i ng model s t o s how successi vel y l ower el ect r i cal s ubs y s t ems . however . and a . Thus. Four t h.or t op. I n a compl ex wor l d. di f f er ent i at i on appr oach i s a necessi t y . Whi c h ones t o at t ack bec omes a mat t er of our capabi l i t y . we st ar t out wi t h t he bi g pi ct ur e of t he st r at egi c ent i t y . Whi c h ones ar e mos t i mpor t ant bec omes cl ear when we deci de what ef f ect we want t o pr oduce on t he enemy i n or der t o i nduce hi m t o accept our posi t i on . we l ear n a t act i cal appr oach t o t he wor l d . For t he mat hemat i cal l y i ncl i ned. when we want t o t hi nk not about f i ght i ng war s but about wi nni ng t hem. we have l i t t l e need f or t he i nf i ni t e amount of i nf or mat i on t heor et i cal l y avai l abl e on a st r at egi c ent i t y l i ke a st at e . we mus t t ake a st r at egi c and oper at i onal . ever y l i f e. we pul l out s ubs y s t ems l i ke el ect r i cal power under syst em essent i al s and s how i t as a f i ve.

y ou want t o sur vi ve per sonal l y ( t hi s i s not t o say y ou won' t di e f or your syst em. but y ou pr obabl y see your sel f and t he syst em as bei ng cl osel y t i ed t oget her ) . The enemy l eader shi p act s on s ome cost / r i sk basi s. Fai l ur e t o do so means your syst em ef f ect i vel y ceases t o exi st .pol i t i cal . but we can' t k now pr eci sel y what i t mi ght be . Suppos e t hat onl y s ome of t hese di r e event s wer e t hr eat ened or deemed l i kel y . Now. And si xt h. wi t h an under st andi ng of how enemi es ar e or gani zed. To do t hi s. y ou agr ee i mmedi at el y .FI RST CENTURY def ense syst em t o pr ot ect i t f r om at t ack . or dope pusher s . al l y ou have t o do i s agr ee t o st op sel l i ng cocai ne i n one count r y . and mi l i t ar y. ai r cr af t . t he enemy i s a syst em. however . not an i ndependent mas s of t anks. whi c h l eaves y ou per sonal l y i n a pr ecar i ous posi t i on and unabl e even t o r et i r e i n spl endor because y ou can' t get at t he bi l l i ons y ou had socked away i n a count r y wi t h st r i ct pr i vacy i n banki ng l aws .t o t he enemy hi gher t han he was wi l l i ng t o pay or t o i mpose st r at egi c or oper at i onal par al ysi s on hi m so t hat he woul d bec ome i ncapabl e of act i ng. your c ommuni c at i ons wi t h t he wor l d out si de your mount ai n r et r eat wi l l be sever ed. t he f i ve r i ngs pr ovi de a good met hod f or cat egor i zi ng i nf or mat i on and i dent i f yi ng cent er s of gr avi t y . You have cer t ai n r at her basi c goal s t hat nor mal l y wi l l t ake pr ecedence over ot her s . W e sai d ear l i er t hat our goal i n war woul d gener al l y be t o mak e t he cost .AI RTHEORY FORTHE TWENTY. and your hous e wi l l be conver t ed t o r ubbl e . To avoi d t hese nast y t hi ngs. W e can. What do y ou do? I f y ou ar e r emot el y r at i onal . put your sel f i n t he cent er of t he f i ve r i ngs as t he l eader of a st r at egi c ent i t y l i ke a dr ug car t el or st at e . economi c. For y ou t o sur vi ve per sonal l y ( i n mos t i nst ances) t he syst em y ou l ead mus t sur vi ve i n somet hi ng r easonabl y cl ose t o i t s pr esent f or m. Per haps y ou woul d agr ee t o sel l l ess cocai ne i n t he t ar get . Let us say t hat y ou ar e t he l eader of a dr ug car t el and an enemy t hr eat ens y ou cr edi bl y wi t h t he f ol l owi ng ( t o whi c h y ou cannot r espond) : your bank account s wi l l be zer oed. y ou mi ght choose t o negot i at e . Fi f t h. we can begi n t he pr ocess of det er mi ni ng how t o accompl i sh ei t her or bot h wi t h ai r power t ool s . Fi r st . I n t hi s case. mak e s ome r easonabl e guesses based on syst em and or gani zat i on t heor y . y our cocai ne pr ocessi ng f aci l i t y wi l l be dest r oyed. The obj ect of war i s t o convi nce t he enemy l eader shi p t o do what y ou want i t t o do .

( We wi l l r et ur n t o i t l at er when we di scuss oper at i onal par al ysi s . I n t he r eal wor l d we do so al l t he t i me . i t woul d depend l ar gel y on how muc h he was wi l l i ng t o s pend t o cr eat e a cost f or y ou . Obvi ousl y. have al ways wei ghed cost s as t hey wer e pl anni ng or conduct i ng an oper at i on . t hen. Hi s choi ces ar e basi cal l y t wo : sl ow down or st op t he mov ement of hi s ar my so t hat i t c an as s ume a r easonabl e def ensi ve posi t i on. Does i t al so appl y at an oper at i onal l evel . Let us as s ume t hat s omeone t el l s Gener al Pat t on at a st af f meet i ng t hat al l f uel del i ver i es t o hi s Ar my wi l l cease i n t wo days . Geor ge Pat t on was an aggr essi ve c ommander who bel i eved t hat speed of advance was key t o success . Per haps y ou woul d agr ee t o a mor at or i um on sal es . Si nce t he l at t er i s l i kel y t o l eave t he maj or i t y of t he ar my i n an unt enabl e and unpl anned posi t i on and i s unl i kel y t o achi eve anyt hi ng f i nal . i f mov i ng f ast was good f r om Geor ge Pat t on' s per spect i ve. Now.BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE count r y . but t he whol e syst em t hat suppor t ed t hem at t he f r ont . Mi l i t ar y c ommander s . Real i ze al so t hat unbek nowns t t o t he c ommandi ng gener al . Pat t on opt s f or t he f or mer because he has assessed t he cost of cont i nui ng as t oo hi gh f or t he possi bl e r esul t s .Sept ember of 1944 . ever y subor di nat e c ommander and sol di er wi l l st ar t act i ng on i nf or mat i on about an i mpendi ng f uel shor t age as soon as he . l et us do a qui ck f i ve.not j ust t he t anks. i t was bad f r om t hei r s . t he Thi r d Ar my needed t o mov e qui ckl y as a s y s t em. I n our i deal wor l d we l i ke t o t hi nk we don' t negot i at e wi t h dr ug deal er s or t yr ant s l i ke Saddam Hussei n . Fr om t he Ger man si de. Ver y r ar el y ar e we wi l l i ng t o i nvest t he t i me and ef f or t r equi r ed t o achi eve maxi mal r esul t s . Let ' s t ake a hypot het i cal l ook at Geor ge Pat t on and t he Thi r d Ar my i n Wor l d War I I . wi t h t he except i on of a f ew r eal l y st upi d ones. ) Let us suppose t hat somet hi ng cat ast r ophi c happened t o Thi r d Ar my' s f uel suppl y i n mi d. Your enemy mi ght or mi ght not accept t hese count er pr oposal s . or t el l ever yone t o pl unge ahead as f ar as possi bl e unt i l t hey r un out of gas .t he l evel at whi c h mi l i t ar y f or ces ar e act ual l y empl oy ed? The ans wer i s an absol ut e yes . Our di scussi on of cost s has so f ar been or i ent ed at a st r at egi c l evel .r i ng anal ysi s of t he Thi r d Ar my f r om j ust t he cost st andpoi nt .

Had he under st ood. 4 A si mi l ar event may have t aken pl ace i n J apan i n l at e 1944 and i nt o 1945 . Li ke Saddam a hal f . who si mpl y f ai l ed t o c ompr ehend f or sever al week s what t he st r at egi c ai r at t acks agai nst hi m wer e doi ng t o hi s f ut ur e . I n t he Japanese case par t of t he pr obl em may hav e s t emmed f r om t he Bushi do code of per sonal br aver y t hat t ended t o as s ume t hat success i n war woul d be a f unct i on of aggl omer at i ng many t act i cal successes .t er m and shor t . I n t he event we cannot educat e and i nf or m hi m pr oper l y. we need t o mak e t wo mor e poi nt s on t he subj ect of cost . The pr i nci pl e i s si mpl e : at al l l evel s. Thi s al most cer t ai nl y was t he case wi t h Saddam Hussei n. Hi s l ack of under st andi ng f l owed f r om i gnor ance of t he ef f ect of moder n ai r at t ack 3 and f r om l ack of i nf or mat i on. The coal i t i on at t ack i n t he f i r st mi nut es had so di sr upt ed communi cat i ons at st r at egi c l evel s t hat i t was ver y di f f i cul t t o r ecei ve and pr ocess damage r epor t s . he mi ght have sued f or peace t he f i r st mor ni ng of t he war . we cannot depend on t he hi s mak i ng t he concessi ons we ask because of a r eal i st i c cost / benef i t anal ysi s .FI RST CENTURY hear s about i t . f or war d mov ement al r eady woul d have ceased and hoar di ng of r emai ni ng f uel suppl i es woul d have bec ome wi despr ead . Japanese ar my l eader s per si st ed i n t hei r desi r e t o c ont i nue t he war ev en t hough t hei r homel and was col l apsi ng ar ound t hem as a r esul t of st r at egi c ai r and sea at t acks . The concept s of st r at egi c and oper at i onal war wer e si mpl y not t her e . The f i r st i s t hat t he enemy l eader may not r ecogni ze how muc h at t acks on hi m ar e cost i ng at t he t i me of at t ack and i n t he f ut ur e . by t he t i me t he f or mal or der t o hal t c omes down. Bef or e movi ng on t o di scuss i mposi t i on of st r at egi c and oper at i onal par al ysi s. They appar ent l y l acked t he i n.dept h under st andi ng of war and t hei r c ount r y t o appr ec i at e what was r eal l y happeni ng . The ef f ect i s obvi ous . we .AI RTHEORY FORTHE TWENTY. l eader s mak e deci si ons based on a cost / benef i t anal ysi s . You may al so have t o gi ve hi m accur at e i nf or mat i on on t he ext ent of hi s l osses. t he J apanes e wer e st uck i n a par adi gm t hat sai d t hat t he onl y i mpor t ant oper at i ons i n war wer e t he cl ashes of ar mi es .cent ur y l at er . Two l essons f l ow f r om t hese exampl es : y ou may have t o educat e t he enemy on t he ef f ect your oper at i ons ar e l i kel y t o have .t er m ef f ect s l i kel y t o f l owf r omt hem As we have seen.and t he l ong.

Thei r f i nances begi n t o dr y up. Let us go bac k t o t he dr ug car t el exampl e we ear l i er di scussed . pr ocessi ng. but we can r each and dest r oy one of hi s syst em essent i al s. and t hei r st ocks dwi ndl e qui ckl y . t he par al ysi s i mposed at t he st r at egi c l evel of t he car t el dest r oys t he or gani zat i on' s abi l i t y t o sel l t he dr ugs i t s opposi t i on di dn' t want i t t o sel l . however . The or gani zat i on may st i l l be abl e t o f unct i on. I f t hey ar e not get t i ng r egul ar pay. but not i nst ant l y. or br ai n. i t i s not t he onl y possi bi l i t y. Suppos e t hat t he suppl i er s and pusher s hear not hi ng f r om headquar t er s f or s ome per i od of t i me . The obvi ous pl ace t o i nduce st r at egi c syst em par al ysi s i s at t he l eader shi p. Suppose t hat we can' t r each t he dr ug l or d. t he ef f or t we put i nt o under st andi ng how enemi es ar e or gani zed and how t o i mpose cost s l eads us di r ect l y i nt o t he concept s and mec hani s ms of par al ysi s . l evel . I f i t doesn' t succeed. nobody pr ot ect s t hem f r om compet i t or s. i f t he br ai n cannot be l ocat ed or at t acked? Al t hough t he l eader shi p f unct i on al ways pr ovi des t he mos t l ucr at i ve pl ace t o i nduce par al ysi s. we have ef f ect i vel y par al yzed t he syst em at a st r at egi c l evel . however .BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE mus t be r eady t o consi der i mposi t i on of st r at egi c and oper at i onal par al ysi s . t he maj or i t y of t he or gani zat i on' s suppl i er s and wor ker s mus t eat and mus t pay f or ser vi ces r ender ed . . and i t wi l l cer t ai nl y sear ch f ur i ousl y t o r epai r or r epl ace i t s f i nanci al net . t hey ar e goi ng t o be f or ced agai n t o f i nd al t er nat i ves out si de t he or gani zat i on t hat can no l onger pr ovi de t hemwi t h a syst em essent i al . we need t o i dent i f y t hose par t s of t he syst em whi c h we c an af f ect i n s uc h a way as t o pr event t he s y s t em f r om doi ng somet hi ng we don' t want i t t o do . I f t he enemy i s seen as a syst em. What happens. Af t er al l .al l whi l e t he over whel mi ng maj or i t y of t he i ndi vi dual s i n t he or gani zat i on ar e unhar med and not even di r ect l y t hr eat ened . What do t hey do? They begi n t o l ook f or ot her car t el s t o deal wi t h or f or ot her l i nes of wor k . For t unat el y. and usi ng i nf or mat i on we don' t want hi m t o have. I n a shor t per i od of t i me. The i dea of par al ysi s i s qui t e si mpl e . The best pl ace t o st ar t i s nor mal l y at t he cent er f or i f we can pr event t he syst em' s l eader shi p f r om gat her i ng. such as hi s f i nanci al net ? W e ar e l i kel y t o have cr eat ed a di f f er ent l evel of par al ysi s . t hi s par al ysi s i n one par t of t he st r at egi c syst em i s l i kel y t o cause muc h of t he r est t o at r ophy and bec ome i nef f ect i ve .

AI RTHEORY FORTHETWENTY. Mos t assur edl y. Bef or e i t s f uel was cut of f . wher e t o send t he f uel and ammuni t i on. goi ng f r om t he cent er of t he r i ngs t owar d t he out si de suggest s we shoul d l ook next i n t he syst em. but not unf ocused speed . Mak i ng t hi s deci si on i s t he t oughest i nt el l ect ual chal l enge . He needed t o k now wher e he was goi ng. per haps by i nt er di ct i ng t he Red Bal l Expr ess. or bul l et s .essent i al ( or suppl y) r i ng f or an ans wer . Thi r d Ar my woul d have been ef f ect i vel y par al yzed i nsof ar as i t s abi l i t y t o conduct r api d of f ensi ves si mpl y because of f ensi ves on t he gr ound at any speed ar e ext r aor di nar i l y compl ex and r equi r e huge amount s of good i nf or mat i on . Thi r d Ar my was a f ast movi ng. Under t hese condi t i ons. I magi ne t he ef f ect on t he Uni t ed St at es i f al l of i t s el ect r i ci t y st ops f unct i oni ng . So f ar we hav e di scussed ef f ect s we mi ght want t o pr oduce on t he enemy : unt enabl e cost s or par al ysi s at one or mor e l evel s . wher eas we r ar el y ( f ar t oo r ar el y) t hi nk about st r at egi c and oper at i onal . Pat t on depended on speed f or success.FI RST CENTURY At a bi g. Suppos e t he Ger mans had succeeded i n bl i ndi ng Pat t on by depr i vi ng hi m of hi s abi l i t y t o gat her and di ssemi nat e i nf or mat i on . danger ous t hr eat t o t he Ger mans . Thus. i t bec omes a sl ow. i nduces t he desi r ed f or m of oper at i onal par al ysi s and conver t s Thi r d Ar my i nt o somet hi ng di f f er ent . wel l bef or e i t mak es any sense t o t al k about mechani cs. what hi s t r oops wer e goi ng t o encount er . Next . Let us r et ur n t o our Geor ge Pat t on and Thi r d Ar my ex ampl e t o l ook at oper at i onal par al ysi s . af t er t he f uel st ops. i t i s i mper at i ve t o deci de what ef f ect y ou want t o pr oduce on t he enemy . one can i magi ne a si mi l ar out c ome i f t he st at e l oses a syst em essent i al l i ke el ect r i ci t y . Bef or e pr oceedi ng. once t he desi r ed ef f ect i s deci ded. i t i s usef ul t o not e t hat we hav e used qui t e a f ew pages t al ki ng about ai r t heor y and hav e yet t o di scuss bombs . and wher e t o shi f t l and and ai r f or ces as r equi r ed . sl oggi ng beast si gni f i cant l y di f f er ent i n nat ur e and t hr eat . we mus t l ook at how we go about doi ng i t . what el se coul d t hey hav e done t o i nduce oper at i onal par al ysi s? Agai n.no f uel . The r eason i s si mpl e . I f t he Ger mans wer e unabl e t o bl i nd Pat t on. el i mi nat i on of f uel .st at e l evel . no speed . Pat t on' s speed depended on f uel f or hi s t anks and t r uc k s . mi ssi l es. f i gur i ng out how t o at t ai n i t i s muc h easi er i f f or no ot her r eason t han we pr act i ce t he necessar y t act i cal event s ever y day. however .

BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE

pr obl ems . Let us pr opose a ver y si mpl e r ul e f or how t o go
about pr oduci ng t he ef f ect : do i t ver y f ast .
I t may s eem f acet i ous t o r educe t he " how" t o s uc h a si mpl e
r ul e, and, i ndeed, we wi l l now mak e i t a l i t t l e mor e c ompl ex by
t al ki ng about par al l el at t ack . Never t hel ess, t he essence of
success i n f ut ur e war wi l l cer t ai nl y be t o mak e ever yt hi ng
happen y ou want t o happen i n a ver y shor t per i od of
t i me- i nst ant l y i f possi bl e . W
hy ? And what i s par al l el war ?
Par al l el war br i ngs so many par t s of t he enemy syst em
under near - s i mul t aneous at t ack t hat t he s y s t em si mpl y
cannot r eact t o def end or t o r epai r i t sel f . I t i s l i ke t he deat h of
a t housand cut s ; any i ndi vi dual cut i s unl i kel y t o be ser i ous . A
hundr ed, however , st ar t t o sl ow a body consi der abl y, and a
t hous and ar e f at al because t he body cannot deal wi t h t hat
many assaul t s on i t . Our best exampl e of par al l el war t o dat e
i s t he st r at egi c at t ack on I r aq i n t he Gul f War . Wi t hi n a mat t er
of mi nut es t he coal i t i on, at t acked over a hundr ed k ey t ar get s
acr oss I r aq' s ent i r e st r at egi c dept h . I n an i nst ant , i mpor t ant
f unct i ons i n al l of I r aq st opped wor ki ng ver y wel l . Phone
ser vi ce f el l pr eci pi t ousl y, l i ght s went out , ai r def ense cent er s
st opped cont r ol l i ng subor di nat e uni t s, and key l eader shi p
of f i ces and per sonnel wer e dest r oyed . To put I r aq' s di l emma i n
per spect i ve, t he coal i t i on st r uck t hr ee t i mes as many t ar get s
i n I r aq i n t he f i r st 24 hour s as Ei ght h Ai r For ce hi t i n Ger many
i n al l of 19431
The bombi ng of f ensi ve agai nst Ger many ( unt i l t he ver y end)
was a ser i al oper at i on, as vi r t ual l y al l mi l i t ar y oper at i ons have
been si nce t he dawn of hi st or y . Oper at i ons have been ser i al
bec aus e c ommuni c at i ons made c onc ent r at i on of men
i mper at i ve, t he i naccur acy of weapons meant t hat a gr eat
number had t o be empl oy ed t o hav e an ef f ect , and t he
di f f i cul t y of mov ement essent i al l y r est r i ct ed oper at i ons t o one
or t wo l ocat i ons . I n addi t i on, mi l i t ar y oper at i ons hav e most l y
been conduct ed agai nst t he enemy' s mi l i t ar y, not agai nst hi s
ent i r e st r at egi c or oper at i onal syst em. Al l t hi s meant t hat war
was a mat t er of act i on and r eact i on, of cul mi nat i ng poi nt s, of
r egr oupi ng, of r ef or mi ng . Essent i al l y, war was an ef f or t by one
si de t o br eak t hr ough a def ensi ve l i ne wi t h ser i al at t acks or i t
was an at t empt t o pr event br eakt hr ough .

AI RTHEORY FORTHE TWENTY- FI RST CENTURY

I n any event t he maj or i t y of t he enemy syst em l ay i n r el at i ve
saf et y t hr ough mos t of a conf l i ct wi t h t he f i ght i ng and damage
conf i ned l ar gel y t o t he f r ont i t sel f . Even when aer i al bombar dment
began t o r each st r at egi c dept hs, t he bombar dment t ended t o be
ser i al ( agai n because of i naccur at e weapons and t he need t o
concent r at e at t acki ng f or ces so t hey coul d penet r at e an aer i al
def ensi ve l i ne) . Thi s meant t hat t he enemy coul d gat her hi s
def ender s i n one or t wo pl aces and t hat he coul d concent r at e t he
ent i r e syst em' s r epai r asset s on t he one or t wo pl aces whi c h may
have suf f er ed s ome damage . Not so i n I r aq.
I n I r aq, a count r y about t he s ame si ze as pr ewar Ger many ,
so many key f aci l i t i es suf f er ed so muc h damage so qui ckl y
t hat i t was s i mpl y not possi bl e t o mak e st r at egi cal l y
meani ngf ul r epai r . Nor was i t possi bl e or ver y usef ul t o
concent r at e def enses ; successf ul def ense of one t ar get mer el y
meant t hat one out of over a hundr ed di dn' t get hi t at t hat
par t i cul ar t i me . As i n t he t hous and cut s anal ogy, i t j ust
doesn' t mat t er ver y muc h i f s ome of t he cut s ar e def l ect ed . I t i s
i mpor t ant t o not e t hat I r aq was a ver y t ough c ount r y
st r at egi cal l y . I r aq had spent an enor mous amount of money
and ener gy on gi vi ng i t sel f l ot s of pr ot ect i on and r edundanc y
and i t s ef f or t s woul d have pai d of f wel l i f i t had been at t acked
ser i al l y as i t had ever y r i ght t o ant i ci pat e i t woul d . I n ot her
wor ds, t he par al l el at t ack agai nst I r aq was agai nst what may
wel l have been t he count r y best pr epar ed i n al l t he wor l d f or
at t ack . I f i t wor k ed t her e, i t wi l l pr obabl y wor k el sewher e .
Execut i ng par al l el at t ack i s a subj ect f or anot her essay or even
a book . Suf f i ce i t t o say her e t hat t hose t hi ngs br ought under
at t ack mus t be car ef ul l y sel ect ed t o achi eve t he desi r ed ef f ect .
W
e have now pr ovi ded t he gr oundwor k f or a t heor y of ai r
power t o use i nt o t he t went y- f i r st cent ur y . To s ummar i z e :
under st and t he pol i t i cal and t echnol ogi cal envi r onment ; i dent i f y
pol i t i cal obj ect i ves ; det er mi ne how y ou want t o i nduce t he enemy
t o do your wi l l ( i mposed cost , par al ysi s, or dest r uct i on) ; use t he
f i ve- r i ng syst ems anal ysi s t o get suf f i ci ent i nf or mat i on on t he
enemy t o mak e possi bl e i dent i f i cat i on of appr opr i at e cent er s of
gr avi t y; and at t ack t he r i ght t ar get s i n par al l el as qui ckl y as
possi bl e . To mak e al l t hi s a l i t t l e mor e under st andabl e, i t i s
usef ul t o f i ni sh by ment i oni ng t he Gul f War ' s k ey st r at egi c and

BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE

oper at i onal l essons, whi c h l ook as t hough t hey wi l l be usef ul
f or t he next quar t er - cent ur y or mor e .
W
e c an i dent i f y 10 concept s t hat s ummar i z e t he r evol ut i on
of t he Gul f War and t hat mus t be t aken i nt o account as we
devel op new f or ce l evel s and st r at egy:
1 . The i mpor t ance of st r at egi c at t ack and t he f r agi l i t y of
st at es at t he st r at egi c l evel of war
2.

Fat al consequences of l osi ng st r at egi c ai r super i or i t y

3.

The over whel mi ng ef f ect s of par al l el war f ar e

4.

The val ue of pr eci si on weapons

5 . The f r agi l i t y of sur f ace f or ces at t he oper at i onal l evel of war
6.

Fat al consequence of l osi ng oper at i onal ai r super i or i t y

7 . The r edef i ni t i on of mas s and sur pr i se by st eal t h and
pr eci si on
8 . The vi abi l i t y of " ai r occupat i on"
9 . The domi nanc e of ai r power
10 . The i mpor t ance of i nf or mat i on at
oper at i onal l evel s

t he st r at egi c and

Let us l ook at each of t hese br i ef l y .

1 . The i mpor t ance of st r at egi c at t ack and t he f r agi l i t y of
st at es at t he st r at egi c l evel of war . Count r i es ar e i nver t ed
pyr ami ds t hat r est pr ecar i ousl y on t hei r st r at egi c i nnar ds- t hei r
l eader shi p, communi cat i ons, key pr oduct i on, i nf r ast r uct ur e,
and popul at i on . I f a count r y i s par al yzed st r at egi cal l y, i t i s
def eat ed and cannot sust ai n i t s f i el ded f or ces t hough t hey be
f ul l y i nt act .
2 . Fat al consequences of l osi ng st r at egi c ai r super i or i t y .
W
hen a st at e l oses i t s abi l i t y t o pr ot ect i t sel f f r om ai r at t ack, i t
i s at t he mer c y of i t s enemy, and onl y t he enemy' s c ompas s i on
or exhaust i on c an save i t . The f i r st r eason f or gov er nment i s t o
hen a st at e c an no
pr ot ect t he ci t i zenr y and i t s pr oper t y . W
hen a st at e l oses
l onger do so, i t has l ost i t s r eason f or bei ng . W
r
easonabl
e hope of
st r at egi c ai r super i or i t y and has no
r egai ni ng i t qui ckl y, i t shoul d sue f or peace as qui ckl y as
possi bl e . Fr om an of f ensi ve st andpoi nt , wi nni ng st r at egi c ai r
super i or i t y i s t he number one pr i or i t y of t he c ommander ; once
t hat i s accompl i shed, ever yt hi ng el se i s a j ust a mat t er of t i me .

AI RTHEORY FORTHETWENTY- FI RST CENTURY

3. The over whel mi ng ef f ect s of par al l el

war f ar e. St r at egi c

or gani zat i ons, i ncl udi ng st at es, have a smal l number of vi t al
t ar get s at t he st r at egi c l evel - i n t he nei ghbor hood of a f ew
hundr ed wi t h an aver age of per haps 10 ai mpoi nt s per vi t al
t ar get . Thes e t ar get s t end t o be smal l , ver y expensi ve, have f ew
backups, and ar e har d t o r epai r . I f a si gni f i cant per cent age of
t hem ar e st r uck i n par al l el , t he damage bec omes i nsuper abl e .
Cont r ast par al l el at t ack wi t h ser i al at t ack wher e onl y one or
t wo t ar get s c ome under at t ack i n a gi ven day ( or l onger ) . The
enemy c an al l evi at e t he ef f ect s of ser i al at t ack by di sper sal
over t i me, i ncr easi ng t he def enses of t ar get s t hat ar e l i kel y t o
be at t acked, concent r at i ng hi s r esour ces t o r epai r damage t o
si ngl e t ar get s, and conduct i ng count er of f ensi ves . Par al l el
at t ack depr i ves hi m of t he abi l i t y t o r espond ef f ect i vel y, and
t he gr eat er t he per cent age of t ar get s hi t i n a si ngl e bl ow, t he
mor e near l y i mpossi bl e i s r esponse .

4. The val ue of pr eci si on weapons . Pr eci si on weapons al l ow
t he economi cal dest r uct i on of vi r t ual l y al l t ar get s- especi al l y
st r at egi c and oper at i onal t ar get s t hat ar e di f f i cul t t o mov e or
conceal . They change t he nat ur e of war f r om one of pr obabi l i t y t o
one of cer t ai nt y. War s f or mi l l enni a have been pr obabi l i t y event s
i n whi c h each si de l aunched huge quant i t i es of pr oj ect i l es ( and
men) at one anot her i n t he hope t hat enough of t he pr oj ect i l es
( and men) woul d ki l l enough of t he ot her si de t o i nduce r et r eat or
sur r ender . Pr obabi l i t y war f ar e was c hanc y at best . I t was
unpr edi ct abl e, f ul l of sur pr i ses, har d t o quant i f y, and gover ned
by acci dent . Pr eci si on weapons have changed al l t hat . I n t he
Gul f War , we k new wi t h near cer t ai nt y t hat a si ngl e weapon
woul d dest r oy i t s t ar get . War mov ed i nt o t he pr edi ct abl e .
Wi t h pr eci si on weapons , even l ogi st i cs bec ome si mpl e ;
dest r uct i on of t he I r aqi s at t he st r at egi c, oper at i onal , and
t act i cal l evel s r equi r ed t hat about 12, 000 ai mpoi nt s be hi t .
Thus, no l onger i s i t necessar y t o mov e a near - i nf i ni t e quant i t y
of muni t i ons so t hat s ome t i ny per cent age mi ght hi t somet hi ng
i mpor t ant . Si nce t he I r aqi ar my was t he l ar gest f i el ded si nce
t he Chi nese i n t he Kor ean W
ar and si nce we k now t hat al l
count r i es l ook about t he s ame at t he st r at egi c and oper at i onal
l evel s, we can f or ecast i n advance how many pr eci si on weapons
wi l l be needed t o def eat an enemy - as s umi ng of cour se t hat
we ar e conf i dent about get t i ng t he weapons t o t hei r t ar get s .

BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE

5. The f r agi l i t y of sur f ace f or ces at t he oper at i onal l evel of
war . Suppor t i ng si gni f i cant number s of sur f ace f or ces ( ai r , l and,
or sea) i s a t ough admi ni st r at i ve pr obl em even i n peacet i me .
Success depends upon ef f i ci ent di st r i but i on of i nf or mat i on, f uel ,
f ood, and ammuni t i on . By necessi t y, ef f i ci ent di st r i but i on
depends on an i nver t ed pyr ami d of di st r i but i on . Suppl i es of al l
oper at i onal commodi t i es mus t be accumul at ed i n one or t wo
l ocat i ons, t hen par cel ed out t o t wo or f our l ocat i ons, and so on
unt i l t hey event ual l y r each t he user . The nodes i n t he syst emar e
except i onal l y vul ner abl e t o pr eci si on at t ack . As an exampl e,
consi der what t he ef f ect woul d have been of a si ngl e ai r r ai d a
day - ev en wi t h nonpr eci si on weapons - on t he WWI I Red Bal l
Expr ess or on t he bui l dup behi nd VI I and XVI I I Cor ps i n t he Gul f
War . The Red Bal l Expr ess bec ame i nt er nal l y unsust ai nabl e,
and t he VI I and XVI I I Cor ps bui l dups sever el y st r ai ned t he
r esour ces of t he ent i r e US Ar my - ev en i n t he absence of any
enemy at t acks .
Logi st i cs and admi ni st r at i on domi nat e sur f ace war f ar e, and
nei t her i s easy t o def end . I n t he past t hese act i vi t i es t ook pl ace
so f ar behi nd t he l i nes t hat t hey wer e r easonabl y secur e . Suc h
i s no l onger t he c as e- whi c h br i ngs i nt o ser i ous quest i on any
f or m of war f ar e t hat r equi r es huge l ogi st i cs and admi ni st r at i ve
bui l dup .

6. Fat al

consequence of l osi ng oper at i onal

ai r super i or i t y .

Funct i oni ng at t he oper at i onal l evel i s di f f i cul t even wi t hout enemy
i nt er f er ence . I f t he enemy at t ai ns oper at i onal ai r super i or i t y ( and
expl oi t s i t ) 5 and can r oamat wi l l above i ndi spensabl e oper at i onal
f unct i ons l i ke suppl y, communi cat i ons, and movement , success i s
not possi bl e . As wi t h t he l oss of st r at egi c ai r super i or i t y, l oss of
oper at i onal ai r super i or i t y spel l s doom and shoul d pr ompt qui ck
measur es t o r et r eat whi ch i s l i kel y t o be ver y cost l y- or t o
ar r ange f or sur r ender t er ms.

7. The r edef i ni t i on of mass and sur pr i se by st eal t h and
pr eci si on. For t he f i r st t i me i n t he hi st or y of war f ar e, a si ngl e
ent i t y can pr oduce i t s own mas s and sur pr i se . I t i s t hi s si ngl e
ent i t y t hat mak es par al l el war f ar e possi bl e . Sur pr i se has al ways
been one of t he mos t i mpor t ant f act or s i n war - per haps even t he
si ngl e mos t i mpor t ant , because i t coul d mak e up f or l ar ge
def i ci enci es i n number s . Sur pr i se was al way s di f f i cul t t o
achi eve because i t conf l i ct ed wi t h t he concept s of mas s and

12 0

el i mi nat i ng mos t mi ddl e management . I n t he past . sat el l i t e) . so t he odds on sur pr i si ng t he enemy wer e smal l i ndeed . assembl i ng and movi ng l ar ge f or ces i n secr et was qui t e di f f i cul t . Today. Ai r power hel i copt er . " Count r i es conf or m t o t he wi l l of t hei r enemi es when t he penal t y f or not conf or mi ng exceeds t he cost of conf or mi ng . Gr ound occupat i on. cr ui se mi ssi l e. I t i f necessar y . i s i ndi cat ed when t he i nt ent i s t o col oni ze or ot her wi se appr opr i at e t he enemy' s homel and .FI RST CENTURY concent r at i on . by def i ni t i on. and f or mi ng wor l dwi de neur al net wor ks t o capi t al i ze on t he abi l i t y of uni t s i n and out of t he di r ect conf l i ct ar ea. even i n t he days bef or e aer i al r econnai ssance. Cl ear f or t he f ut ur e i s t he r equi r ement t o r edesi gn our or gani zat i ons so t hey ar e bui l t t o expl oi t moder n i nf or mat i on. occupat i on ( i n t he r ar e i nst ances when i t was needed or possi bl e) was accompl i shed by gr ound f or ces. The I r aqi s conf or med wi t h UN demands as muc h as or mor e t han t he Fr ench di d wi t h Ger man demands when occupi ed by mi l l i ons of Ger mans . . t he concept of " ai r occupat i on" i s a r eal i t y and i n many cases i t wi l l suf f i ce . St eal t h and pr eci si on have sol ved bot h si des of t he pr obl em. a c ommander had t o as s embl e and mov e l ar ge number s .because t her e was no good subst i t ut e . The domi nanc e of ai r power . The vi abi l i t y of " ai r occupat i on. Of cour se.whi c h ar e mak e l ess vul ner abl e .AI R THEORY FORTHE TWENTY. i f an enemy' s st r at egi c and oper at i onal ver y vul ner abl e and ver y di f f i cul t t o c an al so dest r oy mos t t act i cal t ar get s ( f i xed wi ng. however . pushi ng deci si on mak i ng t o ver y l ow l evel s. 8. st eal t h achi eves sur pr i se. 10 . At t he s ame t i me. I n t he Gul f War . wi l l dest r oy t ar get bas es .handl i ng equi pment . The i mpor t ance of i nf or mat i on at t he st r at egi c and oper at i onal l evel s. Cost can be i mposed on a st at e by par al yzi ng or dest r oyi ng i t s st r at egi c and oper at i onal base or by act ual occupat i on of enemy t er r i t or y . t he coal i t i on managed i t s own i nf or mat i on r equi r ement s accept abl y. I n or der t o have enough f or ces avai l abl e t o hur l enough pr oj ect i l es t o wi n t he pr obabi l i t y cont est . and pr eci si on means t hat a si ngl e weapon accompl i shes what t housands wer e unl i kel y t o accompl i sh i n t he past . t he coal i t i on depr i ved I r aq of mos t of i t s abi l i t y t o gat her and use i nf or mat i on . even t hough i t was or gani zed i n t he s ame way Fr eder i ck t he Gr eat had or gani zed hi msel f . Thi s al so means f l at t eni ng or gani zat i ons. 9. not checked.

or do we l ook f or i nnovat i ve sol ut i ons? I f we def i ne t he pr obl em as one of pr event i ng gr oups of sol di er s f r om wander i ng ar ound a ci t y. but unpl easant . Suppose a l ar ge ci t y i s under t he cont r ol of r ovi ng gangs of sol di er s. we woul d t hi nk t hat coul d onl y be done by put t i ng our own sol di er s on t he gr ound . 6 Thi s f ai l ur e made Saddam' s j ob muc h easi er and gr eat l y r educed t he chance of hi s over t hr ow. weapons . t he coal i t i on s uc c eeded i n br eaki ng I r aq' s abi l i t y t o pr ocess i nf or mat i on but f ai l ed t o f i l l t he voi d by pr ovi di ng I r aqi s an al t er nat e sour ce of i nf or mat i on . and i t i s Amer i can pol i cy t o r est or e s ome degr ee of or der t o t he ci t y. t her e wer e r ar el y mor e t han a f ew hundr ed ai r men i n t he ai r as opposed t o t he t ens of t housands of sol di er s and sai l or s i n t he di r ect c ombat ar eas) . I t may be ver y di f f i cul t t o pr event an i ndi vi dual f r om skul ki ng ar ound a ci t y or even r obbi ng an occasi onal bank . and ot her par apher nal i a? W hen gr oups ar e spot t ed. i t behooves t he ai r pl anner t o t hi nk of one ot her ar ea : what c an be done wi t h ai r power t hat i n t he past we k new coul d onl y be done wi t h gr ound or sea power or coul dn' t be done at al l ? The quest i on mus t be addr essed f or sever al r easons : ai r power has t he abi l i t y t o r each a conf l i ct ar ea f ast er and cheaper t han ot her f or ms of power . Let us l ook at j ust one exampl e . const i t ut e a r el at i vel y smal l t act i cal pr obl em si nce t hey ar e unl i kel y t o be abl e t o cause wi de. t hey f i r st r ecei ve a war ni ng t o di sper se . r ubber bul l et s. and i t may pr ovi de t he onl y way f or t he Uni t ed St at es t o par t i ci pat e at accept abl e pol i t i cal r i sk ( use of ai r power does not r equi r e physi cal pr esence on t he gr ound) . Can we not put a combi nat i on of AC. however . whi c h have appl i cabi l i t y wel l i nt o t he f ut ur e. Capt ur i ng and expl oi t i ng t he dat aspher e may wel l be t he mos t i mpor t ant ef f or t i n many f ut ur e war s . Bey ond t hese Gul f War l essons.BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE The i nf or mat i on l esson f r om t he Gul f was negat i ve . But what i f pol i cyr naker s ar e unwi l l i ng t o accept t he pol i t i cal and physi cal r i sks at t endant t o doi ng so? Do we do not hi ng. ent angl i ng chemi cal net s. Si ngl e i ndi vi dual s. I f t hey don' t t hey f i nd t hemsel ves under at t ack by nonl et hal .130s and hel i copt er s i n t he ai r equi pped wi t h sear chl i ght s. l et hal f or ce i s at hand . l oudspeaker s. I f t hese don' t wor k. Nor mal l y. empl oy ment of ai r power t ypi cal l y put s f ar f ewer peopl e at r i sk t han any ot her f or m ( i n t he Gul f War . we may be abl e t o sol ve i t f r omt he ai r .scal e di sr upt i on as can mul t i pl e 12 2 .

our r esponsi bi l i t y i s t o di st r i but e i t t o t he r i ght peopl e. Of cour se.FI RST CENTURY gr oups . however . A st r at egi c ent i t y i s any sel f . " Thus. " The Uni t ed St at es depends on i t s Ai r For ce and ever yone k nows t hat no one ever won a war f r om t he ai r .bomb capabi l i t i es . we k now t hat we wi l l be cal l ed on t o conduct humani t ar i an and peac emak i ng oper at i ons . wi l l r equi r e put t i ng as muc h ef f or t i nt o devel opi ng pr eci si on f ood. busi ness. t he f or mer i s a pol i ce mat t er .del i ver y t echni ques as we put i nt o devel opi ng pr eci si on bomb or cl ust er . I ndeed.AI RTHEORY FORTHE TWENTY. 3. i f we al l r esol ve t o t hi nk . Not es 1 . 2. I f we t hi nk about f ood del i ver y as t he s ame as bomb del i ver y and under st and t hat wi t h f ood. To do so. t he Fr ench i n Wor l d War I exul t i ng t he doct r i ne of " col d st eel " agai nst t he mac hi ne gun and bar bed wi r e as t he f l ower of a gener at i on per i shed . Accept i ng t he changes made mani f est i n t he Gul f War wi l l be equal l y di f f i cul t f or t he Uni t ed St at es but by no means i mpossi bl e. t her e i s a new wor l d bui l di ng ar ound us and t he r evol ut i ons i n pol i t i cs.cont ai ned syst em t hat has t he gener al abi l i t y t o set i t s own goal s and t he wher ewi t hal t o car r y t hem out . i t i s human nat ur e t o st ay wi t h t he ol d way s of doi ng busi ness even when t he ext er nal wor l d has made t he ol d way s obsol et e or even danger ous . The l at t er pr obl em i s ser i ous but manageabl e . and t he st eel and aut o mak er s of t he Uni t ed St at es convi nced t hat t hei r f or ei gn compet i t or s wer e i nept even as t hei r mar ket posi t i ons pl ummet ed . Saddam made t he f ol l owi ng st at ement shor t l y af t er hi s successf ul i nvasi on of Kuwai t . A t er m i nt r oduced by Don Si mmons i n Hyper t on ( New Yor k : Bant am Books. not i gnor e t hem. t hi nki ng out si de t he l i nes wi l l be a necessi t y i f ai r power i s t o pr osper and t o pl ay a key r ol e i n def endi ng Amer i can i nt er est s wel l i nt o t he next cent ur y . we shoul d be abl e t o do as wel l wi t h f ood as we do wi t h bombs . hi s 123 . So many exampl es c ome so easi l y t o mi nd : t he heavy kni ght s at Agi ncour t r ef usi ng t o bel i eve t hat t hey wer e bei ng dest r oyed by peasant s wi t h bows . And i ndeed. The pr obl em i s t he s ame and i s t heor et i cal l y suscept i bl e t o an ai r power sol ut i on i f we ar e wi l l i ng t o t hi nk out si de t he l i nes . By t he s ame t oken. A st at e i s nor mal l y a st r at egi c ent i t y as i s a dr ug car t el or a guer r i l l a or gani zat i on . and war have happened and we mus t deal wi t h t hem. as wi t h bombs. 1990) .

t he s ame t hi ng di d not happen at t he st r at egi c l evel i nsi de I r aq f or a var i et y of not ver y good r easons . 4 . as a r esul t . Some woul d ar gue t hat t he muj ahi deen i n Af ghani s t an l ost oper at i onal ai r super i or i t y and yet st i l l pr evai l ed . t he f or mer i s not . . The coal i t i on pr ovi ded I r aqi sol di er s at t he f r ont gr eat quant i t i es of i nf or mat i on and di d so ef f ect i vel y. The l at t er i s t r ue . so t hey had i nt ended t o pr ovi de hi m accur at e r epor t s of al l at t acks by usi ng psychol ogi cal war f ar e asset s . The Sovi et s si mpl y di d not have t he pr eci si on weaponr y and det ect i on capabi l i t y t he Uni t ed St at es had i n t he Gul f War . t he pl anner s wer e unabl e t o mak e t hi s happen . t he pl anner s had r ecogni zed t hat Saddam woul d not be abl e t o gat her i nf or mat i on. For a number of r easons. 6 . because t he St i nger ant i ai r cr af t mi ssi l es f or ced t he Sovi et s t o oper at e at an al t i t ude t hat depr i ved t hem of t he abi l i t y t o hi t anyt hi ng . As an asi de.BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE pr econcei ved not i on ( shar ed by many mi l i t ar y of f i cer s ar ound t he wor l d) made i t di f f i cul t f or hi mt o anal yze what was happeni ng t o hi m. Saddam l acked i nf or mat i on t hat t he coal i t i on r eal l y want ed hi mt o have . 5 .

None of t hi s i nt ends t o do any mor e t han add gr eat er di scer nment t o t he t heor y of par al l el war and hyper war . 8) . Second. or whet her s ome post .i n t housands and t housands of Coal i t i on sor t i es.Chapt er 5 Par al l el War and Hy per war : I s Ev er y Want a Weak nes s ? Col Ri char d Szaf r anski . " I s ever y want a weakness?" i s a Zen Buddi st r ef l ect i on . Repr i nt ed wi t h per mi ssi on . pr i nci pal l y as t hey appl y t o ai r campai gns. Bi l l y Mi t chel l . i t ar gues t hat t he t heor y i s usef ul i f appl i ed agai nst weak i ndust r i al st at es . Ai r power . Deser t St or mpr oved. t hei r shor t comi ng i s t hat t hey have onl y l i mi t ed ut i l i t y i n t he emer gi ng wor l d . 121.or so advocat es bel i eve and want us t o bel i eve . An edi t ed ver si on appear s i n t he August 1995 i ssue of Pr oceedi ngs ( vol . Next . no. i t exami nes par al l el war t o det er mi ne what i s new i n t he i dea . Theor i es of par al l el war f ar e ar e not " bad" or " wr ong . J i mmy Dool i t t l e. i t exami nes t hi s " new" ki nd of ai r war f ar e t o i l l umi nat e t he st r engt hs and shor t comi ngs par al l el war evi dences i n t heor y and pr act i ce . Thi r d. 2 and ot her s3. USAF Somet hi ng happened i n Deser t St or m never wi t nessed bef or e . Copyr i ght 1995. Advocat es of ai r power ear nest l y want ot her s t o accept what t hey bel i eve Deser t St or mpr oved . i t post ul at es t heor et i cal ways t o def eat an adver sar y i nt endi ng t o empl oy par al l el war . Def eat i ng par al l el war i s possi bl e whet her t he Uni t ed St at es i s t he nat i on i nt endi ng t o empl oy i t . r eveal i ng mi nor f l aws i n t he i deas and t hei r appl i cat i on . 12 5 . Fi r st .appear ed t o have def eat ed an enemy . Us Naval I nst i t ut e . That want may be a weakness . " Rat her . t hey asser t . Thi s essay exami nes t he not i ons of par al l el war and hyper war . ' f ul f i l l i ng t he vi si on of Gul i o Douhet . t hat ai r power can be or i s domi nant and deci si ve.Gul f War af i ci onado embr aces t he t heor y.

. W hat I f . al l war s woul d aut omat i cal l y be conf i ned t o a si ngl e deci si ve act or a set of si mul t aneous ones. or a set of si mul t aneous deci si ons. have wi t hi n t hem l eader shi p or s ome i nt er nal cont r ol l i ng mec hani s m. suggest skept i ci sm. . 12 6 . i f al l t he means avai l abl e wer e. W hat I s Par al l el W ar ? The i dea of par al l el war ar i ses f r om under st andi ng t he enemy as a " syst em" or " or gani sm. I f aut hent i c par al l el war wer e possi bl e. But . Advocat es r ef er t o t hese or bi t s or concent r i c " r i ngs" as " t he f i ve r i ngs . si mul t aneousl y empl oyed. Cl ausewi t z hi msel f not ed t hat i f war consi st ed of one deci si ve act . mer el y an ext ensi on of i t . . ( 5) r esi di ng at t he cent er . Thus. i t woul d. . ( 3) a t r ans por t at i on i nf r ast r uct ur e pr ovi di ng or gani c essent i al s . each of t he r i ngs al so has wi t hi n i t t he f i ve c omponent s . . or coul d be. and i f aU had been commi t t ed i n t he f i r st act t her e coul d r eal l y be no quest i on of a second . pr epar at i ons woul d t end t owar d t ot al i t y.ar med f or ces syst em descr i bed by Cl ausewi t z .t he r eason bei ng t hat any adver se deci si on mus t r educe t he s umof t he means avai l abl e. as i t s advocat es ar gue. f or no omi ssi on coul d ever be r ect i f i ed . ? Ev en so. of cour se. f r om t he ar my t o t he i ndi vi dual sol di er . " t he i deas bear cl ose exami nat i on . ( 2) t he mas s es of t he peopl e who ar e not di r ect c ombat ant s . l eader shi p or a cont r ol l i ng mec hani s m f or t he ent i r e syst em. " si mul t aneousl y mor e compl i cat ed and l ess compl i cat ed t han t he peopl e. " 6 Li ke a f r act al . " wi t h t hr ee " coul ds" and t wo " woul ds" i n t andem. Any subsequent mi l i t ar y oper at i on woul d vi r t ual l y be par t of t he f i r st . i t woul d be a val uabl e one i ndeed . Si nce ever yt hi ng pi vot s on " i f . one caveat r emai ns : i f par al l el war i s t he new ai r war f ar e f or m. 5 The enemy st at e t heor et i cal l y has f i ve key or gani c c omponent s : ( 1) f i el ded mi l i t ar y f or ces at t he per i pher y . ( 4) t he or gani c essent i al s t hems el v es . r ender muc h of Cl ausewi t z i r r el evant . 4 Thr ee " i f s.st at e. and.i n ot her wor ds.BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE But . t he f i el ded f or ces at t he per i pher y.

The obj ect i s t o dest r oy or damage ( or t o r ender dysf unct i onal ) t hose t ar get s t hat pr oduce a st r at egi c ef f ect by causi ng l oss of t he enemy syst em' s or gani c capabi l i t i es . gi vi ng bal l . Dest r uct i on i s t he means t o an end . The mos t i mpor t ant i nf or mat i on del i ver ed i n t hi s et her eal sense i s 12 7 . t he t heor y hol ds. " Thus. r ai l and r oad net wor ks. al so asser t s t hat what ever el se " weapons" may be or do. " 7 Leader shi p. l o W hen t hese par al l el war f ar e at t acks occur wi t h si mul t anei t y or gr eat speed. " or " meani ng . but mor e of t en engaged i t s ai r t ar get s and t ar get set s ser i al l y wi t hi n t he or gani c whol e of Ger many . The obj ect i s not j ust t he dest r uct i on of t ar get s . I n a l at er i t er at i on of t he t heor y. and as i nf or mat i on war s i bec omes an i nt r i gui ng not i on wi t hi n t he ser vi ces and t he Depar t ment of Def ense. t he l eadi ng t heor i st . t hey ar e essent i al l y " i nf or mat i on" because t hey c ommuni c at e " messages. or was. $ I n cont r ast . t heor et i cal l y empl oys ai r power t o at t ack al l t he deci si ve poi nt s i n each r i ng and t he deci si ve poi nt of t he ent i r e syst em si mul t aneousl y . t he ent i r e syst em and each r i ng has wi t hi n i t key nodes or " cent er s of gr avi t y . t he t heor i st s ar gue. i s t he key node i n each r i ng and t hr oughout . pet r ol eum. war f ar e t hat engaged each r i ng and i t s cat egor i es of t ar get s i n t ur n. mov i ng f r om t he per i pher y t owar d t he cent er . ai r f i el ds. i nf or mat i on bec omes t he " bol t " r unni ng t hr ough al l t he r i ngs and hol di ng t he r i ngs t oget her . ad ser i at i m. submar i ne pens.bear i ng f act or i es. hyper war r esul t s . I n Wor l d War I I . on t he ot her hand. and ci t i es s ome pr i or i t y f or ai r at t ack at any gi ven t i me . 12 J ohn War den. t he cont r ol l i ng mec hani s m. Ai r .AR PARALLEL W ARAND HYPERW I n t hi s t axonomy. t hat al l ows at t acks agai nst t he i nt er nal r i ngs and al l t he ot her r i ngs wi t hout f i r st col l apsi ng t he out er r i ngs t hat sur r ound t he i nner ones . Par al l el war . ai r power del i ver s " i nf or mat i on" t o t he enemy l eader shi p . ser i al war f ar e i s. 9 I n t he past i t was not possi bl e t o at t ack t he sover ei gn i n t he cast l e unt i l t he opposi ng ar my had def eat ed t he enemy monar c hs f i el ded f or ces and mov ed t hr ough t he popul at i on t owar d t he cent er . ai r at t empt ed t o engage i t s t ar get s i n par al l el . i s t he super i or medi um f or pr osecut i ng t hese oper at i ons . I t i s ai r power . The t heor y i s t hat si mul t aneous and coor di nat ed oper at i ons agai nst al l t he key nodes i n t he syst em and i n each of t he r i ngs ar e t he essence of t he a new ki nd of of f ensi ve mi l i t ar y ai r c ampai gn.

i nt ended t o f or ce t he r api d col l apse of bot h t he enemy' s mi l i t ar y power and t he enemy' s wi l l . par al l el war and hyper war ai m at t he sudden and si mul t aneous r educt i on of t he enemy syst ems over al l " ener gy l evel . The goal i s t o vi si t t he cumul at i ve " deat h of a t housand cut s" on t he enemy syst em. Si nce gr ound f or ces cannot do t hi s. wi t h hi gh l et hal i t y and hi gh mobi l i t y. t hr oughout t he dept h and ext ent of t he t heat er . " you ar e dyi ng. " The si mul t aneous engagement of cent er s of gr avi t y pr event s r ecover y f r om t hi s s hoc k because t he ener gy avai l abl e t o t he syst em i s i nadequat e t o r est or e t he syst em t o f ul l f unct i oni ng. Cooper wr i t es : At t he oper at i onal l evel . " Deat h or par al ysi s of t he syst ems mi l i t ar y or war f i ght i ng capabi l i t y i s t he obj ect i ve and i nt ended ef f ect of t he ai r campai gn . t hat coul d evi dence bot h coher ence and si mul t anei t y . Thus. Cooper .BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE t he message " st op f i ght i ng. Or so t he t heor y goes . si nce f or ces af l oat cannot do t hi s ( except t hr ough t hei r ai r power ) . The at t acks t hemsel ves ar e a ( massi vel y) par al l el ser i es of synchr oni zed i nt egr at ed oper at i ons conduct ed at hi gh. " or " your st r at egy has been def eat ed and you ar e par al yzed. at t acks agai nst t he cent er s of gr avi t y must occur not onl y i n par al l el . enabl ed by t echnol ogy. " or . " so t hat t he or gani c syst em goes i nt o " shock . t he i mpact of t hese coher ent oper at i ons i s t o over whel m t he opponent ' s abi l i t y t o c ommand and cont r ol hi s f or ces. but al so wi t h " hyper " speed .t empo. W hat i s New Her e? Accor di ng t o Jef f r ey R. and f or ci ng hi m at t he l i mi t t o execut e onl y uncoor di nat ed pr epl anned act i ons . i n t he ext r eme case. The consequence of t he at t acks i s r api d def eat of t he enemy f or ce 128 . what mi ght be new i s a way of f i ght i ng. t hen ai r f or ces ar e t he f or ces best sui t ed f or empl oyi ng par al l el war at hyper war t empo. denyi ng hi m t he abi l i t y t o r espond t o our c ampai gn pl an and oper at i ons. 13 Because t he obj ect sought i s par al ysi s.

15 Nor shoul d anyone i gnor e t hat t he i dea t hat par al l el war f ar e. t he hi gh l et hal i t y. t hey ar e not mut ual l y excl usi ve. Qui t e t he opposi t e . t he l ess per cept i bl e mi nut e accumul at i on of l i t t l e i t ems pi l i ng one on t op of t he ot her unt i l at s ome unk nown poi nt t he mas s of accumul at ed act i ons may be l ar ge enough t o be cr i t i cal . we hav e al ways been t ol d.f or ce engagement . That t he Uni t ed St at es St r at egi c Bombi ng Sur vey and The Gul f War Ai r power Sur vey bot h used empi r i cal dat a t o s how t hat s ome of t he under t aki ngs of ai r power f el l shor t of t he vi si on of ai r power cannot be i gnor ed . 16 Mor eover . a naval of f i cer . Wyl i e. C. i s not a new st r at egi c concept i on .by ai r power advocat es. each dependent on t he one t hat pr eceded i t .PARALLEL W ARAND HYPERWAR due t o t he si mul t aneous par al l el oper at i ons. and t he f acul t y of t he Ai r Cor ps Tact i cal School pr omi sed . t he hi gh mobi l i t y. One i s t he sequent i al . pr omot ed and pl anned f or 12 9 . t he ser i es of vi si bl e. and t he capabi l i t y f or sust ai ned hi gh t empos of oper at i ons. 14 But i s t hi s a new t heor y? Mi l i t ar y f or ces si nce Cl ausewi t z hav e been enj oi ned t o i dent i f y and engage t he " cent er of gr avi t y" of an enemy' s mi l i t ar y capabi l i t y . t he ar chi t ect s of t he nucl ear si ngl e i nt egr at ed oper at i ons pl an ( SI OP) . di scr et e st eps. Nor i s i t novel t hat s uc h a c ampai gn t heor y woul d be adv anc ed by ai r power advocat es . and pawns . ( l at er Rear Adm) J . wi l l be deci si ve . They ar e not i ncompat i bl e st r at egi es. The ot her i s t he c umul at i v e. As ear l y as 1951. Capt . I n pr act i ce t hey ar e usual l y i nt er dependent i n t hei r st r at egi c r esul t . not a new game.even pr omi s ed. whet her t he enemy was vi ewed as a syst em or not i n t he past . i t i s possi bl e t o i mpose checkmat e wi t hout t he ser i al dest r uct i on of al l t he adver sar y' s kni ght s. " He descr i bed t he cumul at i ve appr oach i n an ar t i cl e t hat appear ed i n Pr oceedi ngs i n 1952 . Mi t chel l . asser t ed t hat t her e wer e t wo t ypes of st r at egy : " sequent i al " and " cumul at i ve . What t he ai r aspect s of t he t heor y pr omi se s eem t o di f f er l i t t l e f r om what Douhet . Si mul t aneous and i nt egr at ed at t acks hav e l ong been t he goal of c ombi ned ar ms . At t acks on t he l eader and l eader shi p ar e not new goal s of war f ar e. as di st i ngui shabl e f r om ser i al war f ar e. Ai r power . Wyl i e l at er wr ot e t hat t her e ar e act ual l y t wo ver y di f f er ent ki nds of st r at egi es t hat may be us ed i n war . so many enemy uni t s c an be def eat ed i n det ai l si mul t aneousl y t hat t he oper at i on may r esembl e a mor e cl assi c coup de mai n execut ed i n a si ngl e mai n. l i ke Wyl i e. Ev en i n chess. r ooks.

Ev en so. 22 I t i s i ndi sput abl e t hat i ndust r i al st at es may be or gani zed as t he ki nd of syst em r epr esent ed . and " ot her mi l i t ar y" ( ot her f i el ded f or ces) . SI OP al so evi denced coher ence and si mul t anei t y. " As Des mond Bal l has s hown.at t ack r ecover y capabi l i t y . bot h wer e execut ed si mul t aneousl y and wi t h hyper speed. and bot h sought t o el i mi nat e r api d ( or al mos t " any. t heor y nor i n t he pr oxi mat e ef f ect s t he SI OP and nonnucl ear par al l el war sought . 2° Nucl ear weapons us e does mak e a di f f er ence .mak i ng capaci t y of an i ndust r i al i zed enemy st at e . 19 bot h ai med at dr i vi ng down enemy " ener gy l evel s" dr amat i cal l y. or par al l el war and hyper war . t her e i s scant di f f er ence bet ween t he t ar get i ng l ogi c of t he SI OP appr oach and t he t ar get i ng l ogi c of t he f i ve. t he di f f er ence i n weapons i s not a di f f er ence i n t he t heor y qua. " i n t he case of t he SI OP) enemy post . The SI OP i nt ended t o be so t hr eat eni ng t hat i t al so may have been sel f . decades bef or e cur r ent t heor i st s ar t i cul at ed " t he f i ve r i ngs . SI OP nucl ear weapons wer e al l ocat ed agai nst t ar get set s i n t he f or mer Sovi et syst em char act er i zed as " l eader shi p" ( l eader shi p) . 18 Whi l e t he di f f er ence bet ween t he nucl ear SI OP and par al l el war waged wi t h convent i onal weapons i s cr i t i cal l y i mpor t ant . i s t hat t hey pr omi se t o r educe mor e r api dl y t he war .BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE i nst ant cumul at i ve war . save f or t he i mpor t ant di st i nct i on t hat one empl oyed nucl ear weapons ef f ect s and t he ot her di d not . usi ng Cooper ' s t er ms . but mi ght hav e .r i ngs appr oach. The l ogi c of a cumul at i ve model appear s sound. Thus. 21 St r engt hs and Shor t c omi ngs The st r engt h of cumul at i ve st r at egi es. but has f ewer const r ai nt s on i t s empl oy ment . bot h sought t o c hec k mat e enemy l eader shi p. even t hough t hey ar e t he s ame t heor y.det er r i ng . 13 0 . " economi c and i ndust r i al " ( or gani c essent i al s and l ogi st i cs i nf r ast r uct ur e) . Par al l el war f ar e usi ng nonnuc l ear appear s no l ess t hr eat eni ng i n t er ms of i t s i mmedi at e consequences. bot h s ought t o i mpos e s hoc k and par al ysi s on t he enemy syst em. " nucl ear f or ce" ( nucl ear f or ces) . bot h t he SI OP and par al l el war . t her e ar e mor e si mi l ar i t i es bet ween t he t heor i es t han di f f er ences . Bot h appr oac hes sought t o st r i ke deci si ve poi nt s. 17 The.

had i t been execut ed. The SI OP.r i ngs model i s t hat i t i s i l l equi pped f or copi ng wi t h or gani sms t hat ar e not i ndust r i al i zed or i ndust r i al i zi ng st at e syst ems . or what Gen J ohn Boy d .r i ngs model t hus bec omes i l l ogi cal or at l east i mpr act i cal f or nont r i ni t ar i an war f ar e. and i dent i f i abl e l eader s and ot her t ar get s . Ai r power .PARALLEL W ARAND HYPERW AR al bei t s omewhat mechani cal . The ai r c ampai gn i n Deser t St or m demonst r at ed t hat t he c ombat power of I r aq or a st at e l i ke I r aq can be r educed by appar ent l y s i mul t aneous and c oher ent at t acks agai nst i mpor t ant t ar get s . t he c omponent par t s. t he model hol ds. Wor se. Fi ght i ng i n t he f or mer Yugosl avi a. one di f f i cul t y wi t h t he f i ve. The f i ve. i t i s not al ways easy act ual l y t o i dent i f y or t o i sol at e t hese par t s . of pr oduci ng ef f ect s t hat can be r ever sed . Cer t ai nl y a t er r or i st or gani zat i on i s a " syst em" t hat has separ at e c omponent par t s .f i ght i ng syst em. Thus. usi ng SI OP t ar get i ng l ogi c under a new name. Whi l e t heor et i cal l y possi bl e t o di f f er ent i at e t he c omponent par t s of bot h t er r or i st syst ems and i nsur gent or gani zat i ons. Of cour se an i nsur gent or gani zat i on i s a " syst em" t hat has di f f er ent i at ed c omponent par t s . and t her e ar e l ucr at i ve t ar get s f or ai r at t ack t hr oughout t he enemy syst em. woul d l i kel y al so hav e pr oven t he poi nt agai nst a mor e r obust bel l i ger ent and war . t he abi l i t y t o pr osecut e t hese ki nds of nonnucl ear at t acks.st ar r ed i nt er vent i on i n Somal i a. i n t he case of t he f i ve r i ngs. t he i l l . or f i ve r i ngs of t er r or i st and i nsur gent or gani zat i on ar e exceedi ngl y di f f i cul t f or t he ai r campai gn pl anner t o t ar get . uni f or med ar med f or ces. i t woul d seem. ai r power cannot mak e t he deci si ve and domi nant cont r i but i on t o t hese ki nds of f i ght s. Thus. " 24 Whi l e a cumul at i ve st r at egy pr omi ses t o be ef f ect i ve agai nst any enemy. muc h t o t he chagr i n of ai r power advocat es . but bec omes exqui si t el y i r r el evant f or t hese t ypes of or gani zat i ons and count er t er r or i sm war f ar e and count er i nsur gency war f ar e . i n s ome cases. 23 Convent i onal weapons hav e t he addi t i onal advant age of bei ng easi er t o empl oy and havi ng f ewer const r ai nt s on t hei r empl oy ment t han nucl ear weapons . Unconvent i onal weapons have t he added advant age. As physi cal ent i t i es. wor ks best i n massi ve doses appl i ed as an ant i dot e agai nst t he st r engt h of i ndust r i al or i ndust r i al i zi ng st at es. i s a val uabl e adj unct t o war f ar e i n t he l at t er year s of t he " second wav e . and our i mpot ence i n st oppi ng t he genoci de i n Rwanda ar e onl y t he mor e r ecent exampl es of t he l i mi t s of ai r power .

