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THE SHELL Do the Vampire DA............................................................................................................................1 1nc shell (1 of 6).................................................................................................................................3 1nc shell (2 of 6).................................................................................................................................4 1nc shell (3 of 6).................................................................................................................................6 1nc shell (4 of 6).................................................................................................................................7 1nc shell (5 of 6).................................................................................................................................8 1nc shell (6 of 6).................................................................................................................................9 Link Block........................................................................................................................................10 Biopower da: worldwatch................................................................................................................11 Biopower DA...................................................................................................................................12 Link: Animal Rights (1 of 2)............................................................................................................13 Link: Animal Rights (2 of 2)............................................................................................................14 **Link: Animal Rights**.................................................................................................................15 **Link: Extinction rhetoric**..........................................................................................................17 Link: Nature Protection....................................................................................................................18 Nature protection = anthro...............................................................................................................19 Link: Biodiversity (= commodification)..........................................................................................20 Link: Weather prediction (1 of 2).....................................................................................................21 Link: Weather prediction (2 of 2).....................................................................................................22 Link: Weather prediction = citizenship (biopower)..........................................................................23 **Climate Link**.............................................................................................................................24 **AT: “Nature recovers/regenrates”**.............................................................................................25 AT: return to nature (Vampires now)................................................................................................26 Link: Insecurity................................................................................................................................27 Link: Disease....................................................................................................................................28 Link: Danger....................................................................................................................................29 Link: Danger....................................................................................................................................30 **Link: Security **..........................................................................................................................31 Impact: **Foucault `seventy-eight**...............................................................................................32 Impact: Biopower = atomic death....................................................................................................33 Impact: **Racism = pre-condition for violence **..........................................................................34 Impact: Racism and BP = root cause of war....................................................................................35 Science reps = K...............................................................................................................................36 Reps and shit....................................................................................................................................37 Biology reps = Biopower.................................................................................................................38 Biological language = key ...............................................................................................................39 Biology is a practice.........................................................................................................................40 Alt: Vampire solvency......................................................................................................................41 Alt: solves biopower........................................................................................................................42 Alt: Solves Biopower.......................................................................................................................43 Alt: Vampire is liberating.................................................................................................................44 Alt: Vampire solves modernity impacts (1 of 2)..............................................................................45 Alt: Vampire solves modernity impacts (2 of 2)..............................................................................46 Alt: Vampire solves racism, sexism, hetsxm (1 of 2).......................................................................47 Alt: Vampire solves racism, sexism, hetsxm (2 of 2).......................................................................48
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p. 2 of 59 AT: Vampire bad (you’re just paranoid)...........................................................................................49 AT: Pomo Bad (byers)......................................................................................................................50 AT: Haraway = just word play.........................................................................................................51 AT: Cyborg bad -vampire better than `borg ....................................................................................52 AT: `borg promotes tech (we’re not the cyborg)..............................................................................53 QT: Nature = elites..........................................................................................................................54 **QT: Nature = white, male, straight**...........................................................................................55 QT: Nature = straight, white.............................................................................................................56 QT: Nature = racist, sexist................................................................................................................57 QT Impact: Heterosexism  Omnicide (1 of 2)..............................................................................58 QT Impact: Heterosexism  Omnicide (2 of 2)..............................................................................59

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THE AFFIRMATIVE TEAM’S NORMATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL REPRESENTATIONS PRE-SUPPOSE THAT SOMETHING GROWS ROTTEN IN THE WORLD, THAT THERE IS SOMETHING DANGEROUS AND THREATENING TO THE NATURAL ORDER. HOWEVER, THESE REPRESENTATIONS VIOLENTLY REDUCE NATURE TO A MERE OBJECT OF CONTROL, AND THEY ALSO MISS THE FUNDAMENTAL HETEROGENEITY CONSTITUTIVE OF THE WORLD. WE CAN NEVER RETURN TO A PRE-MODERN GARDEN OF EDEN, AND THE DISCOURSE OF PURITY CAN QUICKLY BECOME THE DISCOURSE OF GENOCIDAL VIOLENCE. RATHER THAN IDENTIFYING WITH THE PURE, VIRGINAL VICTIM, WE SHOULD REALIZE WE ARE ALL ACTIVE PARTICIPANTS IN A VAMPIRELIKE REALITY OF CONSTANT CONTAMINATION. BARTSCH IN `01 (INGRID, WOMEN'S STUDIES AND ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE & POLICY AT UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA, CAROLYN DIPALMA, WOMEN'S STUDIES AND POLITICAL SCIENCE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA, AND LAURA SELLS, SPEECH COMMUNICATION AT LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY, "WITNESSING THE POSTMODERN JEREMIAD: (MIS)UNDERSTANDING DONNA HARAWAY'S METHOD OF INQUIRY," CONFIGURATIONS 9.1 (2001) 127164, MUSE)
Whether the end of the world results from global racial tensions or from environmental destruction, both threats hang on the problem of categories that frame the social and natural world. Like race, nature "is the kind of category about which no one is neutral, no one unscathed, no one sure of their ground if there is a ground. . . . Race, like nature, is about roots, pollution, and origins. [extended quote] An inherently dubious notion, race, like sex, is about the purity of
lineage; the legitimacy of passage; and the drama of inheritance of bodies, property, and stories. I believe that, like nature, race haunts us <213> who call ourselves Americans. All of our rational denials only deepen the suppurating puncture wound of a racialized history, past and present. Inheriting the whirlwind it sowed as founding seeds in slavery, dispossession, and genocide as well as in immigration, democracy, and liberty, the republic of the United States is a society consumed by ideas of racial purity and racial denial. Therefore, the United States is also replete with fascination with racial mixing and racial difference. Fascination with mixing and unity is a symptom of preoccupation with purity and decomposition. [end]"78 Haraway reminds us that our inability to

recognize the fluid connections between the metaphorical and the material for either racial or natural categories determines our incapacity to survive difference. Nature is not merely a scientific category, an object of science, but a subject that can and should participate in civic culture; thus her idea of civic or social nature, or nature as a part of the body politic. Just like racial categories, categories of the natural world are demanded by political battles and are therefore necessary, no matter how fictional. Notions of preserved, Edenic authenticity fund identity politics in which fixed ideas of gender, race, and sexual orientation are carefully tended. This desire for authenticity parallels the impulse to preserve the taxonomies of naturalized scientific categories in botanical and zoological gardens, national parks, theme parks, state fairs, and even suburban gardens. Preserving the natural world entails defining it, putting a border or fence around it, and giving it its own color on the Rand McNally map. Mapping natural categories is both necessary and reductive, requiring and creating the natural world as a garden, one tended and maintained by very particular interests--few of which include the natural world as a material semiotic actant. The objectification of nature remains a key tenet in Haraway's politics of faith. If we take Haraway's argument seriously, then feminists need desperately to rearticulate identity politics based on blood, kinship, and kind toward more vampiric notions of identity based on relationality. Vampiric identity compels humans to include nature as part of the relationality. Vampiric kinship with nature is not a nostalgic hunger for a romanticized "real"
nature or an equally romanticized "oneness" with nature. Rather, relationality with nature recognizes human connectedness with nature as a fluctuating, tense, and responsible interdependence, construed along the vectors of power that define civic life. As mentioned earlier, Grosz argues for metaphors that "implicate the subject in the object," metaphors that force a relational perspective not only between women and other women but between humanity and nature, metaphors that promote nature as part of public culture. Grosz's critique of how mechanistic metaphors such as the cyborg promote relativism and the mastery of the body applies as well to the body politic of nature, a body subject to political and discursive categories and their violence. 79 Vampiric and Cyborgian Wetlands: The Politics of Mitigating Nature In Florida, where the three of us live, work, and write squarely amid a host of natural theme parks, we cannot help but think of this violence, and as a result, seriously deploying Haraway's method becomes an imperative. 80

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Walking through theme parks in west central Florida, tourists find large-scale commercial terrariums where California date palms grow next to Hawaiian hibiscus and Australian eucalyptus, planted side by side in a von Humboldtian attempt to reconstruct biogeographic categories. 81 These (un)natural theme parks [End Page 149] create a living, multicultural, biological diorama of Costa Rican birds, Japanese goldfish, and Indonesian amphibians. Within the colonized, landscape mosaic of these terrariums, West Indian seagrass beds reside comfortably next to Antarctic ice floes and Key West beaches. The temperate coastal tidal-pool displays encourage children to handle and displace unsuspecting sea urchins and sea stars from their artificial-natural habitats. "Nature" in these parks always means a romanticized, Edenic aesthetic centered on the visible signifiers of nature--green leaves, water, birds. In the guise of appreciating a nature that, ironically, follows the dictates of this garden aesthetic rather than any alleged natural order, children and their families learn the god-trick of a naïve, colonialist omnipotence, all for the price of forty dollars. The politics of artificially created ecosystems extends well beyond Florida theme-park tourism, however. It is painfully obvious in the political and scientific discursive battles over defining the only endangered and legally protected ecosystem in the United States, wetlands. The battle over wetlands illustrates the way that ecosystems are political subjects: subjects to be violated by the politics of categories and also subjects in their own right, who act in their own interests in a civic nature. The legislation, regulation, and definition of wetlands and their restoration reveal the political nature of wetlands.

Just as the generic category of woman flattens the differences among and between women, the generic category of "wetlands" reduces the complexity of wetlands as an ecosystem. Yet, like vampires, mestiza, 82 and other inappropriate/d others, wetlands are transitional bodies that interface two terrains--in this case, the more classic and conventional terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems. Bridging land and water, and taking characteristics of both simultaneously, wetlands are relational entities whose boundaries are themselves rather messy to categorize, challenging to define, and difficult to pin down. Wetland boundaries shift and fluctuate seasonally and annually depending on their hydrology, or water cycle. Like blood vessels, the hydrologic cycle technically acts as a circulatory system by introducing, transporting, and delivering essential elements to the functioning parts of the wetland. In this unique ecosystem the water table remains consistently at or close to the surface of the earth, which allows the flourishing of plants that are tolerant of standing water near their roots. Formal definitions of wetlands recognize these features. Recalcitrant juridical subjects and vampiric by nature, wetlands must be defined and redefined through repeatedly modified legislation. Because the U.S. legal and regulatory system requires fixed, identifiable boundaries, the definition of wetlands is legislated according to the most visible characteristic--water. The presence, absence, and movement of water--the lifeblood of the wetland--becomes the signifier, the quantum blood measure that policymakers use to draw fixed boundaries delineating wetlands from other systems. 84 Understanding hydrology is, therefore, key to understanding the identity and civic politics of wetlands. This matters, of course, because wetlands are threatened by development projects, regulated by government agencies, and restored by legislative mandate. Vampiric wetlands are literally and figuratively a terrain of struggle for government agencies, developers, environmentalists, environmental scientists, and ducks, all of whom have competing interests in questions of definition, jurisdiction, regulation, and control.

(TWENTY THREE PARAGRAPHS LATER)
Vampiric Infections: Politics of the Postmodern Jeremiad Our argument has been that cyborgs are useful to name shifting categories that occur when material and metaphor, fact and fiction, science and science fiction collide. This naming, however, is sterile, in that all names eventually settle down as tyrants over their constituents. To make categories travel, to practice a form of identity politics that features relationality rather than relativism, Haraway turns to the infectious capacity of the vampire. The political praxis of vampiric identity politics takes its inspiration from two important connotations of the vampire metaphor: its ability to infect, and its suspension in the realm of the undead. First, a vampire's Dark Gift that infects the blood supply invites a discussion of relationality. By infecting categories, the generational pollution of the vampire combats an essentialist identity politics based on an additive rather than a dynamic and simultaneous orientation to multiple identities. By allowing the subject simultaneously to infect and be infected by the object, the vampire challenges essentialist identities and the politics that attend them and instead promotes a notion of identity defined neither by its own unique essence nor by its resistance to the essence of a dominant identity. Instead, identity is continually and dynamically redefined in tense relation to other identities within shifting social and historical contexts. Identity here does not rely on blood alone, but on blood in the context of power relations. With the Dark Gift traveling

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THE FANTASY OF A PERFECTLY ORDERED ENVIRONMENTAL UTOPIA IS SELF-DEFEATING PROVIDING THE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE VIOLENT ERADICATION OF NATURE ITSELF – THIS IS THE BASIS FOR VIOLENCE AGAINST THOSE LABELED ABNORMAL AND PERVERSE.
STAVRAKAKIS IN `99 (YANNIS, UNIVERSITY OF ESSEX, LACAN
AND THE

POLITICAL, P. 62-65)

In order to illustrate further this point let us return to the example of our constructions of nature, a nature which is still generally thought as a hard reality, existing and being accessible independently of any fantasmatic scenario. This idea of nature is closely associated with an overwhelming consensus, forming the foundation of the science of ecology, that the 'natural', original state of nature was balance (a consensus that was hegemonic until a new generation of ecologists began to question all these old ideas and metaphors and to assert that nature is inherently unbalanced or chaotic Worster, 1994: 389). The fact that this view of nature had to repress all the evidence for any other representation of nature, until that proved to be impossible (when chaos kept boiling out from nowhere, breaking down order and balance (Worster, 1994: 389), shows that, for humans, reality needs to be coherent, and since it does not seem to be by itself it has to be constructed as a coherent harmonious whole (at least a harmonious whole in the making). Of course, this harmony can be of many different forms. In the construction of nature, for example, one can trace a movement from the divine order of nature in Linnean ecology to the romantic holistic and animistic conception of nature. This trajectory culminates, within modern ecology, in the organismic idea of a climax of nature introduced by Clements, in Odum's 'ecosystemic' view and Lovelock's Gala. No matter how different these representations of nature were they are all positing a harmonious nature. Take for example Worster's point about Odum and Clements, two of the most important figures in the science of ecology: Eugene Odum may have used different terms than his predecessor Frederic Clements, and he may even have had a radically different picture of nature; but he did not depart from Clements' notion that the law of organic nature was to bring order and harmony out of the chaotic materials of existence. (Worster, 1994: 367) Mac Arthur, Odum and Clements, like Isaac Newton, 'had tried to make nature into single coherent picture where all the pieces fitted firmly together'. All of them tried to reduce the disorderliness or the unknown qualities of nature to a single all-encompassing metaphysical idea (Worster, T4: 400). Even conceptions of nature stressing the element of conflict, such as the Darwinian one, sometimes feel the need to subject this nonperfect image to some discernible goal of nature (for example the 'constantly increasing diversity of organic types in one area' (Worster, 1994: 161) which introduces a certain harmony through the back door. What constantly emerges from this exposition is that when harmony is not present it has to be somehow introduced in order for our reality to be coherent. It has to be introduced through a fantasmatic social construction.19 One should not get the impression though that this is a mere philosophical discussion. In so far as our constructions of reality influence our behaviour – and this is what they basically do - our fixation on harmony has direct social and political consequences. Reality construction does not take place on a superstructural level. Reality is forced to conform to our constructions of it not only at the spiritual or the intellectual, but also at the material level. But why does it have to b forced to conform? This is due, for instance, to the gap between our harmonious fantasmatic constructions of nature and nature itself, between reality and the real. Our constructions of reality are so strong that nature has to conform to them and not they to nature; reality is conceived as mastering the real. But there is always a certain leftover, a disturbing element destabilising our constructions of nature. This has to be stigmatised, made into a scapegoat and <63> exterminated. The more beatific and harmonious is a social fantasy the more this repressed destabilising element will be excluded from its symbolisation - without, however, ever disappearing. In this regard, a vignette from the history of nature conservation can be revealing. As is well known nature conservation was developed first in the United States; what is not so well known is that 'a major feature of the crusade for resource conservation was a deliberate campaign to destroy wild animals - one of the most efficient, well organized, and well-financed such efforts in all of man's history' (Worster, 1994: 261). All this, although not solely attributable to it, was part of a 'progressive' moralistic ideology which conceived of nature together with society as harbouring ruthless exploiters and criminals who should be banished from the land (Worster, 1994: 265).

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The driving force behind this enterprise was clearly a particular ethically distinctive construction of nature articulated within the framework of a conservation ideology. According to this construction what was had to conform to what should be and what ‘should be,’ that is to say nature without vermin (coyotes and other wild preditors), was accepted as more natural more harmonious than what 'was' 'These conservationists were dedicated to reorganizing the natural economy in a way that would fulfil their own ideal vision of what nature should be like' (Worster, 1994: 266). This construction was accepted by the Roosevelt administration in the USA (1901-9) and led to the formation of an official programme to exterminate vermin. The job was given to a government agency, the Bureau of the Biological Survey (BBS) in the Department of Agriculture, and a ruthless war started (in 1907 alone, 1,700 wolves and 23,000 coyotes were killed in the National Parks and this policy continued and expanded for years) (Worster, 1994: 263). What is this dialectic between the beatific fantasy of nature and the demonised vermin doing if not illustrating the Lacanian dialectic between the two sides of fantasy or between fantasy and symptom? Since we will explore the first of these two Lacanian approaches to fantasy in Chapter 4, we will concentrate here on the fantasy/symptom axis.2° As far as the promise of filling the lack in the Other is concerned, fantasy can be better understood in its relation to the Lacanian conception of the symptom; according to one possible reading, fantasy and symptom are two interimplicated terms. It is the symptom that interrupts the consistency of the field of our constructions of reality, of the object of identification, by embodying the repressed jouissance, the destabilising part of nature excluded from its harmonious symbolisation. The symptom here is a real kernel of enjoyment; it is the repressed jouissance that returns and does not ever 'stop in imposing itself [on us]' (Soler, 1991: 214). If fantasy is 'the support that gives consistency to what we call reality' (Zi2ek, 1989: 49) on the other hand reality is always a symptom (Ziiek, 1992). Here we are insisting on the late Lacanian conception of the symptom as sinthome. In this conception, a signifier is married to jouissance, a signifier is instituted in the real, outside the signifying chain but at the same time internal to it. This paradoxical role of the symptom can help us understand the paradoxical role of fantasy. Fantasy gives discourse its consistency because it opposes the symptom (Ragland-Sullivan, 1991: 16). Hence, if the symptom is an encounter with the real, with a traumatic point that resists symbolisation, and if the discursive has to arrest the real and repress jouissance in order to produce reality, then the negation of the real within fantasy can only be thought in terms of opposing, of stigmatising the symptom. This is then the relation between symptom and fantasy. The self-consistency of a symbolic construction of reality depends on the harmony instituted by fantasy. This fantasmatic harmony can only be sustained by the neutralisation of the symptom and of the real, by a negation of the generalised lack that crosses the field of the social. But how is this done? If social fantasy produces the self-consistency of a certain construction it can do so only by presenting the symptom as 'an alien, disturbing intrusion, and not as the point of eruption of the otherwise hidden truth of the existing social order' (Ziiek, l991a: 40). The social fantasy of a harmonious social or natural order can only be sustained if all the persisting disorders can be attributed to an alien intruder. To return to our example, the illusory character of our harmonious construction of nature is shown in the fact that there is a part of the real which escapes its schema and assumes a symptomatic form (vermin, etc.); in order for this fantasy to remain coherent, this real symptom has to be stigmatised and eliminated. It cannot be accepted as the excluded truth of nature; such a recognition would lead to a dislocation of the fantasy in question. When, however, the dependence of fantasy on the symptom is revealed, then the play - the relation - between the symptom and fantasy reveals itself as another mode of the play between the real and the symbolic/imaginary nexus producing reality. 7

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WHILE WE CAN FUNDAMENTALLY AGREE WITH THE AFFIRMATIVE’S DEMAND FOR ACTION, WE DISAGREE WITH THE POLITICAL METAPHORS AND REPRESENTATIONS THEY USE TO JUSTIFY THEIR ACTIONS. RATHER, WE WILL ENDORSE THE ALTERNATIVE FIGURE OF THE VAMPIRE: THE VAMPIRE ESCAPES RATIONAL BIOLOGICAL AND BLOOD-BASED CATEGORIZATION, RESISTING THE VIOLENCE OF METAPHYSICS AND THE BIOPOLITICAL ORDERING
OF SOCIETY

HARAWAY IN `97 (DONNA, HISTORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS AT UC-SANTA CRUZ, MODEST_WITNESS@SECOND_MILLENNNIUM. FEMALEMAN_MEETS_ ONCOMOUSE, P. 213-217)
Lurching beyond the symptom in the first paragraphs, however, I acknowledge that a specific figure animates this essay. The figure is the vampire: the one who pollutes lineages on the wedding night; the one who effects category trans formations by illegitimate passages of substance; the one who drinks and infuses blood in a paradigmatic act of infecting whatever poses as pure; the one that eschews sun worship and does its work at night; the one who is undead, unnatural, and perversely incorruptible. In this essay, I am instructed by the vampire, and my questions are about the vectors of infection that trouble racial categories in twentieth-century bioscientific constructions of universal humanity. For better and for worse, vampires are vectors of category transformation in a racialized, historical, national unconscious. A figure that both promises and threatens racial and sexual mixing, the vampire feeds off the normalized human, and the monster finds such contaminated food to be nutritious. The vampire also insists on the nightmare of racial violence behind the fantasy of purity in the rituals of kinship.1 <214> It is impossible to have a settled judgment about vampires. Defined by their categorical ambiguity and troubling mobility, vampires do not rest easy (or easily) in the boxes labeled good and bad. Always transported and shifting, the vampire's native soil is more nutritious, and more unheimlich, than that. Deeply shaped by murderous ideologies since their modern popularization in European accounts in the late eighteenth century—especially racism, sexism, and homophobia— stories of the undead also exceed and invert each of those systems of discrimination to show the violence infesting supposedly wholesome life and nature and the revivifying promise of what is supposed to be decadent and against nature. Just when one feels secure in condemning the toothy monster's violations of the integrity of the body and the community, history forces one to remember that the vampire is the figure of the Jew accused of the blood crime of polluting the wellsprings of European germ plasm and bringing both bodily plague and national decay, or that it is the figure of the diseased prostitute, or the gender pervert, or the aliens and the travelers of all sorts who cast doubt on the certainties of the self-identical and well-rooted ones who have natural rights and stable homes. The vampires are the immigrants, the dislocated ones, accused of sucking the blood of the rightful possessors of the land and of raping the virgin who must embody the purity of race and culture. So, in an orgy of solidarity with all the oppressed, one identifies firmly with the outlaws who have been the vampires in the perfervid imaginations of the upstanding members of the whole, natural, truly human, organic communities. But then one is forced to remember that the vampire is also the marauding figure of unnaturally breeding capital, which penetrates every whole being and sucks it dry in the lusty production and vastly unequal accumulation of wealth.Yet the conjunction of Jew, capitalist, queer, and alien is freighted with too much literal genocide to allow even the jeremiad against transnational capital to carry the old-time conviction of moral certainty and historical truth. The vampire is the cosmopolitan, the one who speaks too many languages and cannot remember the native tongue, and the scientist who forces open the parochial dogmas of those who are sure they know what nature is. In short, once touched by the figure of this monster, one is forced to inhabit the swirling semantic field of vampire stories. In those zones, uninvited associations and dissociations are sure to undo one's sense of the self same, which is always neatly prelabeled to forestall moral, epistemological, and political scrutiny. So, I need the undead and non-innocent figure of the vampire to enter the fraught constructions of human unity and racial difference in the twentieth-cen tury United States. Painted in interaction with an earlier version of this chapter, Lynn Randolph's 1995 painting Transfusions sets my visual text for proceeding [Figure 6.1. Transfusions]. A blue-clad dancer's body lies prone on a stark whiteoperating table, her neck penetrated by a vampire bat whose wing vessels pulse with her red blood. A transfusion bag on a medical stand ties into the circulation of the woman and the bat, which is linked in swirling time-lapse photographic repetitions to the teleoperator chamber in the top right hand quadrant of the painting. Inside the chamber and operating its controls is the rat-toothed figure of Count Graf Orlock from Nosfemtu, F.W. Murneau's 1922 German Expressionist silent film, which was the first vampire movie. The fingernails on the hands of the mad doctor-vampire are clawed, and the chamber is swathed in the sterilizing light of blues, purples, and ultraviolets. The black field of the painting is transected by the bright white of the slab and punctuated by the reticulations and pools of red blood. The surrealist traffic of informatics and biologies in the circulating fluids of the cables and joysticks of the remote control machine, the dancing bats, and the prone woman infuse the visual field. Remembering the toxic cocktail of organicism, anti-Semitism, anticapitalism, and anti-intellectualism that percolates through vampire stories, I cannot see Randolph's painting as a simple affirmation of the woman and indictment of the techno-vampire.