25 t hi s need not i nval i dat e t he t heor y ent i r el y . Nont r i ni t ar i an war f ar e i s onl y one of t he chal l enges wi t h whi ch t he t heor y cannot cont end. I f . Some of t he char act er i st i cs of war f ar e on t he eve of t he " t hi r d wave" al so conf ound t he t heor y: demassi f i cat i on. 132 . A sat el l i t e r ecei ver or t r ansmi t t er t hat measur es one. l eader shi p wi l l al so become demassi f i ed. For exampl e. as descr i bed by Mar t i n van Cr evel d. Di st r i but ed l apt ops ar e l ess at t r act i ve t ar get s because t hey ar e si mul t aneousl y mor e numer ous.t ar get set of nodes . Dual . as John Keegan. mai nf r ame comput er s ar e an at t r act i ve and easy. Whi l e t he model may be val i d. and ar med f or ces . As hi er ar chi es yi el d t o net wor ks. i t i s not i nconcei vabl e t hat t he l eader s of war f ar e oper at i ons i n t he f ut ur e can c ommand t hese oper at i ons f r om t hei r domi ci l es. i s war f ar e wher ei n t he war r i ng si des do not mani f est t he or gani zat i on of Cl ausewi t z' s r emar kabl e " t r i ni t y" of st at e. convent i onal war bet ween i ndust r i al st at es i s t he l ess l i kel y war f ar e f or m f or t he f ut ur e. " Vi r t ual " pr esence mak es di st ance c ommand and cont r ol possi bl e . Mi ni at ur i zat i on combi nes wi t h demassi f i cat i on t o compl i cat e t he chal l enge .t o. f or exampl e. Car l Bui l der . Just as t el ecommut i ng i s possi bl e f or nonwar f ar e " knowl edge wor ker s" t oday. Thus. Demassi f i cat i on i s t he f r act i onat i ng of l ar ge convent i onal t ar get s i nt o muc h smal l er ones . " Nont r i ni t ar i an war f ar e. Fer ment at i on chamber s. mobi l e. or f r om of f shor e . peopl e. even among war r i ng st at es. and ni nj i t su . and l ess easy t o t ar get .use t echnol ogi es and f aci l i t i es al so conf ound t he f i ver i ngs campai gn pl anner . t he t ar get i ng chal l enge i s such t hat t he model mi ght as wel l be i nval i d si nce i t has l i t t l e ut i l i t y . " Thi r d. especi al l y i f t housands ar e empl oyed i n a di st r i but ed net wor k. Mar t i n v an Cr evel d and ot her s suggest .hal f met er i n di amet er i s a mor e di f f i cul t t ar get t o st r i ke. di ver si t y.gui ded or even ar ea weapons . t he l eader s need not r esi de i n t he st at es t o di r ect t he f i ght i ng .wave" i nf or mat i on t echnol ogy l i ber at es l eader shi p and l eader shi p c ommand cent er s f r om t he r equi r ement t o r esi de i n f i xed l ocat i ons . Asat el l i t e di sh r ecei ver t hat measur es t hr ee t o f i ve met er s i n di amet er i s an easy t ar get f or pr eci si on. l ess easy t o l ocat e.BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE cal l s " i r r egul ar war f ar e. f r om nonbel l i ger ent st at es. The model r emai ns ext r emel y usef ul f or i t s heur i st i c val ue t o novi t i at e st udent s of war f ar e and as a t hesi s t o st i mul at e ant i t hesi s and debat e .

ci r cumvent ed.possi bl e . Si xt h. enemy ai r def enses mus t be def eat ed. I nf or mat i on t echnol ogy i s ubi qui t ous and muc h of i t ser ves mul t i pl e const i t uenci es . By di st r i but i ng i mpor t ant el ement s of a syst em. or suppr essed . Dual . or cont r ol of t he ai r . and even t hough t he i ni t i al onsl aught may have at t acked ot her t ar get s i n ot her cat egor i es. t he asser t i on t hat " i nf or mat i on i s t he bol t t hat hol ds t he r i ngs t oget her " s eems t o gi ve t he l i e t o t he ent i r e t heor y . 26 Ther e ar e at l east seven addi t i onal mi nor pr obl ems . t he cur r ent model negl ect s t he r eal i t y of t he chal l enges posed by t he post . Fi r st . mi ni at ur i zat i on. t he Ai r Taski ng Or der ( ATO) syst em.t er mi nat i on i ssues . Next . i n t he wor l d t hat i s emer gi ng. r educi ng t hem dr amat i cal l y i n si ze. Thus.ARANDHYPERW AR PARALLEL W ar e essent i al c omponent s of a syst em t hat br ews beer . but t he const el l at i on of t hese sat el l i t es i s demassi f i ed and di st r i but ed . i t negl ect s evol ut i on i n t he at t acked or gani sm or syst em. They occur r ed sequent i al l y and over t i me . t her e may be l i t t l e r oom f or t hi s t ype of ai r campai gn . and neut r al s . uni ver si t y r esear ch cent er s) . i t pays i nsuf f i ci ent at t ent i on t o war .use al so mak e ni nj i t su. t he at t acks may not act ual l y occur si mul t aneousl y. Beer i s good .t he " ar t of i nvi si bi l i t y" . embeddi ng t hem i n ot her t hi ngs ( r el i gi ous f aci l i t i es. Mor eover . Fi f t h. GPS user s ar e mi l i t ar y and ci vi l i an . l i ke t he SI OP. To achi eve ai r super i or i t y.r i ngs t heor i st s i n t he Gul f W ar di d not occur si mul t aneousl y . except when c ompar ed t o war f ar e of t he di st ant past . The s i mul t aneous at t acks cel ebr at ed by t he f i ve. The Gl obal Posi t i oni ng Sy s t em ( GPS) woul d be a l ucr at i ve t ar get . And l ast .use syst ems do not f i t easi l y i nt o t he t ar get i ng t empl at e . These s ame f er ment er s ar e al so essent i al f or t he pr oduct i on of bi ol ogi cal weapons . Eac h of t hese l esser chal l enges deser ves a f ew wor ds . Bi ol ogi cal weapons ar e not good . For ai r power t o be ef f ect i ve.at t ack damage assessment ar chi t ect ur e. t he cur r ent model st r i ves f or t he " deci si ve bat t l e" i n new f or m. enemy f or ces. Mos t communi cat i ons sat el l i t es pose t he s ame t ype of pr obl em f or c ampai gn pl anner s . t he consequences of at t acki ng GPS mus t be bor ne by f r i endl y f or ces. and dual . t hese el ement s ef f ect i vel y bec ome i nvi si bl e t o t he c ampai gn pl anner . ai r super i or i t y. i s necessar y . Demassi f i cat i on. Thi r d. Thus. Four t h. and t he r eal i t y of c ombi ned ar ms oper at i ons . ci vi l i an hospi t al s. el i mi nat i on or r educt i on of t he capabi l i t i es of t he 133 .

t he t heor y hol ds. 134 . const i t ut es ser i al war f ar e. 28 Sea. t he oppor t uni t y t o wi n a deci si ve bat t l e may have t hen been l ost . Or i t coul d be bad weat her . t he bane of avi at i on . t hat asser t i on appear s t o cont r adi ct cur r ent ai r doct r i ne . however . i t seeks t o anni hi l at e enemy capabi l i t y . i t i n ef f ect asser t s t hat t he Napol eoni c and Cl ausewi t zi an " deci si ve bat t l e" i s i t s ai m. ) I f t he ai m of t he ai r campai gn i s not achi eved. but somewher e el se . of cour se. 3o ( I t does t hi s.t hat i s. 27 I f t he t heor i st s and ai r campai gner s asser t t hat suppr essi on of enemy ai r def enses was not t hei r f i r st pr i or i t y i n t i me and i n space. but r epl y t hat t he f i r st wave of at t acks i ncl uded ot her t ar get s. but mer el y ver y cl ose i n t i me . t he openi ng sal vos of t he Deser t St or m ai r campai gn wer e di r ect ed. " t hen t he dogma has been vi ol at ed and.t hen t he f aul t mus t r esi de not i n t he ai r campai gn. t he " cr uci al f i r st st ep" i n t he ai r c ampai gn .BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE enemy' s ai r def enses al ways must be t he f i r st pr i or i t y of an ai r campai gn . i s l ess i mpor t ant t han st r at egi c at t ack . t he ef f ect of si r r l ul t anei t y . t hen t he at t acks wer e not si mul t aneous.as t hey mus t be f or ai r power t o be ef f ect i ve. 29 Because t he f i ve.agai nst t he enemy ai r def ense syst em. A compr essed ser i al at t ack i s st i l l ser i al war f ar e.r i ngs model f or ai r campai gn pl anni ng asser t s t hat t he consequence of i t s at t acks wi l l be par al ysi s of t he enemy syst em. f ai l ur e t o achi eve a deci si ve bat t l e c an al so be at t r i but ed t o i nadequat e i nt el l i gence . Cl ose ai r suppor t . How qui ckl y ot her t ar get s i n t he ser i es f ol l owed. I f sor t i es have t o be r eappor t i oned because of some " gr ound emer gency.l aunched Tomahawk cr ui se mi ssi l es and Ar my Apache hel i copt er s wer e par t of t hi s f i r st wave of at r power at t acks f or ai r power ' s benef i t . I f t hey accept t hat copi ng wi t h enemy ai r def ense capabi l i t y was t he f i r st pr i or i t y. ( Zeno pr obabl y woul d ar gue t hat any separ at i on i n t i me. i f t he consequent i s not af f i r med. becomes l ess r el evant t o t he t heor y . 31 Dogmat i c adher ence t o t he ai r campai gn pl an l i st of pr i or i t y t ar get s i s necessar y t o " pr ove" t he t heor y . ) I n t r ut h. Mor eover . Or i t coul d be caused by an adapt i ve enemy . Wher e t he t ar get i ng l i st i s f ol l owed r el i gi ousl y. by t he way. mor e i mpor t ant . even t hough t i me compr essi on may cr eat e t he appear ance and. even whi l e some of i t s advocat es suggest t hat t hei r t heor i es now mi ght have r ender ed muc h or most of Cl ausewi t z i r r el evant .

Ri gi d adher ence t o an ai r campai gn pl an speci f yi ng a ser i es of par al l el at t acks i n advance i s r i gi d adher ence t o a set of at t acks desi gned agai nst t he i ni t i al or gani sm. i t i s t he f aul t of i nt el l i gence . War s may end because t he l oser s sense t hat t her e i s somet hi ng t hey val ue mor e t han t he obj ect of t he war and t hat cont i nui ng t he war i mper i l s pr eser vat i on of t hi s mor e i mpor t ant val ue or pr ef er ence set . al l owi ng t he enemy r espi t e and t he oppor t uni t y hen mobi l e mi ssi l es ar e t o r ecover . def eat i n det ai l i s t hen possi bl e. not t he evol ved one . Ai r power advocat es di d i n f act ar gue t hat t he I r aqi Sc uds wer e not mi l i t ar i l y si gni f i cant . and t o i t s new envi r onment . Cer t ai nl y. al so appear t o be negl ect ed i n t he f i ve. Mobi l e mi ssi l es ought t o have been pr i or i t y t ar get s i n t he ai r campai gn : as pol i t i cal weapons t hey mi ght have al t er ed t he cour se and out come of t he war . t hat i s. f or exampl e. i f at t acks anni hi l at e a l ar ge par t of t he enemy' s capabi l i t y. Ev en si mpl e at t acks can t hen have uni nt ended consequences . W hen oper at i ons agai nst mobi l e mi ssi l es depl et e sor t i es i nt ended t o achi eve t he deci si ve vi ct or y of t he ai r campai gn. W i nt r oduced i n unexpect ed ways. t o i nt er nal changes. The posi t ed ai m of t he ai r c ampai gn i s st r at egi c par al ysi s. The danger wi t h a wonder f ul l y det er mi ni st i c ai r campai gn pl an i s t hat i t may adapt poor l y t o an or gani sm t hat evol ves i n unexpect ed way s . per haps encour agi ng t he enemy t o f i ght t o t he deat h . W hen f l yi ng weat her i mpedes mechani cal execut i on of t he ai r c ampai gn pl an.r i ngs model at t acks ever yt hi ng but popul at i on cent er s. t he or gani s m may nei t her r eal i ze i t s par al ysi s nor behave as a par al yt i c . i t i s t he f aul t of chaos . not negl ect ed i n t he SI OP.t he expect at i on bei ng t hat " par al ysi s" mus t s omehow equat e t o " sur r ender . " The r eal i t y i s s omewhat di f f er ent . 34 The f i ve. may al so depr i ve l eader shi p of f eedback r egar di ng damage t o t he or gani sm.PARALLEL W ARANDHYPERW AR The r eal i t y i s t hat or gani sms ar e aut opoi et i c . i t i s t he f aul t of t he pol i t i ci ans . 13 5 . Thus.r i ngs appr oac h . W ar t er mi nat i on i ssues. At t ac k s agai nst c ommuni c at i ons des i gned t o separ at e l eader shi p f r om f i el ded f or ces. t hey st r uggl e t o pr eser ve t hemsel ves . 32 Any at t acked or gani sm can be expect ed t o st r uggl e f or sur vi val by r espondi ng and adapt i ng t o st i mul i . 33 That t he mi ssi l es mi ght have r ent t he Gul f War Coal i t i on asunder had t hey not been act i vel y pur sued and engaged s hows an i mmat ur e under st andi ng of what const i t ut es " mi l i t ar y" si gni f i cance i n st at e war f ar e .

or gr ound.hal f mi l l i on per son al l i ed ar my on i t s bor der wi l l i nvar i abl y behave di f f er ent l y t han one onl y f aci ng ai r at t acks. no mat t er how wonder f ul t he poundi ng t o whi c h ai r subj ect s t hat enemy .nor mal l y i mper f ect i on i s t he st at us quo unl ess t he weat her i s per f ect . I t woul d be equal l y f ool har dy t o under est i mat e t he power of publ i c opi ni on i n f i ght s not per cei ved by our ci t i zens as i nvol vi ng t hei r vi t al i nt er est s .t he r esi st ant el ement descr i bed by Cl ausewi t z. I f t he Gul f W ar educat ed us. I f t he enemy . 136 . ( Wher e t he ATO i s l ess ef f ect i ve and t he f aul t cannot be at t r i but ed t o " i nt el l i gence. under est i mat e t he r ut hl essness of a Uni t ed St at es f or ced t o f i ght f or i t s vi t al i nt er est s .t aker ( and even t hough Gen H. or naval . The f i ve. That Saddam was not st upi d. 35) The ATO t akes a l ong t i me t o pr oduce . None s houl d. pr obl ems ar i se f or t he ai r c ampai gn pl anner . and cl ose coor di nat i on ar e al l r equi r ed t o mak e t he ATO syst em f unct i on ef f ect i vel y .t hat i s. An enemy f aci ng a 400. f our t h. i f publ i c opi ni on on t he wi nni ng si de suppor t s t he bl oodl et t i ng r equi r ed t o def eat an enemy i n det ai l .i s not weak or st upi d. or t ent h.BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE whet her t he enemy f i ght s on or not .r at e opponent t o i l l ust r at e or pr ove a t heor y . i s s hown by hi s pawns gambi t on t he bor der of Kuwai t i n 1994 . of cour se. t hei r c ombi ned ef f ect s. or i f t he t ar get set i s char act er i zed by at t ent i on t o ni nj i t su.r i ngs appr oac h may wor k wel l agai nst a weak enemy and a t r anspar ent t ar get set . 37 War f ar e agai nst a smal l and i nf er i or st at e i s an even poor er l abor at or y .. I f damage assessment i s i mper f ect . 000 or a one.onl y. t o def eat t he enemy' s st r at egy . Pr ewar i nt el l i gence. W e f i ght wi t h c ombi ned ar ms and depend on t hei r i nt er act i on.t he pr obl ems ar e c ompounded .si ght ed t o r esi gn f or ces i n ot her medi a t o t he nul l set when at t empt i ng t o use an act ual f i ght wi t h a t hi r d. Nor man Schwar zkopf r evi l ed hi m as a st r at egi st ) . " i t i s. al bei t an excessi vel y bol d r i sk. we ar e t ol d by some. we shoul d now appr eci at e t hat war f ar e i s a poor l abor at or y f or val i dat i ng ai r . Per haps t he Gul f War educat ed hi m. t he f aul t of t he Ar my and t he Mar i nes . i nt el l i gence i s pr eci se and abundant . I t may be as di vi si ve as i t i s shor t . and t he enemy i s per f ect l y i nept or st upi d. 36 Thi s f act al one ensur es t hat i t di r ect s at t acks agai nst an or gani sm t hat no l onger exi st s .onl y t heor i es ..onl y. ver y ef f ect i ve damage assessment .

War s occur and war f ar e occur s wi t hi n a muc h br oader cont ext t han t he bat t l espace . and mi l i t ar y gamut of goal s. Thi s i s not t o suggest any adver sar i al r el at i onshi p wi t h or host i l e desi gns agai nst Chi na . Rat her .t he wel l . weak er st at es mi ght d s uc h war f ar e wor k Wi l l t he Uni t ed St at es had i n Deser t St or m? hen pr opor t i onal I r aq was and i s a smal l c ount r y . Ai r For ce.PARALLEL W ARANDHYPERW AR Ai r power . " t hen i nf or mat i on i s t he deci si ve cent er of gr avi t y . cost t he Uni t ed St at es t r i l l i ons of dol l ar s over decades . bel l i ger ent and hot . or was i t power f ul because of t he f or ce. as t hey ar e i n Fi gur e 3. economi c.t ype ai r c ampai gn agai nst any but smal l and r equi r e an equi val ent i nvest ment .bl ooded human bei ngs. Mar i ne Cor ps. pol i t i cal . t he evol vi ng 13 7 . and ot her nat i on ai r power . Navy. t he mov e f r om t heor y t o pr act i ce i s bot h a t or t ur ous and t or t uous one .t r ai ned. Pr epar edness t o execut e a Deser t St or m. wel l .t ol er at e t he ki nd of Deser t St or m ai r c ampai gn adv oc at ed? Par al l el war i s and has been a wonder f ul t heor y .t he ent i r e soci al . t hi s per spect i ve mer el y i l l umi nat es t he f act t hat I r aq i s a ver y smal l count r y . a weak nes s l eadi ng us away f r om s ound st r at egy? 38 Thi s l ast quest i on i s an i mpor t ant one when ex ami ni ng t he ai r campai gn' s quest f or par al l el war . Yet . f or exampl e. Of t hat t her e c an be no doubt . hor i zont al and ver t i cal par al l el war . br ought t he i nt er act i ve power of l and war f ar e and amphi bi ous assaul t t o bear on I r aq even as t he ai r c ampai gn unf ol ded? Has our desi r e f or f ew casual t i es bec ome yet anot her weak nes s .poi sed t o t ake t he f i ght t o Baghdad on l and and f r om t he sea? Woul d not have t r ue par al l el war . and behavi or s.ar med. shoul d we not ai m al l at t acks at i nf or mat i on? Ev en t hough our under st andi ng of i nf or mat i on oper at i ons or i nf or mat i on war f ar e i s i mper f ect and i mmat ur e. Wi l l t he st r at egi c cont ext of t he f ut ur e. i f i nf or mat i on i s " t he bol t t hat hol ds t he f i ve r i ngs t oget her . s eems t o be t he ans wer . t he aer i al achi evement s of Deser t St or m appear i n a di f f er ent l i ght . Accor di ngl y.Ar my . Fi nal l y. W si l houet t es of I r aq ar e super i mposed over a l ar ger nat i on. But was i t power f ul because I r aq was so i nf er i or ? W as ai r power power f ul al one.was power f ul i n Deser t St or m. i nt er est s. Woul agai nst a l ar ge count r y? Agai nst a peer ? ever agai n have t he sur pl us r esour ces i t Not l i kel y. Pr epar edness t o execut e t he SI OP.

Compar at i ve Si zes t heor y demands t hat t he connect i vi t y bet ween and wi t hi n t he r i ngs becomes t he obj ect of at t ack . i f not met . or woul d be. On t he ot her hand. t hen bec omes t he f aul t not of t he t heor y. I nf or mat i on i s.BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE CHI NA & I RAQ COMPARATI VE SI ZES MI LES DR ARMI N LUDWI G. mi ssi l e pr oduct i on i nst al l at i ons. ai r f i el ds. 13 8 . I ncl usi on of i nf or mat i on as a l ucr at i ve t ar get may be a t r endy af t er t hought on t he par t of ai r power advocat es on t he one hand . 000 1995 Fi gur e 3. 1. El ect r i cal power pr oduct i on f aci l i t i es. AI R W AR COLLEGE. but of pr ehost i l i t y t ar get i nt el l i gence or t he cl umsy execut i on of a br i l l i ant ai r c ampai gn pl an. i t may be cr eat i on of anot her pr econdi t i on f or success of t he ai r campai gn . and gover nment bui l di ngs ar e not di f f i cul t f or t he ai r campai gner t o t ar get . di f f i cul t t o t ar get . Chi na and I r aq. r oads and r ai l s. The pr econdi t i on.

t he adver sar y wi l l embed mi l i t ar y act i vi t i es i n ci vi l i an ones .wi l l be us ed f or admi ni st r at i ve mi l i t ar y communi cat i ons . and r ecr eat i onal f aci l i t i es . f i ber opt i cs. Ther e ar e ant i t het i cal not i ons out t her e i n t he r eal wor l d . To def eat par al l el war even bef or e i t c ommenc es . Wher e mobi l i t y i s not possi bl e.mi l i t ar y f aci l i t i es. I f publ i c opi ni on i s t he Cl ausewi t zi an hub upon whi c h al l mov ement depends i n mos t democr at i c st at es. Suc h a cunni ng adver sar y wi l l have mobi l e syst ems wher ever possi bl e . ) zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA " Di sgui se. at t acki ng t hi s hub i s bot h a pr ewar and war t i me pr i or i t y . and demassi f y t he syst em. Weapons r esear ch act i vi t i es wi l l be col l ocat ed i n hospi t al s. For ce t he ai r campai gn pl anner and t he ai r campai gner t o st r i ke what appear t o be wi del y di st r i but ed and pr i mar i l y ci vi l i an t ar get s . t empl es. An adver sar y 13 9 . wi t h each one exami ned i n t ur n .r i ngs model mak es t o t he st udy of war f ar e i s t hat i t el uci dat es how one can f al si f y or def eat t he t heor y . I f t he f i ve r i ngs suppor t t he over al l st r at egy or const i t ut e t he st r at egy of t he ai r campai gn. and " demassi f y" key el ement s of t he syst em so t hat t ot al war i s necessar y .PARALLEL W ARAND HYPERW AR Def eat i ng Par al l el War Per haps t he mor e val uabl e cont r i but i on t he f i ve. we woul d do wel l t o keep i n mi nd t hat our concept i ons of r i sk and l egal i t y may be our s al one. uni ver si t i es. t hat t hi s di scour se ai ms at t heor y and ant i t hesi s . The cent er of gr avi t y of Uni t ed St at es ar med f or ces may be publ i c opi ni on . and r el i gi ous cent er s . how can one def eat t he st r at egy? Ther e ar e at l east f i ve ways. i s t o def eat an adver sar y' s st r at egy . pl ease.t hei r pr ot est at i ons t o t he cont r ar y not wi t hst andi ng . Command and cont r ol t r ansmi t t er s and r ecei ver s wi l l be pl aced on school s. a wi se adver sar y wi l l st r i ve t o di sgui se. Sun Tzu t el l s us. s ome of t hese count er vai l i ng means ar e as r i sky as t hey ar e i l l egal .use s y s t ems t el ecommuni cat i ons medi a. t he best way t o def eat an adver sar y. Ai r f i el ds wi l l be j oi nt commer ci al . Ai r campai gner s do not appear t o be st r at egi st s . di ver si f y. hot el s. Ev en so. Mor e l i kel y t hey ar e ai r t act i ci ans. di ver si f y. I n pr act i ce. Dual . di r ect br oadcast and ver y smal l aper t ur e sat el l i t es. ( Recal l . r out i nel y us ed by commer ci al and mi l i t ar y ent i t i es . Weapons pr oduct i on wi l l occur i n f aci l i t i es pr oduci ng ci vi l i an goods . The f i r st pr i or i t y.

The adver sar y wi l l enc our age engagement . enl ar gement . and f or ei gn i nvest ment . Di st i nct i ve pai nt i ng or mar k i ng. An ast ut e adver sar y wi l l al so capi t al i ze on t he at t acker s cul t ur al myopi a and mi r r or . School s. bal l i st i c mi ssi l es i n r ef r i ger at or f act or i es.i dent i f i abl e mi l i t ar y communi cat i ons. t he adver sar y wi l l di st r i but e W among t he i nnocent s wi t h t he s ame i mpuni t y t hat ot her mi l i t ar y capabi l i t y i s c ommi ngl ed . Lat er al i s bet t er t han mer el y ver t i cal . Nucl ear weapons pr oduct i on f aci l i t i es may have bol d.i magi ng. Si nce t hose may be t he W MD of choi ce i n t he t hi r d wave. and even uni f or ms do not cont r i but e t o i nvi si bi l i t y . be i nvi si bl e . 14 0 . an adver sar y i nt endi ng t o def eat par al l el war wi l l MD acqui r e t hem. A cunni ng adver sar y wi l l r eal i ze t hat what ever i s t he key node i n t he under gr ound f aci l i t y shoul d al so r esi de beneat h a ci vi l i an f aci l i t y . One of t he best way s t o cr eat e i nvi si bi l i t y i s t o go under gr ound . Wher e possi bl e. To MD def eat par al l el war . Acqui si t i on of any del i ver abl e W m i l i t ar y cal cul us dr am at i cal l y. sour ce.BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE mi ght bui l d t anks i n aut omobi l e f act or i es. The adver sar y' s obj ect i ve i s t o up t he ant e f or t he at t acker by f or ci ng hi m t o war on t he i nnocent s and agai nst t he i nvest or s . W MD so r ai se t he r i sks and consequences of an MD and mobi l e del i ver y at t ack t hat mer e possessi on of W syst ems may i mpose pr ewar par al ysi s on t he at t acker . t he deeper . changes t he pol i t i cal and " Wher e i mmobi l e. or phanages. The adver sar y woul d al so be wi se t o mov e f r om mi l i t ar y l eader shi p hi er ar chi es t o mi l i t ar y l eader shi p net wor k s . br i ght si gnat ur es . zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA " Acqui r e weapons of mas s dest r uct i on ( WMD) on mobi l e syst ems . t he bet t er . t he enemy wi l l put f or ei gn cont r act or s i n al l mi l i t ar i l y si gni f i cant f aci l i t i es . and coul d bui l d i t s mi l i t ar y gar r i sons i n popul ous ar eas . t our i sm. and " baby mi l k" f act or i es may have hi gh ut i l i t y f or conceal i ng t hese ki nds of bas ement s . mi ght c ommi ngl e mi l i t ar y and ci vi l i an t r anspor t . The obvi ous and key poi nt i s t hat what ever cannot be i dent i f i ed cannot be t ar get ed . Chemi cal and bi ol ogi cal weapons pr oduct i on f aci l i t i es do not . The wi se adver sar y wi l l at t ack and def eat i t s opponent ' s st r at egy ev en bef or e decl ar at i on of a st at e of host i l i t i es .

an adver sar y wi l l r eal i ze t hat at t acks shoul d begi n i n t he pr ehost i l i t y phas e . s uc h as assassi nat i on and ot her ki nds of t er r or i sm. t r ansf or m i t sel f .may mi ndl essl y cont i nue t o adher e t o t he i nst al l at i on. ( One cannot be especi al l y c unni ng wi t hout havi ng consi der ed and pr epar ed f or t hi s i n adv anc e . f or exampl e. an adver sar y may t ur n t o " wor ms" and " vi r uses" as i t s swor ds . ) Thi s unexpect ed mut at i on mak es damage assessment di f f i cul t . act i ve meas ur es mi ght st i mul at e unchar act er i st i cal l y f er oci ous r esponses . ) Fai l i ng t he success of pr opaganda and ant i ci pat i ng an at t ack. The f i ve r i ngs exi st i n peacet i me as wel l as i n war t i me . t he adv er s ar y mi ght r es pond by i nt ent i onal l y shut t i ng down al l vi si bl e el ect r i cal power .PARALLEL W ARAND HYPERW ARzyxwvutsrqpo " W hen at t acked. I f . I f i nf or mat i on i s i ndeed t he bol t t hat hol ds t hemt oget her . Ev en so.dr i ven or t ar get . Anot her usef ul mut at i on mi ght be t o wi t hdr aw uni f or med f i el ded f or ces and empl oy t er r or i st s or speci al oper at i ons f or ces i n t he at t acker ' s homel and . may pr event a weak. As one c ommuni c at i ons anal yst has not ed : . may f al l i nt o t he t r ap of wi shf ul t hi nki ng and r eal l ocat e sor t i es t o ot her r ol es. " Combi ni ng pr opaganda wi t h mor e act i ve measur es.dr i ven ai r c ampai gn pl an . Especi al l y cunni n g adver sar i es wi l l choose an asymmet r i cal and unpr edi ct abl e r esponse t o at t acks. The adver sar y i nt ent on def eat i ng par al l el war wi l l ant i ci pat e a r educt i on i n ener gy l evel s af t er an at t ack . " At t ack i nf or mat i on . t he adver sar y al so wi l l r eal i ze t hat a pl anned mut at i on at t he bi f ur cat i on poi nt i s super i or t o a r andomone . ( On t he ot her hand. The ai r c ampai gn pl anner may cope wi t h t hi s di f f i cul t y by f or ci ng an ext ensi ve sear ch f or cor r obor at i on t hat at t acks have achi eved r equi r ed damage expect anci es.wi l l ed at t acker f r om t aki ng t he of f ensi ve . or . and r ecover . not a symmet r i cal or pr edi ct abl e one . el ect r i cal power pr oduct i on c omes under i nt ense at t ack. i f at t acked .and t hi s i s t he l i kel y c as e. The obj ect of pr el i mi nar y at t acks i n t he pr ehost i l i t y phas e wi l l be t o par al yze or dest r oy a t ar get set cal l ed " any publ i c opi ni on t hat does not suppor t my ai ms . mut at e . Def eat i ng par al l el war al so r equi r es pl anni ng how t he or gani sm wi l l adapt .

For exampl e. t he pendul um wi l l cont i nue t o swi ng bet ween measur es and count er measur es . avenues mus t be expl oi t ed on a pr i or i t y . Dat abase r ecor ds can be ( and have been) al t er ed by out si de i nt er f er ence. Ev en on a smal l budget .l evel i nvest ment s . wher e t her e i s a wi l l t her e i s a way . and t he c onc ept s of oper at i ons and or gani zat i on t hat al l ow Vemi cht ungschl acht l i kel y wi l l cont i nue . Af t er acqui r i ng t he capabi l i t y. cr eat i ng an unf i xabl e mes s . K. VSM( Ret i r ed) .BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE Comput er " hacker s" hav e r el at i vel y easy access t o sof t war e pr ogr ams cal l ed " wor ms" and " vi r uses . i t i s onl y a mat t er of t echni que and t i me bef or e t hese count er measur es t o par al l el war ar e empl oyed . 41 I n t he quest f or pr i macy i n war f ar e. 39 As Br i gadi er V. What ar e t he count er . Nai r . Lessons f or t he Thi r d Wor l d: Act i ve measur es t o degr ade at t acki ng el ect r oni c syst ems shoul d be cost ef f ect i ve and si mpl e . Concl usi ons Ther e may not r eal l y be muc h t hat i s r evol ut i onar y i n cont empor ar y not i ons of par al l el war and hyper war . 4o si mpl e and ef f ect i ve Thus. Di sper si ng and di sgui si ng t ar get s and mak i ng t he publ i c opi ni on consequences of st r i ki ng t hem unaccept abl e cause t he mor e obvi ous of t hese modul at i ons . I t i s t he l ogi cal evol ut i on of a nonnucl ear SI OP accel er at ed i n ser i al appl i cat i ons . Absent t he power f ul r eal or i magi ned sur vi val mot i ves t hat i mpel l ed t he 142 . al t hough i nf or mat i on t echnol ogy may pr ovi de t he homeopat hy of f ut ur e war f ar e .count er measur es? Ther e may be none. The abi l i t y t o execut e a nonnucl ear SI OP agai nst a l ar ge st at e or peer woul d r equi r e SI OP. Cheap. wr ot e i n hi s book W ar I n The Gul f . t he weapons. " A wor m i s used t o del et e a por t i on of a t ar get comput er ' s memor y . coul d be t ot al l y di sr upt ed by t he pr oj ect i on of a sui t abl e vi r us t hat woul d aut omat i cal l y f i nd t hei r [ si c] way bac k i nt o t he comput er s on whi c h t he syst ems ar e dependent . and t he apt l y named vi r us cal l s f or t h a machi ne' s f i l es and copi es i t sel f ont o t hem. an adver sar y coul d c hec k mat e i t by si mpl e t act i cal adj ust ment s modul at i ng t he st r at egi c envi r onment . The el usi ve sear ch f or t he t echnol ogi es. i t seems. t he mos t sophi st i cat ed s y s t em s uc h as t hat of t he Uni t ed St at es. j ust as br oadcast i ng ai r waves have been i nt er cept ed and pr eempt ed .

War f ar e i s about human bei ngs. 45 Ev en so. Par al l el war t heor i st s r equi r e t he r eady avai l abi l i t y of t he t echnol ogi es t hat al l ow speed. f ear . " I f t hi s. The sci ence of t he par al l el war t heor i st s i s col d. di spassi onat e t echnol ogy . 42 The new t heor i es s eem t o be l ess about war f ar e t han t hey ar e about t he way s i n whi c h s ome bel i eve t he bat t l espace ought t o be appor t i oned and t he r esour ces t hat ought t o be acqui r ed once t he r ol es of f or ce el ement s ar e det er mi ned .f r omt he per spect i ve of t hose who val ue j oi nt ness or i nt egr at i onmi sappl i ed . st i l l l acks a t heor y . A pr obl emwi t h cont empor ar y ai r c ampai gn t heor i es may be t he pr ogr essi ve det ac hment of t hese pr esumpt i ve ai r power t heor i es. t he t heor y r emai ns a r at her l ar ge and i mpor t ant f oot not e t o t he Gul f W ar . War f ar e bet ween humans i s a hot t hi ng. Pr eci si on t ar get i ng depends on speed and cer t ai nt y.AR PARALLEL W ARANDHYPERW SI OP. i ncl udi ng t he assur ance t hat humans can k now and under st and causal r el at i onshi ps . 44 Technol ogy i s appl i ed sci ence. 43 Thus. The hubr i s of cont empor ar y ai r power t heor i st s may be t hat t hey so badl y want ai r power t o be domi nant or deci si ve t hat t hey hav e made t he Deser t St or m ai r c ampai gn t he mechani st i c t empl at e f or al l f ut ur e war s . det er mi ni st i c. ai r power i n t hi s cur r ent f or mul at i on s eems t o have bec ome no mor e nor l ess t han t he power of det ached. as Car l Bui l der suggest s i n The I car us Syndr ome. and. pr eci si on. even whi l e caut i oni ng t hem t hat t hey may not have f ound one yet . sur pr i se. and t he c hi mer a of ac c ur at e k nowl edge and aut hent i c under s t andi ng . and f r i ct i on t han i t i s about t echnol ogy . t hen t hat " i s a supposi t i on t hat war f ar e r ar el y subst ant i at es . I t i s mor e about bl ood. Ai r power . human aspi r at i ons. 14 3 . not a col d t hi ng. No one shoul d t hought f ul l y r el egat e t he st udy of war f ar e t o t he i nvest i gat i on of st er i l e t echnol ogy and t he t ar get s t hat r esi de i n pr eci sel y def i ned s y s t ems or r i ngs . Par al l el war r equi r es mas s i v e r esour ce i nvest ment s . Absent t he acqui si t i on of t he r equi r ed t echnol ogi es. Thi s want i s a pot ent i al l y danger ous weak nes s . one mus t appl aud t hose who sear ch f or one.pr esumpt i ve f r om t he r eal i t i es of war f ar e . i t i s unl i kel y t hat t he Uni t ed St at es or any ot her nat i on wi l l acqui r e t he ki nd of ai r power r equi r ed t o sat i sf y t he needs of t he par al l el war and hyper war ai r c ampai gn . and human passi ons .

. . Magyar . . Tr ai nor . 1966) . War den I I I . Gor don and Ber nar d E. f or poi nt i ng out t hi s essay . " 311.318 . Di ct i onar y of Mi l i t ar y and Naval Quot at i ons ( Annapol i s: Uni t ed St at es Naval I nst i t ut e. War den I I I . Scal es. Ai r Uni ver si t y . On War . Par do. The char act er i st i cs of par al l el war and t he ai r c ampai gn pr i mar i l y t ar e hose pr ovi ded by Col onel War den . Li ke Col J ohn R. Magyar . eds . emer ged as t he l ead ai r power t heor i st i n t he Uni t ed St at es Ai r For ce . Col onel War den i s a f or mer c ommandant of t he Ai r Command and St af f Col l ege. i s pi r at ed. " i n Ri char d H. : Ai r Uni ver si t y Pr ess. t r ansl at ed. 10 . t he pr i nci pal ar chi t ect of t he Deser t St or m ai r c ampai gn pl an. 144 . Cer t ai n Vi ct or y ( Washi ngt on. . Dan Hughes r emi nded me t hat i n physi cs. Jr .f i r st Cent ur y. unpubl i shed manuscr i pt . by Mi chael Howar d and Pet er Par et ( Pr i ncet on : Pr i ncet on Uni ver si t y Pr ess. 79 . D. The FVt ur e of Ai r Power i n t he Af t er mat h of t he Gul f War ( Maxwel l AFB. Boy d bef or e hi m. 1994) . . War den. a body has and can have onl y one cent er of gr avi t y. speech t o t he Geor get own Uni ver si t y Al umni Associ at i on. J r . The Gener al s War : The I nsi de St or y of t he Conf l i ct i n t he Gul f ( Bost on : Li t t l e. one. 1992) . See al so J ohn A.329 . Hi s pr ewar book. Al a. Ai r Uni ver si t y . " i n Kar l P. ed . 277. Jr . 77i e Ai r Campai gn : Pl anni ng f or Combat . ci t ed i n Rober t D. . 8 . : Ai r Uni ver si t y Pr ess. " 14 Oct ober 1994. OSD/ NA. The Swedi s h Ai r For ce uses hi s t heor i es as t he model f or t he mos t st r essf ul ki nd of ai r at t ack agai nst whi c h t hey mus t be pr epar ed t o def end . Al a . 1976) . 30 Apr i l 1949. 1993) . Ai r power advocat es bel i eve ai r power was bot h domi nant and deci si ve i n t he Gul f War . 1. j ust as i n j uj i t su. Schul t z. t hey ar e ci t ed . bk . 3 . 1994) .21 . I n t he wak e of t he war . " See J ames H.296 . 6 . and t r ans . " Ai r Theor y f or t he Twent y. Wher e pr i mar y wr i t t en wor k s ar e avai l abl e. and st udi ed abr oad . Pf al t zgr af f . 5 . Hei nl . Col J ohn A. " Fi r i ng f or Ef f ect Change i n t he Nat ur e of War f ar e.331 . and Rober t L. c hap . ed . 4 . 7 . Chal l enge and Res pons e: Ant i ci pat i ng US Mi l i t ar y Secur i t y Concer ns ( Maxwel l AFB. The aut hor i s gr at ef ul t o Col Jef f r ey Bar net t . Davi d Dept ul a. Dool i t t l e. " 326. : Ai r Uni ver si t y Pr ess. 12.f i r st Cent ur y. dr af t . C. 2 . War den i s r ank ed al ong wi t h Douhet and Tr enc har d as an i mpor t ant ai r t heor i st .BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE Not es 1 . J ohn R. See Rober t H. " Empl oyi ng Ai r Power i n t he Twent y. ed .69 . Jr . Emphas i s i n or i gi nal . 9 . Chal l enge and Res pons e : Ant i ci pat i ng US Mi l i t ar y Secur i t y Concer ns ( Maxwel l AFB. I n Aust r al i a. " Some di sagr ee r egar di ng ai r power ' s cont r i but i on i n t he Gul f W ar . 6 . War den asser t s t hat one of t he t en concept s t hat descr i be " t he r evol ut i on of t he Gul f W ar and mus t be t aken i nt o account " as we devel op new f or ce l evel s" i s ' The domi nanc e of ai r power . War den I I I . Mi chael R. . " Ai r Theor y f or t he Twent y. " The f unct i on of t he Ar my and t he Nav y i n any f ut ur e war wi l l be t o suppor t t he domi nant ai r ar m. 64. 1994) . Br own and Co . . Dr Hughes i s a col l eague at t he Ai r War Col l ege. " Ai r Theor y. mos t of War den' s br i l l i ant exposi t i on of par al l el ai r war f ar e i s i n t he or al t r adi t i on : br i ef i ngs and br i ef i ng sl i des . 326. Car l v on Cl ausewi t z. War den. Al a . " i n Kar l P. and J ohn A. " Par al l el War f ar e : I t s Nat ur e and Appl i cat i on. : US Gov er nment Pr i nt i ng Of f i ce.f i r st Cent ur y.

N. 101 .1983. f or exampl e. 2. ( Maxwel l AFB. " Cyber war i s Comi ngl " Compar at i ve St r at egy. 16 . Jef f r ey R. 15 . t o t i me sea. " US Naval I nst i t ut e Pr oceedi ngs 78. Apr i l _ on t he W 1952. Anot her Vi ew of t he Revol ut i on i n Mi l i t ar y Af f ai r s ar Col l ege. " Devel opment of t he SI OP. Mi l i t ar y St r at egy : A Gener al Theor y of Power Cont r ol ( New Br unswi ck. Cohen.. Gul f War Ai r Power Sur vey : Summar y Repor t ( Washi ngt on.40 . i n Cl assi cs of Sea Power ( Annapol i s : Naval I nst i t ut e Pr ess. C. si nce det er r i ng and f i ght i ng a peer may r equi r e a r et ur n t o dependenc e on nucl ear weapons . See al so J . Mi l i t ar y St r at egy: A Gener al Theor y of Power Cont r ol . Summar y Repor t ( Eur opean War ) . 141. 1945 . 5 Augus t 1994 .PARALLEL W ARAND HYPERWAR " I nf or mat i on Domi nanc e Edges Towar d New Conf l i ct Fr ont i er . Bal l i st i c mi ssi l e at t ack opt i ons evi denced ext r aor di nar y coher ence and si mul t anei t y . and Thomas A. " whi l e t he SI OP was a " j oi nt i dea . Suc h a l ar ge number of t or nadoes hi t t i ng at t he s ame t i me woul d mak e r ecover y exceedi ngl y di f f i cul t si nce r ecover y r esour ces coul d not be shar ed easi l y . 37. . : US Ar my W concl usi ons about t he const r ai nt s on an aut hent i c r evol ut i on i n i nsi ght f ul appl i ed t o t he ai r c ampai gn t heor y of ( RM A) can al so be mi l i t ar y af f ai r s par al l el war . 26 .June 1993. Cooper ' s ( Car l i sl e Bar r acks. I t r emai ns an i mpor t ant one f or nucl ear oper at i ons. : Gov er nment Pr i nt i ng Of f i ce. " i n Des mond Bal l and Jef f r ey Ri chel son. August 1994. The Uni t ed St at es St r at egi c Bombi ng Sur vey. " Ai r Theor y.based and l and. " Par al l el war i s an ol d i dea . 1967) . J .81 . Pa . 14 . f or t hcomi ng i n Ai r Power Jour nal . eds . r epr i nt ed i n The Uni t ed St at es St r at egi c Bombi ng Sur veys ( Eur opean War ) ( Paces War ) ( Maxwel l AFB. 13 . 1989) .J ohn Ar qui l l a and Davi d Ronf el dt .Fi ght er s Dat a Base" 11 . poi nt ed out t o t he Ai r For ce of f i cer s det ai l ed t o assi st wi t h t he st udy t hat t he t ar get i ng l ogi c of t he I nst ant Thunder ai r campai gn br i ef i ng was t he s ame as t he SI OP. J . Wyl i e i nt r oduced t he di f f er ent i at i ons of sequent i al and cumul at i ve i n " Ref l ect i ons ar i n t he Paci f i c. 12 . Kear ney and El l i ot A.30 .based bal l i st i c mi ssi l e l aunches so t hat al l at t acki ng war heads ar r i ved at t he f i r st possi bl e poi nt of enemy r adar det ect i on 14 5 . Theor et i cal l y i t was possi bl e. no . " J une 1994. St r at egi c Nucl ear Tar get i ng ( I t haca: Cor nel l Uni ver si t y Pr ess. 10 Nov ember 1994 . See al so War den. Conver sat i on wi t h Col onel War den. and Nor man B. Wyl i e. Cooper . A hi st or i an assi gned t o t he Gul f W under t he pr omi se of nonat t r i but i on. Al a .65 . " Net War . 1960. He was t ol d t hat " par al l el war " was " an Ai r For ce i dea. C. 4. : Rut ger s Uni ver si t y Pr ess. C. 1994) . " 329. 1993) . Al a . 1986) . " Command and Cont r ol War f ar e : Put t i ng Anot her Tool i n t he War . 17 . Des mond Bal l . Apr i l . : Ai r Uni ver si t y Pr ess. See al so Geor ge St ei n. J ohn War den s omet i mes us es t he ex ampl e of 150 t or nadoes s i mul t aneous l y st r i ki ng t he Uni t ed St at es . speaki ng 18 . Hut cher son.330 . nor ar e pr eci si on weapons of muc h us e unl ess suppor t ed by pr eci se pr est r i ke i nf or mat i on on t he t ar get and post st r i ke damage t o i t . : Ai r Uni ver si t y Pr ess) . 1987) . ar Ai r power Sur vey t eam. Wyl i e. 80. 351. D. " Si gnal Magazi ne. 29. The bomber does not " al ways get t hr ough" ( somet i mes bomber s have di f f i cul t y get t i ng t hr ough t he budget pr ocess) . I t al i cs added .Cyber War I nf or mat i on War . 19 .361 .

J ohn Keegan. M. mi si nf or mat i on. I woul d ar gue t hat t hi s f ur t her i l l umi nat es a l i mi t at i on i n t he t heor y : t o pr oduce t he " ef f ect " desi r ed i n t i me. however . di sper si on. What may be " new" her e may be t hat s ome i n t he t act i cal ai r f or ces di scover ed t he appr oach t hat st r at egi c ai r and mi ssi l e f or ces had l ong t aken t o war f ar e . suggest s t hat t he di f f er ence bet ween empl oyi ng nucl ear weapons and nonnucl ear weapons cr eat es di st i nct i ons t hat ar e " def i ni t i ve .121 . Maxwel l AFB. Al abama. Sour ce i s a di scussi on wi t h Lt Gen J ay W . asser t ed t hat achi evi ng ai r s upr emac y agai nst I r aq was about as di f f i cul t as " shoot i ng at a t et her ed goat . USAF. Maj Gen Pet er D. speaki ng under t he pr omi se of nonat t r i but i on. 25 . The Ai r For ce Di r ect or at e of War f i ght i ng Concept s Dev el opment ( AF/ XOXW) l ays cl ai ms t o t he not i on of par al l el war f ar e. i mi t at i on i s t he hi ghest f or m of f l at t er y . Pr est on Ni bl ack. Per haps i t was awar eness of t hi s l i kel i hood i n t he l eader shi p of t he f or mer Sovi et Uni on ( or t he US) t hat made such a US ( or Sovi et ) at t ack unnecessar y . War and Ant i . Dan Hughes suggest s t hat t her e ar e at l east t wo si des t o t hi s i ssue . " Guns or But t er : The Twi l i ght of a Tr adeof f ?" ( May 1994) . Wi nnef el d. 29. Bar r y R. 28 . Johnson. di sgui se. have been near l y t he epi t ome of second wav e war f ar e . A League of Ai r men: U. 20 . 1993) . Mar t i n v an Cr evel d.War : Sur vi val at t he Dawn of t he 21st Cent ur y ( Bost on : Li t t l e. I t may . Al abama . 7he 7y -ansf or mat i on of War ( NewYor k : Fr ee Pr ess. Admi r al Wyl i e woul d pr obabl y be pl eased . A ver y seni or ai r of f i cer i nvol ved i n t he Deser t St or m ai r campai gn. " 23 . Us ed wi t h per mi ssi on . 1991) . Knopf . poi nt s out t hat t he t echni ques of mobi l i t y. 27 . Br own and Co . The demassi f i cat i on and dehumani zat i on of at t ack syst ems coul d mak e t he suppr essi on of enemy ai r def enses a muc h l ower pr i or i t y. . f or mer c ommandant of t he Ai r W ar Col l ege. A Hi st or y of War f ar e ( NewYor k : Al f r ed A.i n advance of manned syst ems . Schnei der poi nt s out t hat " compact ed ser i al war f ar e may ` be par al l el war f ar e i n ef f ect " i f t he adver sar y does not have t he t i me t o r espond ef f ect i vel y . 1994) . Kel l ey. 21 .l aunched and sea.r i ngs' par al l el war ai r c ampai gn pl anner may not have s uc h mi ssi l es t o empl oy . S. Al vi n and Hei di Tof f l er . we mus t us e Cl ausewi t zi an 14 6 . " 22 . decept i on. and di ver si on ar e st i l l usef ul way s of cr eat i ng ni nj i t su .l aunched bal l i st i c mi ssi l es t hat pr eceded at t acks by manned ai r cr af t . Cal i f . J ames A. SSBNs ar e " st eal t hy" by vi r t ue of t hei r oper at i ons . a pr esent at i on t o t he USAF Ai r Uni ver si t y Nat i onal Secur i t y For um. 1 Dec ember 1994 . v an Toal . Maxwel l AFB. Ai r Power i n t he Gul f War ( Sant a Moni ca. usi ng t he di f f er ences bet ween par al l el and ser i al el ect r i cal ci r cui t s as t he i l l ust r at i ve model .as we woul d expect t hem t o be i f t he SI OP and par al l el war f ar e t heor i es ar e t he s ame. 26 . : RAND.BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE si mul t aneousl y . A st at e l i ke I r aq i s an even easi er t ar get set . Deser t St or m was not t hi r d wav e war f ar e . The f i ve. Cr ui se mi ssi l es and st eal t h as a desi gn f eat ur e bec ome t he anal og of i nt er cont i nent al bal l i st i c mi ssi l es and wer e empl oy ed. 120. 1994) . and Car l Bui l der . Gener al Kel l ey i s t he c ommander of Ai r Uni ver si t y . 24 . and Dana J . Robi nson. OSD Net Assessment . CMDR J . A st r engt h of t he SI OP was t he l and.

1992) . I ndi a: Lancer I nt er nat i onal . Col o . Sai d anot her way. : Bayl i n Publ i shi ng. 35 . Er i ch Jant sch. 196 . C. Nai r . J os eph A. Engel br echt . Coc hr an et . 41 . 1992) . Gr aduat e School of Ar t s and Sci ences. Wheat l ey. Gul f War Ai r Power Sur vey. Absent near l y unl i mi t ed mass. : Gov er nment Pr i nt i ng Of f i ce. " The possi bi l i t y t hat cont r ol act ual l y i s secur ed by anni hi l at i ng mi l i t ar y capabi l i t y shoul d not be over l ooked . 30 . 1980) . i s devel oped i n Rober t R. quot ed i n Mar gar et J . Leader shi p and t he New Sci ence : Lear ni ng about Or gani zat i on f r om an Or der l y Uni ver se ( San Fr anci sco : Ber r et t . 1992) . and Di ane Chot i kul . Fi ght i ng by Mi nut es : Ti me and t he Ar t of W ar ( West por t . di mensi ons cur r ent l y negl ect ed i n Ar my doct r i ne. says. Accor di ng t o a seni or Ai r For ce of f i cer speaki ng t o t he Ai r W ar Col l ege under t he pr omi se of nonat t r i but i on. Dr Coc hr an i s a col l eague at t he Ai r W ar Col l ege. See Mar shal l and Er i c Mc Luhan. t he f or mer c ommandant of t he Mar i ne Cor ps. r educes t he power of ai r power . . i nf or mat i on t echnol ogy may be t he ant i dot e f or al l war f ar e . Conn . and embel l i shed by t echnol ogy t o i nt r ude i nt o acoust i c. t he of f i ci al ar gued. Ul mer . K. t hey wi l l event ual l y bec ome l ess usef ul f or and ef f ect i ve i n c ombat . " I ' ve never seen a bat t l ef i el d t oo cr owded t o excl ude any one who want s a shot at t he enemy . See t he di scussi on of s ome of t he l i mi t s of t he ATO syst em on page 74 . Vol ume I : Pl anni ng ( Washi ngt on. I nc . al . Ai r Uni ver si t y. The Sel f . One wonder s i f unwi l l i ngness t o ki l l t he enemy or empl oy f r i endl y gr ound f or ces i n mor t al c ombat agai nst an adver sar y' s homel and f or ces r ender s t he Uni t ed St at es weak t o t he poi nt of i mpot ence .Or gani zi ng Uni ver se ( Oxf or d : Per gamon Pr ess. 1991) . Leonhar d. 1994) . and vi sual space. i nf or mat i on war f ar e may pr ovi de t he ant i dot e f or par al l el war f ar e . " War Ter mi nat i on : W hy Does A St at e Deci de To St op Fi ght i ng?" ( Unpubl i shed doct or al di sser t at i on. t he not i on of par al l el ai r war f ar e may onl y be val i d i f appl i ed agai nst smal l count r i es . . 31 .4 . Gr egor y L . The Mar i nes ar e t o bl ame f or wi t hhol di ng sor t i es f r om t he j oi nt f or ces ai r c omponent c ommander ( JFACC) . Dr Schnei der i s a col l eague at t he Ai r W ar Col l ege. 40 . ol f act or y. Heur et i cs : The Logi c of I nvent i on ( Bal t i mor e : J ohns Hopk i ns Uni ver si t y Pr ess. " Fi r i ng f or Ef f ect . I f t he Ar my and Mar i ne Cor ps gr ound f or ces ar e unus ed i n combat .PARALLEL W ARANDHYPERW AR mas s i n space . " 20 . 103. Col Engel br echt i s a col l eague at t he Ai r Uni ver si t y' s Ai r W ar Col l ege . : Pr aeger Publ i sher s. 36. 39 . Ai r Uni ver si t y. t act i l e. Davi d Dept ul a. 1993) . 1994) . The i mpor t ance of t i me and oppor t uni t y i n war f ar e. Al exander S. 37 . dr af t . 7. The Depar t ment of Def ense pl ans t o i ncr ease i nvest ment i n nonl et hal t echnol ogi es si gni f i cant l y . Col umbi a Uni ver si t y. Advocat es ar gue t hat t he obj ect i ve i s not anni hi l at i on but " cont r ol . V. " 38 . As Gen Al Gr ay.Koehl er Publ i sher s. War I n The Gul f . 110 . D. Pel t on. t he Ar my i s t o bl ame f or i t s passi on f or " deep at t ack" and t he way i n whi c h i t uses t he f i r e suppor t coor di nat i on l i ne ( FSCL) t o appor t i on t he bat t l espace . Laws of Medi a : The New Sci ence ( Tor ont o : Uni ver si t y of Tor ont o Pr ess. 1988) . 18 . Al l of t hi s. 34 . Fut ur e Vi ew: Communi cat i ons Technol ogy and Soci et y i n t he 21st Cent ur y ( Boul der . 32 . Lessons f or t he Thi r d Wor l d ( New Del hi . " The Sovi et Theor y of Ref l exi ve 14 7 . Event ual l y. Joseph N. 33 .

A t heor y t hat asser t s. or def ense r esour ce appr opr i at i on. f or exampl e. 1994) . t heor i es . 43 . Wher e t he mai nt enance and moder ni zat i on of l ar ge l and ar mi es cont i nue t o sap nat i onal i nvest ment s. : Naval Post gr aduat e School . t hat an ai r f or ce " owns" r esponsi bi l i t y f or t he " deep bat t l e" or t he " hi gh bat t l e" i s not a war f ar e t heor y . S. t hat an ai r f or ce " owns " r esponsi bi l i t y f or ever yt hi ng t hat t r ansi t s t he ai r i s not a war f ar e t heor y . f or exampl e. and Ger many pr ovi de good exampl es .BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE Cont r ol i n Hi st or i cal and Psychocul t ur al Per spect i ve : A Pr el i mi nar y St udy. a means t o an end . Car l Bui l der . W hen i t bec omes an end i n i t sel f . Ai r For ce ( New Br unswi ck. and Engl and . Thus. t her e i s no Ai r For ce . " Techni cal Repor t NPS55. hypot hesi zes t hat t he bat t l espace i s seaml ess . 45 . The I car us Sy ndr ome : The Rol e of Ai r Power Theor y i n t he Evol ut i on and Fat e of U.86. A t heor y.013 ( Mont er ey. Cal i f . . A t heor y t hat asser t s. t he r equi r ed t echnol ogi es ar e l ess l i kel y t o be f or t hcomi ng . The " ar my" st r uct ur al l y and f i nanci al l y domi nat es t he def ense debat e and budget . Ger many. A seni or Ai r For ce of f i cer speaki ng t o t he Ai r W ar Col l ege under t he pr omi se of nonat t r i but i on asser t ed t hat " wi t hout t echnol ogy. NJ . 44 . : Tr ansact i on Publ i sher s. i t may ser ve i t sel f i nst ead of war f ar e . Fr ance. " Technol ogy i s a t ool . Thes e ar e r ol es and mi ssi ons. ai r power i s f or edoomed t o st r uct ur al i mpot ence i n Fr ance. Engl and. on t he ot her hand. 42 . 1986) .

" I nf o War " i s not t he s ame as i nt el l i gence oper at i ons. " and . and.t he t act i cal di sr upt i on.cycl e . " Dr Geor ge St ei n pl aces emer gi ng t hi nki ng on i nf or mat i on war f ar e i nt o t he cont ext of t he Tof f l er s wav e t heor y : " As f i r st wav e war s wer e f ought over l and. or dest r oy t he enemy' s i nf or mat i on and i t s f unct i ons . of an enemy' s deci si on.maki ng syst em. Cyber war i s t he oper at i onal ext ensi on of i nf or mat i on war and net war . cor r upt . c ommand and cont r ol . and expl oi t i ng our own i nf or mat i on oper at i ons . i ndeed. et c .ot her i nf or mat i on mani pul at i on whi c h cr eat es " vi r t ual r eal t i es" t hat coul d ser i ousl y t hr eat en a st at e' s cont r ol . As i t i s emer gi ng i n Def ens e Depar t ment t hi nki ng. " and pl anner s descr i be t he obj ect i ve of i nf or mat i on war as " i nf or mat i on domi nanc e . deci si on. and ` second wave' war s wer e f ought over physi cal r esour ces and pr oduct i ve capaci t y. or mer el y gener at e chaos r emai ns t o be seen . i nf or mat i on war f ar e i s an at t ack on an adver sar y' s ent i r e i nf or mat i on. As Ai r For ce Pl ans put s i t : i nf or mat i on war f ar e i s " any act i on t o deny. Or i ent . al t hough i t i s cl ear l y r el at ed t o i nt el l i gence . St ei n caut i ons t hat whet her cyber war c an act ual l y " shape" t he bat t l ef i el d. pr opaganda.t he emer gence of t echni ques " combi ni ng l i ve act or s wi t h comput er gener at ed vi deo gr aphi cs. " Net war i s i nf or mat i on war waged l ar gel y t hr ough c ommuni c at i ons syst ems . " I nf or mat i on war f ar e i s di r ect ed at shr i nki ng or i nt er f er i ng wi t h t he enemy' s Obser ve. expl oi t . However . Gov er nment s whi c h r el y f or 14 9 . c ommand and cont r ol . t hen domi nat i on. The 1991 Gul f W ar exhi bi t ed i t vi a t he Coal i t i on' s at t ack on t he whol e s pec t r um of Saddam Hussei n' s i nf or mat i on. But i t i s t o t he r eal m of " i nf o pr opaganda" wher e Dr St ei n cal l s our par t i cul ar at t ent i on. " and " f i ct i ve si mul at or s. St r at egi st s now speak of i nf or mat i on as a " st r at egi c asset . Al l t hi s has obvi ous i mpl i cat i ons f or c ommand and cont r ol war f ar e agai nst an adver sar y . Deci de. pr ot ect i ng our sel ves agai nst t he act i ons . " Rel at ed t o i nf or mat i on war ar e " net war " and " cyber war . t he emer gi ng ` t hi r d wave' war s wi l l be f or t he access t o and cont r ol of knowl edge . Act ( OODA) l oop whi l e ex pandi ng and i mpr ovi ng our own .Over vi ew: I nf or mat i on War f ar e I ssues I nf or mat i on war f ar e i s emer gi ng as a pot ent new el ement of st r at egy . and per haps even t he r eor der i ng.

Ul t r a i nt er cept s. " was t he capabi l i t y t hat made possi bl e t he [ Al l i es] ` l ef t hook' us ed t o def eat Saddam Hussei n' s ar mor ed di vi si ons . I ndeed. An ex ampl e was t he Luf t waf f e r ai d on Covent r y . GPS. and t he i mpact of i nf or mat i on t echnol ogy dur i ng t he Gul f War . st at ed. ar e ver y vul ner abl e t o penet r at i on. I ndeed. He uses t he al l i ed decept i on and cr ypt anal ysi s dur i ng WWI I . t hat democr at i c soci et i es may be par t i cul ar l y vul ner abl e t o at t ack by adver sar i es usi ng i nf or mat i on war . Thei r communi cat i ons i nf r ast r uct ur e i s wi de open t o at t ack f or t hei r " domest i c comput er . who had wor ked wi t h Ul t r a dur i ng WWI I pr i or t o l aunchi ng hi s l egal car eer . Sound st r at egy.Col d War age . t hen. whi c h wer e never compr omi sed. . Chur chi l l had t o mak e numer ous pai nf ul deci si ons not t o def end Al l i ed asset s he k new wer e goi ng t o be at t acked f or f ear of al er t i ng t he Ger mans t o Al l i ed pr i or knowl edge of t hei r pl ans . " pr ovi ded t he bul k of i nt el l i gence t o t he Al l i es dur i ng t he war . desi gned t o di sr upt or end an adver sar y' s communi cat i ons and deci si on mak i ng . St ei n caut i ons. communi cat i ons. however . US Ar my uni t s us ed t he NAVSTAR GPS at t he t act i cal l evel t o l ocat e I r aqi uni t s even i n t he mi dst of deser t s and st or ms . and i nf or mat i on net wor ks . . " The sheer i nf or mat i on over l oad at t endant t o Coal i t i on oper at i ons was mi nd boggl i ng : 700. wr i t es Mc Cl endon. t o i l l ust r at e t he quant um l eap f r om pr opaganda and di si nf or mat i on dur i ng WWI I t o t he syst emat i c appl i cat i on of i nf or mat i on war f ar e i n t he post .boat oper at i ons agai nst At l ant i c convoys . The Gul f War br ought t he use of i nf or mat i on decept i on and i nf or mat i on war t o i t s zeni t h . " Ul t r a gave t he Br i t i sh advance war ni ng of t he Ger man at t ack on Engl and and of U. The use of al l i ed " Ul t r a" i nt er cept s of Nazi war pl ans and oper at i ons was cr i t i cal t o al l i ed success . mani pul at i on.BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE t hei r l egi t i macy on i nsul at i ng t hei r soci et i es f r om r eal i t y l ook par t i cul ar l y vul ner abl e t o i nf or mat i on war . 000 mes s ages 150 . " I n no ot her war have c ommandi ng gener al s had t he qual i t y and ext ent of i nt el l i gence pr ovi ded by Ul t r a . or even dest r uct i on by det er mi ned hacker s . " The essay by Col Mc Lendon i s bui l t ar ound a cr i t i que of t he hi st or i cal evol ut i on of i nf or mat i on war . especi al l y i t s c omponent s net war and cyber war . 000 phone cal l s and 150. " As Supr eme Cour t Just i ce Lewi s Powel l . empl oys i nf o war as an of f ensi ve el ement of oper at i ons.

Jer emi ah. " wr i t es f or mer Vi ce Chai r man of t he JCS. successf ul deconf l i ct i on of over 35. 240 ai r sor t i es per day . 000 di f f er ent communi cat i ons f r equenci es . 000 dur i ng t he war 2. Davi d E. AW ACS ai r cr af t cont r ol l i ng t han 90. The Gul f War exper i ence has spur r ed r ecogni t i on wi t hi n t he US Def ense Depar t ment t hat an abi l i t y t o achi eve " i nf or mat i on domi nance" coul d r epr esent a new er a i n st r at egy f or mul at i on. " . " Gl obal domi nance. " wi l l be achi eved by t hose t hat most cl ear l y under st and t he r ol e of i nf or mat i on and t he power of knowl edge t hat f l ows f r om i t .I NFORMATI ON W ARFARE I SSUES per day . Adm.mor e wi t h no mi dai r col l i si ons .

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psychol ogi cal . and wher e t her e ar e c unni ng per f or mances t her e wi l l be cunni ng hear t s .Chapt er 6 I nf or mat i on W ar . g . i n deal i ng wi t h f or ei gn st at es or gr oups. . t he pr esi dent and t he Congr ess) and. and wi t h one who has t r oubl ed t he qui et of hi s soul Tao wi l l not dwel l . i n or der t o i ncr ease t he pr obabi l i t i es and f avor abl e consequences of vi ct or y and t o l essen t he chances of def eat .Net war Geor ge J .Cyber war . I t i s not t hat I do not k now about t hi s i nvent i on . and mi l i t ar y f or ces as necessar y dur i ng peace and war . Chuang Tz u t el l s t he st or y of a si mpl e gar dener who was s hown a new t ool t hat pr omi sed t o change gar deni ng . economi c. He l aughed scor nf ul l y and r epl i ed. he who has bl ur r ed t he pr i st i ne pur i t y of hi s nat ur e has t r oubl ed t he qui et of hi s soul . I St r at egy. Commer c e. i t i s obvi ous t hat t he pol i t i cal and economi c aspect s of t he nat i onal secur i t y pol i ci es of t he Uni t ed St at es ar e devel oped by t he nat i onal pol i t i cal aut hor i t i es ( e . " 2 For mos t peopl e. but t hat I shoul d be as hamed t o use i t . i s t he " ar t and sci ence of devel opi ng and usi ng pol i t i cal . He i n whos e br east a c unni ng hear t l i es has bl ur r ed t he pr i st i ne pur i t y of hi s nat ur e . Mor e i mpor t ant l y : What ar e psychol ogi cal f or ces? By whom wi l l t hese f or ces be used? Wi t h what aut hor i t y? To what ends? New t ool s and t echnol ogi es f or c ommuni c at i on hav e cr eat ed t he pot ent i al f or a new f or m of psychol ogi cal war f ar e t o a 153 . however . Few. I us ed t o be t ol d by my t eacher t hat wher e t her e ar e c unni ng cont r i vances t her e wi l l be cunni ng per f or mances. et c . Agr i cul t ur e. accor di ng t o t he Depar t ment of Def ense. execut ed by t he Depar t ment s of St at e. Pol i ci es f or devel opi ng and usi ng mi l i t ar y f or ces ar e f or mul at ed by t he nat i onal pol i t i cal aut hor i t i es and conveyed t o t he ar med f or ces t hr ough t he secr et ar y of def ense . St ei n I n Ar t hur Wal ey' s Thr ee Way s of Thought i n Anci ent Chi na. have pai d muc h at t ent i on t o j ust how and by whom psychol ogi cal f or ces ar e t o be dev el oped t o suppor t nat i onal pol i ci es . t o af f or d t he max i mum suppor t t o pol i ci es.

capst one concept of mi l i t ar y knowl edge st r at egy .cr eat i on f or m" of t hat soci et y. we may f i nd t hat we ar e as hamed t o use i t . Thi s new f or m of hen we c ome t o war f ar e i s k nown as " i nf or mat i on war f ar e . t her e i s nei t her f or mal mi l i t ar y doct r i ne nor of f i ci al def i ni t i ons of i nf or mat i on war f ar e . di st r i but e. t he Tof f l er s ar gue t hat t he ar t o US mi l i t ar y i s expandi ng t he concept of I nf or mat i on W oper at i ons ai m ed at i nf l uenci ng t he i ncl ude psychol ogi cal " emot i ons. si nce " combat f or m" i n any soci et y f ol l ows t he " weal t h. f or exampl e. " W k now t he Tao of s uc h an i nvent i on as i nf or mat i on war f ar e. 30" ( 6 May 1993) of t he US Joi nt Chi ef s of St af f . And. and a pol i cy f or how t he ar med f or ces wi l l acqui r e. obj ect i ve r easoni ng.BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE degr ee i magi ned onl y i n sci ence f i ct i on . t he emer gi ng " t hi r d wav e" war s wi l l be f ought f or cont r ol of knowl edge . " net war " and " cyber war " ar e emer gi ng as k ey concept s i n di scussi ng I nf or mat i on W ar . pr ocess. war s of t he f ut ur e wi l l be i ncr easi ngl y " i nf or mat i on war s . t o t he pr esent emphasi s on gener at i ng i nf or mat i on pr oduct s as a maj or new sour ce of i nc ome . t he concept s of net war and cyber war have been devel oped by J ohn Ar qui l l a and Davi d 154 . Consi der . " Suc h a st r at egy woul d i ncl ude cl ear doct r i ne. mot i ves. Or i gi nal l y t hese i deas s eem t o hav e c ome f r om t he sci ence f i ct i on c ommuni t y . As " f i r st wave" war s wer e f ought f or l and and " second wave" war s wer e f ought f or cont r ol over pr oduct i ve capaci t y. I t evol ut i on of t r adi t i onal war f ar e t owar d I nf or mat i on W woul d al so mi r r or t he pr ogr ssi ve st eps of gener at i ng weal t h f r om agr i cul t ur e and nat ur al r esour ces i n muc h ear l i er t i mes. t he t hought . t o t he ni net eent h and ear l y t went i et h cent ur y emphas i s on i ndust r i al pr oduct i on. 3 Quot i ng f r om t he " Memor andum of Pol i cy No . " Cur r ent l y.pr ovoki ng f ut ur e war suggest ed i n Br uc e St er l i ng' s I sl ands i n t he Net s Mor e r ecent l y. 4 Despi t e t he l ack of aut hor i t at i ve def i ni t i on.i t al so poses i mpor t ant pol i cy quest i ons . Suc h an expansi on woul d mi r r or t he ar . t he i dea of i nf or mat i on war f ar e has not onl y capt ur ed t he at t ent i on of mi l i t ar y anal yst s. The f ut ur i st s Al vi n and Hei di Tof f l er have ar gued t hat t he Uni t ed St at es ar med f or ces need t o devel op a " syst emat i c. Des pi t e t he c omput er j ar gon i nvol ved. and pr oj ect knowl edge . and ul t i mat el y t he behavi or " of ot her s .

f or exampl e.l evel i deat i onal conf l i ct waged i n par t t hr ough i nt er net t ed modes of communi cat i on . " Net war . however . " t her e was l i t t l e demoni zat i on or dehumani zat i on of t he opponent .CYBERW AR . whi l e Saddam Hussei n bec ame t he " new Hi t l er " and Pr esi dent Bus h was t he " Gr eat Sat an. t he Comi nf or m. i s a soci et al .NEI W I NFORMATI ON W AR Ronf el dt i n t hei r i mpor t ant essay. One coul d ar gue t hat cer t ai n aspect s of t he col d war had t he char act er i st i cs of a dr ess r ehear sal f or f ut ur e net war .f ashi oned pr opaganda . Net war i s about i deas and epi st emol ogywhat i s k nown and how i t i s k nown .st at e conf l i ct . suggest s t hat t he gover nment s may not be t he onl y par t i es wagi ng I nf or mat i on War . Per haps t he mul t i cul t ur al nat ur e of t he Amer i can.t o. I t woul d be comf or t i ng t o bel i eve t hat t he " t r i ed and t r ue" met hods ( and l i mi t at i ons) of pr opaganda st i l l wor k ed . or t he US I nf or mat i on Agency . The war cont ai ned many el ement s of cl assi c pr opaganda : accusat i ons of bombed baby. " Cy ber war i s Comi ngl " 6 Thei r suggest i ons pr ovi de a t hought f ul st ar t i ng poi nt f or expl or i ng t he i ssues t hat sur r ound " i nf or mat i on war .AR. as wel l as sur vi val i st mi l i t i as or I sl ami c r evi val i st s. One el ement of t r adi t i onal pr opaganda was absent . i nf l at ed r het or i c and i nf l at ed st akes of t he conf l i ct .agai nst . The t ar get of net war i s t he human mi nd . But net war may i nvol ve mor e t han t r adi t i onal st at e. net war may appear t o be a new wor d f or ol d. Consi der . and t he cl assi c " us or t hem" pol ar i zat i on i n whi c h " neut r al i t y" or unent husi ast i c suppor t was decr i ed . t her e may hav e been a spar k of net war geni us i n t r eat i ng t he I sl ami c I r aqi sol di er s 15 5 .nat i on st r at egi c l evel conf l i ct . At f i r st gl ance. Agenc e Fr ance Pr esse. accor di ng t o t hem. al l wi t h easy access t o wor l dwi de comput er net wor ks f or t he exchange of i nf or mat i on or t he coor di nat i on of pol i t i cal pr essur e on a nat i onal or gl obal basi s.l ed al l i ance pr ecl uded t ur ni ng t he I r aqi ar my i nt o somet hi ng s ubhuman . t he f ut ur e of t he new wor l d or der and " t he mot her of bat t l es" f or t he f ut ur e of I s l am. net war i s mos t l i kel y t o be a nat i on. That i s. The emer gi ng of nonst at e pol i t i cal act or s such as Gr eenpeace and Amnes t y I nt er nat i onal . Radi o Fr ee Eur ope.mi l k f act or i es and st ol en baby i ncubat or s. And t he Gul f W ar s howed t hat bot h Saddam Hussei n and t he Al l i ance wer e st i l l of t he ol d school . I t woul d be waged l ar gel y t hr ough a soci et y' s communi cat i on syst ems . I ndeed.

And t her e may have been a gl i mpse of f ut ur e net war . Never t hel ess. Thi s medi a. mul t i sour ce f i ct i ve uni ver se t o " wage soci et al . Ther e wer e no r epor t er s wi t h " skyl i nk" i n Sudan because t he gover nment of Sudan i ssued no vi sas . t her e i s no di shonor i n sur r ender i ng . Cont empor ar y dat abas es and mul t i pl e c hannel s f or i nf or mat i on t r ansmi ssi on hav e cr eat ed t he oppor t uni t y f or cust om. Comput er bul l et i n boar ds. t hi s f i ct i ve uni ver se bec omes t he pol i t i cal l y r el evant uni ver se i n soci et i es i n whi c h t he gov er nment or i t s mi l i t ar y i s supposed t o " do somet hi ng. r ebel s i n Chi api s.t ai l or ed net war at t acks . or even nonst at e i nt er est s t o mani pul at e t he mul t i medi a. di sor der . vi deo c amer as t i ed t o f ax machi nes. " Under s uc h condi t i ons. of cour se. And. t he cl ose et ymol ogi cal r el at i onshi p bet ween " f i ct i ve" and " f i ct i onal " suggest s how easy i t i s t o mani pul at e t he mes s age .Spangl ed Banner . r el evant .cr eat ed uni ver se i s dubbed " f i ct i ve" r at her t han " f i ct i onal " because whi l e what i s s hown may be " t r ue.i t i s r umor ed t hat Baghdad Radi o si gned on one mor ni ng wi t h " The St ar . ? 15 6 . par t i es i n a ci vi l war s uc h as Bosni a. or cont ext ual t r ut h . Many peopl e hav e begun t o r eal i ze t hat gov er nment al deci si ons ar e bec omi ng i ncr easi ngl y r eact i ve t o a " f i ct i ve" uni ver se cr eat ed by. " Tr adi t i onal pr opaganda was usual l y t ar get ed t o i nf l uence a mas s audi ence . " i t i s j ust not t he whol e. cel l ul ar t el ephones.al l pr ovi de ent r y poi nt s and di ssemi nat i on net wor ks f or cust omi zed assaul t . " Somal i a get s i n t he news and t he Uni t ed St at es get s i nt o Somal i a despi t e t he r eal i t y of equal l y di sast r ous st ar vat i on. Cont empor ar y t echnol ogi es have t he pot ent i al t o c us t omi z e pr opaganda . Any one who has r ecei ved i ndi vi dual l y t ar get ed adver t i si ng f r om a c ompany speci al i zi ng i n " ni che" mar ket i ng has had a moment ar y s hudder upon r eal i zi ng t hat s ome pr i vat e c ompani es s eem t o k now ever yt hi ng about our t ast es and buyi ng habi t s . A maj or new f act or i n i nf or mat i on war r esul t s di r ect l y f r om t he wor l dwi de i nf ospher e of t el evi si on and br oadcast news . CNN and i t s var i ous i nt er nat i onal compet i t or s .l evel i deat i onal conf l i ct s" shoul d be obvi ous . The pot ent i al f or gover nment s. and r api ne r i ght next door i n Sudan .BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE as " br ave men put i nt o an i mpossi bl e si t uat i on by a st upi d l eader .

anal ogous t o cent r al cont r ol of pay. Tr adi t i onal pr opaganda mi ght have at t empt ed t o di scr edi t an adver sar y' s news medi a showi ng. To put i t i n t he j ar gon of t he i nf owar r i or s. Pi ct ur es Wor t h A Thous and Tank s W hen t he new. f or exampl e. t he mas t er y of t he t echni ques of c ombi ni ng l i ve act or s wi t h comput er .vi ew pr ogr ams. a genui nel y r evol ut i onar y t r ansf or mat i on of pr opaganda and war f ar e bec omes possi bl e . The t ar get st at e woul d not k now what had happened unt i l t oo l at e . or br oadcast by gover nment s or al l sor t s of pl ayer s t hr ough i ncr easi ngl y di ver si f i ed net wor k s . but al r eady wel l .t ar get ed or ni che.NETW AR Fi ct i ve or f i ct i onal oper at i onal envi r onment s. Today. or per haps even a bat t l e whi c h exi st s i n " ef f ect s" t hough not i n f act .ni che at t ack ' i n an i ncr easi ngl y mul t i sour ce f i ct i ve uni ver se of f er s unl i mi t ed pot ent i al f or soci et al . per haps. s ummi t meet i ng.l evel net war . t hen. Now.I NFORMATI ONW AR.under st ood. di st r i but ed. $ Di r ect sat el l i t e br oadcast t o sel ect ed cabl e syst ems. The cr edi bi l i t y of t he opponent was t he t ar get and t he st r at egi c i nt ent i on was t o separ at e t he gov er nment f r om t he peopl e . agai n of f er s t he pot ent i al f or peopl e i n one pr ovi nce or r egi on of a t ar get ed st at e t o di scover t hat t he max i mum l eader has deci ded t o pur ge t hei r c l ans men f r om t he ar my . or banki ng i nf or mat i on ar e t r ansmi t t ed t o suggest t hat " Mexi co" i s about t o deval ue t he peso coul d easi l y pr ovoke f i nanci al chaos . commer ci al . 15 7 .per . The ni chemani pul at i on pot ent i al avai l abl e t o st at es or pr i vat e i nt er est s wi t h access t o t he uni ver se of i nt er net t ed c ommuni c at i ons s uc h as t he net wor ks over whi c h busi ness. t hat as t he of f i ci al casual t y f i gur es wer e demonst r abl y f al se. " pi ct ur es" wi l l be wor t h a t housand t anks . t r ansmi t t ed. whet her mass. can be gener at ed. si mul at i on t echnol ogi es of t he Tek war and MTV gener at i on ar e added t o t he ar senal of net war .CYBERW AR . St or ed vi deo i mages can be r ecombi ned endl essl y t o pr oduce any ef f ect chosen .t ar get ed.gener at ed vi deo gr aphi cs c an easi l y cr eat e a " vi r t ual " news conf er ence. i nf o. al l " news" f r om t he gov er nment was equal l y f al se .

ar e t ai l or ed t o t he st r at egi c needs of t he moment : s ome r ecei ve r ei nf or cement f or t he f i ct i ve si mul at i on . " i nf or mat i on" whi c h pr oduces ef f ect s i ndependent of i t s physi cal r eal i t y . var i ous " i nf o. Let us r et ur n t o t he pr evi ous scenar i o t o pl ay out i t s ef f ect s . The f i ct i ve si mul at i on of t he max i mum l eader ' s cal l t o st op f i ght i ng woul d. t he war may be over . be f ol l owed i mmedi at el y by a " r eal " br oadcast i n whi c h st at e " Voi ce and Vi si on" exposes t he net war at t ack as pr opaganda i nvent ed by " cul t ur e dest r oyer s i n Hol l ywood . I n a soci et y under assaul t acr oss i t s ent i r e i nf ospher e. Thi s i s not t r adi t i onal pr opaganda i n whi c h t he t ar get i s di scr edi t ed as a sour ce of r el i abl e i nf or mat i on . or bel i ef s of t he t ar get popul at i on. but by t he t i me t he peopl e of t he t ar get ed nat i on di scover t hat t he nat i onwi de br oadcast of t he conver sat i on bet ween t he max i mum l eader and " J i mmy Car t er " i n whi c h al l l oyal ci t i zens wer e t ol d t o cease f i ght i ng and r et ur n t o t hei r homes was cr eat ed i n Hol l y wood or Langl ey. What i s bei ng at t acked i n a st r at egi c l evel net war ar e not onl y t he emot i ons. of cour se. Obj ect i ve r easoni ng i s t hr eat ened . a " f i ct i ve si mul at i on" i s br oadcast . Si mul t aneousl y. " t r ut h wi l l out " event ual l y. at l east i n a t i mel y manner . " " J i mmy Car t er " i s denounc ed as a hoax . or mot i ves. and t he i nf or mat i on t hey r ecei ve. ot her r ecei ve t he " r eal " t r ut h . ot her s r ecei ve mer el y sl i ght var i at i ons . t he ver y possi bi l i t y of " t r ut h" i s bei ng r epl aced wi t h " vi r t ual r eal i t y" . Net war i s begi nni ng t o ent er t he zone of i l l usi on . What i s happeni ng her e? Thi s ki nd of mani pul at i on el evat es t he st r at egi c pot ent i al of i nf opr opaganda t o new hei ght s .ni ches" i n t he t ar get st at e ar e accessed vi a " t he net . " Thes e i nf o. Thi s i s not sci ence f i ct i on .BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE Of cour se. i t wi l l bec ome i ncr easi ngl y di f f i cul t f or member s of t hat soci et y t o ver i f y i nt er nal l y t he t r ut h or ac c ur ac y of anyt hi ng . t hat i s. t hese ar e t he capabi l i t i es of exi st i ng or r api dl y emer gi ng t echnol ogi es . 15 8 . but t he ver y power of obj ect i ve r easoni ng : t hi s t hr eat ens t he ver y possi bi l i t y of st at e cont r ol . But t he damage has al r eady been done : i t i s al l but i mpossi bl e f or t he t el evi si on vi ewer s of t he t ar get ed st at e t o t el l whi c h br oadcast i s t r ue and whi c h f i ct i on.ni che t ar get s. Rat her . Her e' s how i t mi ght wor k : t hr ough hi t chi ng a r i de on an unsuspect i ng commer ci al sat el l i t e.

W hat I s Tr ut h? Any di scussi on of i nf or mat i on war f ar e. or even per cept i on mani pul at i on as a c omponent of c ommand and cont r ol war f ar e by t he ar med f or ces of t he Uni t ed St at es at t he st r at egi c l evel mus t occur i n t he cont ext of t he mor al nat ur e of c ommuni c at i on i n a pl ur al i st i c. gover nment al or mi l i t ar y " act i ons" bec ome i ncr easi ngl y chaot i c as t her e i s no " r at i onal " r el at i onshi p of means t o ends .l evel net war or i nf or mat i on war br i ngs us wi t hi n si ght of t hat el usi ve " ac me of ski l l " wher ei n t he enemy i s s ubdued wi t hout ki l l i ng by at t acki ng hi s abi l i t y t o f or m a coher ent st r at egy . The i dea of " soci et al . net war . 10 The subst ant i ve pur pos e of c ommuni c at i on i s t he bui l di ng or devel opi ng of t he i ndi vi dual human per sonal i t y . " deci si ons" r es pond i ncr easi ngl y t o a f i ct i ve or vi r t ual uni ver se and.CYBERW AR. I t woul d seem. t he quest i on mus t be r ai sed whet her t he ar med f or ces of t he Uni t ed St at es have ei t her t he mor al or l egal aut hor i t y and. i t i s 15 9 . mor e i mpor t ant l y. secul ar . however . t he pr act i cal abi l i t y t o devel op and depl oy t he t echni ques of i nf or mat i on war f ar e at t he st r at egi c l evel i n a pr udent and pr act i cal manner . That i s. and vi ct or y not so neat . 9 Real i t y. t hen. cyber war . mor e i mpor t ant l y. and i nt oxi cant f unct i ons . t he mor al basi s of c ommuni c at i on i n any soci et y can be di scussed i n t er ms of i t s subst ant i ve. Li kewi se. t he abi l i t y t o " obser ve" i s f l ooded by cont r adi ct or y i nf or mat i on and dat a . of cour se. pr agmat i c. t he quest i on mus t be r ai sed whet her usi ng t he t echni ques of i nf or mat i on war f ar e at t he st r at egi c l evel i s compat i bl e wi t h Amer i c an pur poses and pr i nci pl es . democr at i c soci et y . Ther e ar e good r easons t o be skept i cal . as t he " end st at e" of net war may not be bl oodl ess sur r ender but t ot al di sr upt i on of t he t ar get ed soci et y .I NFORMATI ON W AR. Accor di ng t o t he phi l osopher Er i c Voegel i n. Vi ct or y may be t oo cost l y as t he cost may be t r ut h i t sel f . t he abi l i t y t o " or i ent " i s weak ened by t he assaul t on t he ver y possi bi l i t y of obj ect i ve r eas oni ng . t hat st r at egi c. may be f ar mor e c ompl ex t han t he i nf owar r i or s yet i magi ne.NETW AR At t he st r at egi c l evel .l evel i deat i onal conf l i ct " may need t o be consi der ed wi t h al l t he car e gi ven t o t he conduct of nucl ear war .

mi nded" per sons i s cr eat ed. I r an. t o t he 16 0 . i dent i f yi ng t he pr agmat i c f unc t i on of c ommuni c at i on i n soci et y. any r eal wor l d soci et y r est s on t he subst ant i ve c ommuni c at i on and under s t andi ng among i t s member s . Pr agmat i c c ommuni c at i on i s def i ned by i t s goal and consi st s of t he uni ver se of t echni ques desi gned t o i nf l uence ot her per sons t o behave i n way s t he c ommuni c at or wi shes . and consequent l y behavi or . r eal . or Saudi Ar abi a t o i nsul at e t hei r soci et i es f r om t he ef f ect s of t he gl obal communi cat i ons net wor k i l l ust r at e t hei r awar eness t hat t hei r cul t ur es and soci et i es may depend on a shar ed. as " pr i vat e r el i gi ous vi ews. soci et y i s no mer e ext er nal st r uct ur e of r el at i onshi ps . " a uni ver se of meani ng " i l l umi nat ed wi t h meani ng f r om wi t hi n by t he human bei ngs who cont i nuousl y cr eat e and bear i t as t he mode and condi t i on of t hei r sel f . i t i s t he gl ue whi c h bi nds a soci et y t oget her . I t i s usual l y i ndi f f er ent t o t he subst ant i ve mor al cont ent of t he communi cat i on and i nt ends t o mol d per cept i on.BATTLEFI ELD OF THEFUTURE si mul t aneousl y t he pr ocess by whi c h a subst ant i ve. " ' 1 The ef f or t s of sever al nat i ons s uc h as Chi na. Voegel i n' s s ec ond const r uct . Si mpl y.r eal i zat i on . mus t not cor r upt t he publ i c school f or mat i on of char act er f or l i f e i n pl ur al i st i c. t he Fr ench bel i eve t he cont i nued exi st ence of Fr ance as a di st i nct i ve soci et y or gani zed f or act i on i n hi st or y may r equi r e st at e i nt er vent i on i n t he subst ant i ve cont ent of c ommuni c at i on wi t hi n soci et y . Fi nal l y. Agai n. At t he mos t t r i vi al l evel . moder n Amer i c a . Mos t pol i t i cal and commer ci al c ommuni c at i on i s mer el y pr agmat i c . i s r eas onabl y st r ai ght f or war d . i t i s a " cosmi on.wor l d c ommuni t y of " l i ke. 12 That Fr ance seeks t o l i mi t t he per cent age of f or ei gn br oadcast mat er i al and Amer i c an f i l ms i n Eur ope i l l ust r at es t he ser i ousness wi t h whi c h t hey consi der t he subst ant i ve nat ur e of c ommuni c at i on . subst ant i ve uni ver se of di scour se di st i nct i ve t o t hei r soci et i es . Ev en wi t hi n t he West . devel oped and sust ai ned . At a mor e ser i ous l evel . Onl y behavi or mat t er s . i n Voegel i n' s t er ms. t he mor al pur pose of subst ant i ve c ommuni c at i on c an be seen i n cont empor ar y Amer i c an ef f or t s t o r emov e sexi st or r aci st l anguage f r om accept ed use . t he debat es i n Amer i c an soci et y about pr ayer i n t he publ i c school s i l l ust r at e a r ecogni t i on of t he subst ant i ve and f or mat i ve nat ur e of c ommuni c at i on i n soci et y. " i n t he vi ew of many .

NETW AR pur poses of t he c ommuni c at or . Gov er nment at t empt s at " communi cat i on" i n an i nf or mat i on war . pr of essi onal spor t s br oadcast s. consequent l y. t he r eal i ssue . Pl ur al i st i c Amer i ca i s s uppos ed t o be a soci et y i n whi c h t he f or mat i on of char act er or opi ni on i s l ef t .known f or ms of di st r act i on and di ver si on i s wel l cat er ed t o by t he ent er t ai nment i ndust r y .t hat i s. ci vi l communi cat i on or publ i c di scour se i n cont empor ar y Amer i can soci et y i s domi nat ed al most ent i r el y by t he i nt oxi cant and pr agmat i c modes . The of f i ci al mi l i t ar y vi ew of st r at egy. t hr ough t he use of var i ous means of c ommuni c at i on. of cour se.CYBERW AR . A nat i onal secur i t y st r at egy of i nf or mat i on war or net war at t he st r at egi c l evel . 14 Sound mi l i t ar y st r at egy r equi r es i nf l uenci ng t he adver sar y deci si on mak er i n s ome way t hat i s not onl y advant ageous but r easonabl y pr edi ct abl e . not c haos . psychol ogi cal . pl ur al i sm. hi gh. and mul t i cul t ur al i sm. especi al l y i f pr osecut ed by t he ar med f or ces. i s t he " ar t and s c i enc e of dev el opi ng and us i ng pol i t i cal . soap oper as. howev er . t he absence of subst ant i ve communi cat i on i n publ i c l i f e i s def ended by muc h of t he secul ar and l i ber al pol i t i cal cl ass i n t he name of f r eedom. r ecal l . Mor e i mpor t ant l y. The goal i s cont r ol . r omanc e novel s. The addi ct i on of a consi der abl e par t of t he ci t i zenr y t o t al k shows.I NFORMATI ON W AR. a pur pose t oget her wi t h a syst em of measur es f or i t s accompl i shment .l evel i deat i onal conf l i ct waged . " soci et al . t he cent r al essence of i nf or mat i on war . For Voegel i n t hen. I f st r at egy wer e seen as " a pl an of act i on desi gned t o achi eve s ome end . mul t i cul t ur al soci et y . may hi ghl i ght a pr obl em of I nf or mat i on War . " t he l i mi t at i ons of i nf owar t hi nki ng ar e obvi ous . I t s use by t he gover nment and t he ar med f or ces i s. A sl i ght l y di f f er ent v i ew of st r at egy. Fi nal l y. i n or der t o i ncr ease t he pr obabi l i t i es and f avor abl e c ons equenc es of vi ct or y and t o l essen t he chances of def eat . ec onomi c .pr of i l e l egal t r i al s and ot her wel l . t o pr i vat e i ni t i at i ve . wi t h mi l i t ar y st r at egy ser vi ng pol i t i cal or pol i cy pur poses . Thi s pr agmat i c use of c ommuni cat i on as an at t empt at per cept i on mani pul at i on i s. t he i nt oxi cant f unct i on of c ommuni c at i on i n Amer i c an soci et y i s equal l y st r ai ght f or war d . woul d r ai se ser i ous quest i ons i n a pl ur al i st i c. " 13 St r at egy i s t he means t o achi eve an end. and mi l i t ar y f or ces as necessar y dur i ng peace and war t o af f or d t he max i mum suppor t t o pol i ci es.

nonl i near and i nher ent l y unpr edi ct abl e by our si de as t her e i s no " r at i onal " r el at i onshi p of means t o ends . i s unl i kel y t o pr oduce ef f ect s t hat ar e r easonabl y pr edi ct abl e . has j ust been r ender ed chaot i c) . not an i ndet er mi nat e anyt hi ng .l evel c y ber war or command. but t o expl oi t oppor t uni t i es as t hey evol ve unpr edi ct abl y f r om t he di sor i ent ed. " As Sun.and an oper at i onal .and. and f or ci ng hi s " deci si ons" t o r espond t o a f i ct i ve or vi r t ual uni ver se. Conf l i ct i s about a det er mi nat e somet hi ng.Tzu obser ved. especi al l y hi s c ombat f or ces. Mer el y def eat i ng host i l e f i el ded mi l i t ar y f or ces may be i nsuf f i ci ent . t hen.and. yet t hese successes ar e not 16 2 . t hat t he dest r uct i on of enemy r at i onal i t y may col l apse " bat t l e" i nt o mer e " f i ght i ng" wi t h no out come but sur r ender or deat h .BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE i n par t t hr ough i nt er net t ed modes of c ommuni c at i on" .st r at egy depends on t he abi l i t y of t he l ocal mi l i t ar y c ommander t o depl oy hi s power asset s. of cour se. or i r r at i onal enemy act i ons . wi l l be ampl i f i ed f or t he enemy i n a successf ul cyber war . ' Mos e who ar e abl e t o adapt t o changes i n t he enemy and achi eve vi ct or y ar e consi der ed s upr eme . I f t he goal of i nf l uenci ng t he adver sar y' s abi l i t y t o " obser ve" by f l oodi ng hi m wi t h cor r upt ed or cont r adi ct or y i nf or mat i on and dat a . Cyber . t hi s appeal s t o t he i nf owar r i or an at t r act i ve mi l i t ar y st r at egy .and. A successf ul cyber . t he not or i ous " f og and f r i ct i on" of r eal bat t l e. however . di sr upt i ng hi s abi l i t y t o " or i ent " by t he el i mi nat i on of t he possi bi l i t y of obj ect i ve r easoni ng . be pr oduced.l evel cyber war or c ommand. not mer el y t o domi nat e t he enemy deci si on cycl e ( whi ch.cont r ol war f ar e c an " shape" t he bat t l ef i el d or wi l l mer el y gener at e chaos r emai ns t o be seen . Sun. Whet her . af t er al l .st r at egy i s t he cont r ol of t he evol ut i on of t he bat t l ef i el d or t heat er power di st r i but i on t o i mpose t he al l i ed c ommander ' s " or der " on t he enemy' s " chaos . The i nher ent l y unpr edi ct abl e nat ur e of combat .c ont r ol war f ar e c ampai gn t o decapi t at e t he enemy' s c ommand st r uct ur e f r om i t s body of t r oops may or may not be " advant ageous" but . r andom.Tz u al so obser ved t hat " when bat t l es gai n vi ct or i es and at t acks achi eve occupat i ons.cont r ol war f ar e. mor e i mpor t ant l y. I n t he cont ext of mi l i t ar y oper at i onal . " 15 The t hr eat exi st s. decapi t at ed. but t hey may wel l be act i ons whi ch ar e chaot i c. command. " act i ons" wi l l .

pot ent i al i s gr as ped by t he nat i onal pol i t i cal l eader shi p . communi cat i on. and t hey s eem t o be ef f ect i ve . On t he ot her hand. 19 A st r at egi c i nf or mat i on war f ar e at t ack on Amer i c a' s communi cat i on syst ems.NETW AR f ol l owed up. i t may al so be t he abol i t i on of st r at egy as i t at t acks t he ver y r at i onal i t y t he enemy r equi r es t o deci de f or war t er mi nat i on . shoul d be empl oy ed .AR. or gani zat i on. Thi s appl i cat i on may not be pr udent . But t he r esour ces. The domes t i c c omput er . or Chi nese vi r us i nt o Compus er v e or ot her par t s of t he i nt er net . Oper at i onal l evel cyber war may. and casual t yr educi ng. Thi s i s k nown as ' per si st i ng t ur moi l ' . get t i ng us t o bel i eve f i ct i ve cl ai ms appear s t o be what commer ci al and pol i t i cal adver t i si ng ar e al l about . i t may be t oo vul ner abl e t o engage i n net war wi t h an adver sar y pr epar ed t o " f i ght bac k . " 16 Whet her t he r ecent Gul f War was a st r at egi c vi ct or y or mer e " bat t l e" r emai ns f or hi st or i ans t o . and i nf or mat i on net wor ks essent i al f or t he dai l y f unct i oni ng of Amer i c an soci et y ar e ver y vul ner abl e t o penet r at i on and mani pul at i on. I n many ways. many of t he t ool s and t echni ques of bat t l ef i el d cyber war can be appl i ed t o net war or st r at egi c.by det er mi ned hacker s . j udge . " i s " wi de open" i n our soci et y . " I 7 The communi cat i ons i nf r ast r uct ur e. cyber war i s mor e demandi ng t han net war .wi nni ng. Al so we may f i nd physi cal cont r ol and secur i t y t o be i mpossi bl e .even dest r uct i on. I r ani an. Amer i c an soci et y may be t er r i bl y vul ner abl e t o a st r at egi c net war at t ack .l evel i nf or mat i on war . as t her e ar e ser i ous r easons t o doubt t he abi l i t y of t he Uni t ed St at es t o pr osecut e i nf or mat i on war successf ul l y. t he " i nf or mat i on hi ghway.CYBERW I NFORMATI ON W AR . Suc h a devel opment woul d cer t ai nl y be pr udent . be t hat ver y " acme of ski l l " whi c h r educes t he enemy wi l l wi t hout ki l l i ng.pai d " net wor k ni nj as" i nser t i ng t he l at est Fr ench. i ncl udi ng our mi l i t ar y c ommuni c at i on 163 . however . t hese may not be amat eur s but wel l . dur i ng war t i me. and t r ai ni ng needed f or cyber war wi l l be pr ovi ded once i t s war . 18 I n t he f ut ur e. One r eason i s t hat t he Uni t ed St at es i s an open soci et y . St r at egi c I mpl i cat i ons The t ool s. t hen. i t i s di sast r ous . t echni ques and st r at egy f or cyber war wi l l be devel oped and. On t he ot her hand.

ai r t r af f i c cont r ol syst em. Whi c h commi t t ees of t he Hous e or Senat e woul d have cont r ol and over si ght of pol i ci es at t endant t o i nf or mat i on war . 2 o I nf ospher e domi nance. and dat abase secur i t y . s ome i n t he empl oy of host i l e commer ci al or i nt el l i gence ser vi ces . say. communi cat i ons. coul d be c ommuni c at ed f r om t he pr esi dent t o t he execut i ve br anch agenci es. 2 l I t wi l l cer t ai nl y be expensi ve : t he US busi ness c ommuni t y and t he US ar med f or ces ar e r equi r ed t o devot e ever mor e r esour ces and at t ent i on t o comput er . i t i s uncl ear whet her t her e woul d be adequat e congr essi onal over si ght . t o an I r ani anor i gi nat ed comput er vi r us assaul t on t he FBI ' s cent r al t er r or i st dat abase? And what about pr epar i ng f or i t ? How shoul d we devel op and i mpl ement a nat i onal capabi l i t y f or net war ? Whi l e t heor et i cal l y a r equi r ement t o devel op or i mpl ement a nat i onal i nf or mat i on war st r at egy. but t he r esour ces and ski l l s r equi r ed t o wage I nf or mat i on War at t he nat i onal st r at egi c l evel woul d be massi ve . f i nanci al net . and whi c h woul d hav e t he power t o i nqui r e i nt o t he j udgment of a l ocal ambas s ador or mi l i t ar y c ommander who wi s hed t o us e t he t ool s of c y ber war f or a per c ept i on mani pul at i on i n peacet i me t hat woul d s hape t he pot ent i al war t i me envi r onment ?22 164 . f or exampl e. Cur r ent l y.BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE syst ems. 000 I nt er net dat abases ar e bei ng used by over 30 mi l l i on peopl e i n over 90 nat i ons . The r ecent " spy f l ap" bet ween Fr ance and t he Uni t ed St at es over al l eged US at t empt s t o gat her dat a on Fr ench Tel ec om may be i ndi cat i ve of t he f ut ur e . What of congr essi onal over si ght ? Woul d one " decl ar e" i nf or mat i on war i n r esponse. f uel pi pel i ne pumpi ng sof t war e.based cl ock/ t i mi ng syst ems. coul d r esul t i n soci et al par al ysi s .may be as c ompl ex and el usi ve as " escal at i on domi nanc e" appear ed t o be i n nucl ear st r at egy . The second r eason t o doubt US abi l i t y t o pr osecut e an i nf or mat i on war i s t hat t he pol i t i cal and l egal i ssues sur r oundi ng i nf o war ar e mur k y . 600 sof t war e pi r at es ar e pr owl i ng t he I nt er net .cont r ol l i ng t he wor l d of i nf or mat i on ex c hange. over 14. The r esour ces and ski l l s r equi r ed f or bat t l ef i el d cyber war ar e not i nsi gni f i cant . and comput er . Ov er 1. anal ogous t o t he nucl ear er a si ngl e i nt egr at ed oper at i ons pl an.

t he l at t er may not be .l evel cyber war .I NFORMATI ONW AR. any st r at egi c. 16 5 . t hey ar e devel opi ng. I f . devel opi ng t he t ool s and capabi l i t i es t o execut e a nat i onal st r at egi c i nf or mat i on war st r at egy . but si mpl y a host of cont endi ng vi ews. t he goal woul d be t o " wi t hdr aw t he Mandat e of Heav en" f r om t he r ul er s and " i nf l uence" t he Chi nese l eader s and peopl e t o adopt t he pol i ci es or behavi or we f i nd appr opr i at e . but per haps a dr awback i n wagi ng i nf or mat i on war . And. However .NETW AR The US ar med f or ces onl y execut e t he nat i onal mi l i t ar y st r at egy. al bei t uni nt ent i onal l y. say. The f or mer i s t hei r j ob under t he Const i t ut i on .l evel i nf or mat i on war pol i ci es .l evel net war or i nf or mat i on war woul d s eem t o r equi r e t he abi l i t y t o c ommuni c at e a r epl acement f or t he di scr edi t ed cont ent of t he t ar get soci et y .CYBERW AR.l evel i nf or mat i on war capabi l i t y i s even mor e essent i al t han over si ght of t he i nt el l i gence c ommuni t y . t he l ack of a mor al cent er or publ i c phi l osophy i n Amer i c an soci et y coul d r ender t he pol i t i cal l eader shi p i ncapabl e of bui l di ng a consensus on st r at egi c. They ar e si mul t aneousl y.conf l i ct r econst r uct i on. Unl ess t he goal of i nf or mat i on war i s mer el y t o unhi nge peopl e f r om t hei r abi l i t y t o r eason obj ect i vel y. and t her eby cr eat e an i nt er est i ng pr obl em f or post . qui t e appr opr i at el y. Congr essi onal over si ght i n t he devel opment of a nat i onal st r at egi c. Whi l e di ver si t y may mak e t he f or mat i on and execut i on of domest i c and even f or ei gn pol i cy mor e compl ex. a nat i onal secur i t y st r at egy of i nf or mat i on war coul d be devel oped by t he nat i onal secur i t y deci si on mak er s t hat l acked a mor al consensus . Pl ur al i sm i s a gr eat st r engt h of Amer i can soci et y. The t echnol ogi cal wi zar dr y does not change t he humani t y of t he t ar get . t he t ool s and t echni ques t o execut e t he nat i onal mi l i t ar y st r at egy f or oper at i onal . an i nf or mat i on war wer e t o be mount ed agai nst Chi na t o di sr upt i t s dr i ve f or r egi onal hegemony. si nce t her e i s no si ngl e vi ew of what i s mor al l y accept abl e.l evel i deat i onal conf l i ct waged i n par t t hr ough i nt er net t ed modes of communi cat i on" may si mpl y be beyond t he compet ence of t he execut i ve agenci es t hat woul d have t o det er mi ne t he subst ant i ve cont ent t o be c ommuni c at ed . The t hi r d r eason t o doubt US capabi l i t i es i n pr osecut i ng an ef f ect i ve i nf or mat i on war i s t hat such a " soci et al .t hey do not cont r ol i t .

r at i onal i t y. I ndeed.l evel i deat i onal conf l i ct " mus t be consi der ed wi t h al l t he car e gi ven t o t he conduct of nucl ear war .BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE Put i n t er ms of s uc h a c onc r et e pol i cy goal .even i f t hat r at i onal i t y i s t he mer e coor di nat i on of ends wi t h means . Sec ond Thought s The t echni ques bei ng devel oped by t he ar med f or ces f or a mor e nar r owl y const r ai ned oper at i onal . a successf ul al l . 166 have dest r oyed t he enemy' s .l evel cyber war was demonst r at ed i n t he Gul f W ar . and behavi or gr ounded i n t he Chi nese r eal i t y we pr opose t o i nf l uence? Woul d our " f i ct i ve" cr eat i on r eal l y hav e " vi r t ual " ef f ect s . t hey{ . W e mi ght be abl e t o use t he ar med f or ces or t he CI A t o dest r oy Chi na' s obj ect i ve r easoni ng t hr ough a " successf ul " i nf or mat i on war . mi ni mal r easoni ng and pr agmat i c c ommuni c at i on ar e r equi r ed . r easoni ng. but t hat i s not usual l y t he pol i t i cal goal of war . i ncl udi ng t he ar med f or ces and t he Cent r al I nt el l i gence Agency. However . Tr ansl at ed t o t he st r at egi c l evel . i ncl udi ng endi ng war s t hi s si de of bl ast i ng peopl e i nt o uncondi t i onal sur r ender . t he phi l osophi cal l y pr obl emat i c nat ur e of i nf or mat i on war bec omes out r ageousl y obvi ous . Does anyone r eal l y bel i eve t hat t he US nat i onal execut i ve agenci es.out st r at egi c. however . k now t he subst ant i ve di scour se of Chi na suf f i ci ent l y wel l t o wi t hdr aw t he Mandat e of Heav en? The f i nal r eason. mot i ves. we mi ght be abl e t o l oose anar chy i n a soci et y. however . Mor al r easoni ng and subst ant i ve c ommuni c at i on may not be r equi r ed . net war or i nf or mat i on war i s not a pr udent nat i onal secur i t y or mi l i t ar y st r at egy f or t he si mpl e r eason t hat nei t her t he ar med f or ces nor any ot her i nst r ument s of nat i onal power have t he abi l i t y t o expl oi t an adver sar y' s soci et y i n a way t hat pr omi ses ei t her advant ageous or pr edi ct abl e r esul t s . as s umes and r equi r es some. as t he " end st at e" of a net war may be t ot al di sr upt i on of t he t ar get ed soci et y . c an be st at ed i n t he f or m of a quest i on : does anyone r eal l y bel i eve t hat anyone i n t he US gover nment has t he phi l osophi cal sophi st i cat i on t o pr oj ect an al t er nat i ve di scour se t o r epl ace t he emot i ons. " Soci et al . Conf l i ct r esol ut i on.l evel i nf or mat i on war may .

" 23 I nf or mat i on War .t he cl i ni cal consequence of whi c h i s gener al l y acut e psychosi s . t her eby. of t en pr oposed as a key goal of an i nf or mat i on war .f i r st cent ur y . and " t ot al i t y" of a st r at egi c i nf or mat i on war . wi t hout gai n. i nt ensi t y. dependi ng on t he cont ent . The " decapi t at i on" of t he l eader shi p i s. t he Uni t ed St at es 16 7 . t hen. " mut ual l y assur ed cyber dest r uct i on" may r esul t i n a ki nd of i nf owar det er r ence . may be t he cent r al nat i onal secur i t y i ssue of t he t went y. wi t h whom. war t er mi nat i on.Tz u advi sed. one of t he gr eat myst er i es . How do we accompl i sh conf l i ct r esol ut i on. t he cr edi bi l i t y and l egi t i macy. even i f c ommuni c at ed t o t he peopl e by ei t her t he enemy l eader shi p or our " net war r i or s. Ther ef or e. per sonal i t i es coul d be f l ooded wi t h i r r at i onal or unconsci ousness f act or s. hopef ul l y. That i s. t hen.NETW AR I NFORMATI ON W abi l i t y t o k now anyt hi ng wi t h cer t ai nt y and. nucl ear or ot her wi se . do not ut i l i ze . " woul d be accept ed as " r eal " and not anot her " vi r t ual " event ? And. enabl i ng smal l power s. hi s capaci t y f or mi ni mal r easoni ng or pr agmat i c c ommuni c at i on . do not act . Pr eci sel y how war t er mi nat i on woul d have been accompl i shed wi t hout an ef f ect i ve l eader shi p wi l l r emai n. And as t he t echni ques of " cyber st r i ke" pr ol i f er at e t hr oughout t he wor l d.of t he deci si onmaker s wi l l be c ompr omi s ed or dest r oyed r el at i ve t o t hei r own popul at i on and i n t er ms of t hei r own wor l dv i ew.even t he physi cal abi l i t y t o c ommuni c at e. wi t hout cr i ses. so may be t he mut ual l y dest r uct i ve ef f ect s of a " t ot al " i nf or mat i on war ex c hange on t he publ i cs ex pos ed and subsequent r at i onal communi cat i on bet ween t he si des . do not bat t l e . And ev en i f we mer el y " sei ze" hi s c ommuni c at i on s y s t em el ect r oni cal l y and subst i t ut e our " r eal i t y" i nt o hi s soci et y. " wi t hout advant age. As Sun. or even t er r or i st hacker s t o do massi ve damage t o t he Uni t ed St at es.CYBERW AR. however . do we negot i at e t he end of t he conf l i ct ? What conf i dence do we have t hat a cal l t o sur r ender . I n s ome exer ci ses dur i ng t he col d war " decapi t at i on" of t he Sovi et mi l i t ar y l eader shi p i n a hypot het i cal nucl ear exchange was i nt ended t o def end t he Uni t ed St at es by pr event i ng an escal at or y or expl oi t at i ve st r i ke. or post conf l i ct r econst r uct i on wi t h a popul at i on or l eader shi p whos e " obj ect i ve r easoni ng" has been compr omi sed? J us t as t he mut ual l y dest r uct i ve ef f ect s of nucl ear war wer e di spr opor t i onat e t o t he goal s of al most any i magi nabl e conf l i ct .AR. nonst at e act or s.

t hen. howev er . and i nf or mat i on war . Rwanda . 24 Many of t he s ame t echnol ogi es and syst ems c an be us ed t o devel op a nat i onal . I t i s usel ess t o pr et end t hat t he pr ol i f er at i on of t hese t echnol ogi es wi l l not pr ovi de capabi l i t i es t hat c an do ser i ous har m.l evel capabi l i t y f or st r at egi c " net war . Per haps st r at egi c. t her e ar e genui ne doubt s . t hat t he pr esi dent and t he Congr ess gi ve ser i ous and sust ai ned at t ent i on t o cyber war .war r i or s woul d cl ai m t he abi l i t y t o " r eor i ent " t he f or mer Sovi et Uni on i nt o a l i ber al soci et y. under t he r ubr i c of c ommand and cont r ol war f ar e. net war . " Her e.BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE mus t devel op a coher ent nat i onal . i n t he sur e and cer t ai n knowl edge t hat t he t echnol ogi es have al r eady " pr ol i f er at ed" t o bot h st at e and nonst at e pot ent i al r i val s.based c ommand and cont r ol war f ar e capabi l i t i es wi l l not be devel oped. t he t echnol ogi es and syst ems t hat wi l l pr ovi de t he capabi l i t y f or " cyber war . i ndeed. or t o i nf l uence t he f ar mor e anci ent bar bar i sm i n t hat hear t of dar kness.l evel pol i cy on t he mi l i t ar y and st r at egi c use of new i nf or mat i on war f ar e t echnol ogi es . To f aci l i t at e t hi s obj ect i ve. t he US ar med f or ces ar e devel opi ng. i t may not be possi bl e t o cont r ol and expl oi t i nf or mat i on and i nf or mat i on t echnol ogi es t o i mpos e " a f or m on t he r emnant s of soci et i es no l onger capabl e of sel f or gani zat i on" because t hei r subst ant i ve uni ver se of meani ng has been dest r oyed or cor r upt ed . i t s empl oyment . t he f ol l y of mut ual l y assur ed dest r uct i on . 25 Few i nf o. I t i s essent i al . As Voegel i n f ear ed. But i f t he Uni t ed St at es i s t o devel op t he capaci t y f or i nf or mat i on war . 16 8 . a r eal i st i c nat i onal consensus mus t be bui l t .l evel i nf or mat i on war i s. t hough t her e ar e s ome doubt s . l i ke nucl ear war : t he capabi l i t y i s r equi r ed f or det er r ence . " I t may be possi bl e t o cont r ol and expl oi t i nf or mat i on so as t o pur posel y gener at e st ochast i c chaos. and i t i s usel ess t o pr et end t hat cyber war t echnol ogi es coul d not be t ur ned t o net war appl i cat i ons . I t i s al most uni ver sal l y agr eed t hat t hese capabi l i t i es ar e essent i al on t he c ont empor ar y bat t l ef i el d . I t i s usel ess t o pr et end t hat mi l i t ar y.

1993) . " Cul t ur e War s. W i nn Schwar t au. " A Rogue' s Rout i ng. 10. 14 . Br own & Co . 4 . Command and Cont r ol War f ar e. Hi st or i ans may r ecor d t hat Ecuador ' s post i ng of gov er nment c ommuni ques on t he i nt er net at t he begi nni ng of t he r ecent " war " wi t h Per u may have been t he f i r st " net st r i ke . Ar nol d et .138 . W ar and Ant i war : Sur vi val at t he Dawn of t he 21st Cent ur y ( Bost on : Li t t l e.CYBERWAR . 7 . Rear Admi r al J . ar ( New Yor k : Bar nes 9 . 141. Ral ph D. 53. 8 . 109. J . I bi d. ( New Yor k : Qui l l . " Wi r ed. ( May 1995) . Ar t hur Wal ey. i nf or mat i on. " Necessar y Mor al Bases f or Communi c at i on i n a Democr acy. I nf or mat i on War f ar e: Chaos on t he El ect r oni c Super hi ghway ( New Yor k : Thunder s Mount ai n Pr ess. 2 ( Apr i l . 19 . Sun. al . " Towar d a Fr enc h ' Ec onomi c I nt el l i gence' J an 1994. H. . 1993) . 15 .based war . Paul Wal l i ch. 1994) . DC: US Gov er nment Pr i nt i ng Of f i ce. . " St r at egi c Revi ew.165 . 70 . Md . 20 . 169 . 5. 13 . 68 . . " The St r at egi c I mpl i cat i ons of I nf or mat i on Domi nance. 130. si xt h. J ohn Andr ews. 1967) .208 . 10 . Er i c Voegel i n. ' Def ense Anal ysi s. Er i c Voegel i n. Pet er Bl ack.West Eur ope 25 J anuar y 1994. 1993) . C3I .June. 2 . The Ar t of War . 177 . 6 . 27 . 1939) . Wyl i e.85. 17 .02. The New Sci ence of Pol i t i cs. Sawyer . 1952) . and. The vocabul ar y of i nf or mat i on war f ar e i ncl udes i nf or mat i on war . D.NETWAR Not es 1 . Summer . " Wi r ed. " Compar at i ve St r at egy 12 : no .68 . 8 Mar c h 1993 .Tzu. " Newsweek. 26. 1956) . 11 .30 . Jul y/ August 1993.I NFORMATI ONW AR . t r ans . 2 . el ect r oni c war f ar e. 1988) . " " A Bor der l ess Di sput e. i n Russi an usage. J ohn Ar qui l l a & Davi d Ronf el dt . C. Depar t ment of Def ense Di ct i onar y of Mi l i t ar y and Associ at ed Ter ms ( Washi ngt on. 21 . t r ans . : Naval I nst i t ut e Pr ess. no .50 .gener at i on war f ar e. Sun. 31 . i nf or mat i on oper at i ons. ( Chi cago : The Uni ver si t y of Chi cago Pr ess. i n Feder al Br oadcast I nf or mat i on Ser vi ce .31 . Al vi n & Hei di Tof f l er . H. Thr ee Way s of Thought i n Anci ent Chi na ( New Yor k : Doubl eday. " Sof t Ki l l : f i ght i ng i nf r ast r uct ur e war s i n t he 21st cent ur y. 1994. 1989) . 20 Febr uar y 1995. " Cyber war i s Comi ngl . 1994) . 141 . " Def ense Nat i onal e. 20 . " Pr obl ems of Communi cat i on i n a Pl ur al i st i c Soci et y ( Mi l waukee : Mar quet t e Uni ver si t y Pr ess. Model . 181. August . 49. 18 . Br uc e St er l i ng. 14 . J ean Pi chot . 24. Huang. " Tar get i ng Fi nanci al Sy s t ems as Cent er s of Gr avi t y : ' Low I nt ensi t y' t o ' No I nt ensi t y Conf l i ct . 12 . 16 . Joi nt Pub 1. no .t zw The Ar t of W & Nobl e. 1994. J ohn Ar qui l l a. 350 .Ducl os. Mi l i t ar y St r at egy : A Gener al Theor y of Power Cont r ol ( Annapol i s. " Sci ent i f i c Amer i can 272. c ommand and cont r ol war f ar e. I sl ands i n t he Net ( NewYor k : Ace. May 1995. 3 . 5 . 73. Joi nt Chi ef s of St af f Memor andum of Pol i cy 30.

Er i c Voegel i n. Ar my W ar Col l ege. 1991) . 1994) . Br i g V. 110 . K. Nai r . . Cooper . Rouge : Sun Tzu. Anot her Vi ew of t he Revol ut i on i n Mi l i t ar y Af f ai r s e Bar r acks. 1974) . 23 . 25 . ( Car l i sl 24 . Jef f r ey R.BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE 22 . ' " The Ec umeni c Age. W ar i n t he Gul f Lessons f or t he Thi r d Wor l d ( New Del hi : Lancer I nt er nat i onal . Pa : St r at egi c St udi es I nst i t ut e. 117 . " i n Or der and Hi st or y ( Bat on Loui si ana St at e Uni ver si t y Pr ess.

Thus. I nf or mat i on war f ar e adds a f our t h di mens i on of war f ar e t o t hose of ai r . and sea . but we mus t consi der t he addi t i onal vul ner abi l i t i es t o our syst ems t hat c ome wi t h t hi s added capabi l i t y . USAF I nf or mat i on has al ways been a cr i t i cal f act or i n war . Mc Lendon. . I n t hi s new di mensi on. f or i t s t i me a ver y c ompl ex i nt el l i gence and decept i on oper at i on . use. bot h of f ensi vel y and def ensi vel y. Cl ausewi t z sai d " i mper f ect k nowl edge of t he si t uat i on . can br i ng mi l i t ar y act i on t o a st andst i l l . The comput er age gi ves us t he capabi l i t y t o absor b. I nf or mat i on war f ar e embodi es t he i mpact of i nf or mat i on on mi l i t ar y oper at i ons . eval uat e. I t was i n t hi s conf l i ct t hat t he c omput er c ame of age. The wi des pr ead avai l abi l i t y of i nf or mat i on t echnol ogy di ct at es t hat we car ef ul l y assess t he vul ner abi l i t i es of t he syst ems we empl oy . Chur chi l l us ed i nf or mat i on war f ar e when he us ed t he ar Eni gma mac hi ne t o r ead Ger man codes dur i ng Wor l d W I I . l and. we mus t st ay ahead . " and Sun Tz u i ndi cat ed i nf or mat i on i s i nher ent i n war f i ght i ng . t hat mus t be f aced i n t he f ut ur e . Lessons f r om Deser t St or m gave i mpet us t o t hi s f our t h di mensi on of war f ar e . t he val ue of i nf or mat i on t o t he war f i ght er has been magni f i ed t o a new l evel . . Mul t i pl e sour ces of dat a can be cor r el at ed f ast er t han ever . and exchange l ar ge vol umes of i nf or mat i on at hi gh speeds t o mul t i pl e r eci pi ent s si mul t aneousl y .Chapt er 7 I nf or mat i on War f ar e : I mpact s and Conc er ns Col J ames W . Not onl y do we have oppor t uni t i es t o enhanc e our of f ensi ve capabi l i t i es manyf ol d. . He al so us ed i nf or mat i on war f ar e t hr ough hi s el abor at e net wor k emanat i ng f r om t he London Cont r ol l i ng Sect i on. and pr esent ed us wi t h new chal l enges. t r ansmi t .

BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE

I nf or mat i on War f ar e : Ol d Concept , New Tec hnol ogy
Gi ven t he wi de r eal m of act i vi t i es t hat mi ght be i ncl uded
under t he headi ng of i nf or mat i on war f ar e, one mi ght concl ude
t hat i t i s not a new concept but r at her one t hat c an be mor e
aggr essi vel y empl oy ed t oday wi t h new t echnol ogy . Had t he
t er m i nf or mat i on war f ar e exi st ed i n Chur chi l l ' s day, he mi ght
have us ed i t t o descr i be hi s act i vi t i es i nvol vi ng Ul t r a . Gi ven t he
avai l abi l i t y of c ommuni c at i ons and c omput er t echnol ogy
t oday, t he pot ent i al f or i nf or mat i on war f ar e s eems l i mi t l ess .
Unl i ke nucl ear weaponr y, however , t hi s t echnol ogy i s not
l i mi t ed t o a f ew nat i ons . I t i s wi despr ead and avai l abl e t o any
count r y, and, i n mos t cases, t o any i ndi vi dual or gr oup t hat
want s i t . I t i s f or t hi s r eason t hat our pur sui t of an of f ensi ve
i nf or mat i on war f ar e capabi l i t y mus t not ov er s hadow our
appr eci at i on of t he need f or a def ensi ve capabi l i t y .
Thi s essay of f er s evi dence of t he need f or a r i gor ous def ensi ve
i nf or mat i on war f ar e capabi l i t y . I t i ncl udes a case st udy f r om
Wor l d . War I I t hat demonst r at es Chur chi l l ' s cr eat i vi t y i n usi ng
i nf or mat i on war f ar e agai nst t he Ger mans and pr oposes t hat
hi st or y may not have compl et el y doc ument ed hi s act i vi t i es i n
t hi s endeavor . Fr omWor l d W
ar I I , we mov e t o t he Per si an Gul f
War , wher e i nf or mat i on t echnol ogy was embedded i n vi r t ual l y
ever y aspect of Coal i t i on oper at i ons . Our dependenc e on
i nf or mat i on medi a dur i ng t he Gul f W
ar i s evi dent . Thi s
dependency may al so equat e t o yet unk nown vul ner abi l i t i es,
t hus hi ghl i ght i ng t he need f or t he pr ot ect i on of t hese medi a .
I nf or mat i on has al ways been a cr i t i cal f act or i n war . Accor di ng
t o Cl ausewi t z, " i mper f ect knowl edge of t he si t uat i on . . . c an br i ng
mi l i t ar y act i on t o a st andst i l l . " ' Pi ck up any book on war , and
t he val ue of i nf or mat i on bec omes cl ear . As i ndi cat ed by Sun Tz u
i n 500 B. C. , i t i s i nher ent i n war f i ght i ng. 2 I t may be obvi ous t hat
t he mor e an ar my k nows about i t sel f and i t s enemy, t he st r onger
i t wi l l be i n bat t l e . What i s not so obvi ous ar e t he uses t hat may
be made of i nf or mat i on, and howknowl edge can be mani pul at ed
t o r ei nf or ce t he st r engt h of an ar my many t i mes over .
I nf or mat i on war f ar e embodi es t he i mpact of i nf or mat i on, or
knowl edge, on mi l i t ar y oper at i ons . I t i s def i ned as " any act i on t o
deny, expl oi t , cor r upt , or dest r oy t he enemy' s i nf or mat i on and
i t s f unct i ons ; pr ot ect i ng our sel ves agai nst t hose act i ons ; and

17 2

I NFORMATI ON W
ARFARE

expl oi t i ng our own i nf or mat i on oper at i ons . " 3 Addi t i onal l y i n
t hi s cont ext , i nf or mat i on war f ar e " vi ews i t sel f as bot h separ at e
r eal m and l ucr at i ve t ar get . " 4 Whi l e t hi s def i ni t i on i s new, t he
concept i sn' t . I t i s onl y as we c ome t o t er ms wi t h t he benef i t s
of t he c omput er age t hat we r eal i ze t he pot ent i al i n conduct i ng
t he oper at i ons descr i bed above .
The comput er age gi ves us t he capabi l i t y t o absor b, eval uat e,
use, t r ansmi t , and exchange l ar ge vol umes of i nf or mat i on at
hi gh speeds t o mul t i pl e r eci pi ent s si mul t aneousl y . Mul t i pl e
sour ces of dat a can be cor r el at ed f ast er t han ever . Unt i l r ecent l y,
mas s es of i nf or mat i on wer e t r ansmi t t ed i n t he l i t er al , or
al phanumer i c f or mat , and had t o be r ead and manual l y
mani pul at ed t o be of any use . Thi s made i t di f f i cul t t o sor t t he
cr i t i cal f r om t he usef ul , and muc h of t he i nf or mat i on went i nt o
t he bur n bag . Today, muc h of t hat s ame i nf or mat i on i s
t r ansmi t t ed t o t he war f i ght er di gi t al l y and pr esent ed gr aphi cal l y .
Li t t l e goes t o wast e . Thus, t he val ue of i nf or mat i on, i t s uses, and
our dependence on i t have been magni f i ed t o a new l evel .
Duane Andr ews, f or mer assi st ant secr et ar y of def ense f or
C3I ( c ommand, cont r ol , communi cat i ons, and i nt el l i gence) ,
descr i bes i nf or mat i on t oday as a " st r at egi c asset . " 5 The
Tof f l er s go even f ur t her . I n t hei r di scussi on on t hi r d wav e war ,
t hey r ef er t o " k nowl edge war r i or s, " descr i bi ng t hem as
" i nt el l ect ual s i n and out of uni f or m dedi cat ed t o t he i dea t hat
knowl edge can wi n, or pr event , war s . " 6
Maj Gen Kennet h Mi ni han, Ai r For ce assi st ant chi ef of st af f f or
i nt el l i gence, descr i bes i nf or mat i on war f ar e i n mor e obj ect i ve
t er ms, whi c h he says i s r eal l y " i nf or mat i on domi nanc e . " 7 I n
descr i bi ng i nf or mat i on domi nance, he put s i t t hi s way :
I nf or mat i on domi nanc e i s not " my pi l e of i nf or mat i on i s bi gger
t han your s" i n s ome sor t of l i near sense . I t i s not j ust a way t o
r educe t he f og of war on our si de or t hi cken i t on t he enemy' s
si de . I t i s not anal ysi s of yest er day' s event s, al t hough pr oper
appl i cat i on of hi st or i cal anal ysi s i s i mpor t ant t o gai ni ng
i nf or mat i on domi nanc e . I t i s somet hi ng t hat i s bat t l ed f or , l i ke ai r
super i or i t y. I t i s a way of i ncr easi ng our capabi l i t i es by usi ng t hat
i nf or mat i on t o mak e r i ght deci si ons, ( and) appl y t hemf ast er t han
t he enemy c an . I t i s a way t o al t er t he enemy' s ent i r e per cept i on
of r eal i t y . I t i s a met hod of usi ng al l i nf or mat i on at our di sposal t o
pr edi ct ( and af f ect ) what happens t omor r ow bef or e t he enemy
even j umps out of bed and t hi nks about what t o do t oday . " 8

173

BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE

The Nav y pr esent s t he bot t om l i ne vi ew: " I nf or mat i on, i n al l i t s
f or ms, i s t he keyst one t o success . " 9
The Depar t ment of Def ense and al l of t he ser vi ces ar e doi ng
mor e t han payi ng l i p ser vi ce t o t hi s new di mens i on . I n
addi t i on t o t hei r at t empt s t o f und ext ended pr ogr ams i n t hi s
subj ect , seni or mi l i t ar y l eader s ar e t aki ng st r ong posi t i ons i n
f avor of t hi s capabi l i t y . Unf or t unat el y, whi l e t he Uni t ed St at es
hol ds t he l ead i n i nf or mat i on t echnol ogy t oday, ot her nat i ons,
i ncl udi ng devel opi ng nat i ons, ar e r api dl y gai ni ng access t o t hi s
capabi l i t y . Thi s i s cause f or concer n, and t he answer s ar e not
si mpl e .