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Rather, drawing on her practice of metaphoric realism, Randolph uses the vampire-cyborg mythology to interrogate the undead psychoanalytic, spiritual, and mundane zones where bio-medicine, information technology, and the techno-organic stories of kinship converge. This is the kinship exchange system in which gender, race, and species—animal and machine— are all at stake. Joining the pulsing fluids of blood and data, Transfusions guides us through the interrogation of universal donors. I approach the universal through a particular discourse, the science of biology. Biology's epistemological and technical task has been to produce a historically specific kind of human unity: namely, membership in a single species, the human race, Homo sapiens. Biology discursively establishes and performs what will count as human in powerful domains of knowledge and technique. A striking product of early biological discourse, race, like sex and nature, is about the apparatuses for fabricating and distributing life and death in the modern regimes of biopower. Like nature and sex, at least from the nineteenth century race was constituted as an object of knowledge by the life sciences, especially biology, physical anthropology, and medicine. The institutions, research projects, measuring instruments, publication practices, and circuits of money and people that made up the life sciences were the machine tools that crafted "race" as an object of scientific knowledge over the past 20 years. Then, in the middle of the twentieth century, the biological and medical sciences began to disown their deadly achievement and worked like Sisyphus to roll the rock qf race out of the upscale hillside neighborhoods being built in post-World War II prosperous times to house the new categories of good natural science. All too predictably, the new universals, like the suburbs and the laboratories, were all too white. Biology is not the body itself but a discourse on the body. "My biology," a common expression in daily life for members of the U.S. white middle class, is not the juicy mortal flesh itself, but a linguistic sign for a complex structure of belief and practice through which I and many of my fellow citizens organize a great deal of life. Biology is also not a culture-free universal discourse, for all that it has considerable cultural, economic, and technical power to establish what will count as nature throughout the planet Earth. Biology is not everyone's discourse about human, animal, and vegetable flesh, life, and nature; indeed, flesh, life, and nature are no less rooted in specific histories, practices, languages, and peoples than biology itself. Biologists are not ventriloquists speaking for the Earth itself and all its inhabitants, reporting on what organic life really is in all its evolved diversity and DNA-soaked order. No natural object-world speaks its metaphor-free and story-free truth through the sober objectivity of culture-free and so universal science. Biology does not reach back into the mists of time, to Aristotle or beyond. It is, rather, a complex web of semiotic-material practices that emerged over the past 200 years or so, beginning in "the West" and traveling globally. Biology emerged in the midst of major inventions and reworkings of categories of nation, family, type, civility, species, sex, humanity, nature, and, race. That biology—at every layer of the onion—is a discourse with a contingent his tory does not mean that its accounts are matters of"opinion" or merely "stories." It does mean that the material-semiotic tissues are inextricably intermeshed. Discourses are not just "words"; they are material-semiotic practices through which objects of attention and knowing subjects are both constituted. Now a transnational discourse like the other natural sciences, biology is a knowledgeproducing practice that I value; want to participate in and make better; and believe to be culturally, politically, and epistemologically important. It matters to contest for a livable biology, as for a livable nature. Both contestations require that we think long and hard about the permutations of racial discourse in the life sci ences in this century. This chapter is a small contribution to that end.

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1: PURIFYING POLLUTION. THE 1AC ASSUMES THAT THE ENVIRONMENT HAS BEEN DEFILED BY POLLUTING TECHNOLOGIES AND FOSSIL FUELS – IMPLICITLY ASSUMES THAT THERE ONCE EXISTED A PRE-TECHNOLOGICAL PAST THAT WAS CLEAN AND UNTHREATENED THAT WE MUST RETURN TO. THIS QUEST IS IMPOSSIBLE AND WILL FAIL, LEADING TO RESENTMENT AND VIOLENCE, AS OUR STAVRAKAKIS EVIDENCE POINTS OUT. 2: MODELS OF MANAGEMENT. THEY ASK US TO MONITOR THE ENVIRONMENT UNTIL IT REACHES AN IDEAL, NORMALIZING STATUS. TARGET CONSUMPTIONS LEVELS AND STANDARDIZED EFFICIENCY REQUIRE THE PARTICIPATION OF EVERYONE. NO CONSUMER OR INDIVIDUAL CAN ESCAPE ENVIRONMENTAL SURVEILLANCE, OR ELSE THEY ARE VIOLENTLY EXCLUDED FROM THE NORM. 3: STATISTICAL
SOCIAL BODY SCIENCE.

NUMBER-BASED

MODELS REDUCE THE ENVIRONMENT INTO STATISTICS-BASED LIFE PROCESSES, GIVING HYSTERICAL WOMEN AND HOMOSEXUAL PERVERTS WERE ALL THE CREATIONS OF

SCIENTISTS THE PRETENSE OF MATHEMATICAL OBJECTIVITY AND THE LEGITIMACY TO DEMARCATE DISEASES AND THREATS TO THE

IMAGES OF GREEDY

JEWS,

REDUCTIONIST SCIENCE..

4: PREDICTION = PRE-EMPTION. DESCRIBING UNREALISTIC AND APOCALYPTIC SCENARIOS MAKES US FEAR ENVIRONMENTAL FLUCTUATIONS, AND IT TAUTOLOGICALLY GIVES THE STATE LEGITIMACY TO ACT IN THE NAME OF NATURE AND CIVILIZATION, JUSTIFYING VIOLENCE. …GEORGE BUSH SR. INVADED IRAQ TO “PROTECT” THE KURDS, BUT HE ALSO CHASTISED JAPAN AND GERMANY FOR THEIR ENVIRONMENTAL “FAILURES” – THESE ARE THE BANNER ISSUES OF FOREIGN POLICY. 5: ONE WORLD, ONE PEOPLE. THE 1AC IGNORES DIFFERENCES IN “NATURE,” ERASING DIFFERENT EXPERIENCES ALONG FAULTLINES OF CLASS, RACE, GENDER AND SEXUALITY. (FOR EXAMPLE, THE INNER CITY IS ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY GREENHOUSE GASES BUT WILL NEVER BECOME A PRISTINE STATE OF NATURE, WHICH MEANS MAINSTREAM ENVIRONMENTALISTS WILL FOCUS MORE ON ANWR THAN THEY WILL ON THE POOR, MINORITIES OF SOUTH COMPTON.)

Everybody is ignorant, only on different subjects.

West p oint ’o 6

BIOPOWER DA: WORLDWATCH

do the vampir e p. 11 of 59 .

THE ECOLOGICAL IMPERATIVE TO DEFINE AND PROTECT A NORMAL VERSION OF ‘NATURE’ IS JUSTIFICATION
FOR MASSIVE SURVEILLANCE OVER LIFE AND BIOPOLITICAL CONTROL

LUKE IN `97 (TIM, DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, VIRGINIA POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE AND STATE UNIVERSITY, “THE (UN)WISE (AB)USE OF NATURE: ENVIRONMENTALISM AS GLOBALIZED CONSUMERISM?” HTTP://WWW.CDDC.VT.EDU/TIM/TIMS/TIM528.HTM)
Human beings must slow their increasing mass populations, halt wasteful resource-intensive modes of production, and limit excessive levels of material consumption. All of these ends, in turn, require a measure of surveillance and degree of navigational steering beyond the powers of modern nation-states, but perhaps not beyond those exercised by some postmodern worldwatch engaged in the disciplinary tasks of equilibriating the "net primary production" of solar energy fixed by photosynthesis in the four systems to global consummativity as consummation. Natural resources in the total solar economy of food stocks, fisheries, forest preserves, and grass lands are rhetorically ripped from Nature only to be returned as consummationally-framed environmental resources, enveloped in accounting procedures and encircled by managerial programs. Worldwatching presumes to know all of this, and in knowing it, to have mastered all of its economic/ecological implications through its authoritative technical analysis to perfect consumption as the would-be warden of this planetary solar economy. By questioning the old truth regime of mere consumptive growth, a new regime of consummation for a much more sophisticated ecological economy stands ready to reintegrate human production and consumption in balance with the four biological systems. No longer Nature, not merely ecosystem, the terraforming of our world under this kind of watch truly reduces it to strategic spaces. As "an environment," ringed by many ecological knowledge centers dedicated to the rational management of its assets, the global ecosystem is to be understood through the disciplinary codes of green operational planning. The health of global populations as well as the survival of the planet itself allegedly necessitate that a bioeconomic spreadsheet be draped over consummativity on Earth, generating an elaborate set of accounts for a terraforming economy of global reach and local scope. Hovering over the world in their scientifically-centered astropanopticon of green surveillance, the disciplinary grids of efficiency and waste, health and disease, poverty and wealth as well as employment and unemployment. Fusing geo-economics with geo-politics, Brown, Flavin and Postel declare "the once separate issues of environment and development are now inextricably linked."80 Indeed, they are, at least, in the discourses of Worldwatch Institute as its experts survey Nature-in-crisis by auditing levels of topsoil depletion, air pollution, acid rain, global warming, ozone destruction, water pollution, forest reduction, and species extinction brought on by excessive mass consumption. Worldwatch terraforming would govern through things, and the ends things serve, by restructuring today's ecologically unsound system of objects through elaborate managerial designs to realize tomorrow's environmentally sustainable economy in the ecologically perfected objects of that environmentalized system. The shape of an environmental economy would emerge from a reengineered economy of environmentalizing practices vetted by worldwatching codes. The individual human subject of today, and all of his or her things with their unsustainable practices, would be reshaped through a consummational environmentality, redirected by practices, discourses, and ensembles of administration that more efficiently synchronize the bio-powers of populations with the geo-powers of environments. To police global carrying capacity, in turn, this environmentalizing logic would direct each human subject to assume the much less capacious carriage of disciplinary frugality instead of affluent suburban abundance. All of the world must come under this watch, and the global watch would police its human charges to dispose of their things and arrange their ends--in reengineered spaces using new energies at new jobs and leisures--around these post-consumptive agendas. Sustainability, like sexuality, would become another expert discourse about exerting power over life.81 What the biopower strategies of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries helped fabricate in terms of human sexuality now must be reimagined for humanity in worsening global conditions of survival as a perfected consummative survivalism. How development might "invest life through and through" becomes a new sustainability challenge, once biopolitical relations are established, in making these investments permanently profitable as consummational systems of objects.82 Thus, the Worldwatch Institute issues pamphlet after monograph after book on the supreme virtues of bicycles, solar power, windmills, urban planning, or organic agriculture to reveal the higher forms of consumer goods perfection attainable by the system of objects. Moreover, sustainability more or less presumes that some level of material and cultural existence has been attained that is indeed worth sustaining. This formation, then, constitutes "a new distribution of pleasures, discourses, truths, and powers; it has to be seen as the self-affirmation of one class rather than the enslavement of another: a defense, a protection, a strengthening, and an exaltation...as a means of social control and political subjugation."83 Sustainable development means developing new consummative powers through defining a new model of green subjectivity organized around sustaining both new object worlds in a more survivable second nature and new consummational systems for their surviving subjects.

Everybody is ignorant, only on different subjects.

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BIOPOWER DA

do the vampir e p. 12 of 59 .

ATTACHING NORMATIVE REPRESENTATIONS OF THE ENVIRONMENT TO THE STATE JUSTIFIES MASSIVE REGULATION OVER LIFE, REDUCING US TO SUBJECTS OF BIOPOWER LUKE IN `97 (TIM, DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, VIRGINIA POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE AND STATE UNIVERSITY, “THE (UN)WISE (AB)USE OF NATURE: ENVIRONMENTALISM AS GLOBALIZED CONSUMERISM?” HTTP://WWW.CDDC.VT.EDU/TIM/TIMS/TIM528.HTM)
Newer ecological discourses about total cost accounting, lifecycle management, or environmental justice may simply articulate more refined efforts to sustainably develop these bigger global processes of universal capitalization by accepting small correctives against particular capitalist interests. Admitting that poor people have been treated unjustly in siting decisions for environmental bads lets rich people redistribute these ecological costs across more sites so that they might benefit from the material and symbolic goods created by being just so environmental. Environmental justice movements perhaps are not so much about attaining environmental justice as they are about moving injustices more freely around in the environment, assuring the birth of new consumerisms for increased efficiency at risk management and broader participation ecological degradation in our terraformed Nature. In conclusion, Foucault is correct about the network of governmentality arrangements in the modern state. State power is not "an entity which was developed above individuals, ignoring what they are and even their very existence," because its power/knowledge has indeed evolved "as a very sophisticated structure, in which individuals can be integrated, under one condition: that this individuality would be shaped in a new form, and submitted to a set of very specific patterns."116 Producing discourses of ecological living, articulating designs of sustainable development, and propagating definitions of environmental literary for contemporary individuals simply adds new twists to the "very specific patterns" by which the state formation constitutes "a modern matrix of individualization."117 The emergent regime of ecologized bio-powers, in turn, operates through ethical systems of identity as much as it does in the policy machinations of governmental bureaux within any discretely bordered territory. Ecology merely echoes the effects from "one of the great innovations in the techniques of power in the eighteenth century," namely, "the emergence of 'population' as an economic and political problem."118 Once demography emerges as a science of statist administration, it is statistical attitudes can diffuse into the numerical surveillance of Nature, or Earth and its nonhuman inhabitants, as well as the study of culture, or society and its human members, giving us ecographies written by the Worldwatchers steering effects exerted from their astropanopticons through every technoscientific space.119 Government, and now, most importantly, superpowered statist ecology, preoccupies itself with "the conduct of conduct," particularly in consumerism's "buying of buying" or "purchasing of purchasing." Habitus is habitat, as any good product semanticist or psychodemographer knows all too well. The ethical concerns of family, community and nation previously might have guided how conduct was to be conducted; yet, at this juncture, "the environment" serves increasingly as the most decisive ground for normalizing each individual's behavior. Environments are spaces under police supervision, expert management, risk avoidance, or technocratic control. By bringing environmentalistic agendas into the heart of corporate and government policy, one finds the ultimate meaning of a police state fulfilled. If police, as they bound and observed space, were empowered to watch over religion, morals, health, supplies, roads, town buildings, public safety, liberal arts, trade, factories, labor supplies, and the poor, then why not add ecology--or the totality of all interactions between organisms and their surroundings--to the police zones of the state? The conduct of any person's environmental conduct becomes the initial limit on other's ecological enjoyments, so too does the conduct of the social body's conduct necessitate that the state always be an effective "environmental protection agency." The ecological domain is the ultimate domain of unifying together all of the most critical forms of life that states must now produce, protect, and police in eliciting bio-power: it is the center of their enviro-discipline, eco-knowledge, geo-power.120 Few sites in the system of objects unify these forces as thoroughly as the purchase of objects from the system of purchases.

Everybody is ignorant, only on different subjects.

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LINK: ANIMAL RIGHTS (1 OF 2)

do the vampir e p. 13 of 59 .

THE PROMOTION OF NON-HUMAN RIGHTS IS THE AUDOBONIZATION OF LIFE: THE EXTENSION OF A BIOPOLITICAL DISCOURSE THAT SEEKS TO KNOW, WATCH AND ADMINISTER LIFE PROCESSES. IT IS ANTHROPOCENTRIC AND HUMANBASED, JUSTIFYING PANOPTIC SURVEILLANCE THAT RENDERS NATURE INTO PASSIVE OBJECTS 4 CONTROL LUKE IN `2K (TIMOTHY, POLITICAL SCIENCE, VIRGINIA POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE AND STATE UNIVERSITY,“BEYOND BIRDS: BIOPOWER AND BIRDWATCHING IN THE WORLD OF AUDUBON,” CAPITALISM, NATURE, SOCIALISM, SEPTEMBER, PROQUEST)
At the root of Audubonization is a discourse of pathos and a discipline of surveillance that turns birds into more  performative sources of biopower. Beautiful but pitiable, the beleaguered bird life of the nation is to be continuously  watched, monitored, and counted so that human beings might feel sorrow from their destruction as well as feel moved  in their pathos to protect any survivors. Instead of confidently asserting dominion over bird life through physical acts  of violence to take possession of these feathered animals by collecting their eggs and skin, as commercial or scientific  ornithologists once did, new birding practices emerged in the 1880s and 1890s under pressure from Audubon Society  chapters.  Worries   about   mass   extinctions,  like   those   caused   by   the   market   hunting   of   passenger   pigeons   or  feathercollecting from egrets, herons, and terns, coupled with anxieties over the closing of America's Western frontier,  where the buffalo and Native American no longer could roam, brought talk of mercy, humane respect, and rights  by Audubon Society members to the discussion of bird life.3 The development of the NAS in the 20th century, then, is one more sign of the changing nature of power, territory, and  sovereignty in the 19th century. After the American and French revolutions, as Foucault suggests, sovereignty shifts  from a domain overshadowed by the autocratic infliction of death to one tied back to a distributed system of managing  life through continuously operating regulatory mechanisms. With the protection of birds, which many still kill for their  feathers and flesh, power found in avian preservationism a kind of  nature conservationism that provided, first,  new  means for "distributing the living in the domain of value and utility,"4 and articulated, second, the requisite forms of  authority that "made an essentially normalizing power acceptable."5 Fearing the loss of more birds, and believing their    loss would only enrich slob hunters, nest raiders, and hat makers,    the National Audubon Society intervened directly    into everyday American life by advocating something strange: the equally important nonhuman rights of birds    to their own nonhuman life, health, happiness as biotic populations   . Audubonization here articulates "a whole      series of different tactics that combined in varying proportions  the objective of disciplining the body and that of       regulating populations"6 by focusing upon the bodies of birds and birdlife populations. Once given this respect,  avian biopower could perform its vital ecological purposes in the human world's food chains. Audubonization, then, begins to change the stark objecthood of animals and plants into one of codependent    intersubjectivity with humans in relation to Audubonized care   . Instead of being little better than bacteria,    birds      become nearly as good as people  And, their populations acquire biopower in human ecologies of agriculture,   . horticulture, and silviculture, which justifies their surveillance, protection, and administration. More recently,  the NAS has allowed other animals also to enjoy Audubonization. In contemporary Audubon Society literatures,  frogs, for example, have become fascinating little technicolored beings with world ecological significance in Nature's  balance of life. No longer slimy little nothings, frogs are transformed by science and journalism into an amphibian  marker of the human degradation of Nature. 

Everybody is ignorant, only on different subjects.

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LINK: ANIMAL RIGHTS (2 OF 2)

do the vampir e p. 14 of 59 .

With such grants, every issue of Audubon magazine enlists new readers and old members to enter "the world of  Audubon"   where   they   can   meet   and   greet   these   Audubonized   nonhuman   beings   whose   continued   existence   is  amplified/extended/valorized by Audubonized attention. The NAS, then, seeks to protect birds as well as other forms  of wildlife because of the crucial roles they play in the human foodchain. Every action that the NAS takes ultimately is  meant to discipline animal bodies and regulate wildlife populations, as its Member's Guide asserts, "for the benefit of  humanity and the Earth's biological diversity."s These organizational goals articulate the ends of Audubonization very  effectively: sustainable development for economic growth and social control for political legitimacy.   Audubonizing   , first, bird life, and then, later,  all animal life in the United States, essentially expresses another       effect   from   "one   of   the   great   innovations   in   the   techniques   of   power   in   the   18th   century,"   that   is,   "the  emergence   of   `population'   as   an   economic   and   political   problem."9  Audubonization   is   not   about   the  preservation of Nature for its own sake. It is instead pitched at the articulation of new power relations and  performative modalities of control, which pertain to the realms of human society, into the conservation of useful  nonhuman populations and valued natural sites. Discovering the exciting world of Audubon in the U.S. is about    finding "one world" ­ human and nonhuman excited by    panoptic surveillances   , population dynamics, and multiple    powers for American managerial elites intent upon imposing those practices and precepts in all other world. This study examines these contradictory qualities in the NAS from its beginnings in the 19th century to the present.  After reviewing how and why the Audubon movement began, the analysis discusses the Audubonization of American  society over the past century. At the same time, it explores how Audubonizing this nation articulated, in part, deeper  dynamics from America's consumer capitalism and national democracy. Finally, it suggests that the "audubonding"  institutions of the NAS are trapped in nationalistic and anthropocentric approaches to conservation that make this  organization unlikely to realize fully the preservationist goals it professes to its membership.

Everybody is ignorant, only on different subjects.

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**LINK: ANIMAL RIGHTS**

do the vampir e p. 15 of 59 .

ANIMAL RIGHTS FRAME NATURE THROUGH HUMANISTIC LANGUAGE IN ORDER TO LEGITIMIZE SCIENCE’S AUTHORITY OVER THE BODY, JUSTIFYING WHOLESALE REGULATION OF ALL POPULATIONS LUKE IN `2K (TIMOTHY, POLITICAL SCIENCE, VIRGINIA POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE AND STATE UNIVERSITY,“BEYOND BIRDS: BIOPOWER AND BIRDWATCHING IN THE WORLD OF AUDUBON,” CAPITALISM, NATURE, SOCIALISM, SEPTEMBER, PROQUEST)
John   James  Audubon's   remarkable   anthropomorphic   bird   life   studies   in   Birds   of   America,   however,   began   to  reimagine the everyday existence of birds in very humanistic tropes. These odd images ironically made each individual  bird seem worthy of respect and entire bird populations quite worth preserving. Once positioned within these narrative  frames, birds were much more difficult to treat simply as economic objects useful only for their feathers or flesh.  Instead such avian anthropomorphs could be cast by naturalists in moralistic melodramas of nest robbing, senseless  slaughter, and feathertaking to incite human pathos. Just as print capitalism was helping enlightened elites to invent nations with particular national subjects, so too was it  promoting the construction of particular forms of Nature, which was populated with its own unique natural subjects.  Like   nations,   Nature   needed   boundaries,   identities,   narratives,   and   politics.  Audubon's   life   studies  of   feathered  creatures in the U.S. easily  provided some of these by creating animal life forms worthy of coexisting with, if not  because   of,  modern   humanity.   The   creation   of   "Man"   in   these   post­Enlightenment   times   virtually   required   the  coevolution of humanity with other creatures, like Audubon's idealized "Birds."31  Audubonization in this fashion  becomes another disciplinary dimension in the processes of cultural modernization that  alters the existing social  discourses   for   defining   and   dealing   with   Nature.  Indeed,  Audubon's   anthropomorphic   renderings   of   birds  ironically reflect the redrawing of power dynamics in the 18th and 19th centuries. The traditional prerogatives in  juridical systems of power laid claim on the bodies of subjects through deadly force and compulsory labor, while the  newer systems of productive power were accepting the rights of individuals to their own bodies, happiness, and health  inasmuch   as   they   acknowledged   the   normalizing   use   of   discipline   and   discourse   as   technologies   of   life.32  The  enthusiasm   of  human  actors  in   search of  abstract agency  as  autonomous  human  beings  quickly  gained  reflexive  rearticulations in many efforts, like those of the National Audubon Society, to map such quasi­subjective statuses over  to birds, bees, forests or trees, especially if their survival served more performative outcomes in the ecosystem. These  acts, as Foucault (1980) argues, advance "the entire political technology of life" by investing birds, bees, forests, and  trees with a new sovereign right to survive, and maybe even thrive, under caring guidance by organizations like the  NAS in the U.S.33 Birdwatching as a new analytical means for scientific ornithology  stressed not only looking at individual birds, but  also  counting   their   overall   populations   and   assessing   their   position   in   the   food   chain   or   ecosystemic   balance.  Therefore,   the   NAS's   work   with   birds   can   be   regarded   as   being   disciplinary,   and   it   contributed   to   reinventing  "birdness." Watching birds in the wild as niche players in the biotic order instead of killing them, taking their eggs,  and stuffing them into curiosity cabinets at home is the result of a new type of Man coming into new fields of nature      concentrate   the  biopower   of   birds  in   various   ecologies,   food   chains,   and   countries   to   benefit   humanity. to          Audubonization was tied on the one hand, To the disciplines of the body: the harnessing, intensification, and distribution of forces, the adjustment and economy  of energies. On the other hand, it was applied to the regulation of populations, through all the far­reaching effects of its  activity. It fitted in both categories at once, giving rise to infinitesimal surveillances, permanent controls, extremely  meticulous   orderings   of   space,   indeterminate   medical   or   psychological   examination,   to   an   entire   micro­power 

Everybody is ignorant, only on different subjects.

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p. 16 of 59 concerned with the body.34  (Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol. I: An Introduction (New York:  Vintage, 1980), p. 145­146.)

do the vampir e

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Everybody is ignorant, only on different subjects.

West p oint ’o 6

**LINK: EXTINCTION RHETORIC**

do the vampir e p. 17 of 59 .

THE LANGUAGE OF EXTINCTION IS CONTROLLED BY INSTITUTIONS OF POWER THAT SEEK TO LEGITIMIZE THE CONTROL AND DISCIPLINE OF NATURAL BODIES, EXTENDING BIOPOLITICAL
PENETRATION TO ALL LIFE

LUKE IN `2K (TIMOTHY, POLITICAL SCIENCE, VIRGINIA POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE AND STATE UNIVERSITY,“BEYOND BIRDS: BIOPOWER AND BIRDWATCHING IN THE WORLD OF AUDUBON,” CAPITALISM, NATURE, SOCIALISM, SEPTEMBER, PROQUEST)
The technologies of Audubonization become a complicated series of different tactics to discipline the body of birds  and regulate bird populations as part of an ecological administration of Nature's biosystemic services, which focuses  on the performativity of species in biotic energy and matter exchanges to safeguard humanity's social reproduction. The specter of extinction is real, and its reality was brought home more frequently in the U.S. during the late 19th and  early 20th centuries.  A scientist working for the Museum of Comparative Zoology in the 1870s, J. A. Allen, began  writing   extensively   in   the   popular   press   and   for   scientific   audiences   about   the   decline   of   the   buffalo   and   the  destruction   of   many  bird  species.  "Unless   something   is   done   to   awaken   public   opinion   in   this   direction,"   Allen  asserted, and to enlist the sympathies of the people in behalf of our persecuted birds, the close of the next half­century  will witness a large increase in the list of wholly exterminated species."35 To awaken the public and find sympathetic  allies,  Allen reimagined all bird life in North America as innocent, beautiful, and defenseless victims of human  cruelty. This cult of birds as pathetic fauna caught the imagination, first, of sportsmen, who feared the demise of their  sport in the vanishing of game birds; second, of humanitarians, who wanted to allay or end the suffering of birds at  human hands; and, third, of middle­class women, who stripped bird plumage from their hats and clothes in sympathy    with these tiny beings. All of these interests believed they might truly  halt the extinction  of birds by their efforts.          Allen's vision of birds as the little innocent victims of human arrogance and avarice also became a bedrock foundation  for new groups like the National Audubon Society.  He then challenged the nation to form special societies "whose  express object should be the protection throughout the country of not only....innocent and pleasure­giving species, but  also the totally innocuous herons, terns,  and gulls, whose extermination  is progressing with needless and fearful  rapidity."36 Amidst the second coming of the Audubon movement, "ultraprotectionists," like the nature writer Leander Keyser,  suggested scientific ornithologists should not continue to shoot birds and rob their nests for feathered skins and eggs.  Instead they must study "birds in all the varied phases of their lives" and "set the example of mercy" to preserve bird  populations that could then be observed in life studies.37 Wittier Stone in a report to the Bird Protection Committee of  the AOU in 1898 seconded these sentiments when he protested that this "sacrifice of birds to science" should not be  "conscientiously   ignored"   any   longer.38   He   followed   these   claims   in   1899   in   a   pamphlet   "Hints   to   Young   Bird  Students" that urged young egg collectors not to succumb to the commodity fetishist quest for complete series of egg  sets, because "there is nothing to be gained from the collecting of series, excepting the extermination of birds, which  surely is not your object."39 Rather than stalking, shooting, and stuffing birds to produce boxes of scientific specimens gauged by size, color, and  plumage,  this   new   vision   of   avifaunal   study   called   upon   all   ornithologists   ­   amateur   and   professional   ­   to   start  watching. Looking at birds in their wild environs was what birding should become. Life studies of the truly wild  became the only means for understanding "bird life" as living beings in their natural environments. Once this move  was   made,   a   new   appreciation   of   the   ecological   services   performed   by   birds   in   food   chain   dynamics,   biome  maintenance, and habitat stability also turned most ornithologists and their science in new directions that benefited  humanity.  Everybody is ignorant, only on different subjects.

West p oint ’o 6

LINK: NATURE PROTECTION

do the vampir e p. 18 of 59 .

THE LANGUAGE OF NATURE PROTECTION IS A DISCIPLINARY TACTIC TO GIVE SCIENCE
WHOLESALE AUTHORITY OVER THE BODY

LUKE IN `2K (TIMOTHY, POLITICAL SCIENCE, VIRGINIA POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE AND STATE UNIVERSITY,“BEYOND BIRDS: BIOPOWER AND BIRDWATCHING IN THE WORLD OF AUDUBON,” CAPITALISM, NATURE, SOCIALISM, SEPTEMBER, PROQUEST)
Once avifauna were respected enough as Philippine natives to be protected, it is clear that their biopower would  become accepted as an essential component in the larger web of life that all could observe. Mass birdwatching by  amateurs, school children, and homeowners completed these lines of legitimation. This ethic of surveillance was advanced further by the introduction of Bird Day after being first proposed by C. A.  Babock in 1894 as an imitation of Arbor Day. After studying birds for months, children were urged to go out into the  field and observe birds in their native habitat in order to better recognize "the value of our native birds and the best  means of protecting them."41 William butcher saw this developing new regime of pathetic aviculture as being the most  potent form of bird protection: Legislation may be of vast benefit in protecting all bird life, yet we firmly believe that the true solution to the problem  will be the education of children of our schools, both public an private. They should be taught in every grade, from  kindergarten to the college, not only the aesthetic but the economical value of birds....when we have educated our  children, laws will be unnecessary 42 The discourse of pathos, the teachings of biological and economical sciences, and the discipline of panoptic  observation all combined in Audubonization into a self managed means of education for humans to come to  their full respect for the avian biopower of bird populations. The emergence of the Audubon Society also came at a time when the theory and practice of ornithology as a science  were being sharply disputed  by their practitioners and audiences. For decades, scientific ornithologists  had been  devoted collectors of individual bird species their eggs, nests, and hides ­ in elaborate taxonomic campaigns that  compared and contrasted beak shapes, plumage patterns, body colorations, egg sizes, and nest forms. Tied to amateur  naturalist practices that filled both curiosity cabinets at home and major museums downtown with dead stuffed birds, a  few ornithologists were among the first scientists to worry about animal extinctions caused by mindless forms of  primitive accumulation and wonder what role their normal scientific procedures might play in contributing to the loss  of   species.   By   the  turn   of   the   19th  century,  many  scientific   ornithologists   and  amateur   naturalists   believed   that  watching bird life, observing the interactions of all bird populations, and surveying bird/habitat connections provided a  new operational method for their science. Audubonization in ornithological science let these amateur birdwatchers and  government wildlife officials bring birds to another juncture where their closely watched populations  became "a  datum," serving "as a field of intervention and as an objective of governmental techniques" that society and the state  now had "to be able to govern effectively in a rational and conscious manner."43

Everybody is ignorant, only on different subjects.

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NATURE PROTECTION = ANTHRO

do the vampir e p. 19 of 59 .

NATURE PROTECTION IS A HUMANISTIC AND ANTHROPOCENTRIC DISCOURSE THAT REDUCES ORGANISMS TO COMMODIFIED PROPERTY, AND IT JUSTIFIES LARGER REGIMES OF BIOPOLITICS
LUKE IN `2K (TIMOTHY, POLITICAL SCIENCE, VIRGINIA POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE AND STATE UNIVERSITY,“BEYOND BIRDS: BIOPOWER AND BIRDWATCHING IN THE WORLD OF AUDUBON,” CAPITALISM, NATURE, SOCIALISM. PROQUEST)
In a society obsessed with private property rights, nature preservationists, as the Audubon Society learned long ago,  must adapt to the rigorous demands of commercial commodification to succeed. The reimagination of birding to cut  its operational ties to primitive accumulation and reestablish itself as a maker of experiences and manager of their  documentation is a perfect case in point. Likewise,  the reduction of bird life to imperiled fugitives from pesticides,  predators, and people has enabled birders to push for the creation of many different types of bird refuges where these  fugitives   might,   along   with   other   imperiled   animals,   live   comparatively   unthreatened   lives   to   perpetuate   their  performance of necessary ecological services. With both strategies, the unmovable moving precept of private property  rights induced creative resistances by the NAS, first, to invent closely related, but still quite innovative, new property  definition and possession rites in the panoptic practices of avian biopower, and, second, to become the wright of new  private property tracts occupied by bird refuges. Bringing "life and its mechanisms into the realm of explicit calculations" through scientific knowledge clearly led to  "transformation of human life" in the 19th and 20th centuries. Yet, these same techniques also could be used in other  revolutions, which soon led to the transformation of many forms of animal and plant life as well. Audubonization  represents these revolutionary shifts for bird life as scientific observation and technical regulation colonized the space  in   Nature  that   birds   occupied,  while   new   generations   of   ornithologists   both   amateur   and   professional   ­   started  "broadening and organizing that space, methods of power and knowledge assumed responsibility for the life processes  and undertook to control and modify them."84 Mainstream environmental organizations, like the National Audubon  Society, simply organize themselves to survive in the mainstream environments of American society, which have been,    in turn, defined by industrial democracy,    suburban consumerism, and scientific realism.   Birding  before  Audubonization  meant   death  to  bird  life.  In  a  sport   modeled  on  big  game  hunting,   amateur  and  professional ornithologists killed, captured, or acquired birds and their eggs, so birders were not unlike butterfly or  beetle collectors. The pressures of human predation, however, came to be seen as a threat to all bird life over the past    hundred   years,   and   birding   has   changed   into   a   type   of  governmentalizing   biopolitics. These   changes   are   not        accidental. Rather they articulate broader transformations in social order and cultural understanding that have meshed  well   with   America's   emergent   consumer   capitalism   and   national   democracy.   These   values,   however,  are   not  biocentric. On the contrary, the NAS's views about avian biopower are quite managerial and manipulative.          The "exciting   world   of   Audubon"   ultimately   is   centered   upon   human   needs   and   interests,   which   require   highly  performative avian biopower in humans' food chains, rather than a selfless concern for Nature as such, in order to  survive and succeed.

Everybody is ignorant, only on different subjects.

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LINK: BIODIVERSITY (= COMMODIFICATION)

do the vampir e p. 20 of 59 .

THE LANGUAGE OF BIODIVERSITY IS MOBILIZED FOR THE COMMODIFICATION AND CONSUMPTION OF
CAPITALISM

LUKE IN `97 (TIM, DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, VIRGINIA POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE AND STATE UNIVERSITY, “THE (UN)WISE (AB)USE OF NATURE: ENVIRONMENTALISM AS GLOBALIZED CONSUMERISM?” HTTP://WWW.CDDC.VT.EDU/TIM/TIMS/TIM528.HTM)
Faced by an extinction wave of greater pervasiveness than any confronted during recorded history, the WWF-US mobilizes the assets of biocelebrity to leverage its limited guardianship over the planet's biodiversity, because we may see as much as one quarter of the Earth's biodiversity going extinct in twenty or thirty years. Even so, the WWF fails to realize how closely its defense of the rational, efficient use of precious natural resources as third wave environmentalism may contribute to the extinction of biodiversity. And, the conspicuous consternation of the WWF permits a focused fixation upon biocelebrities to occlude this fact for those who truly care about Nature--as long as it is equated with rhinos, tigers, and elephants. WWF ecotourism remanufactures Nature into consummational reserves, transforming habitat into assets, flora and fauna into operating plant, and indigenous communities into entrepreneurial stakeholders or, even worse, underpaid site managers, for global ecoconsummation. Nature conservation becomes a game, and everyone involved becomes a player for the WWF. In fact, the WWF's worldwide banking powers over Nature's biological riches as interdependent mutual funds collateralizes the ecotourism bargain. As the WWF declares, the deal is dangerous, but potentially very rewarding, inasmuch as "for many rural communities and local and national governments, the booming travel industry is a rich resource for cash-starved economies and an important development tool that can foster conservation by giving communities an economic stake in the nonconsumptive use of their natural resources."102 The WWF-US believes pushing economies beyond primary and secondary sectors of production into tertiary "nonconsumptive uses of natural resources" in the leisure and recreation business will provide jobs that offer "people financial incentives to protect, rather than exploit or destroy, natural resources."103 From the WWF's global perspective of providing local regulation via global conservation, these planned means of consummational appropriation are the "wise use" of Nature, because "these jobs are often better and last longer than occupations like logging and mining because they focus on the preservation and wise use of natural resources, not their extraction."104 From a WWF's regulationist perspective, these jobs are usually worse and longer suffering, because they pay much less than logging or mining, and lock local economies into low-yield, low-value adding, low-status service sector activities. Nonetheless, the ecotouristic strategy does reveal how one dimension in the WWF's vision of nature's "wise use" works. An (un)wise (mis)use of extractive industries promoting the hyperconsumptive use of natural resources cannot be taken seriously as "wise use." Instead, the protection of ecosystems in Nature preserves, which host lowimpact sustainable cultivation of flora and fauna in traditional economies or high-traffic flows of conscientious ecotourists, becomes the sine qua non of "wise use" for WWF wildlife fund managers worldwide. As coequals in the circle of life coevolving in the webs of biodiversity, human beings nobly become another animal being responsible for other animal beings. Thus, the World Wildlife Fund, becomes the key trustee of an international family of mutual funds for creating and operating these little wildlife worlds all over the planet. Its consummational agenda for a transnational ecocolonialism pays out as a post-consumptive environmental reservation system where the Earth's last remaining wilderness and wildlife become the tamelife habitats and inhabitants of exotic biodiversity. This is pathetic, but it is where whatever was once "wild nature" is now left. The wise use of Nature boils down to containing only a few of the most egregious instances of the unwise abuse of select charismatic megafauna by detaining a few survivors in little wildlife worlds all over the planet. And, in the current political environment, which increasingly favors legislative moves to rollback any serious Nature preservation initiative, even this ecocolonialist work of the WWF now can only be applauded. The WWF is caught within the same global capitalistic economy that promotes pollution, poaching, and profit, but its consummational good deeds advance the reproduction of global capitalism at all other unpreserved sites, shifting the role of the WWF from that of anti-consumptive resistance on a local level to one of pro-consummational rationalization on a global scale.

Everybody is ignorant, only on different subjects.

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LINK: WEATHER PREDICTION (1 OF 2)

do the vampir e p. 21 of 59 .

WEATHER AND CLIMATE PREDICTION IS A DISCOURSE THAT ATTEMPTS TO CONTROL AND ORDER NATURE BY LOCATING IT AS AN OBJECT TO BE EXAMINED, UNDERSTOOD AND FEARED STURKEN IN `01 (MARITA, USC ANNENBERG SCHOOL OF COMMUNICATIONS, “DESIRING THE WEATHER: EL NINO, THE MEDIA, AND CALIFORNIA IDENTITY,” PUBLIC CULTURE - VOLUME 13, NUMBER 2, MUSE)
Controlling the Weather: The Rise of Weather Media Throughout history, the relationship of humans to the weather has been dictated by narratives of control. Weather has long been understood as the primary symptom of nature, the way that nature speaks to its occupants. Nature has been defined historically in both religious and gendered terms, with centuries' worth of analogies of nature as female and science/technology as male. 2 Natural disasters have been understood as the result of man's fall from nature, and hence a form of punishment, as well as the work of an unforthcoming and vengeful female nature. One of the primary narratives governing the weather is that of revenge. Originally a Christian narrative about the weather as a punishment for sins, this story has evolved in contemporary environmental politics into the weather as nature's anger at humans for all the ills they have perpetrated upon it. 3 The idea of nature's revenge thus provides a contemporary secular theme for the weather: nature's "fury" is aimed at the negligence and indifference of humankind toward the environmental consequences of its actions. Its current manifestation is the compelling argument that the weather upheaval of the late twentieth century is the result of global warming caused by pollution. Control of the weather has often been understood in terms of replicating its actions. Much of the scientific understanding of weather has come from experiments of simulated weather, which range from, for instance, Francis Bacon's sixteenth-century attempts to artificially create snow, rain, and hail under experimental methods to contemporary computer simulations. 4 However, narratives of the weather ascribe to it particular powers of spectacle and viewership precisely [End Page 163] because it is understood as uncontrollable. A fascination with chaos theory's "butterfly effect"--the idea that a butterfly flapping its wings over China can affect the development of winter storms over the Atlantic Ocean a few days later--indicates the thrill of weather as an unpredictable force. The fantasy of controlling the weather by actually changing it has never been realized, and it is precisely this uncontrollability that situates the weather as a site of displaced desire. Controlling the weather also takes the form of measuring its activity, defining its source, and naming it. Within nationalist discourses, weather is most often defined as coming from elsewhere. In the western United States, weather is understood to come from the Pacific and Asia, and in the Midwestern and eastern states, it is seen to arrive from an undifferentiated territory above the border (otherwise known as Canada). The naming of weather phenomena (whether for climate variations, such as El Niño and La Niña, or for hurricanes and typhoons) and the creation of logos (Storm Track 97, El Niño Watch, and so on) serves to domesticate and familiarize weather. In the case of El Niño, the name gives this periodic event of warming Pacific waters a dynamic personality, one it cannot maintain when it is defined by science with its other name, ENSO: El Niño-Southern Oscillation. 5 The name El Niño comes from nineteenth-century Peruvian fishermen, who noticed that fish became scarce as waters warmed off the coast in December. Because of this occurrence at Christmastime, the fishermen termed this phenomenon "El Niño," which is Spanish for the Christ child (and more generally for a male child). The warm ocean conditions are not only associated with this effect on fishing but also with more general effects on weather conditions, often causing rain in dry areas and drought in normally wet climates. In most years, El Niño's impact is limited to the western South American coast, but larger El Niño systems move north and cause changes in weather systems worldwide--among other things, bringing winter storms and cold temperatures to Southern California. La Niña refers to El Niño's reverse, with waters cooling off the Pacific coast and producing equally unpredictable changes in weather. A La Niña followed the 1997-98 El Niño into 2000 and was referred to as El Niño's "ornery" little sister. 6 [End Page 164]

Everybody is ignorant, only on different subjects.

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LINK: WEATHER PREDICTION (2 OF 2)

do the vampir e p. 22 of 59 .