I nf or mat i on War f ar e i n Wor l d W
ar H:
How Far Di d Chur chi l l Go?
Wor l d War I I s aw many f i r st s . Some of t he mor e si gni f i cant
ex ampl es wer e : l ar ge- scal e ai r - t o- ai r c ombat , st r at egi c
bombi ng- bot h dayl i ght and ni ght t he use of naval car r i er s
t o pr oj ect ai r power , and t he f i r st and onl y uses of at omi c
bombs dur i ng host i l i t i es . The f ol l owi ng case st udy asser t s t hat
we al so s aw t he f i r st wi despr ead and wel l - or chest r at ed use of
i nf or mat i on war f ar e, and pr esent s a hypot het i cal model f or
i nt er act i on bet ween decept i on and cr ypt anal ysi s .
Many of us r emai n i nt r i gued by t he cl andest i ne and cover t
W
I I . Thi s s t udy
oper at i ons c onduc t ed by t he Al l i es i n W
di s c us s es t wo of t hos e oper at i ons : dec ept i on and
cr ypt anal ysi s bas ed on r adi o i nt er cept s . I t al so, and mor e
i mpor t ant l y, at t empt s t o bui l d a model f or an i nt er act i ve
r el at i onshi p bet ween t he t wo t hat coul d have syner gi st i cal l y
i mpr ov ed t he cont r i but i ons of t hese oper at i ons t o t he
successf ul pr osecut i on of t he war . The model , t hough pur el y
hypot het i cal , uses f act s t o pr esent a case f or t he pot ent i al of
maxi mi zi ng mi si nf or mat i on t hr ough t he i nt egr at i on of t hese
t wo di sci pl i nes . Sai d anot her way, t hi s paper suggest s t hat
t he Al l i ed l eader shi p, speci f i cal l y Wi ns t on Chur chi l l , f ound
cr ypt anal ysi s nec es s ar y but not suf f i ci ent f or vi ct or y .
Cr ypt anal ysi s and dec ept i on wer e bot h nec es s ar y and

174

I NFORMATI ON W
ARFARE

suf f i ci ent . Hence, t he l ogi c of t he model suggest s t hat
Chur chi l l di r ect ed an of f ensi ve i nf or mat i on war f ar e c ampai gn .
The Logi c of t he Model
The quest i on posed i s whet her Pr i me Mi ni st er Chur chi l l
woul d, or coul d, have sel ect i vel y chosen t o c hanc e usi ng t he
Eni gma ( t he mac hi ne us ed by t he Ger mans t o enci pher
hi gh- gr ade wi r el ess t r ai f i ci ° ) t o enci pher not i onal mes s ages
and i nt r ude on Ger man wi r el ess r adi o net s t o mi si nf or m t he
Ger mans on Al l i ed i nt ent i ons or ot her wi se di sr upt Ger man
mi l i t ar y oper at i ons .
Chur chi l l ' s concer n f or t he secur i t y of t he Eni gma, and t he
k nowl edge t hat i t was bei ng us ed by t he Al l i es, was
consi der abl e, as wi l l be s hown l at er . The r i sk of compr omi si ng
Al l i ed use of t he Eni gma was col ossal , af f ect i ng many l i ves and
t he pot ent i al out c ome of many bat t l es . On t he ot her hand,
successf ul decept i on coul d be equal l y ef f ect i ve .
For Chur chi l l t o have t aken t hi s st ep woul d hav e been
bol dness f r om " sheer necessi t y" i n t he st r i ct est Cl ausewi t i an
t er ms . 11 The r i sk i n not doi ng so woul d have t o have been
gr eat er t han t he r i sk i n doi ng so . The l ogi c of t he model i s t hat
i f Chur chi l l di r ect ed t hat messages encr ypt ed usi ng Eni gma be
t r ansmi t t ed, he woul d onl y have done so out of necessi t ywhen Br i t ai n was i n di r e st r ai t s.
" Decept i on i s as ol d as war i t sel f . " 12 Al t hough t hi s st at ement
i s f r om WWI I , i t was cl ear l y not a r evel at i on of f act . Sun Tz u
i ncl uded decept i on as one of hi s t enet s of war f ar e when he
sai d, " Al l war f ar e i s bas ed on decept i on . " 13 The moder n
compl exi t i es of war and t he ens ui ng t echnol ogi cal
advancement s enhance t he means t hr ough whi c h decept i on
c an be empl oyed, and WWI I was no except i on . The use of
decept i on dur i ng WWI I has been wi del y publ i ci zed . At l east
one book, The Man W
ho Never Was, was publ i shed and a
movi e by t he s ame t i t l e was made about a si ngl e event . 14
Decept i on
and t act i cal
st r at egi c i n
decept i on at
vi sual , aur al

and i t s i mpl ement at i on occur i n bot h t he st r at egi c
spher es . The exampl e doc ument ed above was
i t s suppor t of t he Nor mandy i nvasi on . Tact i cal
t hat t i me was t hought t o f al l under t hr ee headi ngs,
( or soni c) , and r adi o . 15 Whi l e aur al decept i on mi ght

17 5

BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE

appl y i n l i mi t ed f ashi on t o speci f i c engagement s, i t i s l ogi cal
t hat vi sual and r adi o decept i on coul d be us ed f or br oader
obj ect i ves at bot h t he st r at egi c and oper at i onal l evel s .
I t i s not sur pr i si ng t hat mos t i nf or mat i on concer ni ng
decept i on act i vi t i es r emai ned cl assi f i ed f or many year s af t er
t he war and i s onl y now comi ng t o t he at t ent i on of t he publ i c .
I t appear s t hat most , i f not al l , of t he i nf or mat i on concer ni ng
t act i cal decept i on has been decl assi f i ed . Thi s i s not t he case
wi t h anot her st r at agem used agai nst t he Ger mans , t hat of
i nt er cept i ng r adi o c ommuni c at i ons and usi ng t he Eni gma
mac hi ne t o deci pher t he mes s age t r ansmi ssi ons . Whi l e
pr evi ousl y cl assi f i ed doc ument s concer ni ng Ul t r a ar e now
l ar gel y avai l abl e t o t he publ i c, a r evi ew of t he pr i mar y sour ces
r eveal s t hat many st i l l cont ai n bl ank pages t hat ar e mar k ed
" not r el easabl e" whi l e ot her s cont ai n por t i ons t hat have been
bl anked out wi t h no expl anat i on . Thus, even t hough we k now
muc h mor e t oday t han we di d 15 year s ago about t hese
act i vi t i es, publ i c access r emai ns unavai l abl e f or muc h of i t .
Thes e cont i nui ng r est r i ct i ons may wel l be t he r esul t of
c omment s made on 15 Apr i l 1943 by Col Al f r ed Mc Cor mac k i n a
memor andum t o Col Car t er W
. Cl ar ke . Mc Cor mac k , t hen " Mr
McCor mack, " had ear l i er been appoi nt ed as speci al assi st ant t o
t he secr et ar y of war t o st udy t he uses of Ul t r a and est abl i sh
pr ocedur es f or mak i ng t he best use of t hi s sour ce . At t he t i me of
t he memor andum, Mc Cor mac k was deput y chi ef of t he Speci al
Br anch and wor ked f or i t s chi ef , Col onel Cl ar ke . The pur pose of
t he Speci al Br anc h was t o handl e si gnal s i nt el l i gence .
McCor mack' s memor andum consi st s of 54 pages on t he or i gi n,
f unct i ons, and pr obl ems of t he Speci al Br anch, Mi l i t ar y
I nt el l i gence Ser vi ce ( MI S) . I n t hi s memor andum, Mc Cor mac k
descr i bes, i n hi s vi ew, Ul t r a secur i t y r equi r ement s as f ol l ows :
One l apse of secur i t y i s al l t hat i s nec es s ar y t o dr y up a r adi o
i nt er cept sour ce. Ther ef or e, bot h on t he of f i cer l evel and bel ow, onl y
per s ons of t he gr eat est good s ens e and di scr et i on s houl d be
empl oy ed on t hi s wor k . Thi s consi der at i on i s basi c si nce i nt er cept
i nf or mat i on i nvol ves a di f f er ent ki nd of secr ecy t han does mos t ot her
cl assi f i ed i nf or mat i on. I t wi l l mak e no di f f er ence a year f r om now
howmuc h t he enemy k nows about our pr esent t r oop di sposi t i ons,
about t he wher eabout s of our naval f or ces or about ot her si mi l ar
f act s t hat nowar e cl ear l y guar ded secr et s . But i t wi l l mak e a l ot of
di f f er ence one y ear f r om now- and possi bl y many year s f r om

176

The Or i gi n of Ul t r a Ul t r a' s or i gi n begi ns wi t h t he del i ver y of a Ger man Eni gma mac hi ne t o t he Br i t i sh by Pol i sh di ssi dent s . t hey t ook t he l ead and used i t successf ul l y t hr oughout t he war .I NFORMATI ON W ARFARE now. 21 Hi s i nt er est i n c odebr eak i ng i s doc ument ed as ear l y as Nov ember 1924 when. i ncl udi ng cont r ol s est abl i shed t o pr ot ect t he i nf or mat i on and i t s sour ce wer e l ai d out i n a l et t er t o Gener al Ei senhower f r om Gener al Mar shal l on 15 Mar c h 1944 . i s Thi s secr ecy was mai nt ai ned t hr oughout t he war . not mer el y secr ecy unt i l t he bat t l e i s over . he st at ed. Onl y car ef ul l y sel ect ed i ndi vi dual s i n Was hi ngt on and i n t he f i el d had access t o t he i nf or mat i on pr oduc ed t hr ough t hese i nt er cept s . 22 I n hi s r equest . . The pr ocedur es f or use by f i el d c ommander s and t hei r per sonnel . but per manent secr ecy of t hi s oper at i on i s what we shoul d st r i ve f or . Ent er Wi ns t on Chur chi l l Wi nst on Chur chi l l had a pr of ound i nt er est i n t he Ul t r a t r af f i c pr oduced f r om Eni gma and r equi r ed t hat al l i mpor t ant decr ypt s be pr ov i ded t o hi m. The hi st or y and acqui si t i on of t he Eni gma mac hi ne ar e qui t e l engt hy and c ompl ex . havi ng begun t hei r ef f or t s i n t he ear l y 1920s . " 23 17 7 . I at t ach mor e i mpor t ance t o t hem as a means of f or mi ng a t r ue j udgment of publ i c pol i cy i n t hese spher es t han t o any ot her sour ce of knowl edge at t he di sposal of t he St at e .whet her t he enemy has l ear ned t hat i n Apr i l 1942 we wer e r eadi ng hi s most secr et codes . successf ul r eadi ng of Eni gma t r af f i c was pur el y a Pol i sh achi evement . Not pr esent secr ecy. he r equest ed access t o i nt er cept s . 18 Us i ng t hei r own copy of t he Eni gma. as t he chancel l or of t he exchequer . 19 Bet ween 1933 and 1939. 17 Thes e pr ocedur es l ast ed at l east t hr ough t he end of t he war . . " I have st udi ed t hi s i nf or mat i on over a l ong per i od and mor e at t ent i vel y t han pr obabl y any ot her Mi ni st er has done . t hey achi eved t hei r f i r st successf ul br eak i n r eadi ng Eni gma ci pher s i n Dec ember 1932 and J anuar y 1933 . 2° Onc e t he Eni gma f el l i nt o Br i t i sh hands. however . I t i s suf f i ci ent her e t o r ef l ect t hat t he Pol es had est abl i shed a successf ul cr ypt anal yt i c ef f or t agai nst t he Ger mans by t he ear l y 1930s.

I n one of t hose i nst ances. t he headquar t er s f or t he Br i t i sh cr ypt anal yt i c or gani zat i on. 290 guns . Real i zi ng he was out number ed and about t o be over r un. The I t al i ans per cei ved a f or ce on t hei r r i ght f l ank muc h l ar ger t han t hei r s and t r i ed t o r un . Usi ng onl y t wo di vi si ons. i n f act .boat at t ack r at her t han r i sk compr omi si ng Ul t r a secur i t y . t he Br i t i sh capt ur ed 130. t he Br i t i sh c ommander used i nf l at abl e r ubber t anks.24 W he backed of f t o r ecei vi ng sever al dozen mes s ages a day . he di r ect ed he be pr ovi ded " dai l y al l Eni gma hen t hi s t r af f i c bec ame over whel mi ng i n vol ume. 400 t anks. r epeat edl y al l owed naval convoys t o c ome under U. He est abl i shed t he London Cont r ol l i ng Sect i on ( LCS) i n hi s headquar t er s speci f i cal l y t o pl an t hose st r at agems necessar y " t o decei ve Hi t l er and t he Ger man Gener al St af f about Al l i ed oper at i ons i n t he war agai nst t he Thi r d Rei ch . 1. t wo. " 28 Chur chi l l ' s concer n f or secur i t y of Ul t r a was par amount . " 31 Not onl y di d Chur chi l l est abl i sh t he LCS but he al so per sonal l y concei ved t he i dea f or t hi s or gani zat i on af t er a ser i es of successf ul uses of decept i on i n t he Li byan deser t l ed t o t he def eat of I t al i an f or ces . Chur chi l l r ei t er at ed hi s f ai t h i n Ul t r a. He di r ect ed t hat no act i on be t aken i n r esponse t o Ul t r a i nt er cept s unl ess cover coul d be pr ovi ded. 3o Chur chi l l was al so di r ect l y i nvol ved i n t he conduct of decept i on oper at i ons . 000 usi ng decept i ve measur es . 400 wounded.t on t r ucks.pr ecl udi ng t hem f r om sor t i ng out t he act ual or der of bat t l e on t he gr ound .BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE Then i n Sept ember 1940. and 55 mi ssi ng i n act i on . and pr i me mover s t o pr esent t he i mage of a l ar ger f or ce . Thei r l osses wer e mi ni mal f or t he magni t ude of t he conf l i ct 500 ki l l ed i n act i on. f i el d guns. He empl oyed cr owds of Ar abs wi t h camel s and hor ses t o dr ag har r ow. he spoke t o a cr owd of t he st at i on manager s and r ef er r ed t o t hemas " t he geese t hat l ai d t he gol den eggs and never cackl ed . . and 1. and ot her s si mi l ar t o 178 . 32 Thi s i mpr essi ve event r ocked London and gave cr edence t o f ur t her devel opment of t hi s capabi l i t y . 000 men def eat ed an I t al i an f or ce of 310. af t er onl y f our mont hs as t he pr i me mi ni st er . 000 pr i soner s. messages . Thi s act i on. descr i bi ng i t as hi s " secr et weapon" 27 and st at i ng hi s bel i ef t hat " i t had saved Engl and . a smal l Br i t i sh f or ce of 36. 29 and he. and he used ant i ai r cr af t ar t i l l er y t o keep t he I t al i an r econnai ssance ai r cr af t hi gh.l i ke equi pment t o st i r up dust st or ms. " 26 Af t er t he war . 25 Dur i ng a vi si t t o Bl et chl ey Par k.

al ways i nt r i cat e oper at i ons of cover t war f ar e desi gned t o cl oak over t mi l i t ar y oper at i ons i n secr ecy and t o myst i f y Hi t l er about t he r eal i nt ent i ons of t he al l i es . By J une 1944. convi nced Chur chi l l t hat decept i on needed an i nst i t ut i on so i t coul d be appl i ed on a br oader scal e . The i nvasi on was t o begi n wi t h an ai r c ampai gn .I NFORMATI ON WARFARE i t . Ral ph Bennet t descr i bes Ul t r a' s cont r i but i on succi nct l y i n hi s pr ef ace t o Ul t r a i n t he West For by of t en r eveal i ng t he enemy' s pl ans t o t hem bef or e t hey deci ded t hei r own. 33 I t was " member s of t he LCS and t hose of ot her Br i t i sh and Amer i c an secr et bur eaus" 34 who devel oped and execut ed LCS act i vi t i es.al l bei ng r ead at Bl et chl ey Par k .hundr ed per day. r eachi ng a poi nt of t wo. and act i on based upon i t coul d be t aken wi t h t he gr eat est conf i dence . and avai l abl e f ast er . mor e vol umi nous. mor e t r ust wor t hy. and f r om mor e 17 9 . Ul t r a i nt er cept s pr ovi ded t he bul k of i nt el l i gence t o t he Al l i es dur i ng t he war . On 13 August . 90 per cent of t he Eur opean i nt el l i gence s ummar i es pr ovi ded t o Was hi ngt on wer e based on Ul t r a i nf or mat i on . So pr ol i f i c was t he sour ce t hat at many poi nt s t he Ul t r a account of t he c ampai gn i s al most i ndi st i ngui shabl e f r om t he " t ot al " account . t her e coul d be no doubt about i t s aut hent i ci t y. 39 Ul t r a i nf or mat i on al so has been descr i bed as " mor e pr eci se.Jul y 1940 when i t pr ovi ded f or ewar ni ng of Ger man pl ans t o at t ack Engl and . 37 Cl ear l y. LCS was bor n .I t s Cont r i but i on Ul t r a pr oved i t s val ue as ear l y as mi d. when t he f i r st ai r r ai ds began.t o t hr ee. The LCS was t he f i r st bur eaucr acy desi gned expr essl y t o decei ve . 38 Ul t r a pr ovi ded i nf or mat i on on f or ce di sposi t i on and Ger man i nt ent i ons at bot h t he st r at egi c and t act i cal l evel s . l onger l ast i ng. Ul t r a gav e t he Al l i ed Commander an unpr ecedent ed advant age i n bat t l e : si nce Ul t r a was der i ved f r om decodes of t he Wehr mac ht ' s wi r el ess communi cat i ons. " speci al means " i s " a vaguel y si ni st er t er m t hat i ncl uded a wi de var i et y of sur r ept i t i ous. mor e cont i nuous. r ef er r i ng t o t hei r weapons as " speci al means . Thes e i nt er cept s cont i nued. I nt er cept s at t hat t i me r eveal ed Hi t l er ' s di r ect i ve out l i ni ng t he pl anned i nvasi on of Engl and . at a hi gher l evel . t he Br i t i sh wer e mor e i nf or med of t he pl ans t han wer e many of t he Luf t waf f e uni t s . somet i mes mur der ous. Thus. " 35 I n t hi s cont ext . " 3s Bac k t o Ul t r a.

Awar e t hat Ger man r adi o i nt er cept uni t s wer e t ar get i ng t hei r t r ansmi ssi ons. I t i s t her ef or e vi t al l y i mpor t ant t hat your secur i t y i s per f ect . The f ol l owi ng st at ement was among t he many i nst r uct i ons concer ni ng secur i t y pr ovi ded t o t hem: You mus t r eal i ze t hat t he enemy i s pr obabl y l i st eni ng t o ever y mes s age y ou pass on t he ai r and i s wel l awar e t hat t her e i s a possi bi l i t y t hat he i s bei ng bl uf f ed . 180 . cr eat i ng dead t i me and peak t r af f i c l evel s . t hey r egul at ed t he genui ne t r af f i c pas s ed on aut hent i c oper at i onal net s. a not i onal . use of cont r ol l ed camouf l age ( bot h t o conceal and i nt ent i onal l y s how i ndi scr et i ons) . one car el ess mi st ake may di scl ose t he whol e pl an . t he Al l i es est abl i shed an el abor at e communi cat i ons net wor k desi gned expr essl y t o t r ansmi t bogus t r af f i c t hat woul d mi si nf or m t he Ger mans of t hei r i nt ent i ons and oper at i ons . dummy equi pment . For exampl e. " They decei ved enemy ai r r econnai ssance t hr ough t he maneuv er of r eal t r oops. f i ct i ve or gani zat i on headed by Gen Geor ge S. Pat t on. t hey us ed a t hr ee. 41 Taki ng advant age of t hi s l at t er k nowl edge. What woul d have pr event ed i ncl udi ng encr ypt ed Eni gma messages di r ect l y t o t he Ger mans i n t hi s bogus t r af f i c? Radi o Dec ept i on The Br i t i sh and Amer i cans us ed mani pul at i on t hr ough cover and decept i on t o t ar get speci f i c sour ces of enemy i nf or mat i on . t hey sent not i onal r adi o t r af f i c over aut hent i c oper at i onal net s . Fi nal l y. t hey pr epar ed not i onal r adi o __t r af f i c t o be_ t r ansmi t t ed by s Q eci al decept i on t r oops over net s est abl i shed sol el y f or t he pur pose of decept i on .pr onged st r at egy agai nst t he Ger man l i st eni ng st at i ons . 42 Si gnal t r oops empl oyed i n decept i on act i vi t i es wer e speci al l y t r ai ned i n t hese oper at i ons 43 and t hor oughl y i ndoct r i nat ed on t he sensi t i vi t i es t hat accompani ed t hei r ef f or t s . 44 One of t he mos t el abor at e s c hemes empl oyi ng r adi o decept i on was us ed i n suppor t of t he Fi r st US Ar my Gr oup ( FUSAG) . Fi r st . " 4° I t ev en pr ovi ded i nf or mat i on on Ger man i nt er cept s and anal ysi s of Br i t i sh and Amer i can r adi o net wor ks . and " Q" l i ght i ng ( t he posi t i oni ng of l i ght s t o dr aw bomber s t o nonexi st i ng ai r f i el ds) .BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE c ommands t han any ot her f or m of i nt el l i gence . Second. t hey r el eased f al se i nf or mat i on t o t he wor l d pr ess and st aged act i vi t i es t hat " made t he news .

al l owi ng t hem t o r econst r uct necessar y el ement s of t he Ger man r adi o c ommuni c at i ons net wor k . si x US i nf ant r y di vi si ons.of f t o t he r ecei ver f or t hese l at t er set t i ngs was cont ai ned i n t he t r ansmi ssi on . a Canadi an i nf ant r y di vi si on. doubl e enci pher ment .of f s t o t he pl anned Ger man i nvasi on of Br i t ai n wel l i n advance .ev en ar r ogant . associ at ed or gani zat i ons. and t hei r uns hak abl e.conf i dence i n Eni gma" 5U made i t unl i kel y t hey woul d us e aut hent i cat i on devi ces i n t hei r mes s ages . . The Ger mans t hen cl ear l y wer e vul ner abl e t o decept i on ef f or t s usi ng encr ypt ed Eni gma mes s ages br oadcast by t he net s ser vi ng t he London Cont r ol l i ng Sect i on . 49 The speed wi t h whi c h t hese messages wer e deci pher ed coul d hav e pr ovi ded t he essent i al i nf or mat i on r equi r ed by t he Br i t i sh t o use t he mac hi ne t o ot her advant ages . t he pur pose i n est abl i shi ng a nonexi st ent FUSAG was t o per suade t he Ger mans t hat t he at t ack woul d t ake pl ace at Pas de Cal ai s . The Eni gma used wheel s t hat had t o be set i n t he pr oper or der f or t he decr ypt i on t o t ake pl ace . a Canadi an cor ps. a US ar my. The speed wi t h whi c h Bl et chl ey Par k was r eadi ng t he Ger man Eni gma per mi t t ed t he Br i t i sh cr ypt anal yst s t o ext r act i nt el l i gence f r om sever al hundr ed messages a day. 48 The Cas e Eni gma t r af f i c pr ovi ded t he t i p. The Ger man us e of " st andar d phr ases. a Canadi an ar mor ed di vi si on. even t hough t he Eni gma set t i ngs wer e compl ex and changed f r equent l y . addr essees. . The t r af f i c woul d have pr ovi ded t hem wi t h i nf or mat i on on mes s age or i gi nat or s. 45 Concei ved as a par t of Bodyguar d. Fr om t he v ol ume of i nt er cept . Ot her mi nor set t i ngs wer e made wi t h each message . Thes e set t i ngs wer e usual l y changed ever y 24 hour s wi t h mi nor set t i ngs changed mor e of t en. t hei r l ack of an ef f ect i ve. i t i s obvi ous t he Br i t i sh k new t hei r t ar get s' or gani zat i ons and f r equenci es . 47 The r adi o net suppor t i ng FUSAG r epr esent ed t he f ol l owi ng uni t s : a Canadi an ar my. pr ot ect i ve moni t or i ng pr ogr am. The t i p. Woul d Chur chi l l have t aken t he r i sks associ at ed wi t h expl oi t i ng t hi s vul ner abi l i t y? . t hr ee US cor ps. Awar e t hat t he Ger mans ant i ci pat ed an Al l i ed at t ack. and f or mat s. and f our US ar mor ed di vi si ons . 46 t he FUSAG was c ompos ed of mor e t han f i f t y " di vi si ons" l ocat ed i n sout heast Engl and .I NFORMATI ON WARFARE Jr .

and t he onl y t ar get r ef er ences avai l abl e t hr ough Ul t r a wer e code names r epr esent i ng t ar get l ocat i ons . I n pr epar i ng f or t he i nvasi on. Oper at i on Bodyguar d had al r eady been i mpl ement ed . Ul t r a r eveal ed Covent r y as a t ar get and at l east one Br i t i sh of f i ci al bel i eved nami ng t he t own i nst ead of us i ng a c ode wor d was a mi s t ak e on t he par t of t he Ger mans . begi nni ng i n mi d. Had somet hi ng t i pped t he Ger mans t hei r mai l was bei ng r ead? On 14 November . 52 hi s as s es s ment as t o t he pot ent i al f or success coul d hav e l ed t o t hi s r i sky deci si on . par t i cul ar l y. Sc hemes coul d hav e been devi sed usi ng not i onal t r af f i c sent over t he 18 2 . t he t ar get s t hat wer e t o be hi t . 53 The use of code wor ds sur el y made Chur chi l l ner vous. i f not al l . Per haps r el yi ng on t he conf usi on and di sor der he k new exi st ed among s ome of t he Luf t waf f e uni t s.Sept ember . The i nf r ast r uct ur e f or r adi o decept i on was i n pl ace and i n use . ambul ance. Fr om 13 Augus t unt i l mi d. The bat t l e began wi t h each si de r oughl y equi val ent i n f r ont .Sept ember and l ast i ng t hr oughout Oct ober . I nt er est i ngl y. and pol i ce uni t s . but i t was t ouch and go unt i l t he Luf t waf f e l ost i t s abi l i t y t o mount sust ai ned at t acks . usi ng t he Eni gma t o enci pher mes s ages f or t r ansmi ssi on . Thi s i nf r ast r uct ur e woul d al so have made an excel l ent poi nt of or i gi n f or i nt r usi on i nt o Ger man r adi o net s.out ef f or t by Br i t ai n . t he r ai ds wer e f l own at ni ght . The Bat t l e of Br i t ai n. r epr esent ed a cr i t i cal per i od f or t he Br i t i sh . The def eat of Ger many i n t hat bat t l e r equi r ed t he al l . Thi s concer n coul d account f or hi s wi del y r epor t ed deci si on t o t ake no act i on t o evacuat e Covent r y ot her t han t o al er t f i r e. t he Luf t waf f e c onduc t ed r ai ds dur i ng dayl i ght hour s. 51 The danger s f aci ng t he Br i t i sh dur i ng t he massi ve ai r r ai ds mi ght have convi nced Chur chi l l at s ome poi nt t hat i t woul d be wor t h t he r i sk t o use t he Eni gma t o i nt r ude on Ger man r adi o net s . A successf ul i nvasi on woul d br i ng Ger many and t he Thi r d Rei ch t o t hei r downf al l . -' 14 The Nor mandy I nvasi on was t he l ast cr i t i cal j unct ur e f or t he Al l i es . gi vi ng hi mcause t o quest i on i f Br i t i sh use of Eni gma had been c ompr omi s ed .BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE Di r e St r ai t s The Bat t l e of Br i t ai n and t he Nor mandy i nvasi on wer e t wo of t he mos t si gni f i cant event s i n WWI I . 1940. and Ul t r a t r af f i c r eveal ed most .l i ne f i ght er s.

especi al l y i f t her e wer e oppor t uni t i es t o s hape t he post war wor l d . May be t he Al l i es di d not possess enough i nf or mat i on on t he keyi ng cycl es necessar y t o expl oi t t hat avenue of decept i on . I f he di d not . may be t he c aus e was t hat i t was t oo r i sky. Consi der i ng what we now k now about Ul t r a oper at i ons. Revel at i ons i ncl ude t hose al r eady made and t hose yet t o be made .ARFARE I NFORMATI ONW decept i on net s. who wer e i nvol ved i n pr ovi di ng advance war ni ng and ot her i nf or mat i on t o Al l i ed f or ces may never get al l t he cr edi t t hey ar e due . whi c h wer e k nown t o be moni t or ed by t he Ger mans . t o c ompl ement i nt r usi on t r af f i c enci pher ed wi t h Eni gma . Per haps i t was . t he oppor t uni t i es woul d have gr own . Absent f ur t her decl assi f i cat i on. 18 3 . Muc h of t he hi st or y of WWI I may need t o be r ewr i t t en because of t he r evel at i ons of Ul t r a cont r i but i ons . i t woul d have been i nf or mat i on war f ar e at i t s best . Gr eat er oppor t uni t i es woul d have been ent i ci ng t o Chur chi l l .par t i cul ar l y oper at i ons . I f Chur chi l l s aw t he i nvasi on as t he l ast bi g pus h t o def eat Ger many . The per sonnel empl oy ed i n t he r adi o decept i on wer e wel l t r ai ned f or t hei r pur pose and i ndoct r i nat ed i n t he secr ecy of t hei r wor k . Whi l e l ogi c suggest s Chur chi l l woul d hav e expl oi t ed Eni gma. The men and women at Bl et chel y Par k and ot her l ocat i ons. t he f act s may pr ove ot her wi se . or j ust t oo t ough t o do . I t i s nowwel l k nown t hat " Ul t r a di d i ndeed s hape t he char act er of st r at egy and oper at i ons. he may al so hav e vi ewed sel ect i ve use of i nt r usi on as j ust i f i ed and wor t h t he r i sk . I n no ot her war have c ommandi ng gener al s had t he qual i t y and ext ent of i nt el l i gence pr ovi ded by Ul t r a . As t he r i sk di mi ni shed. t he r i sk woul d have gr adual l y di mi ni shed wi t h t i me dur i ng t he cour se of t he f i ght . one c an as s ume t hat cr edi t f or success i n a bat t l e of t en went t o t he wr ong par t y . I f he di d use i t i n t hi s manner . Or may be t he Al l i es j ust mi ssed a good oppor t uni t y . Gi ven t he i ncr easi ng di sr upt i on t hat occur s wi t h t he mul t i pl yi ng i nt ensi t y of bat t l e. Bl et chl ey per sonnel coul d pr epar e t he Eni gma t r af f i c and s end i t t o t he r adi o decept i on uni t s t o be t r ansmi t t ed ver bat i m on speci f i ed f r equenci es . " -9 -9 Whet her Chur chi l l act ual l y used t he Eni gma of f ensi vel y f or t he pur poses hypot hesi zed her e may never be k nown . we cannot k now f or cer t ai n .

r ecent advancement s i n di gi t al t echnol ogy per mi t t ed t he r api d pr ocessi ng. Ar chi t ect ur es enabl i ng connect i vi t y bet ween t hese many syst ems wer e nonexi st ent when I r aq i nvaded Kuwai t . 000 phone cal l s and 152.BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE I mpac t of I nf or mat i on Technol ogy on t he Gul f W ar Al t hough t he use and exchange of i nf or mat i on have been cr i t i cal el ement s of war si nce i t s i ncept i on. Sat el l i t e connect i vi t y per mi t t ed t hi s same ai r act i vi t y t o be di spl ayed l i ve i n t he Pent agon command cent er . t r ucks. and di spl ay of i nf or mat i on at al l echel ons. wi t h no mi dai r col l i si ons and no f r i endl y ai r engagement s . t hey wer e put i n pl ace dur i ng t he bui l dup and suppor t ed Coal i t i on f or ces f or t he dur at i on of t he war . 184 . and l andl i nes handl ed 700. Whi l e i n l ar ge par t t hese t echnol ogi es wer e space. t he Gul f War was t he st age f or t he most compr ehensi ve use of i nf or mat i on. JSTARS t r acked t anks. For exampl e. 240 sor t i es a day.dependent . f i xed i nst al l at i ons. t o dat e . and i nf or mat i on deni al . and ot her equi pment . 000 dur i ng t he war . 000 messages a day . Coal i t i on f or ces avoi ded communi cat i ons i nt er f er ence t hr ough successf ul deconf l i ct i on of mor e t han 35. however . mi cr owave. even t hough t hi s syst em had not met oper at i onal capabi l i t y st at us . mor e t han 90. ear ni ng t hei r pl ace i n hi st or y as cont r i but or s t o t he Coal i t i on success i n t hi s war . These ar chi t ect ur es wer e cl ear l y necessar y t o ef f ect i vel y cont r ol t he myr i ad act i vi t i es oper at i ng si mul t aneousl y i n t he bat t l ef i el d. successf ul l y made t hei r t r i al r un dur i ng t hi s conf l i ct . Any at t empt t o descr i be t he compl exi t i es of managi ng t hi s syst em woul d be an under st at ement . t r ansmi ssi on. Some pr ot ot ype syst ems. 11 Ai r bor ne War ni ng and Cont r ol Syst em ( AWACS) ai r cr af t cont r ol l ed 2. enabl i ng deci si on maker s t o r espond r api dl y t o devel opi ng si t uat i ons on t he bat t l ef i el d. Sat el l i t es. New t echnol ogi es i n t hi s conf l i ct enhanced t he Coal i t i on' s abi l i t y t o exchange and use i nf or mat i on and hi ghl i ght ed t he i mper at i ve of denyi ng t he adver sar y hi s abi l i t y t o communi cat e wi t h hi s f or ces . 000 f r equenci es . such as JSTARS.

t heat er and i nt o and out of t he t heat er of oper at i ons . and convent i onal i nt el l i gence col l ect i on i n suppor t of f or ce packages i n vi r t ual and near . and f i nd t r oops i n di st r ess f ast er t han ever bef or e .sensi t i ve i nf or mat i on coul d be ex c hanged bet ween gr ound. naval . Coal i t i on f or ces had access t o secur e st r at egi c and t act i cal c ommuni c at i ons i n. cal l si gns. navi gat i on.El ect r oni c Oper at i ng I nst r uct i ons ( JCEOI ) . bel ongi ng t o t he Uni t ed St at es. who t hemsel ves do not vent ur e acr oss i t f or f ear of bec omi ng l ost . and ai r uni t s spr ead t hr oughout t he t heat er . Fr ance.r eal . 57 Thes e sat el l i t es br i dged t he gap f or t act i cal UHF and VHF si gnal s t hat her et of or e had been l i mi t ed t o t er r est r i al l i ne of si ght . navi gat e t hr ough t he nak ed I r aqi deser t bet t er t han t he I r aqi s t hemsel ves. Wi t hout t hi s capabi l i t y.I NFORMATI ONW ARFARE The Joi nt Communi cat i ons. Usi ng s ome 60 sat el l i t es. and v ol ume. and t he USSR pr ovi ded t he Coal i t i on wi t h c ommuni c at i ons . Ther e ar e s ome who cr edi t t he capabi l i t i es af f or ded by t he NAVSTAR Gl obal Posi t i oni ng Syst em ( GPS) " as mak i ng t he si ngl e mos t i mpor t ant cont r i but i on t o t he success of t he conf l i ct . Ev en t hough t her e wer e st i l l shor t f al l s at t he t act i cal l evel i n t i mel i ness. i nt el l i gence. Coal i t i on f or ces wer e abl e t o l ocat e and desi gnat e t ar get s wi t h r emar kabl e pr eci si on. Thus t i me. J STARS. pr eci si on. The US Ar my used t he GPS t o navi gat e t he I r aqi deser t i n t he mi ddl e of s and st or ms. whi c h was used t o al l ocat e f r equenci es. 56 Thi s syst emwas used f or bot h space and t er r est r i al communi cat i ons .t i me woul d have been i mpossi bl e . sur vei l l ance. Gul f W ar Spac e Cont r i but i ons Spac e asset s. was publ i shed i n over a dozen copi es and wei ghed 85 t ons i n paper f or m. and suf f i xes f or t he Gul f War . cal l wor ds. t he Uni t ed Ki ngdom. bot h mi l i t ar y and commer ci al . " 58 Usi ng a const el l at i on of 14 sat el l i t es. sur pr i si ng ev en t he I r aqi s. as wel l as of f er i ng l i ve t el evi si on of t he war t o home vi ewer s ar ound t he wor l d f or t he f i r st t i me . 18 5 . and ear l y war ni ng. t he communi cat i ons r equi r ed t o suppor t t he pr epar at i on and di st r i but i on of t ask or der s and t he coor di nat ed oper at i ons of AWACS. c ommander s at al l l evel s had ac c es s t o unpr ecedent ed communi cat i ons capabi l i t i es .

18 6 .t hat of mi ni mi zi ng col l at er al damage . i n l ar ge par t . and i t s at t endant capabi l i t i es. r esul t i ng i n a v ol umi nous amount of unf us ed and uncor r el at ed i nf or mat i on bei ng col l ect ed and di ssemi nat ed . t echni cal l y avai l abl e t o any one . t he bul k of whi c h i nvol ved secondar y i mager y pr oduct i on. and capabi l i t i es. 59 US t r oops st at i oned i n Saudi Ar abi a al so r ecei ved commer ci al l y pur chased GPS devi ces f r om t hei r r el at i ves . and weat her dat a . mov ement . t hey wer e al so essent i al i n meet i ng anot her Coal i t i on obj ect i ve. Pr eci si on t ar get i ng c ombi ned wi t h t he use of pr eci si on gui ded muni t i ons si gni f i cant l y decr eased ci vi l i an casual t i es and l ef t st r uct ur es adj acent t o t ar get s i nt act . The use of GPS was.t he. Gul f War I nt el l i gence The r api d depl oyment of a var i et y of syst ems t o t he Per si an Gul f i n r esponse t o t he cr i si s t her e l ed t o a number of st ovepi ped or gani zat i ons.BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE GPS capabi l i t y made possi bl e t he " l ef t hook" us ed t o def eat Saddam Hussei n' s ar mor ed di vi si ons . 6o Ac c es s t o GPS. t he evi dence s hows t hat t i mel y. To a l ar ge degr ee. el ect r oni c i nt el l i gence.sour ce i nf or mat i on and t he def i ci ency i n compat i bi l i t y of t en pl aced a bur den on r eci pi ent s who had nei t her t he per sonnel nor t he ski l l s necessar y t o put i t al l t oget her i n one pr oduct . t he r esul t of of f . al l . Mor e t han 30 mi l i t ar y and commer ci al sur vei l l ance sat el l i t es wer e us ed f or i nt el l i gence gat her i ng dur i ng t he war . added t r emendousl y t o t he mor al e of Coal i t i on f or ces .shel f pur chases acqui r ed by speci al cont r act ar r angement . t he i mpedi ment was t he r esul t of f i el di ng pr ot ot ype syst ems f or whi c h t her e was l i t t l e t er mi nal capabi l i t y . qual i t y i nt el l i gence was avai l abl e t o t hose uni t s f or t unat e enough t o have access t o t he r i ght t er mi nal syst ems . t hese wer e t he s ame syst ems t hat had been desi gned and mar ket ed f or r ecr eat i onal boat us e. Not wi t hst andi ng t hi s l i mi t at i on. Thi s l ack of i nt egr at ed. One of t he mos t pr ol i f i c pr oducer s of i nf or mat i on i n t hi s cat egor y was t he Tact i cal I nf or mat i on Br oadcast Ser vi ce ( TI BS) .t hus . Al so many i ncompat i bl e syst ems wer e depl oyed . Whi l e t hese syst ems pr ovi ded pr eci se t ar get i ng i nf or mat i on on enemy l ocat i ons. 61 Thes e sat el l i t es pr ovi ded Coal i t i on f or ces wi t h i mager y.

l ocat e. c ommuni c at i ons f aci l i t i es.135 pr ov i ded r eal . t he Coal i t i on gave no sl ack whi l e conduct i ng t he mos t compr ehensi ve ai r at t ack of t he war .t i me i nt el l i gence t o t heat er and t act i cal c ommander s i n t he deser t and Per si an Gul f ar eas . k nown Sc ud si t es. Tar get i ng st r at egi c mi l i t ar y.135 Ri vet Joi nt .at t ack mi ssi l es ( TLAMs) .I NFORMATI ON W ARFARE but a l i mi t ed number of t er mi nal s di ct at ed t hat onl y key nodes coul d hav e access t o t hi s pr oduct .3 AW ACS and E.52s. 64 Whi l e c ommand of t he ai r was t he i ni t i al key obj ect i ve. ai r f i el ds. Ear l y war ni ng si t es. The Coal i t i on us ed mas s i v e ai r power at t he ons et of host i l i t i es t o accompl i sh t hi s obj ect i ve . and c ommuni c at i ons ( C3) f aci l i t i es as t he key cent er s of gr avi t y . di r ect l y f r om col l ect or s and associ at ed gr ound pr ocessi ng f aci l i t i es . Cons t ant Sour c e. i ncl udi ng wi ngs and squadr ons. 62 The RC. l eader shi p. 187 . and el ect r i cal power f aci l i t i es wer e at t acked by B. and r epor t I r aqi emi t t er s t hat mi ght pose a t hr eat t o Coal i t i on f or ces. The Coal i t i on i dent i f i ed t he I r aqi l eader shi p and I r aqi c ommand. Thes e syst ems ar e onl y a sampl i ng of t hose depl oyed t o t he t heat er t o pr ovi de i nt el l i gence suppor t .117s. t he Coal i t i on l aunc hed i t s at t ack on I r aq on 17 J anuar y 1991 . i nt egr at ed ai r def ens e nodes. TI BS and i t s cousi n. cont r ol . Tomahawk l and. " 63 t he RC. Ref er r ed t o as t he " ear s of t he st or m" i n cont r ast t o t he AW ACS r ol e as " eyes of t he st or m.8 J STARS. nuc l ear / chemi cal / bi ol ogi cal f aci l i t i es. i t al so s aw t he benef i t s of deny i ng t he I r aqi c ommand and cont r ol s y s t em i t s abi l i t y t o f unct i on . I r aqi Command and Cont r ol ( Or Lac k Ther eof ) The Coal i t i on not onl y r ecogni zed t he val ue of i nf or mat i on t o i t s ef f or t s. t he E. C3 f aci l i t i es r ecei ved pr i or i t y i n t ar get i ng . Never t hel ess. Revi ews and act i on ar e ongoi ng t o r esol ve t he pr obl ems r esul t i ng f r om st ovepi pi ng and i ncompat i bl e syst ems . and hel i copt er gunshi ps .boar d sensor s t o i dent i f y. Dur i ng t he f i r st t wo days. F. f l yi ng i n coor di nat i on wi t h i t s si st er shi ps. and i nf r ast r uct ur e f aci l i t i es. pr ov i ded t i mel y updat es of i nt el l i gence i nf or mat i on t o var i ous echel ons. f l ew 24 hour s a day t o suppor t t he war . Speci al l y t r ai ned per sonnel us ed on.

i t al so bl i nded I r aqi t act i cal uni t s . I nf or mat i on was t he hub of al l act i vi t y on t he Coal i t i on si de. Tr ai ned t o oper at e under cent r al i zed cont r ol . not t he ai r f or ce. Bui l di ng def enses t o t hese vul ner abi l i t i es i s consi der ed by s ome t o be at odds wi t h i ncr easi ng t he capabi l i t i es . as an I r aqi pr i soner r epor t ed. Ai r def ense f or ces bec ame f ear f ul of emi t t i ng because of t hei r vul ner abi l i t y t o ant i r adi at i on mi ssi l es . Radi o Mont e Car l o. 67 Al t hough l eader shi p as a t ar get was di f f i cul t t o l ocat e and sur vi ved t he conf l i ct . i n r ef l ect i ng hi s sur pr i se over t he speed wi t h whi c h a US Mar i ne uni t over r an hi s uni t i n Kuwai t . t he I r aqi s at t empt ed t o shi el d r at her t han use t hei r ai r cr af t . t he successf ul at t acks agai nst I r aqi C3 essent i al l y put her l eader shi p i n t he posi t i on of havi ng no st r i ngs t o pul l . The c ommuni c at i ons enhanc ement s r eal i zed wi t h t he advent of new t echnol ogi es al so br ought about new vul ner abi l i t i es . s howed he had no i dea t he Mar i nes wer e comi ng even t hough anot her I r aqi uni t l ocat ed adj acent t o hi mhad c ome under at t ack t wo hour s bef or e . Gul f War Concl usi ons The Gul f War cl ear l y demonst r at ed t he need f or accur at e and t i mel y di ssemi nat i on of i nf or mat i on .BATTLEFI ELDOF THE FUTURE Af t er onl y t he openi ng mi nut es of t he war . and t he l ack of i t caused t he f ai l ur e of t he I r aqi mi l i t ar y t o empl oy i t s f or ce . and t he Voi ce of Amer i ca as sour ces t o br i ef c ommander s . The benef i t s enj oyed by t he Coal i t i on' s abi l i t y t o c ommuni c at e and t he i mpact of at t acks on I r aqi C3 have been wi del y publ i ci zed and hav e t o be as s umed t o be wel l k nown by ever y pot ent i al 18 8 . t he I r aqi s pr act i ced st r i ct communi cat i ons secur i t y t hr ough near t ot al emi ssi on cont r ol ( EMCON) . I r aq had l i t t l e C3 i nf r ast r uct ur e r emai ni ng . Whi l e t hi s di d have a negat i ve ef f ect on Coal i t i on si gnal s col l ect i on ef f or t s. One I r aqi br i gade c ommander . 65 The Coal i t i on success was so devast at i ng t hat . The at t empt s t hey di d mak e i n def ensi ve count er ai r pr oved r at her embar r assi ng . " I r aqi i nt el l i gence of f i cer s wer e usi ng Radi o Saudi Ar abi a. t hey used i mpr oper l y . " 66 What l i t t l e communi cat i ons capabi l i t y I r aqi t act i cal c ommander s di d have. Bel i evi ng t he ar my. Appar ent l y c onc er ned over Coal i t i on c ommuni c at i ons moni t or i ng. was t he det er mi ni ng f or ce i n bat t l e. I r aqi f or ces di d not k now how t o f unct i on aut onomousl y .

69 Whi l e our capaci t y t o pr ocess i nf or mat i on at t hi s gr owt h r at e s eems l i mi t ed. W hat Does t he Fut ur e Hol d? Ther e i s an i nf or mat i on gl ut . I t c an be par t i cul ar l y di f f i cul t t o pr ocess l ar ge amount s of i nf or mat i on i n a r eadi l y useabl e f or m dur i ng i nt ense. al ong wi t h syst ems t o ac c ommodat e i t . Wi t h f i ber opt i cs suppor t i ng t hese sat el l i t es. t her e was a 70. And t hi s gr owt h i s accel er at i ng . i ndust r i al f aci l i t i es. t hr ee year s ago. 7. 000. 000 ai r cr af t sor t i es t o be f l own on t he t hi r d day . cr i si s si t uat i ons . And i t does not st op t her e . For exampl e. l et al one r espond t o . W e have t o pr epar e f or si mi l ar at t acks. Mot or ol a i s wor ki ng on a 77. 68 As t he i nf or mat i on gl ut cont i nues t o gr ow. Dur i ng t he Gul f War .pr ecedence mes s ages wer e t aki ng f our t o f i ve days t o r each t hei r dest i nat i on. Addi t i onal l y. and Mar i ne avi at i on. t he vol ume of t r af f i c t ook an i nor di nat e amount of t i me t o r ead.I NFORMATI ONW ARFARE adver sar y . v ol ume was doubl i ng ever y f our year s . Ear l y on. Tur k ey . but di f f i cul t i es at r ecei vi ng or gani zat i ons f or ced adj ust ment s . t echnol ogy has a way of cat chi ng up. 000 per sonnel wor k ed t wo days t o pr oduce t he ai r t aski ng or der ( ATO) f or 2. has mov ed i nt o t he i nf or mat i on age i n one bi g l eap .message backl og. f or exampl e.equi pped per sonal comput er s and l ocal ar ea net wor ks i n mi l i t ar y or gani zat i ons. i t t ook f our and a hal f year s . Ev en usi ng dedi cat ed communi cat i ons ci r cui t s. and pr i vat e homes ar ound t he gl obe . or at t acks of a di f f er ent medi um. agai nst our own i nf or mat i on syst ems i n t he f ut ur e . Navy. vul ner abi l i t i es t o sur r ept i t i ous ent r y ar e cer t ai n t o i ncr ease . 7 ° I t s eems t he 18 9 . ent i r e count r i es ar e bei ng wi r ed .but not necessar i l y i n t i me t o hel p f or a gi ven si t uat i on . Two year s ago.page doc ument devel oped f or t r ansmi ssi on t o Ai r For ce. Ther e i s a pr ol i f er at i on of modem. The amount of i nf or mat i on bei ng r epor t ed i s doubl i ng ever y 18 mont hs .sat el l i t e const el l at i on t hat wi l l pr ovi de cel l ul ar t el ephone ser vi ce f r om any spot on ear t h wi t hi n f i ve year s .some never made i t . and f l ash. The ATO began as a 300. i t t ook t he Nav y t hr ee t o f our hour s t o r ecei ve t he ATO.

t echnol ogy. t he mor e i nf or mat i on t her e i s t o pr ocess . i t i s ver y shor t . I t hi nk t hat i n l ar ge measur e t he pr oduct t oday. AI A l ooks at i nf or mat i on domi nance i n t er ms of t he Obser ve. i nf or mat i on war f ar e t echni ques ar e bei ng i nt ensi vel y st udi ed and i ncor por at ed at t he Ai r I nt el l i gence Agenc y ( AI A) . have an i mpact on mi l i t ar y doct r i ne . t he t i me avai l abl e f or mak i ng a deci si on decr eases . Or i ent . Admi r al Jer emi ah has al r eady consi der ed t hi s . dr i ves doct r i ne and t act i cs. .chai r man of t he J CS. and l ook f or way s t o i ncor por at e t he r i ght l evel of emphasi s on t hi s t opi c i nt o our t hi nki ng. He poi nt s out t hat " i t i s t i me t o c ome t o gr i ps wi t h a di f f er ent i nt er sect i on. " 7 1 The ser vi ces ar e r ecogni zi ng t hi s change i n communi cat i ons. di ct at e t hat we f i nd a way t o measur e t he i mpact . However .and I can y ou wi l l l ose ever y t i me. As y ou go f r om t he st r at egi c l evel t o t he t act i cal l evel . I f y ou can' t t hi nk. " 72 Thi s concent r at i on of ef f or t i n i nf or mat i on t echnol ogy wi l l . I n t he Ai r For ce. Gl obal domi nanc e wi l l be achi eved by t hose t hat mos t cl ear l y under st and t he r ol e of i nf or mat i on and t he power of knowl edge t hat f l ows f r omi t . and t he negat i ve i nf l uences t hi s can have on mi l i t ar y oper at i ons . Deci de. Nav y Adm Dav i d E. and Ai r For ce seni or l eader s have voi ced concer n wi t h t hese ver t i cal st r uct ur es . Navy. i t bec omes a deadl y game of compr essi on and expansi on. and t he associ at ed t echnol ogy. Accor di ng t o Gener al Mi ni han. t act i cs. " 73 W e obvi ousl y ar e f ar f r om r eachi ng f ul l under st andi ng of t he i mpact of i nf or mat i on war f ar e on doct r i ne. and st r at egy . Jer emi ah. and shoul d. . and t o a maj or degr ee dr i ves st r at egy .BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE gr eat er our capabi l i t y t o pr ocess i nf or mat i on. For mer vi ce. Act ( OODA) l oop . Ar my. [ usher i ng i n] an er a of i nf or mat i on domi nanc e . and r eact i ng t o i t . . an i nt er sect i on of t echnol ogy and st r at egi c t hought . I t has bec ome t r adi t i on. sees i t t hi s way : " Technol ogy has f uel ed a change i n communi cat i on. " As we c ompar e f r i endl y and adver sar y OODA l oops. f or 19 0 . At t he t i p of t he spear . and can' t s ee. can' t hear . t he expl osi on of i nf or mat i on on soci et i es ar ound t he wor l d. W e wi l l use i nf or mat i on war f ar e t o expand t he adver sar y' s and compr ess our own act i on l oops . The OODA l oop r epr esent s t he deci si on cycl e t hr ough whi c h a war r i or at any l evel mus t go . One ar ea of concer n i s our pr opensi t y t o st ovepi pe act i vi t i es wi t hi n our st r uct ur es.

maki ng pr ocess and i mpedes syner gi st i c benef i t s t hat ar e avai l abl e f r om i nt egr at ed oper at i ons . The expect ed r esul t i s i nt egr at ed f unct i onal ar eas. i t i s al most cer t ai n ot her nat i ons wi l l buy i nt o t he t r end . " 74 As we pl ace mor e emphasi s on t hi s new di mensi on. t hi s coul d i ncr ease vul ner abi l i t i es t o unaut hor i zed access because i t di sper ses t he i nf or mat i on base on a muc h wi der scal e . " super i or i t y i n t he MTR [ mi l i t ar y. Russi a wi l l pr obabl y be one of t he f i r st . St ovepi pi ng of t en excl udes t he chai n of c ommand f r om t he deci si on. who by and l ar ge suppl i ed mos t of t he weapons t o ot her count r i es ar ound t he wor l d. and onl y t hen by t r oop oper at i ons . and expl oi t i ng t hese new pat hways i s what RV ( i nf or mat i on war f ar e) i s al l about . Russi an seni or mi l i t ar y of f i ci al s have al r eady r ecogni zed t hat t he i nt egr at i on of i nf or mat i on t echnol ogy " coul d gener at e r adi cal changes i n t he or gani zat i onal pr i nci pl es of ar med f or ces . I n t he i nf or mat i on spher e. ^77 Russi an mi l i t ar y l eader s bel i eve t he new " f or mul a f or success" i s t o " Fi r st gai n super i or i t y on t he ai r waves. whi c h shoul d pr ovi de a bet t er st r uct ur e f or i dent i f yi ng needs and r equi r ement s. I n what i s pr obabl y onl y t he begi nni ng f or nat i ons i n conf l i ct . and det er mi ni ng f or ce pr oj ect i on pr i or i t i es . ` super i or i t y i n comput er s' i s of pr eci sel y t he s ame si gni f i cance as super i or i t y i n t ube ar t i l l er y and t anks was t o bel l i ger ent s i n ear l i er war s . " 76 Fur t her mor e. " 78 As t he t wo f or mer adver sar i al wor l d super power s.cont r ol syst ems . " 75 The use of " i nt el l ect ual i zed" weapons i n t he Gul f War by t he Coal i t i on appar ent l y spar ked a mov e i n t he s ame di r ect i on i n Russi a . t o st ovepi pe sever al f unct i onal ar eas s uc h as i nt el l i gence. t hen i n t he ai r . The f ocus. Russi an mi l i t ar y exper t s now bel i eve i n " a new axi om t o t he body of mi l i t ar y ar t : For combat ant s cont endi ng i n mi l i t ar y conf l i ct t oday. and acqui si t i on . l ogi st i cs. Some member s of t he US mi l i t ar y c ommuni t y r ecogni ze t hat " i nt er di ct i ng. however . shoul d be on movi ng f r omver t i cal st r uct ur es. and t ar get acqui si t i on syst ems.t echni cal r evol ut i on] pr oceeds f r om super i or i t y i n ` i nf or mat i on weapons' : 1) r econnai ssance.I NFORMATI ONW ARFARE ex ampl e. pr ot ect i ng. t hen. sur vei l l ance. t he I nt er net has al r eady pr ovi ded a medi um f or i nf or mat i on . or st ovepi pes.and. pur sue i nf or mat i on war f ar e as a new r eal m of combat . and 2) ` i nt el l i gent ' command. we can expect ot her nat i ons t o f ol l ow. t o hor i zont al l y i nt egr at ed syst ems .

pl aced t hem on t he I nt er net . And. usi ng " sel f . access t o cer t ai n dat abases and comput er act i vi t i es . " ar e r el eased i nt o t he I nt er net and sear ch f or i nf or mat i on on t hei r own . gai ned access t o f i l es cont ai ni ng sensi t i ve communi cat i ons r el at i ng t o t he di sput e wi t h Nor t h Kor ea over i nt er nat i onal i nspect i ons of i t s nucl ear pr ogr am. Dur i ng t he r ecent bor der di sput e bet ween Ecuador and Per u. Per u I nt er net us ed a gopher si t e i n an at t empt t o neut r al i ze Ecuador i an pr opaganda . They c an r oam f r om net wor k t o net wor k. 79] The r esul t i ng ver bal ski r mi sh l ef t bot h nat i ons wor ki ng t o set up t hei r own gopher s . and. or at l east undesi r abl e. " These dr ones. [ A gopher i s an i nf or mat i on syst em r esi di ng on t he I nt er net t hat k nows wher e ever yt hi ng i s and. t r ansmi t dat a back t o t hei r or i gi n. Hi s act i ons made t hose f i l es avai l abl e t o about 35 mi l l i on peopl e . Hacker s r out i nel y at t empt t o get i nt o US mi l i t ar y syst ems . 19 2 . even i f t hey f ai l ed dur i ng t hat conf l i ct . Dur i ng t he Gul f War . New sof t war e t echnol ogi es per mi t t hese accesses t o be conduct ed aut onomousl y. bef or e he was caught .af t er subj ect i s l ocat ed . f ar bey ond t he I nt er net capabi l i t y of t oday ( whi ch i s mor e t han a mi l l i on f i l es at dat abases l ocat ed at uni ver si t i es and cor por at e r esear ch cent er s) . 82 Our awar eness of t hese at t empt s does not necessar i l y pr ove t her e wer e no successes of whi c h we ar e unawar e . af t er r eadi ng t hem. r ef er r ed t o as " knowbot s. al l ows a user t o cont i nue choosi ng menu i t ems unt i l t he sought . and I r aq t r i ed t o penet r at e t hese syst ems . Ec uador used t he I nt er net t o publ i sh gover nment bul l et i ns and excer pt s f r om l ocal medi a t o t el l i t s si de of t he conf l i ct . hacker s f r om Denmar k . c an we guar ant ee t he secur i t y of our syst ems dur i ng t he next war ? These vul ner abi l i t i es wer e r eveal ed r ecent l y when a Br i t i sh t eenager usi ng a per sonal comput er at hi s home hac k ed hi s way i nt o a US mi l i t ar y comput er net wor k.navi gat i ng dat a dr ones . Of f i ci al s suspect he had access t o t hese c omput er s f or week s . and communi cat e wi t h ot her k nowbot s . Moscow. about t he pot ent i al f or unaut hor i zed. I n r et al i at i on. cl one t hemsel ves. per haps ev en mont hs . and per haps be concer ned. 8 l Gi ven t hi s capabi l i t y.BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE war f ar e bet ween t wo bel l i ger ent nat i ons . one has t o wonder . 8° Gl obal i nf or mat i on syst ems wi l l enabl e or di nar y user s t o access an ext r aor di nar y number of dat abases. t hr ough an ar r angement of nest ed menus.

l et hal di sabl i ng t echnol ogy f ami l y and i s l i kel y bei ng devel oped by sever al count r i es .al one member of t he non. and. US mi l i t ar y oper at i ons c an r un t he gamut . Ev en i f we coul d acqui r e t hi s l evel of cooper at i on.ei t her st at e. and i ncl udi ng i t as par t of nonpr ol i f er at i on t r eat i es . pr ol i f er at i on of weapons of mas s dest r uct i on. Whet her t hi s i s t r ue or not . They bel i eve CVWr emai ns an abst r act . t he appar ent di f f i cul t y was i n det ect i ng hi m. The i nt er dependence of nat i ons woul d l i kel y r esul t i n as muc h damage t o an aggr essor as t o i t s adver sar y . wi t h our l ead i n t echnol ogy. t o any of t hese t hr eat s . enf or cement woul d be next t o i mpossi bl e . f r om ci vi l . and nobody wi ns . have doc ument ed t hei r concer ns over our vul ner abi l i t y t o comput er vi r us war f ar e ( CVW) by ot her nat i ons . comput er vi r us exper t s. and nucl ear devel opment .I NFORMATI ONW ARFARE I nt er est i ngl y. nont angi bl e concept t o mos t i nt el l i gence anal yst s and pol i cymaker s . t hey cal l f or l egi sl at i on out l awi ng CVWdevel opment . we pr obabl y do not want t o do so . Mor e r el i ance i s bei ng pl aced on communi cat i ons and 193 . They descr i be i n det ai l t he vul ner abi l i t y of comput er syst ems t o t hi s danger . 83 Paul Evancoe and Mar k Bent l ey. l ocal i zed conf l i ct s. and aggr essor s t hat upset t he wor l d peace bal ance.mi l i t ar y af f ai r s assi st ance t o f or ci bl e ent r y. i n one way or anot her . " 84 They al so poi nt out t hat t he i nt el l i gence c ommuni t y and pol i cy mak er s do not f ocus on t hese t hr eat s and gener al l y do not possess enough t echni cal under st andi ng t o r ecogni ze CVWas a r eal nat i onal secur i t y t hr eat . Of f i ci al s added t hat he had al so br eached ot her def ense syst ems . Unf or t unat el y. Some Amer i cans bel i eve t her e wi l l be no bi g war s i n t he f ut ur e because t her e i s t oo muc h dest r uct i ve power . and cl ai m t hat " CVW i s a power f ul st and. cl assi f yi ng CVWas a weapon i nt er nat i onal l y. The US mi l i t ar y may be cal l ed upon t o r eact . CVWdevel opment does not l eave t r aces as does chemi cal . and avai l abi l i t y of f ood and wat er . Fur t her mor e. 85 Among t he t hr eat s we f ace t oday ar e t er r or i sm. And our ef f or t s t o i sol at e t hose ar e not al ways met wi t h success .sponsor ed or r adi cal el ement . and want ed t o. once i t was k nown an i nt r uder was i n t he syst em i t onl y t ook a week t o i dent i f y hi m. i nt ense economi c compet i t i on. I t i s unr eal i st i c t o bel i eve we coul d achi eve t he suppor t of t he i nt er nat i onal c ommuni t y i n t hi s r egar d. t he concept of nat i onal secur i t y i s changyng . bi ol ogi cal .

t hese syst ems ar e st i l l comput er based . The i nt egr at i on and wi de di sper sal of t hese syst ems i ncr ease t he number of vul ner abi l i t y poi nt s wher e an adver sar y mi ght i nt r ude . I nf or mat i on war f ar e pr ovi des a new 19 4 . 87 I t s eems l ogi cal t hat ot her exi st i ng and devel opment al syst ems mi ght al so be i nt er connect ed . t he Tact i cal I nf or mat i on Br oadc as t Ser vi ce ( TI BS) .r eal .based SI GI NT/ EW syst em capabl e of doi ng t hat by t he end of t he decade .Hor i zon ( OTM syst ems.BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE i nt el l i gence syst ems i n suppor t of t hese act i vi t i es.t i me i nt el l i gence syst em capabl e of pr ovi di ng t ar get abl e accur acy i nf or mat i on t o " shoot er s . GPS has i mpr oved our navi gat i on and geo. Oppor t uni t i es t o decei ve and conf use t hr ough an el abor at e mi si nf or mat i on s c heme al ong a myr i ad of i nf or mat i on pat hs ar e avai l abl e t o anyone . and as t hese syst ems bec ome mor e i nt er oper abl e.posi t i oni ng of asset s . t he CVW t hr eat and ot her met hods of i nt r usi on and di sr upt i on ar e not necessar i l y beyond t hei r r each .posi t i oni ng accur acy i n mul t i pl es. Const ant Sour ce. f or year s we have needed a near . " 86 Whi l e sophi st i cat ed ant i j am s y s t ems ar e bei ng devel oped and depl oyed. t hen. I t i s avai l abl e t o t he publ i c and anyone wi t h a f ew hundr ed dol l ar s can buy i nt o t he syst em. Seni or Ruby. " I t i s bec omi ng mor e and mor e di f f i cul t t o di st i ngui sh C4 syst ems f r om i nt el l i gence syst ems . and ai r and gr ound. Tact i cal Recei ve Equi pment Rel at ed Appl i cat i ons ( TRAP) . Over . t hey may bec ome mor e vul ner abl e . For exampl e. The benef i t s.t he. " The Ar my expect s t o have an ai r bor ne and gr ound. Qui ck Look. Some of t hese mi ght i ncl ude t he Joi nt Tar get i ng Net wor k ( JTN) . The GPS may be one of t he mos t r evol ut i onar y syst ems i n our i nvent or y when y ou consi der t he di f f er ence i t can mak e i n navi gat i on and geo. but we ar e not t he onl y ones who can use i t . Di sr upt i on i n one woul d af f ect ot her s . t hat we der i ve f r om t hi s capabi l i t y may be of f set s omewhat by use of t he syst em by an adver sar y .based r adar syst ems . Concl usi ons Ev en t hough t he ant i ci pat ed nat i onal secur i t y t hr eat s of t he c omi ng decades i nvol ve l ess devel oped count r i es.

Gener al Mi ni han pr oposes t he pr ospect of " an i nt el l i gence anal yst mani pul at i ng an adver sar y' s c ommand and cont r ol syst em so t hat r eal i t y i s di st or t ed . i n many cases. but onl y wi t h t oday' s t echnol ogy can we expect act i on i n t hi s spher e of war f ar e on a gr and scal e . Sy s t ems pr oposal s mus t be t hor oughl y eval uat ed and pr i or i t i zed by hi ghest val ue payof f . " I n war . t her ef or e. . One t hi ng i s sur e . and ot her s. Thes e act i vi t i es c an put new l i ght on Wi ns t on Chur chi l l ' s st at ement at Tehr an i n Nov ember 1943 concer ni ng Al l i ed decept i on ef f or t s. wi l l expl oi t t he GPS t o t hei r own adv ant age . and.f aci ng t he unk nown and l osi ng conf i dence i n t hei r oper at i on . t aki ng t he l ead on t hi s per pl exi ng i ssue . we mus t car ef ul l y assess t he vul ner abi l i t i es of t he syst ems we empl oy . " 88 I n t hi s vei n. or s ome ot her i nt r usi on met hod. I nf or mat i on war f ar e i s c omi ng of agel Wor l d War I I set t he st age. " 92 W e mus t al so i nt er di ct t he oppor t uni t i es f or adver sar i es t o i nt r ude on our syst ems . " . An I r aqi " l ef t hook" wi l l be di f f i cul t t o r epeat . wi t h t he r esul t i ng di sr upt i on put t i ng US t r oops i n a f l ai l i ng post ur e. t omor r ow' s sol di er wi l l depend mor e t han ever on t he ver y wel l k nown and t r ust ed f act or s of mobi l i t y and C3 I . 90 I magi ne a scenar i o depi ct i ng a " l ef t hook" i n t he I r aqi deser t t hat f ai l s because t he syst ems i n us e wer e successf ul l y at t acked by CVW . t r ut h i s so pr eci ous t hat she shoul d al ways be at t ended by a bodyguar d of l i es . Ot her nat i ons have r eal i zed t he val ue of of f ensi ve appl i cat i ons of i nf or mat i on war f ar e . For t unat el y. Thi s needs t o be accompl i shed t hr ough a mor e bal anced i nvest ment st r at egy by t he US mi l i t ar y t hat c onquer s our i nst i t ut i onal pr ej udi ces t hat f avor " ki l l er syst ems" weapons . W e have t o as s ume I r aq. we 19 5 . " 89 Consi der Mar v i n Lei bst one' s pr oj ect i on.I NFORMATI ON W ARFARE avenue t o empl oy decept i on t echni ques t hr ough t he us e of mul t i pl e pat hs t hat cr eat e t he per cept i on and val i dat i on of t r ut h . 91 Of f ensi ve syst ems wi l l be at r i sk i f we do not appl y suf f i ci ent def ensi ve consi der at i ons i n t hi s pr ocess .t i me. Wi t h t hi s emphasi s. . " Me el ect r omagnet i c spect r um wi l l be our ` Achi l l es heel ' i f we do not pay suf f i ci ent at t ent i on t o pr ot ect i ng our use of t he spect r um and at t he s ame t i me r ecogni ze t hat we mus t t ake away t he enemy' s abi l i t y t o see us and t o cont r ol hi s f or ces . t he US mi l i t ar y seni or l eader shi p i s bec omi ng i nvol ved.

1. 56 . 8. Sun Tzu. The Ar t of War . I bi d. Top Secr et Ul t r a ( New Yor k : Pant heon Books. " Or i gi ns. chap . Cr ai g L . . Pet er sen. Car l v on Cl ausewi t z. 19 6 . The quot ed mat er i al i n t hi s paper f r om t hi s ser i es i s usual l y t aken f r omt he copi ed mat er i al of t he or i gi nal doc ument s . . 1980) . Pet er Cal vocor essi . Dr af t . Gr i f f i t h ( New Yor k . Not es 1 . 20. 5 . J ohn H. 6 . 3 . 8. c hap . The Man W ho Nev er W as ( New Yor k : J . no . 1984) chapt er 2 . 139 .Not a Paper War . See Ewen Mont agu. Ul t r a Magi c and t he Al l i es. I nc . 1 . " US Naval I nst i t ut e Pr oceedi ngs. 66. ENI GMA ( Uni ver si t y Publ i cat i ons of Amer i ca.War . Mendel sohn. 11 . of f ensi vel y and I nf or mat i on war f ar e adds a f our t h di mensi on of war f ar e t o t hose of ai r . . Al vi n and Hei di Tof f l er . I bi d . : Pr i ncet on Uni ver si t y Pr ess. and sea . 1989) . 4 . vol . Count er i nt el l i gence. Johnson. May 1993. 13 . " Synt hesi s of Exper i ences i n t he Us e of ULTRA I nt el l i gence by U. 20 . 3 . I bi d . . N. 1993) . 16 . Augus t 1994. t he Uni t ed St at es was caught by sur pr i se . 1971) . Cov er t War f ar e : I nt el l i gence. The cont ent of t he ser i es i s pr i mar i l y c ompos ed of decl assi f i ed doc ument s r esi di ng i n t he Nat i onal Ar chi ves . I bi d . 7 . Oxf or d Uni ver si t y Pr ess.21 . 1. 1. MI S. 1984) . B. 1 . Not e : Thi s book i s t he l ast i n a ser i es of 18 v ol umes on cover t war f ar e edi t ed by Mendel s ohn . 95 . 17 . vol . 84 . and Mi l i t ar y Decept i on Dur i ng t he Wor l d War 11 Er a 18 ( New Yor k : Gar l and Publ i shi ng. I n t hi s new di mensi on. ed . 14 . we mus t st ay ahead . " I nf or mat i on War f ar e. Br own. c hap . I nc . and Pr obl ems of t he Speci al Br anch. . Li ppi ncot t Co . . S. Samuel B. . 18 . 191 . 8. 119. . 140 . Funct i ons. Mendel sohn. 12 . On War . and t r ans . Mi chael Howar d and Pet er Par et ( Pr i ncet on. Sun Tzu. 10 . and Co . These doc ument s i ncl uded cl assi f i cat i ons up t hr ough TOP SECRET ULTRA. Sur vi val at t he Dawn of t he 21st Cent ur y ( Bost on : Li t t l e. Wl ady s l aw Kozaczuk. 84 . def ensi vel y. USAF/ XO. Ar my Fi el d Commands i n t he Eur opean Theat er of Oper at i ons. I nf or mat i on War f ar e : Pour i ng t he Foundat i on. J ohn Mendel s ohn. Cl ausewi t z. " 27. W hen t he Sovi et s devel oped a nucl ear pr ogr am af t er Wor l d War I I . ed . " Jour nal of El ect r oni c Def ense 17. I bi d . wi t h al most equal accent uat i on . 3 . 9. 1954) . J . 19 Dec ember 1994. . f .BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE mus t at t ack t he i ssue f r om t wo di r ect i ons. 2 . t r ans . 15 . 19 . I bi d . l and. W ar and Ant i . " I nf o War s. 85 . " 4 . 4.

" Cover and Decept i on. S. " Cover and Decept i on Rec ommended Or gani zat i on. . Uni t ed St at es Ar my ( Washi ngt on. k nowi ng t he Ger mans kept t r ack of hi s f i nest gener al s. Ar my Si gnal s I nt el l i gence i n Wor l d W ar I L A Doc ument pr y Hi st or y. 175 . 1991) . " 17 . " 2 . 1975) . 165 . 184 . 10. Exhi bi t ' 3' of C&D Repor t ETO. 45 . Gi l ber t and J ohn P.160 .45 ( New Yor k : Char l es Scr i bner ' s Sons. I bi d . 15. I bi d . " Appendi x ' C' t o SHAEF/ 18216/ 1 / Ops dat ed 10t h Mar c h 1944 .shocked" sol di er s. 1943. W ar Depar t ment . vol . Davi d Kahn. c hap . 3. vol . 31 . I n Ei senhower ' s mi nd. I bi d . 6. 46 . 22 . 2 .I NFORMATI ON WARFARE 21 . " 1 and 2 . 28 . 30 . vol . 276 . 1939. 42 . Sei zi ng t he ENI GMA: Vi e Rac e t o Br eak t he Ger man U. U. Exhi bi t ' 6' of C&D Repor t ETO. I bi d . 44 . Kahn. 32 . 156. : GPO. 23 Febr uar y 1944. 48 . Ant hony Cave Br own. . Gi l ber t and Gi nnegan. Basi c Decept i on and t he Nor mandy I nvasi on. c hap. " I n war t i me. c hap . D. eds . 33 . . " appendi x B. Ul t r a i n t he Wes t : The Nor mandy Campai gn 1944. Pat t on had got t en i nt o t r oubl e . 4 . I bi d . Gar l i nski . vol . 37 . t r ut h i s so pr eci ous t hat she shoul d al ways be at t ended by a body guar d of l i es . Mendel sohn. I . 11. Exhi bi t ' 5' of C&D Repor t ETO. Bennet t . " Use of CX/ MSS ULTRA by t he U. . pt . vi i i . 34 . Ral ph Bennet t . 15. 27 . 1993) . I t was t aken f r om Chur chi l l ' s st at ement at Tehr an. 25 . 35 . I bi d . 39 . 40 . Kozaczuk.1945. 41 .1943 ( Bost on: Hought on Mi f f l i n Co . 4. 276 . Cent er of Mi l i t ar y Hi st or y. . 1980) . " Oper at i ons i n Suppor t of Nept une : ( B) FORTI TUDE NORTH. 10 . J ames L. 15. consi der ed Pat t on t he per f ect choi ce f or t hi s not i onal out f i t . 23 . 160 . I bi d . . Body guar d of Li es ( New Yor k : Har per & Row.66 . Af t er t wi ce st r i ki ng " shel l . c hap . 38 . 15. I bi d . I bi d . 8 Sept ember 1944. Mendel sohn. pl aci ng Pat t on i n char ge woul d mak e t hi s concoct i on mor e bel i evabl e t o t he Ger mans . Br own. 36 . Bennet t . Mendl esohn. 24 . Exhi bi t ` 6' of C&D Repor t ETO. 42 . .Boat Codes. S. " Oper at i ons i n Suppor t of NEPTUNE: ( C) FORTI TUDE SOUTH I . t he cover t er m f or t he Nor mandy i nvasi on. Mendel sohn. 19 7 . " 47 . 159. BODYGUARD was t he cover name gi ven t o t he decept i on pl an devel oped f or NEPTUNE. The Eni gma War ( NewYor k : Char l es Scr i bner ' s Sons. 26 . 176 . 43 . 29 . Kahn. . 1. I bi d . vol . Gi nnegan. 1979) . 45 . 49 . C. Jozef Gar l i nski . I bi d . c hap . 2 . Def i ni t i on and Pr ocedur e. and. Gener al Ei senhower needed a pl ace t o put hi m. 50 . 175 . I bi d .

Ans on and Cummi ngs . 52 . " The Fi r st Spac e W ar : The Cont r i but i on of Sat el l i t es t o t he Gul f War . and Dr . 85 . Di ane T. . Oct ober 1992) . Va . Cl apper . Va . Hopk i ns I I I . 127 . . 12 1 . : Depar t ment of Def ense. 127 . Thi s st at ement was made by Associ at e Just i ce of t he Supr eme Cour t Lewi s F. ed. C. chi ef . ed . 40 . I bi d. . Pet er son. " i n Al an D. Davi d L. C. 1993) . 62 . He was on Gener al Car l Spaat z' s Uni t ed St at es St r at egi c Ai r For ces st af f as Chi ef of Oper at i onal I nt el l i gence. i n an i nt er vi ew c onduc t ed by Dr Ri char d H. Ai r For ce I nt el l i gence Ser vi ce Hi st or i cal Resear ch Of f i ce . D.9 . Cohen. " Ear s of t he St or m. : AFCEA I nt er nat i onal Pr ess. 66 . Wi l l mot t The Gr eat Cr usade. ed . 63 . . Oct ober . Gul f War ( Fai r f ax. Comput er s and I nt el l i gence Syst ems i n t he Per si an Gul f War ( Fai r f ax. Jr . 67 .. Rober t S. Kohn. 60 . Gul f War Ai r Power Sur vey Summar y Repor t ( Washi ngt on. 198 17 1 . Comput er s and I nt el l i gence Syst ems i n t he Per si an Gul f War ( Fai r f ax. . " The Joi nt CEOI . Thomas A. . Oct ober 1992) . . 57. ULTRA and t he Ar my Ai r For ces i n Wor l d War H ( Washi ngt on. The Fi r st I nf or mat i on War : The St or y of Communi cat i ons. Of f i ce of Ai r For ce Hi st or y. P . J ones and Ri char d C. I bi d . 54 . 61 . Va . 65 . Twel f t h Ai r For ce. I bi d . Powel l . : AFCEA I nt er nat i onal Pr ess. : AFCEA I nt er nat i onal Pr ess. Kozaczuk. 59 . Randt . 167 . 58 . chi ef . As an i nt el l i gence of f i cer i n t he Ar my Ai r For ce. Put ney. 167 . : Of f i ce of Ai r For ce Hi st or y. 174 . The St or y of Communi cat i ons. The Fi r st I nf or mat i on War . Va. Oct ober 1992) 65 . 51 . and t he Nor t hwest Af r i can Ai r For ces. ed . Comput er s and I nt el l i gence Sy s t ems i n t he Per s i an Gul f W ar ( Fai r f ax. . Comput er s and I nt el l i gence Syst ems i n t he Per si an. Campen. Dur i ng WWI I . J ames R. I bi d . 56. as wel l as bei ng Gener al Spaat z' s Ul t r a of f i cer . Keaney and El i ot A.A New Compl et e Hi st or y of t he Sec ond Wor l d War . Campen. . t owar ds t he end of t he war . 97 . 1987) . Va. Put ney. . 53 . J r . Si r Pet er Ans on and Denni s Cummi ngs . Campen. . 1989) 108. Comput er s and I nt el l i gence Sy s t ems i n t he Per si an Gul f War ( Fai r f ax. Uni t ed St at es Ai r For ce. Oct ober 1992) 82 . ( New Yor k : Fr ee Pr ess. He made at l east one vi si t t o Bl et chel y Par k wher e he st ayed and wor k ed f or sever al week s . D. 64 . 55 . " i n Al an D. 172 . Al an D. 130 . The Fi r st I nf or mat i on War : 71w St or y of Communi cat i ons. I bi d . 1992) . . he ser ved wi t h t he 319t h Bomb Gr oup. " i n Al an D. Di ane T. Just i ce Powel l was one of a sel ect gr oup of peopl e chosen t o i nt egr at e Ul t r a i nf or mat i on i nt o ot her i nt el l i gence. : AFCEA I nt er nat i onal Pr ess. " I r aqi Command and Cont r ol : The I nf or mat i on Di f f er ent i al . Put ney. " Deser t W ar : Cr uci bl e f or I nt el l i gence Syst ems. " i n Al an D. 162 . . The St or y of Communi cat i ons. " i n The Fi r st I nf or mat i on War .BATI LEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE 50 . : AFCEA I nt er nat i onal Pr ess. 166 . Campen. ed. 35 . The Fi r st I nf or mat i on War : The St or y of Communi cat i ons. I bi d . H. . Campen.

Augus t 1994. I bi d . The I mpact of t he Mi l i t ar y. 71 . 83. Fi t zGer al d. Br own. 90 . 12 . no . HI . 6. " Ar med For ces Jour nal I nt er nat i onal J une 1994. 20 Augus t 1993. J une 1993. 10 . " Wi nni ng t he I nf or mat i on War . Roos. no . Pet er sen. " Mi l i t ar y Technol ogy 18. 79 . 2d ed . vol . no . or Di gi t i zed?. " Ar my. ver . 39 . " Ar my Pl an Fost er s Dy nami c I nf or mat i on W ar Fr amewor k. 59 . Mar y C. " Si gnal .91. no . Ar my Ti mes. " Si gnal I nt er nat i onal Jour nal 48. . 87 . 40 . 88 . Bal t i mor e Sun. 12. 73 . 325 .4209. 56. . Huds on I nst i t ut e. Johnson. 89 . I l i e Of f i ci al Amer i ca Onl i ne f or Wi ndows Tour GUOP. 31 . " I nt er nat i onal Jour nal 48. Paul Ev anc oe and Mar k Bent l ey. Pet er sen. " Jour nal of El ect r oni c Def ense. 3. Gen J i mmy D. 2. 9 J anuar y 1995. Mar vi n Lei bst one. I bi d. 74 . no . Si gnal . J ohn G. 28 . Pet er son. 86 .0190. Nov ember 1993. 89 . Roos. 54. 48. Augus t 1994. 81 . 85. . 48 . 7. Dar r yl Gehl y. 80 . Ross. " I nf or mat i on Domi nanc e Edges Towar d New Conf l i ct Fr ont i er . 98 . 55 . 78 . News week . " Next .Comput er Vi r us as a Weapon.Techni cal Revol ut i on on Russi an Mi l i t ar y Af f ai r s. 88 . 23 May 1994. 86 . " CVW . no . Jul y 1994. 77 . " Cont r ol l i ng t he Bat t l ef i el d. 92 .C. 89 . I bi d . 20 Febr uar y 1995. 37 . Ross. 72 . 84 . 3 . 76 . 6. 32 . 100 . " I nf oTech I nf oPower . 90 . 2. 12. 91 .Gener at i on Sol di er : Di t ched. 69 . 43. Febr uar y 1994. 75 . 31 . 5. Tom Li cht y. " Mi l i t ar y Technol ogy 18 no . submi t t ed i n par t i al f ul f i l l ment of Cont r act #MDA903. 82 . 70 . May 1994. " I nf or mat i on Domi nanc e Edges Towar d New Conf l i ct Fr ont i er .I NFORMATI ON W ARFARE 68 . I bi d. I bi d. 28 . .

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and among t he 118 si gner s ar e t he Uni t ed St at es. i ncl udi ng i t s use dur i ng Wor l d War I I by Japanese f or ces i n Chi na . l i ke ant hr ax. pr oduct i on. ar e a maj or exampl e of bi ol ogi cal weapons . Col onel Mayer i ndi cat es t hat BWagent s of ot her st at es ar e ver y di f f i cul t . Mayer ' s essay quest i ons whet her t he Uni t ed St at es i s unabl e t o ef f ect i vel y pr ot ect i t s mi l i t ar y f or ces ( medi cal l y and nonmedi cal l y) f r om 20 1 . t r ansi t . Anot her i s bypr oduct s of or gani sms. Some bel i eve t hat Baghdad may st i l l have a l ar ge BWpr ogr am i nt act . i f not i mpossi bl e. had a BW pr ogr amunt i l 1991 . pound f or pound. Lt Col Ter r y Mayer t r aces t he hi st or y of bi ol ogi cal war f ar e. However . and I r aq . I r aq. An exampl e i s bot ul i sm. I r aq now admi t s t hat i t . but al so an el abor at e chemi cal and bi ol ogi cal war f ar e ef f or t . I t has been est i mat ed t hat 10 gr ams of ant hr ax coul d ki l l as many peopl e as a t on of t he ner ve agent Sar i n. Russi a. A wor l dwi de Bi ol ogi cal and Toxi n Weapons Convent i on ( BWC) f ol l owed. US gover nment anal yst s ar e skept i cal about whet her or not I r aq act ual l y dest r oyed i t s bi ol ogi cal war f ar e agent s and equi pment i n 1991 as t hey cl ai m. t her e i s evi dence t hat Mos c ow cont i nued t o manuf act ur e ant hr ax at l east i nt o 1992 .Ov er v i ew: Bi ol ogi cal War f ar e I ssues Bi ol ogi cal war f ar e ( BW) i s t he use of di sease t o har m or ki l l an adver sar y' s mi l i t ar y f or ces. Li vi ng or gani c ger ms. i n 1969 Pr esi dent Ni xon t er mi nat ed t he pr ogr am and announced US uni l at er al di sar mament of of f ensi ve BW weapons . f ood or l i vest ock. as a pot ent i al r et al i at or y measur e agai nst t he USSR.have or ar e pur sui ng BWpr ogr ams . devel oped a BWpr ogr am. Bi ol ogi cal agent s ar e muc h deadl i er . The BWpr obl emwas dr amat i cal l y hi ghl i ght ed dur i ng Deser t St or m when I r aq was di scover ed not onl y t o have a nucl ear weapons pr ogr am. I n addi t i on t o det ect i on shor t f al l s. f or al l i ed i nt el l i gence ser vi ces t o det ect i n r esear ch. Dur i ng ear l y phases of t he Col d War t he Uni t ed St at es. t oo. However . Uncl assi f i ed i nf or mat i on f r om t he Def ense Nucl ear Agency document s i ndi cat e t hat numer ous r ogue st at est hose t hat suppor t st at e sponsor ed t er r or i sm l i ke I r an. Li bya. and Nor t h Kor ea. or empl oyment phases . popul at i on. t han chemi cal agent s . k nown as t oxi ns .

. and wheat r ust . conduct an ef f ect i ve pr eempt i ve count er of f ensi ve st r i ke agai nst enemy BWf aci l i t i es. easy t o pr oduce.BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE BWweapons. or pr ot ect t he ci vi l i an popul at i on agai nst a t er r or i st BWat t ack . He cont ends t hat t he pr ol i f er at i on of BWweapons pr ovi des l ess. but do not have wi de di st r i but i on . Some vacci nes ar e avai l abl e. For exampl e. I ndeed s ome t hi r d wor l d r egi mes see BWas a " pot ent i al equal i zer " t o of f set Wes t er n convent i onal or nucl ear f or ces . Rober t Kadl ec. can be di sgui sed as nat ur al event s ( f or exampl e as agr i cul t ur al spr ayer s) . The OTA anal ysi s suggest s t hat BW i s t he c heapes t and mos t easi l y pr oduc ed of al l t he weapons of mas s dest r uct i on . t he whi t ef l y i nf est at i ons of Cal i f or ni a cr ops i n 1981 and 1991 caused $500 mi l l i on wor t h of damage . ( Lt Col . M. " Dr Kadl ec s hows i nst ances of how BWcoul d be used i n at t acks on l i vest ock and pl ant s i ncl udi ng ant hr ax. USAF) s hows t hat t he ongoi ng r evol ut i on i n bi ot echnol ogy has al so made possi bl e medi cal pr oduct s r eadi l y t r ansf er abl e t o bi ol ogi cal war f ar e appl i cat i ons . BWweapons ar e i nexpensi ve. over $7 bi l l i on i s spent ever y year on pest i ci des . r i nder pest . The Russi an wheat aphi d cost t he Uni t ed St at es $600 mi l l i on . I n hi s essay on bi ol ogi cal war f ar e as a possi bl e means of at t acki ng an adver sar y' s agr i cul t ur al base. gl ander s. Dr Kadl ec anal yzes t he cur r ent BWt hr eat and ci t es Of f i ce of Tec hnol ogy As s es s ment ( OTA) f i ndi ngs whi c h emphas i z e how cer t ai n unst abl e st at es hav e gov er nment s seeki ng W MD. Dr Kadl ec t hen pr ovi des a ser i es of i l l ust r at i ve and hypot het i cal scenar i os of how bi ol ogi cal war f ar e coul d be waged agai nst cer t ai n f ood suppl i er s : spr ayi ng a cor n seed bl i ght over t he Mi dwest er n Uni t ed St at es f r om commer ci al 20 2 . Si mi l ar l y. i ncl udi ng BW . Dr Kadl ec s hows how " t he exi st ence of nat ur al occur r i ng or endemi c agr i cul t ur al pest s or di seases and out br eaks per mi t s an adver sar y t o use BWwi t h pl ausi bl e deni al . ar e har d t o det ect or pr eempt . i n ot her cases t he Medi t er r anean f r ui t f l y caused $900 mi l l i on i n damage and l ost r evenues t o Amer i c an cr ops . To guar d agai nst such pest s. D. He not es i nst ances of nat ur al l y occur r i ng i nf est at i ons of agr i cul t ur e . and ar e har d t o def end agai nst once empl oyed .devel oped count r i es capabi l i t i es t hat coul d be as l et hal and devast at i ng as nucl ear weapons .

such BW at t acks agai nst a count r y' s f ood suppl i es or cr ops coul d be ver y damagi ng . Thus. et c . del i ber at el y sabot agi ng Paki st an' s cot t on cr op wi t h i nsect s .BI OLOGI CAL W ARFARE I SSUES ai r l i ner s t o f or ce massi ve cor n i mpor t s . whi l e not l et hal at t acks on human bei ngs. Suc h BWat t acks agai nst a compet i t or ' s economi c asset s coul d open an unf or t unat e new chapt er i n t he hi st or y of economi c war f ar e. . del i ber at el y spr eadi ng a r api dl y br eedi ng gr ape l ouse acr oss Cal i f or ni a wi ne count r y .

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l i ke s y mpt oms . Fl or i da.t he. Thi s j ust i n . El s ewher e i n t he news . but t he i l l ness i ni t i al l y r esembl es a chest col d t hat pr ogr esses i nt o pneumoni a. The Cent er f or Di s eas e Cont r ol has j ust decl ar ed t hat an epi demi c i s wi des pr ead i n Mi ami .l i ke s y mpt oms appear .shel f t echnol ogy and r eadi l y avai l abl e bi ol ogi cal war f ar e agent s . I f t hat doesn' t s ound cr edi bl e. The Bi ol ogi cal War f ar e Cont est Thi s i s a not i onal . I t t hen pr ogr esses r api dl y i nt o f ever and shor t ness of br eat h W hat i s especi al l y pecul i ar about t hi s epi demi c i s t hat al l t he pat i ent s who hav e sought medi cal at t ent i on at t ended t he Or ange Bowl f oot bal l game on New Year ' s Day . . St ay t uned t o CNNf or f ur t her dev el opment s on t hi s st or y. USAF Pr ol ogue. Aut hor i t i es hav e as k ed t hat any one who went t o t hat game s eek medi c al car e i f col d. Mayer . pl ease not e t hat Saddam Hussei n bought hi s or i gi nal ant hr ax cul t ur e f r om a mai l or der hous e i n 205 . The " concept of oper at i ons" i n t hi s at t ack consi st ed of usi ng sever al i nsect bombs ( t he ki nd wher e y ou pus h t he but t on.Chapt er 8 The Bi ol ogi cal Weapon : A Poor Nat i on' s Weapon of Mas s Dest r uct i on Lt Col Ter r y N. and y ou l eave t he hous e f or t wo hour s) and modi f yi ng t hemby f i l l i ng t he cani st er wi t h ant hr ax bact er i a bought t hr ough a mai l or der speci men c ompany i n t he Uni t ed St at es . i t st ar t s spr ayi ng. yet f r i ght eni ng i l l ust r at i on of what t he f i r st si gns of a bi ol ogi cal war f ar e ( BNq at t ack mi ght s ound l i ke . Doct or s hav e not yet di agnos ed t he speci f i c c aus e of t he r ampant di sease. .4 Januar y Thi s i s a CNN speci al r epor t . Thi s scenar i o i s a pl ausi bl e exampl e of an at t ack a t er r or i st or der anged per son mi ght conduct usi ng of f .

t he Uni t ed St at es' vul ner abi l i t y i s cl ear . The spr i ng 1995 chemi cal war f ar e at t ack i n t he s ubway s of Tok y o i s a gl ar i ng exampl e of j ust how suscept i bl e moder n soci et y i s t o t hi s ki nd of i nsi di ous at t ack . i t does not pr of ess t o have al l t he answer s t o t he ver y di f f i cul t bi ol ogi cal war f ar e di l emma. what i s bi ol ogi cal war f ar e i n l ayman' s t er ms? Fr om a mi l i t ar y per spect i ve. Whi l e t he paper i dent i f i es wher e pr eci ous r esour ces shoul d be f ocused. a si mpl e mec hani s m t o aer osol i ze a subst ance. t he pr er equi si t es ar e compl et e . and t he abi l i t y t o count er t he bi ol ogi cal weapon i s al most ni l . dependi ng on t he per cei ved pur pose of 20 6 . or l i vest ock. and a basi c bi ol ogy l abor at or y. I t does not t ake a gr eat deal of i magi nat i on t o concei ve of ot her si t uat i ons and vul ner abi l i t i es t hat woul d mak e ver y l ucr at i ve t ar get s f or a bi ol ogi cal weapons st r i ke . i t i s t he i nt ent i onal use of di seases t o af f ect an adver sar y' s mi l i t ar y f or ce. The aut hor hopes t o br i ng t he i ssue t o t he f r ont bur ner f or st udy and t o appl y r esour ces t o r esol vi ng t he t ough pr obl ems . A st udy of bi ol ogi cal war f ar e r ai ses s ome f undament al quest i ons : zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA " Just what i s bi ol ogi cal war f ar e? " W hat i s t he hi st or y of bi ol ogi cal i mpor t ant i s i t t oday? war f ar e and how " What bi ol ogi cal war f ar e agent s ar e avai l abl e f or use t oday? " What i s t he bi ol ogi cal war f ar e t hr eat ? " Howcapabl e ar e we of copi ng wi t h t he t hr eat ? " What pol i cy shoul d t he Uni t ed St at es f ol l ow t o cl ose t he gap bet ween t he t hr eat and t he capabi l i t y? The pur pose of t hi s ar t i cl e i s t o r ai se t he awar eness l evel about a ver y r eal and pr obabl e t hr eat t hat has not been deal t wi t h ef f ect i vel y . Fi r st .BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE t he Uni t ed St at es and had i t shi pped over ni ght mai 11l Thi s i s j ust a sampl e of many pl ausi bl e scenar i os t hat coul d empl oy bi ol ogi cal war f ar e agent s i n a t er r or i st or c ombat oper at i on . t he t hr eat i s r eal . popul at i on. cr ops. I f an at t acker has access t o t he t ar get ar ea. Cer t ai nl y. t hi s i s basi c col l ege bi ol ogy coupl ed wi t h mot i vat i on . Whi l e t he use of t hi s weapon has not been pr eval ent i n r ecent year s. Thi s i s not a hi gh. a t er r or i st bi ol ogi cal c ampai gn coul d t ar get t hose s ame ki nds of obj ect i ves.t ech ar ena t hat r equi r es speci al i zed equi pment or cor e mat er i al as do nucl ear weapons .

dumpi ng bodi es i nt o wat er suppl i es has been f ai r l y c ommon f or cent ur i es . For exampl e. Ther e ar e t wo basi c cat egor i es of bi ol ogi cal war f ar e agent s . t he Engl i sh at t acked. As ear l y as 1346 A. 7 20 7 . but s ome medi cal hi st or i ans specul at e t hi s event r esul t ed i n t he buboni c pl ague epi demi c t hat spr ead acr oss medi eval Eur ope bet ween 1347 and 1351. Mi cr oor gani sms ar e l i vi ng or gani c ger ms. 5 Thr oughout hi st or y. Hi st or i cal Per s pec t i v e Bi ol ogi cal war f ar e i s not a t went i et h cent ur y devel opment . . i t has been an ef f ect i ve c ombat weapon f or cent ur i es . Not onl y di d i l l ness cause Kaf f a t o capi t ul at e.made agent s t hat have been us ed t hr oughout hi st or y . Ther e ar e many ot her nat ur al and man. 2 These ar e onl y t wo exampl es of bi ol ogi cal war f ar e agent s. Two t housand year s ago. such as ant hr ax ( baci l l us ant hr ax) . 3 Wer e t he Tar t ar s successf ul i n usi ng di sease as a means t o br eak t he si ege? Yes . Sec ond. t oxi ns ar e t he bypr oduct s of l i vi ng or gani sms. al t hough t hese ar e especi al l y pr eval ent and vi r ul ent exampl es . dur i ng t he Fr ench and I ndi an War . The Engl i sh suspect ed t he I ndi ans wer e l oyal t o t he Fr ench and exposed t he bl anket s t o t he smal l pox vi r us bef or e t hei r appar ent al t r ui st i c over t ur e . D.i nf est ed bodi es i nt o t he ci t y . Tar t ar s hel d t he wal l ed ci t y of Kaf f a under si ege and cat apul t ed pl ague. 4 Thr ee hundr ed year s l at er . many exampl es may be f ound i l l ust r at i ng t he use of nat ur al di seases i n war t o pl ace an adver sar y i n a posi t i on of di sadvant age .THEBI OLOGI CAL W EAPON t he t er r or i st . The Br i t i sh gai ned cont r ol of For t Car i l l on and r enamed i t For t Ti conder oga. Romans f oul ed many of t hei r enemi es' wat er sour ces by t hr owi ng t he cor pses of dead ani mal s i nt o t he wel l s . or ef f ect i vel y nat ur al poi sons. ki l l i ng 25 mi l l i on peopl e . def eat i ng t he i ncapaci t at ed f or ce . and af t er an epi demi c spr ead t hr ough t he f or t . such as bot ul i sm ( bot ul i num t oxi n) whi c h i s a bypr oduct of gr owi ng t he mi cr oor gani sm cl ost r i di um bot ul i num. s Dur i ng t he Amer i can Ci vi l War . Conf eder at e sol di er s shot hor ses and ot her f ar m ani mal s i n ponds i n an ef f or t t o cont ami nat e t he wat er suppl y of t he Uni on f or ces . t he Engl i sh of f er ed bl anket s t o I ndi ans hol di ng For t Car i l l on . The I ndi ans began t o f al l i l l .

Par adoxi cal l y. 9 Ther e i s evi dence t hat J apan t est ed bi ol ogi cal war f ar e agent s on pr i soner s of war and t hat t hey act ual l y us ed t hem on t he popul at i on of Chi na . Ther e i s. 12 W hen t he Br i t ai n l ear ned of t he J apanes e bi ol ogi cal war f ar e pr ogr am. " Whi l e t hese at t acks c aus ed casual t i es. t he weapons di d not f unct i on r el i abl y and ul t i mat el y r esul t ed i n ver y l i t t l e st r at egi c i mpact t hat af f ect ed t he war . chi ef of t he Nazi secur i t y ser vi ce. 14 20 8 . Bot h count r i es had ver y r obust pr ogr ams as ear l y as 1932 and 1934.BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE Whi l e t her e was s ome evi dence of bi ol ogi cal war f ar e i n Wor l d War 1 8 .i nf est ed debr i s over 11 ci t i es i n mai nl and Chi na . The r esul t was a buboni c pl ague epi demi c i n Chi na and Manc hur i a . Bot h J apan and t he Uni t ed Ki ngdom r ecogni zed t hat si nce bi ol ogi cal war f ar e was hor r i f yi ng enough t o out l aw. and t hey i nf ect ed l i t er al l y t hous ands of ani mal s . however . Ev en t hough t her e wer e Al l i ed oper at i onal pl ans t o empl oy bi ol ogi cal weapons dur i ng Wor l d War I I . st r ong evi dence t hat Rei nhar d Heydr i ch. t hey dr opped f l ea. demonst r at i ng t he per si st ence of ant hr ax as a bi ol ogi cal weapon . t he i nt er war year s s aw a new i nt er est i n t he use of di sease as a weapon . r espect i vel y. 13 The Br i t i sh s oon c ombi ned t hei r bi ol ogi cal weapons devel opment ef f or t s wi t h Canada and t he Uni t ed St at es . t her e i s no evi dence t o i ndi cat e t hey wer e act ual l y us ed on a l ar ge scal e . was assassi nat ed wi t h a gr enade t hat had been cont ami nat ed wi t h bi ol ogi cal war f ar e agent s ( t yphoi d f ever ) . Gr ui nar d i s st i l l consi der ed cont ami nat ed and i s of f l i mi t s. pr obabl y t he t wo mos t act i ve pr ogr ams st ar t ed as a r esul t of an i nt er nat i onal i ni t i at i ve t o ban bi ol ogi cal war f ar e agent s . t he Br i t i sh coul d not ef f ect i vel y decont ami nat e t he i sl and af t er t hey st opped t he t est i ng pr ogr am. They concent r at ed t hei r devel opment and t est i ng ef f or t s on t he l et hal ef f ect s of ant hr ax . As a r esul t of t he huge amount of ant hr ax agent di sper sed on t he i sl and and t he l ar ge number of s heep i nf ect ed. t hey put si gni f i cant l y mor e emphas i s t owar d devel opi ng t hei r own BWcapabi l i t y. i t pr obabl y woul d mak e an ef f ect i ve weapon . Sci ent i st s us ed sheep as vi ct i ms t o eval uat e t he ef f ect i veness of t he di sease. Consequent l y. 1 ° To spr ead t he pl ague. Mos t of t hei r t est i ng was conduct ed on an i sl and cal l ed Gr ui nar d of f t he nor t hwest coast of Scot l and .

The r esul t s demons t r at ed t hat l ar ge number s of t he popul ace woul d be exposed t o i nf ect i ous doses under s uc h an at t ack . I t coul d have been used t o at t ack Nor t h Kor ean r i ce f i el ds. i s Fol l owi ng t he Kor ean War . 19 Thi s exper i ment suppor t ed a si mi l ar t est t hat t ook 20 9 . I t was dur i ng t hi s " boost phase" t hat Uni t ed St at es vul ner abi l i t y was cl ear l y demonst r at ed wi t h si mul at ed cover t bi ol ogi cal war f ar e at t acks on at l east t hr ee ci t i es s ubway syst ems . The bul k of t he r esear ch was conduct ed at For t Det r i ck i n Mar yl and . t he Uni t ed St at es concept c hanged t o empl oy ment upon execut i ve or der by t he pr esi dent of t he Uni t ed St at es . 17 The f undament al concept of Uni t ed St at es bi ol ogi cal war f ar e oper at i ons changed as a r esul t . was on bui l di ng a BW r et al i at or y capabi l i t y . Sampl es wer e t hen t aken t o det er mi ne how wi despr ead t he di ssemi nat i on woul d be . t he bi ol ogi cal capabi l i t y was mai nt ai ned pr i mar i l y f or r et al i at i on i n t he event an adver sar y empl oyed a bi ol ogi cal agent agai nst Uni t ed St at es or al l i ed f or ces . Af t er t he new Sovi et pr onounc ement . Thi s change i n pol i cy boost ed t he bi ol ogi cal war f ar e r esear ch ef f or t i n t he Uni t ed St at es . Dur i ng t he Kor ean War . t he f ocus. t hi s mi mi c k ed t he Sovi et posi t i on. 15 Nor t h Kor ea accused t he Uni t ed St at es of usi ng bi ol ogi cal agent s dur i ng t he Kor ean War . Thi s was a dr amat i c shi f t i n Sovi et pol i cy and t he col d war phi l osophy . Sur r ogat e bi ol ogi cal agent s wer e i nt r oduced i nt o t he ai r vent s of t he under gr ound syst ems .THE BI OLOGI CAL W EAPON Bi ol ogi cal War f ar e i n t he Col d W ar Af t er Wor l d War I I and dur i ng t he Kor ean War . at l east f r om t he Uni t ed St at es per spect i ve. t he Uni t ed St at es i nvi gor at ed t he bi ol ogi cal war f ar e pr ogr am i n 1956 af t er Mar s hal Zhuk ov announc ed t o t he Sovi et Congr ess t hat chemi cal and bi ol ogi cal war f ar e weapons woul d be used as weapons of mas s dest r uct i on i n f ut ur e war s . 18 Ef f ect i vel y. i mpl yi ng t hat t he Uni t ed St at es mi ght us e bi ol ogi cal weapons i n si t uat i ons ot her t han st r ai ght f or war d r et al i at i on. t he Uni t ed St at es deni ed t he accusat i on. The US devel oped an ant i cr op bomb and del i ver ed i t t o t he Ai r For ce i n 1951 . The pr evai l i ng phi l osophy was t hat t he t hr eat of r et al i at i on i n ki nd woul d det er t he us e of t hese ki nds of weapons . and t her e was no subst ant i ve pr oof of f er ed i n t he open l i t er at ur e . r educi ng a si gni f i cant sour ce of nut r i t i on f or t he popul at i on .

Pr esi dent Ni xon c hanged t he Uni t ed St at es pol i cy on bi ol ogi cal war f ar e . As he was wal ki ng. he conf r ont ed a man pi cki ng up an umbr el l a . t her e i s evi dence t hat t he Sovi et pr ogr am was t hr i vi ng. t he Uni t ed St at es bi ol ogi cal weapons st ockpi l e was compl et el y dest r oyed. Dur i ng a vi si t t o For t Det r i ck. " 22 ar was r agi ng . he announc ed t hat t he Uni t ed St at es was t er mi nat i ng r esear ch on bi ol ogi cal war f ar e and was uni l at er al l y di sar mi ng any capabi l i t y t o conduct of f ensi ve bi ol ogi cal war f ar e . Whi l e wi del y r epor t ed as a pr ogr am cal l ed " Yel l ow Rai n. A t ot al of 118 count r i es ( i ncl udi ng t he USSR and I r aq) si gned up t o abi de by t he BWC. st ockpi l e. Tur ni ng ar ound. pr oduce. By 1972. 25 21 0 . 21 Thi s gest ur e by t he Uni t ed St at es was t he cat al yst f or t he wor l d c ommuni t y t o embr ace t he Bi ol ogi cal and Toxi n Weapons Convent i on ( BWC) . Geor gi Mar kov. Mar k ov t ook i l l t hat ni ght and di ed sever al days l at er . 24 I n 1978. was a chemi cal . a her bi ci de. he suddenl y f el t a shar p pai n i n hi s l eg . Agent Or ange. The man apol ogi zed and went on hi s way . The aut opsy f ound a smal l met al pel l et coat ed wi t h r i ci n. Kampuc hea. and Af ghani st an. t her e wer e r epor t s t hat t he Sovi et s us ed bi ol ogi cal weapons i n Laos. Dur i ng t hi s t i me. a bi ol ogi cal t oxi c subst ance der i ved f r om t he cast or oi l pl ant .BATTLEFI ELD OFTHE FUTURE pl ace i n 1950 when an aer osol cl oud of a si mul at ed bi ol ogi cal agent was spr ayed of f t he coast of San Fr anci sco . 23 Whi l e t he Uni t ed St at es bi ol ogi cal war f ar e pr ogr am was f l our i shi ng and even af t er our uni l at er al bi ol ogi cal war f ar e di sar mament . " t hese al l egat i ons wer e never pr oven . t he Second I ndochi na W However . whi c h di r ect s t hat t he si gnat or i es wi l l " never i n any ci r cumst ances devel op. t her e i s no cl ear evi dence t hat bi ol ogi cal war f ar e agent s wer e us ed i n t hi s conf l i ct . a popul ar wr i t er and Bul gar i an exi l e. I n t he l at e 1970s and ear l y 1980s. 2 ° I n 1969. but bi ol ogi cal weapons per se wer e not us ed . al t hough t hey had si gned t he BW C i n 1972 .based agent t hat s aw wi de use. The t est r esul t s s howed t hat near l y 100 per cent of t he popul at i on had i nhal ed pot ent i al l y l et hal doses . was wal ki ng t o t he BBC i n London wher e he br oadcast t o hi s homel and f r om Radi o Fr ee Eur ope . or ot her wi se acqui r e or r et ai n any bi ol ogi cal weapons .

r epor t edl y. As t he pol i ce cont i nued t he sear ch t o t he bat hr oom. Russi an Pr esi dent Bor i s Yel t si n admi t t ed t hat t he Sver dl ovsk i nci dent was act ual l y a bi ol ogi cal war f ar e acci dent i nvol vi ng ant hr ax . As t hey conduct ed t hei r sear ch. t hey f ound doc ument s t hat r eveal ed a st r ong wor ki ng knowl edge of l et hal bi ol ogi cal agent s . a cul t cal l ed t he AumShi nr i Kyo.THE BI OLOGI CAL W EAPON Anot her i nci dent occur r ed i n Apr i l 1979 when a l oud expl osi on was r epor t ed f r om a r esear ch c ompound i n Sver dl ovsk. 29 On 20 Mar c h 1995. t hey c ame acr oss a bat ht ub cont ai ni ng many f l asks f i l l ed wi t h what t ur ned out t o be Cl ost r i di um Bot ul i num. Thi s i nci dent ki l l ed at . The Par i s Pol i ce r ai ded a r esi dence suspect ed of bei ng a saf e hous e f or t he Ger man Red Ar my Fact i on . 27 Ther eaf t er . al l egedl y. The def ect or s ver i f i ed hi s cl ai m and i nf er r ed t hat t he mi l i t ar y i s r unni ng t he pr ogr am wi t hout Yel t si n' s knowl edge or consent . many West er n j our nal i st s and sci ent i st s ar gued t hat t he f act s suppor t ed t he Sovi et cl ai ms . Pr esi dent Yel t si n cl ai med he di dn' t k now about any bi ol ogi cal war f ar e pr ogr ams . USSR. The Uni t ed St at es cl ai med t hat t he out br eak was t he r esul t of an acci dent i n a bi ol ogi cal war f ar e pr oduct i on pl ant . t he Wes t has no ant i dot e . or t he Supr eme Tr ut h . t he Fr ench aut hor i t i es made a st ar t l i ng di scover y t hat demonst r at es how vul ner abl e t he wor l d i s t o bi ol ogi cal t er r or i sm. one of t he mos t l et hal bi ol ogi cal subst ances k nown t o man . Pr esi dent Yel t si n si gned a decr ee t hat r ecommi t t ed Russi a t o t he Bi ol ogi cal and Toxi n Weapons Convent i on . 28 Bi ol ogi cal Ter r or i s m I n 1984. i n 1992. But i n 1994. r epor t s of an out br eak of ant hr ax sur f aced . 26 However . t he Tok y o s ubway syst em was at t acked wi t h chemi cal war f ar e agent s by. t hr ee def ect or s r eveal ed an ongoi ng Russi an bi ol ogi cal war f ar e pr ogr am t hat concent r at es on a " super pl ague" f or whi ch. I n t he medi a and t echni cal l i t er at ur e bef or e 1992. cl ai mi ng i t was caused by t ai nt ed bl ack mar k et meat and poor hygi ene among t he popul at i on . t he mi c r oor gani s m t hat pr oduc es bot ul i s m. Ov er t he next f ew days. The USSR vehement l y deni ed t he accusat i ons.

3s 21 2 . or di nar y peopl e . " . I k now t hey exper i ment ed on sheep wi t h Cl ost r i di um Bot ul i num t ype C ( t he sour ce of bot ul i numt oxi n) .BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE l east 11 peopl e and i nj ur ed as l east 5. 500 ot her s . I t f r i ght ens me t o t hi nk how vul ner abl e we ar e . t he mos t dr amat i c bei ng an I r aqi def ect or who was a mi cr obi ol ogi st . 3 l Thi s i s an except i onal l y si gni f i cant event because i t st r i kes at t he cor e of soci et y wi t h f ur t i ve l et hal gases. " 34 BWand t he 1991 Gul f W ar Thes e r ecent wor l d bi ol ogi cal war f ar e event s hav e been al ar mi ng. t he Per si an Gul f War . Tok y o pol i ce al so f ound l ar ge quant i t i es of t he bi ol ogi cal war f ar e agent Cl os t r i di um Bot ul i num dur i ng one of sever al r ai ds on Aum Shi nr i Ky o f aci l i t i es . By t he t i me of t he I r aqi i nvasi on i nt o Kuwai t . As one vi ct i m of t he s ubway at t ack sai d. and ant hr ax . . gar den. and t he wher ewi t hal t o conduct a hor r endous bi ol ogi cal at t ack agai nst an unpr ot ect ed popul at i on . . 33 Thi s di scover y cl ear l y demonst r at es t hat a t er r or i st or gani zat i on had t he r esol ve. sal monel l a. bot ul i sm. As 7t me magaz i ne sai d. 30 Fi ve di f f er ent s ubway car s wer e s t r uc k s i mul t aneous l y by i ndi vi dual s l eavi ng cani st er s di sper si ng a Nazi . but what r eal l y br ought t he bi ol ogi cal war f ar e i ssue i nt o t he spot l i ght of t he publ i c' s eye was t he exper i ence i n Deser t St or m. " We' r e j ust i nnocent . He t ol d a Br i t i sh news paper cor r espondent t hat as ear l y as 1983 I r aqi sci ent i st s wer e ' devel opi ng and t est i ng bi ol ogi cal war f ar e agent s : Ther e wer e many st r ai ns.devel oped ner ve agent cal l ed Sar i n . concent r at ed on ver y t oxi c bot ul i num t oxi n and ver y r esi l i ent ant hr ax . Fr i ends t ol d me t hey had f ound a way t o mak e ant hr ax even mor e t oxi c . 35 Thi s assessment was der i ved f r om a compi l at i on of sever al sour ces and i ndi cat or s.var i et y madnes s had got access t o weapons of t er r or . exposi ng gl ar i ng vul ner abi l i t i es and f oment i ng t er r or among t he popul at i on . " 32 On t he 28t h of Mar c h. t he bi ol ogi cal agent . i t was wi del y acknowl edged t hat I r aq had a bi ol ogi cal war f ar e pr ogr am.

t ype of bomb. one unconf i r med news r epor t of sever al i nci dent s of i l l ness and 21 3 . t he I r aqi s had spent cl ose t o $100 mi l l i on on t hei r of f ensi ve bi ol ogi cal war f ar e pr ogr am and had a si gni f i cant st ockpi l e of bi ol ogi cal war f ar e agent s . The mi l i t ar y was si mpl y not pr epar ed f or t hi s event ual i t y . I n t he el event h hour . and angl e of at t ack was t el ephoned t o t he Cent r al Command CENTCOM pl anner s i n Ri yadh . and t her e was no conf i r med col l at er al damage as a r esul t of r el eased bi ol ogi cal agent . t hi s concept det ai l i ng speci f i c f usi ng. i n t he ef f or t .gui ded bomb on t he suspect ed st or age bunk er s woul d hav e been easy enough . 39 Thi s was t he f i r st t i me si nce Wor l d War I I t hat t he Uni t ed St at es had f aced a mi l i t ar y adver sar y wi t h a hi ghl y pr obabl e bi ol ogi cal war f ar e capabi l i t y and t he r esol ve t o use i t . 42 Al l suspect ed bunk er s wer e at t acked.THE BI OLOGI CAL W EAPON The def ect or sai d he per sonal l y had done r esear ch and sol ved di f f i cul t t echni cal pr obl ems r el at i ng t o t he weaponi zat i on and depl oyment of bi ol ogi cal war f ar e agent s . c omput er model i ng s howed t hat t he desi gn of t he suspect ed bi ol ogi cal weapons st or age bunk er s of f er ed a bombi ng appr oac h t hat mi ght i nhi bi t t he r el ease of t he agent s . when I r aqi ar my i nvaded Kuwai t . Ther e was . 41 I n addi t i on. pl anner s wer e chal l enged t o det er mi ne a mec hani s m t o dest r oy t he bi ol ogi cal war f ar e st ockpi l es bef or e Saddam coul d depl oy t hem. howev er . Sever al t est s wer e conduct ed over a ver y shor t t i me t o t r y t o f i nd t he r i ght ki nd of enhanc ed muni t i ons or bomb t hat woul d r ender t he bi ol ogi cal war f ar e agent unusabl e t o t he I r aqi s and not r el ease l et hal agent s i nt o t he at mos pher e . Pl ans f or f or ce pr ot ect i on i ncl uded pr ot ect i ve equi pment and vacci nat i ons agai nst pr obabl e bi ol ogi cal war f ar e t hr eat s . The cr ash pr ogr am was not f r ui t f ul . 4o The Uni t ed St at es was chal l enged not onl y wi t h how t o pr ot ect t he mi l i t ar y f or ces but how t o pr eempt t he us e of Saddam' s bi ol ogi cal war f ar e ar senal .bar r ed engagement . " i mpl yi ng a no.hol ds. Dr oppi ng a pr eci si on. On 2 Augus t 1990. The r eal chal l enge was dest r oyi ng t he vi abi l i t y or ut i l i t y of t he bi ol ogi cal weapons wi t hout spr eadi ng t he agent s and causi ng massi ve col l at er al damage i n t er ms of human l i ves . 37 Thi s has si nce been conf i r med of f i ci al l y by a r epr esent at i ve of Saddam Hussei n' s pr esent gover nment . 38 Saddam Hussei n announc ed " l oud and cl ear " t hat t hi s war woul d be t he " mot her of al l war s. However .

48 Saddam' s r epr esent at i ves have si nce admi t t ed t o t he Uni t ed Nat i ons i nspect or s t hat t hey had a si zabl e cache of ant hr ax and bot ul i sm agent s. 49 On 24 Febr uar y 1993. 47 Li ke t he Sovi et Uni on. f or mer CI A Di r ect or J ames Wool sey t ol d t he Senat e Gover nment al Af f ai r s Commi t t ee : " I r aq' s bi ol ogi cal weapons capabi l i t y i s per haps of gr eat est i mmedi at e concer n . " 45 I n an even mor e di r ect and unambi guous message. 44 . You and y our count r y wi l l pay a t er r i bl e pr i ce i f y ou or der unconsci onabl e act s of t hi s sor t . t he wor l d has ever y r eason t o bel i eve t hat Saddam Hussei n st i l l has a l ar ge amount of bi ol ogi cal war f ar e agent s at hi s di sposal t oday . Baghdad had an 21 4 . I nspect or s f ound evi dence of a r obus t bi ol ogi cal war f ar e pr oduc t i on capabi l i t y. a 5 J anuar y 1991 l et t er Pr esi dent Geor ge Bus h sai d t o Saddam Hus s ei n : " The Uni t ed St at es wi l l not t ol er at e t he us e of chemi cal or bi ol ogi cal weapons . Cheney sai d t hat " wer e Saddam Hussei n f ool i sh enough t o use weapons of mas s dest r uct i on. The bad news i s t hat Uni t ed Nat i ons i nspect or s wer e not abl e t o l ocat e Saddam' s bi ol ogi cal st ockpi l e . However . t he US r esponse woul d be absol ut el y over whel mi ng and i t woul d be devast at i ng. .BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE deat h i n I r aqi guar ds af t er t he coal i t i on bombed a bi ol ogi cal war f ar e f aci l i t y i n Baghdad . i t i s l i kel y t hat t hey wer e det er r ed by publ i c si gnal s l i ke t he one Secr et ar y of Def ense Di ck Cheney announc ed dur i ng a news conf er ence on 23 Dec ember 1990 . but t hey cl ai m t o have dest r oyed i t t o avoi d havi ng ger ms spr ead over t he I r aqi count r ysi de by al l i ed bombi ng at t acks . Havi ng wi t nessed t he bol d I r aqi decept i ve ef f or t r egar di ng t hei r nucl ear r esear ch pr ogr am. i t appear s t hat Saddam Hussei n di d not use bi ol ogi cal weapons dur i ng Deser t St or m. . I r aq had pr evi ousl y si gned t he BW C. . I r aq of f i ci al sadmi t t ed havi ng a bi ol ogi cal war f ar e pr ogr am t hat t hey sai d had onl y pr ogr essed t o t he r es ear c h st age . Whi l e t he I r aqi r at i onal e may never be k nown f or cer t ai n. t her e was over whel mi ng ci r cumst ant i al evi dence t hat an of f ensi ve bi ol ogi cal war f ar e pr oduc t i on and weaponi zat i on pr ogr am di d exi st . " 4s Af t er t he cease f i r e. but c oul d not speci f i cal l y l i nk i t t o t he bi ol ogi cal war f ar e pr ogr am. . The Amer i c an peopl e woul d demand t he st r ongest possi bl e r esponse . 43 I n t he end.

t her e i s a possi bi l i t y t hat i t s bi ol ogi cal war f ar e weapons exper t s wi l l l ook f or mor e pr os per ous empl oy ment by bui l di ng bi ol ogi cal war f ar e pr ogr ams el s ewher e f or t he hi ghes t bi dder . t her e i s mor e t o t he t hr eat t han j ust count r i es t hat have t he capabi l i t y . or ar e t hi nki ng about st ar t i ng a bi ol ogi cal weapons capabi l i t y . The dual . as of ear l y 1994. Romani a. Thi s f act r ai ses t he pr obabi l i t y of a bi ol ogi cal war f ar e t er r or i st at t ack . 52 Ther e ar e r eal concer ns wi t h t hi s l i st . 21 5 . Bul gar i a. " 5 ° The Bi ol ogi cal War f ar e Thr eat Wi t h t he publ i c expose of act i ve Russi an and I r aqi bi ol ogi cal war f ar e pr ogr ams. Ther e ar e of f i ci al . s ome of t hese nat i ons have been associ at ed i n t he past wi t h st at e. many of t hese count r i es r esi de i n r egi ons of hi st or i cal i nst abi l i t y or emer gi ng i nst abi l i t y . Cuba. wi t h t he economi c di st r ess i n t he f or mer Sovi et Uni on. 51 However . Egypt . t he t hr eat of t hese weapons l ooms l ar ge on t he hor i zon . and nei t her war nor i nspect i ons hav e ser i ousl y degr aded t hi s capabi l i t y . Second.sour ce est i mat es t hat bet ween 10 and 20 count r i es ei t her have. t he CI A had no i ndi cat i on t hat t hi s bi ol ogi cal war f ar e br ai n dr ai n i s occur r i ng . What t ypes of agent s ar e a t hr eat and how wi l l t hey mat ur e gi ven new t echnol ogy? And.us e nat ur e of bi ol ogi cal weapon equi pment and t echni ques mak es t hi s t he easi est pr ogr am t o hi de . I ndi a. does t he i nsi di ous nat ur e of bi ol ogi cal agent s pose a t hr eat ? BWNat i on St at es Some of t he count r i es suspect ed i n open sour ces of havi ng or want i ng a bi ol ogi cal war f ar e pr ogr am i ncl ude Russi a. want .THE BI OLOGI CAL W EAPON advanced pr ogr am bef or e Deser t St or m. I r an. For t unat el y. And t hi r d. Chi na. Li bya. Nor t h Kor ea. Tai wan.suppor t ed t er r or i sm. 53 Bi ol ogi cal War f ar e Tec hnol ogy The degr ee of sophi st i cat i on of eac h count r y' s r esear ch pr ogr amwi l l det er mi ne how advanced bi ol ogi cal agent s wi l l be . I sr ael . and Sout h Af r i ca . open. Paki st an. Syr i a. I r aq. Fi r st .