This Spanish nomenclature allows El Niño to be defined as a foreign entity that is visited upon the United States. Just as the "Asian" or the "Hong Kong" flu (or the West Nile virus) reinforce the sense of siege among Americans toward diseases that come from elsewhere (replicated in media portrayals of the 1990s Asian economic crisis as the "Asian contagion"), the 1997-98 El Niño was read in the popular media in ways that allowed it to remain foreign in origin. In California, the fear of an approaching El Niño, which is understood to arrive from South America and Mexico, has inevitable associations with xenophobic concerns about immigration. Hence, the Spanish name, which provided much fodder for newspaper headline writers and cartoonists, was also a metaphor for the fear of the constant flow of illegal immigrants into Southern California and fears about the impact of those immigrants on the economy and social services. Defined as coming from elsewhere, yet with California as its ultimate goal, the weather story of El Niño began with an extraordinary set of predictions about both the past and the future. El Niño was given credit in retrospect for having contributed to the Black Death of the 1340s and the French Revolution of 1789. In addition, fall 1997 predictions stated that it could potentially cause the following: the starvation of 1 million people in Indonesia; a hundred-year flood in Los Angeles; a drought that could kill as many as 25 million Africans; a huge flood in Somalia, the survivors of which would be threatened by poisonous snakes, crocodiles, and hippos; the migration of record numbers of rats into Los Angeles homes; and plagues, locusts, and other disasters that will produce future global unrest. 7 An increasingly complex media environment in which the weather is a profitable global, national, and local story fueled these predictions. The emergence of weather media in the late twentieth century provides a shift in the concept of weather control. The science of meteorology, which focuses on weather prediction, is a contemporary version of centuries of Western science that attempted to, in Bacon's words, "penetrate" nature in order to unveil "her" secrets. 8 Yet, the proliferation of weather media is based not so much on the idea of controlling weather through prediction as on creating the experience of control through monitoring the weather--via live broadcasts, satellite images, and endless readouts of scientific data about what the weather is doing. [End Page 165] The rise of weather media is predicated on the weather being part of "hard" news. As long as the weather was "soft" news, it was of minimal interest. Until quite recently, the softness of the weather report was provided for the most part by "weather girls" who gave the local forecast and told a joke or two. David Letterman still gets joke mileage out of the fact that he began his career doing the weather for local news in Indiana. The weatherperson was also the source of comedy because even the technology came at their expense as they pretended that they were actually pointing at a weather map rather than a blue screen, often missing the crucial spot. A stereotype of the female news anchor is the former weather girl who worked her way up the network ladder, a story that is told in such films as To Die For (Gus Van Sant, 1995) and Up Close and Personal (Jon Avnet, 1996). The expansion of cable and the advent of satellite technology in the 1980s and the increasingly high-tech aspects of meteorology have transformed the weather from a local into a global story and have made it a central part of hard news. 9 The proliferation of multiple cable channels, set up for narrowcasting to targeted audiences, has produced not only several twenty-four-hour news channels in which weather is a regular story, but also, in 1982, the Weather Channel, devoted to the weather twenty-four hours a day. Satellite technology has allowed for both an increasingly sophisticated tracking of weather systems and a broader dissemination of the weather story, with the capacity to show live footage of weather around the world. The Weather Channel and national and local news stations have all invested in complex and expensive systems of weather radar imaging systems, such as Doppler radar. These high-tech gadgets offer new forms of visualizing weather in ways that allow it to appear technologically contained. They include a range of three-dimensional imaging techniques, multicolored radar imaging of precipitation, and complex mapping systems that can identify the weather on a particular street corner. It is crucial to these devices that the images they generate are more interesting when there is dramatic weather. In other words, such a device can seem like a poor investment in a place such as Southern California where the sun shines relentlessly for nine months a year. I have seen Los Angeles television meteorologists on the air regularly scan up to Montana on their mapping systems in order to show rainfall, which is the most visually arresting effect that can be imaged on their three-dimensional systems. In this new [End Page 166] media environment, the weatherperson is at one with the technology rather than at its mercy.

Everybody is ignorant, only on different subjects.

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LINK: WEATHER PREDICTION = CITIZENSHIP (BIOPOWER)
BE EASILY MOBILIZED IN THE NAME OF A CIVIC INITIATIVE

do the vampir e p. 23 of 59 .

GLOBAL WEATHER NARRATIVES SEEK TO CONNECT THE WORLD INTO A SINGLE CITIZEN POPULACE THAT CAN STURKEN IN `01 (MARITA, USC ANNENBERG SCHOOL OF COMMUNICATIONS, “DESIRING THE WEATHER: EL NINO, THE MEDIA, AND CALIFORNIA IDENTITY,” PUBLIC CULTURE - VOLUME 13, NUMBER 2, MUSE)
Weather is also one of the means through which people situate themselves in the world, not only as local citizens but as national and global citizens. In cold weather climates, such as the Midwest, for instance, the capacity to survive long cold winters is an important aspect of local pride, as is the sunshine of the Southwest and California. Today, satellite technology is a central aspect not only of how the weather is visualized but also of how viewers locate themselves regionally, nationally, and globally. A satellite image situates the viewer from a point of view in space. In that most local news weather maps define weather within a hundred-mile radius, this emphasizes a regional situation for viewers. But for many viewers of cable channels such as the Weather Channel, this emphasizes a positioning within the nation and the globe. This is one of the consequences of the fact that, as Jody Berland puts it, we now view the skies looking down, rather than up. 18 Indeed, it is remarkable on the Weather Channel how rarely one sees weather at ground level.
Satellite images not only situate us geographically, they also offer both a broader narrative of global unity and planetary connection and a full range of aesthetic pleasures. 19 Like photographs of space, satellite photographs demonstrate a pleasure in large-scale mapping and fulfill the modernist [End Page 171] promise of the photographic camera to see beyond the human eye. As Berland writes, "For satellite views of the earth's surface show us not only the weather (if you are trained to read them) but also the following: this is one planet, one life, one world, one dream. This is the view of the globe from the eye of god. . . . This is the gorgeous, metaphysical triumph of the technological sublime, displaying itself in perfect harmony with the arcane laws of nature." 20 The technological achievement of the satellite image is its capacity to establish a singular perspective from space at which the weather consumers are invited to place themselves as omniscient viewers.

The construction of the weather citizen is also specifically about the activity of weather watching as one of civic duty. Here, weather media taps into a long tradition of weather volunteerism. Over the last century, the National Weather Service has deployed thousands of volunteers to measure their local weather in its Cooperative Weather Observer Program. This activity of recording data was envisioned from the onset as a patriotic activity, inspired by the writings of Thomas Jefferson, who had imagined a "republic of yeoman farmers, all gathering and sharing agricultural data about storms and the dates of the first and last frosts, all for the good of the country." 21 While many of the weather stations are now automated, there remain 11,000 volunteers today. Weather observation activity is also incorporated into local news shows in which viewers often call in from around the region to report on events in weather emergencies--an activity that is presented in the weather newscast as an act of citizenship, particularly when the volunteers are young.

(CONTINUED 3 PARAGRAPHS LATER)
It is the very establishment of meaning, some meaning, that matters. In creating an overreaching narrative for the weather, El Niño provided an explanation for that thing which is perceived to be the most uncontrollable, the most arbitrary, and the most chaotic. It established a continuum of events across the world, from the drought and forest fires in Indonesia to ice storms in Canada, from West Coast storms and mud slides to fires in Mexico and the tornadoes and hurricanes in Florida. The message was more than a simple one of global unity--nature has a coherent story and we are all connected by weather/nature--it was a story that made sense of the irrational aspects of tragic events, the violence of difference, and the arbitrariness of death. Hence, viewing El Niño through the media's lens became a form of witnessing. This was weather with a purpose, and, as such, an indicator of a larger purpose in life. As witnesses to El Niño, viewers were not only able to exercise their voyeuristic tendencies in seeing tragedy and disaster wreaked on others, they also were allowed to feel like witnesses to history, witnesses to the end of the twentieth century, and, finally, witnesses to some moment of significance. The weather is the site of a production of knowledge that functions as a means to erase political agency and to substitute the activity of witnessing in its place. Watching it becomes the central experience; indeed it subsumes all other experiences. The weather viewer feels connected to the world of weather twenty-four hours a day, with the Weather Channel as a place where one is safe and protected by technology. The weather citizen is interpellated within a set of narratives that range from the duties of consumerism to the vagaries of fate. The weather, we are told, is uncontrollable, dramatic, and exciting, yet science has given us the capacity to predict it. The government and the media have it under control. Prediction, it is stated, will save us. Prediction, a form of knowledge that is short-lived and of limited capacity, is seen as a shield against the future. If only, we are asked to think, we could be prepared.

Everybody is ignorant, only on different subjects.

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**CLIMATE LINK**

do the vampir e p. 24 of 59 .

THE AFFIRMATIVE’S ASSUMPTION OF A STABLE CLIMATE THAT FEARS ABNORMAL AND PERVERSE WEATHER PATTERNS IS A MANIFESTATION OF THEIR DESIRE TO NORMALIZE AND STABILIZE NATURE. IT IS A VIOLENT IMPOSITION OF MODELS OVER LIVING BEINGS. DALBY IN 2002 [SIMON, GEOGRAPHY AND ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES, CARLETON COLLEGE, PG. 69-70]
'ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY Much of the focus in the environmental security discussion has been on projecting current trends into the future to anticipate likely disasters and instabilities that hopefully can be avoided by adopting appropriate policies in advance or, in Kaplan's case, by being prepared for the coming chaos. This has been usefully challenged by Thomas HomerDixon's insistence that environmental disruptions are already, in part, causing political conflict. But the questions raised by investigations of environmental history have yet to be comprehensively incorporated into the discussions of either the larger questions of environment and security or the more focused scholarly investigation of the environmental degradation leading to political conflict hypothesis. They also need to be linked to discussions of security because environmental history suggests that assumptions of normal weather patterns or stable and predictable climates are not an adequate premise for discussing matters of environmental change. Change within fairly wide parameters is the long-term norm in ecological phenomena, so arguments that try to normalize particular patterns may operate to obscure natural fluctuations. Mike Davis's harsh critique of the failures of environmental planning in the Los Angeles area and the politics of environmental threats there makes the implications of this especially clear. He suggests that cultural assumptions of a relatively stable, wet, and benign environment that English and New England settlers brought with them to Southern California might be termed the "humid fallacy." "Imaginary 'norms' and 'averages' are constantly invoked, while the weather is ceaselessly berated for its perversity" in a region that has a climate that is highly variable and where annual rainfall is only within 25 percent of the "average" 17 percent of the time." Not surprisingly, as he notes, the rich homeowners who build luxury houses in the historic routes of chaparral fires through the Malibu Canyon, and elsewhere in the mountains outside Los Angeles, react with outrage and demand government disaster relief when the eventual fires sweep through their subdivisions destroying their dream houses and, if they don't drive away in time, their luxury sport utility vehicles. That there will be such fires, despite the mose intense efforts at fire prevention, is inevitable in the circumstances, although not predictable in advance for any particular year. Long-term variability only assures the residents that it will burn, eventually, in the Santa Monicas.
ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY,

Everybody is ignorant, only on different subjects.

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**AT: “NATURE RECOVERS/REGENRATES”**

do the vampir e p. 25 of 59 .

ASSUMPTIONS THAT NATURE WILL RETURN TO A HEALTHY, PRE-TECHNOLOGICAL STATE ARE NOT ONLY FALSE BUT ALSO SELF-DEFEATING
DALBY IN 2002 [SIMON, GEOGRAPHY AND ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES, CARLETON COLLEGE, PG. 130-131]
ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY,

Recent research in ecology has suggested that at least Commoner's third law, "nature knows best," is flawed in terms of how its role in conservation is commonly understood. Insofar as it suggests that disrupted ecosystems will eventually naturally recover to a situation where a climax state reasserts itself, the logic of this argument is inadequate, both because assumptions of the necessary ubiquity of climax successions are false and because disruptions by human action are so widespread as to often call into question the possibilities of "leaving nature alone" to recover to a natural state.24 Beyond this Daniel Botkin in particular has argued that ecology needs further rethinking because of its failure to depart from overly mechanistic assumptions, mathematical models of oversimplified ecosystem models, and nonscientific premises of stable and equilibrium natural states as the benchmark for evaluating environmental change and resource management options. When ecosystems are understood as more variable and less predictable systems that are open rather than closed, and hence vulnerable to interactions on larger scales, it suggests that harmonious assumptions and equilibrium states are not appropriate premises for resources management. The lack of predictability and the multiplicity of operant factors suggest the deed for incorporating much complexity in dealing with natural fecundity. Organismic metaphors and discussions on ecosystem health based on equilibrium assumptions are not adequate to consider change and long-term disruptions.25 Most crucially, Botkin points to the necessity of deciding what kind of nature "we" want, what is to be conserved, and what managed to produce what effect. Clearly we need far more thoughtful, long-term research on ecological systems because the simplistic models of stable ecosystems are not adequate for understanding or useful tools for ecosystem conservation and sustainable management. The drastic disruptions of ecologies by the European colonial processes of the last millennium also suggest that simply leaving nature alone to recover is impossible given the scale of the disruptions that have already occurred.26 Further, this point emphasizes that in the case of center-periphery conflicts the assumptions that tribal peoples live in relatively untouched environments that have to be protected from external depredations does not adequately explain the conditions of many peoples struggling over environmental issues. In the case of the resistance in the Narmada valley, Amita Baviskar warns of the dangers of intellectuals romanticizing traditional ways of life in precisely this way, not only because it misrepresents the struggles of local peoples, but because it may also lead to political decisions that are inappropriate for either the peoples or their modes of resistance.27 These criticisms of traditional ecological research, especially of many resource and conservation management practices, on the basis of problems within their widely accepted ontological premises, make the simple appropriation of ecological thinking and its applicability to reformulating state-based notions of security a dubious procedure that is less likely to be helpful in rethinking security than it seems at first glance. The analogies, however, suggest some facets of concern to international security, not least long-term changes and unpredictable contingencies. The collapse of states is not unheard of, and the disappearance of the conditions for the reestablishment of state rule is a concern of scholars who have discerned a phenomenon of failed states in the contemporary world. Suggestions that new political arrangements unlike the traditional state may be necessary are also under discussion, but these analogies are stretching the point somewhat.

Everybody is ignorant, only on different subjects.

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AT: RETURN TO NATURE (VAMPIRES NOW)
WE CAN’T RETURN TO INNOCENT NATURE: WE ARE ALL ALWAYS ALREADY VAMPIRES

do the vampir e p. 26 of 59 .

BARTSCH IN `01 (INGRID, WOMEN'S STUDIES AND ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE & POLICY AT UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA, CAROLYN DIPALMA, WOMEN'S STUDIES AND POLITICAL SCIENCE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA, AND LAURA SELLS, SPEECH COMMUNICATION AT LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY, "WITNESSING THE POSTMODERN JEREMIAD: (MIS)UNDERSTANDING DONNA HARAWAY'S METHOD OF INQUIRY," CONFIGURATIONS 9.1 (2001) 127164, MUSE)
The uncomfortable collapse of "real nature" with "constructed nature" illustrated in cyborg wetlands restates the dilemma of the literal and figurative, of the essentialist and antiessentialist positions that Haraway's vampire attempts to rearticulate. Put differently, this critique of wetland legislation and mitigation leads to the difficult spot of either advocating a romanticized nature that compels feminists to "return to Eden" and "speak for the fishes," or valorizing for the sake of textual play the imploded, hyperreal nature commodified in late capitalism's theme parks--from Disney to Yosemite. As with the categories of identity read either essentially or antiessentially, literally or figuratively, so too are the categories of nature constrained by the political pull of these two mutually constitutive and politically (and ironically) necessary positions. Just as the relative categories of identity rely on necessary fictions that allow the survival of families, kinships, and communities, so too does nature depend on similar fictions for its very existence in a world prone to violence against nature. Neither essentialism nor antiessentialism is adequate to answer the call of Haraway's postmodern jeremiad. Advocating a "real" untouched nature over a mitigated wetland that cannot be self-sustaining is an essentialist position that reads nature literally. This position is impossible because, in a material sense, the scope of human and technological intervention into the natural world precludes the existence of untouched nature. Even if we could return to such a nature, language itself presumes the very category of nature, a presumption in which nature is always already produced by human intervention. In either case, there is no such thing as an innocent nature. [End Page 157]

Everybody is ignorant, only on different subjects.

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LINK: INSECURITY

do the vampir e p. 27 of 59 .

DISCOURSES OF WAR CONSTRUCT THE SECURITY ANALYST AS A DOCTOR DIAGNOSING IMPURITIES AND THREATS TO THE NATIONAL BODY, IMPLYING A RELATIONSHIP OF POWER THAT
JUSTIFES MORE VIOLENCE

CAMPBELL IN `92 (DAVID, POLITICS AT NEWCASTLE, WRITING SECURITY, P. 95-96)
The effects of what we might call socio-medical discourse infiltrate the realms of both clinical medicine and political practice. Haraway and others have noted the salience of military metaphors within immunology.54 Equally, the panoply of military metaphors that permeates the medical discourse on cancer - references to attack and counterattack, invasion and defense, cells that colonize, patients that are bombarded, or bodies that are subverted - has manifest consequences for understanding and treating that disease.55 By constituting the disease as the 'barbarian within,' and by producing a discourse which is taken in some contexts to impute guilt, prescribe punishments, and incite violence, the figurative nature of medical discourse has consequences for clinical practice.56 This should not come as much of a surprise: there is no reason why medical discourse should be immune (so to speak) from the tropical nature of language. Indeed, given <96> the encounters with the unknown in the discoveries of scientific and medical research - encounters that can only be made available for understanding through metaphor - scientific discourse may be particularly prone to tropical discourse.57 But there is an important implication to be drawn from the symmetry of medical and military discourses. As Canguilhem's argument made clear, the regulative ideal of normal/ pathological was not derived from or grounded in the knowledge of medicine; on the contrary, the scientific caste of this regulative ideal is a consequence of its social efficacy. Equally, the symmetry of medical and military discourse is not a situation brought about by the inherent truth value of one or other of these domains. To be sure, our culture regards few arenas as more 'real' than the practice of medicine or the conduct of war, yet neither can escape the tropical character of representation. The authority of each thus stems from a mutual referentiality in which the representations of one authorize the other: the imputed realism of military discourse brings meaning to medical practice just as the assumed facticity of medicine legitimates certain forces in the social and political field. Indeed, it is the overtly tropical nature of medical discourse which enables it to be so effectively marshalled against those who constitute a danger. Consider Ronald Reagan's declaration - in response to the 1985 hijacking of a TWA aircraft in Beirut, when he was considering the option of military retaliation - that 'When terrorism strikes, civilization itself is under attack. No nation is immune ... If we permit it to succeed anywhere it will spread like a cancer, eating away at civilized societies and sowing fear and chaos everywhere.' 58 In such discourse, there are no gray areas, no complexities, no historicized understandings, no doubts about the self, and no qualms about the nature of the response. The performative nature of the bipolarity of normal/pathological in socio-medical discourse means that it does not depend upon either a disease to be tremendously infectious or in actual existence for it to effect exclusions and command responses. For example, leprosy - which is rarely fatal, difficult to transmit, and relatively easy to cure - has been one of the most stigmatized of diseases. 59 Because of the visibility of its degenerative impact on the body, leprosy became a metaphor for social corruption and decay. And when it disappeared from Europe at the end of the Middle Ages it left behind a legacy that remained potent: an interpretative framework suffused with the 'formulas of exclusion' which established 'the values and images attached to the figure of the leper as well as the meaning of his exclusion.' 60 The disease passed on, but its social logic and representational apparatus remained, to be employed later in the confinement of a range of social dangers including 'madness.' Even without a referent for its <97> valuations, this interpretative framework associated with leprosy waited, 'soliciting with strange incantations a new incarnation of disease, another grimace of terror, renewed rites of purification.'61

Everybody is ignorant, only on different subjects.

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LINK: DISEASE

do the vampir e p. 28 of 59 .

DISEASE IS ASSOCIATED WITH EXTERNAL POPULATIONS THAT MUST BE SINGLED OUT AND
ERADICATED

CAMPBELL IN `92 (DAVID, POLITICS AT NEWCASTLE, WRITING SECURITY, P. 95-96)
What has been and remains central to the logic of socio-medical discourse is thus not the biological nature of disease, but a sense that disease is always from somewhere else. As Sontag notes, 'there is a link between imagining disease and imagining foreignness.' Indeed, when syphilis reached epidemic proportions in fifteenthcentury Europe, 'It was the 'French pox' to the English, morbus Germanicus to the Parisians, the Naples sickness to the Florentines, [and] the Chinese disease to the Japanese.' 62 But 'foreignness' does not necessarily coincide with places distant and removed: the foreign can also reside within; something that is evident when (as in the United States) disease is more readily diagnosed in the elderly, the poor, or the working class, even when other groups exhibit many more identifiably biological pathologies.63 In the same manner, we can note how various groups within American and European domestic society have been constituted as marginal through the figurations of socio-medical discourse. Women, blacks, and Jews have at one time or another all been understood as uniquely susceptible to certain disorders. Women were diagnosed as exhibiting a high incidence of hysteria; Jews in general were believed to be prone to psychological disorders; Jewish men were thought to menstruate like women and thus be a source of social 'pollution'; blacks were overwhelmingly considered insane. And for each of these groups, sexuality was medicalized as pathology and indicted as a threat to the integrity of the body politic.64 In sum, two things are particularly striking about these examples of the historical operation of socio-medical discourse. Firstly, it has often been able to function either without any empirical referent from which its valuations are theoretically derived, or it has accomplished its task in direct contradistinction to available empirical sources. The moral characteristics of leprosy lived on after its demise; neither women, nor blacks, nor Jews were any more vulnerable to psychological disorders than any other groups; and Jewish men certainly did not menstruate.65 Secondly, the modes of representation through which these groups are marked as social dangers effectively blend and fuse together various stigmata of difference, such that each figuration of difference functions, not as an image derived from a correspondence relationship, but as an indicator of the various images with which it has some perceived affinity. Or, as Hayden White suggests of metaphor generally, it 'functions as a symbol, rather than as a sign: which is to say that it does not give us either a description or an icon of the thing it represents, but tells us what images to look for in our culturally encoded <98> experience in order to determine how we should feel about the thing represented.'66 In other words, by conflating the stigmata of difference, the tropes and metaphors of socio-medical discourse call to mind certain sensations, dispositions, impressions, and - given the negative valence of such representations - doubts, concerns, anxieties, and suspicions, to be associated with those groups who are the objects of attention. We need only consider contemporary representations of AIDS - in which iconography associated with syphilis, homosexuals, Africans, drug addicts, and inner-city residents is melded into an allencompassing discursive formation so as to inscribe a boundary between the heterosexual, non-IV drug using, white community (i.e. those who are 'normal') and those at risk - to appreciate the continued saliency of these representations.67 Indeed, the boundary-producing effects of the discourse surrounding AIDS recently took a literal turn when the US Immigration and Naturalization Service overruled the Health and Human Services Department and reinstated the presence of HIV as grounds for excluding tourists and immigrants from the United States. With over one million Americans already infected with this virus, such an exclusion 'conveys the message that the danger is outside the US., is a foreigner, a stranger.'68

Everybody is ignorant, only on different subjects.

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LINK: DANGER

do the vampir e p. 29 of 59 .

INVOCATIONS OF DANGER DRAW MORAL BOUNDARIES BETWEEN THE NORMAL AND CIVILIZED VERSUS THE ABNORMAL AND SAVAGE (REPLICATING THE VIOLENCE OF THE 1NC) CAMPBELL IN `92 (DAVID, POLITICS AT NEWCASTLE, WRITING SECURITY, P. 84-85)
The performative constitution of identity: that has been the fundamental theme in this argument. Whether at the level of the body, the individual, the state - or some other articulation - this theme has focused attention upon the boundaryproducing practices that instantiate the identity in whose name they operate. Sometimes these practices will affirm more than they will abjure; at other times they will contain rather than constitute. Foreign policy, being those practices of differentiation implicated in all confrontations between a self and other, embraces both positive and negative valences. In contrast, Foreign Policy, understood as one of the practices which contingently constructs through stylized and regulated performances the identity of the state in whose name it operates, is more obviously dependent upon discourses of fear and danger. The concern of this chapter is with how difference is figured and danger is represented through foreign policy/Foreign Policy. THE MORAL SPACE OF IDENTITY Danger constitutes more than the boundary which demarcates a space; to have a threat requires enforcing a closure upon the community which is threatened. A notion of what 'we' are is intrinsic to an understanding of what 'we' fear. What this highlights is that there is an axiological level which proffers a range of moral valuations that are implicit in any spatialization.! The construction of social space that emerges from practices associated with the paradigm of sovereignty thus exceeds a simple geographical partitioning: it results in a conception of divergent moral spaces. In other words, the social space of inside/outside is both made possible by and helps constitute a moral space of superior/inferior, which can be animated in terms of any number of figurations of higher/lower. For example, in delineating the domain of the rational, ordered polity from the dangerous, anarchic world in which it was situated, Hobbes did more than draw a boundary: he <85> enumerated the character of each realm by arguing that the former was the residence of good, sane, sober, modest, and civilized people, while the^ latter was populated by evil, mad, drunk, arrogant, and savage characters.II Identity is therefore more than something which derives its meaning solely from being positioned in contradistinction to difference; identity is a condition that has depth, is multi-layered, possesses texture, and comprises many dimensions. As such, identity is a condition for which there can be cataloged no single point of origin or myth of genesis; the manifold, diverse, and eclectic ingredients that comprise a settled identity cannot be reduced to any single spatial or temporal source. None of this diminishes the role of difference in the logic of identity. But it does suggest that we might consider all the characteristics or traits or distinctions which are understood as difference as being unequal in their identity-effects. Moreover, this might also suggest that some of the dispositions we combine under the category of 'difference' - especially insofar as that term is often used to refer to entries in a register of marginality, such as race, class, gender, ethnicity etc. - are basic to the construction of the discursive field upon which the dichotomy of identity/difference is itself erected. Whether or not these reflections might possess some veracity in terms of the general problematic of identity would need further consideration. But in terms of the question of state identity, they do allow us to bring to the fore the way in which the paradigm of sovereignty has historically inscribed parameters of the moral content of identity at the same time as it has disciplined ambiguity in terms of the spatial form of inside/outside. Most important in this regard is the gendered figure of 'reasoning man' highlighted by Ashley. As described in chapter three, the figure of 'reasoning man' as origin of language, the maker of history, and the source of meaning - as transcendental, yet implicated in history - is the sovereign presence, the foundational premise, from which we derive the contours of our social and political life. To be sure, this articulation of our horizons is not determinative: the question of the more precise content and nature of identity that emerges from the operations of this modem sovereign is open. Indeed, there are in principle an almost endless range of possible interpretations of 'reasoning man,' and these are dependent upon the articulation of the form of 'reasoning man' in specific historical contexts. 2 But the figure of 'reasoning man' can be said to exhibit tendencies that favor the gendered understanding of reason, rationalism, and enlightenment values as the defining orientations of our existence.

Everybody is ignorant, only on different subjects.

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LINK: DANGER

do the vampir e p. 30 of 59 .

SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS OF DANGER TO THE SOCIAL BODY CREATE THE ASSUMPTION OF A CLEAN, BIOLOGICAL BODY TO BE PROTECTED FROM DISEASE
CAMPBELL IN `92 (DAVID, POLITICS AT NEWCASTLE, WRITING SECURITY, P. 91-92)
Furthermore, the representation of the social as a body involves gendered discourses of power, and the transformations surrounding the concept of corpus mysticum are replete with references to the dominance of the 'male' over the 'female.' Indeed, the body of the body politic is taken to have a 'female' identity to which the head (the 'male' ruler) is married. As one jurist (Cynus of Pistoia) wrote in the fourteenth century: 'the comparison between the corporeal matrimony and the intellectual one is good: for just as the husband is called the defender of his wife ... so is the emperor the defender of that respublica^ In a similar vein, Lucas de Penna wrote that 'The man is the head of the wife, and the wife the body of the man . . . After the same fashion, the Prince is the head of the realm, and the realm the body of the Prince.'20 In medieval England, the marriage metaphor was reproduced when James I declared to parliament (in 1609) that 'What God hath conjoined then, let no man separate. I am the husband, and all the whole island is my lawful wife; I am the head, and it is my body; I am the shepherd, and it is my flock.'21 Equally, Machiavelli figured the body politic as 'female.'22 And in the contemporary period, such patriarchal understandings can be observed when violence by one state against another (such as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990) is represented as 'rape.' Persistent though it has been, the representation of the social as a body has not been devoid of changes. Catherine Gallagher's discussion of the impact of Thomas Malthus' theorization of the body's place in social discourse - whereby it is healthy and fecund bodies, rather than sick and decaying bodies, which are the greatest threat to the survival of the polity -points to an important development which had considerable import for Victorian social thought.23 Equally, Donna Haraway's elaboration of the shift from the hierarchical and organic body of earlier medical discourses, to the understanding of the body within recent biomedical discourses as 'a coded text, organized as an engineered communications system, ordered by a fluid and dispersed commandcontrol-intelligence network [the immune system],'24 contends that we could be currently located in the midst of a transformation which might have an impact upon our political theorizations. These developments have meant that what now counts as a unit or actor is highly problematic: while notions of 'organism' and 'individual' have not <91> disappeared, from the vantage point of the biologist they have been fully 'denaturalized' and exist only as 'ontologically contingent constructs.'25 In Haraway's terms, the contingent ontology of being means that 'Life is a window of vulnerability,' such that identity and (more particularly) individuality are 'a strategic defense problem' which seeks to effect the containment of contingency.26 Haraway's deployment of military metaphors highlights the symbiotic relationship between biomedical discourses and strategic discourses: each uses concepts derived from the other to present its argument. 27 Most importantly, such figurations suggest that whatever transformations there have been in the representation of the social as a body, one of its central functions has been to permit and commission the representation of danger to the social body in terms associated with the representation of danger to the physiological body. In some circumstances, the representation of danger to the body will be in terms that function as codes for gender and sexuality, such as anarchy, insanity, passion, or wildness. At other times, 'Because the body is the most potent metaphor of society, it [will] not [be] surprising that disease is the most salient metaphor of structural crisis. All disease is disorder- metaphorically, literally, socially and politically.'28

Everybody is ignorant, only on different subjects.

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**LINK: SECURITY **

do the vampir e p. 31 of 59 .

FOREIGN POLICY THREATS CREATE DANGER IN ORDER TO REPRODUCE THE MYTH OF A CLEAN AND PURE BODY, SIMULTANEOUSLY JUSTIFYING SOVEREIGN ECONOMIES OF VIOLENCE AND WAR
CAMPBELL IN `92 (DAVID, POLITICS AT NEWCASTLE, WRITING SECURITY, P. 92-93)
REPRESENTING DANGER Danger, argues Mary Douglas, is always present at the border. Danger might involve pressure on the external boundaries; it might involve the violation of internal boundaries; it might be located in the margins of the boundary; or danger might arise with contradictions from within.29 Were there no borders, there would be no danger - but such a condition is at odds with the logic of identity, for the condition of possibility for experience entails (at least to some extent) the disciplining of ambiguity, the containment of contingency, and the delineation of borders. In other words, given that difference is a requisite for identity, danger is inherent to that relationship: 'Where there is no differentiation there is no defilement.'30 As such, danger is not an external condition that can be either tempered or transcended; danger is a part of all our relationships with the world. And as Jean Delumeau concluded with respect to fear, danger can be experienced positively as well as negatively: it can be a creative force, 'a call to being,' that provides access to the world. 31 The issue, then, is how do we orient ourselves to danger, particularly at an historical juncture in which many novel dangers seem to abound? Can we do more than simply extend the old register of security to cover the new domains? What modes of being and forms of life could we or should we adopt? Do we have an alternative to <92> the continued reproduction of sovereign communities in an economy of violence? However one might begin to fathom the many issues located within those challenges, our current situation leaves us with one certainty: because we cannot escape the logic of differentiation we are often tempted by the logic of defilement. To say as much, however, it not to argue that we are imprisoned within a particular and permanent system of representations. To be sure, danger is more often than not represented as disease, dirt, or pollution. As one medical text argues: 'Disease is shock and danger for existence.' 32 Or as Karl Jaspers maintains: 'Disease is a general concept of non-value which includes all possible negative values.'33 But such concerns have less to do with the intrinsic qualities of those conditions than the modernist requirements of order and stability: 'Dirt offends against order. Eliminating it is not a negative moment, but a positive effort to organize the environment.'34 One might suggest that it is the extent to which we want to organize the environment - the extent to which we want to purify our domain - that determines how likely it is that we represent danger in terms of dirt or disease. Tightly defined order and strictly enforced stability, undergirded by notions of purity, are not a priori conditions of existence; some order and some stability might be required for existence as we know it (i.e., in some form of extensive political community), but it is the degree of tightness, the measure of strictness, and the extent of the desire for purity which constitutes danger as dirt or disease. But the temptation of the logic of defilement as a means of orienting ourselves to danger has more often than not been overpowering, largely because it is founded upon a particular conceptualization of 'the body'; in its use since at least the eighteenth century, this conceptualization demands purity as a condition of health and thus makes the temptation to defilement a 'natural' characteristic. This has endowed us with a mode of representation in which health and cleanliness serves the logic of stability, and disorder is rendered as disease and dirt. In the eighteenth century - when state forms were becoming the most prevalent articulations of extensive political community - these modes of representation began to take a new turn which intensified the capacity of representations of disease to act as discourses of danger to the social.

Everybody is ignorant, only on different subjects.

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IMPACT: **FOUCAULT `SEVENTY-EIGHT**
BIOPOWER LEADS TO WARS, HOLOCAUSTS AND NUCLEAR OMNICIDE

do the vampir e p. 32 of 59 .

FOUCAULT, CHAIR OF HISTORY OF SYSTEMS OF THOUGHT AT THE COLLEGE OF FRANCE, 1978 [MICHEL, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, VOLUME 1: AN INTRODUCTION, P. 136-137]
Since the classical age the West has undergone a very profound transformation of these mechanisms of power. "Deduction" has tended to be no longer the major form of power but merely one element among others, working to incite, reinforce, control, monitor, optimize, and organize the forces under it: a power bent on generating forces, making them grow, and on ordering them, rather than one dedicated to impeding them; making them submit, or destroying them. There has been a parallel shift in the right of death, or at least tendency to align its with the exigencies of a life-administering power and to define itself accordingly. This death that was based on the right of the sovereign is now manifested as simply the reverse of the right of the social body to ensure, maintain, or develop its life. Yet wars were never as bloody as they have been since the nineteenth century, and all things being equal, never before did regimes visit such holocausts on their own populations. But this formidable power of death—and this is perhaps what accounts for part of its force and the cynicism with which it has so greatly expanded its limits—now presents itself as the counterpart of a power that exert a positive influence on life, that endeavors to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations. Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purposes of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity; massacres have become vital. It is as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars, causing so many men to be killed. And through a turn that closes the circle, as the technology of wars has caused them to tend increasingly toward all-out destruction, the decision that initiates them and the one that terminates them are in fact increasingly informed by the naked question of survival. The atomic situation is now at the end point of this process: the power to expose a whole population to death is the underside of the power to guarantee an individual's continued existence. The principle underlying the tactics of battle—that one has to be capable of killing in order to go on living—has become the principle that defines the strategy of states. But the existence in question is no longer the juridical existence of sovereignty; at stake is the biological existence of a population. If genocide is indeed the dream of modern powers, this is not because of a recent return of the ancient right to kill; it is because war is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of the population.

Everybody is ignorant, only on different subjects.

West p oint ’o 6

IMPACT: BIOPOWER = ATOMIC DEATH

do the vampir e p. 33 of 59 .

[THE NORMALIZATION OF BODIES THROUGH] BIOPOWER JUSTIFIES THE PARADOXICAL ABILITY TO KILL LIFE ITSELF IN THE NAME OF PROTECTING IT. FOUCAULT IN `76 (MICHEL, BRILLIANT, SOCIETY MUST BE DEFENDED, P. 252-254)
In more general terms still, we can say that there is one element that will circulate between the disciplinary and the regulatory, which will also be applied to body and population alike, which will make it possible to control both the disciplinary order of the body and the aleatory events that occur in the biological multiplicity. The element <253> that circulates between the two is the norm. The norm is something that can be applied to both a body one wishes to discipline and a population one wishes to regularize. The normalizing society is therefore not, under these conditions, a sort of generalized disciplinary society whose disciplinary institutions have swarmed and finally taken over everything-that, I think, is no more than a first and inadequate interpretation of a normalizing society. The normalizing society is a society in which the norm of discipline and the norm of regulation intersect along an orthogonal articulation. To say that power took possession of life in the nineteenth century, or to say that power at least takes life under its care in the nineteenth century, is to say that it has, thanks to the play of technologies of discipline on the one hand and technologies of regulation on the other, succeeded in covering the whole surface that lies between the organic and the biological, between body and population. We are, then, in a power that has taken control of both the body and life or that has, if you like, taken control of life in general-with the body as one pole and the population as the other. We can therefore immediately identify the paradoxes that appear at the points where the exercise of this biopower reaches its limits. The paradoxes become apparent if we look, on the one hand, at atomic power, which is not simply the power to kill, in accordance with the rights that are granted to any sovereign, millions and hundreds of millions of people (after all, that is traditional). The workings of contemporary political power are such that atomic power represents a paradox that is difficult, if not impossible, to get around. The power to manufacture and use the atom bomb represents the deployment of a sovereign power that kills, but it is also the power to kill life itself. So the power that is being exercised in this atomic power is exercised in such a way that it is capable of suppressing life itself. And, therefore, to suppress itself insofar as it is the power that guarantees life. Either it is sovereign and uses the atom bomb, and therefore cannot be power, biopower, or the power to guarantee life, as it has been ever since the nineteenth century. Or, at the opposite extreme, you no longer have a sovereign right that is in excess of biopower, but a <254> biopower that is in excess of sovereign right. This excess of biopower appears when it becomes technologically and politically possible for man not only to manage life but to make it proliferate, to create living matter, to build the monster, and, ultimately, to build viruses that cannot be controlled and that are universally destructive. This formidable extension of biopower, unlike what I was just saying about atomic power, will put it beyond all human sovereignty.

Everybody is ignorant, only on different subjects.

West p oint ’o 6

IMPACT: **RACISM = PRE-CONDITION FOR VIOLENCE **
RACISM THROUGH BIOPOWER IS THE PRE-CONDITION OF ALL VIOLENCE IN OUR SOCIETY FOUCAULT IN `76 (MICHEL, BRILLIANT, SOCIETY MUST BE DEFENDED, P. 254-256)

do the vampir e p. 34 of 59 .

Given that this power's objective is essentially to make live, how can it let die? How can the power of death, the function of death, be exercised in a political system centered upon biopower? It is, I think, at this point that racism intervenes. I am certainly not saying that racism was invented at this time. It had already been in existence for a very long time. But I think it functioned elsewhere. It is indeed the emergence of this biopower that inscribes it in the mechanisms of the State. It is at this moment that racism is inscribed as the basic mechanism of power, as it is exercised in modern Stares. As a result, the modern State can scarcely function without becoming involved with racism at some point, within certain limits and subject to certain conditions. What in fact is racism? It is primarily a way of introducing a break into the domain of life that is under power's control: the break between what must live and what must die. The appearance within the <255> biological continuum of the human race of races, the distinction among races, the hierarchy of races, the fact that certain races are described as good and that others, in contrast, are described as inferior: all this is a way of fragmenting the field of the biological that power controls. It is a way of separating out the groups that exist within a population. It is, in short, a way of establishing a biologicaltype caesura within a population that appears to be a biological domain. This will allow power to treat that population as a mixture of races, or to be more accurate, to treat the species, to subdivide the species it controls, into the subspecies known, precisely, as races. That is the first function of racism: to fragment, to create caesuras within the biological continuum addressed by biopower. Racism also has a second function. Its role is, if you like, to allow the establishment of a positive relation of this type: "The more you kill, the more deaths you will cause" or "The very fact that you let more die will allow you to live more." I would say that this relation ("If you want to live, you must take lives, you must be able to kill") was not invented by either racism or the modern State. It is the relationship of war: "In order to live, you must destroy your enemies." But racism does make the relationship of war-"If you want to live, the other must die"-function in a way that is completely new and that is quite compatible with the exercise of biopower. On the one hand, racism makes it possible to establish a relationship between my life and the death of the other that is not a military or warlike relationship of confrontation, but a biological-type relationship: "The more inferior species die out, the more abnormal individuals are eliminated, the fewer degenerates there will be in the species as a whole, and the more I-as species rather than individual-can live, the stronger I will be, the more vigorous I will be. I will be able to proliferate." The fact that the other dies does not mean simply that I live in the sense that his death guarantees my safety; the death of the other, the death of the bad race, of the inferior race (or the degenerate, or the abnormal) is something that will make life in general healthier: healthier and purer. This is not, then, a military, warlike, or political relationship, but <256> a biological relationship. And the reason this mechanism can come into play is that the enemies who have to be done away with are not adversaries in the political sense of the term; they are threats, either external or internal, to the population and for the population. In the biopower system, in other words, killing or the imperative to kill is acceptable only if it results not in a victory over political adversaries, but in the elimination of the biological threat to and the improvement of the species or race. There is a direct connection between the two. In a normalizing society, race or racism is the precondition that makes killing acceptable. When you have a normalizing society, you have a power which is, at least superficially, in the first instance, or in the first line a biopower, and racism is the indispensable precondition that allows someone to be killed, that allows others to be killed. Once the State functions in the biopower mode, racism alone can justify the murderous function of the State. So you can understand the importance-I almost said the vital importance-of racism to the exercise of such a power: it is the precondition for exercising the right to kill. If the power of normalization wished to exercise the old sovereign right to kill, it must become racist. And if, conversely, a power of sovereignty, or in other words, a power that has the right of life and death, wishes to work with the instruments, mechanisms, and technology of normalization, it too must become racist. When I say "killing," I obviously do not mean simply murder as such, but also every form of indirect murder: the fact of exposing someone to death, increasing the risk of death for some people, or, quite simply, political death, expulsion, rejection, and so on. Everybody is ignorant, only on different subjects.

West p oint ’o 6

IMPACT: RACISM AND BP = ROOT CAUSE OF WAR
RACISM AND BIOPOWER ARE THE PRE-CONDITION FOR WAR FOUCAULT IN `76 (MICHEL, BRILLIANT, SOCIETY MUST BE DEFENDED, P. 257-258)

do the vampir e p. 35 of 59 .

War. How can one not only wage war on one's adversaries but also expose one's own citizens to war, and let them be killed by the million (and this is precisely what has been going on since the nineteenth century, or since the second half of the nineteenth century), except by activating the theme of racism? From this point onward, war is about two things: it is not simply a matter of destroying a political adversary, but of destroying the enemy race, of destroying that [sort] of biological threat that those people over there represent to our race. In one sense, this is of course no more than a biological extrapolation from the theme of the political enemy. But there is more to it than that. In the nineteenth century-and this is completely new-war will be seen not only as a way of improving one's own race by eliminating the enemy race (in accordance with the themes of natural selection and the struggle for existence), but also as a way of regenerating one's own race. As more and more of our number die, the race to which we belong will become all the purer. At the end of the nineteenth century, we have then a new racism modeled on war. It was, I think, required because a biopower that wished to wage war had to articulate the will to destroy the adversary with the risk that it might kill those whose lives it had, by definition, to protect, manage, and multiply. The same could be said of criminality. Once the mechanism of biocriminal was called upon to make it possible to execute or banish criminals, criminality was conceptualized in racist terms. The same applies to madness, and the same applies to various anomalies. I think that, broadly speaking, racism justifies the death-function in the economy of biopower by appealing to the principle that the death of others makes one biologically stronger insofar as one is a member of a race or a population, insofar as one is an element in a unitary living plurality. You can see that, here, we are far removed from the ordinary racism that takes the traditional form of mutual contempt or hatred between races. We are also far removed from the racism that can be seen as a sort of ideological operation that allows States, or a class, to displace the hostility that is directed toward [them}, or which is tormenting the social body, onto a mythical adversary. I think that this is something much deeper than an old tradition, much deeper than a new ideology, that it is something else. The specificity of modern racism, or what gives it its specificity, is not bound up with mentalities, ideologies, or the lies of power. It is bound up with the technique of power, with the technology of power. It is bound up with this, and that takes us as far away as possible from the race war and the intelligibility of history. We are dealing with a mechanism that allows biopower to work. So racism is bound up with the workings of a State that is obliged to use race, the elimination of races and the purification of the race, to exercise its sovereign power. The juxtaposition of-or the way biopower functions through-the old sovereign power of life and death implies the workings, the introduction and activation, of racism. And it is, I think, here that we find the actual roots of racism. So you can understand how and why, given these conditions, the most murderous States are also, of necessity, the most racist. Here, of <258> course, we have to take the example of Nazism. After all, Nazism was in fact the paroxysmal development of the new power mechanisms that had been established since the eighteenth century. Of course, no State could have more disciplinary power than the Nazi regime. Nor was there any other State in which the biological was so tightly, so insistently, regulated. Disciplinary power and biopower: all this permeated, underpinned, Nazi society (control over the biological, of procreation and of heredity; control over illness and accidents too). No society could be more disciplinary or more concerned with providing insurance than that established, or at least planned, by the Nazis. Controlling the random clement inherent in biological processes was one of the regime's immediate objectives.