A mor e st abl e agent t hat pr oduces an accel er at ed r eact i on woul d pr ovi de t he t act i cal c ommander wi t h a vi abl e t act i cal weapon. Wi t hout get t i ng i nt o t he t echni cal aspect s. t he r evol ut i on i n bi ot echnol ogy may pr oduce ot her agent s t hat ar e even mor e t oxi c and r esi l i ent . Ther e i s al so s ome specul at i on t hat a t oxi c agent coul d be pr oduced t hat woul d t ar get onl y a speci f i c genet i c mak eup. 56 Fol l owi ng t he Tok y o s ubway at t ack. 57 Coul d i t be t hat t hi s f anat i c cul t was pl anni ng t o use t hi s sof t war e t o genet i cal l y r eengi neer t hei r bi ol ogi cal or chemi cal agent s? St eal t hy BW Now t he r eal l y sober i ng par t bi ol ogi cal war f ar e agent s ar e ver y di f f i cul t . r el at i vel y mi nor mol ecul ar adj ust ment s may pr oduce a mor e t oxi c. Bot ul i sm and ant hr ax ( ment i oned ear l i er ) ar e hi gh. Addi t i onal l y.pr obabi l i t y candi dat es t hat ar e di f f i cul t t o r eckon wi t h . t he bi ol ogi cal opt i on woul d bec ome muc h mor e at t r act i ve as a bat t l ef i el d weapon . or empl oy ment phases . 55 Thes e t wo ex ampl es of pot ent i al devel opment s i n bi ol ogi cal war f ar e wi l l gi ve t hi s weapon a gr eat deal mor e ut i l i t y. I n addi t i on. Nor mal bi ol ogi cal war f ar e r esear ch f aci l i t i es r es embl e compl et el y l egi t i mat e bi ot echni cal and medi cal r esear ch f aci l i t i es . f ast act i ng. t r ansi t . The pur pose of t hi s t ype of sof t war e i s t o r eengi neer t he mol ecul ar st r uct ur e of chemi cal s or mi c r oor gani s ms t o mak e t hem st r onger or mor e danger ous . gender . i f t he c ommander coul d depl oy bi ol ogi cal agent s agai nst an enemy whi l e f r i endl y t r oops r emai ned i nvul ner abl e.BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE Ev en t he mos t r udi ment ar y pr ogr am wi l l l i kel y have l et hal agent s t hat have been a t hr eat f or s ome t i me . i f not i mpossi bl e. i t has c ome t o l i ght t hat t he Aum Shi nr i Ky o had r ecent l y or der ed sophi st i cat ed mol ecul ar desi gn sof t war e . r aci al or behavi or gr oups as t ar get set s . The s ame pr oduct i on f aci l i t i es t hat c an pr oduce bi ol ogi cal war f ar e 21 6 . gi vi ng an at t acker t he capabi l i t y t o di scr i mi nat e among age. pr oduct i on. t o det ect whi l e t hey ar e i n t he r esear ch. especi al l y on t he bat t l ef i el d . 54 Ther e i s al so a possi bi l i t y t hat genet i c engi neer i ng may pr oduce a weapon t hat i s uni que and c an onl y be pr ot ect ed agai nst wi t h a uni que vacci ne . and st abl e bi ol ogi cal agent .

pr eempt i vel y st r i ke a bi ol ogi cal weapons pr oduct i on or st or age f aci l i t y . Thi s needs t o be done. and agr i cul t ur al pr oduct s . dr ug scan. s i Per sonal pr ot ect i on i n a bi ol ogi cal 21 7 . t he Uni t ed St at es i s unabl e t o ef f ect i vel y pr ot ect t he mi l i t ar y f or ces ( medi cal l y and nonmedi cal l y) . t he t hr eat on t he bat t l ef i el d i s al most as i nsi di ous. i n or der t o conf i dent l y hi ghl i ght a vi ol at i on of t he BWC. Wi t h f ew except i ons. i mmi gr at i on. I n addi t i on. Gi ven t he wi de spect r um of ki nds of agent s t hat mak e up t he bi ol ogi cal war f ar e t hr eat . Shor t f al l s I n addi t i on t o t he det ect i on shor t f al l . or bomb sear ch pr ocedur es t o i dent i f y t he agent . i f necessar y. 59 Si mi l ar l y. t her e i s no mec hani s m usi ng r out i ne cust oms. Deser t St or m r epr esent s a r ecent exper i ence i n whi c h t he Uni t ed St at es needed t he abi l i t y t o det ect bi ol ogi cal war f ar e agent s t o gi ve ear l y war ni ng f or pr ot ect i ve meas ur es . wi t h ver y l i t t l e pr esent det ect i on capabi l i t y .i t was an exper i ment s° I t s eems l ogi cal t hat t he i nabi l i t y t o det ect and t her eby pr ot ect t he ci vi l i an popul at i on or mi l i t ar y f or ce woul d si gni f i cant l y add t o t he vi abi l i t y of bi ol ogi cal weapons as a t er r or i st or t act i cal bat t l ef i el d t hr eat . and i t appear s t hey wi l l be so at l east f or t he near . conduct an ef f ect i ve pr eempt i ve count er of f ensi ve st r i ke.THE BI OLOGI CAL W EAPON agent s may al so pr oduce wi ne and beer . I n ot her wor ds. s houl d al l peacef ul r emedi es f ai l .on bag or c hec k ed l uggage. or pr ot ect t he popul at i on agai nst a t er r or i st at t ack . I t bec omes near l y i mpossi bl e t o i dent i f y t he l ocat i ons and f aci l i t i es t hat ar e act ual l y pr oduc i ng bi ol ogi cal war f ar e weapons . f ood. i f a t er r or i st want ed t o car r y t he bi ol ogi cal agent i nt o t he Uni t ed St at es i n a car r y. The onl y way t o f i nd i t woul d be a physi cal sear ch by a ver y wel l t r ai ned and ver y l ucky sear cher . obvi ousl y. 58 The chal l enge t hi s pr esent s i s i n di st i ngui shi ng l egi t i mat e pr oduct i on pl ant s f r om i l l i ci t ones .t er m. t he capabi l i t y was not t her e . bi ol ogi cal war f ar e agent s ar e vi r t ual l y undet ect abl e whi l e t hey ar e i n t r ansi t . or . The l i mi t ed capabi l i t y t hat was depl oyed was t he r esul t of a cr ash pr ogr am t o pr oduce a bi ol ogi cal det ect or . medi cal pr ophyl act i c meas ur es ( pr i mar i l y vacci nat i ons) ar e i nadequat e. dr i ed mi l k.

Near l y ever y gr ocer y or dr ug st or e sel l s smal l aer osol deodor i zer s t hat per i odi cal l y spr ay a f r agr ant mi st . Ot her " concept s of oper at i ons" ar e not har d t o i magi ne . ar t i l l er y.BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE war f ar e envi r onment cur r ent l y depends on pr ot ect i ve cl ot hi ngt he chemi cal war f ar e sui t . t he ent i r e popul at i on of t he Depar t ment of Def ense headquar t er s woul d be i ncapaci t at ed. I n Deser t St or m. I n a c ombat envi r onment . The f or ce' s abi l i t y t o conduct ef f ect i ve c ombat oper at i ons woul d cer t ai nl y be negat ed . t hey mi ght r ef i l l t hese deodor i zer s wi t h a bi ol ogi cal agent and cl andest i nel y pl ace one i n each r est r oom i n t he Pent agon . Consi der t he i mpl i cat i ons i f t he Aum Shi nr i Ky o had used bot ul i num t oxi n or Ant hr ax i nst ead of t he Sar i n chemi cal agent i n t hei r at t ack on t he s ubway syst em i n Tok y o . t he chemi cal war f ar e sui t was adequat e i f f i t t ed pr oper l y ( a f r equent pr obl em) but unsui t abl e i f wor n f or l ong dur at i ons or whi l e i n hot weat her . f ol l owi ng a bi ol ogi cal war f ar e at t ack. t he war coul d have been l ost . By t he t i me doct or s di agnos ed t he di sease and det er mi ned t he r i ght ant i dot e. 65 Gi ven t hi s di scour agi ng i nf or mat i on. Li ke t he I ndi ans at For t Ti conder oga. An i nf i l t r at i on by speci al oper at i ons f or ces or under cover oper at i ves t o pl ace aer osol cani st er s si mi l ar t o i nsect bombs or deodor i zer s mi ght cr i ppl e a f or ce bef or e i t k new i t was at t acked . i f t her e wer e one. 64 Addi t i onal l y. c aus i ng mas s c onf us i on and wi despr ead t er r or . 63 The Uni t ed St at es i s i mpot ent t o pr event a bi ol ogi cal war f ar e t er r or i st at t ack agai nst t he popul at i on unl ess t her e i s speci f i c i nt el l i gence t o f or ewar n of t he at t ack . or even a spr ayi ng devi ce on an ai r cr af t ( l i ke a cr op dust er ) woul d not be near l y as ef f ect i ve as a mor e sur r ept i t i ous at t ack t hat woul d i nf ect peopl e bef or e t hey donned pr ot ect i ve cl ot hi ng . convent i onal di sper sal wi t h bombs. t her e ar e many agent s t hat medi ci ne can' t t r eat t oday . t he scenar i o descr i bed i n t he pr ol ogue s eems even mor e pl ausi bl e . t he f or ce woul d f al l i l l and many woul d di e . The deat h count and t he magni t ude of t he t er r or woul d have been 21 8 . Af t er a f ew days. I f an adver sar y want ed t o neut r al i ze t he mi l i t ar y br ai nst em of t he Uni t ed St at es. 62 Deser t St or m al so hi ghl i ght ed t he shor t f al l i n t he abi l i t y t o st r i ke a bi ol ogi cal war f ar e st or age f aci l i t y wi t h conf i dence t hat massi ve number s of i nnocent ci vi l i ans woul d not be ki l l ed ( col l at er al damage) as a r esul t .

Cl ear l y. No one woul d consi der a f i r e ext i ngui sher out of t he or di nar y i n a cr i si s si t uat i on af t er t he bombi ng. 66 I n anot her r ecent r eal . t he addi t i on of bi ol ogi cal agent s t o t he convent i onal at t ack woul d r eal l y have t er r i f i ed l eader s and ot her ci t i zens i n t he Uni t ed St at es . The BW vehi cl e t o pr event bi ol ogi cal pr ol i f er at i on .wor l d i nci dent . Resol ut i on Bi ol ogi cal t er r or i sm i s a chal l enge f or t he di pl omat i c. medi cal . muc h t ougher 21 9 . mi l i t ar y.t hat coul d be near l y 5. i nabi l i t y) t o deal wi t h s uc h an event ual i t y . 67 Wi t h t he bl at ant vi ol at i ons of Russi a and I r aq.a sober i ng pr ospect i ve .nat i on st at es.THE BI OLOGI CAL W EAPON hi gher by or der s of magni t ude . These i nci dent s of pot ent i al bi ol ogi cal t er r or i sm mus t r ai se concer n and quest i ons about ci vi l i zed soci et y' s abi l i t y ( or mor e accur at el y. 2 per cent act ual l y ex per i enc ed. I n t he ensui ng pani c. Unf or t unat el y. but t he pol i t i cal ar ena may hol d t he bi ggest st i ck t o det er C i s t he i nt er nat i onal bi ol ogi cal war f ar e aggr essi on . not on t he bat t l ef i el d by war r i or s but among dense popul at i on cent er s by der anged non. t he at t ack coul d have been vast l y mor e devast at i ng . consi der how muc h mor e ef f ect i ve t he t er r or i st bombi ng of t he New Yor k Wor l d Tr ade Cent er woul d hav e been i f t hey had pl aced a f i r e ext i ngui sher f i l l ed wi t h a bi ol ogi cal agent at t he bot t omof each st ai r wel l and r i gged t hem t o begi n spr ayi ng j ust as t he bomb i gni t ed . t echni cal . 000 t i mes t he amount of bot ul i num t oxi n needed t o cause t he s ame ef f ect . i t does not pr ovi de f or ver i f i cat i on or puni t i ve meas ur es . Ther e may have been as hi gh as a 90 per cent f at al i t y r at e i nst ead of 0 . As we ent er t he t went y. As a r esul t . t housands of occupant s of t he bui l di ng escaped down t he st ai r s . pot ent i al l y ever y occupant i n t he Wor l d Tr ade Cent er coul d have been i nf ect ed .and soon . we may wel l be f aci ng weapons of mas s dest r uct i on used. mor e has t o be done t o over come t hi s dr amat i c vul ner abi l i t y. I f t he i nt ent of t he t er r or i st s had been t o demonst r at e how vul ner abl e t he popul at i on of t he Uni t ed St at es i s. 000 dead i nnocent ci vi l i ansl And consi der i ng t hat t he vol ume of Sar i n t o sat ur at e a gi ven ar ea i s appr oxi mat el y equi val ent t o 10. and i nt el l i gence communi t i es.f i r st cent ur y.

t he pr oduct i on f aci l i t i es and st or ed muni t i ons . comf or t abl e. dependi ng on t he scenar i o . no mat t er t he si ze . f or means t o det ect cl andest i ne bi ol ogi cal pr oduct i on f aci l i t i es . i n concer t wi t h t he i nt el l i gence c ommuni t y .use t echnol ogy t hat pr oduces bi ol ogi cal agent s gi ves t he bi ol ogi cal war f ar e pr oducer an al most bui l t . Thi s ef f or t shoul d be a t op pr i or i t y . For obvi ous pol i t i cal r easons.of .BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE ver i f i cat i on pr ot ocol s and st r onger t eet h mus t be bui l t i nt o t he BW C. bot h on t he bat t l ef i el d and i n bi ol ogi cal agent det ect or s si mi l ar t o met al det ect or s .ar t mus t be pus hed t o f i nd s ome means t o det ect a pr oduct i on f aci l i t y wi t h cer t ai nt y. The st at e. The mi l i t ar y al so shoul d hone i t s speci al oper at i ons. Thi s daunt i ng t ask wi l l be even mor e chal l engi ng gi ven t he cont r over sy about t he v ac c i nes admi ni s t er ed dur i ng Des er t St or m and t hei r suspect ed connect i on wi t h t he Gul f War Sy ndr ome . al so. The mi l i t ar y mus t al so be capabl e of r espondi ng t o a mor e st r at egi c bi ol ogi cal war f ar e t hr eat . be kept non.nucl ear .at t ack t r eat ment i n 22 0 . The speci al oper at i on opt i on may be a mor e pl ausi bl e al t er nat i ve. The medi c al c ommuni t y s houl d c ont i nue t o wor k on bi ol ogi cal war f ar e vacci nat i ons t hat ar e br oad. Ther e shoul d al so be t echnol ogi cal expl or at i on.t he. To r espond on t he bat t l ef i el d.i n pl ausi bl e deni abi l i t y . saf e. ai r condi t i oned uni t woul d be i deal . Thi s i s especi al l y chal l engi ng gi ven t hat t he dual . Pl anner s mus t wor k wi t h t he t echnol ogy c ommuni t y t o devel op a capabi l i t y t o bomb a bi ol ogi cal war f ar e t ar get and dest r oy t he vi abi l i t y of t he agent s bef or e t hey c an be br ought t o bear on f r i endl y f or ces and wi t hout causi ng unaccept abl e l evel s of col l at er al damage . l ong.based. and mi l i t ar i es mus t dev el op ef f ect i ve. The t echni cal c ommuni t y has t he gr eat est and mos t ur gent chal l enge t o devel op ef f ect i ve det ect or s. and i n suf f i ci ent quant i t i es t o i nocul at e t hose peopl e mos t suscept i bl e t o bi ol ogi cal war f ar e at t acks . A sel f . s8 Doct or s shoul d al so st r i ve t o i mpr ove t he post .wear i ng pr ot ect i ve cl ot hi ng t o r epl ace t he exi st i ng ens embl e .cont ai ned. s uc h pr eci si on. di r ect act i on ski l l s f or t he bi ol ogi cal ( as wel l as chemi cal and nucl ear ) mi ssi on .gui ded muni t i ons shoul d. Bot h human i nt el l i gence and t he nat i onal t echni cal means mus t be gr eat l y i mpr oved . The mi l i t ar y chal l enge i s t o t r ai n and equi p t o r espond t o a det ect ed bi ol ogi cal t hr eat s .

s ome of t hese ef f or t s have demonst r at ed bl at ant par ochi al i sm. t hi s pol i cy mus t be suppor t ed by unr el ent i ng r esol ve t o act ual l y car r y out t he r et al i at i on .THE BI OLOGI CAL. Per haps even mor e i mpor t ant l y.pr epar ed t o def end agai nst or count er i t . Thi s i s especi al l y i mpor t ant t o det er t er r or i sm i n t he i nt er i m unt i l human i nt el l i gence and nat i onal t echni cal means can pr ovi de mor e def i ni t i ve answer s about who ar e t he haves and hav e not s . Thi s was an ef f ect i ve det er r ent on bot h si des dur i ng t he col d war . Publ i c Heal t h Ser vi ce. Uni t ed St at es and al l i ed pol i t i cal l eader shi p shoul d ar t i cul at e a cl ear r et al i at or y pol i cy agai nst t he us e of any weapon of mas s dest r uct i on . Fi nal l y. and a r esponsi ve sur ge capabi l i t y t o admi ni st er t o l ar ge number s of bi ol ogi cal war f ar e. pl aci ng emphasi s on nat i onal i nt er est s and pr i or i t i zi ng accor di ngl y. A mul t i . Feder al Emer genc y Management Agenc y . Yet t he Uni t ed St at es i s i l l . Mor e r esour ces shoul d be di r ect ed t owar d i dent i f yi ng bi ol ogi cal war f ar e t hr eat s by human and nat i onal t echni cal means .exposed pat i ent s . The i nt el l i gence c ommuni t y mus t be st r engt hened and sensi t i zed i n i t s ef f or t s t o gat her dat a on t he bi ol ogi cal war f ar e t hr eat . Conc l us i ons Bi ol ogi cal war f ar e has been a t hr eat f or decades i f not cent ur i es .agency st eer i ng gr oup . Depar t ment of Def ense.why ? One vi ew i s t hat " t he Uni t ed St at es has a 22 1 . Addi t i onal l y.l evel c ohes i on t o t hese f r agment ed endeavor s .W EAPON t er ms of r api d di agnosi s. t he di r ect i on of t he ef f or t shoul d c ome f r om a mul t i . Cent r al I nt el l i gence Agency. Thi s st eer i ng gr oup i ni t i al l y shoul d i ncl ude pr i nci pal s or pr i mar y deput i es f r om t he Of f i ce of t he Whi t e House.agency st eer i ng gr oup woul d over come t hese st ovepi pe at t i t udes and ef f or t s. but t her e i s l i t t l e seni or . and Depar t ment of Just i ce . and i t appear s t o have det er r ed Saddam Hussei n dur i ng Deser t St or m. ef f ect i ve medi cal t r eat ment . Wel l ver sed t echni cal and oper at i onal advi sor s wi l l be essent i al t o st eer t he ef f or t . Si nc e count er i ng BW i s an i ssue t hat cr osses many gov er nment agency bor der s. Many of t hese agenci es al r eady have ongoi ng pr ogr ams.

Howev er .BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE t endency t o wi s h t he pr obl em woul d go away because i t s eems t oo unsavor y and t oo di f f i cul t t o handl e . s omeone st r i kes us or our al l i es wi t h a poor needs t o be a gi ant The Uni t ed St at es and pr ot ect bef or e man' s nuk e . pr eempt .cost . Wei gh t hi s agai nst a t hr eat t hat has not yet f ul l y mani f est ed i t sel f . but al so. " 7° I t s eems t he r eal i ssue i s t he appar ent i mbal ance bet ween demonst r at ed t hr eat ver sus r esour ces expended t o meet t hat bi ol ogi cal war f ar e t hr eat . 22 2 . Unf or t unat el y. but i t st ep . wher e necessar y and f easi bl e. I t al most s eems l ogi cal t hat deci si on mak er s woul d be r el uct ant t o s pend scar ce r es our c es agai nst a her et of or e i nvi si bl e t hr eat . f or ces mus t be pr epar ed t o det er . pr oduct i on and st or age f aci l i t i es f or s uc h weapons.9 J anuar y Thi s i s a CNN speci al r epor t l i ve f r om t he Ant hr ax Tas k For ce Cent er Mi ami . W e ar e pl aci ng a hi gh pr i or i t y on i mpr ovi ng our abi l i t y t o l ocat e. and t hei r del i ver y s y s t ems . Epi l ogue. The Uni t ed St at es wi l l r et ai n t he capaci t y t o r et al i at e agai nst t hose who mi ght c ont empl at e t he us e of weapons of mas s dest r uct i on. t o pr event i t . The bi ol ogi cal war f ar e t hr eat l ooms . we wi l l need t he capabi l i t y not onl y t o det er t hei r use agai nst ei t her our sel ves or our al l i es and f r i ends. I n Febr uar y 1995. To mi ni mi ze t he vul ner abi l i t y of our f or ces abr oad t o weapons of mas s dest r uct i on. mus t have t he capabi l i t y t o det ect . However . t he f at al i t y count was 16. TMs gr i mf i gur e was j ust gi ven t o us by doct or s her e. pr event and def end agai nst t hei r use . T9us mor ni ng. i dent i f y.BWpr ogr am. 437. we ar e pl aci ng a hi gh pr i or i t y on i mpr ovi ng our abi l i t y t o l ocat e. t o mi ni mi ze t he i mpact of pr ol i f er at i on of weapons of mas s dest r uct i on on our i nt er est s. and t hei r del i ver y syst ems . S. " We don' t need i t [ BW def ense] because we hav e a t r eat y . 71 Thi s i s a st ep i n t he r i ght di r ect i on. i dent i f y and di sabl e ar senal s of weapons of mas s dest r uct i on. I n t he case of bi ol ogi cal war f ar e. and di sabl e ar senal s of weapons of mas s dest r uct i on. pr oduct i on and st or age f aci l i t i es f or s uc h weapons . t he Uni t ed St at es i s mov i ng t owar d a mor e aggr essi ve c ount er . " 69 Anot her skept i c says. t he f i xes ar e t echni cal l y di f f i cul t and t hey wi l l not be l ow. t he Whi t e Hous e publ i shed a nat i onal secur i t y st r at egy t hat sai d : U. so t hat t he cost s of s uc h use wi l l be seen as out wei ghi ng t he gai ns .

11. Takaf uj i . J apanes e Bi ol ogi cal War f ar e 1932. 1994) . . May 23. 1994. Do not hesi t at e.l i ke sympt oms. . and Har r i s and Pax man. . Nat i onal Def ense Uni ver si t y 1991) . Not es 1 Mont gomer y ( Al abama) Adver t i ser . 1982) . and t he US Ar my Resear ch I nst i t ut e of I nf ect i ous Di seases. Col . 4 . 5. H. P. Doct or s ar e wor ki ng f r ant i cal l y t o save as many as possi bl e. M. you ar e pr obabl y i nf ect ed. t he Cent er f or Di sease Cont r ol . US Ar my. Bai l ey. B. 11 . Back t o CNNNews Headquar t er s .up ( NewYor k : Rout l edge. Kat hl een C. and Har r i s and Pax man. t o name j ust a f ew. Mi l i t ar y Cont r ol Over t he New Genet i c Technol ogi es ( New Yor k : Beech Tr ee Books. Bai l ey. 4 . 2 .81 . 10.45 and t he Amer i can Cover . Har r i s. 113. 6. Bai l ey. C. They ar e war ni ng anyone who at t ended t he Or ange Bowl on New Year ' s Day t o seek medi cal at t ent i on i mmedi at el y. 1994) . 10 . " Bi ol ogi cal Weapons and Moder n War f ar e" ( For t McNai r . Bai l ey. : Lawr ence Li ver mor e Nat i onal Labor at or y. . Har r i s and Pax man. 2 . The Feder al Emer gency Management Agency heads t he t eam t hat consi st s of r epr esent at i ves f r om t he FBI . Gene War s. D. The FBI r epor t s t hat t hi s appear s t o be a del i ber at e act of mass mur der . The Ant hr ax Task For ce was qui ckl y assembl ed on t he si xt h of Januar y af t er doct or s acr oss t he nat i on di agnosed t he hor r i bl e epi demi c as pul monar y ant hr ax . t he Ar med For ces Mi l i t ar y I nt el l i gence Cent er . 9. Er nest T. Yamamot o. but t hey ar e r unni ng out of ant i bi ot i cs and f aci ng massi ve over cr owdi ng . sec . and r el at i ves ar e bei ng asked t o wai t out si de unl ess t hei r l oved one i s cr i t i cal . 74 .131 . I f you ar e exper i enci ng col d. Char l es Pi l l er and Kei t h R. Nov ember 24. 3 . ed . And t her e ar e many of t hose . They ar e of f er i ng a t en mi l l i on dol l ar r ewar d f or any i nf or mat i on about t hi s hor r endous cr i me . M. 29 . 7. The hal l s ar e cr owded wi t h gur neys. 9. Di r ect or ' s Ser i es on Pr ol i f er at i on ( Spr i ngf i el d.THE BI OLOGI CAL W EAPON t hey say t he number i s goi ng t o i ncr ease dr amat i cal l y because so many pat i ent s ar e cl ose t o deat h r i ght now. 1988) . The I ndust r i al Col l ege of t he Ar med For ces. 75. or i t wi l l be f at al . Va .10. But t hat i s al l t hey have been abl e t o det er mi ne . Rober t Har r i s and J er emy Pax man. 74 . Thi s i s al l f r omMi ami . A Hi gher For m of Ki l l i ng ( New Yor k : Hi l l and Wang. 10 . 22 3 . Fact or i es of Deat h. 8. 9 .83 . . Washi ngt on. i bi d . Shel don H. 75. D.

Uni t ed St at es Ar my. 162. C. 2.32. Conduct of t he Per si an Gul f War . J onat han B. 22 . Bai l ey.74 . The Pr ol i f er at i on of Advanced Weaponr y ( Washi ngt on.93. 27 . . 42 . Fact or i es of Deat h.BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE 12 . Bai l ey. 15 . " Pr ophet of Poi son. 29 . vol . 30. Fact or i es of Deat h. : US Gover nment Pr i nt i ng Of f i ce. 41 . 12 28 . 15 . 30 . Tucker . December 1993. 3 Apr i l 1995. 26 . 21 .98 . 35 .27. Har r i s. C . 34 . 37. S. 639. Mass . 27 . " Repor t : Russi a mak i ng ' Super pl ague Ger ms. 29 . Bai l ey. Bi ol ogi cal War f ar e Pr ogr ams. " Lessons of I r aq' s Bi ol ogi cal War f ar e Pr ogr amme" Ar ms Cont r ol . Bai l ey. eds . S. 6. : US Gover nment Pr i nt i ng Of f i ce. and Jeanne McDer mot t . I bi d. 2 ( Washi ngt on. 156. Cl ouds of Secr ecy. The Ki l l i ng Wi nds. " Japanese Cul t Had Bact er i a Usef ul f or Ger m War f ar e" San Fr anci sco Chr oni cl e. Col e. " The Honol ul u Adver t i ser . and McDer mot t . : AAAS. The New Shape of Ter r or i sm and Conf l i ct ( Lexi ngt on. Har r i s. C . FYnal Repor t t o Congr ess ( Washi ngt on. McDer mot t . The Menace of Bi ol ogi cal War f ar e ( NewYor k : Ar bor House.72. Thi s i s based on t he aut hor ' s exper i ence as chi ef of t he t eam char t er ed wi t h f i ndi ng t he sol ut i on t o at t acki ng bi ol ogi cal war f ar e st or age and pr oduct i on f aci l i t i es . 16 . Joseph D. 189. 42. 16. 28 Mar ch 1994 . 24 . 20 . 40 . I bi d. 39 . and Har r i s. Bai l ey. Fact or i es of Deat h. Ar my Act i vi t y i n t he U. 131 . 171. 25 . Apr i l 1992) . D. 29. Har r i s. Tucker . 224 . Har r i s. 237.63 . 107. 11 . 240. 19. 29 Mar ch 1995. Fact or i es of Deat h.19.44. Dougl as. 1987) . 17 . D. Bai l ey. Mar t Yamaguchi . 31 . 32 . and St ephen Rose. Davi d Van Bi ema. 19 . 28 . 8 Apr i l 1995 . " The Comi ng Expl osi on of Si l ent Weapons. Leonar d A. D. Tucker . 29 . " The Fut ur e of Bi ol ogi cal War f ar e.22 . 88. I bi d . 17 . . 1987) . 33 . " Naval War Col l ege Revi ew. 68. 23 . 16 . Har r i s. 1977) . 28 . 14 . 15 .90 . Tucker .7. U. . 220. 164. 38 . Van Bi ema. The Ar my' s Ger m War f ar e Test s over Popul at ed Ar eas ( Landam. 18 . and Tucker . 37 . Mont gomer y Adver t i ser . Md . I bi d. . Uni t ed St at es Depar t ment of Def ense ( DOD) . Of f i ce of t he Secr et ar y of Def ense. I bi d . Fact or i es of Deat h. 1988) . Fact or i es of Deat h. 18 . DOD. Jonat han B. ( Summer 1989) : 26. 197. : Lexi ngt on Books. Col e. : Rowman & Li t t l ef i el d. Amer i ca t he Vul ner abl e: The Thr eat of Chemi cal / Bi ol ogi cal War f ar e. " i n Thomas Wander and Er i c H. " Tune. 36 . 13 . 1993) . and McDer mot t . Ar net t .

54 . Bai l ey.27 . Br oder and Davi d Lamb .63 . Bai l ey. 85 . 50 .12 . 11. Sof t war e Ret ur ned t o U. 61 . " Some Al l i es Won' t Joi n Of f ensi ve. . Rose. 250. and Rose. I bi d . Bai l ey.41 . Tucker . 68 . 65 . Pr esi dent Geor ge Bush. The Whi t e House. Pr odi gy Ser vi ces Company . 46 . Gui l mar t 3n Jr . .40 . I bi d . Def ense Nucl ear Agency. 29 . 60 . Bai l ey. 35. 62 . 35. 58 . 24 Dec ember 1990 . 3 Apr i l 1995 . 70 . " Bi ol ogi cal Pl an Bombed. Dec ember 8. 40. 259 . 50 . 51 . . 1994 . 64 . . I I . 49 . 20 Jul y 1994) . Det r i ck.59 . 33 . DOD. 82 . Cheney Say s . Rose. Tucker . Pa. 50 . 67 .90 . 48 . 20 . I bi d . 67. 46 . 44 .46 . Apr i l 1994) . I bi d . 26. 52 . Rose. Bi ol ogi cal Weapons Pr ol i f er at i on ( Ft . 71 . 59 . 69 . J ohn M. 85. 55 . " US St at e Depar t ment Di spat ch. Def ens e Nuc l ear Agency. 12 . USA Today. S. Tucker . . : Gov er nment Pr i nt i ng Of f i ce. 53 . I bi d . I bi d . 62. Two Hi st or i ans i n Technol ogy and War ( Car l i sl e Bar r acks. 3 Febr uar y 1991 .THE BI OLOGI CAL W EAPON 43 . 66 . Febr uar y 1995) . 639. 57 . 14 . 47 . 639. 2. " Los Angel es 71i mes. 45 . : US Ar my W ar Col l ege. " London : Reut er s Wi r e Ser vi ce. C. J ohn F. 56 . " Cr i si s i n t he Gul f . . . Rose. 49 . D. : US Ar my Medi cal Resear ch I nst i t ut e of I nf ect i ous Di seases. Md . ( 14 J anuar y 1991) : 25 .46 .46 .76 . 35 . Fi r ms. 63 . DOD. and Si r Mi chael Howar d. Def ense Nucl ear Agency. A Nat i onal Secur i t y St r at egy of Engagement and Enl ar gement ( Washi ngt on.

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gr oups. economi c. has gone r el at i vel y unnot i ced . The r evol ut i on i n bi ot echnol ogy. The i nt r oduct i on of smal l pox i nt o t he NewWor l d by Eur opean expl or er s deci mat ed t he popul at i on of Nat i ve Amer i cans . 2 Adv anc es i n sensor s. Nat ur e has l ong waged i t s own f or m of bi ol ogi cal war f ar e . and i ndi vi dual s 22 7 .Chapt er 9 Twent y. The epi demi c of buboni c pl ague ki l l ed an est i mat ed one quar t er of Eur ope' s medi eval popul at i on ( 25 mi l l i on deat hs) bet ween 1347 and 1351 .f i r st cent ur y. USAF The Uni t ed St at es mi l i t ar y i s ent er i ng " one of t hose r ar e hi st or i cal per i ods when r evol ut i ons happen i n how war s ar e f ought . " i Some t en mi l i t ar y r evol ut i ons have occur r ed si nce t he f our t eent h cent ur y . The r evol ut i on der i ves not f r om any si ngl e i nvent i on or i dea. however . The s ame t echnol ogy and exper t i se whi c h has br ought r evol ut i onar y medi cal t her api es and gr eat er agr i cul t ur al pr oduct i vi t y i s r eadi l y t r ansf er abl e t o t he devel opment of bi ol ogi cal weapons . but f r om a r ange of r api dl y devel opi ng t echnol ogi es . Many t echni cal bar r i er s t hat once l i mi t ed t he ef f ect i ve use of bi ol ogi cal war f ar e ( BW) ar e gone . 5 Suc h event s as t hese undeni abl y c hange bi ol ogi c. 3 A pandemi c of Spani sh f l u may have ki l l ed 50 mi l l i on peopl e wor l dwi de bet ween 1918 and 1919 . A count r y or gr oup wi t h modes t phar maceut i cal exper t i se c an devel op BWf or t er r or i st or mi l i t ar y use . st eal t h t echnol ogy. 40 mi l l i on peopl e coul d be i nf ect ed by t he Human I mmunodef i ci ency Vi r us ( HI V) whi c h causes t he Acqui r ed I mmunodef i ci ency Di sease Sy ndr ome ( AI DS) .Fi r st Cent ur y Ger mWar f ar e Lt Col Rober t P. and pol i t i cal syst ems . Gover nment s. 4 By t he year 2000. communi cat i ons. i t mus t gr asp t he i mpl i cat i ons of t hi s si l ent r evol ut i on . Kadl ec. and pr eci si on muni t i ons hav e pr eoccupi ed t hose l eader s pl anni ng how t he Uni t ed St at es wi l l wage f ut ur e war s . As t he Uni t ed St at es pr epar es i t sel f f or t he nat i onal secur i t y chal l enges of t he t went y.

f or pound. pot ent i al i mpact of use. 60 have been i dent i f i ed wi t h pot ent i al weapon 22 8 . t her e i s a si gni f i cant mi sper cept i on t hat cl ouds BW di scussi ons .def i ned s y mpt om compl exes . bl ood. I n t he cur r ent publ i c opi ni on. and t oxi ns t o i nduce i l l ness or deat h i n humans . t han chemi cal agent s . Of t he f our gener al t ypes of bi ol ogi cal war f ar e agent s ment i oned. vi r uses. bl i st er . and met hods of appl i cat i on ar e di st i nct l y di f f er ent f r om t hose of chemi cal war f ar e ( CW) . Skept i cs mi st akenl y di smi ss t he mi l i t ar y or st r at egi c val ue of bi ol ogi cal weapons . Bi ol ogi cal war f ar e can i ncl ude t he use of bact er i a. I n t hi s cont ext . Bi ol ogi cal war f ar e i s of t en l umped t oget her wi t h chemi cal weapons . and i ncapaci t at i ng agent s . The out come of each exposur e i s dose. The physi ol ogi cal and medi cal ef f ect s of CWar e l i mi t ed t o wel l . physi ol ogi c ef f ect s. met hods of pr ot ect i on and det ect i on. s Ther e ar e f our di st i nct t ypes of chemi cal weapons : ner ve.dose bl i st er agent exposur e such as must ar d gas .dependent deat h or i ncapaci t at i on . These weapons r epr esent a cr edi bl e t hr eat t o Uni t ed St at es secur i t y and f ut ur e economi c pr osper i t y . and t he abi l i t y t o expl oi t US vul ner abi l i t i es . pound.BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE who desi r e weapons of mas s dest r uct i on ( WMD) c an use bi ot echnol ogy t o achi eve t hi s goal . I n BW. Ten gr ams of ant hr ax spor es coul d ki l l as many peopl e as a t on of t he ner ve agent Sar i n. ani mal s. The ef f ect s f r om t hese chemi cal agent s can occur wi t hi n seconds of exposur e as i n t he case of ner ve and bl ood agent s or as l ong sever al hour s i n t he ci r cumst ance of l ow. Usi ng bi ol ogi cal weapons under t he cover of an endemi c or nat ur al di sease occur r ence pr ovi des an at t acker t he pot ent i al f or pl ausi bl e deni al . Chemi c al War f ar e Ver s us Bi ol ogi cal War f ar e Bi ol ogi cal agent s ar e many t i mes deadl i er . and pl ant s . I t i s t he onl y weapon of mas s dest r uct i on whi ch has ut i l i t y acr oss t he spect r um of conf l i ct . Bi ol ogi cal war f ar e of f er s an adver sar y uni que and si gni f i cant advant ages because of i t s ease of pr oduct i on. t he t ypes of agent s. bi ol ogi cal weapons of f er s gr eat er possi bi l i t i es f or use t han do nucl ear weapons . r i cket t si a.

Bot ul i numt oxi n i s t he most t oxi c subst ance k nown t o man. The i nef f ect i ve dose r equi r ed t o i nduce i l l ness or deat h may be as gr eat as t ens of t housand of or gani sms as i n t he case of ant hr ax. Thi s i ncubat i on per i od i s t he t i me necessar y f or t he mi cr obe or vi r al agent t o est abl i sh i t sel f i n t he host and r epl i cat e. af f or ds vi r t ual l y 100 per cent pr ot ect i on . Toxi ns. t he hazar d posed by bi ol ogi cal agent s i s pr i mar i l y an i nhal at i onal one. The most ef f ect i ve means of del i ver i ng a BW agent i s vi a an aer osol i n t he one t o f i ve mi cr on par t i cl e si ze . ? The medi cal ef f ect s of bi ol ogi cal agent s ar e di ver se and ar e not necessar i l y r el at ed t o t he t ype of agent . whi ch can ei t her i ncapaci t at e or ki l l i t s vi ct i m. when pr oper l y f i t t ed and donned. i nhal at i on of nanogr ams ( 10. or j ust a f ew as wi t h t ul ar emi a . ar e a pr oduct of l i vi ng or gani sms and behave si mi l ar t o chemi cal agent s . Bi ol ogi cal agent s gener al l y do not pose a cut aneous hazar d .FI RST CENTURY GERMW ut i l i t y agai nst humans . Some c aus e pneumoni a . An i ndi vi dual i s pr ot ect ed f r om t he vapor and l i qui d hazar d of CW wi t h t he combi nat i on of a pr ot ect i ve mas k and t he Mi ssi on Or i ent ed Pr ot ect i ve Post ur e ( MOPP) sui t . Each one causes a di f f er ent compl ex of sympt oms.ARFARE TWENTY.9 mi l l i gr ams) of t hi s agent wi l l cause pr ogr essi ve muscul ar par al ysi s l eadi ng t o asphyxi at i on and deat h. Wi t h t he except i on of exposur e t o a t oxi n. Haz ar ds and Pr ot ect i on The r i sk posed by chemi cal agent s has t wo component s : a vapor and l i qui d hazar d . A MOPP sui t i s not r equi r ed . Ot her s c an c aus e encephal i t i s or i nf l ammat i on of t he br ai n. When US t r oops depl oyed t o Saudi 22 9 . Wi t hout suppor t i ve car e. a per i od of sever al days or even weeks may pass bef or e t he onset of sympt oms and t he ul t i mat e ef f ect . Cr eat i on of t hi s t ype of an i nvi si bl e aer osol cl oud may be ef f i ci ent l y accompl i shed usi ng an agr i cul t ur al spr ayer f or exampl e . The Uni t ed St at es al so possesses an ar r ay of chemi cal poi nt det ect or s and al ar ms whi ch pr ovi de r eal t i me war ni ng of exposur e or at t ack . The cur r ent US mi l i t ar y pr ot ect i ve mask. I n cont r ast . on t he ot her hand.

t hey di d not hav e an oper at i onal capabi l i t y t o det ect any bi ol ogi cal agent s . 9 Dur i ng t he Gul f War . $ Dur i ng Deser t St or m. The number of pot ent i al agent s.t i me or adv anc ed war ni ng of a bi ol ogi cal at t ack . t he Uni t ed St at es f i el ded onl y a r udi ment ar y devel opment al det ect or s y s t em. t he f i r st l i kel y i ndi cat i on of an at t ack was i l l and dyi ng sol di er s .BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE Ar abi a dur i ng Oper at i on Deser t Shi el d. Al l t hr ee t ypes of pr oduct s c an pr ovi de bot h pr eexposur e and post exposur e pr ot ect i on t o an i nf ect i ous di sease and t her ef or e a BWagent . Vacci nes ar e act i ve i mmuni zat i on measur es wher eby t he host i s i nt ent i onal l y exposed t o ei t her an at t enuat ed or i nact i vat ed f or m of t he di sease causi ng agent . however . t he met hodol ogy f or det ect i ng chemi cal agent s i s not usef ul by i t sel f . and t he demandi ng t echni cal and devel opment al r equi r ement s mak e t he chal l enge of BWdet ect i on daunt i ng. Bi ol ogi c al W ar f ar e Det ec t i on and Medi c al Pr ot ec t i on Det ect i on of bi ol ogi cal agent s i s a compl ex pr obl em. Ther e was no capabi l i t y t o pr ovi de any r eal . I n l i eu of det ect i on or advanced war ni ng and t he oppor t uni t y t o don pr ot ect i ve masks. Vacci nes pr ompt t he body t o pr oduce ant i bodi es whi c h can af f or d a hi gh l evel of pr ot ect i on 23 0 . i mmunogl obul i ns and ant i bi ot i cs c an mi t i gat e t he ef f ect of bi ol ogi cal agent s and t he pot ent i al oper at i onal i mpact . medi cal pr oduct s s uc h as vacci nes. Adv anc es i n medi cal di agnost i cs and bi ot echnol ogy ar e al l owi ng sci ence t o over come t hese t echni cal obst acl es . i t t ook bet ween 13 and 24 hour s af t er t he at t ack t o det er mi ne t he pr esence and i dent i f y t he BWagent . I n addi t i on t o t he l i mi t ed scope of t hi s det ect or . Eac h pr ospect i ve BWagent r equi r es a speci f i c assay t o det ect and i dent i f y . Thi s s y s t em coul d det ect onl y t wo of sever al possi bl e I r aqi BWt hr eat s . at t empt s by t he Uni t ed St at es t o devel op BW det ect i on have met wi t h f r ust r at i on and onl y l i mi t ed success . Gi ven t he chemi cal l y i ndi st i ngui shabl e or gani c pr oper t i es of bi ol ogi cal agent s. Si nce Wor l d War I I .

To dat e t he bi ol ogi cal war f ar e vacci nes have not been associ at ed wi t h PI . Fur t her mor e. t hey ar e pr ot ect i ve f or a speci f i c agent . t Li ke bi ol ogi cal weapon det ect or s. The abi l i t y t o pr ovi de I ND pr oduct s. Thes e r equi r ement s speci f y t he need t o i nf or m t he pr ospect i ve r eci pi ent of possi bl e k nown and t heor et i cal . Unl i ke vacci nes. I mmunogl obul i ns ar e exi st i ng ant i bodi es whi c h c an be har vest ed f r om humans or ani mal s .t er m publ i c r equi r ement f or i t s use . t her e i s l ag t i me bef or e adequat e pr ot ect i ve ant i bodi es devel op . Whi l e sever al BWvacci nes exi st f or k nown t hr eat agent s s uc h as bot ul i num t oxi n and t ul ar emi a. Li ke vacci nes.t er m ef f ect s of t he pr oduct .t er m and l ong. vacci nes ar e hi ghl y speci f i c f or a pot ent i al t hr eat agent . whi c h 23 1 .ARFARE TWENTY. Ther e i s i ndi vi dual var i abi l i t y . t he pr ot ect i ve l evel obt ai ned f or a popul at i on i s not uni f or m. ar e uni que char act er i st i cs of t he speci f i c pr oduct .FI RST CENTURYGERMW f or many year s . Onc e a vacci ne i s gi ven. The l engt h of t i me and t he number of doses of vacci ne r equi r ed bef or e pr ot ect i on i s at t ai ned and i t s dur at i on. The cont r over sy sur r oundi ng Per si an Gul f I l l nes ( PGI ) f ur t her negat i vel y ef f ect s per cept i ons of I ND pr oduct s us ed f or mi l i t ar y pur poses . shor t . The cur r ent Food and Dr ug Admi ni st r at i on ( FDA) appr oved vacci ne agai nst ant hr ax has been s hown t o be o pr ot ect i ve agai nst i nhal at i onal agent s i n nonhuman pr i mat es . a suf f i ci ent l y hi gh dose of a BW or i nf ect i ous di sease agent c an ov er whel m any vacci ne . Vacci nes agai nst exot i c i nf ect i ous di sease agent s associ at ed wi t h of f ensi ve BW f al l under t he pur vi ew of t he Depar t ment of Def ense wi t h t he Ar my as r esear ch and devel opment execut i ve agency . shor t of war or nat i onal cr i si s i s l i mi t ed by t he need t o sat i sf y t he human use or i nf or med consent r equi r ement s . Ful l FDA appr oval may be sl ow i n c omi ng i f t her e i s not suf f i ci ent t est dat a on human r esponse t o t he vacci nes or i f t her e i s a l ack of c ommer c i al demand or no per cei ved near . The st i gma at t ached wi t h I ND st at us may hav e l i mi t ed t he use of t he vacci ne dur i ng Deser t St or m. whi c h ar e s hown t o be saf e i n humans and ef f i caci ous i n ani mal st udi es. t hey r emai n i n a st at us shor t of f ul l FDA appr oval k nown as an i nvest i gat i onal new dr ug ( I ND) . t he t i me needed t o devel op a saf e vacci ne pr oduct sui t abl e f or human use may be 10 t o 15 year s . Fi nal l y. I n addi t i on.

t he us e of ant i bi ot i cs f or pr e. vacci nes. as i n t he case of t he vacci ne. A wel l .BATTLEFI ELD OFTHE FUTURE st i mul at e act i ve pr oduct i on of ant i bodi es by t he host . The r i gor ous FDA appr oval r equi r ed f or vacci nes i s al so r equi r ed f or i mmunogl obul i ns . I n t he absence of BWdet ect i on. I mmunogl obul i ns ar e usual l y used t o pr ot ect vi r al and t oxi n agent s . i mmunogl obul i ns. I mmunogl obul i ns cur r ent l y exi st f or pr e. 13 A l ar ge enough i nf ect i ve dose of a bact er i al or r i cket t si al agent coul d. 11 Fi nal l y.t er m pr ot ect i on whi c h usual l y l ast s week s or mont hs . i mmunogl obul i ns ar e consi der ed passi ve i mmuni zat i on . ov er whel m t he pr ot ect i on af f or ded by ant i bi ot i cs . ant i bi ot i cs may have t o be t aken f or mor e t han 30 days t o pr event i l l ness and possi bl e deat h .exposur e and post .i ncr easi ng doses of an ant i bi ot i c or by t r ansf er r i ng a pi ece of genet i c mat er i al whi c h conf er s ant i bi ot i c r esi st ance .exposur e or post exposur e t r eat ment of bact er i al or r i cket t si al BWagent s of f er s t he pot ent i al f or br oad spect r um. t hey pr ovi de shor t . Del i ber at e r esi st ance c an be i nduced by exposi ng cul t ur es t o ser i al exposur es of ever . For cer t ai n bact er i al BW exposur es. The medi cal means t o mi t i gat e t he ef f ect s of BWagent s and at t ack ar e i mper f ect . Ther e ar e f ur t her pr act i cal t heor et i c l i mi t at i ons t o t he use of ant i bi ot i c . The dur at i on of pr ot ect i on af f or ded by ant i bi ot i cs depends on t he amount of ant i bi ot i c avai l abl e and t he compl i ance of t he i ndi vi dual t o t ake t hem. Dev el opment s i n monoc l onal ant i body t echnol ogi es of f er t he pot ent i al f or r api d dev el opment of i mmunogl obul i n pr epar at i ons f or use i n BWmedi cal def ense. ant i bi ot i c r esi st ance among mi cr obes occur s nat ur al l y or can be devel oped del i ber at el y . medi cal pr oduct s r epr esent t he cor ner st one of pr ot ect i ng US 23 2 . W hen i nj ect ed i nt o a host .exposur e t r eat ment of bot ul i num t oxi n i nt oxi cat i on . Fur t her mor e.known exampl e of an i mmunogl obul i n pr epar at i on i s t he s er um us ed f or Hepat i t i s A.agent pr ot ect i on . Cer t ai n mi cr obi al i nf ect i ous di seases and BW agent s hav e a nat ur al r esi st ance t o di f f er ent ant i bi ot i cs . 12 I t i s possi bl e t o pur posef ul l y devel op a BWagent t hat i s r esi st ant t o a r ange of di f f er ent ant i bi ot i cs . Ev en wi t h r el i abl e det ect or s whi c h pr ovi de r eal t i me or advanced war ni ng. Ant i bi ot i cs however do not pr event or t r eat i l l ness due t o vi r al or t oxi n agent s . and ant i bi ot i cs pl ay a c ompl ement ar y r ol e i n t he passi ve def ense agai nst BW .

Among t he 60 ot her pot ent i al BWagent s.' TWENTY. t he Uni t ed St at es.FI RST CENTURY GERMW ARFARE . under scor ed t he pr obl em i n J anuar y 1992. t hei r f or ces f r om t he ef f ect s of BW admi ni st r at i on may det er an enemy f r om usi ng BW . 14 Ant hr ax and bot ul i num t oxi n f al l i nt o t hi s cat egor y . " sound and compl et e i nt el l i gence dat a" wi l l pl ay a vi t al r ol e i n ascer t ai ni ng whi c h ones pr ol i f er ant s wi l l pur sue . A gr eat deal i s k nown about US of f ensi ve BWagent s devel oped and pr oduced unt i l 1969 ( Tabl e 2) . 15 Rober t Gat es. and possi bl y t he f or mer Sovi et Uni on and I r aq hav e r esear ched and devel oped as weapons . 16 23 3 . t hen di r ect or of t he Cent r al I nt el l i gence Agenc y ( CI A) . when he ci t ed human i nt el l i gence as bei ng cr i t i cal i n assessi ng t he pr ol i f er at i on of bot h chemi cal and bi ol ogi cal weapons i n t he t hi r d wor l d . Rol e of I nt el l i gence and Medi cal Def ens e The need f or a pr i or knowl edge of BWagent t hr eat s f or bot h det ect or s and medi cal pr oduct s has al r eady been suggest ed . Besi des t hei r medi cal benef i t . Tabl e 2 US OFFENSI VE BI OLOGI CAL W EAPONS AGENTS PRODUCED BETW EEN 19541969 Ant i per sonnel Ant i cr op Ant hr ax Wheat r ust Tul ar emi a Rye r ust Br ucel l osi s Ri ce bl ast QFever Venezuel an Equi ne Encephal i t i s ( VEE) Bot ul i numToxi n St aphyl occal Ent er ot oxi n Ther e ar e s ome cl assi cal BWagent s whi c h Japan.

Di ssemi nat i on of BWagent s by convent i onal muni t i ons pose cer t ai n t echnol ogi cal di f f i cul t i es. Weaponi z i ng BW The f i nal di st i nct i on bet ween chemi cal and bi ol ogi cal weapons i nvol ves t he met hods of di ssemi nat i on . 22 A c ommon char act er i st i c shar ed by bot h chemi cal and bi ol ogi cal agent s i s t hei r di ssemi nat i on on anci ent met eor ol ogi cal 234 . Weaponi zi ng of CW and BWi mpl i es t hr ee essent i al el ement s : agent . and mi ssi l e war heads . 18 The Uni t ed St at es over came t hese di f f i cul t i es i n t he l at e 1960s t o pr oduce.obser vabl e means of BWdel i ver y . ul t r avi ol et l i ght . Assessi ng an adver sar y' s cur r ent BWef f or t s may i gnor e devel opment s i n bi ot echnol ogy whi c h may of f er br eakt hr ough capabi l i t i es and novel agent s . Excessi ve heat .f i ve mi cr on par t i cl e si ze . 2° I n cont r ast t o chemi cal agent s. 19 Weaponi zi ng BW i ncl udes s ome unconvent i onal del i ver y syst ems whi c h may put t he Uni t ed St at es at r i sk . and del i ver y syst em. 17 Two quest i ons emer ge f r om t hi s pr ocess . The f i r st i s whet her adequat e pr i or i t y and r esour ces hav e been f oc us ed on col l ect i ng and anal yzi ng BW. BWweaponi zi ng i mpl i es t he ef f i ci ent aer osol i zat i on of vi abl e agent s i n a one. humi di t y and oxi dat i on decr ease t hei r pot ency and per si st ence . muni t i on.r el at ed i nt el l i gence and how successf ul t hese ef f or t s have been . Bot h can be " weaponi zed" i nt o convent i onal muni t i ons s uc h as ar t i l l er y r ounds. cl ust er bombs . 21 Unmanned r emot el y pi l ot ed vehi cl es ( RPVs) wi t h spr ay t anks r epr esent anot her l ow.BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE Congr ess has not mi ssed t he i mpor t ance of i nt el l i gence i n f ocusi ng R&D. weaponi ze. Unl i ke CW. and st ockpi l e sever al BWagent s .t o. because t hey ar e sensi t i ve t o envi r onment al st r esses . The second i s whet her t he pr ocess of cr eat i ng a t hr eat l i st based ent i r el y on i nt el l i gence assessment s i s adequat e . Thi s di ssemi nat i on met hod l ends i t sel f t o bot h cover t and cl andest i ne appl i cat i ons and possi bl e t er r or i st use . Congr essi onal l aw mandat es t hat BWdef ensi ve medi cal ef f or t s be f unded and pr i or i t i zed bas ed on a t hr eat l i st devel oped by t he US i nt el l i gence c ommuni t y . bi ol ogi cal agent s coul d al so be easi l y adapt ed f or us e wi t h commer ci al l y avai l abl e agr i cul t ur al spr ayer s .

under t he pr essur e of economi c sanct i ons.t er r i bl y f ear ed but never seen . and among our mi l i t ar y l eader shi p t hat bi ol ogi cal weapons wer e somet hi ng t hat t hi r d wor l d nat i ons consi der ed a pot ent i al equal i zer . Bor i s Yel t si n.BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE t he gr i sl y and i nhuman ef f ect s of chemi cal weaponr y . 27 Had I r aq used ant hr ax or bot ul i num t oxi n. The f or mer Sovi et Uni on has onl y r ecent l y admi t t ed t he t r ut h about an acci dent at a bi ol ogi cal agent pr oduct i on f aci l i t y i n Sver dl ovosk i n 1979 . i n t he Congr ess. Bi ot echnol ogy al l ows smal l f aci l i t i es t o be capabl e of pr oduci ng l ar ge amount s of bi ol ogi cal agent s . has t he use of BWbeen si mi l ar l y doc ument ed . However . The ease and cost of devel opi ng and pr oduci ng BW i s muc h si mpl er and cheaper t han devel opi ng nucl ear weapons . 28 Cer t ai n f i ndi ngs of t he OTA as s es s ment r el at i ng t o BWar e not ewor t hy . enor mous casual t i es woul d have r esul t ed whi c h woul d have over t axed t he Ar my' s t heat er medi cal syst em. Accor di ng t o t he c ommander of t he US Ar my Chemi cal and Bi ol ogi cal Def ense Agenc y ( CBDA) . The suspi ci on t hat " Yel l ow Rai n" or t he mycot oxi n t r i cot hecene was us ed i n I ndochi na has never been concl usi vel y pr oven. 29 The 23 6 . The psychol ogi cal i mpact of I r an' s Sc ud mi ssi l e at t acks on I sr ael and Saudi Ar abi a was enor mous . but subsequent UN i nspect i ons f ai l ed t o f i nd any def i ni t i ve pr oof . however . Nowher e i n r ecent hi st or y. Ten mi l l i on dol l ar s al l ows a pr ol i f er ant t o pr oduce a l ar ge ar senal . For exampl e. 26 I n s ome measur e. I r aq was suspect ed of havi ng an ext ensi ve BWcapabi l i t y. I r aqi of f i ci al s hav e now di scl osed t hat bet ween 1985 and 1991 I r aq pr oduced t wo ger m war f ar e agent s. bacci l us ant hr aci x and bot ul i num t oxi n . Deser t St or m sol i di f i ed t he per cept i on i n t he Uni t ed St at es. r ecent l y di scl osed Russi a' s vi ol at i on of t he Bi ol ogi cal Weapons Convent i on i n 1992 . BWhas at t ai ned t he st at ur e of t he " bogey man of WMD" . That f ear and t he t hr eat . t o t he embar r as s ment of t he Reagan admi ni st r at i on . hi msel f . I r aq admi t t ed t hat i t had a bi ol ogi cal war f ar e R&D ef f or t . Si mi l ar suspi ci ons have pr oven i nconcl usi ve dur i ng t he Sovi et Uni on' s occupat i on of Af ghani st an . ar e r eal . t he bi ol ogi cal t hr eat has been r ecent l y si ngl ed out as t he one maj or t hr eat t hat st i l l i nf l i ct s cat ast r ophi c ef f ect s on a t heat er depl oyed f or ce .1991 Gul f War . Dur i ng t he 1990. however .

I r aq W 23 5 . Pr ol i f er ant s under st and t he val ue of t hese weapons f or det er r ence. I t al so r ai ses t he r i sks of escal at i on of r egi onal conf l i ct s . A si mi l ar at t ack usi ng 100 ki l ogr ams of ant hr ax under t he s ame condi t i ons woul d cover 300 squar e ki l omet er s and r esul t i n 1 t o 3 mi l l i on deat hs . 3 . wi t h f avor abl e mi l d t o moder at e wi nds . t he t el evi si on i mages of dead Kur di sh vi l l ager s and ar r eveal i ncapaci t at ed I r ani an sol di er s dur i ng t he I r an. woul d r esul t i n an est i mat ed 3. 000 t o 8. The hor r i f i c i mages of Hi r oshi ma and Nagasaki l eave l i t t l e t o i magi nat i on r egar di ng t he deat h and dest r uct i on t hat oc c ur wi t h a nuc l ear det onat i on . and c hemi c al weapons and bal l i st i c mi ssi l es cr eat es a pal l over t he pot ent i al achi evement of a st abl e gl obal envi r onment . 000 ki l ogr ams of ner ve agent Sar i n i s 7 . Sout h Asi a. 000 deat hs . ar e f or unst abl e par t s of t he wor l d. Si mi l ar l y. MD. W par t i cul ar pr obl ems f or t he Uni t ed St at es . . and t he on Kor ean Peni nsul a . 23 Ant hr ax. coer ci on. At t acki ng a maj or met r opol i t an ci t y l i ke Washi ngt on. I t poses 2. The st at es mos t act i vel y wor k i ng t o devel op W t he m os t par t l ocat ed in al t hough l i mi t ed i n number . The pr edi ct i on and cont r ol of t he envi r onment al di sper si on of BW agent s r epr esent s t he gr eat est uncer t ai nt y about t hei r use . The r el at i ve cover age of 1. The pr ol i f er at i on of nucl ear . bi ol ogi cal . The c ons equenc es of t hei r use hav e unf or t unat el y been r ecor ded i n r ecent hi st or y . C.t he Mi ddl e East .FI RST CENTURY GERMW condi t i ons . D. 24 The Cur r ent Bi ol ogi cal War f ar e Thr eat A r ecent l y publ i shed Of f i ce of Technol ogy As s es s ment ( OTA) doc ument . The br eakup of t he Sovi et Uni on pr esent s i mmedi at e t hr eat s t o t he gl obal nonpr ol i f er at i on r egi mes . 8 squar e ki l omet er s under t hese met eor ol ogi cal condi t i ons . Pr ol i f er at i on of Weapons of Mas s Dest r uct i on : Assessi ng t he Ri sks 25 had t hr ee maj or f i ndi ngs . MD pr ol i f er at i on poses danger s t o al l nat i ons . 1 .ARFARE TWENTY. coul d ki l l as many peopl e as a c ompar abl y si zed nucl ear devi ce . and war f i ght i ng. I deal condi t i ons woul d occur at ni ght . under f avor abl e met eor ol ogi cal condi t i ons.

si t e vi si t s by UN i nspect or s f ai l ed t o uncover any i r r ef ut abl e evi dence of an of f ensi ve BWpr ogr am. i n f act . t he l i kel i hood of pr ev ent i ng f ur t her pr ol i f er at i on or r ol l i ng bac k exi st i ng BW. and def end agai nst i t .c apabl e nat i ons s eems unl i kel y . On t he basi s of t he sever al i ncent i ves pr es ent ed ear l i er . I r aq capi t al i zed on t he coal i t i on bombi ng of a " baby mi l k f aci l i t y" f or pr opaganda pur poses . The exi st ence of s uc h pr ogr ams c an be enhanc ed wi t h t i ght secur i t y and decept i on . Aspi r i ng pr ol i f er ant s may see t hem as l ucr at i ve r ecr ui t i ng t ar get s . when. Unl i ke t he c ompl ex t echnol ogi cal r equi r ement s f or nucl ear weapons. Fol l owi ng t he war . The si mpl e ar i t hmet i c of t he number of 23 8 . I f t hi s f ai l s. Ev en wi t h di r ect on.BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE pur sue BWver sus nucl ear or chemi cal weapons . CNN' s Pet er Ar net t ' s vi si t t o t he si t e and r epor t r ai sed publ i c doubt s about whet her t hi s was a l egi t i mat e al l i ed t ar get .use f aci l i t y capabl e of pr oduci ng bi ol ogi cal weapons . Rec ent event s i n t he f or mer Sovi et Uni on c onc er ni ng possi bl e pr ol i f er at i on of nucl ear mat er i al s al so add gr eat er uncer t ai nt y t o t he BW pr ol i f er at i on cal cul us . The I r aqi exper i ence s hows t hat bi ol ogi cal war f ar e pr ogr ams c an exi st and be hi dden wi t hi n l egi t i mat e f aci l i t i es . one or t wo i ndi vi dual s wi t h exper i ence i n BWagent pr oduct i on and weaponi zat i on coul d pr ovi de br eakt hr ough assi st ance t o a f l edgl i ng pr ogr am.si t e vi si t s t he l i kel i hood of di scover y may be smal l unl ess t he vi si t or s k now pr eci sel y wher e t o go and ar e per mi t t ed ent r y . t he Uni t ed St at es mus t be pr epar ed t o det er . pr eempt . Despi t e US of f i ci al cl ai ms t hat t he Abu Ghar y b i nf ant f or mul a pl ant was a dual . i nt r usi ve on. The Uni t ed St at es and Uni t ed Nat i ons cl ai med af t er t he war t hat I r aq had an adv anc ed BWpr ogr am. al t hough publ i c pr oof was l acki ng and I r aq i ni t i al l y deni ed t hi s . The pot ent i al i mpac t and avai l abi l i t y of sci ent i st s and t ec hni c i ans associ at ed wi t h t he f or mer Sovi et of f ensi ve BW pr ogr am shoul d be consi der ed . al t hough t he I r aqi s l at er admi t t ed t hey had pr ocur ed l ar ge quant i t i es of a bi ol ogi cal agent s . The 1991 Gul f War hi ghl i ght s t hi s poi nt . The chal l enge f or t he Uni t ed St at es i s t o devel op a coher ent and coor di nat ed st r at egy t o l i mi t BWpr ol i f er at i on . Dur i ng t he war . i t was .ant hr ax and bot ul i sm t oxi n . Pr ol i f er ant s obt ai n si gni f i cant capabi l i t i es wi t h mi ni mum ec onomi c cost s and pol i t i cal r i sks .

pr oduci ng or gani sms may al l ow f or t he mas s pr oduct i on of t hese agent s .TWENTY. The Uni t ed St at es has pr i or i t i zed i t s nat i onal secur i t y obj ect i ves t o enhanc e economi c gr owt h and devel opment . among aggr essi ve t hi r d wor l d st at es. I t has al so been specul at ed t hat cl oni ng DNA segment s f r om t oxi n. Pr oduc t i on of pr ot ei n mol ecul es s uc h as human i nsul i n has been demonst r at ed and i s commer ci al l y avai l abl e t echnol ogy . I r aq. havi ng l egi t i mat e commer ci al appl i cat i ons . and t o r esol ve r egi onal conf l i ct s . t he use of BWcoul d be di f f i cul t t o pr ove i n s ome cases si nce out br eaks of endemi c or nat ur al l y occur r i ng di sease happen . Nonpr ol i f er at i on and Count er pr ol i f er at i on Pol i cy The f al l of t he Sovi et Uni on si gnal ed t he end of t he super power r i val r y and cr eat ed an oppor t uni t y t o est abl i sh an i nt er nat i onal s y s t em t hat seeks t o ens ur e pol i t i cal st abi l i t y. and col l ect i ve met hods of conf l i ct r esol ut i on. The af or ement i oned l i st may not be al l i ncl usi ve . t o pr event t he pr ol i f er at i on of nucl ear . Russi a. a c ommi t t ed pr ol i f er ant wi t h a " modest l y sophi st i cat ed phar maceut i cal i ndust r y" coul d devel op a cr edi bl e undet ect ed cl andest i ne of f ensi ve BWcapabi l i t y . Gi ven t he abi l i t y t o pr oduce mi l i t ar i l y si gni f i cant quant i t i es of BWagent s ( ki l ogr ams) i n smal l l egi t i mat e f aci l i t i es. 32 Genet i c engi neer i ng i s not expect ed i mmedi at el y t o her al d t he devel opment of new or exot i c BWagent s . al t hough i t has r epor t edl y ended s uc h act i vi t i es . and Tai wan . Li bya. admi t t ed t o devel opi ng an of f ensi ve pr ogr am i n vi ol at i on of t he Bi ol ogi cal Weapons Convent i on. chemi cal . and t her e ar e st r ong i ncent i ves t o 23 7 .FI RST CENTURYGERMW ARFARE sci ent i f i c and t echnol ogi cal knowl edge needed t o devel op and pr oduce of f ensi ve agent s i n si gni f i cant quant i t i es i s r eadi l y avai l abl e and r el at i vel y unsophi st i cat ed . I nst ead. ec onomi c oppor t uni t y. Syr i a. The equi pment r equi r ed i s wi del y avai l abl e and i s dual . Fi nal l y. Never t hel ess. 31 A ni nt h. and bi ol ogi cal weapons . W MD pr ol i f er at i on i s occur r i ng. 3o Ei ght nat i ons have been i mpl i cat ed i n devel opi ng of f ensi ve BWcapabi l i t i es : I r an. and pr obabl y mos t i mpor t ant l y. i t s i mpact may enhance t he envi r onment al st abi l i t y of exi st i ng BW agent s .use. Nor t h Kor ea. I sr ael . Chi na.