Everybody is ignorant, only on different subjects.

West p oint ’o 6

SCIENCE REPS = K

do the vampir e p. 36 of 59 .

LANGUAGE AND REPRESENTATIONS OF SCIENCE ARE ABSOLUTELY IMPORTANT. SCIENTIFIC CATEGORIES HAVE
RELIED UPON CULTURAL ASSUMPTIONS THAT MANIFEST THEMSELVES THROUGH VIOLENCE MORE THAN ANY OTHER DISCOURSE.

HARAWAY IN `97 (DONNA, HISTORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS AT UC-SANTA CRUZ, MODEST_WITNESS@SECOND_MILLENNNIUM. FEMALEMAN_MEETS_ ONCOMOUSE, P. 233-234)

To be sure, in the early twentieth century Franz Boas and social-cultural anthropology broadly were laying the foundations of a different epistemological order for thinking about race. But, encompassing immigration policy, mental-health assessments, military conscription, labor patterns, nature conservation, museum design, school and university curricula, penal practices, field studies of both wild and laboratory animals, literary evaluation, the music industry, religious doctrine, and much more, race—and its venereal infections and ties to sexual hygiene—was real, fundamental, and bloody. If the skeptic of poststruc-turalist analysis still needs to be convinced by an example of the inextricable weave of historically specific discursive, scientific, and physical reality, race is the place to look. The discursive has never been lived with any greater vitality than in the always undead corpus of race and sex. For many in the first decades of the twentieth century, race mixing was a venereal disease of the social body, producing doomed progeny whose reproductive issue was as tainted as that of lesbians, sodomites, Jews, overeducated women, prostitutes, criminals, masturbators, oralcoholics. These were the subjects, literal and literary, of the commodious discourse of eugenics, where intraracial hygiene and interracial taxonomy were two faces of the same coin.5 Even radicals and liberals, to name them anachronistically, who fought the reproductive narrative and social equations named in the preceding paragraph, accepted race as a meaningful object of scientific knowledge. They had litde choice. These writers and activists worked to reshape race into a different picture of collective human health (Stepan and Oilman 1993).6 Scientific racial discourse—in the sense that did not insist on the separation of the physical and the cultural and spoke in the idiom of organic health, efficiency, and familial solidarity—accommodated writers from great American liberators such as W. E. B. Du Bois and Charlotte Perkins Gilman to middleof-the-road, Progressive Era, unabashed racists such as Madison Grant.7 Du Bois is particularly interesting because he most consistently rejected "biologism" in his approach to race and racism, but the broad discourse that assimilated race feeling to family feeling and invited discussion on the childhood and maturity of collective human groups called races was inescapable (Du Bois 1989:8). Although he retracted such language a decade or so later, in 1897 Du Bois wrote that the history of the world is the history of races: "What is race? It is a vast family ... generally of common blood and language, always of common history" (Du Bois 1971:19; see also Appiah 1985; 1990:16n3; Stepan and Oilman 1993:192n7).

Everybody is ignorant, only on different subjects.

West p oint ’o 6

REPS AND SHIT
SCIENTIFIC REPRESENTATIONS ARE NOT NEUTRAL
HARAWAY IN `97 (DONNA, HISTORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS AT UC-SANTA CRUZ, MODEST_WITNESS@SECOND_MILLENNNIUM. FEMALEMAN_MEETS_ ONCOMOUSE, P 64)

do the vampir e p. 37 of 59 .

I call attention to the figures and stories that run riot throughout the domains of technoscience. Not only is no language, including mathematics, ever free of tmping; not only is facticity always saturated with metaphoricity; but also, any sustained account of the world is dense with storytelling. "Reality" is not compromised by the pervasiveness of narrative; one gives up nothing, except the illusion of epistemological transcendence, by attending closely to stories. I am consumed with interest in the stories that inhabit us and that we inhabit; such - inhabiting is finally what constitutes this "we" among whom communication is tobhpossible. --71

SCIENCE IS A CULTURAL DISCOURSE; IT IS NOT OBJECTIVE OR NEUTRAL
HARAWAY IN `97 (DONNA, HISTORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS AT UC-SANTA CRUZ, MODEST_WITNESS@SECOND_MILLENNNIUM. FEMALEMAN_MEETS_ ONCOMOUSE, P. 66) Third, with many others doing contemporary technoscience studies, I believe that science is cultural practice and practical culture.14 The laboratory is, a special place, not for any epistemological reasons that might still comfort positivist philosophers, dyspeptic mathematicians, and their molecular biological sidekicks but because the laboratory is an arrangement and concentration of human and nonhusnan actors, action, and results that change entities, meanings, and lives on a global scale. And the laboratory is not the only site for shaping technoscience. Far from depleting scientific materiality; worldliness, and authority in establishing knowledge, the "cultural" claim is about the presence, reality; dynamism, contingency; and thickness of technoscience. Culture denotes not the irrational but the meaningful.

Everybody is ignorant, only on different subjects.

West p oint ’o 6

BIOLOGY REPS = BIOPOWER

do the vampir e p. 38 of 59 .

WE MUST PAY ATTENTION TO THE LANGUAGE OF BIOLOGY, OR ELSE WE RISK REPEATING MODERN
INSTITUTIONS OF BIOPOWER

HARAWAY IN `97 (DONNA, HISTORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS AT UC-SANTA CRUZ, MODEST_WITNESS@SECOND_MILLENNNIUM. FEMALEMAN_MEETS_ ONCOMOUSE, P. 217) I approach the universal through a particular discourse, the science of biology. Biology's epistemological and technical task has been to produce a historically specific kind of human unity: namely, membership in a single species, the human race, Homo sapiens. Biology discursively establishes and performs what will count as human in powerful domains of knowledge and technique. A striking product of early biological discourse, race, like sex and nature, is about the apparatuses for fabricating and distributing life and death in the modern regimes of biopower. Like nature and sex, at least from the nineteenth century race was constituted as an object of knowledge by the life sciences, especially biology, physical anthropology, and medicine. The institutions, research projects, measuring instruments, publication practices, and circuits of money and people that made up the life sciences were the machine tools that crafted "race" as an object of scientific knowledge over the past 20 years. Then, in the middle of the twentieth century, the biological and medical sciences began to disown their deadly achievement and worked like Sisyphus to roll the rock qf race out of the upscale hillside neighborhoods being built in post-World War II prosperous times to house the new categories of good natural science. All too predictably, the new universals, like the suburbs and the laboratories, were all too white.

Everybody is ignorant, only on different subjects.

West p oint ’o 6

BIOLOGICAL LANGUAGE = KEY

do the vampir e p. 39 of 59 .

BIOLOGICAL LANGUAGE IS THE CENTER OF OUR CULTURAL DISCOURSE. WE MUST EXAMINE IT.
HARAWAY IN `97 (DONNA, HISTORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS AT UC-SANTA CRUZ, MODEST_WITNESS@SECOND_MILLENNNIUM. FEMALEMAN_MEETS_ ONCOMOUSE, P. 217-218) Biology is not the body itself but a discourse on the body. "My biology," a common expression in daily life for members of the U.S. white middle class, is not the juicy mortal flesh itself, but a linguistic sign for a complex structure of belief and practice through which I and many of my fellow citizens organize a great deal of life. Biology is also not a culture-free universal discourse, for all that it has considerable cultural, economic, and technical power to establish what will count as nature throughout the planet Earth. Biology is not everyone's discourse about human, animal, and vegetable flesh, life, and nature; indeed, flesh, life, and nature are no less rooted in specific histories, practices, languages, and peoples than biology itself. Biologists are not ventriloquists speaking for the Earth itself and all its inhabitants, reporting on what organic life really is in all its evolved diversity and DNA-soaked order. No natural object-world speaks its metaphor-free and story-free truth through the sober objectivity of culture-free and so universal science. Biology does not reach back into the mists of time, to Aristotle or beyond. It is, rather, a complex web of semiotic-material practices that emerged over the past 200 years or so, beginning in "the West" and traveling globally. Biology emerged in the midst of major inventions and reworkings of categories of nation, family, type, civility, species, sex, humanity, nature, and, race. That biology—at every layer of the onion—is a discourse with a contingent history does not mean that its accounts are matters of"opinion" or merely "stories." It does mean that the material-semiotic tissues are inextricably intermeshed. Discourses are not just "words"; they are material-semiotic practices through which objects of attention and knowing subjects are both constituted. Now a transnational discourse like the other natural sciences, biology is a knowledge-producing practice that I value; want to participate in and make better; and believe to be culturally, politically, and epistemologically important. It matters to contest for a livable biology, as for a livable nature. Both contestations require that we think long and hard about the permutations of racial discourse in the life sciences in this century. This chapter is a small contribution to that end. In the United States in the twentieth century, the categories of biology often become universal donors in the circulatory systems of meanings and practices that link the family, state, commerce, nature, entertainment, education, and industry. Apparently culture-free categories are like type O- blood; without a marker indicating their origin, they travel into many kinds of bodies. Transfused into the body politic, these categories shape what millions of people consider common sense in thinking about human nature. In this chapter, I will pay attention to three twentieth-century configurations of bioscientific thinking about the categories of unity and difference that constitute the human species. Claiming to be troubled by clear and distinct categories, I will nonetheless nervously work with a wordy chart, a crude taxonomic device to keep my columns neatly divided and my rows suggestively linked.

Everybody is ignorant, only on different subjects.

West p oint ’o 6

BIOLOGY IS A PRACTICE
BIOLOGY IS NOT OBJECTIVE; IT IS PRACTICED
HARAWAY IN `97 (DONNA, HISTORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS AT UC-SANTA CRUZ, MODEST_WITNESS@SECOND_MILLENNNIUM. FEMALEMAN_MEETS_ ONCOMOUSE, P. 230)

do the vampir e p. 40 of 59 .

Of course, practices, ideas, and institutions spill from one period into the next, but I think "real-world" patterns of power and authority shift within the paradigmatic configurations detailed in the rows within each period. The illusion of progressing from one period to the next with no carryovers and uncanny repetitions might be tempered by imagining setting "periodic boundary conditions" on that table, to change the topology of the flat table so that it wraps around on itself to form a cylinder or even a torus. Also, many other practices, ideas, and institutions fill these time periods but find no place on this chart. A paradigmatic category for some communities of practice is contested by other communities, and from various other points of view, what looks like a paradigm to me could look trivial or just wrong. Learning how to get at a point of view in constructing and using a chart is part of my purpose. Unlike a perspective drawing that geometrically constructs the unique point from which to see into the composition, Table 6.1 invites the reader to evaluate contending locations as an intrinsic aspect of participating in scientific culture on the charged topics of race, sex, and nature. One way to do this is to make the chart into a narrative device, that is, to use it to construct a story. Stories are not "fictions" in the sense of being "made up." Rather, narratives are devices to produce certain kinds of meaning. I try to use stories to tell what I think is the truth—a located, embodied, contingent, and therefore real truth. My chart does not argue that "forces" such as political developments "influenced" biology from the "outside," or vice versa; nor does it imply that life science, or anything else, is the summation of its determinations. Biology is complex cultural practice engaged in by real people, not bundles of determinations just waiting for the analyst's clever discovery. Biology might be politics by other means, but the means are specific to the located practice of the life sciences. These means are usually more about things like genes, graphs, and blood than about legislatures or supposed social interests of scientists.

Everybody is ignorant, only on different subjects.

West p oint ’o 6

ALT: VAMPIRE SOLVENCY

do the vampir e p. 41 of 59 .

REPRESENTATIONS OF TIES THROUGH BLOOD HAVE BEEN FAR TOO BLOODY THROUGHOUT HISTORY. SELFIDENTIFYING WITH THE MONSTROUS VAMPIRE IS AN IMPORTANT SHIFT AWAY FROM THE DANGERS OF BIOLOGICAL REDUCTIONISM.

HARAWAY IN `97 (DONNA, HISTORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS AT UC-SANTA CRUZ, MODEST_WITNESS@SECOND_MILLENNNIUM. FEMALEMAN_MEETS_ ONCOMOUSE, P. 264-265)
Alongside a photo of the imaging specialist, labeled with a classically orientalist caption, "Lam creates a mysterious image," That's managing editor tells us still more about the cybergenesis of the woman on the cover:"A combination of the racial and ethnic features of the women used to produce the chart, she is: 15% Anglo-Saxon, 17.5% Middle Eastern, 17.5% African, 7.5% Asian, 35% Southern European and 7.5% Hispanic. Little did we know what we had wrought As onlookers watched the image of our new Eve begin to appear on the computer screen, several staff members fell in love. Said one:'It really breaks my heart that she doesn't exist.' We sympathize with our own lovelorn colleagues, but even technology has its limits. This is a love that must forever remain unrequited." Themes running throughout the essay implode in this unlikely black hole. Early-century racislized ethnic categories reappear as entries in an electronic database for a truly odd statistical population analysis. A virtual woman is the result, fathered like Galatea, Pygmalion's creature, with which he fell in love. The curious erotics of single-parent,masculine,technophilic reproduction cannot be missed. SinsEve is like Zeus's Athena, child only of the seminal mind-of mass and of a computer program. The law of the nation, like that laid down by Athena for Athens in the Orestian trilogy, will be the Law of the Father. The Furies in cyberspace will not be pleased. In the narrative of romantic love, SiniEve forever excites a desire that cannot be flilfilled. This is precisely the myth infusing dreams of technological transcendence of the body. In these odd, but conventional, technoscientific erotics, the actual limits of technology only spur the desire to love that which cannot and does not exist. SisnEve is the new universal human, mother of the new race, figure of the nation; and she is a computergenerated composite, like the human genome itself. She is the secondand third-order othpring of the ramifying code of codes. She ensures the difference of no difference in the human family, PostScdpttM Throughout this chapter, racial discourse has persistently pivoted on sexual hygiene, and the therapeutic scene has been the theater of nature in the city of science. I am tick to death of bonding through kinship and "the family," and I long for models of solidarity and human unity and difference rooted in friendship, work, partially shared purposes, intractable collective pain, inescapable 2 mortality, and persistent hope. It is time to theorize an "unfanuliar" unconscious, a different primal scene, where everything does not stem from the dramas of identity and reproduction. Ties through blood-including blood recast in the coin of genes and information-have been bloody enough already. I believe that there will be no racial or sexual peace, no livable nature, until we learn to produce humanity through something more and less than kinship. I think lam on the side of the vampires, or at least some of them. But, then, since when does one get to choose which vampire will trouble one's dreams?

Everybody is ignorant, only on different subjects.

West p oint ’o 6

ALT: SOLVES BIOPOWER

do the vampir e p. 42 of 59 .

HARAWAY’S ANTI-HUMANIST FIGURES DEFY BIOPOWER BECAUSE THEY DEFY NORMALIZING CATEGORIES HARAWAY IN `91 (DONNA, UC-SANTA CRUZ, "A CYBORG MANIFESTO: SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND SOCIALIST-FEMINISM IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY," IN SIMIANS, CYBORGS AND WOMEN: THE REINVENTION OF NATURE, P. 149-181, HTTP://WWW.STANFORD.EDU/DEPT/HPS/HARAWAY/CYBORGMANIFESTO.HTML)
Likewise for race, ideologies about human diversity have to be formulated in terms of frequencies of parameters, like blood groups or intelligence scores. It is 'irrational' to invoke concepts like primitive and civilized. For liberals and radicals, the search for integrated social systems gives way to a new practice called 'experimental ethnography' in which an organic object dissipates in attention to the play of writing. At the level of ideology, we see translations of racism and colonialism into languages of development and under-development, rates and constraints of modernization. Any objects or persons can be reasonably thought of in terms of disassembly and reassembly; no 'natural' architectures constrain system design. The financial districts in all the world's cities, as well as the exportprocessing and free-trade zones, proclaim this elementary fact of'late capitalism'. The entire universe of objects that can be known scientifically must be formulated as problems incommunications engineering (for the managers) or theories of the text (for those who would resist). Both are cyborg semiologies. One should expect control strategies to concentrate on boundary conditions and interfaces, on rates of flow across boundaries-- and not on the integrity of natural objects. 'Integrity' or 'sincerity' of the Western self gives way to decision procedures and expert systems. For example, control strategies applied to women's capacities to give birth to new human beings will be developed in the languages of population control and maximization of goal achievement for individual decision-makers. Control strategies will be formulated in terms of rates, costs of constraints, degrees of freedom. Human beings, like any other component or subsystem, must be localized in a system architecture whose basic modes of operation are probabilistic, statistical. No objects, spaces, or bodies are sacred in themselves; any component can be interfaced with any other if the proper standard, the proper code, can be constructed for processing signals in a common language. Exchange in this world transcends the universal translation effected by capitalist markets that Marx analysed so well. The privileged pathology affecting all kinds of components in this universe is stress - communications breakdown (Hogness, 1983). The cyborg is not subject to Foucault's biopolitics; the cyborg simulates politics, a much more potent field of operations.

Everybody is ignorant, only on different subjects.

West p oint ’o 6

ALT: SOLVES BIOPOWER
HARAWAY’S METAPHORS OF NON-HUMAN LIFE REFUSE THE ORGANIZING LOGIC OF BIOPOWER HARAWAY IN `97 (DONNA, HISTORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS AT UC-SANTA CRUZ, MODEST_WITNESS@SECOND_MILLENNNIUM. FEMALEMAN_MEETS_ ONCOMOUSE, P. 11-12)
I Time and Space

do the vampir e p. 43 of 59 .

Figures always bring with them some temporal modality that organizes interpretive practice. I understand Foucault's (1978) concept of biopwer to refer to the practices of administration, therapeutics, and surveillance of bodies that discursively constitute, increase and manage the forces of living organisms. He gives shape to his theoretical concept through delineating the 3 nineteenth-century figures of the masturbating child, reproducing Malthusian couple, hysterical woman, and homosexual pervert. The temporality of these biopolitical figures is developmental. They are all involved in dramas of health, degeneartion, and the organic efficiencies and pathologies of production and reproduction. Developmental time is a legitimate descendant of the morality of salvation history proper to the figures of Christian realism and technoscientific humanism. Similarly, my cyborg figures inhabit a mutated time-space regime that I call technobiopower. Intersecting with-and sometimes displacing-the development, fulfillment,-and containment proper to figural realism the temporal modality pertaining to cyborgs is condensation fusion and implosion This is more the temporality of the science-fictional wormhole that spatial anomaly that casts travelers into unexpeccd regions of space, than of the birth passages of the biopolitical body. The implosion of the technical, organic, political, economic, oneiric, and textual that is evident in the material-semiotic practices and entities in late-twentieth-century technoscience informs my practice of figuration. Cyborg figures-such as the end-of-the-milleiim seed, chip, gene, data base,bomb, fetus, race, brain, and ecosystem-are the offspring of implosions of subjects and objects and of the natural and artificial. Perhaps cyborgs inhabit less the domains of life with its developmental and organic temporalities than of 'life itself,"8 with its temporalities embedded in communications enhancement and system redesign. Life itself is life enterprised up, where, in the dyspeptic version of the technoscientific soap opera, the species becomes the brand name and the figure becomes the price. Ironically, the millennarian fulfillment of development is the excessive condensation of implosion.

Everybody is ignorant, only on different subjects.

West p oint ’o 6

ALT: VAMPIRE IS LIBERATING

do the vampir e p. 44 of 59 .

THE IMPLOSION OF CATEGORIES FORCES US TO CONTINUOUSLY CONSTRUCT NEW NARRATIVES OF SCIENCE. THIS IS NOT PESSIMISTIC, RATHER IT IS LIBERATING
HARAWAY IN `97 (DONNA, HISTORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS AT UC-SANTA CRUZ, MODEST_WITNESS@SECOND_MILLENNNIUM. FEMALEMAN_MEETS_ ONCOMOUSE, P. 68-69)
£ Fourth and last in my score for orchestrating the action in technoscience is the dubiously mixed physical and biological metaphor of the force of iniplosion and the tangle of sticky threads in transuranic and transgenic worlds. The point is simple: The technical, textual, organic, historical, formal, mythic, economic, and political dimensions of entities, actions, and worlds implode in the gravity well of technoscience-or perhaps of any world massive enough to bend our attention, warp our certainties, and sustain our lives. Potent categories collapse .:h F into each other. Analytically and provisionally, we may want to move what counts as the political to the background and to foreground elements called s 5 ibp technical, formal, or quantitative, or to highlight the textual and semiotic while - 1/4f muting the economic or mythic. But foreground and background axe relational and rhetorical matters, not binary dualisms or ontological categories. The messy political does not go away because we think we are cleanly in the zone of the technical, or vice versa. Stories and facts do not naturally keep a respectable distance; indeed, they promiscuously cohabit the same very material places. Determining what constitutes each dimension takes boundary-making and maintenance work. In addition, many empirical studies of technoscience have disabled the notion that the word technical designates a dean and orderly practical or epistemological space. Nothing so productive could be so simple. Any interesting being in technoscience, such as a textbook, molecule, equation, mouse, pipette, bomb, fungus, technician, agitator, or scientist, can-and often should-he teased open to show the sticky economic, technical, political, organic, historical, mythic, and textual threads that snake up its tissues. "Implosion" does not imply that technoscience is "socially constructed," as if the "social" were ontologically real and separate; "implosion" is a claim for heterogeneous and continual construction through historically located practice, where the actors are not all huanan.While some of the turns of the sticky threads in these tissues are helical, others twist less predictably. Which thread is which remains permanently mutable, a question of analytical choice and foregrounding operations. The threads are alive; they transform into each other; they move away from our categorical gaze. The relations among the technical, mythic, economic, political, formal, textual, historical, and organic are not causal. But the 69 articulations are consequential; they matter. Implosion of dimensions implies loss of dear and distinct identities, but not loss of mass and energy. Maybe to describe what gets sucked into the gravity well of a massive unknown universe, we have to risk getting dose enough to be permanently warped by the lines of force. Or maybe we already live inside the well, where lines of force have become the sticky threads of our own bodies.

Everybody is ignorant, only on different subjects.

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ALT: VAMPIRE SOLVES MODERNITY IMPACTS (1 OF 2)

do the vampir e p. 45 of 59 .

EMPHASIZING THE VAMPIRE ASPECT OF SUBJECTIVITY BREAKS DOWN THE VIOLENCE OF NATURE-BASED KINSHIP
AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOVEREIGN SUBJECTIVITY

WINNBUST IN `03 (SHANNON, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY AND A MEMBER OF THE FEMINIST STUDIES PROGRAM AT SOUTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, "VAMPIRES, ANXIETIES, AND DREAMS: RACE AND SEX IN THE CONTEMPORARY UNITED STATES," HYPATIA 18.3 (2003), MUSE)
Festivals of Vampires In Modest_Witness @ Second_Millennium.FemaleMan_Meets_Oncomouse (1997), Donna Haraway beckons us to the figure of the vampire: she initiates us into the rituals surrounding the vampire's nutrition, the rituals of blood. As she writes, "A figure that both promises and threatens racial and sexual mixing, the vampire feeds off the normalized human, and the monster finds such contaminated food to be nutritious. The vampire also insists on the nightmare of racial violence behind the fantasy of purity in the rituals of kinship" (1997, 214). If the obsession with strictly defined and rigidly upheld boundaries haunts western conceptions of subjectivity, perhaps the figure who lives by crossing those boundaries tells us something about how they are made and how they might be dismantled. And so I turn to the vampire, that figure who confounds corporeality itself. The iconography of vampires has been alive and well in Western European and North American cultural psyches since the popularization of vampire stories in the late eighteenth century (Haraway 1997, 215; Case 1991, 4). As many studies have shown, the linking of racism, sexism, homophobia, and anti-Semitism is often unmistakable in the majority of these stories. 8 Jews, like whores and blacks and queers, are vampiric—in the fantasy life of Western European and North American psyches. And so what is it to be a vampire? And what are these anxieties that keep calling us white folks back to their bloody stories? Veronica Hollinger (1997) explains that, in these days of deconstructing boundaries, vampires have become "the monster-of-choice . . . since it is itself a deconstructive figure" (1997, 201). As she elaborates, "It is the monster that used to be human; it is the undead that used to be alive; it is the monster that looks like us" (1997, 201. Italics in original). But it is not us. It is the monster that is closest to us, seducing us into its erotically charged feeding frenzies, only to be dispelled, even expelled—fantasized into some neatly confined unreality of the unthinkable, the undead. But the vampire crosses some of phallicized whiteness' most precious boundaries. As Eric Lott (1993) writes in his glossary of "whiteness," Dracula functions as a "sort of one-man miscegenation machine" (1993, 39). The vampire is a bloodsucker. He sucks blood, transferring an illegitimate and disavowed substance, transforming his "victims" from the living to the undead, giving [End Page 7] birth without sex, trafficking in the strange and unruly logics of fluids, mixing and spilling and infecting blood. 9 As Haraway writes, the vampire "drinks and infuses blood in a paradigmatic act of infecting whatever poses as pure" (1997, 214). The vampire pollutes all systems of kinship, pollutes all systems of blood, pollutes all systems of race and sex and desire that must be straight. He infects the body and thereby alters the spirit—no body can transcend the metamorphoses of his bite, not even the straight white male body that is in the flesh but supposedly not of it. The vampire crosses even these boundaries and, with powers that are transfixing for the rigid self of the white male heterosexual, brings his victims across them as well. Where does the vampire get these powers?

Everybody is ignorant, only on different subjects.

West p oint ’o 6

ALT: VAMPIRE SOLVES MODERNITY IMPACTS (2 OF 2)

do the vampir e p. 46 of 59 .

According to the "orthodoxy of vampirism," the vampire can never become a legible subject in the straight white male symbolic of Western Europe and North America. He can never become a subject in the ways that Lacan has read subject formation, for the vampire does not have the one necessary condition to become an upstanding, rational, straight, white, male body-in-control: it has no mirror reflection. A hallmark of all vampire narratives, this "lack" (which is certainly not any lack Lacan conceptualized) is traditionally linked to the embedding of vampire stories in Christianity, where the lack of a mirror reflection is most often read as the lack of a soul, which is then connected to the vampires' fear of crucifixes. While this connection in itself already places the fascination with vampires in the fantasy life of the straight, white, male, Christ-like psyche, the lack of a mirror reflection troubles the logics of subjection and abjection that we find in the Lacanian schema of our cultural psyche. As we have seen in my brief foray into Lacan's mirror stage, the infant's reflection of himself in the mirror is the doorway into subject-formation for Lacanian psychoanalysis. More broadly, this mirror reflection becomes the site at which a subject begins to form ideas of wholeness and self-consciousness—crucial characteristics in virtually all western notions of subjectivity. The vampire, in lacking a mirror reflection, does not even register on the radar of identity-formation: he does not have the necessary condition for the possibility of becoming a subject. But, consequently, nor can he be fully abjected, nor can he be caught, labeled, categorized, and expelled as the Other. Given that subjectivity hinges on this visual image, the mirror reflection, it works its power out on the field of visual images. One is categorized as the Other on the basis of how one appears—for example, both racial and sexual difference are signified through visual markers on the body in U.S. culture. But the vampire fails to be reflected in the mirror: he does not offer up the necessary visual image to be coded by the dominant signifier of phallicized whiteness. The vampire is thus neither subject nor Other. The vampire, that crosser of boundaries extraordinaire, is forever haunting because he is forever beyond the grasps of straight white male subjectivity. The vampire infects his blood, alters [End Page 8] his spirit and—damned most of all—exceeds his concepts. And in exceeding them, he always carries the power to expose them, to expose them and their anxieties—about blood, about boundaries, about kinship and purity and control, about the racing of sex and the sexing of race.

Everybody is ignorant, only on different subjects.

West p oint ’o 6

ALT: VAMPIRE SOLVES RACISM, SEXISM, HETSXM (1 OF 2)

do the vampir e p. 47 of 59 .

THE FIGURE OF THE VAMPIRE DISPLACES THE CENTRALITY OF BLOOD AND BIOLOGICAL TIES, EMPHASIZING THE FLOWS AND AFFINITIES OF SUBJECTIVITY, WHICH MAKES RACISM, SEXISM AND HETEROSEXISM IMPOSSIBLE
WINNBUST IN `03 (SHANNON, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY AND A MEMBER OF THE FEMINIST STUDIES PROGRAM AT SOUTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, "VAMPIRES, ANXIETIES, AND DREAMS: RACE AND SEX IN THE CONTEMPORARY UNITED STATES," HYPATIA 18.3 (2003), MUSE)
Transforming Concepts of Kinship Running with these transformed and transformative dynamics of vampiric kinship, Haraway offers ways around apocalyptic prophesies of twenty-first century technoscience. She develops these vampiric kinship dynamics as dynamics of affections and affinities, not of substance (1997, 214-16). No longer a matter of nature or biology, kinship becomes a particular mode of reading the many flowing affections, affinities, connections, and intensities that circulate amidst bodies in the world. Removing us from romanticism's last vestiges in the neo-Darwinian valorizing of organic bonds (whether read through hematology or genetics) 21 towards the technoscientific, cyborg connections of affinities, intensities, and energies, Haraway asks us to follow the vampire through its mazes of connections and disconnections—not just to continue to indulge it in some unexamined voyeuristic fantasy. Just as Gomez beckons us, so too Haraway asks us—all of us, including we who are not straight white males—to identify with the vampire, not with the victims. She beckons us to follow her down different lines and regions of "kinship"—lines opened already in our cultural fascination with vampires and further accentuated and fractured in the twenty-first century of technoscience. Begging us to pay attention to kinship, Haraway asks, in the world of early twenty-first century technoscience, "Who are my kin in this odd world of promising monsters, vampires, surrogates, living tools, and aliens? How are natural kinds identified in the realms of technoscience? What kinds of crossings and offspring count as legitimate and illegitimate, to whom and at what cost? Who are my familiars, my siblings, and what kind of livable world are we trying to build?" (1997, 52). In this world of twenty-first century technoscience, 22 where computers and chips and screens and wires and databases and units of information forge the bases—or, at least, the conditions of possibility— of many of our relations, the traditional criterion of blood to determine who is "related" [End Page 13] to whom no longer functions. As vampires teach us, blood is not what we, trapped in a metaphysics of solids, might like to think it is. No longer can we draw neat boundaries between what is organic and not organic, what is natural and unnatural, what resembles us and what does not resemble us. But rather than read this as apocalyptic, Haraway encourages us to see the liberatory effects here. Leaving behind the natural/unnatural dichotomy, and all of the (sexual, racial, religious, national) violences it has brought upon us, can we not at last engage kinship, as Haraway encourages, as "a technology for producing the material and semiotic effect of natural relationship, of shared kind" (1997, 53; italics added)? Can we not at last rethink relation as a set of openended affections, affinities, and possibilities, rather than a predetermined, closed set of (often incompatible) organic bonds? In echoes of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (1987), Haraway's vampiric retooling of kinship categories and concepts turns things upside down just a bit. No longer is kinship—that is, that joining of race and sex in the reproduction of a pure, unsullied, white, straight bloodline—a matter of discovering pre-made, biological, organic identities. Rather, in good late-twentieth-century form, identity itself is turned inside out. Identity is no longer the precious stronghold of all things private, internal, "natural," and sacred; rather, it is the fabrication of nodes of connection via affinities, affections, tastes, distastes, labors, pleasures, technical wirings, attractions, repulsions, and chemical responses. Identity changes and shifts and cracks open as these dynamics change and shift and crack open. Stability or fixity becomes a matter of effects—historical, material, semiotic, chemical, etc. 23 Radically open-ended, radically temporary.

Everybody is ignorant, only on different subjects.

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ALT: VAMPIRE SOLVES RACISM, SEXISM, HETSXM (2 OF 2)

do the vampir e p. 48 of 59 .

Virtually all boundaries are crossed here—human/non-human, organic/inorganic, biological/chemical, chemical/mechanical and, yes, alive/undead, male/female, white/black, straight/queer. In Haraway's rendering of the world of technoscience, a world that echoes the worlds of vampires, "any interesting being, . . . such as textbook, molecule, equation, mouse, pipette, bomb, fungus, technician, agitator, or scientist, can—and often should—be teased open to show the sticky economic, technical, political, organic, historical, mythic, and textual threads that make up its tissues" (1997, 68). In teasing open such threads, the structures and slippery dynamics of both racism and sexism often surface. That which appeared as solid and unmovable—even as "natural"and eternal—may now appear as a radically temporary and contingent effect, sedimented by repetition into a pattern that appeared as solid. To be more explicit, race, which continues to haunt us in its biological appearances and patterns despite all our talk of social construction, 24 may finally begin to appear as the subtle effect of investments in nineteenth-century concepts of the organic, the "natural," the rational, the unmovable, and eternally true. Investments by that absent body, the body-in-control, the straight white male body. But investments that we need not continue to treat as unmovable or eternal. [End Page 14] These multiple vectors of kinship that cross so many precious boundaries are already circulating in our bodies, our bodies that are far from purely organic, in the early twenty-first century. And the dramas of relations and kin no longer move down the linear paths of identities and reproductions and weighty moralistic questions about who shall marry whom. They no longer circulate around "family values"—the family itself, that bastion protecting racism, sexism and heterosexism, has been retooled.

Everybody is ignorant, only on different subjects.

West p oint ’o 6

AT: VAMPIRE BAD (YOU’RE JUST PARANOID)

do the vampir e p. 49 of 59 .

THE ANXIETIES CAUSED BY THE VAMPIRE DEMONSTRATE MODERNITY’S INABILITY TO COPE WITH IRRATIONALITY AND NON-BLOOD TIES
WINNBUST IN `03 (SHANNON, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY AND A MEMBER OF THE FEMINIST STUDIES PROGRAM AT SOUTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, "VAMPIRES, ANXIETIES, AND DREAMS: RACE AND SEX IN THE CONTEMPORARY UNITED STATES," HYPATIA 18.3 (2003), MUSE)
Spilling Blood I return us again to my opening dream sequence—the nightmare of the black rapist. As a nightmare, it has no pattern in waking life to which it might attach itself: this perverse "fantasy" has no foothold in any historical or physical reality. Rather, it is a fantasy of the straight white male body, that same straight white male body that raped black slaves in the kitchen, mixing with their blood as their white wives slept in their conjugal bed upstairs, that same straight white male body that has raped black and white and brown and red "bodies"—both physically and psychically —for years and years and years. It is a fantasy that both protects and constitutes this reality, the reality of the violent and violating straight white male body. It protects it from exposure, allowing it to appear as a detached, pure, rational body-in-control—a "subject." But vampires haunt this body, this white phallic symbolic that saturates our cultural scenes. We see it in our continuing fear of infected blood. Whether through laws and morés of miscegenation or the raced and sexed cultural anxieties around AIDS, the spilling and mixing of fluids continues to be one of our culture's greatest fears—projected time and time again all over the racialized and sexualized body of the Other. Perhaps we should follow the retooling of identity opened by these nineteenth-century vampiric festivals of blood. Perhaps we should pick at and irritate the anxieties that linger in their narratives. We need not read these anxieties as some deep and abiding structure intrinsic to white rational identity. We could, rather, read them as the word "projection" suggests—as so many intensities, attractions, repulsions, disavowals, and denials projected across the surfaces of young girls' bodies, of black male bodies, of any body other than that body in which the anxiety originates. Projecting outward from the hollowness at the core of whiteness, at the core of maleness—a hologram of fear, posing as an unmoving substance of control. Rereading these myths of blood and purity with Gomez and Haraway, we might find more and more tools to undo and re-do the myths of kinship, the myths of race and sex, the myths of purity and control that continue to circulate through our cultural bodies. We might find more tools to read the slippery ways that both race and sex continue to be signified as "biological," immediately erasing the birthing power of signification—and concealing the whiteness and [End Page 15] maleness and straightness that such signifying practices benefit. We might find ways to live out the practices that Gomez and Haraway envision and long for. To give Haraway the final words here, "I believe that there will be no racial or sexual peace, no livable nature, until we learn to produce humanity through something more and less than kinship. I think I am on the side of the vampires, or at least some of them" (1997, 265).

Everybody is ignorant, only on different subjects.

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AT: POMO BAD (BYERS)
VIOLENCE OF METAPHYSICS

do the vampir e p. 50 of 59 .

FEARS OF POSTMODERNISM ARE A PARANOID ATTACHMENT TO RACISM, SEXISM, HOMOPHOBIA AND THE BYERS IN `95 (THOMAS, ENGLISH AT LOUISVILLE, “TERMINATING THE POSTMODERN: MASCULINITY AND POMOPHOBIA,” MODERN FICTION STUDIES 4.1, MUSE)
Unsurprisingly, the anti-feminist backlash and virulent homophobia that have formed such pronounced strains in American culture of the last several years are closely related to (though not fully explained by) the economic troubles with which the United States has been struggling to cope. This relation operates on a number of different planes, some more immediately accessible than others. On the simplest level, resentment of women's efforts to attain equality in the job market has risen as that market has "down-sized" in the shift from an industrial to an informational economy. In addition, homophobia has been exacerbated by the scapegoating tendency that in times of economic crisis so often displaces material anxieties into hatred of and violence against the marginalized. [End Page 5] Of the many recent avatars of this pathology, the skinhead phenomenon is perhaps the most spectacular, but the efforts of many states to prohibit ordinances protecting gay rights, as well as the (at times literally) violent reaction against attempts to ease prohibitions against homosexuals in the military, are equally symptomatic. However, increased intensities of reaction in matters of the politics of gender and sexualities were not merely phenomena of the recession of the Bush years, nor are they likely to abate much even in a cycle of "recovery." Rather, they represent a set of deep and persistent fears on the part of a formerly dominant order that has begun to recognize that it is becoming residual. Needless to say, anti-feminism and homophobia are, in part, reactions against progressive attempts to destabilize patriarchal heterosexual hegemony (attempts to which I hope my writing may contribute). But they are also condensations and displacements of popular anxiety, particularly masculine anxiety, over a whole complex of other destabilizations. These include both changes in the material and economic base (fears of which are neither unfounded nor necessarily retrograde) and the general collapse of master narratives. As Yvonne Tasker has pointed out: "Postmodernity . . . signals significant shifts in the definition [and, I would add, the availability] of work and the masculine identity that it proposes. Postmodernism also calls into question the production and status of knowledge and categories of truth. These developments help to situate and historicize . . . shifts in Hollywood's representation of the male hero," whose current struggles embody "anxieties about masculine identity and authority" (242-243). In what follows I will attempt, through an analysis of an immensely popular text, Terminator 2: Judgment Day, to show how feminism and homosexuality become tropes for these postmodern developments and foci for the disease caused by late capitalism--and thus how popular hostilities toward feminist and gay underminings of the traditional masculine subject are overdetermined and intensified by the anxieties of postmodernity. 1. Kissing Our Selves Goodbye Ultimately what all these destabilizations--of base and superstructure, gender and sexual orientation--have in common is that they pose threats to the continued existence of the reified subject of bourgeois humanism and compulsory heterosexuality, as well as to the privileged [End Page 6] site of that subject's being and security: the nuclear family. In short (as Tasker suggests), the traditional subject, particularly the masculine subject, is in the throes of an identity crisis. Moreover, this crisis is a particularly radical one--too radical, in fact, to be contained within traditional humanist boundaries. For it is not simply a matter of discovering or choosing for oneself a single, unified, coherent identity from a range of cultural possibilities. Nor is it only a matter of the subject's dislocation or transition from an old place to a new one. Rather, the current crisis threatens to transform or even overthrow the whole concept of identity. This is the point of convergence of fears of late capitalism, fears of theory, fears of feminism, fears of any swerving from the path of "straight" sexuality: the fears that, together, constitute what I want to call "pomophobia."

Everybody is ignorant, only on different subjects.

West p oint ’o 6

AT: HARAWAY =

JUST WORD PLAY

do the vampir e p. 51 of 59 .

HARAWAY’S FIGURE DOES NOT REDUCE NATURE TO MERE WORDS – SHE IS VERY CAUTIOUS ABOUT THIS BARTSCH IN `01 (INGRID, WOMEN'S STUDIES AND ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE & POLICY AT UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA, CAROLYN DIPALMA, WOMEN'S STUDIES AND POLITICAL SCIENCE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA, AND LAURA SELLS, SPEECH COMMUNICATION AT LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY, "WITNESSING THE POSTMODERN JEREMIAD: (MIS)UNDERSTANDING DONNA HARAWAY'S METHOD OF INQUIRY," CONFIGURATIONS 9.1 (2001) 127164, MUSE)
As the following orchestration of Haraway's use of trope and topoi illustrates, rhetoric in this instance is productive, not merely reproductive: Nature is a topos, a place. Nature is the place to rebuild public culture. Nature is also a trópos, a trope. It is a figure, construction, artifact, movement, displacement. As trópos, nature is about turning. Nature is a topic of public discourse on which much turns, even the earth. Nature for us is made, as both fiction and fact. 46 As this fancifully restructured passage suggests, reinventing nature topically and tropologically turns nature into a discursive resource rather than simply a natural resource, one that embraces nature as part of public culture. Haraway mobilizes nature into a productive resource for making new knowledge claims about the natural world. These knowledge claims recognize that humans react relationally rather than relatively to their environments. Following the ethical imperative of relationality, Haraway avoids the relative colonizing move of simply reducing nature to a discourse constructed by humans. The rhetorical turn on nature as both trope and topos, as inventional systems for scientific knowledge production, is illustrated in the following discussion of Sandra Harding's reinventing yourself as other.

Everybody is ignorant, only on different subjects.

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AT: CYBORG BAD -VAMPIRE BETTER THAN `BORG
DIFFERENCE IN TERMS OF RACE AND OTHER OPPRESSIONS

do the vampir e p. 52 of 59 .

THE VAMPIRE METAPHOR [IS BETTER THAN THE CYBORG METAPHOR: IT] ALLOWS US TO MOBILIZE AND EMPATHIZE WITH

…OR… THE VAMPIRE IS HARAWAY’S ATTEMPT TO SOLVE THE CYBORG’S SHORTCOMINGS
BARTSCH IN `01 (INGRID, WOMEN'S STUDIES AND ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE & POLICY AT UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA, CAROLYN DIPALMA, WOMEN'S STUDIES AND POLITICAL SCIENCE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA, AND LAURA SELLS, SPEECH COMMUNICATION AT LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY, "WITNESSING THE POSTMODERN JEREMIAD: (MIS)UNDERSTANDING DONNA HARAWAY'S METHOD OF INQUIRY," CONFIGURATIONS 9.1 (2001) 127164, MUSE)
In Modest_Witness, Haraway transubstantiates the trope of the cyborg into the vampire, another hybrid figure of ironic tension. In this case, the vampire's hybridity allows it to reside simultaneously [End Page 143] in two worlds, the living and the dead, moving through both at once with the bifurcated consciousness of the undead. The vampire has two connotations that permit Haraway to address two central theoretical problematics--the problem of categories, and the problem of racial identities. Haraway turns to the vampire metaphor first as a way to figure the pollution of "natural" categories. She writes that the vampire is "the one who pollutes lineages on the wedding night; the one who effects category transformations by illegitimate passages of substance; the one who drinks and infuses blood in a paradigmatic act of infecting whatever poses as pure. . . . the one who [is] undead, unnatural, and perversely incorruptible." 68 Vampires, Allucquère Rosanne Stone tells us, "invoke by their simple existence the disruption of classificatory schemata that calls traditional identity formation into question." 69 As an undead figure, the vampire confuses classifications, violates taxonomies, and "makes categories travel." 70 Second, unlike the cyborg, the vampire is heavily race-inflected. Haraway mobilizes its history as the "other" in order to examine the construction of race and racial identities, or the "vectors of infection that trouble racial categories in the twentieth-century biosocial categories." 71 As monsters that exist in the realm of the undead, vampires confound generational thinking by redefining generations. In the age of family values, the vampire is about nongenetic generations, ironic kinships, and familial relations in the realm of the living, the dead, and the undead. As Stone writes, vampires have "the power to confer the Dark Gift--to make new vampires." 72 They allow an analysis of race because the Dark Gift contains bloody, bodily matter that comprises traceable lineages or material genealogies. In other words, while the cyborg remains a useful, powerful, and potent figure, Haraway is forced to develop a new trope, one that is transitive and relational. When she pushes the relativist cyborg into realms such as race, she gets the relational vampire--it's all about blood; it's a bloody business. The relational vampire figures the cyborg's limits in two ways, demonstrating how its original strengths have become potential weaknesses. One of the strengths of the cyborg was its additive nature. This strength, however, can also be seen as a weakness, since the cyborg fails to convey a sense of simultaneity. Simultaneity is not the only characteristic of relationality, but it is certainly a central one. In light of current feminist thinking about the confluence of categories such as race AND sex, gender AND ethnicity, in which strings of identity components deny a sense of simultaneity, the vampire enables the interdependency, tensions, commitments, and obligations of relationality. Another strength of the cyborg was its illegitimacy, which has the unfortunate effect of implicitly legitimating the mechanistic metaphors of technoscience. "Mechanistic metaphors" such as the cyborg "have all presumed a certain mastery of and exteriority to the object--the body, bodies" that feminist theorist Elizabeth Grosz claims is not possible; she describes as an alternative the very qualities of the vampire: "What is needed are metaphors and models that implicate the subject in the object, that render mastery and exteriority undesirable." 73 By focusing on raced bodies rather than technological ones, the vampire assists in rethinking the raced categories of technoscience that technological metaphors often leave invisible in the mechanistic images they evoke.