A compr ehensi ve ant i . Shor t of havi ng r el i abl e human i nt el l i gence wi t h di r ect access t o an adver sar y' s BW pr ogr am. t her e may be a si gni f i cant l ag t i me. Not havi ng speci f i c i nf or mat i on about t he st at us of a BWpr ogr am. or met hods of del i ver y.f i r st cent ur y? What pol i ci es wi l l hel p sol ve t he l i kel y BWchal l enges? How shoul d t he Uni t ed St at es c ount er .FI RST CENTURY GERMW ARFARE count r i es suspect ed of of f ensi ve BWact i vi t i es i s at ni ne and l i kel y t o i ncr ease by t he end of t he cent ur y Recommendat i ons For The Fut ur e How do we meet t he BWt hr eat i n t he t went y. Ev en i f t he i nt el l i gence c ommuni t y col l ect s and val i dat es t hi s i nf or mat i on. I nt el l i gence about t he ant i ci pat ed means of del i ver y and i t s doct r i ne of use i s al so i mpor t ant . and bi oengi neer i ng capabi l i t i es of a pot ent i al pr ol i f er at or .BWpr ogr ams be pr i or i t i zed and i nt egr at ed? I nt el l i gence I nc ompl et e or abs ent i nt el l i gence about a s us pec t ed pr ol i f er ant ' s BWpr ogr ami s a l i kel y sour ce of t r oubl e . or l ocat i ons of pr oduct i on and st or age. ef f ect i ve count er meas ur es can be devel oped and f i el ded . bef or e saf e. Det er mi ni ng t he i nt ent t o devel op BW. medi cal . l ocat i ng suspect f aci l i t i es. year s or even decades. The i mpor t ance of speci f i c BWagent i nt el l i gence f or medi cal and det ect i on capabi l i t i es deser ves emphasi s . Faci l i t y. I nt el l i gence col l ect i on and anal ysi s ar e cr i t i cal f or f ut ur e Uni t ed St at es BWcount er . and assessi ng t he nat ur e of t he of f ensi ve pr ogr am ar e essent i al el ement s of t he i nt el l i gence ef f or t . or t he speci f i c agent s coul d r esul t i n an i ncompl et e assessment . t hi s t ype of i nf or mat i on i s r equi r ed t o assess t he bi ol ogi cal capabi l i t y of t hat nat i on . and capabi l i t i es t o meet t he t hr eat . Thi s coul d di r ect l y i mpact t he devel opment of Uni t ed St at es st r at egy.r el at ed i nt el l i gence al so 23 9 . Thi s i nf or mat i on al l ows devel opment of US act i ve def ense capabi l i t i es t o i nt er di ct and dest r oy del i ver y vehi cl es .TWENTY.BWi nt el l i gence ef f or t mus t col l ect i nf or mat i on r el at i ng t o t he basi c sci ence. pol i cy.pr ol i f er at i on ef f or t s .

t he avai l abi l i t y of human. The abi l i t y t o f ocus l i mi t ed di pl omat i c and economi c r esour ces t o di ssuade.r el at ed or gani zat i ons and pr ol i f er ant s i s i mpor t ant t o opt i mi ze t he ut i l i t y of expor t cont r ol s and t he abi l i t y t o i nt er di ct shi pment s of r el at ed equi pment dest i ned f or suspect ed BW count r i es or or gani zat i ons .r el at ed i nf or mat i on r equi r es t r ai ned per sonnel exper i enced i n mat t er s r el at i ng t o bi ol ogy. and nat ur e. I ncr easi ng col l ect i on pr i or i t i es shoul d al so necessi t at e a concomi t ant i ncr ease i n t he anal ysi s r esour ces devot ed t o t he pr obl em. adequat e r esour ces mus t be appl i ed t o t he pr obl em. As s es s ment of BW. Ther e shoul d be an assessment and i f necessar y a r edi st r i but i on of asset s t o r econci l e t he di spar i t y bet ween t he ef f or t agai nst nucl ear pr ol i f er at i on and t hat of BW . and agr i cul t ur e . Because of t he gr eat er r el at i ve i nt el l i gence chal l enges and t he myr i ad of r el at ed ar eas associ at ed wi t h BWver sus nucl ear pr ol i f er at i on.use f aci l i t i es may not emi t char act er i st i c si gnat ur es. Ther e mus t be execut i ve. and br i ng i nt er nat i onal pr essur e on suspect ed pr ol i f er ant s i s. The abi l i t y t o i dent i f y BW. medi ci ne. Dual .l evel i nt er est and i nvol vement t o over see t he devel opment of a cr i si s r esponse s y s t em t o domest i c BW 24 0 .i s smal l .s our c e i nt el l i gence wi l l be a cr i t i cal el ement i n pr ovi di ng i nf or mat i on r el at ed t o BW pr ol i f er at i on . The domest i c vul ner abi l i t y t o cover t or cl andest i ne act s of BWt er r or shoul d be assessed. al so i nt el l i gencedependent . As al l uded t o ear l i er . l ocat i on. The l i kel i hood t hat nat i onal t echni cal means c an i dent i f y any or al l of t he t hr ee key BW i nt el l i gence c omponent s i nt ent . pur sue ar ms cont r ol . bi ot echnol ogy. t her ef or e. Pol i cy and St r at egy Dev el opment Bey ond t he col l ect i on and assessment of i nt el l i gence. Bal anci ng t he t echni cal c omponent of t he i nt el l i gence anal ysi s pr ocess i s t he need t o i nt egr at e t he exper t i se and exper i ence t he i nt el l i gence syst em. pol i cy devel opment and i nt egr at i on of t he many f unct i ons ar e r equi r ed t o r espond t o BWpr ol i f er at i on . but st i l l be capabl e of pr oduci ng mi l i t ar y si gni f i cant quant i t i es of bi ol ogi cal agent s .BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE al l ows f or i dent i f i cat i on and t ar get i ng of pr oduct i on and r el at ed f aci l i t i es f or count er of f ensi ve st r i kes .

Ev en t hough t he Wor l d Heal t h Or gani zat i on decl ar ed s mal l pox er adi cat ed. headache. Over a per i od of sever al hour s. I t i s beyond t he scope of t he si ngl e agency i dent i f i ed i n t he Feder al Emer genc y Res pons e Pl an. he went si ght . 000 . an Amer i can busi ness man t r avel ed t o New Yor k Ci t y f r om Mexi co Ci t y. pr ogr essed and he di ed ni ne days l at er . Whi l e t he f eder al r esponse t o t er r or i st act s i s wel l del i neat ed. Mi l l i ons of ot her s woul d be f ear f ul of bei ng exposed and seek or demand medi cal car e as wel l . 33 Unl i ke 1947. Though i l l upon hi s ar r i val i n New Yor k. he devel oped a f ever . and r ash .sensi t i ve heal t h car e demands cr eat ed by an act of bi ol ogi cal t er r or mus t be assessed . smal l pox.seei ng . 350. t he Depar t ment of Heal t h and Human Ser vi ces.TWENTY. conser vat i ve est i mat es put t he number deat hs occur r i ng i n t he f i r st f ew days at 400. Dur i ng hi s bus r i de. A si gni f i cant pr opor t i on of t he US popul at i on i s suscept i bl e t o t hi s vi r us . Beyond t he i mmedi at e heal t h i mpl i cat i ons of s uc h an act . 35 Thous ands of ot her s woul d be at r i sk of dyi ng wi t hi n sever al days i f pr oper ant i bi ot i cs and vacci nat i on wer e not st ar t ed i mmedi at el y. Because of smal l pox' s abi l i t y t o be t r ansmi t t ed f r om per son t o per son. he wal ked ar ound t he ci t y and t hr ough a maj or depar t ment st or e . As a r esul t of t hi s si ngl e case. Amer i c ans have not been r out i nel y vacci nat ed agai nst smal l pox si nce 1930 . I f sever al ki l ogr ams of an agent l i ke ant hr ax wer e di ssemi nat ed i n New Yor k Ci t y t oday. Hi s i l l ness. Local l aw enf or cement agenci es woul d be over whel med and woul d need t he assi st ance of st at e and f eder al 24 1 . A hi st or i cal exampl e i l l ust r at es t he scal e of t he ef f or t r equi r ed t o r espond t o an act of BWt er r or i n a maj or met r opol i t an ar ea. Nor t h Kor ea has been i dent i f i ed as one possi bl e count r y r et ai ni ng cul t ur es of t hi s vi r us t o use as a bi ol ogi cal weapon. t he publ i c heal t h consequences coul d be over whel mi ng . t he t i me. I n 1947. t hi s handf ul of cases was deemed so ser i ous by publ i c heal t h of f i ci al s t hat 6. t o mount t he necessar y r eact i on t o deal wi t h t he heal t h consequences and pr event unnecessar y l oss of l i f e .FI RST CENTURY GERMW ARFARE i nci dent s . t he pot ent i al pani c and ci vi l unr est cr eat ed woul d r equi r e an equal l y l ar ge r esponse . 000 per sons i n New Yor k Ci t y al one wer e vacci nat ed i n l ess t han a mont h . 34 Ev en i f a noncont agi ous agent wer e used. The number of cases expect ed t o occur as t he r esul t of a del i ber at e act coul d be i n t he t housands or t ens of t hous ands . 12 ot her cases of smal l pox and t wo deat hs occur r ed .

and vacci nes woul d have t o be pr ocur ed. Li ke t he war ni ng t o consumer s. t he Sovi et mi l i t ar y st r ongl y opposed any l i mi t at i on on of f ensi ve BW . The compl et e vul ner abi l i t y of t he Uni t ed St at es i f exposed t o t hi s t ype of t er r or i sm woul d pr ompt ot her t er r or i st s t o at t empt t he s ame t ype of at t ack f or ext or t i on or addi t i onal t er r or i mpact . and coor di nat ed r esponse mec hani s m mus t be i n pl ace . Pr i or t o a domest i c i nci dent s uc h as t hi s. The Feder al Emer genc y Management Agenc y ( FEMA) pr ovi des t hi s coor di nat i on f unct i on. subscr i ber s t o t he convent i on mus t under st and t hat compl et e ver i f i cat i on i s not j ust el usi ve but i mpossi bl e . The ef f or t r equi r ed t o r espond t o a bi ol ogi cal act of t er r or r i val s t hat needed f or an acci dent al or del i ber at e det onat i on of a nucl ear devi ce . The heal t h. Meas ur es i dent i f i ed i n t he t hi r d r evi ew conf er ence ar e bei ng ex ami ned f or use i n a possi bl e f or mal pr ot ocol . Dur i ng t he or i gi nal pr oposal of t he BW C by t he Uni t ed Ki ngdom. and Def ense woul d have t o be i nt egr at ed i nt o a si ngl e r esponse pl an . but i t s act ual f ami l i ar i t y and pr act i ce associ at ed wi t h bi ol ogi cal t er r or i sm i s not k nown . pr act i ced.BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE agenci es . An addi t i onal cr i t i cal el ement of t hi s r esponse woul d be t he management of i nf or mat i on t o al l ay f ear s and avoi d unnecessar y pani c . i mmunogl obul i ns. Ef f or t s shoul d be made t o pr ovi de bot h di si ncent i ves and i ncent i ves f or cur r ent st at es t o compl y wi t h t he BWt r eat y . " I t ser ves a vi t al f unct i on by est abl i shi ng an i nt er nat i onal nor magai nst BWpr ol i f er at i on . and be r eadi l y avai l abl e t o admi ni st er wi t hi n hour s af t er r ecogni zi ng an i nci dent . mai nt ai ned.r el at ed s uppor t f unc t i ons f ound i n t he Depar t ment s of Heal t h and Human Ser vi ces. a capabl e.caveat empt or . St r engt heni ng t he BW C by enhanc i ng t r ans par enc y of bi ol ogi cal act i vi t i es i s st at ed US gov er nment pol i cy . The Sovi et For ei gn Mi ni st er Andr ei Gr omy k o 24 2 . Ar ms Cont r ol The BW C cl ear l y r epr esent s t he " l ock whi c h k eeps t he honest man honest . Vet er ans Af f ai r s. St ockpi l es of necessar y ant i bi ot i cs.. Nonsi gnat or i es s houl d be l ever aged t o par t i ci pat e i n t he c onv ent i on .

FI RST CENTURY GERMW ARFARE f el t t hat .not i ce vi si t s. al t hough I r aq has admi t t ed t o an R&D ef f or t pr i or t o t he war . and i nt er vi ewi ng of key per sonnel . I ndeed. Ex por t cont r ol s. a pr ohi bi t i on on bi ol ogi cal weapons woul d be usef ul . shor t . t her e i s a st r ong suspi ci on t hat I r aq may not have dest r oyed i t s BWagent s as i t has cl ai med .TWENTY.use l egi t i mat e nat ur e of t he bi ol ogi cal mat er i al s and equi pment . The oppor t uni t y t o st r engt hen t he r egi me mus t al so be t emper ed by event s i n I r aq si nce t he Gul f W ar . i nt er di ct i on. r ecor d r evi ews. but ar e c ommi t t ed event ual l y t o devel opi ng secr et of f ensi ve bi ol ogi cal 24 3 . St at es t hat ar e par t i es t o t he BWC. or di sr upt i on of suppl y net wor ks wi l l have l i mi t ed i mpact gi ven t he dual . 36 The Sovi et Uni on was one of t he t hr ee deposi t or i es of t hi s t r eat y . A di st ur bi ng pr ospect f or st r engt heni ng t he BW C i s t hat t he 21 meas ur es i dent i f i ed i n t he t hi r d r evi ew conf er ence wer e ut i l i zed i n I r aq i ncl udi ng s uc h act i ons as moni t or i ng. Wi t hout i nt er nat i onal cont r ol s. The cont i nuat i on of t he US sanct i ons i s now sol el y dependent on I r aq' s r ef usal t o det ai l t hei r BWpr ogr am. sampl e col l ect i ons. Di pl omat i c ef f or t s t o pr event or cont r ol BWpr ol i f er at i on wi l l have si mi l ar l i mi t s . posi t i ve and negat i ve secur i t y assi st ance. pol i t i cal and mi l i t ar y cost s of pr ol i f er at i on . no concr et e evi dence of i t s of f ensi ve BW pr ogr am has been uncover ed. f or pr opaganda pur poses. Publ i c st at ement s by seni or US i nt el l i gence and gov er nment of f i ci al s i ndi cat es t hat I r aq r et ai ns i t s of f ensi ve BWcapabi l i t y . Despi t e i nt r usi ve i nspect i ons. Deni al of cer t ai n equi pment or t echnol ogi es used i n BW i s pr obl emat i c . and i dent i f yi ng t he economi c. Di pl omat i c Meas ur es and I nt er nat i onal Pr essur e Cur r ent DOD count er pr ol i f er at i on pol i cy emphasi zes us e of publ i c di pl omacy. t he Pol i t bur o and t he Sovi et mi l i t ar y bot h endor sed t he " t oot hl ess" convent i on i n 1972 . These meas ur es hav e yi el ded no concl usi ve evi dence t o dat e about t he pr esent I r aqi BWcapabi l i t y or i t s past pr ogr am. Recent di scl osur es by Pr esi dent Bor i s Yel t si n r egar di ng f or mer Sovi et and Russi an vi ol at i ons of t he Bi ol ogi cal Weapons Convent i on hi ghl i ght t he l i mi t s of t hat t r eat y .

yet pur s ue cl andest i ne of f ensi ve BWpr ogr ams . del ay a pr ol i f er ant ' s ef f or t s . BW i s a s y mpt omof a deeper secur i t y need . " The accur acy and cr edi bi l i t y of t hi s pol i cy opt i on ar e subj ect t o muc h debat e . t hey may mot i vat e det er mi ned pr ol i f er ant s t o conceal or decei ve t hei r t r ue i nt ent and act i vi t i es . The r ange of count er of f ensi ve capabi l i t i es and st r at egi es mus t i ncl ude det er r ence. 24 4 . t he f ocus changes t o mi t i gat i ng i t s per cei ved adv ant age and det er r i ng i t s us e . Ther e ar e r easonabl e i ndi cat i ons t hat di pl omacy al one c an do l i t t l e t o pr event BWpr ol i f er at i on . Bef or e i mpl i cat i ng Li byan i nt el l i gence oper at i ves. pr eempt i on. Cl ear l y. Of cour se t he per f ect sol ut i on t o pr ol i f er at i on i s cor r ect i ng t he under l yi ng r easons why nat i ons choose t o devel op bi ol ogi cal or nucl ear weapons . Bot h Pr esi dent Geor ge Bus h and Secr et ar y of Def ense Ri char d Cheney publ i cl y st at ed t hat any at t ack on US f or ces wi t h chemi cal or bi ol ogi cal weapons woul d be met wi t h " massi ve r et al i at i on . nonsi gnat or i es coul d t ake adv ant age of ec onomi c i ncent i ves or f or ei gn assi st ance pr ogr ams f or j oi ni ng t he BW C. di pl omat i c and economi c pr essur e c an ser ve a usef ul pur pos e i n i nhi bi t i ng a pr ol i f er ant ' s act i vi t i es by i nvoki ng sanct i ons. or publ i cl y di scl osi ng vi ol at i ons . Det er mi ni ng t he cul pabl e par t y af t er a cover t or cl andest i ne BWat t ack has occur r ed may be i mpossi bl e . Never t hel ess. i n t he shor t r un. and dest r uct i on .BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE weapons capabi l i t i es. One mus t r eal i ze t hat i nvoki ng t hese meas ur es depends on t i mel y and accur at e i nt el l i gence . Nat i ons who ar e not si gnat or i es c an r ef use ent r y and pur s ue of f ensi ve pr ogr ams as wel l . I n t he l ong t er m. Di pl omat i c meas ur es whi c h t r y t o cont r ol pr ol i f er at i on may . The ci r cumst ances f ol l owi ng t he bombi ng of Pan Amer i c an Fl i ght 103 hi ghl i ght t he pot ent i al di f f i cul t i es of a f or ensi c i nvest i gat i on f ol l owi ng an act of t er r or . expor t cont r ol s. Count er meas ur es Onc e pr ol i f er at i on occur s and an adver sar y at t ai ns an of f ensi ve BWcapabi l i t y. Dur i ng Deser t St or m specul at i on occur r ed r egar di ng t he i mpl i ci t us e of nucl ear weapons i n r esponse t o BWat t ack . Gi v en t he l ow l i kel i hood of det ect i ng vi ol at i ons. c an do ser i ous BW r esear ch and dev el opment l egal l y f or a t i me wi t hi n t he cur r ent t r eat y f r amewor k .

a downwi nd hazar d coul d occur i f bul k st or age of BWagent s wer e st r uck when met eor ol ogi cal condi t i ons wer e f avor abl e t o t hei r di ssemi nat i on . t he US ai r c ampai gn sought t o dest r oy Saddam Hussei n' s W MD capabi l i t i es i n t he openi ng days of t he Gul f War . Whi l e no speci f i c conf i r med r epor t s of col l at er al damage wer e doc ument ed dur i ng Deser t St or m. pr ocess and del i ver bi ol ogi cal weapons i s t he f i nal el ement of t he count er of f ensi ve st r at egy. Ther e i s a pot ent i al r i sk of col l at er al damage when st r i ki ng BW. Ther e wi l l be t i mes i n t he f ut ur e when t he US pr esi dent may have t o consi der mi l i t ar y pr eempt i ve st r i kes agai nst a t er r or i st st at e or gr oup t o pr ot ect t he Uni t ed St at es and al l i ed gov er nment s agai nst BW at t acks . The 1981 bombi ng of t he I r aqi Or i sak nucl ear r eact or by I sr ael i s r epr esent at i ve of usi ng over t mi l i t ar y f or ce dur i ng i nst ances shor t of open ar med conf l i ct .def ense c an r ange f r om ef f or t s t hat occur dur i ng nonhost i l i t i es t o open ar med conf l i ct . Fi ndi ng a " s mok i ng gun" and pr ovi ng who i s r esponsi bl e f or a f ut ur e cover t bi ol ogi cal war f ar e at t ack coul d be di f f i cul t or i mpossi bl e . Dest r uct i on of t he means t o pr oduce. Pr eempt i ve act i vi t i es or ant i ci pat or y sel f . si nce t he Uni t ed St at es and i t s al l i es mus t al so r espond t o t he chal l enge posed by f ut ur e enemy cr ui se mi ssi l es equi pped wi t h bi ol ogi cal weapon war heads . t her e was one news r epor t t hat i mpl i cat ed t he occur r ence of i l l ness and deat h i n I r aqi guar ds at an uni dent i f i ed BWf aci l i t y sout h of Baghdad af t er coal i t i on bombi ng . Of cour se.FI RST CENTURY GERMWARFARE bot h I r an and Syr i a and sever al t er r or i st gr oups wer e suspect ed . Good bal l i st i c mi ssi l e def enses ar e not enough. On t he ot her hand. I deal l y. The r ecent i nt er cept i on and at t empt ed i nt er di ct i on of pr ecur sor CW mat er i al s bound f or I r an f r om Chi na ( Yi n He i nci dent ) pr esent a r ecent exampl e .r el at ed f aci l i t i es or del i ver y syst ems . i nt er cept i on and dest r uct i on woul d occur dur i ng ear l y boost phas e of t he enemy mi ssi l e l aunch t o l ower t he r i sk of f r i endl y casual t i es . such mi ssi l e def enses ar e def enses of t he l ast r esor t . Theor et i cal l y. The gr eat est pr obabi l i t y of mi ni mi s i ng col l at er al damage woul d be r eal i zed i f speci al f or ces or ot her means of pr eempt i on al l owed t he Uni t ed St at es or i t s al l i es t o dest r oy t he 24 5 . 37 Anot her par t i al answer t o t he BWt hr eat woul d be t o depl oy t heat er bal l i st i c mi ssi l e def enses capabl e of i nt er cept i ng enemy BWwar heads whi l e enr out e t o t hei r t ar get s .TWENTY.

chi ef ( CI NC) i s r equi r ed t o det er mi ne t he r egi onal t hr eat and pr ovi de t he chai r man of t he Joi nt Chi ef s wi t h r equi r ement s . and pr oduci ng Food and Dr ug Admi ni st r at i on. The cont r over sy associ at ed wi t h t he l i abi l i t y r i sk of i mmuni z i ng chi l dr en agai nst Per t ussi s i s i l l ust r at i ve . Har dened shel t er s and wor k ar eas f or r ear . Ev en when det ect or s bec ome avai l abl e. A pr i or i t y ef f or t exi st s t o devel op and f i el d a BW det ect or whi c h c an pr ovi de st and. t est i ng.t er m met hods of pr ot ect i ng US mi l i t ar y f or ces . and pl anes coul d mi ni mi ze t he ef f ect s of bot h chemi cal and bi ol ogi cal weapons .t er m and l ong.t i me det ect i on of at t ack . The i mpor t ance and pr obl ems of BWdet ect or s have al r eady been i dent i f i ed .appr oved vacci nes t o i mmuni z e sol di er s agai nst t he mos t l i kel y BWt hr eat agent s . Ef f or t s shoul d be f ocused f i r st on devel opi ng. I t est abl i shes t he r equi r ement f or bot h peac et i me and cont i ngency use of vacci nes agai nst val i dat ed BW t hr eat s .dedi cat ed vacci ne pr oduct i on i nf r ast r uct ur e .pr essur i zed syst ems f or c ombat vehi cl es. The avai l abi l i t y of sui t abl e vacci nes and ot her medi c al pr oduct s mus t r emai n a pr i or i t y . On 26 Nov ember 1993.of f war ni ng and r eal .echel on t r oops as wel l as f i l t er ed over . Congr ess 24 6 . Medi cal meas ur es t o pr ot ect agai nst bi ol ogi cal t hr eat s i ncl ude shor t . medi cal meas ur es wi l l pl ay an i mpor t ant r ol e i n bot h pr ot ect i on and t r eat ment agai nst BWat t ack . Eac h t heat er commander .i n. Anot her nonmedi c al def ensi ve meas ur e t hat deser ves emphas i s i s t he empl oy ment of col l ect i ve pr ot ect i ve syst ems . Under secr et ar y of Def ense Wi l l i am Per r y si gned t he DOD i mmuni zat i on pol i cy f or BWt hr eat s . Bi ol ogi cal Def ense The l ast el ement of t he BWcount er pr ol i f er at i on st r at egy i s medi cal and nonmedi c al passi ve def ensi ve meas ur es . I nt egr al i n meet i ng t he r egi onal CI NC' s r equi r ement s i s t he devel opment of a DOD. The l i abi l i t y concer ns of t he US phar maceut i cal i ndust r y have af f ect ed devel opment and pr oduct i on of publ i c heal t h vacci nes . shi ps.BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE enemy BWcapabi l i t y pr i or t o an adver sar y f i l l i ng t he weapon or l aunchi ng t he at t ack .

conf i dence war ni ng of an at t ack on our popul at i on occur . Yet . Ther ef or e. coupl ed wi t h spr ead of dual . Concl usi ons The pr ol i f er at i on of bi ol ogi cal war f ar e weapons of f er s l ess devel oped nat i ons a capabi l i t y as l et hal and pot ent i al l y devast at i ng as a nucl ear devi ce . I mmuni z i ng US f or ces and havi ng t he abi l i t y t o pr ot ect ot her s wi l l mi ni mi ze an enemy' s abi l i t y t o coer ce t he Uni t ed St at es and i t s al l i es . subst ant i al amount s of t hese pr oduct s woul d be necessar y t o r espond t o mi ni mi ze i l l ness and deat h .subsi di zed f und t o def r ay cour t awar ded damages r esul t i ng f r om sever e neur ol ogi c sequel ae f r om t he Per t ussi s vacci ne . Suc h a f aci l i t y shoul d r emai n a hi gh pr i or i t y pr oj ect i n devel opi ng capabi l i t y t o r es pond t o BW pr ol i f er at i on . shoul d a hi gh.TWENTY.f i ght i ng capabi l i t y of US mi l i t ar y f or ces as wel l as pr ovi di ng f or t he sur vi val of US ci t i zens . so t o pr eser ve t hei r pr of i t abl e pr oduct i on of i mpor t ant publ i c heal t h vacci nes . The r at i onal e behi nd t hi s ef f or t was t o pr ot ect t he vacci ne compani es f r om l ar ge cash awar ds r esul t i ng f r om l i t i gat i on. vacci nes and medi cal count er measur es can cont r i but e t he means t o mai nt ai n t he war . They wi l l al so l essen t he pot ent i al i mpact of a BWat t ack on t he Uni t ed St at es or i t s al l i es . The abi l i t y and desi r e of t he phar maceut i cal i ndust r y t o c ommi t i t s f aci l i t i es f or dedi cat ed vacci ne devel opment ar e quest i onabl e i n l i ght of pr of i t and l i abi l i t y concer ns . Fi nal l y.FI RST CENTURYGERMW ARFARE mandat ed a gover nment . A US gov er nment vacci ne f aci l i t y has val ue f or bot h BWand publ i c heal t h consi der at i ons . The c ommer c i al or publ i c need f or vacci nes agai nst bi ol ogi cal war f ar e agent s shor t of an act of t er r or i s vi r t ual l y zer o .use l egi t i mat e 247 . cer t ai n el ement s of det er r ence c an be gar ner ed by mi ni mi z i ng t he ef f ect of an adver sar y' s BWagent . The ease and r el at i ve l ow cost of BWpr oduct i on. Besi des t he act ual pr ot ect i ve ef f ect gai ned by BWvacci nes. t he per cei ved or act ual benef i t der i ved by t he BW pr ol i f er ant wi l l be l essened . The peacet i me mi l i t ar y need exi st s as r esul t of t he DOD i mmuni zat i on di r ect i ve .

Toget her .col d war er a. Bi ol ogi cal war f ar e' s pot ent i al t o cr eat e si gni f i cant economi c l oss and subsequent pol i t i cal i nst abi l i t y wi t h pl ausi bl e deni al exceeds any ot her k nown weapon .BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE bi ot echnol ogy.t er m ef f ect i veness of t he Bi ol ogi cal C may of f er f ur t her Weapons Convent i on . The out l ook f or t he f ut ur e of bi ol ogi cal weapons pr ol i f er at i on i s di scour agi ng . pr osper ous. No si ngl e el ement of t he pr ogr am i s adequat e t o deal wi t h t he BWpr obl em. The l ow pr obabi l i t y of det ect i ng t he devel opment and pr oduct i on of t er r or i st and mi l i t ar i l y si gni f i cant quant i t i es of BW agent s l essens t he ef f ect i veness of di pl omat i c measur es s uc h as di ssuasi on. t hese el ement s can l ower t he r i sk and mi t i gat e t he pot ent i al i mpact of BW . however . ani mal . Expect at i ons f or pr event i ng BWpr ol i f er at i on mus t be gr ounded i n r eal i t y . wi l l f aci l i t at e and accel er at e BWpr ol i f er at i on i n t he shor t . 248 . The l i kel i hood of pr event i ng or det er r i ng a det er mi ned pr ol i f er ant f r om obt ai ni ng bi ol ogi cal weapons i s r el at i vel y smal l . dur i ng oper at i ons ot her t han war .man. Ascr i bi ng t o t he BW pot ent i al of pl ausi bl e deni al i f pr ol i f er ant s sought t o use member s hi p as a cover f or t hei r pr ohi bi t ed ef f or t s . Fut ur e US pol i ci es agai nst BWpr ol i f er at i on need t o be based on i nt egr at ed gover nment pol i ci es and capabi l i t i es t o det er .f i r st cent ur y di r ect l y t hr eat ens t he secur i t y of t he Uni t ed St at es and t he achi evement of a peacef ul . pr eempt and def end agai nst t hi s t hr eat . or c an be us ed i n open c ombat scenar i os agai nst al l bi ol ogi cal s y s t ems . and st abl e post . and i nt er nat i onal pr essur e . Bi ol ogi cal weapons can be empl oyed i n nonc ombat set t i ngs under t he gui se of nat ur al event s. or pl ant . The l i mi t at i ons associ at ed wi t h t r eat y ver i f i cat i on l eave l i t t l e opt i mi s m f or t he l ong.t er m and wel l i nt o t he t went y. I n addi t i on. " Br ai n dr ai n" f r om t he f or mer Sovi et Uni on may cr eat e vol at i l e oppor t uni t i es f or br eakt hr ough pr ol i f er ant s . t he pr obl em of bi ol ogi cal war f ar e cannot be nar r owl y f ocused on i t s abi l i t y t o ki l l or r ender peopl e i l l . deni al .f i r st cent ur y . Del i ber at e di ssemi nat i on of BWagent s may be af f or ded possi bl e deni al by nat ur al l y occur r i ng di seases and event s . Ger m war f ar e at t he end of t he t went i et h and i ncept i on of t he t went y.

S. 13 . Bi ol ogi cal Def ense Resear ch Pr ogr am.TWENTY. Al . . 19 Nov ember 1993) . 3 . 7 . USGPO. " CI A For esees I r aq Bi ol ogi cal . No . et al . : vol . Saunder s. Ar my. 17 . 15 . ( Washi ngt on. Wei ner and J ohn Bar r et . Medi c al Mi cr obi ol ogy. t he ar t i l l er y r evol ut i on. 1986) . 1982) . 162. Tr auma. 9. Sovi et War f ar e Thr eat ( Washi ngt on. " Human Monoc l onal Ant i bodi es f or Bi ol ogi cal War f ar e Def ense.163 . D 2. 1986) . Pr ol i f er at i on of Weapons of Mas s Dest r uct i on: As s es s i ng t he Ri s k s ( Washi ngt on. Fal l 1994.FI RST CENTURY GERMWARFARE Not es 1. " The Nat i onal I nt er est . 2 . 1993) . Of f i ce of Technol ogy Assessment . 1990) . A Hi gher For m of Ki l l i ng ( New Yor k : Noonday Pr ess. Rober t Gat es. 3 . 1 . " Caval r y t o Comput er . and t he nucl ear r evol ut i on . C. Gener al Account i ng Of f i ce. : USGPO. C. D. 6. For ces Ar e Not Adequat el y Equi pped t o Det ect Al l Thr eat s ( Washi ngt on. 24 9 D. These 10 r evol ut i ons i n mi l i t ar y af f ai r s wer e i dent i f i ed as t he i nf ant r y r evol ut i on. Anot her good sour ce i s Mi chael R Gor don. Management f or Ci vi l i an. USGPO. Lexi ngt on Books. 2 . . 2 . C. 4. Geor ge F. r evol ut i on of sai l and shot . Davi d L. 14 . 519 . C. 5 . C. Joseph D. Andr ew F. S. St anl ey L. avi at i on r evol ut i on. U. Br adl ey Gr aham. Wi l l i am H. Mc Nei l and Lehr er News Hour . 2. : GPO. S. D. Pl agues and Peopl es ( New Yor k : Anc hor Books. " ( La Jol l a Cal i f or ni a: The Scr i pps Resear ch I nst i t ut e. Congr ess. al . 1991) . " New Yor k Ti f mes. Kr epi nevi ch. t he f or t r ess r evol ut i on. Fr i edl ander . B. 10 . Dougl as and Nei l C. 1977) . 5 . Bi ol ogi cal War f ar e Pr ogr am. 37.Weapon Capabi l i t y i n Ear l y ' 91. " Bat t l e Pl ans f or a New Cent ur y. 1987) . See al so. 1 . 11 . 30. 8 . ( Nor wal k. Br ooks. : Ar my Medi cal Resear ch I nst i t ut e of I nf ect i ous Di seases. 19 . Rober t Har r i s and J er emy Pax man. and Mi l i t ar y Physi ci ans ( Phi l adel phi a : W . J onat han Lasch. 1 . Bi ol ogi cal War f ar e: Bet t er Cont r ol s i n Bi ol ogi cal DOD' s Res ear c h Coul d Pr event Unneeded Ex pendi t ur es ( Washi ngt on. I bi d . i nf or mat i on r evol ut i on. " i n Bi ol ogi cal W eapons : W eapons of t he Fut ur e? ed . 16 . : Appl et on and Lange. 1990) . C. 21 Febr uar y 1995. t he Napol eoni c r evol ut i on. The Pat t er n of Mi l i t ar y Revol ut i ons. 20 J anuar y 1992 . 12 . D. .42 . Br ad Rober t s ( Washi ngt on. I bi d . Amer i c a t he Vul ner abl e ( Lexi ngt on Mas s . " The U. 1993) . Gener al Account i ng Of f i ce. Of f i ce of Technol ogy Assessment . . Ar t hur Fr i edl ander . Huxsol l . D. Al so Def ense I nt el l i gence Agency. : USGPO. A4 . D. et . Li vi ngst one. : 1993) 1 . 76 . 1977) . C. 20 Sept ember 1990. 39 . 3 . mechani zat i on r evol ut i on. 60 . " Wor l d AI DS Day Dec ember 1 1993" Mor bi di t y and Mor t al i t y Week l y Repor t ( At l ant a : Cent er s f or Di sease Cont r ol . Ar my Act i vi t y i n t he U. 18 . N. l and war r evol ut i on. S. M. Chemi c al & Bi ol ogi cal Def ens e: U. naval r evol ut i on. Pos t . " The Was hi ngt on Post . D. 19 Nov ember 1993) .ex pos ur e Pr ophy l ax i s agai ns t Ex per i ment al I nhal at i onal Ant hr ax ( Fr eder i ck. McNei l l . : The Cent er f or St r at egi c & I nt er nat i onal St udi es. 3 .

36 . I bi d . I bi d . 37 .BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE 20 . . Geor ge Fr i el . 54 . 11 . I bi d . J ohn J . 1992. Theodor e Rosebur y. Fi al ka. 22 . 80 . " CI A Say s Nor t h Kor ea Appear s Act i ve i n Bi ol ogi cal . I bi d . Smi t h. " The Washi ngt on Post . 27 . " Bi ol ogi cal Pl ant Bombed. Jef f r ey Smi t h. 3 Febr uar y 1991 . 8 . I bi d . 35 . Shevchenko.Hi l l Book Co . 39 . . Of f i ce of Technol ogy Assessment . Ar k ady N. quot ed i n " Chem. 174 . 1 . 38 . . 24 . Gener al Account i ng Of f i ce. 51 . R. 60 . 1985) . [ bi d . . Knopf . 29 . Of f i ce of Technol ogy Assessment . 33 . Peace or Pest i l ence: Bi ol ogi cal War f ar e and How t o Avoi d I t ( New Yor k : McGr aw. " Copi ng Wi t h Bi ol ogi cal Ter r or i sm. 10 . Nucl ear Ar ms. 25 . 6 Jul y 1995. . I bi d . 1949) . 1 . 26 . Of f i ce of Technol ogy Assessment . 30. 16 . 34 . . " I r aq Had Pr ogr am f or Ger m War f ar e. 42 . . . 41 . 28 . Br eaki ng Wi t h Mos c ow ( New Yor k : Al f r ed A. 25 Febr uar y 1993. Kupper man and Davi d M. See al so. 23 . 39 . 41 . Rober t H. 21 . " i n Rober t s.Bi o Def ense Agenc y Wi l l Tackl e Last Maj or Thr eat t o a Depl oyed For ce. 31 . " London : Reut er s Wi r e Ser vi ce. Kupper man and Smi t h. " Ar med For ces Jour nal . " The Wal l St r eet Jour nal . 32 .

i t s cont ext and t ype ar e changi ng . I n t he Uni t ed St at es al one. The par al l el emer gence of economi c compet i t i on and i t s l i kel y MD r ai ses accompanyi ng conf l i ct s wi t h t he pr ol i f er at i on of W t he possi bi l i t y of a new f or m of war f ar e. The f ocus of many devel opi ng nat i ons i s t o seek weapons of mas s dest r uct i on ( WMD) . " ' Whi l e mi l i t ar y power r emai ns i mpor t ant . bi ol ogi cal . Besi des pr ovi di ng f or t he of t he US popul at i on and a si gni f i cant por t i on of 251 . or ecosyst ems of f er s an adver sar y t he means t o wage a pot ent i al l y subt l e yet devast at i ng f or m of war f ar e. t he agr i cul t ur al $800 bi l l i on i ndust r y .mi l i t ar y compet i t i on i s sl owl y gi vi ng way t o pol i t i co. " The t went y.t o meet r egi onal secur i t y concer ns . The col l apse of t he Sovi et Uni on has di ssol ved t he bi pol ar wor l d and cr eat ed t he openi ng t o f or ge a new i nt er nat i onal secur i t y envi r onment . and chemi cal weapons. one whi ch woul d i mpact t he pol i t i cal . soci al .f i r st cent ur y wi l l be a cent ur y of economi c war f ar e. Kadl ec. and economi c sect or s of a soci et y and pot ent i al l y of nat i onal sur vi val i t sel f . USAF The f i nal decade of t he t went i et h cent ur y has posi t i oned t he wor l d at t he t hr eshol d of t r emendous oppor t uni t y . Usi ng BWt o at t ack l i vest ock. Agr i c ul t ur e For bot h commodi t i es and pr osper i sect or i s an nour i shment devel oped and devel opi ng nat i ons. cr ops.economi c compet i t i on . The pr eemi nence of pol i t i co. nonf uel pr esent an i mpor t ant sour ce of nat i onal secur i t y t y . Thi s i ncl udes t he devel opment and use of bi ol ogi cal war f ar e ( BW) agai nst economi c t ar get s .Chapt er 10 Bi ol ogi cal Weapons f or Wagi ng Ec onomi c War f ar e Lt Col Rober t P.nucl ear . As Shi nt ar o I shi har a pr edi ct s.

and pot ent f er t i l i zer s and pest i ci des . yet not as dr amat i c. agr i cul t ur e i s now one of but a handf ul of sect or s t hat gener at es a t r ade sur pl us f or t he US. 7 Compet i t i on has bec ome i nt ense . 3 per cent and 25 . 4 A si mi l ar . and peanut s . wher e t he number s of peopl e i nvol ved i n agr i cul t ur e decl i ned by 11 . 2 Agr i cul t ur al expor t s hav e been an i mpor t ant sour ce f or r edr essi ng t he US t r ade def i ci t . 2 per cent r espect i vel y. i ndi cat e t hat f ewer number s of peopl e and hect ar es ar e i nvol ved i n agr i cul t ur al pr oduct i on . Thi s r evenue r epr esent s appr oxi mat el y 15 per cent of t he t ot al US expor t s f or t hat par t i cul ar year . agr i cul t ur e gener at ed appr oxi mat el y $67 bi l l i on i n expor t r evenues i n 1991 . The Uni t ed St at es want ed t o pr ot ect dai r y pr oduct s. hi gh. decl i ne was not ed i n devel opi ng count r i es. 3 per cent dur i ng t he s ame per i od . 5 Despi t e t hat decl i ne.suf f i ci ent i n f ood and ot her agr i cul t ur al pr oduct s .bi l l i on sur pl us . I n 1992 i t cr eat ed an est i mat ed $18. 6 Thi s i ncr ease i n pr oduct i vi t y has r esul t ed f r om t he spr ead of moder n f ar mi ng t echnol ogy. Thi s obser vat i on i s especi al l y t r ue of nonoi l pr oduc i ng nat i ons . t he per c ent age of t he ec onomi c al l y act i ve popul at i on i n agr i cul t ur e decl i ned by 31 . 3 Lesser devel oped and devel opi ng nat i ons and ot her nat i ons whos e economi es ar e i n t r ansi t i on have si gni f i cant agr i cul t ur al sect or s t hat pr ovi de i mpor t ant cont r i but i ons of f ood and r evenue t o t hei r economi es .BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE t he wor l d. sugar . t r emendous r esi st ance was encount er ed f r om sever al i mpor t ant nat i ons . The goal of many devel opi ng and devel oped nat i ons i s t o bec ome sel f . cot t on. par t i cul ar l y f ood pr oduct i on. I n devel oped mar k et ec onomi es . Mor eover . Tr ends i n agr i cul t ur al syst ems. Ef f or t s t o r emove t r ade.yi el d cr op var i et i es. mos t i f not al l nat i ons i n t he wor l d ar e f ood i mpor t er s . t he over al l agr i cul t ur al pr oduct i vi t y i n bot h t he devel oped and devel opi ng wor l ds i ncr eased by 45 . J apan want ed t o pr event r i ce 25 2 . Yet . 8 Whi l e i ncl uded on t he Ur uguay Round' s agenda. ev en wi t h pr oduct i ve agr i cul t ur al syst ems.l i mi t at i on pol i ci es essent i al l y mai nt ai n domest i c pr i ces abov e wor l d pr i ces and i sol at e domest i c pr oducer s f r om compet i t i on and t he vol at i l i t y of t he wor l d mar k et .di st or t i ng domest i c subsi di es and l i mi t s t o mar ket access t o agr i cul t ur e wer e obj ect i ves of t he Ur uguay Round of t he Gener al Agr eement on Tr ade and Tar i f f s . Mar k et access. 2 per cent f r om 1980 t o 1992 .

or pl ant s have an unset t l i ng val ue i n 253 . 000 acr es t o onl y 7.known exampl e of a nat ur al l y occur r i ng spor ul at ed bact er i a whi c h ef f ect i vel y cont r ol s cat er pi l l ar s. agr eement on many i t ems was not r eached .bear i ng mosqui t oes and bl ackf l i es whi c h car r y t he par asi t e t hat causes r i ver bl i ndness .bi l l i on l oss i n US cot t on r evenues f r om 1909 t o 1949 . Baci l l us t hur i ngi ensi s ( B. t . 9 Ef f or t s ar e now under way t o i nser t t he gene f r om B. . 10 I n Cal i f or ni a' s I mper i al Val l ey t he pi nk bol l wor m cat er pi l l ar has caused t he amount of l and pl ant ed wi t h cot t on t o dr op f r om 140. A var i ant of BA. Despi t e ef f or t s t o set t l e di f f er ences on i ssues of mar k et access. Thi s par t i cul ar pest caused an est i mat ed $50. . t he devel opment of hi gher . As al l uded t o ear l i er . i . has s hown i t s ef f ect i veness i n cont r ol l i ng mal ar i a. ) . I ni t i al r esear ch i ndi cat es t hat t hi s pr ocedur e enabl es cot t on pl ant s t o r esi st t he bol l weevi l ( ant honomus gr andi s) . vi r uses. and expor t compet i t i on. i nt er nal suppor t s. Nat ur e of t he Bi ol ogi cal War f ar e Thr eat Har mf ul bact er i a. t . ani mal s. Besi des enhanci ng t he pr oduct i vi t y and hear t i ness of f ood or cash cr ops. i s a wel l . i nt o s uc h pl ant s as cot t on . met hods of bi ol ogi cal cont r ol ar e i ncr easi ngl y r el i ed upon t o pr ovi de an envi r onment . or t oxi ns t hat i ncapaci t at e or ki l l humans . whi c h t akes genes coded f or gr eat er pr oduct i vi t y and r esi st ance t o di sease and dr ought and i nser t s t hemi nt o a par t i cul ar speci es of cr op . cal l ed B. par t i cul ar l y t omat o wor ms .f r i endl y means of cont r ol l i ng ec onomi c al l y si gni f i cant pes t s and di seases .ARFARE BI OLOGI CAL W EAPONS FORW AGI NG ECONOMI C W i mpor t s . r i cket t si a. " Today US cot t on f ar mer s spend $500 mi l l i on on pest i ci des . t . Bi ot echnol ogy Par t of t he economi c r evol ut i on i n t he wor l d t oday i s t he expl osi on of bi ot echnol ogy . i sr ael ensi s or B. 000 dur i ng t he past 17 year s . t . Bi ot echnol ogy has been a si gni f i cant r eason why agr i cul t ur al syst ems ar e muc h mor e pr oduct i ve .yi el d cr ops r esul t s par t l y f r om genet i c r ecombi nant engi neer i ng.

I n 1925 Wi ns t on Chur chi l l envi si oned a cont ext f or BWwhen he wr ot e about " pest i l ences met hodi cal l y pr epar ed and del i ber at el y l aunched upon man and beast . The Uni t ed St at es di scont i nued i t s pur sui t of sever al ant i . .ani mal / ant i . I r aq. di ssuaded US of f i ci al s f r om. Chi na. or use of bi ol ogi cal agent s f or of f ensi ve use . engaged i n a l ar ge and ambi t i ous r et al i at or y of f ensi ve and def ensi ve BWr esear ch and devel opment ef f or t . t he Bi ol ogi cal War f ar e Convent i on. pr oduct i on. f ear f ul of per cei ved ef f or t s by bot h J apan and Ger many t o devel op BW. devel opment . no ver i f i cat i on means ar e avai l abl e t o ensur e compl i ance .cr op bomb .cr op agent s . Whi l e 162 count r i es hav e si gned t hi s t r eat y. 254 . wheat r ust . I r an. and Tai wan . .agr i cul t ur al agent s i n t he mi d.1950s si nce t hey l acked mi l i t ar y ut i l i t y . Syr i a. t he Uni t ed St at es. .BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE wagi ng ec onomi c war f ar e . Bl i ght t o dest r oy cr ops. 14 No speci f i c ment i on i s made of any suspect nat i on seeki ng devel opment of ant i . gl ander s. r ye r ust . pur sui ng t hi s opt i on . I sr ael . " 12 Thi s di scussi on nar r ows t he def i ni t i on of BWt o consi der onl y i t s ut i l i t y agai nst s uc h ec onomi c t ar get s as ani mal s and pl ant s . Hi st or i cal Cont ex t and Evol ut i on I nvest i gat or s hav e ar gued t hat Ger man agent s i nt ent i onal l y i nf ect ed hor ses and cat t l e wi t h ant hr ax and gl ander s bef or e t hey wer e shi pped f r om t he Uni t ed St at es t o Eur ope dur i ng Wor l d War 1 . . Si gni f i cant on t he l i st ar e Russi a. I n 1972. Not e t hat t he Uni t ed St at es dur i ng i t s of f ensi ve pr ogr am f i r st devel oped and f i el ded an ant i . speci f i cal l y pr ohi bi t ed t he r esear ch. an i nt er nat i onal t r eat y. i ncl udi ng r i nder pest . The r eal i zat i on t hat t he Uni t ed St at es woul d have t o suppl y f ood t o J apan once t he war ended and t he avai l abi l i t y of t he at omi c bomb. 13 Dur i ng Wor l d War I I . Repor t edl y. up t o 20 nat i ons ar e suspect ed of pur sui ng of f ensi ve BWcapabi l i t i es . Ant hr ax t o sl ay hor ses and cat t l e . . Whi l e never f i el di ng or usi ng a BWweapon. Anecdot al r epor t s suggest US of f i ci al s had consi der ed usi ng r i ce bl ast agent s t o dest r oy Japan' s r i ce cr op dur i ng t he cl osi ng mont hs of t he war t o f or ce i t s s ur r ender . Nor t h Kor ea. and r i ce bl ast t o use agai nst ani mal s and pl ant s . t hey di d devel op sever al BW agent s.

and Af r i ca .bi l l i on i ndust r y . The I mper i al Val l ey pr oduces a l ar ge var i et y of f ood and pr oduce . A r el at ed but di f f er ent st r ai n of whi t ef l y caused $100 mi l l i on i n l osses i n sout heast er n Cal i f or ni a i n 1981 . I n t he ci r cumst ance of t hi s out br eak. The I mper i al Val l ey i nf est at i on r epr esent s a nat ur al event wher e a har mf ul agent ( whi t ef l y) encount er ed a suscept i bl e host ( cr ops) i n a c onduc i v e env i r onment ( t he I mper i al Val l ey) . 15 Not onl y i s BWmor e af f or dabl e. 25 5 . ot her si mi l ar st r ai ns or i gi nat e i n Russi a.end est i mat e of $200 mi l l i on f or devel opi ng a si ngl e nucl ear weapon . mai nl and Asi a. bi ol ogi cal weapons ar e cheap . The i nvest i gat i on of t hi s nat ur al out br eak. but mi l i t ar i l y si gni f i cant quant i t i es of BW agent s ( ki l ogr ams) i n l egi t i mat e bi ol ogi cal l abor at or i es mak e BWpr oduct i on easy t o accompl i sh and conceal . Any nat i on wi t h a moder at el y sophi st i cat ed phar maceut i cal i ndust r y c an do so . whi ch. however . i f i nt r oduced i nt o t hi s nat i on.val ue cash cr op or f ood sour ce . 16 Recent nat ur al l y occur r i ng event s hi ghl i ght t hi s pot ent i al . woul d adver sel y i mpac t t he l i vest ock i ndust r y . t he whi t ef l y coul d hav e ac c ompani ed a s hi pment of poi nset t i a pl ant s f r om Fl or i da . The US Depar t ment of Agr i cul t ur e r ecent l y i dent i f i ed 53 ani mal di seases whi c h ar e noni ndi genous or f or ei gn. Whi l e t he exact pl ace t he poi nset t i a st r ai n or i gi nat e r emai ns a myst er y.end cost est i mat e f or a nucl ear weapons coul d be 10 t o 50 t i mes hi gher .BI OLOGI CAL W EAPONS FORW AGI NG ECONOMI C W ARFARE Bi ol ogi cal Weapons : Cost . 17 The poi nset t i a st r ai n of t he whi t ef l y i s not f ound nat ur al l y i n Cal i f or ni a . Thi s est i mat ed cost st ands i n st ar k cont r ast t o a l ow. r eveal s j ust how a del i ber at e act of BWeconomi c war f ar e coul d be engi neer ed . The hi gh. The US agr i cul t ur al syst em i s a $800. an i nf est at i on by t he sweet pot at o f l y or whi t ef l y dest r oyed muc h of t he cr ops i n t hi s ar ea and caused a $300. I n t he s ummer of 1991. A r ecent Of f i ce of Technol ogy Assessment ( OTA) r epor t pl aces t he cost of a BWl ar ge ar senal as l ow as $10 mi l l i on .ef f ect i ve W MD Compar ed t o ot her mas s dest r uct i on weapons.mi l l i on l oss . Nat ur e at W or k : Whi t ef l f l i es and Pl ausi bi l i t y Bi ol ogi cal ec onomi c war f ar e l i kel y woul d i nvol ve t he i nt ent i onal di sper si on of a har mf ul agent or pest agai nst a hi gh.

Thi s par t i cul ar t ype of whi t ef l y was a di st i nct new st r ai n . Thus. t he i mpac t i t has on t he envi r onment i s usual l y l i mi t ed . I t s appet i t e was vor aci ous . I t s bi ol ogi cal char act er i st i cs made i t an ef f ect i ve agent of dest r uct i on . a nat i on coul d sel ect f r om sever al nat i ve occur r i ng or endemi c pest s . Second. compet i t or s. I n t he cont ext of a del i ber at e act of BW. The sel ect i on of t hi s pest coul d be hi ghl y speci f i c f or a par t i cul ar cr op t hat an economi c compet i t or or r egi onal adver sar y r el i es on f or economi c pr osper i t y or nat i onal sur vi val . To pr ovi de bet t er cover f or a cl andest i ne or cover t BWat t ack. I nf i l t r at i ng and di ssemi nat i ng per pet r at or i nsect s i s t hen dependent on t he mode of t r anspor t at i on and t he l evel of pl ausi bl e deni al desi r ed . t he whi t ef l y car r i ed ot her har mf ul agent s l i ke f ungus . i t al so i nf l i ct ed di sease on al r eady weak ened pl ant s . besi des i t s di r ect ef f ect s. I n t he I mper i al Val l ey ci r cumst ance. Unl i ke ot her k nown st r ai ns of whi t ef l i es. uncont r ol l ed i nsect br eedi ng may cause subsequent cr op dest r uct i on . and pr edat or s. Bal anced bet ween nat ur al condi t i ons. pat hogens . Uni t ed St at es Vul ner abi l i t i es The t hr eat of t hi s t ype of i nsect . however . W hen t hi s f l y or any ot her pest i s pl aced i n an env i r onment wher e nat ur al cont r ol s ar e mi ssi ng. pest s endemi c t o t he t ar get nat i on coul d be si mi l ar l y obt ai ned and coul d enhance i t s r esi st ance t hr ough s uc h l abor at or y mani pul at i on as noni ndi genous pest i ci de exposur e . t he cul pabl e i nsect r epr esent ed mor e t han si mpl y a pest t r ansl ocat ed t o new f er t i l e f i el ds . t he whi t ef l y has a cer t ai n homeost at i c exi st ence . Nat ur al l y occur r i ng genet i c event s of mut at i on and sel ect i on r easonabl y expl ai n t hi s occur r ence . A r ecent OTA r epor t on t he 256 . Fi nal l y. t hi s one c ons umed many t i mes i t s body wei ght i n veget at i on and di ned on a gr eat var i et y of pl ant s .BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE I n i t s nat ur al habi t at . Sel ect i ve management and br eedi ng coul d devel op a " super " pest . i t had an unus ual r esi st ance t o chemi cal and nat ur al l y occur r i ng pest i ci des .bor ne BWat t ack on t he Uni t ed St at es r emai ns t heor et i cal . I t i s al so possi bl e t hat s uc h i nsect s coul d be br ed f or nef ar i ous pur poses . DNA anal ysi s of t he genet i c mak eup s howed a uni que st r ai n of t hi s par t i cul ar i nsect .

I f her bi ci des wer e not us ed t o cont r ol t hem. weed l oss woul d hover ar ound $19 bi l l i on year l y . caused a l oss of s omewher e bet ween $3 . 1991) Spec i es Not Anal y z ed 15 603 - 6 225 >39 Ter r est r i al Ver t ebr at es I nsect s 43 92. exceeded $600 mi l l i on . f or est r y. Thi s t abl e det ai l ed onl y a smal l per cent age of t he l ar ge number of economi cal l y and envi r onment al l y cost l y agent s. 6 and $5 . wat er use. wi t h bot h di r ect and i ndi r ect ef f ect s. " Non. economi c consequences f or US agr i cul t ur e. Cochr an.1991 Cat egor y Pl ant sa* Spec i es Anal y z ed ( number ) Cumul at i v e Los s es ( $ mi l l i ons. Anot her r ecent exampl e ci t ed i n t he OTA r epor t descr i bed how NI S gai n ent r y i nt o t he US. The r epor t i ndi cat ed i nt ent i onal ( noncr i mi nal ) or uni nt ent i onal i mpor t at i on ani mal s. Mar ch 1992 . wi t h a si gni f i cant amount spent on cont r ol l i ng NI S i nsect s . 4 bi l l i on i s spent on pest i ci de appl i cat i ons. 658 >330 Fi sh 3 467 >30 Aquat i c 3 1. The Asi an t i ger f l y ( anophel es 25 7 . f i sher i es. 19 The Medi t er r anean f r ui t f l y caused $897 mi l l i on i n damage and l ost r evenue . Eac h year $7 . Noni ndi genous weeds. so t hei r t r ue i mpact i s not k nown . ut i l i t i es. 207 >35 I nver t ebr at es Pl ant Pat hogens 5 867 >44 Ot her 4 917 - ' Excl udes most agr i cul t ur al weeds . S. Tabl e 3 Est i mat ed Cumul at i ve Losses t o t he US f r om Sel ect ed Noni ndi genous Speci es.I ndi genous Speci es i n t he U. 79 NI S caused doc ument ed l osses of $97 bi l l i on ( Tabl e 3) . 4 bi l l i on per year . Economi c Consequences. " pr epar ed f or Of f i ce of Technol ogy Assessment . or mi cr obes has maj or cur r ent and f ut ur e har mf ul t hat t he of pl ant s. f or exampl e. 18 Fr om 1906 t o 1991. US l osses bet ween 1987 and 1989 t o t he Russi an wheat aphi d ( di ur ahi s noxi a) . Sour ce: M. 1906. and nat ur al ar eas . I mpor t at i on of har mf ul noni ndi genous speci es cost s t he Uni t ed St at es bi l l i ons of dol l ar s annual l y .BI OLOGI CAL W EAPONS FORW AGI NG ECONOMI C W ARFARE Uni t ed f r om St at es addr es s ed t he t hr eat noni ndi genous speci es ( NI S) .

especi al l y di r ect l y 258 . The i mmedi ac y of ai r l i ne t r avel . r api d i dent i f i cat i on. t he Uni t ed St at es has a wel l . A cont empor ar y t heor et i cal ex ampl e of a t hi r d wor l d BW economi c scenar i o i s r epr esent ed by an act ual si t uat i on i n Mal aysi a. t he wor l d' s t hi r d l ar gest pr oducer of r ubber behi nd Thai l and and I ndonesi a . Thi s mosqui t o i s an aggr essi ve human bi t er and a pr ol i f i c br eeder . Thi s bl i ght i s t he mai n r eason a vi abl e r ubber i ndust r y no l onger exi st s i n Sout h Amer i c a . Thi s shor t comi ng was r ecogni zed i n an epi demi c of yel l ow f ever i n Ni ger i a i n 1991 . Because of i t s behavi or . The i mpact and magni t ude of t he t i ger f l y wi l l not r esul t i n bi l l i ons or mi l l i ons of dol l ar s of l ost pr oduct i vi t y or t ens of t hous ands or t housands of deat hs . Wi t h no geogr aphi c bar r i er s.BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE al bopi ct us) mosqui t o does not nat ur al l y l i ve i n t he US. however . t he Asi an t i ger f l y pos es a gr eat er r i sk of endemi c or nat ur al l y occur r i ng mosqui t o. No k nown cur e f or mi cr ocycl us exi st s . 9 mi l l i on of nat ur al r ubber . 2° Si mi l ar modes of NI S i nf i l t r at i on have been descr i bed as a r esul t of ai r l i ne t r avel and f l ushi ng bal l ast t anks on shi ps . ar e not as f or t unat e and do not have an exi st i ng i nf r ast r uct ur e nor adequat e r esour ces t o mi t i gat e t he i mpact of si mi l ar event s . and management i f an epi demi c or out br eak occur s . Thi s f ungus was f i r st det ect ed i n Br azi l at t he t ur n of t he cent ur y and i nf ect s t he s t ems of y oung t r ees and l eaves and si gni f i cant l y decr eases t he out put of sap .bor ne di sease t r ansmi ssi on . t he t i ger f l y has spr ead t o 22 st at es and i s cr eat i ng a publ i c heal t h concer n because of t he i ncr eased occur r ence of Wes t er n and East er n equi ne encephal i t i s and t he r eemer gence of dengue f ever i n t he Uni t ed St at es . I n 1991. Nat i ons of t he t hi r d wor l d. i t expor t ed $971 . Al ong wi t h ot her Sout heast Asi a nat i ons.est abl i shed publ i c heal t h syst em wi t h sur vei l l ance. Cl ear l y. A s hi pment of us ed t i r es f r om Asi a was i mpl i cat ed i n t he i nt r oduct i on of t hi s i nsect . Mal aysi a i s t r yi ng t o keep t he Sout h Amer i c an l eaf bl i ght ( mi cr ocycl us ul ei ) f r om af f ect i ng i t s r ubber t r ee i ndust r y . I t i s nor mal l y f ound i n Sout heast Asi a wher e i t i s t he vect or or car r i er f or t he human di seases dengue and mal ar i a . I n 1985 a f r ei ght er car r yi ng cont ai ner s of ol d t i r es i mpor t ed t hi s mosqui t o i nt o t he Uni t ed St at es vi a t he Por t of New Or l eans .