Everybody is ignorant, only on different subjects.

West p oint ’o 6

AT: `BORG PROMOTES TECH (WE’RE NOT THE CYBORG)
THE VAMPIRE METAPHOR AVOIDS THE PITFALLS OF THE CYBORG’S TECHNOPHILIA

do the vampir e p. 53 of 59 .

BARTSCH IN `01 (INGRID, WOMEN'S STUDIES AND ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE & POLICY AT UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA, CAROLYN DIPALMA, WOMEN'S STUDIES AND POLITICAL SCIENCE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA, AND LAURA SELLS, SPEECH COMMUNICATION AT LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY, "WITNESSING THE POSTMODERN JEREMIAD: (MIS)UNDERSTANDING DONNA HARAWAY'S METHOD OF INQUIRY," CONFIGURATIONS 9.1 (2001) 127164, MUSE)
Another strength of the cyborg was its illegitimacy, which has the unfortunate effect of implicitly legitimating the mechanistic metaphors of technoscience. "Mechanistic metaphors" such as the cyborg "have all presumed a certain mastery of and exteriority to the object--the body, bodies" that feminist theorist Elizabeth Grosz claims is not possible; she describes as an alternative the very qualities of the vampire: "What is needed are metaphors and models that implicate the subject in the object, that render mastery and exteriority undesirable." 73 By focusing on raced bodies rather than technological ones, the vampire assists in rethinking the raced categories of technoscience that technological metaphors often leave invisible in the mechanistic images they evoke. This, then, is how the vampire interrupts the seamlessness of identity politics, of politics based on alignments with type and kind. It illustrates the way that lists of identity categories (gender, race, class, and sexual orientation) simply cannot be strung together but instead are co-constitutive, mutually influencing each other in the formation of identity. The active traffic of the vampire's life features the elision possible between multiple worlds: it is not simply a fusion of subject and object; instead, it lives in both worlds simultaneously; it implicates the subject-in-the object, sex-inrace, gender-in-ethnicity, human-in-animal, ducks-in-women. The vampire implicates the human/living being in the nonhuman/undead, and the pure, authentic identity in the violence done by the construction of categories. This simultaneity eliminates the AND, the additive, link orientation of the cyborg. This is Haraway's point when she suggests that there are significant differences between a woman who gives birth to someone who owns property and a woman who gives birth to someone who is property. This rhetorical turn illustrates the way that the additive model is a relative one that focuses on the alleged similarities between women--all women give birth--while minimizing differences [End Page 145] and ignoring the relational vectors of power that exist between white women and women of color. The vampire foregrounds the legacy of troublesome webs of connection and the necessity of dynamic process. The aura of risk, the need for blood, and the lived memory of a racialized history are evidence that the vampire's genealogy requires the ability to work with and appreciate ironic tension. The vampire--a figure with a much longer and richer history than the cyborg--of course has its own set of problems. First, the issue of class is apparent in the aristocratic references and titles such as Count Dracula. Second, the vampire, like the cyborg, brings with it a set of connotations about gender (specifically, masculinity) and sexuality. Vampires are almost always portrayed in eroticized accounts as males who use females as sexual prey. Current fiction such as The Vampire Chronicles by Anne Rice and the television show Buffy the Vampire Slayer have popularized the notion of vampires hidden among us, underscoring the ever-present danger and the subtleties of important gender, race, and class identity markers. In the semiotics of postmodern vampire identification--where class, race, and gender roles are queered--our traditional expectations of vampires have been diverted, but the sexualized power of seduction and danger remain. A quick search of"vampire" on the internet reveals the enormous popularity, masculinized power, and misogyny of the vast majority of vampire figures and their allies in popular culture. Third, Haraway is acutely familiar with the needs of metaphorical figures to shape-shift, 74 and although the metaphor of the vampire has a robust history and is prevalent in popular culture, like all metaphors, it cannot escape reification. Nevertheless, given the many attributes we have described and the abilities of the metaphorical vampire to encourage simultaneity, enable dynamic tension, and embrace relationality, it is a very productive tool for exposing both moving categories and "whatever passes as pure." 75

Everybody is ignorant, only on different subjects.

West p oint ’o 6

QT: NATURE = ELITES

do the vampir e p. 54 of 59 .

HOMOGENEOUS REPRESENTATIONS OF NATURE EXCLUDE THE “OTHER” AND PERPETUATE THE HEGEMONY OF
CULTURAL ELITES

EVANS IN 2002 [MEI MEI, ENGLISH AT ALASKA PACIFIC UNIVERSITY, "NATURE' AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE" IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE READER: POLITICS, POETICS AND PEDAGOGY, ED. ADAMSON, EVANS AND STEIN, PG. 181-182]
As with other ideological representations, popular U.S. American cultural constructions of "nature" serve to empower some members of our society white simultaneously disempowering others. Ideas of "nature," like representations of race, gender, sexuality, and class, are never neutral; they themselves create and perpetuate particular meanings. (Indeed, these social categories cannot even be understood without an understanding of constitutive ideas of "nature" and what-or who-is "natural," but that is the subject of a different discussion.) It is not my goal here to theorize how, or even why, the idea of Nature has had and continues to exert such a tenacious grip on the U.S. American cultural imagination. Suffice it to say that it does. Rather, the intent of this essay is to demonstrate, by means of a variety of examples, the ways in which particular constructions of nature and/or wild(er)ness serve to promote the interests of a select few to the exclusion of all "Others." Western European conceptions of nature, imported into the "New World," have proven particularly useful for preserving hegemonic entitlements in North America for more than half a millennium. The entire realm of earthly life is of course not a creation or invention of Western hegemony. But ideas of what is "natural," "wild," in need of taming or domestication, and so on, are most decidedly products of culture.1 The Lack of interrogation of such terms as "nature" and "wilderness," for that matter, is perhaps nowhere as conspicuous as in present-day discourses of "environmentalism" and "ecology," thus necessitating the many counterhegemonic challenges that we have come to refer to collectively as environmentatjustice.

Everybody is ignorant, only on different subjects.

West p oint ’o 6

**QT: NATURE = WHITE, MALE, STRAIGHT**

do the vampir e p. 55 of 59 .

REPRESENTATIONS OF A PROPER NATURE RECREATE THE MYTH OF “PROPER” AND “NATURAL” DOMINATION: WHITES, MEN AND HETEROSEXUALS. EVANS IN 2002 [MEI MEI, ENGLISH AT ALASKA PACIFIC UNIVERSITY, "NATURE' AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE" IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE READER: POLITICS, POETICS AND PEDAGOGY, ED. ADAMSON, EVANS AND STEIN, PG. 182-3]
Before proceeding, I wish to make a distinction between what I mean by nature-that is, the entire realm of the actual living world-and Western cultural conceptions of (a mostly nonhuman) Nature. In my use of the upper and lower case, I follow philosopher Neil Evernden's lead of adopting "the convention of speaking of 'nature' when referring to the great amorphous mass of otherness that encloaks the planet, and [of] speak[ing] of 'Nature' when referring specifically to the system or model of nature which arose in the West several centuries ago."' For purposes of this discussion, I have chosen to focus on the enduring and persistent, but nevertheless unstable, conception of wilderness or Nature in U.S. American popular culture as the site par excellence for (re)invention of the self. Locating oneself, or being located, in Nature is a thoroughly cultural activity: when actual subjects in the United States set forth to experience "the call of the wild," they are accompanied always by cultural expectations that the encounter may change or consolidate their identity in some meaningful way. Representations of Nature and representations of social identities have often been deployed side-by-side in U.S. literary narratives in order to suggest ideas about particular subjects' place in the national landscape while simultaneously consolidating conceptions of the place of Nature and/or wild(er)ness in our national imagination. Most often in these narratives, Nature is encountered (and subsequently conquered) by a (white) male figure, who then wrests from the confrontation an instatement or reinstatement of his hegemonic identity. Nature is proffered in these representations as an unproblematic reality, when in fact it is a cultural product designed to serve an ideological function: having conferred upon him his hegemony, Nature is reified as that thing which has the power to do so. The theme of (heterosexual white) men doing battle against Nature in order to achieve "real man"hood has been and continues to be so widely enacted in U.S. popular culture as to scarcely bear mention. In the tradition of Cooper's Leatherstocking, Hemingway's Nick Adams, and Faulkner's Ike McCaslin, for example, young and old U.S. American men continue to enact the ritual encounter with Wild Nature in order to claim or reclaim their manhood. Some examples from recent years include Doug Peacock's memoir, Grizzly Years, Jon Krakauer's bestsellers Into the Wild and Into Thin Air, and feature films such as The Edge and The Thin Red Line, to name just a few. This ideological construction creates a representational paradigm whereby heterosexual white manhood (i.e., "real men") is construed as the most "natural" social identity in the United States: the "true American," the identity most deserving of social privilege.' It's my contention that strategic deployments of representations of Nature or the "wild" have been "naturalizing" and thus privileging straight white men in U.S. society since "discovery." According to this epistemological paradigm, those who have been socially constructed as Other (i.e., not white and/or not straight and/or not male) are viewed as intruders or otherwise out of place when they venture into or attempt to inhabit Nature. In other words, we can see the way that representations of U.S. Nature as a physical location are overdetermined as white, male, and heterosexual when we look at what happens to people who are not white, male, and/or straight when they attempt the same sort of transformative experience in nature. The same paradigm has led to notions of some folk as being less deserving than others not only of access to nature but of the right to clean, uncontaminated environments in which to live and work. I argue here that U.S. Nature or wilderness as culturally constructed locations have been foreclosed to women, people of color, and gays and lesbians. This foreclosure has had material consequences for those belonging to these social identities, as I shall show.

Everybody is ignorant, only on different subjects.

West p oint ’o 6

QT: NATURE = STRAIGHT, WHITE

do the vampir e p. 56 of 59 .

"NATURE" IS CONSTRUCTED AS A RETREAT FOR WHITE, HETEROSEXIST MEN, PRECLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF
QUEER AND MINORITY SUBJECTIVITY

EVANS IN 2002 [MEI MEI, ENGLISH AT ALASKA PACIFIC UNIVERSITY, "NATURE' AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE" IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE READER: POLITICS, POETICS AND PEDAGOGY, ED. ADAMSON, EVANS AND STEIN, PG. 189-191]
Complicating the ideas of nature-as-proving ground for U.S. American masculinity, William Haywood Henderson's 1993 novel Native is founded on the premise that gay men in rural Wyoming risk both social ostracism and violence to their persons should they exercise their sexual desire for one another.' (This premise was brought chillingly to life in 1998 when Matthew Shepard, a gay college student, was brutally beaten, bound, and left to die on a deserted stretch of road in Lander, Wyoming.) At the novel's outset, ranch manager Blue Parker finds himself torn between his love for the Wyoming wilds and his ove for his new ranch-hand, Sam. The dramatic tension consists of Blue's realization that to deny either passion is to deny who he is. Presumably, he and Sam could pursue a relationship within an urban environment insulating gays from homophobia, but to do so would entail the toss of the rural ranch Life he loves. Similarly, to continue to choose that ranch life very likely means that he will never realize a fulfilling love with Sam or any other man. By means of the title Native, Henderson suggests that native-ness and "natural"ness are linked. The book begins and ends with italicized passages describing the actions of an antelope in a mountain domain, the wild and elusive-but vulnerable-quarry of (male) hunters. The animal is gendered as male, suggesting a conflation with Blue. Like the novel's ensuing descriptions of Blue's minute familiarity with his community and its surrounding wild environment, it is a way of discursively emphasizing Blue's incontrovertible "native-ness": like the antelope, Blue belongs here. Like the antelope, he's "natural" to this environment. However, both Blue and the antelope are revealed to be at risk, no match for the heterosexual men who would destroy them. (Indeed, it is the character Derek, a man who has hunted and killed a cougar-a creature representing to Blue something mythical and precious because of its implied wildnesswho later beats Blue's Lover Sam to within an inch of his Life.)' Blue overestimates the social capital he's accrued in this ranching community he's inhabited since boyhood; he mistakenly thinks that his general popularity and reputation for hard work will buy acceptance of his homosexuality. He learns just how badly he has misjudged the tolerance of his neighbors when he discovers that here, at least, normative heterosexual masculinity is compulsory, nonnegotiable. The rancher for whom he works fires him when he embarks on a relationship with Sam, and he is summarily ostracized bu the rest of the town. Another rhetorical representation of native-ness that Henderson explores is the figure of the Native American berdache. The persistent presence of Gilbert, a twice-displaced homosexual Indian, further complicates notions of who belongs or is native (i.e., "natural") here. Gilbert's indigenous presence as social Other is a contradiction that both haunts and taunts Blue, who, in his hegemonic whiteness, is accustomed to entitlements that have been denied Native American men, but who, as a gay man, is as much spurned by his society as Gilbert. The literary conflation runs the risk of collapsing the material differences in the social oppressions engendered by homosexuality and those engendered by nonwhiteness, but the point is made that both gay men and/or those raced as Other are excluded in a social hierarchy privileging straight white men. Taken together, the two men's respective victimizations raise important questions about who has the right to freely inhabit natural space in the United States: which Americans are most entitled to experiencing Nature? The choice Blue seems to be offered upon his firing-either Sam or membership in his community, but not both-is unacceptable to him. Instead, he heads for the hills. His instinct at this moment of crisis to enact a backto-nature sojourn is a comment on the power accorded the role of nature in American society to naturalize or re-naturalize the male identity. But because this cultural construct applies only to heterosexual white men, Blue's ritual enactment of retreating to nature changes nothing upon his return. Indeed, nature fails utterly to provide reconsolidation or reinstatement to any of the gay men in this novel. Nature, in fact, is part of their problem insofar as its over-inscription as the rightful domain of straight white men casts gay men as outsiders. Interestingly, at novel's end, we find Blue wandering the environs of Yellowstone, the nation's first national park. It's a significant gesture on Henderson's part: Can Yellowstone's enshrinement and nationalization of Nature confer upon Blue the "naturalization" he so desperately needs? Can Nature (writ large) succeed in restoring his social identity where the previous sojourn in "regular" nature failed to do so? The novel's conclusion is inconclusive; Henderson fails to convince us that even the representational might of Yellowstone is sufficient to naturalize Blue's queer identity.

Everybody is ignorant, only on different subjects.

West p oint ’o 6

QT: NATURE = RACIST, SEXIST

do the vampir e p. 57 of 59 .

"NATURE' IS CONSTRUCTED AS THE PROPERTY OF WHITE, STRAIGHT, MEN WHO FEEL AT HOME IN THEIR TERRAIN. WOMEN, MINORITIES AND QUEERS ARE EXCLUDED, REPLICATING THE SOCIAL HIERARCHY OF URBAN ENVIRONMENTS. EVANS IN 2002 [MEI MEI, ENGLISH AT ALASKA PACIFIC UNIVERSITY, "NATURE' AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE" IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE READER: POLITICS, POETICS AND PEDAGOGY, ED. ADAMSON, EVANS AND STEIN, PG. 191-192]
I offer these readings to underscore my assertion that, not only is the hegemonic concept of Nature a masculinist social construction, but one that is racist and heterosexist as well. Given the over-equation of U.S. Nature with "real" (i.e., heterosexual white) men, those socially identified as Other in our society go into nature at their own risk. Whereas straight white men look to nature to offer up something-the "elements" or large mammals with big teethagainst which they can prove themselves; women, people of color, and gays and lesbians go into nature in fear of encountering straight white men. U.S. Nature is assumed to be a Location removed from culture, a space that is open to all, but one has only to Look at what happens to those who are not male, not white, and/or not straight when they attempt a transformative experience in nature to see what they risk. One way of understanding the culturally dominant conception of what constitutes "nature" in the United States is to ask ourselves who gets to go there. Access to wilderness and a reconstituted conception of Nature are clearly environmental justice issues demanding redress. :

Everybody is ignorant, only on different subjects.

West p oint ’o 6

QT IMPACT: HETEROSEXISM  OMNICIDE (1 OF 2)
HETEROSEXISM IS THE LOGIC OF OMNICIDE

do the vampir e p. 58 of 59 .

SEDGEWICK IN `90 (EVE KOSOFSKY, CUNY ENGLISH, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET, P. 128-130)
From at least the biblical story of Sodom and Gomorrah, scenarios of same-sex desire would seem to have had a privileged, though by no means an exclusive, relation in Western culture to scenarios of both genocide and omnicide. That sodomy, the name by which homosexual acts are known even today to the law of half of the United States and to the Supreme Court of all of them, should already be inscribed with the name of a site of mass extermination is the appropriate trace of a double history. In the first place there is a history of the mortal suppression, legal or subjudicial, of gay acts and gay people, through burning, hounding, physical and chemical castration, concentration camps, bashing—the array of sanctioned fatalities that Louis Crompton records under the name of gay genocide, and whose supposed eugenic motive becomes only the more colorable with the emergence of a distinct, naturalized minority identity in the nineteenth century. In the second place, though, there is the inveterate topos of associating gay acts or persons with fatalities vastly broader than their own extent: if it is ambiguous whether every denizen of the obliterated Sodom was a sodomite, clearly not every Roman of the late Empire can have been so, despite Gibbon's connecting the eclipse of the whole people to the habits of a few. Following both Gibbon and the Bible, moreover, with an impetus borrowed from Darwin, one of the few areas of agreement among modern Marxist, Nazi, and liberal capitalist ideologies is that there is a peculiarly close, though never precisely defined, affinity between same-sex desire and some historical condition of mori-bundity, called "decadence," to which not individuals or minorities but whole civilizations are subject. Bloodletting on a scale more massive by orders of magnitude than any gay minority presence in the culture is the "cure," if cure there be, to the mortal illness of decadence. If a fantasy trajectory, Utopian in its own terms, toward gay genocide has been endemic in Western culture from its origins, then, it may also have been true that the trajectory toward gay genocide was never clearly distinguishable from a broader, apocalyptic trajectory toward something approaching omnicide. The deadlock of the past century between minor-itizing and universalizing understandings of homo/heterosexual definition can only have deepened this fatal bond in the heterosexist imaginaire. In our culture as in Billy Budd, the phobic narrative trajectory toward imagining a time after the homosexual is finally inseparable from that toward imagining a time after the human-, in the wake of the homosexual, the wake incessantly produced since first there were homosexuals, every human relation is pulled into its shining representational furrow. Fragments of visions of a time after the homosexual are, of course, currently in dizzying circulation in our culture. One of the many dangerous ways that AIDS discourse seems to ratify and amplify preinscribed homophobic mythologies is in its pseudo-evolutionary presentation of male homosexuality as a stage doomed to extinction (read, a phase the species is going through) on the enormous scale of whole populations.26 The lineaments of openly genocidal malice behind this fantasy appear only occasionally in the respectable media, though they can be glimpsed even there behind the poker-face mask of our national experiment in laissez-faire medicine. A better, if still deodorized, whiff of that malice conies from the famous pronouncement of Pat Robertson: "AIDS is God's way of weeding his garden." The saccharine lustre this dictum gives to its vision of devastation, and the ruthless prurience with which it misat-tributes its own agency, cover a more fundamental contradiction: that, to rationalize complacent glee at a spectacle of what is imagined as genocide, a protoDarwinian process of natural selection is being invoked—in the context of a Christian fundamentalism that is not only antievolutionist but recklessly oriented toward universal apocalypse. A similar phenomenon, also too terrible to be noted as a mere irony, is how evenly our culture's phobia about HIV-positive blood is kept pace with by its rage for keeping that dangerous blood in broad, continuous circulation. This is evidenced in projects for universal testing, and in the needle-sharing implicit in William Buckley's now ineradicable fantasy of tattooing HIV-positive persons. But most immediately and pervasively it is evidenced in the literal bloodbaths that seem to make the point of the AIDS-related resurgence in violent bashings of gays—which, unlike the gun violence otherwise ubiquitous in this culture, are characteristically done with two-by-fours, baseball bats, and fists, in the most literal-minded conceivable form of body-fluid contact.

Everybody is ignorant, only on different subjects.

West p oint ’o 6

QT IMPACT: HETEROSEXISM  OMNICIDE (2 OF 2)

do the vampir e p. 59 of 59 .

It might be worth making explicit that the use of evolutionary thinking in the current wave of Utopian/genocidal fantasy is, whatever else it may be, crazy. Unless one believes, first of all, that same-sex object-choice across history and across cultures is one thing with one cause, and, second, that its one cause is direct transmission through a nonrecessive genetic path—which would be, to put it gently, counter-intuitive—there is no warrant for imagining that gay populations, even of men, in post-AIDS generations will be in the slightest degree diminished. Exactly to the degree that AIDS is a gay disease, it's a tragedy confined to our generation; the longterm demographic depredations of the disease will fall, to the contrary, on groups, many themselves direly endangered, that are reproduced by direct heterosexual transmission. Unlike genocide directed against Jews, Native Americans, Africans, or other groups, then, gay genocide, the once-and-for-all eradication of gay populations, however potent and sustained as a project or fantasy of modern Western culture, is not possible short of the eradication of the whole human species. The impulse of the species toward its own eradication must not either, however, be underestimated. Neither must the profundity with which that omnicidal impulse is entangled with the modern problematic of the homosexual: the double bind of definition between the homosexual, say, as a distinct risk group, and the homosexual as a potential of representation within the universal.27 As gay community and the solidarity and visibility of gays as a minority population are being consolidated and tempered in the forge of this specularized terror and suffering, how can it fail to be all the more necessary that the avenues of recognition, desire, and thought between minority potentials and universalizing ones be opened and opened and opened?

Everybody is ignorant, only on different subjects.