" 23 Thi s pest eat s t he f l esh of cows. A maj or concer n cr eat ed by l ower i ng t r ade bar r i er s dur i ng t he Nor t h Amer i c an Fr ee Tr ade Agr eement negot i at i ons was how t hi s t r eat y woul d f aci l i t at e t he spr ead of agr i cul t ur al pest s l i ke t he s c r ewwor m. I nf ect i on of US cat t l e woul d r esul t i n " sever e ec onomi c l osses . and Bul gar i a r eact ed by banni ng t he EC' s own meat expor t s .EAPONS FORW AGI NG ECONOMI CW ARFARE BI OLOGI CAL W f r om Br azi l t o Mal aysi a. Hungar y. an out br eak of hoof . The r eappear ance of t he s c r ewwor m al ong t he Mexi co. and ki l l s newbor n cal ves . t hey l ack money and do not conf or m t o t he EU' s c ommon agr i cul t ur al pol i cy .mout h di sease occur r ed i n I t al y . Bov i ne meat expor t s f r om ei ght Eas t Eur ope count r i es ( Bul gar i a. Hungar y.8 per cent gr owt h r at e . Est i mat es by Mal aysi an Agr i cul t ur al Depar t ment of f i ci al s pr edi ct t hat shoul d t hi s f ungus ent er i nt o i t s count r y' s r ubber t r ees. t he Eur opean Communi t y ( EC) spar ked a " c ow war " when t hey banned bovi ne pr oduct s f r om al l 18 count r i es of East er n Eur ope and t he f or mer Sovi et Uni on . Dur i ng t he past f our decades. and a por t i on of t he f or mer Sovi et Uni on) t ot al ed $103 mi l l i on i n 1991 . Pol and. mak es possi bl e t he uni nt ent i onal ent r y of t hi s f ungus . Pol and. Romani a. East Ger many . East er n Eur opean of f i ci al s say EC mar ket s r emai n al most as cl osed t o t hemi n 1993 as t o t hei r f or mer c ommuni s t r egi mes . over $400 mi l l i on has been spent on US. 22 Whi l e t he gover nment s of East er n Eur opean count r i es have l ar ge agr i cul t ur al i nf r ast r uct ur es wi t h t he pot ent i al f or l ar ge expor t s. 000 head of cat t l e . dest r oyi ng t hei r hi des. i t woul d deci mat e t he t r ees wi t hi n t wo year s .and.Mex i c an s c r ewwor m er adi cat i on pr ogr ams . 21 I n t he spr i ng of 1993. Czechosl ovaki a. Fi ght i ng of f t hi s f ungus i s consi der ed vi t al t o sust ai n Mal aysi a' s economi c boom at i t s pr oj ect ed 7. I t s r et ur n r esul t ed f r om i mpor t at i on of an i nf ect ed her d f r om Cent r al Amer i c a i n Nov ember 1992 . The c ow war s r est r i ct t hei r access t o agr i cul t ur al mar ket s and ec onomi c capi t al whi c h coul d f i nance gr eat er economi c and pol i t i cal r ef or ms . 25 9 .Texas bor der has wor r i ed US cat t l emen . Czechosl ovaki a. Thi s cont agi ous vi r us l ed t o t he dest r uct i on of 4. Af t er aut hor i t i es l i nked t he sour ce of t hi s out br eak t o a l i ve cat t l e s hi pment f r om t he f or mer Yugosl avi a.

was t he hi ghest i n a decade . and nat i onal or i nt er nat i onal r eper cussi ons . 4. 24 The r esul t ant i ncr ease i n cost i ncr eased oper at i ng expenses of c ompani es " t hat handl e[ d] ever yt hi ng f r om cor n. A sl i ght accel er at i on i n f ood i nf l at i on was expect ed i n 1994 . Food i nf l at i on i n 1994 was est i mat ed at bet ween 3 . Suc h a sur ge woul d pus h i nhi bi t ed expor t s and mak e hogs and cat t l e t oo expensi ve f or many f ar mer s t o f eed. The Febr uar y 1994 pr i ce of cor n. I t was expect ed t he cost of a bushel of cor n woul d soar t o t hr ee dol l ar s .bushel cor n cr op woul d pus h pr i ces t o f our dol l ar s a bushel . nat ur al l y occur r i ng event s wher e t he agent . The f al l 1993 har vest was t oo smal l t o suppl y bot h domest i c pr ocessor s and expor t er s . 4 per cent f r om r ecor d s ummer r ai ns and f l oodi ng . Thi s i s t he f i r st t i me i n about f our year s wher eas f ood pr i ces exceeded t he gener al i nf l at i on r at e . However . we may not be so l ucky i n t he t went y. 3 per cent and 3 . and t he envi r onment conver ge c an r esul t i n di sease. 2 per cent i n 1992 .bushel est i mat e woul d si gnal a 4 per cent f ood i nf l at i on r at e i n 1995 .bi l l i on. t he suscept i bl e host . Scenar i o One : Cor n Fut ur es The US Depar t ment of Agr i cul t ur e est i mat es t hat t he 1994 cor n har vest woul d pl unge 31 . " 28 A 7 . event ual l y dr i vi ng up meat pr i ces .f i r st cent ur y . 26 A cor n cr op shor t of t he 8 . " sai d Kei t h Col l i ns. . act i ng assi st ant agr i cul t ur e secr et ar y f or economi cs . up f r om 2 . r i ght on t he edge. . ec onomi c l oss. 27 Some addi t i onal di sast er s s uc h as a dr ought or l oss of cor n t o bl i ght . 29 26 0 .1970s .BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE I I l ust r at i ve Scenar i os Thus . I t i s al l t oo possi bl e t o const r uct a scenar i o whi c h woul d of f er pl ausi bl e deni al and possi bl e gai n t o a pot ent i al adver sar y . 5. US st ockpi l es ar e expect ed t o be at t hei r l owest l evel s si nce t he f ood scar e of t he mi d. " 25 " We ar e vul ner abl e i n 1994 .based et hanol f uel t o l i vest ock . 2 per cent i n 1993 and 1 . " woul d do consi der abl e ec onomi c damage t o wor l d f ood suppl i es . No evi dence i ndi cat es t hat any nat i on or gr oup wi l l f ul l y caused t he event s ci t ed . t he nat i on' s number one cr op.bi l l i on. 5 per cent .

Thi s unexpect ed Chi nese.i nduced cor n seed bl i ght deci mat es t he US cor n cr op . 31 I nf ect ed vi nes may be t r eat ed by r emov i ng t hem and r epl ant i ng t hem wi t h l ouse. The Uni t ed St at es t hen i mpor t s cor n f or t he f i r st t i me i n i t s hi st or y t o meet domest i c needs . i s l i kel y t o have spr ead al r eady t o ot her ar eas . Chi na i s t he wor l d' s second l ar gest cor n expor t er . I t i s est i mat ed t hat 60. wat er . and cot t on at t acks c an i l l ust r at e t he pot ent i al BWt hr eat . t hey cl andest i nel y spr ay t hi s hear t y spor e over t he US Mi dwest f r om commer ci al ai r l i ner s f l yi ng t he pol ar r out e t o Chi cago and Sai nt Loui s . The l ouse i s car r i ed by wi nd. f usar i um gr ami near um. Sel ect i ng a cor n seed bl i ght . and once i n pl ace.ARFARE AGI NG ECONOMI C W BI OLOGI CAL W EAPONS FORW How coul d s omeone us e bi ol ogi cal agent s t o c onduc t economi c war f ar e by r ui ni ng a compet i t or ' s cr op or pr oduct ? Thr ee mor e scenar i os i nvol vi ng cor n. The f al l har vest i s a f ul l 30 per cent bel ow expect ed l evel s . They di ssemi nat e t he spor e i n wi nt er and ear l y spr i ng. i t i s a pr ol i f i c br eeder . despi t e el i mi nat i ng t he cor n set . and mud and. 3 ° Recogni zi ng t he vul ner abl e si t uat i on of t he Uni t ed St at es. 000 vi ne acr es ar e bei ng dest r oyed . suf f er s f r om a cr op di sast er . Chi na gai ns si gni f i cant cor n mar ket shar e and t ens of bi l l i ons dol l ar s of addi t i onal pr of i t s f r om t hei r cr op . Food pr i ces r i se shar pl y and cause hi gher . wi ne. Chi na pl ans an act of agr i cul t ur al t er r or i sm. The expect ed i mpact wi l l be 26 1 . whi c h gr ows wel l at cool t emper at ur es and i n wet soi l . and t he bl i ght i s pr esent i n t he soi l when spr i ng pl ant i ng occur s .asi de r equi r ement s and pl ant i ng mor e t han 80 mi l l i on acr es of cor n. whi c h sl owl y ki l l s t he pl ant . I t i s di f f i cul t t o det ect . once di scover ed.Sonoma wi ne i ndust r y wi l l be about $1 bi l l i on or mor e over t he next f ew year s .t hanexpect ed f ood pr i ces and i nf l at i on . The Uni t ed St at es. The l ouse does not af f ect t he f r ui t of t he vi ne but at t acks t he r oot s. The est i mat ed cost t o t he Napa.r esi st ant pl ant s . Scenar i o Two : Cor n Ter r or i s m A second scenar i o mi ght go as f ol l ows . Scenar i o Thr ee : That ' s a " Lousy" Wi ne The gr ape l ouse ( phyl l oxer a vast r at r i x) i s r avagi ng t he vi neyar ds of Napa and Sonoma count i es i n Nor t her n Cal i f or ni a.70 per cent of t he 68.

A hypot het i cal scenar i o c oul d consi st of a gr oup of di sgr unt l ed Eur opean wi nemak er s who ar e j eal ous at t he super i or qual i t y of Nor t her n Cal i f or ni an wi nes and desi r ous of r ecapt ur i ng t he wi ne mar k et . and sugar cane. whi c h ar e si gni f i cant l y l ess pr of i t abl e ( cot t on i s 43 t i mes mor e pr of i t abl e t han al l ot her cr ops) . The geogr aphi c pr oxi mi t y of 262 . Thi s cr op l oss wi l l af f ect t he count r y' s over al l economi c per f or mance . Ahmed Muk t ar ( t he mi ni st er of st at e f or c ommer c e) sai d. Cot t on f ar mer s. yar n. Ri ce. I n 1991 t he Paki st ani s expor t ed $420 . I n 1993. The heav y r el i ance of Paki st an on a si ngl e expor t cash cr op i s not unus ual i n t he devel opi ng wor l d . Paki st an wi l l pr oduce onl y 10 mi l l i on or so bal es of t he 12 mi l l i on bal es t ar get ed . 35 " Rest or i ng t he conf i dence of f ar mer s. coul d bec ome one of Paki st an' s t oughest chal l enges . . t hey di sper se t hei r deadl y car go . may hav e l onger . . because t he sur pl us . They ar e compet i ng agai nst each ot her i n an ar ms r ace i nvol vi ng nucl ear and convent i onal weapons .l ar gest pr oducer of cot t on behi nd t he Uni t ed St at es and Chi na .pr oduct s ar e i ncl uded. " 3 s The open host i l i t y bet ween Paki st an and I ndi a i s not hypot het i cal . however . wheat . Scenar i o Four : Sabot agi ng Paki st an' s Cot t on Cr op Paki st an i s t he wor l d' s t hi r d.BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE heavi er on t he mor e expensi ve Nor t her n Cal i f or ni a wi nes. " Thi s def i ni t el y woul d be det r i ment al t o our economy. and ot her by. causi ng t he di sappear ance of s ome l abel s . Tr avel i ng as t our i st s. " 34 The i mmedi at e economi c i mpact of t he cr op l oss. t he 1993 har vest wi l l f al l 15 per cent bel ow expect ed l evel s . 32 I f t ext i l es. f ear f ul of exper i enci ng a si mi l ar di sast er next year . 33 Due t o an at t ack caused by an i nsect .l ast i ng ef f ect s . Tr avel i ng t hr ough t he Cal i f or ni a wi ne count r y. s ome 36 per cent of i t s pr i mar y c ommodi t y expor t s ( excl udi ng f uel s) i n 1991 . 4 mi l l i on of r aw cot t on. ar e consi der i ng pl ant i ng somet hi ng el se . woul d have added t o our meager f or ei gn exchange r eser ves . t hey sl i p i nt o t he Uni t ed St at es wi t h t i ns of pat e whi c h conceal mi l l i ons of t he of f endi ng l ouse . appear mor e at t r act i ve and saf er t han cot t on . who doubt t hei r abi l i t y t o gener at e pr of i t s f r om cot t on. al most 60 per cent of Paki st an' s expor t s depend on cot t on .

Usi ng BW i n t hi s f ashi on woul d hav e appl i cat i ons t o wagi ng l ow.val ue t ar get l i ke i t s cot t on cr op . however . i t i s pr udent t o assess t he pot ent i al i mpact of t hi s f or m of economi c war f ar e. agr i cul t ur al di ver si t y. Addr es s i ng t he Pr obl em Recent publ i c debat e about t he appr opr i at eness of t he US i nt el l i gence c ommuni t y ' s col l ect i ng economi cal l y r el evant 26 3 . Dev el oped count r i es wi t h adequat e ec onomi c r eser ves. Li t t l e or no ef f or t s eems t o be devot ed i n assessi ng t he vul ner abi l i t i es of t he Uni t ed St at es or any ot her nat i on' s agr i cul t ur al or ecol ogi cal i nf r ast r uct ur es t o BWat t ack . Lesser devel oped or devel opi ng nat i ons ar e i n a muc h mor e pr ecar i ous posi t i on . and t he soci et y . I mpl i cat i ons of Ec onomi c Bi ol ogi cal War f ar e The cur r ent US f ocus on BW l i mi t s consi der at i on t o t he human ef f ect s of s uc h agent s as ant hr ax. and t he means t o mi t i gat e s uc h occur r ences woul d be r el at i vel y r esi st ant t o s uc h at t ack . t he mi l i t ar y. devel op a compr ehensi ve sur vei l l ance or moni t or i ng syst em. The abi l i t y t o i nf l i ct economi c l oss on Paki st an has r eper cussi ons t hat af f ect t he pr i vat e and commer ci al sect or s. Ev en devel oped count r i es. and smal l pox . and pr epar e count er measur es . I f t he f ocus of i nt er nat i onal and r egi onal compet i t i on i s t r ansi t i oni ng t o economi c power . coul d exper i ence si gni f i cant economi c l osses and pol i t i cal and nat i onal secur i t y r eper cussi ons i f ot her i nt er veni ng event s coul d mak e cer t ai n t ar get commodi t i es mor e vul ner abl e or magni f y t he i mpact of BWuse. Hi st or y has r ecor ded t he chaos and i nst abi l i t y cr eat ed by such nat ur al cat ast r ophes as f ami nes and epi demi cs .ARFARE AGI NG ECONOMI C W BI OLOGI CAL W EAPONS FORW Paki st an t o i t s pr i nci pal adver sar y al l ows a f ai r l y easy r out e of i nf i l t r at i on and i nt r oduct i on of a pest agai nst a hi gh.i nt ensi t y war f ar e wi t h st r at egi c out comes . I f t he t ar get c ommodi t y was a pr i nci pal cash cr op or f ood sour ce. pl ague. usi ng BWmay i nf l i ct a gr ave bl ow t o t hat nat i on' s ec onomy or soci et y and possi bl y r esul t i n s ome pol i t i cal i mpact .

Thi s ef f or t r equi r es a coor di nat ed i nt er agency pr ocess i nvol vi ng t he Depar t ment s of Agr i cul t ur e. 26 4 . The exi st ence of nat ur al l y occur r i ng or endemi c agr i cul t ur al pest s or di seases and out br eaks as descr i bed per mi t an adver sar y t o use BWwi t h pl ausi bl e deni al . Besi des sensi t i zi ng t he f eder al gover nment t o t he pot ent i al pr obl em. s ome exi st i ng i nt egr at ed gover nment al mec hani s m mus t be mobi l i zed qui ckl y t o cont ai n and mi t i gat e t he i mpact of a BW at t ack . Col l ect i on act i vi t i es mus t be f ocused on r esear ch and devel opment ef f or t s of adver sar i al nat i ons i n ar eas r el at i ng t o endemi c and nonendemi c nonhuman di seases and pest s . st at e and l ocal gover nment s shoul d suppor t t hi s ef f or t . and i nt el l i gence anal yst s . The r eal and hypot het i cal ex ampl es ci t ed hi ghl i ght t he oppor t uni t y of f er ed by BWas a means t o at t ack t he agr i cul t ur al i nf r ast r uct ur e of an adver sar y . i nt el l i gence r emai ns key .BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE i nt el l i gence di d not ment i on t he i mpact of BWpr ol i f er at i on on economi es .sour ce di scussi on about pr ol i f er at i on of bi ol ogi cal weapons does not addr ess i t s ut i l i t y i n wagi ng ec onomi c war f ar e . Si mi l ar l y. Local and f eder al agenci es shoul d i nvest i gat e r epor t s of nonhuman out br eaks whi c h oc c ur i n def i ned hi gh. As i n ot her f or ms of weapons pr ol i f er at i ons. St at e and l ocal gover nment s shoul d be educat ed on t he i mpor t ance of r epor t i ng nonhuman out br eaks of di sease or pest s wi t h ec onomi c si gni f i cance . bot ani st s. ecol ogi st s. hor t i cul t ur i st s. The Feder al Emer genc y Res pons e Pl an cont ai ns at l east a t heor et i cal st r uct ur e t o begi n t o addr ess t hi s pr obl em. The means t o assess any i nf or mat i on col l ect ed r equi r es a t r ul y mul t i di sci pl i nar y ef f or t i nvol vi ng vet er i nar i ans. i nvol ve pot ent i al BWor nonendemi c agent s.val ue commodi t i es. Whi l e t her e i s a r equi r ement t o assess what pot ent i al adver sar i es ar e doi ng i n t hese ar eas. however . ent omol ogi st s. and Tr easur y as wel l as t he Envi r onment al Pr ot ect i on Agenc y . Commer c e. Any open. vul ner abi l i t y and pot ent i al i mpact dat a mus t be col l ect ed on US syst ems . I nt er i or . The f oundat i on of i nt el l i gence assessment r el at ed t o BWdi r ect ed agai nst ec onomi c t ar get s i s bas ed on human i nt el l i gence . or i nf l i ct a cer t ai n t hr eshol d economi c l oss .

1993) .col d war er a and as we ent er t he t went y. I bi d . 1993) . 1946) . 2 . ed . t he ec onomy det er mi nes super power st at us . Not es 1 .15 August 1945) ( Washi ngt on DC: US Ar my . 6 . C . 8 . A Hi gher For m of Ki l l i ng ( New Yor k : Noonday Pr ess. Rober t Har r i s and J er emy Paxi r r an. no . Shi nt ar o I shi har a ci t ed i n C. act s of BW ? I s our i nt el l i gence c ommuni t y sensi t i zed or t r acki ng pr ol i f er ant ' s ef f or t s t o devel op ant i agr i cul t ur e BW ? I s t her e a mec hani s m wher eby f eder al . 53 . " Japan and t he Uni t ed St at es i n t he New Wor l d Ec onomy . 185. S. 6 . 72 . 155 . st at e. 1994) . 1982) . Congr es s Of f i ce of Tec hnol ogy Assessment . : US Gov er nment Pr i nt i ng Of f i ce. The t hr eat posed by bi ol ogi cal weapons deser ves pr udent consi der at i on . " Nat i onal Geogr aphi c. " i n Hi st or y of t he Chemi cal War f ar e Ser vi ce i n Wor l d W ar I t ( 1 Jul y 1940. I bi d . " i n Theodor e Ruet er . 1993) . " Bact er i a : Teachi ng Ol d Bugs New Tr i cks. Thomas Y. . " Nat i onal Geogr aphi c. ( June 1994) : 80 . . 5 . I bi d . . " Bi ol ogi cal War f ar e Resear ch i n t he Uni t ed St at es. Cochr ane. " Ki ng of Fi ber s. 72 . 175 . 2 . 10 . and l ocal agenci es r epor t and r espond t o act s af f ect i ng val uabl e economi c r esour ces or i nvol vi ng suspi ci ous or nonendemi c agent s? I n t he post . The quest i on i s whet her our gover nment i s awar e of . 12 . 184. U. Fr ed Ber gst en. . Har mf ul Noni ndi genous Speci es i n t he Uni t ed St at es ( Washi ngt on. 65 . UNCTAD Commodi t y Year book. J on Thomps on. 70 . 3 . 4 . no . 7 . The pr esent concer ns about t he pr ol i f er at i on of weapons of mas s dest r uct i on appr opr i at el y r ecogni ze t he t hr eat pos ed by BWagai nst our mi l i t ar y and ci t i zenr y . 71 . 3 . Wor l d Economi c Sur vey 1993: Cur r ent Tr ends & Pol i ci es i n t he Wor l d Economy ( New Yor k : Uni t ed Nat i ons Publ i cat i ons. The Uni t ed St at es gave up i t s ant i agr i cul t ur al bi ol ogi cal weapons l ong bef or e i t uni l at er al l y r enounc ed t he use and devel opment of bi ol ogi cal war f ar e i n 1969 . 9 .f i r st cent ur y. D. or pr epar ed t o r espond t o. I bi d . Rexi nond C. I bi d . ( NewYor k : McGr aw. 2 ( August 1993) .BI OLOGI CAL WEAPONS FORWAGI NGECONOMI C WARFARE The i mpact of s uc h event s woul d go beyond si mpl y af f ect i ng a nat i on' s ec onomy t o pot ent i al l y af f ect i ng i t s nat i onal secur i t y .Hi l l . The Uni t ed St at es i n t he Wor l d Pol i t i cal Economy. 13 . Canby . 11 . ( New Yor k : Uni t ed Nat i ons Publ i cat i on. 26 5 .

Of f i ce of Technol ogy Assessment . C. 18 . Gi l l . " Epi demi c Hi t s I t al i an Li vest ock. " Wal l St r eet Jour nal . 4% Pl unge i n US Har vest Fr om Last Year . D. Scot t Ki l man. " Chr i st i an Sci ence Moni t or . 19 . " Wal l St r eet Jour nal . 24 . I bi d . Sept ember 1993 44. 25 . Wor l d Economi c Sur vey 1993.i ndi genous Speci es. 30 . Har mf ul Non. 17 . I bi d . I bi d . " Mal aysi a Rubber I ndust r y Fear s Deadl y Lat i n Fungus. " 1 . 32 . 16 . 65 . 18 Apr i l 1993 . 15 . I bi d . 8 . Davi d Cl ar k Scot t . : 1991) . 23 . " Wal l St r eet Jour nal . 33 . 36 . " Pest I nf est at i on Spur s Doubt s Ov er St andar ds i n Mexi co. I bi d . 31 . 1 . 9 Nov ember 1993 . 836 . " Amer i c an Way . 29 Dec ember 1993. " Cot t on Far mer s Face Bi g Set back. UNCTAD Commodi t y Year book. 29 . " Chr i st i an Sci ence Moni t or . 16 Mar c h 1993. 6 Dec ember 1991) . I bi d .i ndi genous Speci es i n t he Uni t ed St at es. 28 . 20 Apr i l 1993 . Har mf ul Non. 35 . " Cor n Pr i ces Ar e Expect ed t o Soar Af t er For ecast of 31 . I bi d . " Sci ence Moni t or . 21 . " Mor bi di t y and Mor t al i t y Weekl y Repor t ( At l ant a : Cent er f or Di sease Cont r ol . 301 . 16 J anuar y 1993 . : Gov er nment Pr i nt i ng Of f i ce. 27 . Of f i ce of Technol ogy Assessment . Ray mond J . 5 . Er i c Bour ne. 15 Chr i st i an . " The Sweet Pot at o Whi t ef l y Pr obl em i n Sout her n Cal i f or ni a. " Aedes al bopi ct us I nt r oduct i on i nt o Cont i nent al Af r i ca. See al so. Kat hl een Shar p. Cal i f . 16 . Pr ol i f er at i on of Weapons of Mas s Dest r uct i on ( Washi ngt on. " Cal i f or ni a Depar t ment of Food & Agr i cul t ur e Repor t ( Sacr ament o.BATTLEFI ELD OF THE FUTURE 14 . I bi d . Far han Bokhar i . 20 . 22 . " Eur ope' s ' Cow War ' Shows Per si st ence of Col d W ar Di vi des. 26 . " The Out l ook : As Food Pr i ces Ri se 1994 Cr ops Hol d Key. 7 Mar c h 1994. 1993) . " The Out l ook : As Food Pr i ces Ri se 1994 Cr ops Hol d Key. " Bal t i mor e Sun. 11 . ' Me Louse and t he Gr ape. . . 34 .

and f ocused l ogi st i cs whi l e pr ovi di ng f ul l di mensi onal pr ot ect i on of f or ces and asset s i n c ombat . i f det er mi ned. $87 mi l l i on f or speci al f or ces i mpr ovement s. t he c hai r man of t he Joi nt Chi ef s of St af f r ecent l y r el eased a r epor t cal l ed Joi nt Vi si on 2010. I t i s a f act of l i f e t hat even poor st at es s uc h as t he Democr at i c Peopl e' s Republ i c of Kor ea. Thi s r epor t of f er s a br oad f r amewor k f or under st andi ng j oi nt war f ar e i n t he f ut ur e . J V2010 i s a r ef l ect i on of t he basi c bel i ef t hat a r evol ut i on i n mi l i t ar y af f ai r s i s occur r i ng.Sar i n and Tabun ner ve gases . Al so i n WWI I . ' One r ecent one began when t he Uni t ed St at es det onat ed i t s f i r st at omi c bomb i n t he ear l y 1945 Tr i ni t y t est . t he Ger mans manuf ac t ur ed. Schnei der Shor t l y af t er he bec ame secr et ar y of def ense.dol l ar i ncr ease i n US def ense spendi ng on count er pr ol i f er at i on pr ogr ams : $732 mi l l i on f or passi ve def enses. The Hi r os hi ma and Nagas ak i ar I I . I n t hat det onat i ons i n Augus t 1945 hel ped end Wor l d W s ame war . and i t as s umes t hat new capabi l i t i es ar e needed t o cope wi t h t hat RMA. t he J apanes e exper i ment ed wi t h ger m war f ar e by spr eadi ng buboni c pl ague agent s on Chi nes e popul at i on cent er s vi a bombi ng mi ssi ons . Cohen t our ed US f or ces i n Kor ea ..f i r st Cent ur y War f ar e Dr . Bar r y R. The br i ef i ngs he r ecei ved on t he Nor t h Kor ean chemi cal and bi ol ogi cal war f ar e t hr eat caused hi m t o i mmedi at el y or der a bi l l i on. Lawr ence E. c an devel op r evol ut i onar y weapons t hat mi ght of f set t he convent i onal f i r epower of t he wor l d' s sol e r emai ni ng mi l i t ar y super power . and $36 mi l l i on f or act i ve def ense addi t i ons . Wi l l i am S . I n or der t o pl an f or t he bat t l ef i el d of t he f ut ur e. Gr i nt er and Dr . 26 7 . domi nant maneuver s.Chapt er 11 On Twent y. Ther e have been per haps a dozen r evol ut i ons i n mi l i t ar y af f ai r s si nce t he f our t eent h cent ur y . I t al so di r ect s US ar med f or ces acqui si t i on pr ogr ams i n obt ai ni ng t he capabi l i t i es t o r un mi l i t ar y oper at i ons us i ng pr eci si on engagement . $146 mi l l i on f or count er f or ce pr ogr ams.but di d not use.

) Ther e i s at l east one undecl ar ed nucl ear weapons st at e. Anot her r evol ut i on i n mi l i t ar y af f ai r s. and chemi cal ar mament s now f or m a new " t r i ni t y" of weapons of mas s dest r uct i on t hat t hr eat en t o mak e t went y. domi nat i ng maneuv er .f i r st hi c h set of st r at egi es best f i t s t hose c ent ur y war s ? W t echnol ogi es? Wi l l t he t echnol ogi es of a past RMA.sponsor ed t er r or i sm. I n a conf l i ct agai nst s uc h a heavi l y ar med opponent . t her e ar e t he near . equi p. r i sky r el i ance on escal at i on domi nanc e t o det er adver sar y use of W MD. we emphas i z e par al l el war f ar e. r el yi ng on escal at i on domi nanc e t o det er enemy i nt r awar r esor t t o W MD. and/ or i mpr oved act i ve and passi ve def enses? Or can we f ol l ow an enhanc ed ver si on of Deser t St or m wher e. Russi a. i nf or mat i on war f ar e. Bey ond t hi s. i n t he hands of our enemi es. t he Uni t ed Ki ngdom. Some of t hese ar e host i l e r adi cal r egi mes. neut r al i ze or pr ecl ude t he ut i l i t y of t he newer t echnol ogi es of a mor e moder n RMA? Tr ansl at i on : wi l l enemy use of NBC and mi ssi l e syst ems i nf l uence t he t er ms of bat t l e so as t o mar gi nal i ze our abi l i t y t o pr osecut e i nf or mat i on 268 . Fr ance. hy per war . I sr ael . and I r aq .These nucl ear . has been t he spr ead of W MD t o s uc h NBC. Thi s wi l l cause consi der abl e c hange i n how t he Uni t ed St at es and i t s al l i es wi l l have t o f i ght . I r an. I n 1998 t he wor l d has seven acknowl edged nucl ear weapons st at es : t he Uni t ed St at es. ( I ndi a and Paki st an do not yet admi t t hei r nucl ear t est expl osi ons ar e f or weapons .Ar mi ng Sponsor s of Ter r or i sm and I nt er vent i on ( NASTI ) . and Paki st an . at l east f r om an Amer i c an per spect i ve. gr eat er mobi l i t y.nucl ear st at es s uc h as Nor t h Kor ea.cent ur y war f ar e mor e cost l y t han anyt hi ng seen bef or e . I ndi a. and suppl y t hei r f or ces opposi ng s uc h f oes i n f ut ur e maj or r egi onal conf l i ct s . wi l l t he Uni t ed St at es and i t s al l i es be f or ced t owar d mor e di sper sed f or ces. t r ai n. i t i s est i mat ed t hat bet ween 20 and 30 st at es possess one or mor e of t he NBC and mi ssi l e weapons .f i r st . I f bi ol ogi cal and chemi cal weapons ar senal s ar e added t o t he nucl ear cl ub. pr eci si on t ar get i ng. and/ or space t echnol ogi es t o beat t he enemy mi l i t ar y and secur e our obj ect i ves? Whi c h set of t echnol ogi es wi l l be us ed i n t went y. Chi na. bi ol ogi cal .r ogue st at es t hat t hr eat en t hei r nei ghbor s wi t h i nt er vent i on and/ or st at e. out r angi ng of t he opponent i n di sengaged combat .

Adver sar i es coul d al so mount NBC weapons on mobi l e mi ssi l e l auncher s. ai r bases.t ech asset s har ml ess .war f ar e.al t i t ude nucl ear bur st s and t he r esul t ant el ect r omagnet i c pul se ( EMP) mi ght r ender mos t al l i ed space asset s i ner t . const ant l y mov ed. mi ssi l es and s mar t bombs st i l l need cor r ect coor di nat es t o car r y out pr eci si on at t acks . Thi s woul d cr eat e a t ar get i ng ni ght mar e si mi l ar t o t hat t he al l i es f aced i n t he Gul f W ar agai nst I r aq' s Sc ud mi ssi l e l auncher s . pr eci si on war f ar e. or gani zat i ons. and power gr i ds i n t he r egi on of combat . even i f ef f ect i ve bal l i st i c and cr ui se mi ssi l e def enses ar e not devel oped. and st r at egi es? Or wi l l t heat er mi ssi l e def enses emer ge t hat c an neut r al i ze an adver sar y ar med wi t h 20 t o 40 NBC war heads mount ed on bal l i st i c and cr ui se mi ssi l es? Al t er nat i vel y.val ued mobi l e mi l i t ar y asset s . i nf or mat i on war . c amouf l aged. and domi nat i ng maneuv er ? Or wi l l t he f ear of al l i ed r et al i at i on k eep t he adver sar y f r om i ni t i at i ng W MD st r i kes agai nst al l i ed f or ces. and domi nat i ng maneuv er t echnol ogi es. Af t er al l . especi al l y t hei r hi ghest . Count er meas ur es t aken t o bl i nd US and al l i ed space asset s may r ob war . space war . and Hi gh. and hi dden f r om si ght and easy det ect i on .f i ght i ng c ommander s i n chi ef and t hei r st af f s of t he i nf or mat i on needed t o t ar get enemy f or ces. wi l l t he al l i es' possessi on of over whel mi ng nucl ear weapons pr eponder ance be enough t o MDs once det er r ogue st at es f r om usi ng t hei r mor e l i mi t ed W war has begun? Wi l l det er r ence st i l l suf f i ce t o keep t he peace 26 9 . ci t i es? por t s. t r ansi st or s. EMP coul d bur n out t he ci r cui t r y of mos t al l i ed r adi o syst ems. i f t he enemy i s not bl i nded ef f ect i vel y. r ender i ng many of t he al l i es' hi gh. t he domi nat i ng maneuv er s of f ut ur e " l ef t hooks" may be r udel y i nt er r upt ed by cat ast r ophi c encount er s wi t h nucl ear at t acks and ant hr ax bar r ages or a bat t l ef i el d engul f ed i n cl ouds of poi son gases . Woul d t he NBC and mi ssi l e r evol ut i on i n mi l i t ar y af f ai r s t r ump t he War den RMA of par al l el war / hy per war ? Woul d i t ov er c ome t he RMA i dent i f i ed by t he anal yst s f r om Sci ence Appl i cat i ons I nt er nat i onal Cor por at i on ( SAI C) whi c h emphasi zes t he cont r i but i ons t hat may be made by c hanges i n a combi nat i on of pr eci si on war . comput er s. space war . Fur t her .

St r at egy i s now bei ng r et hought i n t he mi dst of what s ome bel i eve t o be a di st i nct i ve new r evol ut i on i n mi l i t ar y af f ai r s . For 270 . and t hey may di scover how t o r educe vul ner abi l i t i es of t hei r oper at i onal . and oper at i onal f act or s acr oss al l f i ght i ng medi ums ai r .r ange and st andof f pr eci si on st r i kes.i nt egr at ed pol i t i cal . i nf or mat i on war f ar e. now gi ve t he Uni t ed St at es t he abi l i t y t o wr eak havoc on an adver sar y' s ent i r e t ar get syst em. and soci oeconomi c devel opment s . l and. however . or gani zat i onal . US st r at egy pl anni ng and war f i ght i ng i n t he next 10 t o 20 year s wi l l r equi r e hi ghl y sophi st i cat ed and wel l . i ndi r ect . J ohn War den has wr i t t en t hat of f ensi ve t echni cal and mi l i t ar y advancement s. and l ogi st i cs cent er s of gr avi t y . oper at i onal .syst em RMA. and sea.s uc h as l ong. Thi s " i nt egr at ed syst em" RMA i s al so pushi ng t he r ei nf or cement of t echni cal . aggr essi ve r egi mes may wel l f or ce t he Uni t ed St at es i nt o ver y di f f er ent ki nds of st r at egi es . and t hey usual l y can be count er ed . adver sar i es may devel op count er measur es t o t hese US capabi l i t i es f or par al l el war and hyper war . " I n t i me. domi nat i ng maneuv er emphasi zi ng t he st r at egi c posi t i oni ng of f or ces. The magni t ude of t he exper i enced by t he Uni t ed al l i es cannot r i sk put t i ng l ar ge equi pment i n t he way of a W MD casual t i es coul d exceed anyt hi ng St at es i n a si ngl e bat t l e . c ombi ned wi t h suppr essi on of enemy def enses. st andof f . W MD t hr eat s by r adi cal . Suc h a degr ee of mi l i t ar y s hoc k mi ght be appl i ed so qui ckl y t hat i t coul d pr oduc e " par al ysi s . but i f an adver sar y al so i s capabl e of usi ng weapons of mas s dest r uct i on. or gani zat i onal .even i f ef f ect i ve mi ssi l e and ai r def enses ar e not avai l abl e? Cl ear l y. As t he SAI C t eam has poi nt ed out . New modes of c ombat may have t o emphas i z e mobi l e. and space war f ar e .t echni cal ef f or t s . c ommuni c at i ons .mi l i t ar y. s ome " new" or power f ul ar eas of war f ar e ar e emer gi ng. Def ensi ve meas ur es ar e expect ed. t he cur r ent RMA i s mul t i f acet ed and i s demonst r at i ng t he si mul t aneous i nt er pl ay and r ei nf or cement of t echni cal . t he st akes and t he ef f ect s on st r at egy coul d shi f t subst ant i al l y . The Uni t ed St at es and i t s concent r at i ons of t r oops and at t ack . and di sengaged oper at i ons unt i l f or ces i n t he c ombat ar ea can be def ended agai nst ai r and mi ssi l e at t acks . Wi t hi n t hi s i nt egr at ed. di sper sed.

When conf r ont i ng a " Saddam Hussei n wi t h WMD.Japan ar ea. i t coul d become sui ci dal t o i nt r oduce an ar my i nt o a por t or put i t i nt o a r egi on t hr ough l ocal ai r bases . Unl ess t he enemy W MD c an be el i mi nat ed i n i ni t i al count er f or ce st r i kes. wi l l be adequat e t o pr ot ect US over seas expedi t i onar y f or ces. Absent ef f ect i ve mi ssi l e and ai r def enses. naval convoys. mor e US t r oops mi ght be ki l l ed i n a si ngl e one. and popul at i on cent er s .honor ed pr i nci pl es of war l i ke " mass" may have t o be r ei nt er pr et ed t o emphasi ze concent r at i ng f i r epower r at her t han t r oops .t i er ed def ense syst em. i t may even be 27 1 .day W MD at t ack t han wer e l ost i n al l t he year s of t he Vi et nam War . al l i ed capi t al s. I n such megar i sk si t uat i ons. ai r bases. I t coul d even t hr eat en t he out r i ght def eat of US and al l i ed f or ces i n t he f i el d . wher e t he Uni t ed St at es assembl es a f or ce l i ke we f i el ded i n t he Gul f War or l i ke we mai nt ai n i n t he Kor ea. wher e each l ayer has ar ound a 90 per cent pr obabi l i t y of ki l l agai nst an i ncomi ng enemy r eent r y vehi cl e. mai nt ai ni ng t he of f ensi ve i ni t i at i ve i n combat may have t o wai t unt i l we can er ect mi ssi l e and ai r def enses agai nst t hem. Kor ean War . por t s. out r angi ng t he enemy. or even i n Wor l d War I I . Wi t hout ef f ect i ve mi ssi l e def enses. decei vi ng t he adver sar y about one' s own cent er s of gr avi t y. t i me. Wi t hout ef f ect i ve t heat er mi ssi l e def enses.exampl e. Theat er mi ssi l e def ense i s t he mos t i mpor t ant i ngr edi ent needed t o cope wi t h r adi cal and wel l ar med r egi mes . and emphasi zi ng di sengaged " r emot e" combat unt i l t he enemy' s W MD and ot her " bi g guns" ar e si l enced . Wi t hout such pr ot ect i on. bl i ndi ng enemy r econnai ssance. t he cost s of engagi ng such a NASTI may f ar exceed t he gai ns i n def eat i ng hi m. No l ess t han a t wo. Anyt hi ng l ess and t he pr obl ems of deal i ng wi t h NBC. W MD can scar e of f possi bl e al l i es f r om j oi ni ng a coal i t i on agai nst our enemy and r ai se t he body count so hi gh as t o mak e US power pr oj ect i on i nt o t he r egi on pol i t i cal l y unt enabl e . di sper si on. An al t er nat i ve i s t o r el y mor e on const ant movement .ar med adver sar i es begi n t o s wamp t he sol ut i ons . " i t may become essent i al t o devel op and depl oy an ai r t i ght ai r def ense syst em and an ef f ect i ve mul t i l ayer ed mi ssi l e def ense i n t he r egi ons t hr eat ened .

t he NASTI may be det er r abl e by al l i ed super i or i t y i n W MD. bi ol ogi cal . al so l ooms as a pot ent new war f ar e t echni que .advi sabl e t o r evi se US f or ei gn pol i cy c ommi t ment s so we ar e not compel l ed t o act agai nst s uc h l et hal r egi onal enemi es . ki l l i ng 12 J apanes e ci t i zens and har mi ng 27 2 . Some of t he mos t danger ous among t he BWr esour ces ar e ant hr ax ( baci l l us ant hr aci s) and t he bot ul i num t oxi n . Vul ner abi l i t y t o c omput er vi r us war f ar e and ot her nonl et hal di sabl i ng t echnol ogi es now has t he at t ent i on of nat i onal secur i t y pl anner s . or chemi cal weapons . or agai nst i t s l eader ' s abi l i t y t o appear l egi t i mat e i n t he eyes of i t s popul at i on. As May er and Kadl ec hav e wr i t t en. cheaper and qui t e l et hal bi ol ogi cal and chemi cal t echnol ogi es ar e al so bei ng devel oped . space asset s. or t he ear l y depl oyment of ef f ect i ve act i ve def enses may hel p t o per suade hi mnot t o escal at e t he conf l i ct and t o abst ai n f r om usi ng hi s nucl ear . and i t i s est i mat ed t hat at l east t wo dozen count r i es have t hem. I f s uc h escal at i on domi nanc e r esul t s i n i nt r awar det er r ence of t he enemy' s use of hi s wor st weapons. Whi l e t he pur sui t of nucl ear weapons by r ogue r egi mes i s al ar mi ng. I n 1991 i nf or mat i on t echnol ogy al r eady was changi ng war f i ght i ng . Sel f . and ot her st r at egi es and t echni ques . Saddam Hussei n had l ar ge chemi cal weapons pr ogr ams under way . On t he ot her hand. pr eci si on st r i kes wi t h advanced convent i onal weapons. a cul t i n J apan spr ead t he Sar i n agent i n Tokyo' s subways. As May er t el l s us.navi gat i ng dat a dr ones can be empl oy ed t o sear ch aut onomousl y acr oss numer ous i nf or mat i on net wor ks . t hen t he Uni t ed St at es and i t s al l i es may be f r ee t o expl oi t t hei r t echnol ogi cal edge vi a i nf or mat i on war f ar e. Bel l i ger ent s have al r eady us ed pr opaganda vi a t he I nt er net . The gl obal posi t i oni ng syst em al l owed US and al l i ed gr ound uni t s at t acki ng t he I r aqi ar my' s f l ank t o mai nt ai n t hei r posi t i ons accur at el y on t he Kuwai t i deser t even dur i ng bl i ndi ng s ands t or ms . The devel opment and empl oy ment of i nf or mat i on war f ar e agai nst an adver sar y' s c ommand and cont r ol syst ems. The I r aqi bi ol ogi cal war f ar e t hr eat gr eat l y concer ned coal i t i on mi l i t ar y pl anner s dur i ng t he Gul f War . and I r aq had begun t o manuf act ur e si zabl e quant i t i es of BWagent s pr i or t o t hat war . bi ol ogi cal war f ar e weapons ar e easy t o pr oduce.

t he Uni t ed St at es and i t s al l i es ar e encount er i ng r ogue st at es newl y ar med wi t h weapons of mas s dest r uct i on t hat wer e f or mer l y hel d onl y by t he maj or power s . Rat her .5. t hi s edge can be l ost i f a f ut ur e adver sar y mast er s t he t ool s of t he l ast RMA or t he next one . and cyber space. Mor eover . Thi s gr oup al so had begun r esear chi ng on and st ockpi l i ng bi ol ogi cal weapons when J apanes e pol i ce and secur i t y f or ces i nt er vened . and bi ol ogi cal weapons . Soon. t he Uni t ed St at es and i t s al l i es may encount er new modes of war f ar e. t oo. Al r eady. ai r . Bi ol ogi cal agent s coul d be used t o conduct economi c war f ar e. dest r uct i on of al l i ed 273 . Ther e i s l i t t l e doubt t hat t he cont i nuous game of measur e.enhanced i nf or mat i on t echnol ogi es. space. and t he agr i cul t ur al di sast er s t hey cause may easi l y be di sgui sed as nat ur al event s . count er . Bi ol ogi cal war f ar e pr ogr ams ar e har d t o det ect i n t he devel opment and pr oduct i on st ages. di gi t i zed bat t l ef i el ds. t hus l endi ng t hemsel ves t o cover t appl i cat i ons .f i r st cent ur y as st r at egi st s and sci ent i st s i nt r oduce new t echnol ogi es and appl i cat i ons . chemi cal . or f ood suppl i es of cr owded popul at i ons or unpr ot ect ed ar med f or ces .count er measur e. wi l l cont i nue i nt o t he t went y. t heat er mi ssi l e def enses. 500 mor e . ai r . Pr esent US and al l i ed advant ages wi l l gener at e count er measur es by f ut ur e enemi es t hat neut r al i ze or l eapf r og t hem. t hey mi ght use asymmet r i cal st r at egi es and t echni ques t hat ut i l i ze NBC weapons. sea. They unsuccessf ul l y t r i ed one bi ol ogi cal weapons at t ack pr i or t o t hei r chemi cal weapons at t ack on t he s ubway syst em.i n t he r eal ms of l and.based mi l i t ar y syst ems.on.f or ce convent i onal bat t l e . count er measur e. pr eci si ongui ded weapons .t hr ough t he use of i nnovat i ons i n comput er . Fut ur e enemi es ar e unl i kel y t o conf r ont t he Uni t ed St at es i n a st r ai ght f or ce. and so on. and nucl ear . guer r i l l a war f ar e t echni ques. Whi l e t he Uni t ed St at es cur r ent l y enj oys a si gni f i cant convent i onal f or ces t echni cal edge over l i kel y r i val s. as Kadl ec wr i t es. Thi s wi l l af f ect t he abi l i t y t o pr oj ect power i nt o t hose r egi ons and wi l l r equi r e a t hor ough r eex ami nat i on of how f ut ur e maj or r egi onal conf l i ct s ar e t o be f ought . st at e. bi ol ogi cal agent s can be easi l y adapt ed f or use wi t h commer ci al l y avai l abl e spr ayer s. space. and bi ol ogi cal agent s coul d cause sever e casual t i es i f i nt r oduced i nt o t he wat er . sat el l i t e si gnal j ammi ng.sponsor ed t er r or i st at t acks.

" Th Nat i onal I nt er est no .f oot l ongbow enabl ed ar cher s t o penet r at e t he ar mor of caval r ymen. At t he end of Wor l d War I I . US and al l i ed st r at egi st s. Andr ew F. and r api d. Not e 1 . Nat i onal secur i t y i s a cont i nuous pr ocess . 27 4 . ( 4) t he si xt eent h. Kr epi nevi ch. ( 5) t he Napol eoni c r evol ut i on t hat har nessed t he j oi nt t ool s of t he mass nat i onal i st i c ar my and t he i ndust r i al r evol ut i on t o a new st r at egy of i ndependent mar ches and concent r at i ons on t he bat t l ef i el d t hat hi t her t o had been i mpossi bl e. and ot her i nf or mat i on war f ar e t echni ques t o l evel t he pl ayi ng f i el d and achi eve t hei r ai ms . 30. and oper at or s mus t cont i nue peer i ng har d i nt o t he f ut ur e t o ensur e mast er y of t hese t r ends . sci ent i st s. per haps t he most si gni f i cant RMA of al l began: ( 11) t he nucl ear r evol ut i on . Mor e har d wor k and t hi nki ng ar e cal l ed f or t o i nf or m t he st r at egi es and acqui si t i on pr ogr ams needed t o cope wi t h asymmet r i cal t hr eat s . i mpr oved r ange and accur acy of weapons due t o r i f l i ng.dr i ven i r on shi ps wi t h l ong.t o.cent ur y f or t r ess r evol ut i on i n whi ch t hi cker wal l s and mor e i nt r i cat e mul t i l ayer ed const r uct i on al l owed st at i c def enses t o of f set t he ear l i er ar t i l l er y r evol ut i on . consi gned t o def eat i n t he next er a . cul mi nat i ng i n t he dr eadnought s of t he ear l y t went i et h cent ur y . Joi nt Vi si on 2010 gi ves f ew answer s as t o how t he Uni t ed St at es and i t s f r i ends c an cope wi t h s uc h st r at egi es . ( 2) t he ar t i l l er y r evol ut i on whi ch hel ped br each t he wal l s of ci t i es and cast l es .12. and i nf or mat i on t r ansmi ssi on i mpr ovement s .gr ound st at i ons t hat r ecei ve i nf or mat i on f r om space asset s. The 12 RMAs t he aut hor i dent i f i es si nce t he f our t eent h cent ur y i ncl ude: ( 1) t he i nf ant r y r evol ut i on i n t he Hundr ed Year ' s War wher e t he si x. t he t el egr aph.10) t he i nt r awar RMAs due t o mechani zat i on.r ange cannons. " Caval r y t o Comput er : The Pat t er n of Mi l i t ar y Revol ut i ons. Thos e who r est on t hei r pr esent mi l i t ar y advant ages r at her t han seeki ng cont i nuous i mpr ov ement s t o cope wi t h f ut ur e t hr eat s and changi ng condi t i ons wi l l be l ef t behi nd.f i r i ng weapons of t he l at e ni net eent h cent ur y . ( 6) t he l and war f ar e r evol ut i on br ought on by t he i nt r oduct i on of r ai l r oad net wor ks. ( 7) t he naval r evol ut i on of t he mi d. 37 ( f al l 1994) . Thi s wi l l hel p us st ay ahead of di l i gent compet i t or s and wi l l gi ve our mi l i t ar y f or ces t he hi ghest pr obabi l i t y of vi ct or y on t he bat t l ef i el ds of t he f ut ur e .dr i ven shi ps obsol et e . ( 3) t he naval r evol ut i on when sai l s and cannons made oar .l at e ni net eent h cent ur y wher e wooden sai l i ng shi ps wi t h shor t . avi at i on. and ( 8.r ange cannons wer e r epl aced by st eam. Thi s r evol ut i on i n mi l i t ar y af f ai r s has r ecent l y been f ol l owed by ( 12) t he i nf or mat i on r evol ut i on based on di gi t i zat i on and comput er appl i cat i ons . Unf or t unat el y.

C. nat i onal def ense. A r et i r ed US Ar my of f i cer . A gr aduat e of t he US Naval War Col l ege ( MA. Hi s cur r ent wor k i s f ocused on aer ospace war f ar e i n t he st udy of t he r evol ut i on i n mi l i t ar y af f ai r s. Mr Bl anchf i el d has 28 year s' exper i ence as an educat or . Gr i nt er . pi l ot . Muc h of hi s ser vi ce car eer was f ocused on secur i t y i ssues i n t he Paci f i c or Mi ddl e East . Lawr ence E. wher e he has di r ect ed semi nar s. SAI L . D. and i nt er nat i onal r el at i ons i ssues . SAI C. pr of essor of Asi an st udi es. Mar t i n' s) and Looki ng Back on t he Vi et nam War ( Gr eenwood) . USMC War f i ght i ng Cent er . nat i onal secur i t y and st r at egi c st udi es) . admi ni st r at or . war games. St r at egy and Pol i cy Responses i n t he Paces Ri m ( Ri enner ) . Dal e Hi l l i s a seni or anal yst . The Fl et cher School of Law and Di pl omacy. si mul at i ons. He was pr evi ousl y t he di r ect or of pol i t i cal mi l i t ar y st udi es and seni or f el l ow at t he Cent er f or St r at egi c and I nt er nat i onal St udi es i n Washi ngt on. he ear ned hi s PhD at Tuf t s Uni ver si t y. Mr Bl anchf i el d al so has an MA i n I nt er nat i onal Rel at i ons f r om Sal ve Regi na Uni ver si t y . Dr Gr i nt er ear ned hi s PhD f r om t he Uni ver si t y of Nor t h Car ol i na at Chapel Hi l l . He i s t he co. SAI L . St r at egi c Assessment Cent er . t aught at West Poi nt . A f or mer US Mar i ne Cor ps of f i cer . Ai r War Col l ege. He speci al i zes i n r esear ch on t he r evol ut i on i n mi l i t ar y af f ai r s . I n t he past he ser ved as a r esear ch anal yst on t he Gul f War Ai r Power Sur vey. Ri char d Bl anchf i el d i s a seni or anal yst . He ser ved i n hi s l ast mi l i t ar y assi gnment as di r ect or .hand exper i ence as an anal yst wor ki ng on pol i t i cal . and i s t he aut hor of var i ous publ i cat i ons i ncl udi ng Thunder i n t he Deser t : The St r at egy and Tact i cs of t he Per si an Gul f War ( Bant am) . as wel l as 35 schol ar l y ar t i cl es .About t he Cont r i but or s J ames Bl ackwel l i s t he assi st ant di r ect or . and pl anner . A 27 5 . St r at egi c Assessment Cent er . St r at egi c Assessment Cent er . t eaches and wr i t es on Asi an and gl obal secur i t y i ssues i ncl udi ng W MD pr ol i f er at i on . and r esear ch . East Asi an Conf l i ct Zones ( St . oper at or .mi l i t ar y. St udi es and Anal ysi s Di vi si on. i ncl udi ng 12 year s of f i r st .edi t or / aut hor of numer ous publ i cat i ons i ncl udi ng Secur i t y.

He speci al i zes i n i nf or mat i on war r esear ch and has t aught cour ses i n hi s speci al t i es at NDU and t he Naval War 27 6 . USAF. A c ommand pi l ot . af t er a 37y ear car eer . and has pr of essi onal mi l i t ar y educat i on degr ees f r om t he Ar med For ces St af f Col l ege. he i s a di st i ngui shed gr aduat e of t he US Ai r For ce Ac ademy . i ncl udi ng F. i s a physi ci an assi gned t o t he Of f i ce of t he Secr et ar y of Def ense f or I nt er nat i onal Secur i t y Pol i cy as a seni or assi st ant f or count er pr ol i f er at i on . Mr Hi l l gr aduat ed f r om t he I ndust r i al Col l ege of t he Ar med For ces. Hi s l ast posi t i on was as c ommander i n chi ef . and ser ved i n seni or posi t i ons as mi l i t ar y assi st ant t o t he assi st ant secr et ar y of t he Ai r For ce and as a mi l i t ar y pl anner i n Chec k mat e dur i ng Oper at i ons Deser t Shi el d and Deser t St or m. 300 hour s i n a var i et y of f i ght er ai r cr af t . Nor t h Amer i c an Aer os pac e Def ense Command and t he US Spac e Command . Rober t Kadl ec. USAF. Ret i r ed. t he Ni nt h ai r f or ce.4s . Dur i ng Oper at i ons Deser t Shi el d and Deser t St or m. and t he Nat i onal War Col l ege . t echnol ogy assessment . A speci al i st i n bi ol ogi cal war f ar e i ssues. t he I ndust r i al Col l ege of t he Ar med For ces. Gener al Homer f l ew over 130 c ombat mi ssi ons i n I ndochi na . Homer . F.f or mer Ai r For ce f i ght er pi l ot . he has mor e t han 5. Gener al . He has a Mast er ' s degr ee i n i nt er nat i onal r el at i ons f r om Ok l ahoma St at e Uni ver si t y . Geor ge Kr aus i s a seni or anal yst i n t he St r at egi c Assessment Cent er of SAI C. l ef t t he Ai r For ce i n 1995. and c ommanded wi ngs. He has an ext ensi ve bac k gr ound i n mi l i t ar y and naval oper at i onal and i nt el l i gence anal ysi s and of compar at i ve anal ysi s. Gener al Hor ner was c ommi s s i oned i n 1958. He al so hol ds a mast er ' s degr ee i n nat i onal secur i t y st udi es f r om Geor get own Uni ver si t y . and US Cent r al Command Ai r For ces . Gener al Hor ner c ommanded al l US and al l i ed ai r oper at i ons . and war gami ng desi gn . and F. Char l es A. t he Mar i ne Command and St af f Col l ege.15s. He i s a gr aduat e of t he Uni ver si t y of I owa. ai r di vi si ons. Lt Col . Mr Hi l l c ommanded an F. and t he Ai r W ar Col l ege .16s.16 s quadr on. He hol ds a doct or of medi ci ne and a mast er ' s degr ee of Tr opi cal Medi ci ne and Hygi ene f r om t he Uni f or med Ser vi ces Uni ver si t y of t he Heal t h Sci ences .

and ear ned an MS i n st r at egi c i nt el l i gence at t he Def ense I nt el l i gence Col l ege . USAF. Pr ovi si onal . FYed Li t t l epage i s deput y assi st ant . ser ved as assi st ant ai r at t ache t o t he Amer i c an Embas s y i n Mos c ow. mi l i t ar y t act i cs. He ser ved st af f t our s at ever y echel on f r om wi ng t o ai r st af f i n var i ous capaci t i es . Ter r y N. Net As s es s ment . he has wor k ed as t he assi st ant di r ect or of r esear ch. 615t h Ai r Mobi l i t y Suppor t Gr oup. c ommand and cont r ol . Mos t r ecent l y. r esponsi bl e f or r est r uct ur i ng t he concept of ai r mobi l i t y and gl obal r each i nt o t he Paci f i c .130. 000 hour s i n HC. SAI C. he was i ni t i al cadr e on t he Chec k mat e pl anni ng cel l and l at er was dr af t ed by DI A t o l ead a t i ger t eam char ged wi t h f i ndi ng a met hod of c onduc t i ng a pr eempt i v e st r i ke agai nst I r aqi bi ol ogi cal war f ar e st or age and pr oduct i on f aci l i t i es. i nf or mat i on war . He has an MBA f r om Chapman Col l ege and i s a gr aduat e of t he Ai r W ar Col l ege . He has pr ovi ded numer ous r esear ch paper s on cur r ent Russi an secur i t y i ssues. r obot war f ar e. A r et i r ed US Nav y c ommander . Di r ect or at e of Sovi et Af f ai r s. VC. Of f i ce of t he Secr et ar y of Def ens e.Col l ege . Lt Col . Of f i ce of t he Secr et ar y of Def ense. s ubmar i ne i ssues. Mayer . St r at egi c As s es s ment Cent er . Lt Col May er was t he c ommander . Dur i ng t he Gul f War . 27 7 . He i s a Rus s i an l anguage and ar ea speci al i st . He has publ i shed var i ous ar t i cl es t hat f ocus on t he Sovi et Uni on.a t eam t hat was awar ded t he Nat i onal I nt el l i gence Mer i t or i ous Uni t Ci t at i on by t he di r ect or of Cent r al I nt el l i gence .135. space mi l i t ar y i ssues. ar Col l ege. and mi l i t ar y i ssues r el at i ng t o t he f or mer Sovi et Uni on. and ot her i nt el l i gence mat t er s . and wor k ed i n Naval i nt el l i gence f or many year s . Mr Kr aus wor k ed as a mi l i t ar y assi st ant t o t he di r ect or of net assessment . i s a mast er navi gat or wi t h over 3. and VC. A f or mer USAF of f i cer .137 ai r cr af t . Mr Kr aus has an MA i n A gr aduat e of t he Naval W r el at i ons f r om Sal ve Regi na Col l ege and an i nt er nat i onal under gr aduat e degr ee i n pol i t i cal sci ence f r om MI T. wor k i ng on cont r act r esear ch on t opi cs s uc h as t he r evol ut i on i n mi l i t ar y af f ai r s . and ser ved as a Mi nut eman c ombat cr ew c ommander . t he newl y i ndependent st at es. was di r ect or of cur r i cul um of t he USAF Sovi et Awar enes s Team.

Tr oy St at e Uni ver si t y) i s a car eer i nt el l i gence of f i cer . Ger many ( t wi ce) . def ense anal yst . i s a gr aduat e of Squadr on Of f i cer Sc hool ( r esi dence) . He ear ned mast er ' s degr ees at bot h t he US Naval Ac ademy and at t he J ohns Hopki ns School of Adv anc ed I nt er nat i onal St udi es. conf l i ct and change. McLendon. Bar r y R. He i s t he aut hor and edi t or of many publ i cat i ons. He i s assi gned t o Headquar t er s Ai r For ce Speci al Oper at i ons Command as t he di r ect or of i nt el l i gence . f or ei gn af f ai r s of f i cer ( ACDA) . Hi s exper i ence i ncl udes nat i onal . Hi s over seas assi gnment s i ncl ude Tai wan ( t wi ce) .Jef f r ey McKi t r i ck i s t he di r ect or . Ai r Command and St af f Col l ege ( r esi dence) . Cur r ent l y. and economi cs . and i nt er nat i onal f l ash poi nt s . gr ound t act i cal ( mobi l e) . Vi r gi ni a . Andr ew Mar shal l . Def ense Pol i cy ( Pr aeger ) . f or Sci ence Appl i cat i ons I nt er nat i onal Cor por at i on ( SAI C) i n McLean. as t he mi l i t ar y assi st ant t o t he di r ect or of net assessment s. i ncl udi ng t wo books : Mi ssi l es f or t he Ni net i es : I CBMs and St r at egi c Pol i cy ( West vi ew) and Cur r ent I ssues i n U. Whi l e on dut y as an act i ve dut y US Ar my of f i cer . St at esi de. he has ser ved on t he st af f of Ai r For ce I nt el l i gence Command ( AFI C) ( and i t s pr edecessor s) t hr ee t i mes and was t he AFI C Li ai son Of f i cer t o t he Ai r For ce Speci al Oper at i ons Command pr i or t o at t endi ng t he Ai r War Col l ege . wher e he t aught cour ses i n i nt er nat i onal r el at i ons. he i s 27 8 . He has pr evi ousl y ser ved as a col l ege pr of essor .f i r st cent ur y war f ar e. Vi et nam. and as an assi st ant pr of essor at t he US Mi l i t ar y Ac ademy at Wes t Poi nt . and Saudi Ar abi a . and Ai r W ar Col l ege . Col onel Mc Lendon has c ommanded t hr ee i nt el l i gence s quadr ons . Col onel . he ser ved as mi l i t ar y advi sor t o t he vi ce pr esi dent . W MD pr ol i f er at i on i ssues. nat i onal secur i t y. pr of essor of i nt er nat i onal r el at i ons. and act i ve s peak er and edi t or / wr i t er on nat i onal secur i t y i ssues . wr i t es and t eaches a var i et y of i ssues concer ni ng t went y. af t er c ompl et i ng an under gr aduat e degr ee at I ndi ana Uni ver si t y . S. St r at egi c As s es s ment Cent er . t he r evol ut i on i n mi l i t ar y af f ai r s. t he Uni t ed Ki ngdom. Ai r War Col l ege. USAF ( MS. he ser ved as t he speci al assi st ant on nat i onal secur i t y and f or ei gn pol i cy i ssues t o Vi ce Pr esi dent Dan Quayl e . J ames W . Schnei der . and ai r bor ne oper at i ons . congr essi onal st af f er . Pr evi ousl y.

Bef or e j oi ni ng t he Ai r W ar Col l ege. War den I I I . Col onel War den f l ew 266 c ombat mi ssi ons i n Sout heast Asi a .1993. He i s wi del y publ i s hed i n Ai r power Jour nal . Pr of essor St ei n was on t he f acul t y of t he School of I nt er di sci pl i nar y St udi es.f i ni shi ng a book on " Count er pr ol i f er at i on : Mi l i t ar y Responses t o Pr ol i f er at i on Thr eat s. hol ds t he Nat i onal Mi l i t ar y St r at egy Chai r at t he Ai r W ar Col l ege . He al so pl ayed a l eadi ng r ol e i n pl anni ng and suppor t i ng t he ai r c ampai gn i n t he 1990. Depar t ment of Conf l i ct and Change. and f ut ur e st r at egi es . t he Ai r For ce I nst i t ut e of Technol ogy. Col or ado.4s. and was t he c ommander of Pet er son AFB. Ai r Command and St af f Col l ege . chai r man. Mi ami Uni v er s i t y and Mi ami ' s Eur opean Cent er i n Lux embour g .15s. Dr St ei n r ecei ved hi s MA f r om Penn St at e and hi s PhD f r om I ndi ana Uni ver si t y . " Dr Schnei der ear ned hi s PhD i n I nt er nat i onal Rel at i ons f r om Col umbi a Uni ver si t y . F. and OV. He i s a c ommand pi l ot wi t h over 3. US Spac e Command. Col onel . Col onel Szaf r anski ' s pr evi ous assi gnment s i ncl ude c ommand at t he squadr on. Ret i r ed. Ri char d Szaf r anski . i n 1988 . St ei n. St r at egi c Revi ew. gr oup. compl et ed 30 year s of act i ve dut y i n t he Uni t ed St at es Ai r For ce i n Jul y 1995 . USAF. USAF. and has r ecei ved t he Mer i t or i ous Ci vi l i an Ser vi ce Awar d f or hi s cont r i but i on t o t he USAF chi ef of st af f s s t udy Spacecast 2020. Geor ge J. i s us ed i n mi l i t ar y school s ar ound t he wor l d . t he Nor t h Amer i c an Aer os pac e Def ense Command. Hi s BA i s f r om Fl or i da St at e Uni ver si t y and hi s MA i s f r om Cent r al Mi chi gan Uni ver si t y . Col War den' s l ast act i ve dut y assi gnment was as c ommandant . et c . A gr aduat e of t he Ai r For ce Academy. John A. Ar med For ces Quar t er l y. Par amet er s. 000 hour s i n F.1 Os . " i n Ai r power Jour nal ( Spr i ng 1995) . 279 . He has ser ved at headquar t er s St r at egi c Ai r Command. wr i t es and t eaches cour ses on i nf or mat i on war f ar e. Eur opean secur i t y i ssues. and wi ng l evel s . Hi s book. and t he Ai r For ce Spac e Command . The Ai r Campai gn. and t he Nat i onal War Col l ege. Pr oceedi ngs. He r ecent l y publ i shed " A Theor y of I nf or mat on War f ar e : Pr epar i ng f or 2020.91 Gul f War . Col onel . Ai r W ar Col l ege. Col onel Szaf r anski c ommanded t he 7t h Bomb Wi ng dur i ng 1991.

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